

# Steady on Course for Pearl Harbor 1851-1941

William D. O'Neil  
Copyright 2016, 2020  
w.d.oneil@pobox.com

THIS IS A SET of essays on the history of how the United States and Japan came into conflict in 1941 that appeared originally as appendices to William D. O'Neil, *Undefending Pearl Harbor: How America's Strongest Bastion Became Its Most Weakly Defended*, 2nd edition (Fairfax VA: Peter Press Publishers, 2016) ISBN 978-1946080004.

A great deal has been published on this subject and almost all of the entries in the bibliography are to secondary works. What motivated these essays is that the existing work is almost entirely cast from a Japanese or American point of view, or from a narrowly bilateral one, but such frameworks cannot help but severely distort the actual story and lead to incorrect conclusions. Here I examine established factual information in a multilateral analytical framework and come to conclusions that are somewhat distinctive.

I do not identify "the guilty men." In a full-length treatment using a similar analytical approach there would appear a few men whose lapses of performance of duty or judgement had particularly unfortunate consequences, but the story of the origins of the Pacific War is almost entirely one of institutions rather than individuals. Circumstance and institutional imperative very largely dictated the course and virtually everyone involved played his institutionally assigned role at least adequately. This is not to say that there were no major lapses, but they were in the nature of

traps that could have been avoided only by Delphic foresight and Herculean effort. Time permitting, perhaps I will at length elaborate on these themes.

These essays are extracted directly from the book and I have preserved the original pagination so that if it is necessary to cite from them this may be done with reference to their original publication. More has been published since 2016 and if I were to revise these essays thoroughly today I would add some more citations and change some points of wording. I am satisfied, however, that nothing that has appeared would cause me to alter any of my major conclusions.

Comments, questions, or requests for permissions are welcomed and may be directed to me.

## Appendix A: Background to War

**W**HY AND HOW DID JAPAN and the United States come to fight? It was easily foreseeable that such a conflict would be immensely costly for both sides, after all. To most people it does seem obvious that compromise with Hitler was unthinkable, but neither Japan nor the United States was ruled by psychopathic monsters, superheated wartime rhetoric not to the contrary. What objectives could have been so supremely important that a war was better than any possible compromise?

Today, the two nations are closely allied and large majorities in each view the other with trust and respect.<sup>1</sup> But 75 years ago, opinions could scarcely have been more different. Key leaders on both sides saw in one another a threat not simply to their own nation's interests but its continued existence. This appendix will very briefly review the background to this extraordinary and deadly confrontation. It will focus more on Japan not only because she is less known to English-speaking audiences but because it was the Japanese who took action.

Although Japan's origin myth would have the history of the nation and its imperial house stretching back more than 2600 years, in fact it was roughly 1500 years ago that the Japanese emerged from the Neolithic past, adopting and adapting a great deal from the much older Chinese civilization.<sup>2</sup> But just as the evolution of Europe's political institutions owed at least as much to its tribal barbarian roots as to its heritage from Rome, so Japan's political development diverged strongly from China's.

For the past thousand years and more the emperor has very rarely held substantial power, although he might sometimes exercise considerable indirect influence. Rather than an absolute ruler as in China, he has been identified with the soul and essence of Japan, whether as a symbol or, to many, a quasi-divine embodiment. Those who did hold real power often felt the need of imperial sanction for its exercise.

Until 1865, real power almost always was in the hands of military overlords. Often, one supreme overlord, known as a *shogūn*, was strong enough to keep the lesser lords in line, thus maintaining relative peace. But shoguns faced many obstacles, not least the great difficulty of long-distance communications and movement across Japan's rugged landscape.<sup>3</sup>

Following an extended interval of internal war, Japan was finally reunited under Ieyasu Tokugawa in 1600.<sup>4</sup> He established a shogunal dynasty that lasted until the 1860s, consistently maintaining peace after the conflicts involved in initial consolidation.<sup>5</sup>

## The challenges of the Tokugawa shogūns

Like earlier shogūns the Tokugawas swore their allegiance to the emperor and claimed authority in his name. But they maintained their military government, the shogunate or *bakufu*, in Edo (later to become Tokyo), a journey of several days to the east of the emperor's court in Kyoto and thus safely removed from imperial interference. (A high shogunate official remained in Kyoto to keep close watch on court doings, but court officials were unwelcome in Edo.)<sup>6</sup>

While internal opposition had been thoroughly subdued by 1630, the Tokugawa shogunate continued to face a variety of challenges.

Below the southwestern horizon, five to ten days' sail, loomed China, in all her glory and potential menace. In the 1600s China went through a very turbulent period as the long-established Ming Dynasty decayed, fractured, and was conquered and supplanted by the quasi-Chinese Manchus. They eventually established themselves as the Qing Dynasty, which outlasted the Tokugawa shogunate and directed its expansionism toward China's landward frontiers, paying little attention to Japan.<sup>7</sup> But Japan's relations with China had historically been turbulent and there was reason for caution on both sides.<sup>8</sup>

Of greater concern, in some ways, were the Europeans. The Portuguese, who had spearheaded European seaborne penetration into Asian waters since 1498, reached a then-disunited Japan in the 1540s, bringing guns, clocks, and Jesuits. All three were embraced by at least some of the warring feudal lords, and the Portuguese established themselves as middlemen in a vigorous Sino-Japanese trade, much to their profit. Later, however, Spanish Franciscans arrived from the Philippines, clashing with the rival Jesuits.<sup>9</sup>

Once they had triumphed and set about getting the country firmly under their control, Ieyasu Tokugawa and his immediate successors concluded that guns and clocks were worth keeping but that the priests and their Portuguese sponsors were a potentially unsettling influence, and quickly banned both. The Dutch, who had been fighting a worldwide war with the Portuguese for control of rich colonial possessions and trade rights, were invited to take over such trade with the outside world as the shogunate desired, but only under the strictest control and with no contact with non-official Japanese. Aside from licensed trade with the Chinese and Dutch, Japanese were strictly forbidden any contact with foreigners or foreign ideas, on pain of death, and prohibited from leaving the country.

The Tokugawa system for ruling Japan was a little reminiscent of Feudal Europe. There were about 250 "domains" or *han*, varying widely in size and population, each ruled by a lord, called a *daimyō*, closely subject to the shogūn. The domains remitted no taxes to Edo, but were responsible for managing their own affairs in accordance with the shogūn's direction and answering any calls for military ser-

vice or special assistance. The shogūn was the nation's greatest land-lord and relied on revenues from his own lands together with some excises to fund the shogunate.

During the period of civil war prior to the Tokugawa victory all the daimyō had built up substantial fighting forces. These too were feudal in a broad sense, hereditary personal retainers of the daimyō classed as *samurai*, or more or less equivalently as *bushi*. After the consolidation of the Tokugawa state the samurai class is thought to have made up roughly five percent of the population, although rather unevenly distributed. Each samurai family received a stipend of rice whose size varied widely depending on rank and was responsible for providing one or more fully trained and equipped warriors at the daimyō's call—perhaps many warriors as well as horses in the case of higher-ranking samurai.<sup>10</sup>

Routine guard duty and occasional responses to public disorder aside, there was little need for military service in Tokugawa Japan. In the more immediate term samurai were called upon to serve as administrators, bureaucrats, clerks, or servants, depending on station. But they went about armed, each with two swords, exercised at archery and swordsmanship, and remained self-consciously military. Whatever his station, unflinching courage, upright honor, undying loyalty and stoic self-denial were the samurai's cardinal virtues, at least in principle, even if their degree of realization varied a good deal, particularly for those living amidst the fleshpots of Edo.<sup>11</sup>

The Tokugawa shogūns did not pursue policies particularly well calculated to promote the economy, but *Pax Tokugawa* was good for prosperity in a broad sense. If peasants benefitted not much, cities thrived as never before and supported a substantial well-to-do middle class. The shogūn, daimyō, and especially the samurai gained very little however.

The greatest gains were in Edo, the capital city, which grew from a rural hamlet to one of the largest cities in the world. To further strengthen their control, the Tokugawa rulers required daimyō to keep their families in Edo and to spend half the year there themselves. The result was a major economic squeeze on the shogūn, his daimyōs, and the samurai who accompanied them. This was one rea-

son underlying a progressive cracking of shogunal control over the course of Tokugawa history.

## **Revolt, “Restoration,” and revolution**

Tokugawa Ieyasu established his dominance by winning a great battle near Sekigahara in Central Japan in October 1600, leading a coalition of daimyō mostly from the northeast against a nearly-equal southwestern coalition. His victory was not so complete that he could crush the losers; they were made to suffer for their sins, but few were actually dispossessed. Their descendants bore various marks of shogunal displeasure at their ancestral perfidy and nurtured resentments for more than two and a half centuries.

Aside from mounting economic and social irritants, and awareness of bakufu weakness, another destabilizing factor was increasing western presence in the region.

Many European countries long believed that promotion of trade was one of the chief responsibilities of the state, by force if necessary. (Through the 1700s, finding trade opportunities was always one of the major motivations for voyages of exploration, along with Christian proselytization for some.)

The Chinese empire had a long tradition of severely restricting foreign traders and this led to a series of ugly conflicts starting with the Opium War of 1839-42. In earlier times the Chinese had proven able to control the seafarers from the West, but by the 1830s the disparities in wealth and technology had grown beyond China's power to cope, for all her size.<sup>12</sup> It all looked rather disquieting viewed from across the East China Sea.

It was a very long voyage from Europe and the Europeans did not see especially enticing trade prospects in Japan, keeping her fairly safe for a while. But by the 1850s the Americans were growing distressed at Japanese treatment of whaleships in need of water, provisions, or storm repairs in the Western Pacific. A squadron of steam-and-sail warships was dispatched to impress the Japanese with the importance of hospitality. The shogunate, profiting from the Chinese example, decided not to embark on a war it was bound to lose

and after protracted resistance reluctantly agreed to “open” the country through a treaty of “amity and commerce” signed in 1858.

In the eyes of many this was a craven and outrageous yielding to the “long-nosed barbarians,” a disgraceful betrayal of the shogūn’s sacred responsibilities to the emperor. They had no constructive alternative: the shogūn should just say no and take whatever steps might be necessary to repel the intruders. Thus the shogunate had its choice: face up to internal enemies it might seem reasonably able to defeat or to external foes it very likely could not. The choice that was made was logical enough under the circumstances, but ultimately it proved fatal.

It was not the descendants of the daimyō defeated at Sekigahara who raised the banners of revolt, but those of their samurai. And not their highest-ranking samurai, although the usual description of them as low-ranking is a bit of an exaggeration. (They were ordinary men at arms, not at leadership levels, but for the most part not at the lowest rungs.)<sup>13</sup> Now, however, they took the lead in a sporadic series of moves and counter-moves through the late 1850s and 1860s that culminated in a successful war of revolution in 1868-69.<sup>14</sup>

As civil wars then went it was not very bloody; the United States then had a population little more than two-thirds of Japan’s but the American Civil War cost about 20 times as many dead. In part the revolutionaries had benefitted from mortality. Until early 1867 the throne was held by Emperor Kōmei, a young and vigorous man who was quite opposed to changing things very much. He succumbed to a major worldwide pandemic of smallpox, however, and was succeeded by his 14-year-old son who is known as the Meiji Emperor.

(The naming of Japan’s emperors involves complications I won’t go into, generally using just the name by which they seem most widely known. “Meiji” was the name given the era in which he reigned, meaning “enlightened rule.”)

The new boy emperor had no political views of his own and courtiers sympathetic to the revolutionaries were able to manipulate him and get the stamp of imperial approval on the policies they favored. Thus the revolutionaries could march under the imperial banner, a major advantage.



It's one thing to overthrow a regime, quite another to make a better one in its place. The revolutionaries started by calling their revolt the "Meiji Restoration," meaning that they were simply restoring imperial power to its rightful place. This was complete nonsense in historical terms, but wrapping themselves in the imperial mantle made excellent public relations. A core group who continued to take an active role in government constituted an informal "Meiji oligarchy." By the time the last of the Meiji oligarchs left the scene, about 55 years later, Japan had vaulted forward by about four or five centuries in terms of closest European equivalents. It was a tremendously impressive accomplishment but it inevitably left a great many loose ends and unresolved tensions, and these would be major factors in impelling Japan to the cataclysm of the Pacific War.<sup>15</sup>

Everything needed to be done, and there were few blueprints to follow. The oligarchs had been raised as provincial soldiers in a very isolated land, but they were intelligent and extremely determined to learn what they needed to in order to enable Japan to make her way in a world dominated by the Europeans. And true to their samurai upbringing they were utterly fearless.

### **Building a new Japan**

A core problem was that Japan in 1870, although not truly "feudal," was very far from a modern unitary and integrated nation. The long-standing division into domains or *han* had fostered a local particularism at the expense of national unity or even consciousness. The imperial throne was one of the very few universally recognized and accepted unifying institutions. The ruling oligarchs used the emperor's authority to breathe life into a variety of other national institutions and establish programs of intense nationalistic indoctrination in the schools.

At the same time they were themselves the products of the old divisions, sons of the southwestern domains that had been on the losing side three centuries earlier, harboring hostility and suspicion toward northeasterners. It was more closely akin to the feelings of the French for the Germans than American Southerners for New Englanders. In the new army in particular it was much better for your career to be from one of the "right" domains. The internal fac-

tionalism of the army (and to a lesser extent of the navy) was to have baleful effects.<sup>16</sup>

Another core problem was that the world of the late 1800s and early 1900s was dominated by the European powers (with the United States looming increasingly large in the background) and to them the Japan of the 1870s and 1880s was a toy nation, a realm whose quaint absurdity was marked by Gilbert and Sullivan's hit comic opera, *The Mikado* (1885). To gain wealth and power Japan needed to convince the Europeans that she was a real, European-style state.

So the oligarchs studied the Europeans and Americans, and provided their nation with a constitution, a parliament, a justice system, and a full array of western institutions and practices, including strong military forces. Most important of all, perhaps, they fought and won two major, high-stakes wars. First came a war with China in 1894-95 over who was to dominate Korea. China too had been making efforts toward modernization and because she was so much bigger it was widely thought that she held the advantage. In fact the Japanese made short work of the Chinese forces.

Next came the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Not only was Imperial Russia also much bigger but she was a European power with a reasonably modern army. The recently opened Trans-Siberian Railway allowed the Russian Army to mass forces in the east and it was widely supposed that they would prove far too tough for the Japanese. Ultimately though, after a desperate struggle, the Japanese destroyed most of Russia's fleet and inflicted serious defeats on the Russian ground forces. By mid-1905 the Japanese had nearly exhausted their last resources, but defeats in the east had seriously undermined the Russian monarchy and led to a highly dangerous revolt, prompting both sides to settle for a compromise that largely favored Japan, although it left many Japanese dissatisfied.<sup>17</sup>

By the time the fact of Japan's victory had settled in she had come to be accepted as a "real" country, the dominant power in East Asia and fully on a par with at least the lesser European powers. There was a lot less condescension toward Japan, and it was recognized that she could not be pushed around or ignored. It was what the

Meiji oligarchs had set out to achieve, a feat worthy of admiration and respect.

But the price had not been cheap. The war had very nearly bankrupted Japan's government, which got through only by borrowing heavily on New York's markets, thanks in no small measure to the support of prominent Jewish bankers hostile toward the Czar and his vicious *pogroms*.<sup>18</sup> Nearly 50,000 Japanese had been killed, with many others left crippled, and the damage to the economy had been substantial. The overseas debts would weigh on budgets for many years to come.

The last decades of the 1800s and first of the 1900s were the culmination of European overseas empire-building, and her wars had allowed Japan to claim an empire of her own. The Chinese had been forced to give up Taiwan (then a deeply impoverished and neglected outpost) and the victories in the two wars had opened the way for Japan to annex the weak and backward kingdom of Korea as a colony too. (Europeans thought the Koreans unfit to govern their own land and saw too little value in the peninsula to want it for themselves.) Finally, the spoils of the victory over Russia had included the territorial and economic "concessions" that Moscow had earlier extracted in Manchuria from the tottering Chinese Empire.

### **America's empire, and an end of empire in China**

It was during this period too that the United States gained a Pacific empire. Victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 had brought with it cession Spain's rights (such as they were) to the colony of The Philippines as well as the island of Guam. (Somehow or another the Filipinos got the idea that they had a right govern their own affairs; it took a number of years of war and tens of thousands of deaths to disabuse them.)<sup>19</sup>

In addition, it was in this period that Americans with private interests in Hawai'i stirred up unrest and rebellion against the native government, finally culminating in U.S. annexation. This brought the first confrontation between the United States and Japan, which sent a warship in an effort to assert a Japanese interest in the islands,

with a large population of Japanese who had been brought in to work on plantations.<sup>20</sup>

The justification advanced for colonialism by its supporters leaned a good deal on its supposedly great economic benefits. The business-oriented Americans characteristically were among the first to recognize that this was largely bogus. While individual businessmen and landowners might profit, the nation as a whole would gain little from the acquisition of impoverished lands beyond the seas, and pay much for their protection.

(The economics of European overseas empires have been debated hotly for generations. The consensus has largely been that in purely economic terms the costs of defense outweighed the other returns, at least after the 1700s, if not before—but there are many who would not agree, including most Marxist and Marx-influenced economists.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the defense costs have generally been borne largely by the home-country public while the returns flowed largely to individuals or economic groups. That makes imperialism essentially an indirect mechanism for transferring public resources into particular private hands—the definition of governmental corruption, and deeply antithetical to the American sense of what is fair.)

There were also trade issues. A colony was a protected market. But Americans felt little need of protected markets and rightly saw little profit in them. It was argued too that possession of Manila somehow would facilitate trade with China. That had been true enough in the 1500s when the Spanish had first established themselves there, but not much by the end of the 1800s.

Strategic interests were another question, but they could cut both ways. Hawai‘i in unfriendly hands could be pretty uncomfortable, as hostile naval forces based there could interdict transpacific trade and threaten the West Coast; control of the islands provided cheap defense insurance.

For Guam and the Philippines the case was quite different. They provided no help in defending the United States *per se*, but offered potential bases from which U.S. naval (and later air) forces could exert power in the Central and Western Pacific. Whatever the value of this to the United States (which depended on American strategic

objectives as well as other elements of its strategic posture at the time) it had the potential to complicate relations with Japan.

The implication was that the value of these bases could extend no farther than American ability to defend them. The advance of military technology together with Japanese force buildups steadily increased the price of defense.

The United States was very ambivalent about economic imperialism for itself or anyone else. While Americans sought gains from U.S. colonialism in Hawai'i and the Philippines, the official U.S. policy was the "open door," adopted with British support at the end of the 1800s. Its principle was that in benighted countries unable to defend their own interests (especially China, where foreign intervention had already combined with internal forces to push the Manchu Qing Dynasty to the wall) all the advanced nations should have equal access for trade. If not, the implied threat was that you could expect trouble from Uncle Sam.<sup>22</sup>

In 1911 modernizing Chinese revolutionaries toppled the Qing Dynasty, bringing a close to 2,232 years of imperial rule. (In practice, however, there were a number of intervals during which there was no effective imperial rule.) They proclaimed a republic, to be ruled on modern, enlightened lines. It was a promise that was always going to be difficult to keep in a deeply impoverished and fragmented land with no tradition of popular rule, and neither the Japanese nor the other foreigners with interests in the region did much to make it any easier.

### **Aspiring to a Japanese empire<sup>23</sup>**

Japan's remarkable success in state-building at home left many with a sense of momentum and even euphoria. In this way the Japanese and Americans were counterparts, and rather different in their outlook from Europeans. Many Japanese sought to carry on and increase Japan's role in the world.<sup>24</sup>

Frequently their conception was quite benign: Japanese using the lessons of their own transformation to aid other Asians to find their way to prosperity and modernity. Some saw this in wholly altruistic terms while others expected to turn a profit on it.

For some the vision of profit on the mainland joined one of power. It was the heyday of so-called "social Darwinism," the notion that it was the strong who were "fittest" and thus rightly destined to prevail while the weak went to the wall.<sup>25</sup> Dominate or be dominated. (Note that Darwin was not the author of "social Darwinism," and that it does not follow from his evolutionary theory.<sup>26</sup>) It was a time when Cecil Rhodes could proclaim, openly and confidently, "I contend that we [English] are the first race in the world, and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race"<sup>27</sup>; many Japanese could echo the sentiment for their own "race."

Three major possible routes to the dominance decreed for Japan by heaven commanded broad support. The first was to focus all energy on economic growth; play the "open door" game with the United States and Britain but rely on the industry, frugality, and inventiveness of Japanese to gain the export advantage, particularly in nearby Asian markets. The second route, the so-called "southern option," was to follow what was seen as the British route to empire by building up the fleet and gaining more colonies and concessions in the southern regions, including South China and Southeast Asia. Finally, the third possibility, the "northern option," would involve forcible domination of Manchuria followed by expansion into Mongolia, North China, and perhaps far beyond, to gain not only territory but the raw materials Japan lacked.<sup>28</sup> This was the vision that attracted widest support among army officers, expansion-minded civilians, and politicians; deeply passionate support in many cases.

A number of years, however, were required to work out the course that Japan would actually follow. Inevitably it was far from a matter of straightforward calculation, for in deciding the Japanese had to work through their deeply conflicted views about the West and Japan's relationship with it. Were the westerners to be admired and imitated or scorned and rejected? How and in what measure?<sup>29</sup> These questions were deeply intertwined in decision-making about Japan's course. It was those who scorned and rejected the West who were to exercise the strongest influence.

## Racism and policy

It is necessary to briefly examine the social forces usually lumped under the label of “racism,” and recognize their impact on events.

In our modern world racism is a strongly loaded concept, usually avoided by most people except for those who wish to use it as an accusation to hurl against enemies. Frequently racism is the elephant in the corner, or perhaps the venomous snake, that everyone knows is there but prefers to stay away from and ignore. The trouble is that it is difficult to understand some things clearly without looking it in the eye.<sup>30</sup>

Racism is a very complex, multifaceted phenomenon with many shifting manifestations. Most have ultimate psychological roots in the evolutionary history of our species. For most of the four to six million years over which humans evolved they gathered in communities of no more than a few hundred individuals, living in relative isolation because they lacked the technology and economic organization to produce adequate food for many people in a compact area. They faced many dangers and an individual had little chance to survive long without the mutual support of the community. People with the aptitudes for forming and integrating themselves into a strong and cohesive community had a survival advantage and such traits thus appear to have become part of our underlying genetic heritage.<sup>31</sup>

Depending on the balance of his or her individual psychological makeup as well as the specific circumstances, a person may be more or less ready to respond to “outsiders” as threats to the vital community. Such tendencies may be made more potent and automatic when the outsiders are obviously different in some external characteristics, such as skin color, facial features, or speech pattern, although even without such clues we are strongly primed to draw a sharp distinction between members of the community and “others.”

But how we respond to our perceptions of “outsideness” is affected a great deal by social factors. Only within living memory it has become socially unacceptable in most circles in the United States to display overt antisemitism or denigrate African-Americans or homosexuals based on group identity.

It was also within living memory that the era of strong, overt anti-Japanese hostility and discrimination closed in America, particularly on the West Coast and in Hawaii. Most people today are less sharply aware of the problem of anti-Japanese racism than of those of anti-Semitic or anti-black racism, but in its day racial hostility to the Japanese in America played a significant and very negative role in relations with Japan, for the Japanese very naturally responded to hostility with outrage and hostility of their own.

For the Japanese, emigration seemed a major issue. Peasant farmers still made up a major portion of the population—in 1930 about half of Japan's 65 million people farmed the land. Family farms averaged 2.4 acres and in a good year there was just enough to feed the family and pay the landlord; a bad year brought severe hardship and a string of bad years, ruin and famine. Improved agricultural practices had raised yields greatly over the preceding half century, but had been enough only to keep up with population growth. And Japan regularly had to import much of her food.<sup>32</sup> Today most of the population works in manufacturing or services, but that lay unimaginably far in the future; in the period before World War II it seemed obvious to Japanese that their nation must export her surplus sons and daughters.

To Japanese as to most others, the United States had long stood near the very top of the list of desirable destinations for emigration. American entrepreneurs looking for labor for plantations in Hawaii or agriculture and forestry on the West Coast had little difficulty in finding hardy, tough Japanese peasants willing to work hard for low wages. It was the influx of these very foreign-seeming men and women, competing with American and European-immigrant labor, that activated virulent anti-Japanese racism.

Immigration to America from China had begun earlier and reached a larger scale; similar anti-Chinese racism had culminated in passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.<sup>33</sup> The Chinese were deeply offended but since the crumbling imperial government was powerless the United States could afford to ignore its protests. Japan was another matter and both Tokyo and Washington sought to re-



duce tensions without formal action, reducing Japanese immigration to a trickle.

By the 1920s, however, racist and nativist sentiment in the United States had swelled to a fevered peak. The moribund Ku Klux Klan was revived in 1915, more on a platform of nativism than anti-black action; by 1924 it had more than a million members and was playing a very active role in politics.<sup>34</sup>

In this atmosphere it is scarcely surprising that the Reed-Johnson Immigration Act of 1924 was highly restrictive.<sup>35</sup> It included provisions which had the effect of barring any immigration whatever from Japan. The Coolidge Administration, wary of the impact on relations with Japan, remonstrated with Congress, but to little effect.<sup>36</sup>

In Japan the act was seen as evidence of American perfidy and hypocrisy as well as racism, and served to severely undercut those who had sought to make productive relations with America and the West a foundation of Japanese policy. Thereafter the hostility and unreliability of the United States would be taken as a given in Japan. This was a principal argument of the far right in Japan and played a substantial role in stimulating its growing strength.<sup>37</sup> Thus for the United States Japanese exclusion was a major strategic self-inflicted wound. It's a classic example of why national leaders even in quite democratic countries sometimes feel called upon to thwart the popular will, for it is hard to argue that heeding it in this case brought any benefit even remotely commensurate with its strategic cost.

