In recent days, a series of supposedly leaked videos taken from the JCG cutters have appeared on YouTube. The most finished of these has sequences showing both collisions from the decks of the cutters involved, with captions denouncing the perfidy of the Chinese.
The Japanese government has confirmed the authenticity of the videos, while insisting that their release was unauthorized.
The order of the day in the Chinese media seems to be, "MAKE SMOKE!" They would have us believe that the JCG cutters were really the aggressors. I suppose that someone unused to the sea might read this into the clip I mentioned, but to this seaman's eye is it clear that the Chinese fisherman (which appears to be a trawler with gear over the stern) is turning into the cutters very deliberately. In any event, in another clip (out of many) we can watch from the deck of one cutter as the fisherman deliberately rams the other.
None of this proves that it was all a Chinese government plot in the first place. For instance, the Chinese fisherman's master might have been in his cups, and simply reacted belligerently. But at very least the Chinese have deliberately made a cause célèbre of the business.
I will observe that the cutter COs did not play it the way I would have thought most prudent. These cutters are fast, powerful small warships that did not come off as well as they should have in such an encounter. I was taught that with two intercepting ships you should bracket the target, and never allow him to put you forward of his beam while closing the range. They were trying to hail the fisherman and tell him to stop, and I suppose they assumed reasonable behavior. They needed more of the policeman's mentality — never take it for granted that the other guy does not mean you harm.
I don't see in the videos what they did to corral him following the collisions. The JCG can be plenty tough, but it seems clear that they were under orders not to use force. I suppose that they caught him between two or more of their rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) filled with armed men who swarmed over the rail and overpowered the crew if they could not just overawe them. It would be interesting to know.
Jianjun Tu has published "An Economic Assessment of China’s Rare Earth Policy" on the Jamestown Foundation Web site. It's very well done.
The U.S. Geological Survey has a Web page of links to its publications on rare earth minerals. A recent paper by a U.S. Army analyst provides much background.
China is reported to have resumed rare earth shipments — for now. But people are unlikely to forget how capricious it has been. It does not seem at all the behavior of a prudent government.
This is the first of what may or may not become a series of commentaries on the confrontation between Japan and China in the East China Sea and the seas around the Ryukyu Islands. Chinese claims regarding its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea overlap a great deal with those of Japan (and Korea). Although the nations have ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) their interpretations of its provisions differ and the competing claims have not been adjudicated. (Neither China nor Japan seems prepared to accept outside adjudication as provided by UNCLOS.) There is also a dispute regarding claims to the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands to the Chinese). Nor does this exhaust the list of possible disagreements, as we shall see.
On 7 September 2010 two cutters of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrolling the territorial waters of the Senkakus were involved in a collision with a Chinese fishing vessel. The JCG took the vessel and its crew into custody but they were soon released -- except that the master, Zhan Qixiong, was held pending investigation of charges that he deliberately rammed the cutters. China protested vigorously that it was illegal for Japan to prosecute him because China does not recognize Japan's claims to the islands. The Japanese may have expected quiet negotiations over the issue, but officials in China issued inflammatory public statements and the state-controlled media whipped up a storm of popular nationalist protest. Ten days or so later, without any official announcement or acknowledgement, China suspended or greatly curtailed shipment of rare earth minerals to Japan -- a serious matter given their critical role in modern technology and current lack of alternative sources. On 24 September Zhan was released by the prosecutors in Okinawa, who said that they were acting on their own initiative but motivated by concern over economic consequences. But it is not clear whether rare earth shipments are resuming.
Zhan's fate in itself is of no wider importance and his release costs Japan scarcely anything of substance. The question is what next. The statements of Chinese officials and the government-controlled press seem to suggest that they are taking the action as an admission that Japan was in the wrong all along, rather than a gesture of goodwill. If this in fact represents the Chinese view it augurs ill for all, including especially China.
It could well be sensible enough for Japan to make some sort of accommodation with respect to the Senkakus issue. The islands are of no value in themselves, have no inhabitants, and represent no significant strategic position, and while there are some potential economic implications to the waters associated with them they are not very great. The other disputed maritime claims in the East China Sea are of greater economic significance, but not overwhelmingly so. The real issue is the very great strategic significance of the Ryukyus Islands and China's seeming intent to impair Japanese control of them and their waters.
As the Chinese themselves are acutely aware, their long, bulging coastline looks out onto marginal seas hemmed by a continuous chain of islands running from Kyushu down the Ryukyus to Taiwan and on to the maze of the Philippine and Malaysian Islands. China cannot have unhindered access to the sea so long as this so-called "first island chain" is held by others, and some Chinese quasi-official writers have hinted broadly that these islands all are China's by right. In fact, the Chinese have what could be presented as colorable claims to all of them except Kyushu itself -- and in particular to the Ryukyus. These claims are tenuous in many ways, but no more so than others the Chinese have pursued vigorously.