(Some counter hotly that the Japanese exhibited marked racism and nativism of their own. But while there is some truth in this the question of moral balance has nothing to do with the political effects, where Americans paid a very real price for no gain.)

## **Japanese democracy flowers and withers**

The men who had made the Meiji state had been samurai building both civil and military institutions, which they expected to work together in the interests of Japan. But as the founders died off the navy and the army developed their own individual cultures and views of the nation's future. Neither felt it at all necessary to bow to civilian authority; in fact many army leaders in particular saw their service as

the most authentic and essential expression of the nation. The emperor, who before the revolution had been a purely pacific, sacerdotal figure, now usually appeared in public in military uniform, and leading members of the imperial family served as high-ranking officers.

But the institutions of modern statehood that the Meiji oligarchs had established asserted themselves in ways that their inventors had not favored or foreseen. A parliament (called by an old German term, a *Diet*) had been given limited control over the budget. It wasn't very much, but it was enough to encourage some civilians who had their own visions for their nation. Parties developed and it became difficult for a cabinet to operate with opposition from the majority in the lower house of the Diet. (There was also a House of Peers with the power to obstruct.)

Shortly before the war with Russia, Japan had made an imperial alliance with Britain in which each promised to respect the other's imperial interests and to provide support to the other (extent unspecified) if its interests were attacked. It was fundamentally directed against Russia, which was menacing both Japanese and British interests in Asia and it served to isolate Russia from French help in the Russo-Japanese War.

Technically the alliance did not demand that Japan support Britain in the circumstances of World War I, but a pro-British civilian government pushed through a declaration of war against Germany before the Japanese Army and its supporters—who were strongly pro-German—could muster effective opposition. Japan shed scarcely any of the war's blood and reaped a very worthwhile measure of its political and economic benefits, ending with a substantially strengthened position. One result was to enhance the prestige of civilian government.<sup>38</sup>

The victory of the more-or-less democratic Britain, France, and United States, together with the defeat and destruction of the autocratic Germany, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires raised the prestige of democracy a great deal. It was seen as the "modern," "advanced," "successful" form of government. For the most part, the 1920s were much like the 1990s, an era of prosperity,

peace, and democratic optimism. Even though it had been isolated and “secluded” in living memory, Japan had grown cosmopolitan and open to the currents of world opinion. Democracy flourished, policies of economic expansion were pursued, and the influence of the armed services on national policy remained limited.<sup>39</sup>

In 1924 a coalition of the major parties led by Takaaki Kato (1860-1926) swept the elections. The emperor had the responsibility for picking the prime minister (subject to his ability to form an effective government) and advisors who acted in his name picked Kato, the first time that a leader was selected based directly on election results. Making good on an electoral promise the Kato government greatly broadened the franchise, giving the vote to all self-supporting males 25 or older, comprising about one fifth of the whole population.<sup>40</sup>

But democracy is a delicate flowering, easily crushed by politicians who pursue power too heedlessly and with too little constraint. Japan largely lacked institutions that could support and buffer it. The powerful army and navy had a great deal of independence under the country’s constitution, and many of their officers remained hostile to the principles of democracy and civilian rule. Thoughtless politicians appealed to the military for support against their political opponents, with predictably disruptive results. Some senior retired military officers involved themselves directly in politics.<sup>41</sup>

And then came the Great Depression. As a distinguished economic historian memorably put it

The Great Depression was to Japan like a severe winter to a very sick man. It hastened the death of democracy and the rise of militarism which soon manifested itself in the ignoble invasion of Manchuria.<sup>42</sup>

There were many countries where democracy suffered acute pneumonia in the 1930s, and Japan was one of several where it succumbed. (Germany was the other very notable and consequential example.) As is usually true with pneumonia, death came to those already weakened by preexisting conditions. (Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have clarified the reasons for the weakening of democracy. Briefly, the human social values that support democracy only flourish when the people in general feel a sense of personal se-

curity. Serious attacks on their economic security undermine their sense that democracy subserves their values.<sup>43</sup>)

(The United States was Japan's principal foreign trade partner in the 1930s by a wide margin<sup>44</sup> and did its bit toward impoverishing her and pushing her into the arms of the militarists by building tariff barriers against Japan particularly high—higher than against others. The motive seems to have been pure prejudice, since there was surely no economic benefit to Americans as whole from discriminating lopsidedly against Japanese trade.<sup>45</sup>)

In countries such as the United States, Britain, and France, where it was quite firmly rooted and disputes were only about who should hold high office, democracy survived, weakened perhaps but not gravely undermined. But in Japan (as in Germany and various other states) powerful forces opposed the very principle of democracy and strove to bring it down. In the Japanese case these forces were first of all the armed services, the army and the navy.<sup>46</sup>

Not that Japan was some "banana republic" in which the military could justify a naked coup d'état simply on the basis of wanting power for itself. The army and navy owed allegiance to the emperor and their officers generally took this quite seriously. Not the emperor as an autonomous individual so much as the emperor as the symbol/embodiment of the nation and state. Defiance of the emperor would deny them legitimacy; it might perhaps raise mass popular resistance, and would certainly demoralize the services internally.<sup>47</sup>

The revolutionary founders of the Meiji state had made a constitution for it in the best current European fashion and had promulgated it in the emperor's name in 1890. The original Meiji oligarchs had mostly been raised as soldiers and served in the war to overthrow the shogunate. They were very aware of the importance of war in the modern Western-dominated world, and they took care to ensure that the armed services would not be neglected. While they were subject to the decisions of the cabinet which governed in the emperor's name, they each separately had an independent place in the cabinet, not subject to the prime minister, and as the constitution was interpreted they eventually gained effective power to veto Cabinet decisions uncongenial to them.<sup>48</sup>

All that was necessary for the military to take control was to kick civilian government to the curb. The political parties were first undermined by playing one against the other and showing that the armed forces could and would defy orders from elected politicians. The advisors who guided the emperor and spoke in his name then turned to non-political “elder statesmen” and purely appointive cabinets. Those who were not amenable to the military’s views were warned off, and assassinated if need be—or just because it felt good.

It was not necessary for anyone in a high place to actually issue an assassination order, for there were many men who were quite ready to respond violently to seemingly subtle hints, more subtle even than Henry II’s regarding Archbishop Thomas Becket. No one in high places even had so much as to say, “Will no one rid us of this troublesome politician!” Between 1931 and 1936 two out of three finance ministers were slaughtered and three out of five prime ministers—a fourth survived only by chance.<sup>49</sup> Japanese politicians were stalwart but courage has its limits. By 1936 any disagreements were over means and timing rather than ends.

### **An army with an empire**

In 1931 Japan’s army, quite on its own (but with at least the tacit approval of some politicians), launched an invasion of Manchuria. (Manchuria was part of China, but effectively ruled by a semi-autonomous warlord.) The calculation was that Manchuria would provide the natural resources for Japanese industry, thus permitting the nation to build the capability to wage modern “total war,” as well as opening an outlet for emigration.<sup>50</sup>

Conquest could be quick but economic development such as the Japanese envisioned for Manchuria was inevitably slow, all the more so due to the limited resources the country was able to apply to the task. At best, years of intensive investment lay between the conquest and any major material return; Japan never reached that point, and certainly never came close to achieving the economic self-sufficiency that had been the army’s goal.<sup>51</sup> (An economic analysis of Japanese colonialism in Korea over a longer term shows that it never produced any significant overall net benefit but did transfer wealth to some

specific individuals and economic groups, suggesting that Manchu-kuo was likely to produce similar results in the long run, had there been one.<sup>52</sup>) In the meantime, a number of Japanese officers in the region sought more immediate gratifications through further acquisitions of territory, more or less on their own. Inevitably, these were at the expense of China.

China was ruled by the Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975). (*Chiang* was his surname, *Kai-shek* his given name.) He had once studied in Moscow and the Nationalists had joined with the Chinese Communists until Chiang had purged them in a bloody coup in April 1927, thus managing to betray the communists before they betrayed him. For much of the decade thereafter he waged sporadic campaigns to suppress the remnants of the communists, while at the same time seeking to bring China's warlords to heel.<sup>53</sup>

The base of the Nationalist government lay largely in the south of China and its rule was weakest in the north, where the Japanese were encroaching. But even at very best, the Chinese forces were much weaker than Japan's. While China had more than 7½ times as many people, Japan's GDP per person was more than three times China's. Worse, China had very little industry and scarcely any capacity to manufacture any but the most basic armaments, while Japan could equip her forces with a full range of modern weapons. Finally, China's political fragmentation inhibited the central government from effectively mobilizing even the nation's slender economic resources.

Believing that military resistance would be costly but futile, the Chinese leaders chose to depend on rescue by the League of Nations, the United States and Britain, and/or the Soviet Union. The League did send an august investigating commission which issued a report that split the difference but was critical of Japan. The Japanese walked out of the League in a huff but need scarcely have bothered, for no further action was ever taken.<sup>54</sup>

That left the Americans and British, or Stalin (1878-1953), the Soviet dictator. It was not that the Chinese thought of any of them as good-hearted friends; they were selfish imperialists, one and all, in Chinese eyes. But surely, Chiang and his colleagues reasoned, they had motivations to help China in their own interests.

It was scarcely a secret that many Japanese envisioned expansion into Soviet territory in the Far East. Acquisition of a strong base in Manchuria and North China would intensify the threat and the Chinese leadership expected Stalin would want to join them in opposing it.

Britain and the United States both had extensive commercial and trade interests in China and founded their policy on the “open door” for everyone in the country; Japanese efforts to corner all the economic advantages in China had to be a very serious matter for them, the Chinese leadership imagined.

Stalin did strengthen his Siberian military garrisons and the British and Americans did remonstrate with Japan, but that was as far as it went. All three were distressed and somewhat alarmed by the Japanese moves but not prepared to take Japan on given their relatively limited interests.

Recognizing that help was not forthcoming Chiang and his lieutenants attempted to buy time for getting China’s house in order by yielding slowly to Japanese demands while focusing their energies on suppressing the divisive and weakening forces of warlordism and communism. But within China nationalism was gathering force and nationalists did not understand why the government did not devote its forces to expelling the Japanese invaders rather than fighting internal rebellion. Increasingly, popular pressures narrowed Chiang’s room for maneuver.

### **Japan’s China morass**

In the meantime, at the western end of the Eurasian Continent, Hitler assumed power in Germany in 1933 and over the next few years began to expand the nation’s strength and territory. With a virulently hostile Germany to his west and an equally rapacious Japan to the east, and a keen awareness of Russia’s economic and military limitations, Stalin began to feel nervous. Part of his response was to try to enmesh the Japanese in China too deeply to permit them to move against Russia. Let the two Asian nations bleed each other while the Soviets stayed out.<sup>55</sup>

With popular nationalism pushing and the prospect of Soviet help pulling, in July 1937 Chiang decided to make a stand over what was

objectively simply one more in a long chain of Japanese nibbles, what was to become known as the *Marco Polo Bridge Incident* (or *Lugouqiao Incident*). The Nationalist forces had been strengthened by aid not only from the Soviets but even more from Germany. They put up a good fight—but not good enough to turn back the Japanese army.

Paying little attention to reservations from many politicians or even from some of its own senior officers the Japanese army poured reinforcements into China. With the Chinese continuing to resist, the army pressed further and further into China's vast territory. Surely, the Japanese told themselves, if they pressed one step further, Chiang will come to his senses and give in, as he had many times before 1937. What they never seemed able to comprehend was that the situation had changed, that even if Chiang had wanted to compromise he knew that the forces of nationalism had mounted to a level sufficient to depose him if he yielded to the hated invaders. There was no going back.<sup>56</sup>

Chiang's calculation was that if China could resist for four or five years it would help to catalyze a conflict between Japan and the Soviets and/or the United States with Britain which would permit China ultimately to emerge on the winning side. It was a gigantic gamble, but arguably the best option he had. The Japanese, who had many other options, took the other half of the bet, which was just as big a gamble.

It was all a classic of military miscalculation. Both sides entered with a mixture of expectation and anxiety, weighted toward the optimistic side. Both fell far short. The Chinese had improved their capabilities in many ways and they did inflict some painful local reverses, but never could hold back the Japanese for long. With his forces in tatters, Chiang turned to a Fabian strategy, drawing the Japanese into the vast Chinese hinterland.<sup>57</sup>

The Japanese army had dug a deep hole and leaped in. They couldn't simply call on their countrymen to give them a hand out, because if they admitted that their China gamble had been miscalculated they would lose political power and no longer be able to dic-



tate the nation's policy. And the grave of every soldier killed in China simply deepened the hole.

It couldn't possibly be their fault; that was unthinkable, or at least not admissible. It was the wicked foreign powers who were egging Chiang on and propping him up with arms, supplies and technical advisors. Cut them off and it would all blow over. So the army set out to seal off the border with Russia and, with the navy's aid, conquer the coast in order to close the ports.

This did weaken the Nationalist forces, but not Chinese resolve. For all their immense, unspeakable suffering the mass of the Chinese people continued to support resistance against the increasingly hated invaders.

### **America views the world**

The 1930s were a period of extreme stress for Americans, caught up in the worst economic depression of the country's history. It had developed across the administration of President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933—not that Hoover bore much responsibility for it, of course), which struggled with little success to stop the crash as it happened. His successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) took office at the absolute nadir of the Depression; he attempted (with mixed success) to stimulate recovery while ameliorating distress. Only with rearmament in 1940-41 were the last of the Depression's wounds closed. Naturally, the attention of Americans and the Roosevelt Administration were riveted on the economic drama before all else; foreign relations were relegated to the status of "noises off."<sup>58</sup>

One of the innovations of the 1930s was public opinion polling. The early polls suffered from lack of statistical sophistication as well as meager resources, but with a certain amount of care can reveal a great deal about the views of the public.<sup>59</sup> The vast majority of 1930s polling was conducted in the United States, with small amounts in Britain, France, and a few other countries.

Opinion researchers began asking about the Sino-Japanese conflict soon after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and continued at intervals up to Pearl Harbor. For many Americans it was initially of strong interest, but it fell fairly quickly far down their list of issues of

concern, well behind prominent domestic and European events.<sup>60</sup> Generally the public was very wary of anything that might draw the country into the conflict,<sup>61</sup> but increasingly sympathized with the Chinese.<sup>62</sup> Most opposed selling arms and war matériel to Japan<sup>63</sup> while there was a trend toward greater willingness to take risks in order to prevent Japan from controlling China.<sup>64</sup> Popular support for a boycott of Japanese goods was strong, although there were no major boycott campaigns.<sup>65</sup>

There never was anything close to a national consensus that the country should go to war with Japan over China. Whatever Chiang and his lieutenants may have supposed, China simply didn't seem that important to Americans.

Those who held economic power in the United States were even less inclined to confront Japan, very much in contradiction of Chinese assumptions.<sup>66</sup> Outside of Britain, Japan was the nation's largest overseas trading partner; business had much to lose in a conflict with her. The China trade was considerably smaller.<sup>67</sup>

From 1931 onward many had urged trade sanctions against Japan, and in particular a cutoff of oil. Since U.S. and British firms produced or controlled the great majority of the world's oil supplies, while Japan had virtually no oil of her own, this would have been a severe blow. So severe, in fact, that neither the Hoover nor Roosevelt Administrations had dared take such a step for fear of a desperate and destructive Japanese response.<sup>68</sup> Hoover, indeed, publically repudiated the idea, thus assuring the Japanese that there would be no American opposition of any substance.<sup>69</sup>

The irony in this is that in the early-to-mid 1930s, before Japan had built her stockpiles of oil and other strategic materials a comprehensive embargo would have much too serious to be borne more than very briefly. It would have very seriously damaged Japan's economy and compelled a drastic weakening in the campaign against China. While it would of course have been at some cost to the United States, the costs would have been very asymmetric. And however furious the Japanese might have been they simply lacked the military or economic capacity to mount any serious attack on the United

States or its vital interests. By 1941, when an embargo was at last imposed, matters had changed greatly to American disadvantage.<sup>70</sup>

### **At the other end of Eurasia**

If to most Americans the imperial Japanese were degraded vermin, the Nazi Germans were dangerous, ravening beasts. (Citing specific poll references is otiose; polls asked questions about the threat repeatedly after 1938 and the answers were highly consistent. When Hitler finished devouring Europe, most thought, America would be his next course. At the same time, there was great and widespread confidence in the country's ability to defend herself.) The Japanese thought to play on the West's obsession with Hitler to further their ends in Asia, but in doing so blackened themselves further in American eyes.

All through 1938 and 1939 Germany was on the march, occupying first Austria, then part of Czechoslovakia, and finally the rest of Czechoslovakia. Each move was accompanied by a European political crisis. Hitler would calm matters by declaring that this move marked the limits of his territorial ambitions. And then a few months later would come another. All the European nations made frantic efforts to rearm; war came to seem inevitable, and not far off.

Surely, little attention could be spared for matters in the Far East, and less power; now was the time to improve Japan's position, many in the Japanese army and government supposed.

In the north the semi-independent Japanese army in Manchuria (the *Kwantung Army*) took it upon itself to probe the frontiers with the Soviet Union and its satellite, Mongolia, leading to a series of border incidents, culminating in a substantial clash in 1938 and an all-out border war in 1939.<sup>71</sup> The result was a very serious drubbing at the hands of Soviet forces whose superiorities in armor, artillery, mobility, tactics, and logistics could not be made up by the very intense nationalistic martial spirit that the Japanese army inculcated and placed primary reliance on.<sup>72</sup>

Although the Japanese initially attacked in both cases it is likely that the Soviets deliberately lured them to do so, for Stalin was more concerned than ever to ensure that the Japanese army remain irretrievably mired in China. He further sought to ensure this by en-

couraging Chiang Kai-shek and helping to arm and supply Chinese ground and air forces.

While parts of the Japanese army were butting heads with the Soviets in the north, major attention was turning to the south. Southeast Asia offered prospects of good supplies of the raw materials Japan needed to make modern war. Moreover, the few remaining routes by which Western supplies could reach China lay through Southeast Asian countries. All the countries of the region other than Thailand were European colonies (except for the American colony of the Philippines) and with European attention and military resources focused in Europe it seemed opportune to expand in that direction.

Like Stalin, President Franklin Roosevelt felt the need to keep watch in both directions, east and west, to guard American security. Prior to his election in 1932 his experience in Washington had been as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administration, during the era of the First World War. (The Navy Department had only one assistant secretary then and it reported directly to the president, with no defense department intervening.) Wilson had begun the war counseling his countrymen firmly to remain "neutral in thought as well as deed," but had wound up feeling compelled to fight on the side of the Western Allies. That experience left FDR with a strong impression of the importance to America of European events and of how easily the United States might find itself forced to choose sides in a European conflict.

At the same time he shared the concern of the navy with the Pacific. He had even been moved to publish an article examining the prospects of conflict with Japan, concluding that with good will and moderation both sides could prosper in harmony.<sup>73</sup> The article was written in late 1922 or early 1923, when he was struggling to recover from polio and not very active in politics. As there is no obvious benefit to him in it we may take it as an expression of sincere personal interest and concern.

It seems clear that he expected that the United States could also become entangled in conflicts in East Asia, if perhaps not so readily as in Western Europe. Where many Americans saw the oceans as great barriers isolating the United States from dangers, east and

west, to Roosevelt they were great highways linking East Asia, America, and Western Europe. Commerce could pass easily over those highways, but so could war.

While some Midwestern Republicans could and did say that they would sooner see Hitler triumph in Europe than for America to go to war to stop him, Roosevelt seems quite early to have concluded that this was a false dichotomy, that there could be no possibility of peaceful coexistence with a Nazi-dominated Europe. He strove to stay out of direct conflict, but hoped that with American assistance and support the anti-fascist powers in Europe could do the job. But to accomplish what Roosevelt wanted of them the Europeans appeared to need access to the resources of their Southeast and South Asian colonies.

So from this perspective, any Japanese drive to the south was a threat to America's interest in a strong European bulwark against Hitler. In addition, of course, acquisition of Southeast Asia's resources would permit Japan to greatly strengthen her threat in the Pacific. Thus early in 1938, when Japan showed clear signs of starting to turn south, she increased that stakes considerably as FDR saw it.

How large and dangerously could Japan roll the snowball? What could America do to stop it without a war which no one wanted? And stay within the bounds of public and Congressional support while doing it?

After several months of internal debate the answer came down to starting to apply trade sanctions while at the same time extending small loans to Chiang to buy U.S. arms and war matériel. These were steps that had been debated off and on for the preceding seven years but always rejected due to risk. Now the risks seemed fairly small relative to the risks of inaction and there was public and Congressional support. Indeed, some on Capitol Hill had threatened legislative action on sanctions.

Japanese leaders greeted the sanctions in particular with shock and dismay, but showed no signs of being deterred as Washington had hoped.

## Naval armaments between the two world wars

The United States had been rearming since 1938, but quite tentatively, with Congress remaining very reluctant to approve funding and the Roosevelt Administration not much more eager to request it. The shock of the fall of France stirred greater action; the State national guards were called to federal service along with the reserves, the first peacetime draft in American history was approved, and orders were placed for hundreds of new warships and a hundred times as many new warplanes.

But there was a great deal of ground to be made up.

In 1921 Japan had signed the Five Power Treaty (Washington Naval Treaty) by which the number and size of battleships in her fleet was limited, along with those of the U.S., British, French, and Italian fleets. Taken together with the accompanying agreement not to build fortified bases in the Pacific and an extension to cruisers in 1930 the effect was to ensure that Japan and her possessions in the Western Pacific could be quite secure against attack, while also allowing equal security to the United States in the Eastern Pacific and Britain in the Indian Ocean, at a price that Japan could afford. It was a great bargain for the Japanese, as it saved them from the possibility of an unwinnable naval arms race with the United States, which had many times Japan's wealth and industrial strength. Many of Japan's leaders understood this very clearly and were relieved that the Americans and British were thus willing to let them off the hook.

The Japanese built up to the limits allowed by the treaties, and indeed cheated on the size limits by as much as 30 percent, thus giving themselves a margin for significantly greater combat power.<sup>74</sup> But not only did the United States not press the treaty limits but the three Republican presidents and the Republican-dominated Congresses of the 1920s—with the cooperation of most Congressional Democrats—vied with one another to see which could do the most to ensure that U.S. naval strength lagged well behind them.<sup>75</sup> In 1922 the U.S. Navy had the world's newest fleet and second largest (just a little smaller than Britain's generally older and war-weary fleet). But over the next decade it built less than a quarter as many ships (total-

ing less than half the tonnage) as Japan, and less even than France or Italy.<sup>76</sup>

By 1932 there was a very immediate prospect that the United States would lose its industrial capacity to build major warships altogether. The Hoover Administration, with support from most of Congress, was committed to the conventional conservative remedy for severe economic anemia: budget bloodletting. If there was not enough private spending to keep the economy from shrinking (and thus cutting tax revenues) then it was incumbent on government to slash its expenditures, thus further depressing spending. Such policies aim to keep budgets in balance, or at least avoid excessive imbalance, but in practice almost always depress the economy so much that deficits actually worsen due to falling revenues.

Dimly sensing a little of the contradiction embodied in this policy, Hoover attempted to increase public works while continuing to reduce overall spending, in the name of relieving distress among workers while spreading “confidence” (in which he put much store). After much pleading the navy convinced him to spend a small fraction of the public works money on three small ships.<sup>77</sup>

FDR took office in March 1933 having crushed Hoover in the 1932 election. His economic ideas were not all that different from Hoover’s, but the Depression had made the luckless and charisma-challenged Hoover the most unpopular president in modern history.<sup>78</sup> Roosevelt had run on a basis of being virtually everything Hoover was not, and being sharply aware that the people expected strong action he was much readier to consider departures from orthodoxy. Moreover, unlike Hoover, who believed that America had little need of a blue-water navy at all, Roosevelt was very committed to the navy as a key instrument of policy—and had something of a personal love affair with the sea service. With the support of the president and some key Congressmen the navy was able to get enough funding for shipbuilding to prevent it from slipping into serious obsolescence, while maintaining a core of capacity to build warships.

Good a deal as the naval treaties had been for their country, to some of the Japanese navy’s more ardent spirits, determined to pursue forceful expansion come what may, the treaty limits were a dis-

grace and affront. They expressed violent outrage that Japan was allowed fewer battleships and cruisers than the United States or United Kingdom. The rationale was that the Americans and British each had to divide their fleets to cover two or more widely separated theaters, while Japan had but one. No matter the reason, it was intolerable to them; they defeated those who recognized the value of the treaties and secured Japanese denunciation of the treaties effective 1936.<sup>79</sup>

The logical U.S. and British response might have been to agree to levels that Japan could not possibly afford to build to without wrecking her economy, and then build up their own forces to meet them. By the mid-1930s the need to rearm against the German threat was quite clear and both nations had the economic and industrial capacity to far outbuild Japan. But both still suffered from profound confusion about what constituted responsible government spending in a deep depression, and thus were willing to run grave military risks rather than borrow to build up as they should have, an effort that would likely have brought payoffs just in purely economic terms to have more than repaid its costs, given the very low cost of borrowing in that era.

The Americans and British spent more than a year trying to coax and wheedle the Japanese into some sort of compromise but were simply put off. Finally, the outbreak of open war in China in July 1937 seemed to make the need for increased military strength manifest. In his 1936 re-election campaign, however, Roosevelt had responded to Republican taunts about excessive spending—and to his own sincere beliefs about government finances—with a pledge to balance the budget in the next year or two. The budget for Fiscal Year 1937, starting in July 1936, was already largely fixed but that for FY 1938 was planned to be brought into balance through some increases in taxes and major cuts in spending.

It was not a well-conceived plan in any respect. While unemployment had declined from its peak of nearly a third of the private non-farm workforce it was still above 13 percent. Slashing government outlays, in combination with very ill-conceived monetary policies, promptly drove it back up over 18 percent.<sup>80</sup> And the resulting slow-



ing of economic activity cut tax revenues so much that the budget did not balance after all. It was entirely predictable—and predicted by the economists who paid closest attention—but the urge to treat anemia with bloodletting was very powerful, as always.<sup>81</sup>

One result was a sharp reduction in warship construction. This was doubly costly because the disruption in shipyard work that it entailed cut shipbuilding efficiency and increased the costs per ship built.<sup>82</sup>

In the meantime Japanese naval construction continued as fast as it possibly could.<sup>83</sup> With the opening of war on a large scale in China both the army and navy operating expenditures shot up, and the army continued its own expansion and modernization programs. It was really more demand than Japan's quite limited economy, less than 15 percent as large as America's, could meet—all the more so as the services refused to coordinate and consolidate their acquisition programs. The result was inflation. The highly effective finance minister, who had largely saved the country from the worldwide Great Depression, tried to protest and was brutally assassinated by way of thanks for his services.<sup>84</sup>

With the situation in Europe looking darker, as well as that in East Asia, both the United States and Britain moved to strengthen their fleets in 1938, so that Japan could no longer build faster, or even quite keep up.<sup>85</sup> By extensively rebuilding their older battleships the Japanese had gained an edge in overall modernity of its battle force, but that was on the verge of eroding as the Americans and British were again building new ships. The Japanese, however, had a secret weapon in which they placed much stock: the super-battleships of the Yamato class, the largest ever built. When these ships were completed in 1942 their 18.1 inch guns would throw projectiles that were 20 percent to 45 percent heavier than those of the 16 inch American guns to ranges 5 to 6½ nautical miles greater.<sup>86</sup> This, the Japanese strategists believed, would ensure the defeat of the Americans in the climactic mid-Pacific fleet duel they felt sure would decide the naval war at a single stroke.<sup>87</sup>

## Notes for Appendix A

---

<sup>1</sup> Pew Research Center, “Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years After the End of WWII” (2015).

<sup>2</sup> Mikiso Hane and Louis G. Perez, *Modern Japan: A historical survey*, 5th ed. (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2013) is a succinct and current brief introduction to Japan’s history. Earlier editions are satisfactory for most purposes.

<sup>3</sup> Marius B. Jansen, ed., *Warrior rule in Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) is a collection of contributions by experts on shogunal rule.

<sup>4</sup> As is true for all prominent Japanese figures mentioned here a brief but useful biographical sketch may be found in Seiichi Iwao, ed., *Biographical dictionary of Japanese history* (Tokyo: Kodansha in collaboration with the International Society for Educational Information, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> John W. Hall, Keiji Nagahara and Kōzō Yamamura, eds., *Japan before Tokugawa: Political consolidation and economic growth, 1500 to 1650* (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1981). John W. Hall, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>6</sup> Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Harvard University Press, 2002) is an excellent broad survey of Japan from 1600 to 2000.

<sup>7</sup> John Keay, *China: A history* (New York: Basic Books, 2011) is a good, up-to-date survey. Jonathan D. Spence, *The search for modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York, London: Norton, 1999) is a deeper look at the period since 1600.

<sup>8</sup> Marius B. Jansen, *China in the Tokugawa world* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

<sup>9</sup> Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Portuguese seaborne empire: 1415-1825* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1975). Charles Ralph Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948). Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Christian century in Japan 1549-1650* (Manchester: Carcanet in association with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1951). Jurgis Elisonas, “Christianity and the Daimyo,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan*, ed. John W. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> Eiko Ikegami, *The taming of the samurai: Honorific individualism and the making of modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Douglas R. Howland, “Samurai status, class, and bureaucracy: A historiographical essay,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 2 (May 2001): 353-80.

- <sup>11</sup> The inner world of the Tokugawa samurai may be glimpsed in the fiction of Shūhei Fujisawa and Gavin Frew (trans.), *The bamboo sword: and other samurai tales* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2005).
- <sup>12</sup> John King Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953). Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*, Norton library N521 (New York: Norton, 1970). Peter Ward Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975). John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
- <sup>13</sup> Albert Craig, "The Restoration Movement in Chōshū," *Journal of Asian Studies* 18, no. 2 (1959): 187-97.
- <sup>14</sup> Marius B. Jansen, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- <sup>15</sup> The whole arc of modern Japan's political development is the subject of R. L. Sims, *Japanese political history since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
- <sup>16</sup> Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its rise and fall, 1853-1945* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2009). Drea is superb on all aspects of the Japanese army and its place in Japanese society and politics.
- <sup>17</sup> David Wolff et al., eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: World War Zero* (Leiden: Brill, 2005-2007).
- <sup>18</sup> Edward S. Miller, "Japan's Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the Russo-Japanese War," in *The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: World War Zero*, Vol. I, ed. David Wolff et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2005-2007), Vol. I: 465-484.
- <sup>19</sup> H. W. Brands, *Bound to empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) provides a history and thoughtful analysis of the American involvement with the Philippines. Stanley Karnow, *In our image: America's empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989) offers a good popular history.
- <sup>20</sup> Morgan, *Pacific Gibraltar*.
- <sup>21</sup> Out of a vast and sprawling literature I'll recommend two useful surveys, Avner Offer, "The British empire, 1870-1914: A waste of money?," *The Economic History Review* 46, no. 2 (1993) for the biggest and best-studied case and Patrick K. O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, "Balance Sheets for the Acquisition, Retention and Loss of European Empires Overseas," *Itinario* 23, 3/4 (1999) for European empires generally.

<sup>22</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 69-76, & passim.

<sup>23</sup> Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987), which is overall the best summary history of the subject, takes up the story at about this point and may be consulted for further details and references on most of what is said here. Unfortunately, it is not always insightful or well informed regarding the U.S. side.

<sup>24</sup> Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) emphasizes the symmetries between the two nations and the frictions they gave rise to.

<sup>25</sup> E.g., D. C. Wells, "Social Darwinism," *American Journal of Sociology* 12, no. 5 (1907).

<sup>26</sup> James A. Rogers, "Darwinism and Social Darwinism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 33, no. 2 (1972).

<sup>27</sup> "Confession of Faith," 1877.

<sup>28</sup> Ikuhiko Hata and Alvin D. Coox (trans.), "Continental expansion, 1905-1941," in Duus, *The Twentieth Century*. What is said there about the United States and the European powers is not always very well informed, however.

<sup>29</sup> Tetsuo Najita and H. D. Harootunian, "Japanese revolt against the West: political and cultural criticism in the twentieth century," in Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.

<sup>30</sup> Bernard E. Whitley and Mary E. Kite, *The psychology of prejudice and discrimination*, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010) is a widely-used text with a research orientation. Ali Rattansi, *Racism: A very short introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) is indeed a very short sound introduction.

<sup>31</sup> Eugene E. Harris, *Ancestors in our genome: The new science of human evolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) is a good and up-to-date introduction to human evolution. R. I. M. Dunbar, John Gowlett and Clive Gamble, *Thinking big: How the evolution of social life shaped the human mind* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2014) introduces the present state of knowledge regarding evolutionary psychology. (The two closely-linked research fields are very active and these books might be superseded in the future.) Patrick Nolan and Gerhard Lenski, *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology* (Boulder: Paradigm, 2004) reviews the development of human societies.

- 
- <sup>32</sup> Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949). G. C. Allen, *A short economic history of modern Japan*, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).
- <sup>33</sup> 22 Stat. 58.
- <sup>34</sup> Roland G. Fryer and Steven D. Levitt, "Hatred and Profits: Under the Hood of the Ku Klux Klan," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127, no. 4 (2012).
- <sup>35</sup> 43 Stat. 153
- <sup>36</sup> Roger Daniels, *The politics of prejudice: The anti-Japanese movement in California and the struggle for Japanese exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962) remains the major study of Japanese exclusion.
- <sup>37</sup> Takahashi Itō, "The Role of Right-Wing Organizations in Japan," in *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
- <sup>38</sup> Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and national reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999)
- <sup>39</sup> Japan's history between the world wars is well covered in Takafusa Nakamura and Edwin Whenmouth (trans.), *A history of Shōwa Japan, 1926-1989* (Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 1998).
- <sup>40</sup> Toshiki Koyama, "Enactment of the General Election Law and the Beginning of Democratic Politics: Lecture 2," in Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*. For broader currents in Japan's political development see Taichirō Mitani and Peter (. Duus, "The establishment of party cabinets, 1898-1932," in Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.
- <sup>41</sup> Regarding political developments in the 1930s see Gordon M. Berger, "Politics and mobilization in Japan, 1931-1945," in Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.
- <sup>42</sup> Kōzō Yamamura, "Then Came the Great Depression: Japan's Interwar Years," in *The Great Depression revisited: Essays on the economics of the Thirties*, ed. Hermann van der Wee (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), 182.
- <sup>43</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- <sup>44</sup> Ippei Yamazawa and Yuzo Yamamoto, *Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868, 14: Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments*, ed. Kazushi Ohkawa, Miyohei Shinohara, and Mataji Umemura, Choki Keizai Tokei-Suikai to Bunseki (Estimates of Long-Term Economic

Statistics of Japan Since 1868) (in Japanese) 14 (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1979), Tables 13 and 14.

<sup>45</sup> Martin Bronfenbrenner, "Japan and Two World Economic Depressions," in Dore; Sinha; Sako, *Japan and world depression*, 36.

<sup>46</sup> The process is briefly and clearly outlined in chapter 9 of Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The search for a new order in the Far East, 1921-1931* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990).

<sup>47</sup> David Anson Titus, *Palace and politics in prewar Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) explores the complexities of the imperial role.

<sup>48</sup> Sims, *Japanese political history since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000*. The political position of the army is explored in Alvin D. Coox, "Chrysanthemum and Star: Army and Society in Modern Japan," in *The Military and Society: The Proceedings of the Fifth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy 5-6 Oct. 1972*, ed. David MacIsaac (Washington and Colorado Springs: Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force Academy, 1972) and Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*. For the navy see David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press) as well as Sadao Asada, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: American strategic theory and the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2012). In practice the extent of the veto power varied over time.

<sup>49</sup> S. C. M. Paine, *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 44.

<sup>50</sup> James W. Morley, ed., *Japan erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932*, Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyō Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) tells the broader story. James B. Crowley, *Japan's quest for autonomy: National security and foreign policy, 1930-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) explains the factors that led to the coup, explored also by Iriye, *After Imperialism* in chapter 9. Haruo Tohmatsu, "From the Manchurian Incident to Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations," in Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*, incorporates recent scholarship and offers sharp insights.

<sup>51</sup> Christopher Howe, "Japan's Economic Experience in China before the Establishment of the People's Republic of China: a Retrospective Balance-sheet," in Dore; Sinha; Sako, *Japan and world depression*. Katsuji Nakagane, "Manchukuo and Economic Development," in *The Japanese Informal Em-*

*pire in China, 1895-1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

<sup>52</sup> Mitsuhiro Kimura, "The economics of Japanese imperialism in Korea, 1910-1939," *The Economic History Review* 48, no. 3 (1995): 555-74.

<sup>53</sup> For a brief summary of the background see John W. Garver, "China," in *The origins of World War Two: The debate continues*, ed. Robert W. D. Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

<sup>54</sup> Youli Sun, *China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-1941* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) explores the dilemmas faced by China.

<sup>55</sup> Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the prelude to the Pacific War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992). John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," *The China Quarterly* 113 (1988)

<sup>56</sup> James E. Auer and Tsuneo Watanabe, eds., *From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who was responsible?* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006) is an account from the Japanese side written under the auspices of the center-right newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun*. While it waffles the question of its subtitle, it provides a crisply reportorial chronicle. James W. Morley, ed., *The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941*, Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyō Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) remains standard on Japan's side of the political history of the conflict.

<sup>57</sup> Mark R. Peattie, Edward J. Drea and Van de Ven, Hans J, eds., *The battle for China: Essays on the military history of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) examines multiple aspects.

<sup>58</sup> Books on the economy of the era are beyond number; the best is definitely Barry Eichengreen, *Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses—And Misuses—Of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For other aspects Eric Rauchway, *The Great Depression & the New Deal: A very short introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) fulfils its promise and offers a guide to further reading. On FDR's foreign policy there is no truly neutral first-class treatment; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932-1945: With a new afterword* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 1995) is admiring but thorough. Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policies, 1933-1945*, *Debating twentieth-century America*

(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) present views from two contrasting perspectives.

<sup>59</sup> Adam J. Berinsky, "American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (Winter 2006) and Adam J. Berinsky et al., "Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 3 (June 2011)

<sup>60</sup> Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, eds., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 515-16: q. 10 [515-16:10].

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 774:2; 780:10; 1074:1-3 & 4; 1101:1; 1102:15; 1135-1; 1156:1 & 5

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 1081:1; 1082:3-4

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. 1075:11; 1156:2; 1157:16

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. 1076:24; 1157:17; 1162:76.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. 123:8

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. 961, s.v. "Foreign Relations (Japan)."

<sup>67</sup> Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, 2 vols., Bicentennial Edition (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1975) 2: 903, Ser. U 330-31; 2: 905-06, Ser. U 348-49.

<sup>68</sup> Herbert Hoover, *The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933: Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1952): 366-77.

<sup>69</sup> Waldo H. Heinrichs, *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (New York: Little, Brown & Co, 1966) 174-75.

<sup>70</sup> All made quite clear by Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

<sup>71</sup> Katsu H. Young, "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union," *Monumenta Nipponica* 22, 1/2 (1967) remains a good brief summary. Alvin D. Coox, *The anatomy of a small war: The Soviet-Japanese struggle for Changkufeng, Khasan, 1938* (Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press, 1977) and Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Pr, 1990) remain the most comprehensive available accounts. Stuart D. Goldman, *Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's victory that shaped World War II* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013) is briefer, with much reflection on the diplomatic sequelae. Tomoyuri Hanada, "The Nomonhan Incident and the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact," in Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan* updates the story in certain respects. There is reason to suspect that still-sealed Soviet-era files may contain important unexamined information; see Hiroaki Kuromiya, "New



Questions on the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan)," *Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* 19 (2014).

<sup>72</sup> Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army* explores the army outlook thoroughly. See also Edward J. Drea, *In the service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1998).

<sup>73</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Shall We Trust Japan?," *Asia* 23, no. 7 (1923).

<sup>74</sup> Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, 228-29.

<sup>75</sup> Gerald E. Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1963).

<sup>76</sup> Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the onset of World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 77.

<sup>77</sup> Robert H. Levine, "The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930-1938" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1/1/1972) details this and subsequent maneuvering.

<sup>78</sup> For a sympathetic but clear-eyed succinct portrait of this extraordinary man see William Edward Leuchtenburg, *Herbert Hoover* (New York: Times Books, 2009).

<sup>79</sup> Asada, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor*. Also Idem, Sadao Asada, *Culture shock and Japanese-American relations: Historical essays* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007). Isamu Hatano, "London Naval Conference, Imperial Court, Political Parties, and the Imperial Japanese Navy: Lecture 4," in Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan* provides some valuable perspectives, drawing from recent research.

<sup>80</sup> "Labor force, employment, and unemployment: 1890-1990 [Weir]." Table Ba470-477 in Susan B. Carter et al., eds., *Historical statistics of the United States: Earliest times to the present*, Millennial ed., 5 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>81</sup> The story of the 1937 recession is told clearly and authoritatively in Chapter 18 of Eichengreen, *Hall of Mirrors*, which disposes of several popular myths.

<sup>82</sup> Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," in *The Naval Arms Race, 1930-1941*, vol. 73, ed. Jürgen Rowher, *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* (Stuttgart: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1991), 73 summarizes shipbuilding in this period.

<sup>83</sup> Saburo Toyama, "The Outline of the Armament Expansion in the Imperial Japanese Navy During the Years 1930-1941," in *The Naval Arms Race, 1930-1941*, vol. 73, ed. Jürgen Rowher, *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Mili-*

taire (Stuttgart: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1991), 73. Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*.

<sup>84</sup> Richard J. Smethurst, *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2007).

<sup>85</sup> Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, 367 & passim.

<sup>86</sup> N. J. M. Campbell, *Naval weapons of World War Two* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985).

<sup>87</sup> Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun* 250-62, 293-95 and 370-73.

## **Appendix B:**

### **Poland to Pearl Harbor**

**A**UGUST OF 1939 BROUGHT BEWILDERING political shifts in Europe, culminating in war early in September. Stalin had hoped for an anti-Hitler alliance with Britain and France, but Britain's prime minister, Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940), saw the Communists as a greater threat than the Nazis and moved very cautiously. In August, with Poland obviously Hitler's next target, Stalin abruptly changed face, negotiating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Hitler under which they would divide Poland and Stalin would have a free hand in the east. Then Hitler struck, and Britain and France reluctantly and fearfully declared war.<sup>1</sup>

It was just 25 years since the start of the First World War and many Americans shuddered with the recollection of how the country had been drawn into what they had come to see as a thoroughly unnecessary and futile conflict. Most thought that American involvement in World War I had been a mistake, one they were determined not to repeat. This time America had very restrictive neutrality laws that barred exports of war materials of any kind to fighting powers, and few could conceive how Hitler, vicious as he was, could vault the wide expanse of the Atlantic.

The Poles resisted the Nazi invasion fiercely but were very quickly overwhelmed and after that a few months of relatively light action followed until spring, 1940. But by mid-June the German armies had defeated France and the forces Britain had sent to reinforce her, and overrun virtually all of Northwestern Europe. Britain was now nearly alone, and Hitler threatened to invade her as soon as his air forces gained adequate control of the air over the English Channel and Southern England.

The fall of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, all within a few weeks, electrified the world. Suddenly the German armed forces seemed preternaturally strong, capable of almost any feat. The Nazis had a deep visceral understanding of Thomas Hobbes' principle that "reputation of power is power," and did everything possible to hype Germany's reputation of power. America didn't seem nearly as safe as she had a few months before.

While the U.S. Congress had been reluctant to support naval expansion there had long been a faction within Congress, led by Rep. Carl Vinson (Dem., Ga.), agitating for a strengthened navy. Vinson had attracted increasing support across the 1930s and now his hour had struck, for with the fall of France to Hitler's armies Congress was at last prepared to vote for a major fleet increase. The resulting Two-Ocean Navy Act would expand naval strength by 70 percent, with most of the new ships reaching the fleet by 1944.<sup>2</sup>

It came as a tocsin of doom to Japanese naval expansionists. The Japanese navy had been developing more and more ambitious shipbuilding plans to try to keep up with U.S. naval expansion programs. The shipyards were building to their utmost capacity and Japan lacked the land or resources to expand them, leaving no possibility of significant further expansion. A very large portion of Japanese steel production went into shipbuilding, and there were many constraints preventing steelmaking expansion. By 1944 the Japanese would be completely overmatched at sea, with no hope of prevailing in a conflict with the United States.<sup>3</sup>

This would have been a good time for Japan's leaders to remember what their predecessors had done 26 years earlier, when World War I had first broken out. Although in many ways they had been more in

sympathy with Germany and Austria-Hungary they correctly calculated that the odds lay on the side of the Allies and that by throwing in with them Japan could reap benefits from the war with minimal risk.

The situation in 1940 was more complex but had important parallels. Even after the fall of France the odds still favored Britain and the United States due to their much greater economic potential. And the risks for Japan were very asymmetric; if she supported the Allies and the Axis won, there was relatively little that the land powers of Germany and Italy could do to injure her in Asia, while if she aligned with the Axis and they lost the great maritime power of the Allies could do Japan tremendous damage—as in the event it did. Given the anxieties felt in London and Washington in the autumn of 1940 it seems likely that Japan could have won very valuable concessions in return for her support, while she could earn great economic returns and strengthen her industry and markets by building ships and goods for the embattled Western nations.

Naturally it is possible that in the end it might have proven impossible to work out a satisfactory agreement with the Allies. But not to have tried, or even to have seriously analyzed the possibilities, represented grave neglect of the nation's interests.

One major obstacle that proponents of Allied alignment faced was that any proposals along these lines always met with angry references to the treatment Japan had received after World War I when she had, it was claimed, been denied the rightful fruits of her participation in the war and subjected to humiliating discriminatory treatment.

In the end, Japanese support for an agreement with the Allies had been among the casualties of the fall of France. The August 1939 agreement between Stalin and Hitler had dismayed and dispirited the supporters of the Axis in Japan and allowed those who favored the Allies to gain political momentum. This faltered when the Americans declined to respond to Japanese overtures and the Nazi successes in 1940 abruptly reversed it entirely, and brought calls to jump on the German bandwagon.<sup>4</sup>

One of the things that the Nazi regime did really well was propaganda. From Tokyo, it seemed as if Hitler was destined to triumph throughout Europe, and soon. Nazi boasts about conquering Britain were taken at face value just when the real prospects for a successful invasion were rapidly fading. The lessons of Britain's devastating economic blockade of the Central Powers in World War I were ignored, while it was taken for granted that Britain's army could never be a match for Germany's, and that Germany's strength in the air was overwhelming. Even as the United States was announcing orders for production of weapons on a scale never before even contemplated anywhere else, American strength and resolve were widely dismissed. Surely, many Japanese leaders told themselves, with Germany on her side Japan could have no difficulty in facing down the soft, weak-willed Americans. So at the end of September, 1940, Japan joined Germany and Fascist Italy in the Tripartite Pact, which pledged its members to support one another against outside attack.

### **From nuisance to threat: The Tripartite Pact<sup>5</sup>**

Just as the U.S. leaders had misjudged the deterrent effect of their earlier economic sanctions so did the Japanese misjudge American reluctance to confront the threat of Germany, even Germany combined with Japan. The practical effect of the Tripartite Pact was just the opposite of what had been imagined.

So long as the Japanese confined their depredations to Asia they remained at worst a nuisance in American eyes, an especially despised species of vermin. Asia was simply not a major area of American concern. After all, Japan was herself by far the largest U.S. trading partner in the region. Asia was a great deal less critical than Europe, as Americans and their leaders saw things. It was all but inconceivable that the United States would ever go to war over China.

But Nazi Germany was seen as a mortal threat, and by allying with Hitler Japan promoted herself from nuisance to very real threat. Far sterner measures now seemed called for.

With the signing of the Tripartite Pact Japan's leaders had set the nation on a road that could only lead to war with the United States.

It was not yet impossible to take a detour, but the broad clear main route seemed much more inviting than a tortuous side path.

As is most frequently true in such situations neither side actually wanted war, but both were very reluctant to compromise what they saw as vital objectives for the sake of peace. And neither understood clearly how hard it would be to avoid war. After all, surely the other side would soon come to its senses and see the justice in one's position. This gives a certain appearance of symmetry which has led some authors to fault the Roosevelt Administration for insisting on Japanese concessions without being willing to make more of its own. But this neglects a very profound element of asymmetry, for while no conceivable loss in a war with Japan could threaten the existence of the American state, in Tokyo it was already clear that the Japanese Empire might truly suffer destruction at American hands. This might reasonably have counseled caution for the Japanese.

Another aspect that has clouded the vision of some authors is failure to see the U.S.-Japan conflict in its full global context. Germany under Hitler was regarded as a grave potential threat to the very existence of the United States and Americans certainly would yield on nothing that could undermine their position against Hitler. Throughout 1940 and 1941 they largely continued to hope that they could defeat Hitler with American weapons in the hands of others without having to fight him themselves, and above all this meant maintaining close relations with *de facto* allies. Britain was first among these but China, with her vast manpower, was thought to be potentially powerful if the conflict did grow to include Japan.

It may seem that Britain versus Germany was too uneven a match to be taken seriously, since at that point Germans outnumbered Britons by about 3:2. In 1940, however, it was very widely supposed that air power would be decisive, and it was not yet well appreciated that in the conditions of that day air power too was quite manpower-intensive and that its real effectiveness was much more limited than was widely imagined.<sup>6</sup> Thus many entertained a vision of a greatly strengthened Royal Air Force that could crush the Nazi tarantula without meeting it on the ground.<sup>7</sup>

The list of major allies was rounded out by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. All were British “dominions” already contributing forces to the fight against Germany but they pursued more or less independent policies and could play important roles in the Pacific. (In fact, Australia was a crucial Pacific ally, especially so in the first two years of war.)

Then on June 22, 1941, Hitler added Stalin to the list of potential allies against him by invading the Soviet Union. Many people ever since have expressed disapproval of any alliance with Stalin even against Hitler, but as the staunchly anticommunist Winston Churchill privately remarked at the time, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.” The times simply seemed too desperate for political scruples. The Soviets occupied a favorable geostrategic position and disposed of manpower second only to China’s. America soon began shipping arms and essential supplies to Russia.

Finally, China herself was seen as a potentially valuable ally, owing to her strategic position and large population. Moreover, beyond their actual strategic value as allies the Chinese and the others had a moral claim to fair treatment and consideration of their interests. Morality, after all, was a crucial point of distinction between the Allies and the Axis, and a basis of appeal to allies and supporters.

It was essential for Roosevelt to take the interests of all of these allies into account in whatever he did. Mollifying Japan at the cost of alienating allies could not be sensible, given American strategy.

It is true that many in Japan thought that the empire itself was under threat if it couldn’t break out of the supposed “encirclement” by the Western powers. We may dismiss these concerns as unrealistic, but there is little reason to doubt that they were sincerely held. In this sense again there was seeming symmetry with the concerns of the Americans regarding Nazi Germany.

(In mid-1941, as we shall see, the Japanese by their actions transformed their long-standing fantasy of encirclement into reality.<sup>8</sup>)

But once again the U.S. leaders realistically assessed their nation as having the economic and military potential to resist the German threat effectively. As we shall see, the Japanese leaders received



warnings that their nation had poor chances in a war with the West; they had no real plan beyond fighting hard and hoping for the best.

### **American policy constraints, real and imagined**

A very important element that influenced American policy was the lessons believed to have been learned from recent history, and particularly the history of resistance against Hitler, or lack of it. The first of these was, “No more ‘Munichs’!” In September 1938, after Hitler had invaded the Rhineland and Austria on thin excuse and in violation of treaty commitments, he claimed Germany’s right to take over the border provinces of Czechoslovakia that were inhabited by German-speakers, the *Sudetenland*. Britain and France had commitments to aid Czechoslovakia but were desperate to avoid war. So their leaders flew to Munich, Germany, met with Hitler, and agreed (with no input from the Czech leaders) to allow Hitler to occupy the Sudetenland in return for his solemn promise to go no further. The British leader, Neville Chamberlain, flew back to England proclaiming that the agreement meant, “Peace in our time,” but within a few months Hitler concocted an excuse to conquer the rest of Czechoslovakia, and in less than a year he went on to invade Poland, starting the European part of World War II. “Munich” thus became a synonym for craven betrayal, and a charge to hurl at political foes.

Similarly with “appeasement,” which had always meant simply avoiding conflict by reasonable compromise. But Mussolini and especially Hitler were not at all prepared to be reasonable, nor to compromise, thus leading to the discrediting of “appeasers.”

The events of the late 1930s had also done something to deprecate rigid anticommunism and enhance the image of the Soviets. To most Europeans (and Americans) between the world wars communism seemed a good deal worse than fascism. The fascists, for all their repellent aspects, did not propose to overthrow the entire structure of social relations and property entitlements (at least not openly), whereas the communists did, loudly and threatenly. So when Stalin, the Soviet dictator, called for leftists and moderates everywhere to join with communists in a “popular front” against fascism, he made little headway in most places.

This was especially so in Britain, where Prime Minister Chamberlain, while distressed by Hitler's crudity, thought that he was not such a bad fellow at heart, whereas Stalin was demon straight from the Pit. In the wake of Hitler's conquest of Czechoslovakia, when it was clear that Poland would be next, Stalin reached out to propose making common cause with Britain and France to block further Nazi aggression. But Chamberlain displayed no enthusiasm whatever and Stalin decided he had better cut a deal with Hitler—the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—thus sealing the fate of Poland and Europe. So when Hitler betrayed Stalin and invaded Russia, Britain and the United States were prepared to accept Stalin as an ally, even if with a certain amount of caution.

Finally, the leaders of Imperial Japan had come to be seen as fascists, in the same company with Mussolini and Hitler. This was not an entirely unnatural idea and even now many historians, particularly those influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx and his followers, often call the regime fascist, but in practice the ideology of Japan's leaders diverged a great deal from that of the European fascists. In fact the alliance with Hitler and Mussolini was far more a union of opportunism than of shared passion, but this was not apparent to many western statesmen, and it sometimes led them to overestimate the influence Hitler exerted in Tokyo.

All these ideas—abhorrence of “Munich” agreements in which real concessions were exchanged for promises of good behavior from those believed to have demonstrated their lack of good faith, avoidance of appeasement with those deemed unappeasable, acceptance of the value of alliance with Stalin, and overestimation of the depth of the links between Hitler and Japan—played very major roles in the thinking of U.S. leaders in the months they spent trying to avert a conflict.

### **An expansionist cabinet; Konoe & Matsuoka**

Their brutal experiences of the 1938-39 border wars with the Soviets had sapped Japanese Army General Staff enthusiasm for attacking in the north. Instead many of its members turned their vision to the south. The south promised access to supplies that were critical to Japan's military strength, particularly petroleum. It also would pro-

vide an opportunity to seal off the last routes by which China might import war matériel, which many in the army thought would cause the final collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek's resistance. As a bonus, it would cut Britain and the United States off from important sources of war materials, and thus support Japan's German and Italian allies.

Beyond all of these concrete advantages, to increasing numbers of officers it formed a step toward realizing a vision of a greater empire encompassing all of the eastern parts of Asia as well as the islands to the south; what soon came to be known as the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. (In Japanese the title was a much catchier phrase, *Daitōa Kyōeiken*.) This they saw as Japan's "manifest destiny," its task appointed by heaven. It was a protean mission that tended to arouse a good deal more passion than any of the more immediate and pragmatic objectives. In the summer of 1940 expansion into Southeast Asia came to take high precedence in the General Staff's view, perhaps even over finishing off the war with China.<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese Navy General Staff had long urged southern expansion, but on the whole remained cautious about direct confrontation with the West.

Even before the fall of France in June 1940, the Japanese had been putting pressure on the French colony of Indochina to cut off transit of matériel to China. After June interest shifted to occupying the northern half of the colony.<sup>10</sup> Before the end of July the army had pushed out the "weak" Cabinet and its successor, headed by Prince Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945), had agreed to pursue a policy that included making an alliance with Hitler and Mussolini, avoidance of conflict with the Soviets, seizure of the European colonies in Asia, and willingness to risk war with the United States if truly essential to achieve Japan's aims—in short, very much the policy that Japan actually pursued, leading her to Pearl Harbor.<sup>11</sup>

The foreign minister in Konoe's cabinet was Yōsuke Matsuoka (1880-1946). He had journeyed to America at age 13 to seek his fortune, learned English, and earned a law degree from the University of Oregon before returning to Japan in 1902, at age 22, to pursue an erratically brilliant career in diplomacy, business and politics.<sup>12</sup>

Matsuoka had early committed to nationalistic expansion at any price, and his acceptability to the army and other expansionists had been one of his chief recommendations for the job. He was extraordinarily loquacious, whether in Japanese or English, and projected an air of brash self-confidence. Supposed expertise in dealing with the United States was one of Matsuoka's principal claims to the job, but top-level Americans from Roosevelt on down loathed and mistrusted him. Everyone acknowledged his brilliance but there was no one it seemed, East or West, who trusted or truly liked him. If the object was to improve relations with the United States then Matsuoka was about as unsuitable a choice as could have been made.

The man who chose him, Konoe, headed the most aristocratic family in Japan, closely related to the imperial line and only a single step below it in rank and prestige. He had all the polish and aura of the grand aristocrat, but he had been orphaned at birth and a loveless childhood had left him deeply wounded and insecure. Konoe was well educated, highly intelligent and imaginative, and he cut a wide swath in Japanese politics. He could have been a great figure in Japanese history but his insecurities and uncertainties repeatedly betrayed him and mocked and corrupted all his accomplishments.<sup>13</sup>

This was Konoe's second ride on the merry-go-round of the Japanese premiership. In his first, 1937-38, he had led Japan ever deeper into the quagmire of the war in China, accomplishing nothing of value and proving himself utterly unable to exert any control over military adventurism.

Konoe deeply resented the influence that Britain and the United States were able to exert over Japan by virtue of their economic power and colonial empires. Marxist economic and political analyses (but not Soviet-style revolutionary communism) held wide influence in Japan and it was probably this that shaped Konoe's views and pushed him in the direction of seeing imperialist expansion as the right answer to Western "encirclement."

### **Japan impales herself on the Axis**

When the new government took office on July 22, 1940, the Japanese Army was already well on its way toward occupying the northern

half of French Indochina. Matsuoka strove to take leadership, but the army was not amenable to civilian control (and had no constitutional obligation), and in any case the army's leadership was struggling to control some of its own more aggressive officers. In the end what might have been carried off as a fairly quiet administrative occupation with a gloss of legitimacy became a noisy military circus that heightened the impression that Japan was totally committed to brutal, reckless conquest.

At the same time, the new foreign minister moved to satisfy his army backers by closing the deal with Hitler. He quickly found that when you wanted a deal with Hitler you took it on Hitler's terms, or else; the *Führer* didn't believe in negotiating. At German insistence, the treaty was bluntly pointed at the United States, intending to deter U.S. intervention on Britain's side.<sup>14</sup>

The Japanese Navy remained quite reluctant, but the forces favoring the treaty (mostly in the army but including some officers in key places in the navy) were strong enough to overcome the opposition. Where necessary, those who might oppose the treaty were warned off with hints of assassination.

On September 27 the treaty was formally signed by Japan, Italy, and Germany at a ceremony in Berlin. Only in Japan, however, was there any real excitement.

As imagined by Matsuoka and Konoe, the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to ease the way to an agreement with the United States by impressing the Americans with Japan's resolve and the strength of her support. But of course their Nazi partners had no interest whatever in a rapprochement between Japan and the Americans, and the real sponsor of the pact, the Japanese army, saw it simply as preparing the way to wage war more effectively.

Many Japanese officials and leaders wasted no time in making it clear (as could already be seen from the text of the pact) that it was aimed at the United States and that it would not be long before "world totalitarianism would effectively wipe out the nearly bankrupt Anglo-Saxon democracies."<sup>15</sup>

The Japanese army had long thought almost exclusively in terms of fighting the Soviet Union; it was the focus of all training and doc-

trine. Even after it had enmired itself in China most of its strongest and best-equipped formations stood opposite the Soviet borders, with the fighting in China left to second-line formations manned with recalled reservists.

In the fall of 1940 the Germans were eager to enlist their new allies in the fight against Britain, in hopes of weakening her for invasion. Go south, they counselled the Japanese, conquer Singapore and Britain's Asian possessions, cutting her off from their resources.

In fact, the Japanese Army General Staff was already moving in that direction. Late in the year a unit was set up in the tropical southern region of Taiwan (then a Japanese imperial possession) to develop methods and doctrines for war in the tropics. Training exercises began in the spring of 1941. In the meantime, staff officers were dispatched, under cover, to survey the areas targeted for invasion. There could be no question that the army was serious about a southern thrust.<sup>16</sup>

### **America moves toward rearmament**

In the United States in the autumn of 1940 all eyes were on the elections. FDR was running for an unprecedented third term. His opponent, Wendell Willkie, was a strong internationalist and their foreign policy positions did not differ greatly, but Roosevelt was at pains to avoid any suggestion that he wanted or expected to lead America into war. Some Japanese leaders had hoped that the Tripartite Pact and the threat of war that it implied would help those opposed to Roosevelt, but he won with 55 percent of the popular vote.

With the election settled, Roosevelt turned his full attention to defending the country against Hitler. Knowing what we do today it's hard for us to imagine a direct Nazi threat to America but in 1940 and 1941, after Hitler had conquered virtually all of Western Europe in a few weeks, it seemed all too possible. And the sense of threat was magnified by pervasive and strident German propaganda, intended to terrorize enemies into passive submission.

But as we all know, threats can evoke any of three responses, fight, flight, or freeze. There was no place for America to flee and FDR was not a man to freeze, as anyone familiar with his record would have recognized at once. He had no eagerness to jump into the European

war but he was determined to see Hitler vanquished and to be ready to fight if need be.

America, however, was far from readiness to fight. While the army's manpower had been substantially increased by instituting the draft it had a long way to go both in terms of training and equipment before it would be ready to field large, combat-ready formations. In particular it had very few tanks, and those it had were not a good match to stand up to the latest German models. The state of the air force, which then reported to the army, was comparable. It had very few modern combat aircraft and very limited trained crews. The navy had no modern battleships in service to pit against the new German and Japanese heavy ships, and not nearly enough destroyers for fighting the formidable and rapidly growing German and Japanese submarine fleets. The navy too suffered from a shortage of modern aircraft, and had only a few aircraft carriers to fly them from.

The Great Depression had devastated much of American industry and the government's parsimony in weapons buying had deepened the damage in many of the most urgently needed sectors. In the 1930s the U.S. aircraft industry had become world-renowned for innovation in transport aircraft; the Douglas DC-3 of 1936 was the first transport that could earn enough to pay its own way in transport service without substantial subsidies. The result was a modest stream of orders from domestic and foreign commercial and military operators that sustained the aircraft and aero engine industries in what otherwise would have been a very bleak period. But there were not nearly enough orders to permit the companies to develop mass-production methods for airframes and engines.

As war loomed in 1939 Britain, France, and other European countries sought to augment their own production with orders from U.S. manufacturers for aircraft and other vital war matériel, often providing up-front payments or credits to help the undercapitalized firms expand. The U.S. services also began to increase orders, but Congressional rules for procurement made it difficult and risky for firms to finance needed expansion. Of the 2,895 combat aircraft and large transports produced in 1940, four out of five went to foreign buyers.<sup>17</sup>

In response to insistent calls by the president, Congress loosened the strings somewhat after mid-1940, but foreign orders were threatened by the Nazi conquests and by Britain's shortage of money to pay for more American production. Something of the same sort had occurred 23 years earlier. Britain and France had depended heavily on American food and industrial materials to sustain them in World War I but by early 1917 had nearly run out of money. It was just at that point that German unrestricted submarine warfare had forced the United States to enter the war, and the Americans agreed to continue the vital flow of supplies, lending its allies the money to pay for them. This led to a huge accumulation of debt on the European side and an equally huge accumulation of assets on the American side. The imbalance was a major cause of the Great Depression, which in turn made it impossible for the allies to pay off their debts, leading to much American bitterness.

FDR was determined to avoid a repetition of this destructive cycle and on a relaxation cruise aboard the presidential yacht conceived a plan under which the United States would "lend" the needed supplies and matériel under "lease," subject only to post-war return of what was not used or destroyed. The resulting Lend-Lease Act was deftly structured to appeal to many important interest groups and easily passed Congress early in 1941.<sup>18</sup>

As the threat posed by Hitler gradually sank in the opposition in Congress grudgingly yielded, inch by inch, permitting appropriation of more funds and giving the president more authority. Not everyone was convinced, particularly in American industry. The CEO of General Motors, Alfred Sloan, for instance insisted that the war was simply an inconvenient quarrel between foreigners whose main threat was to GM's fortunes. Henry Ford refused to accept contracts to produce engines if any were to go to Britain. Although there were leaders who genuinely put patriotism ahead of narrow (and often misconceived) ideas of corporate benefit, the more negative attitudes were echoed in corporate boardrooms throughout the country. By dangling money and power, however, Roosevelt was able, over the next few months, to entice corporate leaders, or at least enough of them to get industrial mobilization rolling.<sup>19</sup>



### **Anxious about the Atlantic, sanguine about the Pacific**

While the Tripartite Pact made Japan's hostility and aggressive intent manifest, she nevertheless remained very much a secondary threat. There was acute concern that Hitler was going to take over Spain and Portugal, seize Gibraltar, force the French to yield their North African possessions to his control, capture the Azores, Canaries, and Cape Verde Islands, and use them as stepping stones to gain footholds in South America and the Caribbean from which to assault the United States. All within a matter of months. It now sounds fantastic to us who know it never happened, but after watching the Germans roll swiftly over all of Western Europe anything seemed possible. In fact Hitler did entertain designs along much these lines—just as soon as he disposed of the Soviet Union and Britain.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, while the German potential to do harm was being overrated, that of Japan was not fully recognized. Nazi Germany's image was of power, advanced technology, limitless numbers of troops and weapons, all directed with precision and unwavering purpose. While it was recognized that Japan had advanced rapidly, she was still regarded as comparatively backward.

Few in the West had seen Japan's most advanced ships, aircraft and weapons, while Japanese troops appeared much less formidable than Hitler's legions to the casual observer. The Japanese successes against China did little to impress; surely the Chinese were much weaker than the foes the Germans had vanquished. The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were forgotten or discounted. Western military intelligence services conceded that Japan would be able to achieve substantial successes with bold strokes in the initial phases of a conflict, but few conceived just how substantial they might be.

Thus American policy continued to emphasize shoring up Hitler's enemies, even at the risk of courting Nazi attack—a precisely accurate representation of the public's preferences as shown in polls. A war with Japan would distract from the struggle against Hitler and so was to be avoided or deferred if possible.

## No meeting of minds

Cordell Hull (1871-1955) had served 30 years representing his rural Tennessee district in the House and Senate when the newly-elected Franklin Roosevelt nominated him to be Secretary of State in 1933. It had been a choice governed by political needs rather than any close relationship between the two men. Hull was a politely distant man who never developed a particularly warm relationship with his boss, but he was a very determined and able defender of American interests and he was still in it in 1941, aged 70. During the war to come he would go on to act as a central driving force behind the creation of the United Nations in its modern form.

His deputy, Under Secretary B. Sumner Welles (1892-1961) came from the same sort of old-wealth background as Roosevelt and the two had family connections. They were on easy terms and the president showed confidence that Welles would understand his intentions fully and carry them out resourcefully and subtly.

Roosevelt believed that he knew and understood Europe based on lifelong acquaintance but felt no such close connection with Asia and generally left Japan to Hull and his staff. There were exceptions when larger strategic or political considerations supervened, but otherwise it was Hull in charge.

Hull believed that just as the United States was a nation of laws so its diplomacy should proceed from American principles. In this as in most other things his style was a good deal more formal than FDR's, but it well suited diplomacy.

Early on, in consultation with his staff Hull formulated four principles for treating with Japan:

Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

In addition, the United States wanted assurance that Japan would not stab it in the back if it fought the Germans in self-defense.

Hull was prepared to show flexibility in their application, depending on the circumstances and demands of the moment, but he was not prepared to abandon them in the face of Japanese pleas or threats.

There was no individual in Tokyo empowered to formulate equivalently clear and explicit principles, but in effect the Army General Staff too had its own set from which no one was allowed to deviate, on pain of assassination. In essence Japan was to insist on:

Her right and obligation to live up fully to the terms of the Tripartite Pact.

A completely free hand in China, without outside interference in any form.

Absolute assurance of unhindered access to oil and other resources in whatever quantity she desired for whatever purposes she saw fit.

Full trade rights with America and Europe.

Above all, American leaders wanted assurance that if they resisted Nazi aggression the Japanese would not stab them in the back. The dominant elements of the Japanese Army at the same time believed fervently that Hitler's war in Europe and the Levant presented a unique, heaven-sent opportunity for Japan to achieve her ordained domination over Asia and the Western Pacific.

There never was any real prospect of finding common ground between these two positions, and few of the leaders on either side truly believed that there was. At best they hoped that by continuing to talk the two sides might grow more moderate and compromising in spirit, ruled less by the absolutes of power and more by the beauties of peace.

The result was a series of American and Japanese initiatives aimed at finding a basis for some agreement, or at least creating some room for further negotiation. But they were played against the background of a massive, inexorable march to war. At very best, the negotiations bought an additional 60 days of peace—and probably a good deal less.

The men who set the course for the Japanese army had little interest in settlement on any terms but their own. Scarcely had it occupied the northern part of French Indochina before the army turned toward the south. Southern Indochina's resources, chiefly of rice

production from the lush granary of the Mekong River Basin, were not a major factor in its appeal. Its real value was geostrategic, as a base area for conquest of the British colonies in Southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies.

In principle there was still a sovereign French government in 1941, seated in Vichy, a fashionable spa town in the south central region that had been much favored by Louis-Napoléon, in the days before 1870 when he was emperor of the French. It was ironic that his republican successors in power had been chased there by the same Germans who had chased him from his throne 70 years earlier. The French are said to have a taste for irony, but it is doubtful whether they appreciated this one.

Whatever the case, the Vichy government was in no mood to throw open the gates to southern *Indochine française* when the Japanese came knocking. Above all, looking to a postwar future, they were most anxious not to undermine France's title to her Southeast Asian colony. With quiet encouragement from Washington they responded with a firm *non*.

Not to worry, the Japanese thought; they would simply get their great and good friend Hitler to press a little more firmly with the boot heel to bring the *Vichystes* around. But Hitler was friend to no one, particularly not to little yellow men he thought not much better than monkeys, and considerably less amusing. He and his lieutenants had other demands to make on Vichy and were not about to use their leverage on behalf of their Asiatic ally. Ultimately the Japanese managed to extract a sort of permission from the French at sword's point.

All of this had been watched by Washington, far more penetratingly than the Japanese had imagined. Without ever so much as seeing an example of the highly complex Japanese electromechanical cipher machine, the U.S. Army's tiny Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had managed to learn its innermost secrets so well that it was possible for the United States to read most Japanese diplomatic messages starting late in 1940 and continuing throughout the war. (See Appendix D for more detail.)

All the while that the army was getting set to invade southern Indochina, a diplomatic tragicomedy was playing out. Two senior members of the Maryknoll order of Catholic missionaries to Asia, Bishop James E. Walsh (1891-1981) and Fr. James M. Drought (1896-1943), decided on a little freelance diplomacy. This was a violation of U.S. law and of questionable morality, for they presented themselves in Tokyo as speaking for the U.S. government and in Washington as speaking for the Japanese, when in fact they were voicing only their own views. The American State Department caught on very quickly, and so did Foreign Minister Matsuoka once he returned to Tokyo from a trip to Berlin, Rome, and Moscow and learned of it, but in the meantime the good fathers muddled the waters considerably.<sup>21</sup> Whether they managed to do any actual harm to the very dim prospects for peace is questionable, although some historians continue to argue that they did.

During Matsuoka's spring 1941 trip to Europe he had caught hints that Hitler was about to turn against Stalin and invade Russia. This presented a serious challenge for the policy that Konoe and Matsuoka had been pursuing, which was based on the existence of an understanding between Hitler and Stalin, thus securing the borders of Manchuria. In fact, they had sought to convert the Tripartite Pact into a four-way deal by signing up Moscow to join Berlin, Rome and Tokyo. So to avoid the danger of being unwillingly sucked into a war against the Soviets, Matsuoka went straightway to Moscow and negotiated a treaty under which Japan and the Soviet Union each agreed to remain neutral in any war the other became involved in.

Notwithstanding the neutrality pact, a Nazi-Soviet war posed serious strategic problems for Japan, which had based its policy on the notion that Hitler would promptly conquer Britain, thus opening up its Asian colonies to Japan, while the alliance with Hitler would scare the United States off from intervening. At best, the invasion of Russia meant that of Britain would be delayed for a number of months at least. It might have made sense to hold back until the situation cleared, but the Japanese army was much too impatient for that.

## Into the vortex

Early on June 22, 1941, Germany's armies swept across the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Hitler and his closest military advisors anticipated yet another bloody and intense but brief campaign, ending in the destruction of the Red Army within a matter of weeks. It had worked many times over the preceding 22 months; why should this one be different? There was a great deal of territory, but most of it was open country, favorable for the armored formations of the German spearhead.

The world held its breath.

Expert opinion varied widely in Britain and America but Roosevelt and Churchill both seem to have believed from an early stage that in the end Hitler would fail in his attempt to knock out the Soviet Union. For this, however, it was essential that Japan not attack in Siberia.

In Tokyo the turmoil was intense as proponents of moves to the north and south argued their cases in light of the new development. Matsuoka, who had scarcely finished bragging about his triumph in securing the neutrality treaty with Stalin, now called stridently for immediate invasion of Siberia, causing some to question his mental stability. The army also had its advocates of striking north, but they faced several obstacles. First, the campaigning season in Siberia is short due to the long, brutally harsh winter. The time was already late; if an invasion were to be mounted in 1941 there would be only weeks to prepare for it.

And memories of the drubbing the army had taken at the hands of the Soviets at Nomonhan remained fresh. Unless the Soviets quickly cut back on their strength in Siberia—which there was no sign of—an invasion would meet strong resistance and could not expect rapid success. Moreover, the strength the Red Army had shown in the battles on the Manchurian border led to doubts about swift and easy German triumph. Hitler had changed course sharply before without alerting Japan; if the Japanese Army became deeply engaged in Siberia it could find itself facing the main strength of the Red Army if Hitler made some sort of deal with Stalin.

The south seemed much more manageable and rewarding—as long as the Japanese navy could guarantee to keep the British and especially Americans at bay. This the navy was deeply conflicted about and reluctant to commit.

Earlier in the year, the United States had given a number of hints of willingness to compromise with the Japanese. Now the need to guard the Soviet eastern flanks from the Japanese army prompted stiffening of the U.S. position. No one on the U.S. side had any way of knowing that the Japanese were agonizing over the choice between striking north or south; for all they knew the Japanese might do both, just as the Germans had struck in multiple directions in quick succession over the preceding year. It was not a subject that was addressed in diplomatic cables so Washington's ability to read Japan's cable traffic did not help in this. Thus the Japanese move into southern Indochina did not rule out a Siberian invasion, so far as the Americans knew.

All over Asia and the Western Pacific, observers caught signs that the Japanese were marshaling their forces. Cautiously, so as not to reveal that their code had been broken, Tokyo was warned that a move into southern Indochina would risk serious consequences, as would one into Siberia. All just talk, the Japanese thought.

U.S. sanctions had damaged the Japanese war economy but not terribly seriously, and had done nothing visible to induce them to caution. But Japan still relied on its trade with America to meet some very important needs, above all petroleum. The United States had pioneered the commercial extraction of oil 80 years earlier, and remained by far the world's largest producer. U.S. companies had gotten there first and exercised great control over the world trade in petroleum in a cartel far more powerful than the OPEC cartel ever was to become.<sup>22</sup>

It had long been apparent that the Japanese campaign in China ran on American oil. This raised considerable public outcry and mounting threats of legislation to cut off oil to Japan. No one who recalled the Japanese exclusion imbroglio of just 17 years before—with many of the same members—could feel easy about what Congress might do if given its head. The risk would be even more acute

if Congress were to learn what the administration had come to strongly suspect, that Japan had been stockpiling massive amounts of oil—surely with war in view, very likely war against America and her allies.

Concern about a Japanese violent response to a cut-off had always kept both Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt from closing the oil tap. But with strong signs that the Japanese were bent on war in any event, it started to seem that the benefits outweighed the risks. It would certainly erode Japanese power, even if not immediately, and the shock might prove salutary. Washington could dangle the possibility of easing or reversing a ban could be a powerful negotiating tool. What was the alternative, other than sitting around waiting for a Japanese attack, while continuing to supply them with the fuel to power it? Would it not be appeasement of the worst sort to make no strong response when the Japanese took over southern Indochina?

In May FDR had declared a state of unlimited national emergency and on June 14 he used his emergency powers to freeze the assets of Germany and Italy. On July 25, two days after Japanese troops landed at Saigon, he announced that he had added Japan to the list along with her Axis allies. Quietly, without public announcement, he also approved tightening the screws on control of exports to Japan, particularly crude oil and petroleum products.

(This constitutes what is often simply referred to as an embargo of oil. Unfortunately the historiography of this crucial complex of events is somewhat muddled. The most thorough and perceptive examination of all the details is by financial expert Edward Miller.<sup>23</sup> His conclusions regarding the effects on Japan's economic health have been criticized on economics grounds, but do arguably represent what might have been foreseen in 1941.<sup>24</sup>

(Questions have been raised regarding presidential intent. Jonathan Utley believes that Roosevelt wanted to apply pressure but without drastic restrictions; in his view it was Dean Acheson, then an official in the Department of State, who willfully subverted the president's intentions in order to cut off all Japanese access to oil or other goods as an exercise in personal power and ideological commitment to hurting Japan.<sup>25</sup> However, I agree with Waldo Heinrichs



that this is implausible and that the best evidence is that Acheson was simply efficiently and resourcefully implementing very much what FDR intended.<sup>26)</sup>

While the most perceptive Japanese leaders understood immediately that the American response to the move into southern Indochina had been more serious than had been calculated, for many it took some time. The Army General Staff “Confidential Journal of War” recorded

Lieutenant Colonels Kumon and Tsuji of the Operations Division are urging the launching of a military campaign in the South Seas on the ground that the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States will certainly be followed by a total embargo immediately or soon. They are quite insistent.

We do not consider the freezing order tantamount to a total embargo.... In our opinion the total embargo will come eventually, but not before early next year [1942]. Commander Onoda of the Navy General Staff agrees with us.<sup>27</sup>

For what it was worth, as the truth sank in the Japanese leaders were indeed duly shocked. They had told themselves repeatedly that if they proceeded by small steps and stoutly upheld the Axis alliance the Yankees would do nothing serious in response. (Just in case, however, they had been hiding dollar assets since late 1940 to guard against a freeze, violating U.S. law about reporting transactions where need be.<sup>28)</sup> Very few had any realistic picture of the United States or much idea of how the government worked. The Americans, they imagined, were governed wholly by their appetites, whether for wealth, sex, or pleasure, living in a frantic moral wasteland. They worshiped machines and had little of the discipline, martial spirit, or will to self-sacrifice that characterized the Yamato race. Behind the glittering façade, all was hollow.<sup>29</sup> It could all be seen in the Hollywood movies that were popular in Japan—gangster films, light-hearted musicals, westerns.

Even a little study of American history would have challenged this picture, but the Japanese did not devote much study to America. Some wealthy people did send their sons to study in American universities (as Konoe sent his ill-fated first son<sup>30)</sup>, but outstanding graduates of the army’s staff college—the future leaders of the Army

General Staff—went instead to study the Germans or Russians. What could be learned from the contemptibly weak-willed and decadent Americans or British? Even those who did venture to the United States often returned with quite distorted impressions.

Naturally the American leaders had no clearer view of the Japanese than they had of them. On neither side did those at the top understand how the others made decisions. This was inevitable because neither understood how the other society worked, how bonds among people and within groups were formed and operated. American leaders tended to project their own tacit understanding of how decisions were reached in Washington onto others. This might serve them fairly well sometimes in dealing with Europeans but was generally quite unhelpful with the Japanese. There had been scarcely any serious study of Japanese society by trained sociologists on which officials might draw for insight. There was much more on American society but it was all but opaque to top-level Japanese, even if translated, and they felt little inclination to consult any of the very few Japanese academic sociologists for enlightenment. On each side the few diplomats who had gained some insight into the other's society through serving there were suspected of having "gone native."<sup>31</sup> Americans looked down on the "yellow races" (who in their movies were always cast as feckless, sinister or depraved), and Japanese leaders returned their antipathy and contempt, and allowed it to poison their judgement of the dangers.<sup>32</sup>

(The first major broad study of Japanese society by a western expert was written during the war, depending on very limited indirect evidence: pioneer anthropologist Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*.<sup>33</sup> It was path breaking and provided some useful insights but was inevitably limited. Most modern work has focused on a much-changed Japan, so only a few studies are especially helpful in understanding the Japanese society of 1941.<sup>34</sup>)

Roosevelt suggested that some accommodation might be made if the Japanese backed out of Indochina, but the Japanese were willing to consider it only once the Chinese surrendered. The Japanese continued to seek ways to roll back the restrictions, but on their terms. What they really wanted was not U.S. willingness to sell oil but con-

trol of their own. The only way to get it was to conquer the rich oil fields on Sumatra and Borneo Islands in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI—present-day Indonesia). That was the major objective of the southern strategy that the Japanese military had long pursued and southern Indochina was an essential jumping-off point for the invasion of the NEI as well as the British colonies of Malaya and Burma, and the main British base in the region at Singapore. Until the conquests were completed, or rendered unnecessary by sweeping western concessions, the Japanese military meant to stay firmly in control of Indochina. And of course its insistence on so doing sent another signal to Washington about Japan's course for war.

### **Philippines puzzle**

Another important element in U.S. calculations was the Philippines. The colony had been a self-governing "commonwealth" since late 1935 and was scheduled under U.S. law for full independence in 1946. The Commonwealth was supposed to be building the institutions of sovereign independence, including military forces, and engaged the services of the recently-retired chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) as its military advisor.

Constructing a force capable of defending the new country against Japan would be a major challenge. The Philippines per-capita GDP wasn't much more than half of Japan's, and the gap in the size of the populations was more than 4:1, so the Philippines couldn't hope to raise nearly as many troops as Japan, nor could she afford to arm and equip them as well.<sup>35</sup> Beyond these immediate material factors, Japan enjoyed a 65-year head start on army-building. By normal standards Japan was about ten to twenty times as strong in military terms.

Such calculations did not daunt MacArthur. He had extensive experience in the Philippines and great faith in her people. With their support, he assured their leaders, he was confident that he could mold a Philippine military capable of standing off the Japanese, and do so within the constraints of the Commonwealth's very limited budget.<sup>36</sup> At his request the U.S. Army seconded two exceptionally able mid-grad officers to aid him and under his direction they set

out to do everything that intelligent, energetic effort could possibly accomplish.

One of the officers was Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, the future Allied commander in Europe and later U.S. president. Eisenhower admired MacArthur greatly and supported him strongly, but eventually grew deeply disillusioned, coming to believe that he was a towering egotist who was deceiving him and everyone else involved, and that that without a great deal of outside help the forces of the Commonwealth could not be made strong enough to defend it against a serious attack by Japan.<sup>37</sup>


Until the Philippines became fully independent the United States retained responsibility for her defense (and foreign policy), and continued to maintain military forces in the country. (The army of the Commonwealth could be called to U.S. service, somewhat like the State national guards, in event of emergency.) The U.S. Army's Philippine Department had one somewhat understrength U.S. infantry division (formed in part of units manned by Filipinos recruited as U.S. troops) as well as a number of seacoast artillery batteries and a handful of old aircraft. It was supposed to support the formation and training of the Commonwealth forces, but actually did scarcely anything along these lines. Thus it sabotaged the development of what should have been a major source of reinforcements in event of war.

Underlying this bizarre lapse was not only racism but widespread doubt in the U.S. Army whether the Philippines could be defended against an attack by the only likely enemy in the region, the Japanese. Effective defense would require some combination of robust ground and air forces in the Islands and a fleet strong enough to quickly force its way across the Pacific in the face of Japanese opposition to bring reinforcements and supplies. But Congress and the administrations of the 1920s and 1930s were much too parsimonious to provide any of this. There were some army officers who took an optimistic, positive view of the potential for defense as well as some navy officers who felt confidence in the fleet's ability to push through to the Western Pacific, but their optimism only sporadically prevailed in the face of the discouraging facts. Much depended, of

course, on one's assessment of how determined and effective the Japanese would be.<sup>38</sup>

### **A light in the tunnel?**

In the late 1930s came a new factor: high-performance bombers. As late as early 1932 the U.S. Army Air Corps was taking delivery on 13,000 lb Keystone B-6A fabric-covered biplane bombers able to carry 2500 lb of bombs 460 miles at cruising speeds slightly over 100 m.p.h. They represented only marginal advance in performance over the bombers of World War I, fifteen years earlier.



**Figure 28.** Less than 8 years separated deliveries of the Keystone B-6A from those of the Boeing B-17B. (Shown here is a B-17D of very similar appearance.)

But less than eight years later the Air Corps was receiving 38,000 lb streamlined Boeng B-17B all-metal monoplanes whose four turbo-

supercharged engines allowed them to carry 4,000 lb of bombs 2,400 miles at 230 m.p.h. Even better performance was promised very soon. (Fifteen years later the Air Force would be introducing the jet Boeing B-47B bomber carrying 10,000 lb 4,000 miles at 500 m.p.h.)

Air power visionaries had been proclaiming the dominance of the bomber since the early 1920s, but with aircraft such as these suddenly becoming available it no longer took a wild-eyed visionary to envision a major role for air forces. As a base for long-range bombers the Philippines now seemed far more important, and potentially defensible. It was claimed that the B-17s or the even newer B-24s flying from northern bases in the Philippines could reach many important cities and industrial targets in southern Japan. Or perhaps permission could be obtained from Stalin for bombers to continue on to Vladivostok for refueling. Moreover, any invasion fleet would be open to devastating air attack. Would not the Japanese, seeing all this, be powerfully deterred from any attack?<sup>39</sup>

(In reality, even with minimal bomb loads such missions would have stretched the capabilities of these aircraft to their ultimate limits, involving considerable risk of running out of fuel before reaching the Philippines on the return flight.<sup>40</sup>)

Optimism about the value of Philippines bases was reinforced by the confidence that the much-respected MacArthur expressed regarding the potential to defend the islands. At the end of July 1941 he was recalled from retirement and immediately installed as commander in chief of all U.S. Army forces in the region (including air forces). The U.S. Army Air Forces (established June 20 as the operational command for all aviation-related units) began flying much of its so-far meager forces of B-17s across the Pacific to the Philippines. Shorter-ranged modern fighters were rushed out in fast ships, along with a variety of reinforcements for MacArthur's ground forces. Given a few months to prepare, MacArthur assured Washington, he could defend the Islands against Japan.

In 1941, after an extended visit with MacArthur in his Manila headquarters, Claire Boothe [Luce], wife of the founder and head of the Time-Life news magazine empire, wrote a breathless cover story

for *Life Magazine* that wonderfully captured the general's views in the issue ironically dated December 8, 1941. A telling sample:

When President Roosevelt chose Douglas MacArthur to be head fighting man in the Far East, he wrote a new chapter head in the history of World War II. Reading the news in the Netherlands Indies, Dutch Chief of Staff Ter Poorten must have sighed in sudden relief. In Singapore, weary old Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Air Marshal and Military Commander of Great Britain's Far Eastern Forces, no doubt snored peacefully for the first night in a long year. In Chungking, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek may have murmured, after four long years of war: "America awakes at last!" For the Allied Powers sensed that in Tokyo this chapter head would cause many a fan-toothed naval jaw to drop and many a military bandy leg to buckle.<sup>41</sup>

(Of course that this last sentence could appear in a major magazine speaks effectively of the prevailing racist outlook.)

### **Why not offer Japan more?**

With confidence in the strategic value of the Philippines and its air power, the U.S. top leadership saw no reason to make major concessions to the Japanese. Any significant veering in Japan's direction seemed bound to undermine the coalition against Hitler and his allies that FDR was determined to build as a matter of urgency, for no concession was possible without damaging the security of one or more of the partners, nor without calling the reliability and sincerity of American commitments into serious question. Moreover, if pressure were taken off Japan her expansionist leaders might feel emboldened to attack Siberia at the moment when the Soviet Union was straining all its strength to resist Hitler.

Some authors, including a clear majority of Japanese as well as westerners of various motivations, charge that the Roosevelt Administration was gravely remiss in taking too firm a stance. By failing to appease the expansionists through leaving China to Japanese domination and reverting to liberal trade policies the United States prompted the Japanese attack, in their view. (They are divided as to whether it would have been necessary also to hand over the European colonies in Asia.) The Japanese expansionists, they feel sure, would have been content with these concessions and thereafter turned to the ways of peace. They scold FDR and Hull for entertain-

ing doubts on this score. Those who do not attack Roosevelt himself blame various dark influences in his Administration and see him as their helpless plaything with no firm policy of his own.

Yet suppose that the United States had offered major concessions, concessions inevitably damaging to some of its partners, in order to make peace with Japan, as the critics believe it should have. Then what lesson would those who were facing the full weight of attack by Nazi Germany's far stronger forces have drawn? Might they not have concluded that it was time to cut whatever deal they could with Hitler, rather than tie their fate to an irresolute America? In short, would it not have become a matter of every country for itself as all raced for the exits? That at any rate was Roosevelt's concern. His critics won't say that it would have been acceptable to allow all of Eurasia to fall under Hitler's domination and to risk a possible transatlantic attack if need be in order to avoid a war with Japan—it's not presently socially acceptable for "serious" people to say such things in public, even in Japan. But it's a risk that adoption of their preferred policies would inexorably have involved.

### **Decision-making in Tokyo**

The bottom line was that if the Japanese wanted peace then they needed to behave peacefully. If they joined their Axis allies in aggression then they must share in American hostility to Axis aggression. It was no good expecting Roosevelt to give them a special pass.

As always in such matters there were questions about exactly where the boundary between permissible ambition and impermissible aggression lay. But by mid-1941 it was altogether clear that it lay a very long way from the course that the Japanese Army General Staff was determined to follow, along with a major portion of the Navy General Staff.

Not only Japanese social norms but the nature of the governmental system demanded that any major policy shift—such as committing to make war—receive acquiescence if not active support from a broad range of individuals and institutions. Advocates could try to force the formation of such a consensus by concocting some incident or simply taking the first violent step, as had happened repeat-



edly in the 1930s. (In the old tradition, the instigators had demonstrated their sincerity by committing suicide afterwards, but that rule had largely lapsed by the 1930s.) But the hottest firebrands were army officers and there was no opportunity for an army unit to irrevocably initiate a war with the Western powers all on its own. With its push into Indochina the army had gone far enough to set the stage for war, but not to actually start one. For that it would need to win its first victory in the conferences in Tokyo.

(The Japanese navy has been identified by a number of authors as the real dark force behind the push for war, but this theory doesn't hold up very well to scrutiny. Unlike the army the navy really did have the means to concoct a war-initiating incident all on its own, but it never took any steps in this direction. Moreover, the fateful move into Indochina had been strictly an army affair. Some naval officers had expressed enthusiasm but the navy as a whole had dragged its feet.)

Those who did not favor expansion had long been excluded from public life, and anyone strongly opposed to forcible expansion was well advised to keep his silence, lest he be assassinated. But there were those who were not flatly opposed (or at least were careful not to say so in public) but nevertheless were cautious regarding its risks. Among them was the emperor, the man known to most Americans as Hirohito (1901-1989). (His proper title, used by some authors, is Emperor Shōwa, *Shōwa* being the somewhat incongruous formal title of the period of his reign, meaning "Enlightened Peace.")<sup>42</sup>

Emperor Hirohito, as he understood his responsibilities under the Japanese constitutional order at that time, was obliged to give formal approval on behalf of the state to decisions agreed by his cabinet and his military advisors, the military chiefs of staff. He was not simply a monarch in the sense usually understood by westerners but also the occupant of a quasi-divine office embodying the spirit of the nation, and as such his pronouncements carried supernatural authority, at least in the eyes of traditionalists. But it was his duty to exercise this awesome power only on the recommendation of his government. He

was by nature and inclination quite a dutiful man and he took this responsibility very seriously indeed.

Inevitably, there was room for interpretation. Did his ministers and service chiefs truly understand the implications of the advice and proposed decisions they were presenting to him? How seriously and thoroughly had they examined the issues? As Hirohito understood matters he was entitled and indeed obligated to ask these questions. As he occasionally reminded some of his officials, to their intense discomfiture, they had sometimes in the past given him solemn assurances that turned out to be ill-founded or ill-considered.

But the emperor was obliged to be very careful in this, lest he intrude into decision-making. This was a matter of his highest duty, the preservation of his state and throne. He was after all the 125<sup>th</sup> of his line, according to tradition, a direct descendant of the very first emperor, Jimmu, who had supposedly lived 2,600 years earlier. It is significant that the only time he ever intervened substantially in the process of state decision-making came in August 1945 when the issue was whether Japan should fight on to likely final destruction or preserve herself by surrender. The Americans had agreed, on behalf of the Allies, that if she surrendered Japan could retain the imperial institution and on that understanding Hirohito broke a deadlock among his government officials to decide on surrender and thus the survival of the monarchy.

In 1941, however, the interests of the throne appeared to lie on the side of going along with war, if that was indeed the decision of the government and service chiefs. For Hirohito to pit himself against their lawful authority would run a great risk of chaos and endanger the foundations of the throne. And of course he could not be sure they were not right in their assessments of the necessity of war as a matter of national survival.

Nevertheless, the Emperor believed he had the right and responsibility to make sure that the alternatives to war had been investigated deeply and seriously. It was after all apparent that some of his ministers felt only minimal enthusiasm for the course their more ardent colleagues were advocating so vigorously. In particular Prince Fumimaro Konoe, the prime minister through the two thirds of 1941,

and a cousin of the Emperor, was plainly terrified at the thought of leading the country into a war with great potential to be even more disastrous than the war in China that the military had begun during his first premiership in 1937.

### **An unreachd summit**

Shortly after the United States imposed its financial freeze at the end of July in response to the Japanese thrust into southern Indochina Konoe revived an idea first advanced in the spring by Fr. James Drought, the Maryknoll missionary official and hyper-ambitious peace entrepreneur, for a summit meeting between the Japanese prime minister and U.S. president to conclude a grand settlement. Drought's deceptions left each side imagining that the other was proposing the idea when in fact it was all Drought. The U.S. leaders were skeptical but willing to consider a meeting to seal a deal if the Japanese desired it. But in May the Japanese dropped the idea of meeting without any explanation.

The summit meetings we take so much for granted today are a product of the jet age; in 1941 logistics told heavily against them, and the potentials and limitations of summitry had yet to be worked out. The only remotely positive modern precedent, the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, offered little guidance or encouragement. Most other meetings of heads of governments had been capitulations by one or the other, like Munich. But with the occupation of southern Indochina bringing relations with the United States to a crisis, a summit meeting seemed to Konoe to offer a possible way out, profoundly averse to confrontation as he was and terrified of assassination if he were to confront his war-minded colleagues.<sup>43</sup>

Konoe would journey to meet FDR in Hawaii or some other midway point and they would sit together and work things out. Surely he could get Roosevelt, a fellow aristocrat after all, to understand. Of course the American would not agree fully to the demands of the Japanese Army; that was out of the question. But with a reasonable compromise initialed by the President he could return to Japan and get his cousin, the Emperor, to ratify it and the army would have to obey. It was perfect!

In reality it was complete fantasy. Great though his anxiety about war might be Hirohito was far too circumspect and politically realistic to imagine that he could impose a *fait accompli* on the military. The likely result would be to get him and Konoe both assassinated, while gravely undermining the position of the throne. But to Konoe it looked like a hope, however slender, and he grasped at it.

FDR initially was intrigued but as he and Hull thought more about it they could see the pitfalls that would be involved in an open-ended summit meeting with Konoe. He had just returned from his dramatic summit meeting with Churchill at sea off Newfoundland where they had agreed on a high-minded statement of war aims that Roosevelt christened the Atlantic Charter. It had been a triumph for FDR but much less satisfactory for Churchill who wanted desperately to hear some statement of commitment. The one thing Roosevelt had agreed to was a stern warning to Japan. If he turned around and left on a much longer trip for a peace parley with Konoe it would send all the wrong signals. Comparisons with Chamberlain's journey to Munich were inevitable.

Chaing, Stalin, Churchill, the Dutch, the Australians, the New Zealanders, and even the Canadians could not fail to be anxious that they might be sold down the river, even if inadvertently. In a free-wheeling, wide-ranging meeting it would be impossible to keep all the allies fully in touch, especially given the limitations of 1941 communications. And it would be all too easy for Konoe—known for his strident anti-westernism and for presiding over the onset of the China war—to mousetrap the American side by presenting outrageous demands and then denouncing the “perfidious Yankees” for choosing war in preference to his sincere peace proposals.

Rather than reject the idea out of hand Hull pushed the Japanese to define the scope of the meeting and give some assurances of constructive intentions. Discussions sputtered on while the Japanese military general staffs made the decisions that counted.

### **War, of course**

On August 8, a week after it had become apparent that the Americans really were cutting off the oil, the Japanese Army General Staff's “Confidential Journal of War” recorded

- I. What is the best way to deal with the United States and Great Britain? Should we rise in arms against them, or should we surrender to them? Is there any way out from this predicament? We have been discussing this question in great distress for two days now.

We must not be dragged into a protracted war against the United States. However, how could we surrender to the United States and Great Britain in betrayal of the Tripartite Pact? Granted that there is no hope for a victory in the protracted war, can't we hold out without suffering a defeat?

Is there any device by which we can work out a temporary compromise [with the United States] and by so doing put off the inevitable war as long as possible without impairing the dignity of our Empire? Can't we maneuver so that we can obtain oil from the United States at least until the German offensive on the British Isles resumes in earnest? Indeed we're confronted by a national crisis.

- II. . . . Lieutenant Colonel [Sakō] Tanemura insists that we should not give up diplomatic means to break the deadlock. He advised the chief that the army be prepared to accept *de facto* abrogation of the Tri-Partite Pact in order to lead diplomatic negotiations to success. The problem here is the *quid pro quo*. It is highly questionable that a temporary retreat or surrender could really help break this deadlock. If they demand from us a total surrender we must demand a full supply of oil in exchange. We doubt very much that the United States would supply us with enough oil if we promise her not to use force in the South Seas.<sup>44</sup>

In the General Staff's view, clearly, war or "surrender" were the only choices, and evidently a settlement on anything other than the army's terms meant "surrender." Moreover, in any event any settlement was to last only for so long as it took Hitler to dispose of his war in the east and turn again to conquering Britain.

Under such assumptions, war was the only possible choice. Thus within a few days the General Staff had definitively rejected a move against Siberia, at least in 1941, and was demanding an immediate commitment to war with the United States and Britain, to be launched by the end of October. Roosevelt had at very least succeeded in safeguarding the Soviet eastern flank so that Stalin could mobilize all his strength against Hitler.

By early September the war party had won approval for their “Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire’s Policies,” committing the nation to war if negotiations did not produce major U.S. concessions by early October. When it was presented to the Emperor as a cabinet/armed-services policy he gave formal approval but attempted to register disquiet by reading a poem written by his grandfather in praise of peace. It was subtle enough that his listeners could read into it what they wish, but Konoe (with whom he had been more candid in private) looked for ways out.

Then, in the middle of October, one of Konoe’s close associates was arrested as a Soviet spy. (He was later hanged.) The next day Konoe, already deeply troubled by his lack of success in deflecting the march to war, resigned as prime minister. With other political figures he urged the appointment of an imperial prince who could exert the moral power of the throne to resist the tide of war. But the emperor’s advisors/handlers were strongly opposed to anything that might compromise the position of the throne through involvement in politics. (Apparently they were much more sanguine regarding the effect on the throne of losing a total war. In fact, Hirohito came very close to being indicted as a war criminal five years later, and the imperial institution came close to being abolished altogether.)

Finally, the nomination went to General Hideki Tōjō (1884-1948), one of the foremost of the hawks, more or less on the theory of “set a thief to catch a thief.”<sup>45</sup> Tōjō, who revered the imperial institution, was made to promise Hirohito that he would faithfully follow every possible avenue for making peace before committing to war. He carried through with his promise but his heart was not in it and he was unalterably opposed to the sort of compromises that might have made peace possible.

Finally it was decided that the United States was to be presented with not one but two ultimatums, Plan A and Plan B, offers it “couldn’t refuse” (without war with Japan). Both were vinegary old wine in new bottles with a little dollop of honey added in that of Plan B.

Seeing what was coming, thanks to their mastery of the Japanese diplomatic cipher, the U.S. leaders sought to develop a counterpro-

posal that might have some prospects of success. They knew from decrypted messages that the Japanese leaders had secretly imposed an end-of-November deadline on negotiations, with the implication that if there was no agreement by then they would attack. It seemed clearly impossible to reach a comprehensive settlement by then, but at Roosevelt's urging Secretary of State Hull and his team sought to frame a *modus vivendi*, an interim position that could satisfy the Japanese well enough to keep the peace for a few more months during which it might be possible to work out a more enduring solution.

The problem was to do this without losing the support of the Allies and/or the public. A few leaks that hinted at what was being attempted drew sharply negative responses on both fronts and it came to seem clear that there was no possible hope of any viable compromise.<sup>46</sup> Finally Hull gave the Japanese a note which responded to their ultimatums by simply restating the same minimum conditions for a settlement that he had insisted on repeatedly for months. Japanese propagandists and others eager to justify the Japanese have ever since called it the "Hull ultimatum," but it was nothing of the sort: it was simply a principled rejection of the Japanese ultimatums. Even before it was received in Tokyo the Japanese high command had launched the machinery for war to an extent that in practice put it beyond recall.

### A war for what?

It's often claimed or at least implied that it was U.S. concern for China that ultimately lay behind the war. I have argued above that this does not hold water. Japan's aggression against China was a sore point with the American public from early on but neither public wrath nor economic interest was nearly sufficient to impel U.S. leaders to war.

Far more accurate to say that it was China that impelled Japan to war with the United States. In reality, the Japanese position in China bore a lot of parallels to the German experience in the West in World War I. Like the Germans they admired so much the Japanese army won the great majority of its battles but could not win the war, and like Germany Japan was being drained white by its effort to win the

unwinnable. Finally, much as Germany had attacked American ships in an ill-conceived effort to cut the flow of supplies to the European Allies in 1917, so Japan attacked in large measure to cut off those to China two dozen years later.

Like their German model the Japanese army had in the meantime shouldered aside the politicians, taking total control over the war effort. But taking unavoidable responsibility for the results along with the control made it all the harder to actually behave responsibly when it became clear that the army's "successes" in the field was leading the country into mortal danger. Army leaders confused loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the army as an institution and shied from exposing the army to the loss of power and influence that they feared would be the result of a retreat.

In Germany in 1918 army power had come to be concentrated in one dominant figure, General of Infantry Erich F. W. Ludendorff. When he cracked under the pressure of clearly-looming defeat it allowed the start of a process that led Germany to acceptance of a negotiated partial defeat rather than a total one, and allowed her to retain her sovereignty and power, albeit in much diminished form (and ultimately with disastrous consequences for all involved).<sup>47</sup>

Here the analogy becomes less illuminating. In 1941, thanks largely to Hitler, the Japanese army could imagine that it still had options, that by lashing out at the United States and Britain it might somehow wrest a settlement from them that would serve their institution better than being seen to back down in China. Of course it might have happened that the army could have come to be led by an individual or group who felt that the interests of the nation transcended those of their parochial institution and was according more open to genuine compromise, but it's hard to see any movement at all in this direction. Tōjō always was an unlikely candidate and when he was given the opportunity to rise to the role he quite explicitly refused. And it's difficult to see anyone who showed much real potential for better. We have to conclude that the Japanese army ultimately was innately programmed for self-destruction, like the cells of our bodies, owing to its own internal logic and structure.



In Japan on the eve of the Pacific War, as earlier in Germany, the navy played a generally negative but in any case subsidiary role; the army was more actively locked in combat and its much greater personnel reinforced its central political position. Some of the leaders of the Japanese navy came closer to a broad national view, but they could never hope to prevail against the parochialism of the army as well as most of their own colleagues. The navy might perhaps have had the capacity to hold the line against the army but taken as an institution it lacked the vision.

Thus if there was to be a settlement short of war it would have had to be one which spared the army from any stigma of defeat. And the propaganda of the army and their various allies and supporters had raised expectations so high as to make it extremely difficult to find anything that might have qualified

### **Insanity?**

It often is said that Japan had no chance of winning a war with the western powers. (By mid-1945 she was at war with virtually the entire world.) Depending on standards of measurement, Japan's industrial product was only about five percent to ten percent as great as the United States' and her population was at best about equal to that of the United States.<sup>48</sup>

Indeed, in August 1941 a study group drawn from outstanding mid-career officials in every government ministry spent two days briefing the cabinet on the results of six weeks of intensive study of Japan's prospects in a war, coming to extremely dismal conclusions. There was no way that Japan could avoid defeat, as they saw it.

Tōjō, who had taken careful notes, was unfazed. "This is, after all, a desktop exercise," he is reported to have said. "Actual wars do not go as you fellows imagine. We did not go to war with Russia [in 1904] thinking that we would win, but we did win." "Your work doesn't include elements of unpredictability," he insisted.<sup>49</sup>

In reality, it is necessary to define goals before deciding on what chance Japan had of achieving them. No one in a high place was thinking in terms of being in a position to dictate terms at sword's point (an often misquoted casual remark of Yamamoto not to the contrary). There never was a full and precise statement of war aims,

but it appears that what the Japanese leaders had in mind was to take over Southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies as well as the Philippines and then form a defensive redoubt around them which, in cooperation with the fleet, would be able to hold off American and British attacks.<sup>50</sup>

The disparity in warmaking potential between the United States and Britain on the one side and Japan on the other was so great that no Japanese defensive redoubt could stand against their combined attack unless they were somehow unwilling or unable to mass more than a fraction of their strength against it. Some of the Japanese leaders argued that the Allies (and especially the Americans) lacked the courage and determination to successfully carry an assault against Japanese forces, which were held to be inspired by a unique and unconquerable military spirit. The westerners, it was expected, would be thrown into despair by the intensity of Japanese resistance and give up the war as not worth its cost.

It was a curious notion. Eighty years earlier the United States had fought an enormously costly, bloody war against southern rebels. The southerners were able to mount a defense on land that was relatively far stronger than anything the Japanese could hope to achieve among islands in the Pacific and exacted casualties on a scale that still is almost beyond imagining. Yet the United States pursued the war relentlessly until the rebels were no longer able to offer effective resistance. Similarly, in World War One, less than a quarter century earlier, British and Commonwealth efforts had persevered despite huge costs and casualties. Surely such historical examples should have given pause to anyone who imagined that the Americans and British could be fought to a standstill by greatly inferior forces.

In fact, some Japanese officers claimed to believe that their forces could defeat enemies who were as much as twenty times their strength. This seems to have been a purely mystical belief, not founded in any cold-eyed military analysis. To the extent that the Japanese went to war on assumptions like this the decision can fairly said to have been irrational in the strict sense of the word.

But another possibility, one that seems to have figured more heavily with most of those at the top, was that the Allies would be

unable to mobilize much of their strength against the Japanese defenses. One major line of thinking was that Hitler would succeed in conquering Russia, or else negotiate a peace, and then turn his forces to conquer Britain, leaving the United States to face him alone. In 1941 this did not seem altogether out of the question, of course. But by late autumn it would be hard to argue rationally that the chances of Nazi victory in Russia were better than fifty-fifty.

Moreover, the Japanese were in a good position to assess the chances of a successful cross-Channel invasion as they had much relevant experience and planning staffs experienced in amphibious operations. They would have had to have seen, if they examined it, that such an operation could scarcely have had better than fifty percent chances of success.

That is, the overall combined chances of German success against both Russia and Britain would have appeared to have been no better than twenty-five percent, one chance in four. (We know now, of course, that the chance never was nearly that high.) That meant that there were at least three chances in four that the Allies could sooner or later throw a large measure of their strength into battering the Japanese redoubt.

On the whole, then, sober calculation would have said that by going to war with the Americans and British Japan would be running a high risk—surely well more than one chance in two, even by optimistic estimates—that her forces would face counterattack in irresistible strength. As Tōjō's remarks at the end of the briefing suggest, they were wagering the fate of their empire that "something would come up."

Was this "insane," as a number of authors have suggested? Perhaps so, but if so then it's a pretty common insanity. In the American Civil War the leaders of the rebels were making a pretty similar wager—which they lost spectacularly, of course.

Perhaps more relevantly, in 1914 the three major Continental European empires, the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian, had each chosen to go to war—and by the end of 1918 all had been destroyed as a direct result. None had been forced into war by invasion or overwhelming threat; each had other options open to it. And

none had realistic, thought-through plans for achieving its war aims and avoiding the destruction that was to overtake them.<sup>51</sup>

Three imperial gambles on war, and all lost, lost catastrophically. There's little to suggest much serious study of these directly relevant historical examples by the men who made the decision for war in 1941.<sup>52</sup> Their claim was that Japan had "no choice," that the alternative was the ruin of Japan and her empire, but the evidence goes all the other way. If the parochial interests of the army could somehow have been subjected to those of the nation, Japan had many options, scarcely any of which were less promising than war with two of the greatest powers on Earth.

Ironically, of course, ultimately the army's rigid insistence that it had to have victory and undiminished power over the country's affairs led it not only to defeat and ouster from power but to dissolution altogether. It was solely the political commitment of the key victors to the rule of law and due process, thin though it was, that saved most of its major officers from execution.

### **No appeasement, no peace**

Did the two countries mutually rush to a ruinous war, leaving on the table a genuine chance of a mutually-beneficial settlement of their differences, as many superficial analyses claim? No, certainly not. As just shown, any settlement would have had to satisfy the Japanese Army and preserve its power by at very least cashing its claims to have defeated China and secured a strong position in Asia.

The U.S. leaders, at the same time, were utterly unwilling to agree to anything they believed might significantly compromise their ability to ensure Hitler's destruction. Appeasing a hostile Japan at the expense of weakening and alienating developing allies China, Britain, and/or the Soviet Union seemed like dangerous folly. This was all the more so since Japan's course seemed from Washington to have been erratic and even irrational, leading to fears that costly concessions would not in the end achieve anything of positive value.

Nor did the Japanese leaders have any greater trust in the Americans than the Americans had in them. They had scarcely any notion of how the situation appeared from Washington and felt that Amer-

icans harbored irrational hostility toward Japan. The sense of hostility was not without foundation, but they failed to see that American hostility was much more than simple racial animosity, as they imagined, and it blinded them to the real political differences.



**Figure 29. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, center, escorts Japanese Ambassadors Nomura (on left) and Kurusu to call on the President in November 1941.**

The political differences might not have been absolute and final barriers to any settlement, but they could not be surmounted in the very limited time the Japanese were willing to allow before attacking. It is often said that the time limit was simply a result of the U.S. cut-off of oil shipments, but really that was only one factor of several. A very strong segment of the Japanese leadership had been set on war months before the freeze because they felt that Japan's own political situation was unstable and unsustainable owing to the war with China and at the same time they saw Hitler's victory express train with steam up and they wanted to be sure to climb aboard before it was too late. The U.S. leadership could see signs of this, especially so because they were reading Japanese "secret" diplomatic cables, and

this played a significant part in the decision to impose severe sanctions, together with the internal political pressures already astir in the country.

The hope that the sanctions would cause the Japanese to take pause was foredoomed, but no one seems to have placed much faith in this in any event. The hope that it might hinder Japan's preparations for war had more substance, but the time for that would have been far better a few years earlier. Whether it actually triggered a Japanese decision for war that might otherwise have gone the other way is not entirely clear, but on balance it seems unlikely. If the Japanese were indeed going to war it is unlikely that the oil cutoff really speeded the act by much of any, for there were many other reasons to launch it no later than early December.

If circumstances had allowed more time for negotiation and consideration it is certainly conceivable that some sort of settlement might have been reached, one that would be more nearly "Pareto optimal" in the sense of leaving at least some parties better off and none worse. The costs of the Pacific War after all were horrific and avoiding or ameliorating them would have brought enormous benefits to be shared out among the parties.

The impassioned efforts of many Japanese and apologists to indict the United States for the failure of the peace make no realistic sense whatever, however. Not only was Japan the most intransigent of the parties, she had far the most to lose and was far the most likely to lose it. That was entirely clear in 1941 and the logical implication is that responsible leadership in Tokyo, had there been any with the freedom to act, should have taken steps to define the nation's true core interests and to develop and pursue negotiating positions that would protect them effectively, rather than throwing them to the winds of war. There were in fact some high officials who recognized this, but they lacked the power or determination to carry it into practice, with tragic results for their nation and the world.

While the U.S. government did not play its part flawlessly, on the whole it performed a great deal better than the Japanese. It is perhaps ironic that the coming of the Pacific War has long been the subject of much more searching analysis in America than in Japan,

but it also is an aspect of why the American performance was superior at the time, for a consistent practice of self-analysis and self-criticism is a key factor in improvement.

The key question in analyzing the failure of peace in 1941 is not *who* but *how* and *why*. Those who avoid these issues do their nations and their institutions no service.

## Notes for Appendix B

---

<sup>1</sup> Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) remains the best overall treatment of the war. Gerhard L. Weinberg, *World War II: A very short introduction*, Very short introductions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) is a remarkably good treatment in a very condensed scope. Both cover the early phases of the European War effectively.

<sup>2</sup> Calvin W. Enders, "The Vinson Navy" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1970).

<sup>3</sup> Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun* 358-59.

<sup>4</sup> James W. Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940*, Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from *Taihei'yō Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) 191-214.

<sup>5</sup> The best informed and most penetrating analysis of American policy and actions in the year before Pearl Harbor is Waldo H. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Eri Hotta, *Japan 1941: Countdown to infamy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013) is the best overall treatment of Japanese thinking and action. Heinrichs provides a succinct summary of the main points as they relate to the conflict with Japan in Waldo H. Heinrichs, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Risks of War, 1939-1941," in *American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia, 1931-1949*, ed. Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1990).

<sup>6</sup> R. J. Overy, *The bombing war: Europe 1939-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2013) treats the perceptions and realities of bombing.

<sup>7</sup> Even as late as 1942, Alexander de Seversky's triumphalist book *Victory Through Air Power* was a popular and influential best seller.

<sup>8</sup> Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* 146-59 describes this. See also Akira Iriye, "Japan Against the ABCD Powers," in

*American, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives on wartime Asia, 1931-1949*, ed. Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1990).

<sup>9</sup> Sachiko Murakami, "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 6/1/1981) 121. Sumio Hatano and Sadao Asada, "The Japanese Decision to Move South (1939-1941)," in *Paths to war: New essays on the origins of the Second World War*, ed. Robert W. D. Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

<sup>10</sup> James W. Morley, ed., *The Fateful Choice: Japan's advance into South-east Asia 1939-1941*, Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyō Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) 117-124, 155-208. Murakami, "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945" traces the history in greater depth.

<sup>11</sup> David John Lu, *Agony of choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke and the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002) 145-57. Murakami, "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945" 63-66.

<sup>12</sup> Lu, *Agony of choice*. Masaharu Ano, "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far-Western Roots of a World-Political Vision," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 98, no. 2 (1987). Regarding Matsuoka's character cf. Frederick R. Dickinson, "Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yosuke and the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946 (review)," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (2004).

<sup>13</sup> Yoshitake Oka, *Konoe Fumimaro: A political biography* (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1992). The older transliteration, *Konoye*, is sometimes seen, as in Chonghan Kim, "Konoye Fumimaro and Japanese Foreign Policy, 1937-1941" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, March 1956).

<sup>14</sup> Morley, *Deterrent Diplomacy* 181-90; 191-257. Lu, *Agony of choice*, 159-66. Oka, *Konoe Fumimaro*, 118-23.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of State, ed., *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941*, 2 vols. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943) 171-73. Hotta, *Japan 1941* 54.

<sup>16</sup> Haruo Tohmatsu, "The Imperial Army Turns South: the IJA's Preparation for War against Britain, 1940-1941," in *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume III: The Military Dimension*, ed. Ian Gow and Yoichi Hiramatsu (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> Tom Lilley et al., *Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World War II* (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1947) 7.



<sup>18</sup> Warren F. Kimball, *The most unsordid act: Lend-lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

<sup>19</sup> Charles K. Hyde, *Arsenal of democracy: The American automobile industry in World War II* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2013) 3 & passim. While focused on the auto industry, this book gives a very clear and balanced picture of American industrial mobilization and production. Many popular books on mobilization are naïve panegyrics to private industry which seriously distort a complex story.

<sup>20</sup> This can be traced throughout Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*.

<sup>21</sup> R. J. C. Butow, *The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) remains the standard account of this episode.

<sup>22</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

<sup>23</sup> Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*.

<sup>24</sup> Kris J. Mitchener, "Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor. By Edward S. Miller.: book review," *Journal of Economic History* 68, no. 02 (2008).

<sup>25</sup> Jonathan G. Utey, *Going to war with Japan, 1937-1941* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985) 152-56.

<sup>26</sup> Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* 132-42 passim. See n68, 146-47 regarding the "rogue bureaucrat" theory.

<sup>27</sup> Murakami, "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945" 352-53.

<sup>28</sup> Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy* provides rich details, especially in Chapter 16.

<sup>29</sup> Michael A. Barnhart, "Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War, Chapter 14: 'Best Case' Analysis," in May, *Knowing One's Enemies* provides a broad overview. Most other publications about Japanese intelligence focus more narrowly on military intelligence.

<sup>30</sup> Alex Costin, "A Prince at Princeton," *Nassau Weekly*, 2/21/2015.

<sup>31</sup> David Kahn, "The United States on Germany and Japan in 1941: Chapter 16," in May, *Knowing One's Enemies* offers a number of sharp observations on the limitations of top-level American perceptions of the Japanese. See also Edward S. Barkin and L. M. Meyer, "Comint and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 2, no. 4 (1988); Erik J. Dahl, "Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway," *Intelligence*

and *National Security* 28, no. 1 (2013); Ralph L. DeFalco III, "Blind to the Sun: U.S. Intelligence Failures Before the War with Japan," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, most works on the role of racism and ethnocentrism are more hortatory than analytical in tone, so much so as to undermine their credibility. However, Howard Young, "Racial Attitudes and the U.S. Navy's Unpreparedness for War with Japan," in *New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers from the 5th Naval History Symposium*, ed. U.S. Naval Academy Department of History (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985 [1976]) provides examples of artless expressions of racism by U.S. naval leaders assessing the Japanese that speak eloquently for themselves.

<sup>33</sup> Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

<sup>34</sup> Best places to start include Hiroshi Minami, *Psychology of the Japanese people* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971 [1953]), Chie Nakane, *Human Relations in Japan: Summary Translation of "Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei" (Personal Relations in a Vertical Society)* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), and Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), as well as Kazuko Tsurumi, *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

<sup>35</sup> For population and GDP per capita comparisons see Angus Maddison, "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD," <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm>.

<sup>36</sup> Douglas MacArthur, "Can the Philippines Be Defended?," *Christian Science Monitor Weekend Magazine*, November 2, 1938, 1 & 15 offers a good sample of his views.

<sup>37</sup> Kerry Irish, "Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning," *Journal of Military History* 74, no. 2 (2010) addresses the tensions between the two men in the context of the overall mission, and summarizes the views of others.

<sup>38</sup> Brian McAlister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Miller, *War Plan Orange*. Roy K. Flint, "The United States Army on the Pacific Frontier, 1899-1939," in *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy, 1-3 October 1980*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington: United States Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1980).

<sup>39</sup> Daniel F. Harrington, "A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941," *Pacific Historical Review* 68, no. 2 (1979) is a good summary, although I question how well he grasps the psychological impact of the suddenness of the aeronautical revolution. See Arthur Krock, "Philippines as a Fortress: New Air Power Gives Islands Offensive Strength, Changing Strategy in Pacific," *New York Times*, November 19, 1941 for a contemporary perspective.

<sup>41</sup> Claire Boothe [Luce], "MacArthur of the Far East: If War Should Come He Leads the Army That Will Fight Japan," *Life* 11, no. 23 (December 8, 1941) 123-39. The article also outlines MacArthur's defense plans.

<sup>42</sup> Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000) is the best-known treatment and a good source of biographical detail, but relentlessly indicts its subject for every aggressive aspect of Japanese policy. A more rounded and balanced perspective is provided by Noriko Kawamura, *Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015). Other views also worth examining include Ikuhiko Hata, *Hirohito: The Shōwa Emperor in War and Peace*, with the assistance of Marius B. Jansen (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), Stephen S. Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A political biography* (London: Routledge, 1992), and Peter Wetzler, *Hirohito and war: Imperial tradition and military decision making in prewar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998).

<sup>43</sup> R. J. C. Butow, "Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: The Proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941," *The Journal of American History* 59, no. 1 (1972) remains the only focused study.

<sup>44</sup> Murakami, "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945" 359. Lt. Col. Tanemura was the actual keeper of the General Staff's war journal.

<sup>45</sup> On Tōjō see R. J. C. Butow, *Tojo and the coming of the war* (Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1961), still the standard source. Also worthwhile is Alvin D. Coox, *Tojo*, Ballantine's illustrated history of the violent century (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), although its value is limited by lack of references.

<sup>46</sup> Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the origins of the Pacific War: A study of British policy in East Asia, 1937-1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 265-67 describes this from the British standpoint.

<sup>47</sup> David Stevenson, *With our backs to the wall: Victory and defeat in 1918* (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) is a good summary.

<sup>48</sup> William D. O'Neil, "Interwar U.S. and Japanese National Product and Defense Expenditure," Working Paper CIM D0007249.A1 (Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 2003).

<sup>49</sup> Hotta, *Japan 1941*, 164-67.

<sup>50</sup> Michael W. Myers, *The Pacific War and contingent victory: Why Japanese defeat was not inevitable* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015) and James B. Wood, *Japanese military strategy in the Pacific War: Was defeat inevitable?* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) both lay out cases more or less along these lines and argue that they could have succeeded. In both cases the analyses suffer from serious deficiencies in scope and comprehensiveness.

<sup>51</sup> Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: Harper, 2013) describes the decision-making. For the defects and limitations of Germany's so-called "Schlieffen Plan," see William D. O'Neil, *The Plan That Broke the World: The "Schlieffen Plan" and World War I* (2014).

<sup>52</sup> As shown by Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan prepares for total war: The search for economic security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) and Crowley, *Japan's quest for autonomy*, some Japanese army officers did seek to profit by the war's lessons in better preparing the matériel basis of the army, although in the end their efforts had limited effects due to economic constraints.

## **Appendix C: Communications, Codes, and Transportation**

**I**SSUES OF COMMUNICATIONS, CODEBREAKING, AND transportation played very important roles in the story of Pearl Harbor. They are all more or less familiar activities today and it is easy to misunderstand how differently they functioned in 1941. This appendix briefly reviews the realities of that time.

### **A very distant outpost**

Washington was a very long way from Oahu in those days, and neither had a very clear understanding of the thinking of the other. Nowadays the top commanders in Hawaii can board a military jet transport in Oahu at the end of one day, be in Washington for a full round of conferences the next, and get back to their desks in Oahu in time to start the following day—if perhaps somewhat wearily. But in 1941 it was a minimum of a two-day trip in each direction, and could easily be considerably longer because even top officers were at the mercy of airline schedules, to say nothing of the weather. The flights ran only once or twice a week in each direction, so a round trip could not be completed in less than a week. There is scarcely any

place in the world that is as far from Washington today in terms of travel time as Oahu was then.

(According to the Pan American Airways System Atlantic and Pacific Time Tables for June–August 1941 (made available by courtesy of [timetableimages.com](http://timetableimages.com)) a Boeing 314 four-engined flying boat was due to depart Pearl Harbor at 2:20 PM every Monday, arriving at San Francisco at 3:00 PM the following day, after 17 hours in the air. At 2,400 miles (2,085 nautical miles) this was the longest transport flight in the world. Due to the fuel load required, only 25 passengers could be carried on this segment, although the 314 could normally sleep 30.<sup>1</sup> Depending on the timing of the connections it would have been possible to reach Washington DC early on Wednesday on an American Airlines overnight flight, flown in Douglas DC-3 twin-engined planes. The weekly westbound flight to Hawaii departed at 4:00 PM on Tuesday, arriving at 9:15 AM on Wednesday. Every other week there was an additional eastbound flight departing at 2:30 PM on Tuesday, arriving at Los Angeles the following day at 10:00 AM, with corresponding westbound service flying from Los Angeles at 4:00 PM Saturday to arrive at 8:30 AM Sunday at Pearl Harbor. In flying across country to meet the westbound flight it would be essential to allow a substantial layover to guard against a flight delay that could cause one to miss the only flight for a week. None of the aircraft was pressurized, forcing them to fly low where they were subject to the vagaries of the weather. Naturally the fares for such journeys were very high.)

Nor is there any major city that is as far out of touch with Washington now as Honolulu was in 1941. It was possible to make a telephone call, although the voice quality was not good and it took intervention by operators and time to set it up. But it was by a radio link and anyone who wanted to could listen in, including the Japanese. There were “scramblers,” but they made it even harder to understand what was being said at the other end, and communications experts had warned that they did scarcely anything to protect against serious eavesdropping. It was not until 1943 that the world’s first truly secure voice transmission system, codenamed SIGSALY, went into service.<sup>2</sup>

Airmail took two days to a week or more, depending on airline schedules and weather. The only quicker way to communicate securely was by coded message, via radio or telegraphic cable. The army and navy each had a message center in Washington and to send a message to Hawaii it first went to one of these. There it was encoded for secrecy, resulting in a series of groups of five seemingly random letters separated by spaces.

Then a decision had to be made about routing. The army and navy each had their own radio transmitters, and the FBI had theirs too, which the armed services used on occasion. Very often, particularly for routine messages, the choice fell to a commercial service, which might use either radio or an undersea cable that ran from San Francisco to Honolulu. Once a communications channel was established, actual transmission would go reasonably rapidly—a message the length of a newspaper op-ed article would take a few minutes, a rate of roughly one quarter to one fifth of normal reading speed. If the message was received at the other end without garbles due to radio noise it was then transcribed and decoded before the final version was carried to the recipient by messenger.

If all went well, a brief message might make it from army or navy headquarters in Washington to the commanders in Oahu in less than an hour. But there were many possibilities for delay. Poor receiving conditions could slow radio communications to a crawl, or even block them altogether for hours, building up long backlogs. This was especially true for the army. A turf dispute with the navy some years before had resulted in a treaty limiting army transmitters to a power of 10 kilowatts, and that often was not enough to stretch between the East Coast and Hawaii without relaying messages via San Francisco.<sup>3</sup> At such times the army routed most of its traffic via the commercial services, but often they would be running slowly because of the transmission problems.

This cumbersome process for sending radio or cable messages was not one that encouraged sending any but the most condensed and essential information.

## Reading Japan's diplomatic mail

As might be imagined, the diplomats on both sides faced even greater problems in communicating between Washington and Tokyo. The flights from the U.S. West Coast to Oahu continued on across the Pacific, hopping to the Midway Islands, on to Wake Island, to Guam, and to Manila, where connecting flights could be caught to Tokyo or other regional destinations. By this means it was possible to make one's way from Washington to Tokyo, or back the other way, in about a week. Comfortable accommodations and attentive service minimized the wear and tear on passengers during the long flights, but the cost was enormous and it was scarcely a pleasure trip. For less urgent trips it was usual to take a fast Japanese passenger steamer across the North Pacific (which could sometimes be pretty rough), resulting in a journey of two or two and a half weeks.

There were transpacific cable and radio services, including radio-telephone service, but the vagaries and delays were even greater than those of their mainland-Oahu counterparts.

Sensitive diplomatic messages could be sent by "diplomatic pouch," accompanied by a courier and not subject to inspection by foreign officials. The United States had an advantage in this because the transpacific flying boat service was operated by Pan American Airways, a U.S. company with strong government connections, and its flight crews acted as diplomatic couriers.

For many purposes, however, the week it took to fly a message from one capital to the other was too long. To preserve the secrecy of "diplomatic cables" (as they were and still are often called regardless of the actual mode of transmission) sent by cable or radio, cryptographic protection was used. *Book codes* had been used for centuries, employing a code book in which each word in the dictionary had a corresponding code word or random group of letters. But book codes have to have a lot of variations or else foreign intelligence services will quickly work out the code. In addition they're cumbersome to use.<sup>4</sup>



## Machine cryptography

Starting in World War I a number of inventors developed mechanical or electro-mechanical devices for encrypting and decrypting messages. They all used *ciphers*, meaning that messages were coded letter by letter rather than word by word. Manual ciphers had long been in use but machines made it possible to use very complex ciphers without laborious, slow, and error-prone hand processes. Every major nation adopted some cipher machine or another for at least a part of its secret messages.

Best-known of these was the *Enigma*, used by the Germans (among others, in various versions), which has featured in a number of novels and films, giving it an aura of romantic mystery. Commercial versions were available and widely used; they were studied by the communications intelligence services of every major nation and influenced the design of many other cipher machines to one extent or another.<sup>5</sup>

(Terminology varies, but according to an authoritative source, “The phrase ‘communications intelligence,’ abbreviated for the sake of convenience to ‘COMINT,’ means intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications, including the breaking, reading and evaluating enciphered communications; ‘cryptology’ is a synthetic which is applied to the combined cipher activity—i.e., constructing ciphers as well as breaking ciphers, to which, in turn, the synthetics ‘cryptography’ and ‘cryptanalysis’ are applied, respectively.”<sup>6</sup> People working in COMINT were usually referred to as *cryptologists* or *cryptanalysts*, depending in part on the specific scope and focus of their efforts.)

## U.S. cryptology

Almost by accident, the U.S. Army’s tiny Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) was headed by one of the world’s foremost cryptologists, Dr. William F. Friedman. Friedman was also an extremely able bureaucrat, who nurtured and built his little group all through the 1930s despite meager funding and weak top-level interest. The army was intensely parochial and distinctly anti-Semitic and it’s remarkable how much influence a Jewish civilian was able to wield.

It was not a result of the valuable intelligence that SIS provided for the army in peacetime. Most radios used by foreign armies had low power and limited range so that the U.S. Army was rarely in a position to listen in to exercises or conflicts. As a result, SIS had few intercepted messages to hone and practice its skills on, and was in no position to provide information about the order of battle, doctrine, or weapons of any potential enemies. (An *intercepted* message is simply one received by someone other than the intended recipient. Often shortened to just *intercept*.)

SIS's counterpart in the U.S. Navy was designated Op-20-G, and had much better access to foreign messages, at least those of the Japanese Navy.<sup>7</sup> It was led by Laurence Safford, a somewhat eccentric and remarkably accomplished naval officer. The Japanese Combined Fleet conducted fairly frequent large-scale exercises in the Pacific which offered good opportunities to observe Japanese operations and to collect the numerous encrypted messages that accompanied them. The U.S. Fleet developed the capacity to intercept Japanese messages and to employ radio direction finding (DF) to determine the location of the sender. The intercepts provided Op-20-G with a rich vein to mine, and by correlating what could be learned from the form and content of the intercepts with DF and what might be visible to observers much could be learned about Japanese thinking and practices (The Japanese reciprocated, following U.S. exercises and intercepting American messages. In fact, it appears that the Americans got the idea, at least in part, from the Japanese.)

Most of the navy's cryptologists were naval officers, for whom it was a sideline; service at sea was required for promotion and tended to interfere with development of special skills like cryptology. The navy had no one of William Friedman's stature, but did have one outstanding civilian, Mrs. Agnes Meyer Driscoll, who led its most challenging codebreaking efforts and ensured continuity as officers rotated in and out of the organization. And several talented officers had become very able and innovative cryptologists. The navy had a few officers who had studied the Japanese language but they served under the Director of Naval Intelligence and were organizationally

separate from the cryptology group. Only one navy cryptologist also had Japanese language skills.<sup>8</sup>

There was tension between the two service cryptologic groups, sometimes intense, reflecting the rivalry between their parent armed services. But there was also cooperation, principally on technical matters, varying with personalities in key positions. Crucially, Friedman and Safford respected each other and sought constructive solutions to interservice issues.<sup>9</sup>

Both SIS and Op-20-G were limited in their ability to collect foreign signals and process them quickly. The navy had intercept stations in the Philippines, Guam, Oahu, and the Pacific Northwest. Somewhat later the army developed its own intercept capabilities in all of these regions except Guam. But neither service had a fast, secure means to transmit intercepted material to higher commands. The major analytical capabilities were in Washington and at very best it would take more than a week for material from the Western Pacific stations to get there, with most taking a month or more. This was more or less acceptable as long as the object was to understand Japanese cryptosystems, but it was hopeless for tactical and operational purposes. Occasionally a piece of extremely urgent information would be encrypted in a special U.S. system and sent by radio, but this was a limited capability that could not handle much.

Eventually the services linked their COMINT activities by cable and teletype for rapid, secure transmission of information. But this was a huge task, and not much was accomplished until well into the coming war.

### **More than codebreaking**

Actually, it was only in the last years of peace that the COMINT organizations even had direction-finding capabilities to deal with many of the most important messages. Radio had been an invention of the late 1800s and at the time of Pearl Harbor the U.S. Navy had been using it for only four decades. The changes in radio technology over that period had been hectic.

One of the major concerns, especially for navies, was to develop radio systems that could communicate over oceanic distances without excessive bulk, weight, or power. An answer was found in radios

operating at frequencies between about 3 MHz and 30 MHz, corresponding to waves between 100 meters and 10 m long. This was called the HF (high frequency) or shortwave band.<sup>10</sup> (“High” and “short” relative to earlier radios; today frequencies more than 1,000 times higher and wavelengths less than one one-thousandth as long are widely used in communications.)

The attraction of HF was that under many conditions radio waves in this band will be essentially reflected off layers in the Earth’s ionosphere, scores of hundreds of miles above the surface, returning to the surface hundreds or thousands of miles from the transmitter. Multiple “hops” can carry the signal around the world. The power required was much less than that for long-distance communication using lower frequency bands, and the antennas also could be smaller. Within a decade, by 1930, HF radio was spreading widely through the warship fleets of the world.<sup>11</sup>

Before the HF revolution all long-distance radio communication had been by “ground wave” (or “surface wave”), meaning that the radio waves followed the curving surface of the ground. (Actually, this works best over seawater.) At very low frequencies, using high power, ground waves can be used to communicate halfway around the world. The challenges of finding the direction from which ground waves at LF and MF frequencies (30 kHz to 3 MHz) had been met by the time of World War I, and LF/DF and MF/DF had played valuable roles in the war.<sup>12</sup>

But HF “sky wave” transmissions reflected from the ionosphere presented new problems for direction finding, and the established methods were definitely inadequate, yielding large and erratic errors.<sup>13</sup> HF/DF sets were available in the mid-1930s, but they did not fully meet military needs.<sup>14</sup> The U. S. Navy’s Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was a pioneer in HF research and development and in 1936 it developed what is said to have been the first HF/DF system to meet operational needs for accuracy. In its production version, designated Model DT, it was installed at many sites in the Pacific from 1938 onward.<sup>15</sup>

## The MAGIC of breaking Type B

In the absence of foreign army radio traffic to intercept and analyze, Friedman and his SIS had taken on the task of reading Japanese diplomatic messages. In 1931 Japanese Navy cryptologists developed the Type A Cipher Machine and furnished it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for transmission of diplomatic messages. U.S. cryptologists soon began to encounter messages encrypted in the new system, which for security purposes they eventually code-named “Red.”

The Japanese did not have the long history of using and breaking codes and ciphers that the Europeans and even Americans had. They had only recently started studying the art, and still had much to learn. This was apparent in the Red system, which was fairly quickly solved by Friedman’s SIS, and later by the British and German cryptologic services as well as that of the Soviets (who got a leg up from espionage).<sup>16</sup>

Japan’s naval cipher experts continued to work on more complex and secure techniques and by 1939 major Japanese embassies were phasing in the Type B Cipher Machine, later known by its American code-name, “Purple.” This was a much more sophisticated system whose overall complexity was comparable to that of the famous German “Enigma.”<sup>17</sup> In 18 months of intense, exhausting effort an army SIS team headed by one of Friedman’s young deputies, Frank B. Rowlett, not only worked out the operation of the Purple system but built a functional replica that duplicated the operations of the Type B machine. There were occasional delays and hangups but for the most part the Americans were able to decrypt Japanese diplomatic messages within two or three days of intercepting them, and often much sooner. Indeed, because the American Purple replica machines were more efficient and reliable than the Japanese originals they sometimes read cables before their intended recipients could.

Recognizing that knowledge is power, those in positions of power seek knowledge—and those who hope for favor from the powerful compete to provide it. The breaking of Purple had been an army effort, with some navy support. (The replica machines were made by the Naval Gun Factory, for instance.) But there was a high-level

squabble over who was to break the key messages and distribute them to top leaders. Eventually the two services agreed to share the honor (and burden) in a fairly reasonable way.

In addition to the intense high-level interest, attacking Japanese diplomatic systems had the practical advantage that it was not too difficult to collect the signals. Intercept stations with sensitive receivers (and operators especially trained to copy Japanese transmissions) located in the Pacific Northwest, for instance, could effectively collect radio signals between Tokyo and Washington, D.C. Moreover, *sub rosa* (and illicit) arrangements were made with the commercial communications companies that handled Japanese traffic to make copies.

### **Military mysteries**

But while Purple provided extremely valuable information there were important limits and problems. The Japanese military insisted that it was the business of diplomats to do as they were directed and not to ask questions. They certainly did not think that diplomats should be told any military secrets whatever. Thus Purple, which was strictly a Ministry of Foreign Affairs system, yielded scarcely any direct insight into Japanese military plans.

Although providing crucial information to the president and other top officials had many rewards, it diverted resources and attention from the military communications that the army's SIS and the navy's Op-20-G were chartered to pursue. This did not make too much difference for SIS, which still had little access to Japanese or German messages. But Op-20-G was accumulating a growing backlog of tens of thousands of Japanese naval messages that it could not break.

Through much of the 1930s the cryptologists had read Japanese naval messages pretty regularly. This would be interrupted from time to time as the Japanese Navy changed its codes, but sooner or later Op-20-G always solved the new systems. But breaking a new code was laborious and time-consuming, even though Op-20-G used the latest-technology IBM high-speed punched-card tabulating machinery to aid them.<sup>18</sup>

Major changes were made in what the codebreakers called the Japanese Navy's "Operations Code" multiple times in 1940 and 1941,

at the same time that the volume of messages sent in the code multiplied. (This code was later codenamed JN-25 by the Americans.) Cryptology and COMINT involves very specialized skills and Op-20-G was able to expand its capabilities only quite slowly. Moreover, a great deal of their resources was absorbed in working on Purple and on German systems. The result was the buildup of a backlog of more than 25,000 unread messages by the time of Pearl Harbor. Some important progress had been made on the system, but not enough to actually read any messages.<sup>19</sup>

### **Keeping the secrets**

In the course of breaking many Japanese and other encryption systems in the 1920s and 1930s the army and navy cryptologists learned a great deal about what made them easier or harder to crack. As a result, they were keenly aware of the deficiencies in many U.S. crypto systems. As funds permitted each service worked on the development of cipher machines, with sporadic exchanges of information, ideas, and specific inventions. The navy had the advantages that its top leadership had long been sold on the concept of cipher machines and that there was a modest navy budget for development of machine for encipherment.<sup>20</sup>

By the end of the 1930s each service had workable, secure machines serving its major headquarters. In 1940, pooling their ideas, they settled on a common system designated the Converter M-134-C SIGABA by the army and Electric Cipher Machine Mk. II (ECM II) by the navy. By late 1941 the major commands in each service were outfitted with the new machine, the first truly unbreakable cipher system that was practical for extensive use. The State Department had earlier versions of this system in service in Washington and London, but elsewhere relied on less secure systems—notably insecure in some cases. Well-founded doubts about State Department cable security played a role in impeding negotiations with Japan.<sup>21</sup>

### **Keeping the secrets too well?**

One of the great tensions of intelligence work is that between the desire to make use of the information it has revealed without at the

same time revealing how that information was gained, and thus hampering efforts to obtain more. It's a particular puzzle in COMINT because even the slightest hint that you're reading the other side's messages can, if he is alert, prompt an immediate change in his communications, cutting off your source. COMINT can be a goose that lays golden eggs, but an extremely skittish goose.

In 1940 and 1941 American military intelligence agencies had relatively little experience in such matters and no established procedures for simultaneously telling key decision-makers of their secrets and preserving their source. From our perspective today it was clearly an error to leave decisions about the handing of top-level diplomatic intelligence to military men, but that's how it was, by default.

Outside of the army and navy intelligence organizations—the only intelligence agencies America then had—the information gained from breaking Japan's diplomatic messages was extremely tightly held. Codenamed MAGIC it was restricted to a few key officers on the army and navy staffs, the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and sometimes the President (but sometimes withheld from him out of concerns regarding White House security). They got to see the messages and the summaries that the military intelligence agencies had produced, but could not keep them. (They didn't actually read all of the traffic; there was simply too much and the military intelligence chiefs selected what they thought the top officials ought to see.) This meant that while the service chiefs had the benefit of support from staff officers who were able to follow the mass of MAGIC material from day to day and evaluate it in context, Hull and Roosevelt for the most part did not. Today, no high official in the U.S. Intelligence Community would give even a moment's consideration to such arrangements for handling top-level diplomatic intelligence in a crisis period.

People being what they are, some people got wind of MAGIC who should not have, including Kimmel, who complained that he ought to have it too. Given the problems of communication between Washington and Oahu it was absolutely out of the question to try to send MAGIC decrypts to him. The only feasible way to handle it would have been to give him one of machines and train his intelli-



gence people to duplicate the work being done in Washington, with some minimal information transmitted to aid the process.

In practice, General Marshall and Admiral Stark and their staffs tried to extract the important information from MAGIC, paraphrase it in a way that concealed the source, and transmit it promptly—a process usually called *sanitization*.

Later analysis, after the fact, showed a few subtle details missed by Washington in the MAGIC messages that might have seemed revealing if one were looking intently for signs of a possible surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. But the problem was not that the decrypted messages were not being reviewed in Hawaii; it was that they were not being reviewed by anyone searching for signs of a possible surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. Neither Kimmel, Short, nor anyone close to them was in fact looking for signs of a possible surprise air attack. Thus having them all reviewed in Hawaii would be unlikely to have added much.

In the process the manpower demands of running a duplicate MAGIC organization would certainly have destroyed the effectiveness of the intelligence staff in providing the operational intelligence that the Hawaiian commanders actually needed—much as it had undermined Op-20G's efforts on the Japanese naval codes.

Short and Kimmel begged off on getting a radar air warning service in timely operation on Oahu because they did not think they could spare the officers to man it or feed it the necessary flight information. So how were they going to find officers to handle and pore through Japanese diplomatic messages in search of clues that might indicate the need for the air warning service?

Since Pearl Harbor a regular industry of sensationalists has fostered myths about Japanese naval communications, spinning tales of Americans decrypting Japanese naval codes, intercepting unguarded messages, and locating transmissions by the carrier fleet on its way to Pearl Harbor. It is all complete fantasy. All of the success in decrypting naval codes came later (although the work done before Pearl Harbor provided an essential foundation). And traffic analysis and direction finding (which was done in Hawaii, under Kimmel's

thumb) were blinded by rigorous Japanese operational security measures before Pearl Harbor.<sup>22</sup>

## Notes for Appendix C

---

<sup>1</sup> See “In Search of an Icon” at <http://rbogash.com/B314.html> for a statement to this effect by Dave Bridges, a former 314 co-pilot on this route.

<sup>2</sup> James V. Boone and R. R. Peterson, *The Start of the Digital Revolution: SIGSALY Secure Digital Voice Communications in World War II* (Fort George G. Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2000). M[orton] D. Fagen, ed., *National Service in War & Peace (1926-1975)*, A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System Volume 2 (Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1978) 291-317.

<sup>3</sup> Terrett, *The Signal Corps* 52, 301.

<sup>4</sup> While not fully current, David Kahn, *The codebreakers: The story of secret writing* (New York: Scribner, 1967, 1996) remains a very engaging introduction to the subject. Simon Singh, *The code book: The science of secrecy from ancient Egypt to quantum cryptography* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999) also is good. Friedrich Ludwig Bauer, *Decrypted secrets: Methods and maxims of cryptology*, 4th, rev. and updated ed. (Berlin: Springer, 2007) is more serious, technical and thorough.

<sup>5</sup> For the history and operation of the Enigma and related machines see Stephen J. Kelley, *Big Machines: Cipher Machines in World War II* (Walnut Creek, California: Aegean Park Press, 2001) as well as Bauer, *Decrypted secrets*, passim.

<sup>6</sup> Laurance F. Safford, “A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States” SRH-149, March 1952 (Released by National Security Agency, Ft. George Meade, MD, 2009) 1 fn.

<sup>7</sup> Frederick D. Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941*, U. S. Cryptologic History, Series IV: World War II Vol 6 (Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1994) traces the history of Op-20-G as far as surviving records permit.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 36-37.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas L. Burns, *The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952*, U. S. Cryptologic History, Series V: Early Postwar Period Vol VI (Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2005) 5-7.

<sup>10</sup> International Telecommunications Union, “Nomenclature of the Frequency and Wavelength Bands Used in Telecommunications,” Rec. ITU-R V.431-8 (Aug 2015). In practice, many HF radios, for technical reasons, were (and are) made to operate at frequencies as low as 2 MHz, thus extending into the MF (medium frequency) band.

<sup>11</sup> Arthur Hezlet, *Electronics and sea power* (New York: Stein and Day, 1975) 156-63.

<sup>12</sup> Guy Hartcup, *The war of invention: Scientific developments, 1914-18* (London: Brassey's Defence, 1988) 123-27.

<sup>13</sup> The issues are discussed in R. Keen, *Wireless Direction Finding* (London: Wireless World and Iliffe & Sons Ltd, 1938) 377-83 (a standard text at the time), as well as P. G. Redgment, “High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Royal Navy: Development of Anti-U-Boat Equipment, 1941-5,” in *The applications of radar and other electronic systems in the Royal Navy in World War 2*, ed. F. A. Kingsley (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) 248-50.

<sup>14</sup> E.g., the Marconi-Adcock DFG 12 system described in Keen, *Wireless Direction Finding* 390-99. Notwithstanding any limitations this set and ones like it saw extensive use in World War II. It is broadly representative in most ways of HF/DF systems widely used in World War II and beyond.

<sup>15</sup> Louis A. Gebhard, *Evolution of Naval Radio-Electronics and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory* (Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1979) 307-08. See Jack S. Holtwick, Jr., Jack S., ed., *History of the Naval Security Group to World War Two* (Pensacola, Florida: U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, 2006) for more regarding the Navy's early struggles with HF/DF, bearing in mind that many of the officers quoted had limited grasp of the technical issues.

<sup>16</sup> Kelley, *Big Machines* 77-83. Stephen Budiansky, *Battle of wits: The complete story of codebreaking in World War II* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) 84-88.

<sup>17</sup> While many authors have expressed diverse opinions about the relative complexity of the Purple and Enigma, Kelley, *Big Machines* provides a clear, direct analysis.

<sup>18</sup> Regarding punched-card machinery see Lars Heide, *Punched-card systems and the early information explosion, 1880-1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) and Martin Campbell-Kelly, “Chapter 4: Punched-Card Machinery,” in *Computing before computers*, ed. William Aspray (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990). IBM was only the most prominent of several manufacturers, but I have seen no references to use of other machines by U.S. cryptanalysts.

<sup>19</sup> On the breaking of the Japanese naval codes up to Pearl Harbor see Stephen Budiansky, "Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor," *Cryptologia* 24, no. 2 (2007): 119-30; Stephen Budiansky, "Too Late for Pearl Harbor," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 125, no. 12 (Dec 1999): 47-51; Philip H. Jacobsen, "Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No! The Story of the U. S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B," *Cryptologia* 27, no. 3 (Jul 2003): 193-205; Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited*; Geoffrey Sinclair, "JN-25 Fact Sheet," version 1.1, Sep 2004, [http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Pacific/CodeBreaking/JN25\\_Factsheet.html](http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Pacific/CodeBreaking/JN25_Factsheet.html)

<sup>20</sup> Development of Army and Navy machine systems is clearly summarized in Kelley, *Big Machines* 108-37, with many further details filled in by Timothy J. Mucklow, *The SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine: "A Beautiful Idea"* (Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2015).

<sup>21</sup> On the insecurity of State Department crypto systems see 488-501 of Kahn, *The codebreakers*.

<sup>22</sup> Philip H. Jacobsen, "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 142-9; Philip Jacobsen, "Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force," *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 695-718; Philip H. Jacobsen, "Pearl Harbor: Who Deceived Whom?," *Naval History Magazine* 17, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 27-32.

## Appendix D: Principal Persons

**T**HIS SECTION VERY BRIEFLY OUTLINES the careers of people who play a prominent role in this story at more than one place in it.

**Andrews, Frank M.** 1884-1943. U.S. Army officer from graduation from West Point in 1906 to his death in an air crash while on an inspection tour. Initially a cavalry officer, he transferred to the Signal Corps Aviation Section during World War I and became a pilot in 1918. In the 1930s he was a prominent proponent of the theory that strategic bombing would be decisive in any future conflict. Andrews was close to George Marshall and when Marshall became the Army's Chief of Staff in 1939 he brought the airman to Washington as one of his chief lieutenants. In 1940 he was sent to reform and revitalize the defenses in the Caribbean and Panama, where he was serving as a lieutenant general in command of U.S. forces throughout the region at the time of Pearl Harbor. In 1942-43 he held top-level command posts in the Mideast and Europe.

**Hull, Cordell.** 1871-1955. Represented Tennessee in House of Representatives and Senate as Democrat for three decades before appointment as Secretary of State by President Roosevelt in 1933. Re-

tired from office in 1944. Noted for advocacy of free trade and United Nations.

**Kimmel, Husband E.** 1882-1968. Graduated from Naval Academy in 1904. Served in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers as well as in staff positions, reaching flag rank in 1937. Appointed Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet in January 1941 with rank of admiral. Following the Japanese attack he was relived and automatically reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral. He retired early in 1942.

**Konoe, Fumimaro.** (Sometimes transliterated as **Konoye**.) 1891-1945. High-ranking nobleman closely related to the imperial house. Prominent critic of the West and proponent of Japanese expansion. Prime Minister 1937-1939, resigning in frustration over futile attempts to end the war with China on terms acceptable to Japanese Army. Became Prime Minister again 1940. Resigned in October 1941 in frustration over futile attempts to find formula for peace with the West on terms acceptable to Army. Continued to play important role behind the scenes. Committed suicide while under threat of prosecution by International Military Tribunal for the Far East as a war criminal.

**Marshall, George C.** 1880-1959. Graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1901 and commissioned in Infantry in 1902. Became renowned for abilities in planning and organization. Promoted to brigadier general in 1936 and became Army Chief of Staff as general in 1939, remaining in the post until war's end. Later served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

**Matsuoka, Yōsuke.** 1880-1946. Emigrated to United States at age 13 in hopes of reviving family fortunes. Received law degree from University of Oregon before returning to Japan for family reasons. Entered Japanese diplomatic service 1904. Left in 1922 for Japanese colonial regime in Manchuria. In 1930 resigned and returned to Japan to pursue career as nationalist politician, gaining prominence. Appointed Foreign Minister in Konoe cabinet in 1940. Negotiated the Tripartite Pact which allied Japan with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, as well as nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Forced out in 1941 because he was perceived as too erratic and

an obstacle to making a settlement with the United States. Escaped post-war prosecution due to ill health and died of tuberculosis.

**Roosevelt, Franklin D.** (Often referred to by his initials, **FDR**.) 1882-1945. President of the United States, 1933-1945. Died in office.

**Short, Walter C.** 1880-1949. Graduated from University of Illinois in 1901 and commissioned in Infantry in 1902. Gained note for excellence in training. Promoted to general officer rank in 1936. Became commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department as lieutenant general in February 1941. Automatically reverted to his permanent rank of major general upon relief from command following the attack and retired at that rank early in 1942.





## Bibliography

- Allard, Dean C. "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective." In *The Naval Arms Race, 1930-1941*. Vol. 73. Edited by Jürgen Rowher, 35-50. Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire. Stuttgart: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1991.
- Allen, G. C. *A short economic history of modern Japan*. 4th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Anderson, Charles R. *Day of lightning, years of scorn: Walter C. Short and the attack on Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 2005.
- Ano, Masaharu. "Yosuke Matsuoka: The Far-Western Roots of a World-Political Vision." *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 98, no. 2 (1987): 164-204.
- Asada, Sadao. *Culture shock and Japanese-American relations: Historical essays*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.
- . *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: American strategic theory and the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2012.
- Auer, James E. and Tsuneo Watanabe, eds. *From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who was responsible?* Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006.
- Barkin, Edward S., and L. M. Meyer. "Comint and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 2, no. 4 (1988): 513-31.
- Barnhart, Michael A. "Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War, Chapter 14: 'Best Case' Analysis." In May, *Knowing One's Enemies*, 425-55.
- . *Japan prepares for total war: The search for economic security, 1919-1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- . "Hornbeck Was Right: The Realist Approach to American Policy toward Japan." In *Pearl Harbor reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific war*. Edited by Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

- Bauer, Friedrich L. *Decrypted secrets: Methods and maxims of cryptology*. 4th, rev. and updated ed. Berlin: Springer, 2007.
- Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.
- Berger, Gordon M. "Politics and mobilization in Japan, 1931-1945." In Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.
- Berinsky, Adam J. "American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 499-529.
- Berinsky, Adam J., Eleanor N. Powell, Eric Schickler, and Ian B. Yohai. "Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 3 (June 2011): 515-20.
- Bix, Herbert P. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. New York: Harper-Collins, 2000.
- Boone, James V., and R. R. Peterson. *The Start of the Digital Revolution: SIG-SALY Secure Digital Voice Communications in World War II*. Fort George G. Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2000.
- Booth [Luce], Claire. "MacArthur of the Far East: If War Should Come He Leads the Army That Will Fight Japan." *Life* 11, no. 23 (December 8, 1941): 123-39.
- Borch, Frederic L., and Daniel Martinez. *Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The final report revealed*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 2005.
- Boxer, Charles R. *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948.
- . *The Christian century in Japan 1549-1650*. Manchester: Carcanet in association with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1951.
- . *The Portuguese seaborne empire: 1415-1825*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1975.
- Brands, H. W. *Bound to empire: The United States and the Philippines*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Bridges, William. *The character of organizations: Using personality type in organization development*. Updated ed. Palo Alto, Calif.: Davies-Black Pub, 2000.
- Bronfenbrenner, Martin. "Japan and Two World Economic Depressions." In Dore; Sinha; Sako, *Japan and world depression*, 32-51.
- Budiansky, Stephen. "Too Late for Pearl Harbor." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 125, no. 12 (Dec 1999): 47-51.
- . *Battle of wits: The complete story of codebreaking in World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
- . "Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor." *Cryptologia* 24, no. 2 (2007): 119-30.
- Bureau of the Census. *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*. Washington: Department of Commerce, 1960.
- . *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*. 2 vols. Bicentennial Edition. Washington: Department of Commerce, 1975.

- Burns, Thomas L. *The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952*. U. S. Cryptologic History, Series V: Early Postwar Period Vol VI. Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2005.
- Butow, R. J. C. *Tojo and the coming of the war*. Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1961.
- . "Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: The Proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941." *The Journal of American History* 59, no. 1 (1972).
- . *The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.
- Campbell, N. J. M. *Naval weapons of World War Two*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985.
- Campbell-Kelly, Martin. "Chapter 4: Punched-Card Machinery." In *Computing before computers*. Edited by William Aspray. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990.
- Cantril, Hadley and Mildred Strunk, eds. *Public Opinion, 1935-1946*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.
- Caravaggio, Angelo N. "The Attack at Taranto." *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 6 (Summer 2006).
- Carter, Susan B., Scott S. Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds. *Historical statistics of the United States: Earliest times to the present*. Millennial ed. 5 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Chang, Hsin-pao. *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. Norton library N521. New York: Norton, 1970.
- Clark, Christopher. *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*. New York: Harper, 2013.
- Clodfelter, Mark. "Pinpointing Devastation: American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor." *The Journal of Military History* 58 (Jan 1994): 75-101.
- Cohen, Jerome B. *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.
- Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, ed. *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.
- Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild. *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*. United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964.
- Coox, Alvin D. "Chrysanthemum and Star: Army and Society in Modern Japan." In *The Military and Society: The Proceedings of the Fifth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy 5-6 Oct. 1972*. Edited by David MacIsaac, 37-60. Washington and Colorado Springs: Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force Academy, 1972.
- . *Tojo*. Ballantine's illustrated history of the violent century. New York: Ballantine Books, 1975.

- . *The anatomy of a small war: The Soviet-Japanese struggle for Changkufeng, Khasan, 1938*. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press, 1977.
- . *Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Pr, 1990.
- Copp, DeWitt S. *Frank M. Andrews: Marshall's Airman*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003.
- Costin, Alex. "A Prince at Princeton." *Nassau Weekly*, 2/21/2015.
- Craig, Albert. "The Restoration Movement in Chôshû." *Journal of Asian Studies* 18, no. 2 (1959): 187–97.
- Crowley, James B. *Japan's quest for autonomy: National security and foreign policy, 1930–1938*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Dahl, Erik J. "Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway." *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 1 (2013): 68–90.
- Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932–1945: With a new afterword*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 1995.
- Daniels, Roger. *The politics of prejudice: The anti-Japanese movement in California and the struggle for Japanese exclusion*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
- DeFalco III, Ralph L. "Blind to the Sun: U.S. Intelligence Failures Before the War with Japan." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 1 (2003): 95–107.
- Dickinson, Frederick R. *War and national reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999.
- . "Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yosuke and the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880–1946 (review)." *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (2004): 167–71.
- Doenecke, Justus D., and Mark A. Stoler. *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policies, 1933–1945*. Debating twentieth-century America. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Dore, Ronald, Radha Sinha, and with M. Sako, eds. *Japan and world depression: Then and now*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987; Essays in memory of E.F. Penrose.
- Drea, Edward J. *In the service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1998.
- . *Japan's Imperial Army: Its rise and fall, 1853–1945*. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2009.
- Dunbar, R. I. M., John Gowlett, and Clive Gamble. *Thinking big: How the evolution of social life shaped the human mind*. London: Thames & Hudson, 2014.
- Duus, Peter, ed. *The Twentieth Century*. 6 vols. The Cambridge history of Japan Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988–1999.
- Eichengreen, Barry. *Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses—And Misuses—Of History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

- Elisonas, Jurgis. "Christianity and the Daimyo." In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 4: *Early Modern Japan*. Edited by John W. Hall, 301–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Enders, Calvin W. "The Vinson Navy." Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1970.
- Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
- Fagen, M[orton] D., ed. *National Service in War & Peace (1926-1975)*. A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System Volume 2. Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1978.
- Fairbank, John K. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953.
- , ed. *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10: *Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Fay, Peter W. *The Opium War, 1840-1842*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
- Flint, Roy K. "The United States Army on the Pacific Frontier, 1899-1939." In *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy, 1-3 October 1980*. Edited by Joe C. Dixon. Washington: United States Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1980.
- Foster, Jonathan K. *Memory: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Fryer, Roland G., and Steven D. Levitt. "Hatred and Profits: Under the Hood of the Ku Klux Klan." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127, no. 4 (2012): 1883–1925.
- Fujisawa, Shūhei, and Gavin Frew (trans.). *The bamboo sword: and other samurai tales*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2005.
- Garver, John W. "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party." *The China Quarterly* 113 (1988): 29.
- . "China." In *The origins of World War Two: The debate continues*. Edited by Robert W. D. Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo, 191–203. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Gebhard, Louis A. *Evolution of Naval Radio-Electronics and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory*. Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1979.
- Goldman, Stuart D. *Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's victory that shaped World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013.
- Grey, C. G. and Leonard Bridgman, eds. *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1940*. London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Company, 1941; Issued March 1941.
- Gudmens, Jeffrey J. *Staff Ride Handbook for the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941: A Study of Defending America*. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.
- Guerlac, Henry E. *RADAR in World War II. The History of Modern Physics, 1800-1950* 8. Los Angeles/New York: Tomash Publishers/American Institute of Physics, 1987.

- Hagedorn, Dan, SR., and Dan Hagedorn, JR. *The Douglas B-18 and B-23: America's forsaken warriors*. Manchester: Crécy Publishing Ltd, 2014.
- Hall, John W., ed. *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Hall, John W., Keiji Nagahara, and Kōzō Yamamura, eds. *Japan before Tokugawa: Political consolidation and economic growth, 1500 to 1650*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Hanada, Tomoyuri. "The Nomonhan Incident and the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact." In Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*.
- Hane, Mikiso, and Louis G. Perez. *Modern Japan: A historical survey*. 5th ed. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2013.
- Hanyok, Robert J. "'Catching the Fox Unaware': Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor." *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 99–124.
- . "How the Japanese Did It." *Naval History Magazine* 23, no. 6 (Dec 2009): 44.
- Harrington, Daniel F. "A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941." *Pacific Historical Review* 68, no. 2 (1979): 217–38.
- Harris, Eugene E. *Ancestors in our genome: The new science of human evolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Hartcup, Guy. *The war of invention: Scientific developments, 1914–18*. London: Brassey's Defence, 1988.
- Haslam, Jonathan. *The Soviet Union and the threat from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the prelude to the Pacific War*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992.
- Hata, Ikuhiko. *Hirohito: The Shōwa Emperor in War and Peace*. With the assistance of Marius B. Jansen. Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Hata, Ikuhiko, and Alvin D. Coox (trans.). "Continental expansion, 1905–1941." In Duus, *The Twentieth Century*, 271–314.
- Hatano, Isamu. "London Naval Conference, Imperial Court, Political Parties, and the Imperial Japanese Navy: Lecture 4." In Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*, 65–82.
- Hatano, Sumio, and Sadao Asada. "The Japanese Decision to Move South (1939–1941)." In *Paths to war: New essays on the origins of the Second World War*. Edited by Robert W. D. Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.
- Heide, Lars. *Punched-card systems and the early information explosion, 1880–1945*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
- Heinrichs, Waldo H. *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition*. New York: Little, Brown & Co, 1966.
- . *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- . "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Risks of War, 1939–1941." In *American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia, 1931–1949*. Edited by Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen. Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1990.

- Hezlet, Arthur. *Electronics and sea power*. New York: Stein and Day, 1975.
- Historical Division. *Barrage Balloon Development in the United States Army Air Corps, 1923 to 1942*. Army Air Forces Historical Studies, No. 3. Washington: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, n.d. (1943?).
- Hofmann, George F. *Through mobility we conquer: The mechanization of U.S. Cavalry*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.
- Holtwick, Jr., Jack S., ed. *History of the Naval Security Group to World War Two*. Pensacola, Florida: U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, 2006.
- Hoover, Herbert. *The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933: Memoirs*. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Hotta, Eri. *Japan 1941: Countdown to infamy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.
- Howe, Christopher. "Japan's Economic Experience in China before the Establishment of the People's Republic of China: a Retrospective Balance-sheet." In Dore; Sinha; Sako, *Japan and world depression*, 155-77.
- Howland, Douglas R. "Samurai status, class, and bureaucracy: A historiographical essay." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 2 (May 2001): 353-80.
- Hyde, Charles K. *Arsenal of democracy: The American automobile industry in World War II*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2013.
- Ike, Mōtōkida, ed. *Japan's decision for war: Records of 1941 Policy Conferences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.
- Ikegami, Eiko. *The taming of the samurai: Honorific individualism and the making of modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Irish, Kerry. "Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines: There Must Be a Day of Reckoning." *Journal of Military History* 74, no. 2 (2010): 439-73.
- Iriye, Akira. *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- . *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*. London: Longman, 1987.
- . *After Imperialism: The search for a new order in the Far East, 1921-1931*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990.
- . "Japan Against the ABCD Powers." In *American, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives on wartime Asia, 1931-1949*. Edited by Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, 223-42. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1990.
- Itō, Takahashi. "The Role of Right-Wing Organizations in Japan." In *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*. Edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
- Iwao, Seiichi, ed. *Biographical dictionary of Japanese history*. Tokyo: Kodansha in collaboration with the International Society for Educational Information, 1978.
- Jacobsen, Philip. "Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 695-718.

- Jacobsen, Philip H. "Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No! The Story of the U. S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B." *Cryptologia* 27, no. 3 (Jul 2003): 193-205.
- . "Pearl Harbor: Who Deceived Whom?" *Naval History Magazine* 17, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 27-32.
- . "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!" *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 142-49.
- Jansen, Marius B., ed. *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- . *China in the Tokugawa world*. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- , ed. *Warrior rule in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- . *The Making of Modern Japan*. Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Johnson, Stephen L. "The Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaii and The Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii." *IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine* 6, no. 12 (Dec 1991): 3-7.
- Kahn, David. *The codebreakers: The story of secret writing*. New York: Scribner, 1967, 1996.
- . "The United States on Germany and Japan in 1941: Chapter 16." In May, *Knowing One's Enemies*, 476-501.
- Karnow, Stanley. *In our image: America's empire in the Philippines*. New York: Random House, 1989.
- Kawamura, Noriko. *Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015.
- Keay, John. *China: A history*. New York: Basic Books, 2011.
- Keen, R. *Wireless Direction Finding*. London: Wireless World and Iliffe & Sons Ltd, 1938.
- Kelley, Stephen J. *Big Machines: Cipher Machines in World War II*. Walnut Creek, California: Aegean Park Press, 2001.
- Kennedy, Greg. "Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power, 1934-1941." *Journal of Military History* 74, no. 3 (Jul 2010): 737-73.
- Kim, Chonghan. "Konoye Fumimaro and Japanese Foreign Policy, 1937-1941." Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, March 1956.
- Kimball, Warren F. *The most unsordid act: Lend-lease, 1939-1941*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.
- Kimua, Mitsuhiko. "The economics of Japanese imperialism in Korea, 1910-1939." *The Economic History Review* 48, no. 3 (1995): 555-74.
- Koyama, Toshiki. "Enactment of the General Election Law and the Beginning of Democratic Politics: Lecture 2." In Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*, 21-40.
- Krock, Arthur. "Philippines as a Fortress: New Air Power Gives Islands Offensive Strength, Changing Strategy in Pacific." *New York Times*, November 19, 1941.
- Kuromiya, Hiroaki. "New Questions on the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (No-monhan)." *Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* 19 (2014): 49-55.



- LaFeber, Walter. *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Lambert, John W., and Norman Polmar. *Defenseless: Command failure at Pearl Harbor*. St. Paul: MBI, 2003.
- Larew, Karl G. "December 7, 1941: The Day No One Bombed Panama." *The Historian* 66, no. 2 (2004): 278-99.
- Large, Stephen S. *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A political biography*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Leuchtenburg, William E. *Herbert Hoover*. New York: Times Books, 2009.
- Levine, Robert H. "The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930-1938." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, January 1, 1972.
- Lilley, Tom, Pearson Hunt, J. K. Butters, Frank F. Gilmore, and Paul F. Lawler. *Problems of Accelerating Aircraft Production During World War II*. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1947.
- Linn, Brian M. *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Lockard, Joseph. "The SCR-270-B on Oahu, Hawaii: Reminiscences." *IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine* 6, no. 12 (Dec 1991): 8-9.
- Lowe, Peter. *Great Britain and the origins of the Pacific War: A study of British policy in East Asia, 1937-1941*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
- Lowry, Thomas P., and John W. G. Wellham. *The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995.
- Lu, David J. *Agony of choice: Matsuoka Yōsuke and the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880-1946*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002.
- MacArthur, Douglas. "Can the Philippines Be Defended?" *Christian Science Monitor Weekend Magazine*, November 2, 1938.
- Maddison, Angus. "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD." <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm>.
- May, Ernest R., ed. *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- McDougall, Walter A. *Let the sea make a noise: A history of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur*. New York NY: Basic Books, 1993.
- Mikesh, Robert C. "The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power." In *Warship, 1991*. Edited by Robert Gardiner. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1991.
- Mikesh, Robert C., and Shorzoe Abe. *Japanese Aircraft, 1910-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990.
- Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda." *MHQ* 4, no. 1 (1991): 36-43.
- . *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
- . "Japan's Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the Russo-Japanese War." In *The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: World War Zero*. Vol. I. Edited by David Wolff et al., 465-84. Leiden: Brill, 2005-2007.
- . *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

- Millotat, Christian O. E. "Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System,," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, January 1, 1992.
- Minami, Hiroshi. *Psychology of the Japanese people*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971 [1953].
- Mitani, Taichirō, and Peter (. Duus. "The establishment of party cabinets, 1898-1932." In Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.
- Mitchener, Kris J. "Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor. By Edward S. Miller.: book review." *Journal of Economic History* 68, no. 02 (2008): 642-43.
- Morgan, William M. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese rivalry over the annexation of Hawai'i, 1885-1898*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 2011.
- Morley, James W., ed. *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyo Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- , ed. *The Fateful Choice: Japan's advance into Southeast Asia 1939-1941*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyo Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- , ed. *The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyo Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- , ed. *Japan erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932*. Japan's Road to the Pacific War: selected translations from Taiheiyo Sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Mucklow, Timothy J. *The SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine: "A Beautiful Idea"* Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2015.
- Murakami, Sachiko. "Japan's Thrust Into French Indochina, 1940-1945." Ph.D. diss., New York University, June 1, 1981.
- Myers, Michael W. *The Pacific War and contingent victory: Why Japanese defeat was not inevitable*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015.
- Najita, Tetsuo, and H. D. Harootunian. "Japanese revolt against the West: political and cultural criticism in the twentieth century." In Duus, *The Twentieth Century*.
- Nakagane, Katsuji. "Manchukuo and Economic Development." In *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*. Edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 133-57. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Nakagawa, Yasuzo. *Japanese Radar and Related Weapons of World War II*. Laguna Hills, California: Aegean Park Press, 1997.
- Nakamura, Takafusa, and Edwin Whenmouth (trans.). *A history of Shōwa Japan, 1926-1989*. Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 1998.
- Nakane, Chie. *Japanese Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

- . *Human Relations in Japan: Summary Translation of "Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei" (Personal Relations in a Vertical Society)*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972.
- Nolan, Patrick, and Gerhard Lenski. *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology*. Boulder: Paradigm, 2004.
- O'Connor, Christopher P. *Taranto: The Raid, the Observer, the Aftermath*. Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishing, 2010.
- O'Brien, Patrick K., and Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. "Balance Sheets for the Acquisition, Retention and Loss of European Empires Overseas." *Itinario* 23, 3/4 (1999): 25–52.
- Offer, Avner. "The British empire, 1870-1914: A waste of money?" *The Economic History Review* 46, no. 2 (1993): 215–38.
- Oka, Yoshitake. *Konoe Fumimaro: A political biography*. Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1992.
- O'Neil, William D. "Interwar U.S. and Japanese National Product and Defense Expenditure." Working Paper CIM Dooo7249.A1, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, June 1, 2003.
- . *The Plan That Broke the World: The "Schlieffen Plan" and World War I*. 2014.
- Overy, R. J. *The bombing war: Europe 1939-1945*. London: Allen Lane, 2013.
- Paine, S. C. M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Parker, Frederick D. *Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941*. U. S. Cryptologic History, Series IV: World War II Vol 6. Ft. George Meade, Maryland: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1994.
- Parshall, Jonathan, and J. M. Wenger. "Pearl Harbor's Overlooked Answer." *Naval History Magazine* 25, no. 6 (Dec 2011): 16–21.
- Peattie, Mark R. *Sunburst: The rise of the Japanese naval air power, 1909-1941*. Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
- Peattie, Mark R., Edward J. Drea, and Van de Ven, Hans J, eds. *The battle for China: Essays on the military history of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Pelz, Stephen E. *Race to Pearl Harbor: The failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the onset of World War II*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Pew Research Center. "Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years After the End of WWII." Apr 2015.
- Prange, Gordon W., with D. M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. *At dawn we slept: The untold story of Pearl Harbor*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1981.
- Prange, Gordon W., with D. M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. *Pearl Harbor: The verdict of history*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1986.
- Puleston, W. D. *Armed Forces of the Pacific: A Comparison of the Military and Naval Power of the United States and Japan*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

- Rattansi, Ali. *Racism: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Rauchway, Eric. *The Great Depression & the New Deal: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Redgment, P. G. "High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Royal Navy: Development of Anti-U-Boat Equipment, 1941-5." In *The applications of radar and other electronic systems in the Royal Navy in World War 2*. Edited by F. A. Kingsley, 229-65. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.
- Rogers, James A. "Darwinism and Social Darwinism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 33, no. 2 (1972): 265-80.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Shall We Trust Japan?" *Asia* 23, no. 7 (1923): 475-478, 526 & 528.
- Rowland, Buford, and William B. Boyd. *The U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II*. Washington: Bureau of Ordnance, U.S. Navy, 1953.
- Safford, Laurance F. "A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States." SRH-149, March 1952, Released by National Security Agency, Ft. George Meade, MD, July 2009.
- Schacter, Daniel. *How the Mind Forgets and Remembers: The Seven Sins of Memory*. New York: Souvenir Press, 2003.
- Shiner, John F. "The Air Corps, the Navy, and Coast Defense, 1919-1941." *Military Affairs* 45, no. 3 (Oct 1981): 113-20.
- Sims, R. L. *Japanese political history since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Singh, Simon. *The code book: The science of secrecy from ancient Egypt to quantum cryptography*. New York: Anchor Books, 1999.
- Smethurst, Richard J. *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Spence, Jonathan D. *The search for modern China*. 2nd ed. New York, London: Norton, 1999.
- Stephan, John J. *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984.
- Stevenson, David. *With our backs to the wall: Victory and defeat in 1918*. Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Stitzer, Steven N., Roger B. Colton, and Frederick G. Suffield. "The SCR-270 Radar." *Microwave Magazine, IEEE* Vol. 8, no. 3 (2007): 88-98.
- Sun, Youli. *China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-1941*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Terrett, Dulany. *The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941)*. United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956.
- The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*. 8 vols. Washington: Department of Defense, 1977.
- Thetford, Owen. *British Naval Aircraft, 1912-58*. London: Putnam, 1958.
- Tidman, Keith R. *The Operations Evaluation Group: A history of naval operations analysis*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

- Titus, David A. *Palace and politics in prewar Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Tohmatsu, Haruo. "The Imperial Army Turns South: the IJA's Preparation for War against Britain, 1940-1941." In *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume III: The Military Dimension*. Edited by Ian Gow and Yoichi Hirama. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- . "From the Manchurian Incident to Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations." In Tsutsui, *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan*.
- Toyama, Saburo. "The Outline of the Armament Expansion in the Imperial Japanese Navy During the Years 1930-1941." In *The Naval Arms Race, 1930-1941*. Vol. 73. Edited by Jürgen Rowher, 55-67. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*. Stuttgart: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1991.
- Tsurumi, Kazuko. *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Tsutsui, Kiyotada, ed. *Fifteen lectures on Showa Japan: Road to the pacific war in recent historiography*. Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2015, 2016.
- U.S. Department of State, ed. *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941*. 2 vols. II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943.
- Utley, Jonathan G. *Going to war with Japan, 1937-1941*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985.
- Viewager, Arthur L., and Albert S. White. "SCR-270 Radar Development." *Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, IEEE* 3, no. 12 (1988): 3-6.
- Voltaggio, Frank, Jr. "The SCR-270 in Japan." *Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, IEEE* 3, no. 12 (1988): 7-14.
- War Department. *Military Intelligence: Identification of Japanese Aircraft, FM 30-38*. Washington: War Department, 1941.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- . *World War II: A very short introduction*. Very short introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Wells, D. C. "Social Darwinism." *American Journal of Sociology* 12, no. 5 (1907): 695-716.
- West, C. P. (. "The Untold Pearl Harbor Radar Story." *Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, IEEE* 9, no. 4 (1994): 3-6.
- Wetzler, Peter. *Hirohito and war: Imperial tradition and military decision making in prewar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998.
- Wheeler, Gerald E. *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1963.
- Whitley, Bernard E., and Mary E. Kite. *The psychology of prejudice and discrimination*. 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010.
- Williams, Kathleen. *Air Defense of the Panama Canal: 1 January 1939-7 December 1941*. Army Air Forces Historical Studies, No. 42. Washington: AAF Historical Office, 1946.

- Willmott, H. P., with H. Tohmatsu, and W. S. Johnson. *Pearl Harbor*. London: Cassell, 2001.
- Wohlstetter, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Wolff, David, Steven G. Marks, Bruce W. Menning, Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David, John W. Steinberg, and Shinji Yokote, eds. *The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: World War Zero*. Leiden: Brill, 2005-2007.
- Wood, James B. *Japanese military strategy in the Pacific War: Was defeat inevitable?* Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Yamamura, Kōzō. "Then Came the Great Depression: Japan's Interwar Years." In *The Great Depression revisited: Essays on the economics of the Thirties*. Edited by Hermann van der Wee, 182-211. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972.
- Yamazawa, Ippei, and Yuzo Yamamoto. *Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868, 14: Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments*. Edited by Kazushi Ohkawa, Miyoei Shinohara, and Mataji Umemura. Choki Keizai Tokei-Suikai to Bunseki (Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868) (in Japanese) 14. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1979.
- Yergin, Daniel. *The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.
- Young, Howard. "Racial Attitudes and the U.S. Navy's Unpreparedness for War with Japan." In *New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers from the 5th Naval History Symposium*. Edited by U.S. Naval Academy Department of History. Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985 [1976].
- Young, Katsu H. "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union." *Monumenta Nipponica* 22, 1/2 (1967): 82-102.
- Zimm, Alan D. *Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, combat, myths, deceptions*. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate, 2011.