Indeed, China's potential claims to the Ryukyus are not greatly more insubstantial than those it asserted in Tibet. Historically the Ryukyuan kingdom was first a Chinese tributary, only later made to accept nominal Japanese dominance. Until 1879 it rendered tribute to both the Chinese emperor and its Japanese overlords, trading with each but without otherwise paying either a great deal of attention. Then Meiji Japan forcibly incorporated the islands and the decaying Chinese empire was too weak, divided, and distracted to do anything about it. Culturally the Ryukyuans are closer to Japan (especially after 130 years of vigorous efforts at assimilation), but such considerations count for little in the Chinese scheme of things.
The Ryukyus are absolutely vital to Japan's security. With them it can take
effective action to secure the sea lanes that are essential to its economic
life; without them it cannot. Indeed, even small hostile forces based in Okinawa
could readily make it nearly impossible for Japan to import oil from the Persian
Gulf, and substantially more expensive to conduct a commerce with Europe.
Okinawa aside, the Ryukyus are essentially undefended at this point, but the
Japanese military has been discreetly pointing out the importance of
strengthening their defenses in response to Chinese moves in the region, and it
seems likely that they will receive a better hearing in the government in the
wake of the current flare-up.
It is thus very important for the Japanese to resist salami-slicing. China has
shown a penchant for salami tactics in areas where it senses weakness, such as
the South China Sea. Its government is not well adapted to dealing with widely
diverse problems, but it is especially able to pursue consistent long-term aims
in areas seen as having special significance. The history of its actions in its
disputes with Japan around the margins of the East China Sea suggests that they
fall into this category, which is in itself disturbing. Japan must consider not
only the Senkakus but what, if anything, might be next. It is sensible for them
to make reasonable concessions to the Chinese, but only in the context of an
overall settlement that the Chinese acknowledge as full and final, and which
does not impair Japanese security.
So far, the Japanese have shown no inclination at all to yield. There has
been domestic criticism over the release of Zhan, but as I've said, that is only
symbolic. The Japanese government has handled it in a way that very carefully
does no imply any impairment of Japanese territorial claims. And by acting
softly, they place the onus of aggression squarely on China. Whether Japan would
be receptive to overtures for an overall settlement is not clear.
If they were willing, would it be possible for Japan to reach some sort of satisfactory accommodation
with China? I see this as by no means clear. The Chinese have mounted the tiger
and I question whether they can climb down when and if they wish to. They have
blown nationalist and in particular anti-Japanese sentiment to white heat.
Anyone familiar with Europe before 1914 or China itself in 1936-37 can hear
echoes today. Moreover, they have roused popular concerns about defense in Japan
to heights not seen in a long time. More substantially, if they truly mean what
their strategic rhetoric says then they cannot be satisfied with anything short
of pretty strong control over the Ryukyus. It all makes a very troubling and
potentially dangerous brew.
The folly not only of what the Chinese have been doing but the way in which they
are doing it makes the matter even more troubling. Economically, China and Japan
are quite interdependent, but it appears to me that China is the partner with
somewhat more to lose if trade relations suffer. Moreover, really serious
tensions would be likely to affect other aspects of China's trade in ways it can
ill afford. Ultimately Japan's underlying political stability is likely to be
less sensitive to economic damage than China's.
In 1941, more than one Japanese cautioned that their military was playing chess
without a checkmate -- that it lacked the power to force a conflict to a
conclusion that was satisfactory or even tolerable. It's equally true of China
here that as long as Japan and the United States remain in concert they hold
escalation dominance at all levels. And by very loudly rattling sabers that it
largely does not have (at least yet) China reminds everyone that it may well be
wiser to make an end to things now, even at a high price, than to wait until it
is better able to force its will on them. Needless to say, even a real threat
that China might open hostilities would lead to the large scale devastation of
China's overseas trade in ways that would not easily be reversed. This is quite
unlike the border
conflict with India, but it is not clear that the Chinese understand this
well.
Finally, the embargo on rare earth minerals, even if unacknowledged, informal
and quickly reversed (which remains to be determined) was amazingly
self-destructive. China stands on the brink of a trade war with the United
States over its currency valuation -- a trade war in which it stands to lose a
great deal more than its adversary. Its illicit embargo sets exactly the wrong
kind of precedent. Moreover, it sends a more general message to everyone about
how unreliable a trade partner China can be. Do not depend on the Chinese, it
says.
In any event, it ensures that China's profitable decade-long quasi-monopoly on
rare earths will quickly end. Given their importance for military hardware,
surely nothing will stop the United States from developing alternative sources
from
Mountain Pass, California and probably
Mt. Weld, Western Australia
as well.
Meanwhile, of course, China has been applying stark pressure against the nations on the littoral of the South China Sea, leading them to turn to the United States for support. It's an excellent example of self-encirclement: China asserts its "natural rights" against other states in the region, they do not yield, or at least not as much as China believes they should, and this leads the Chinese to feel they are being encircled by hostile states. It has disturbing echoes of the paths that Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan took to war in 1912-1914 and 1936-41, respectively. I would have sworn this could not happen, not so long ago, and yet we see it today.
It is no accident, I think, that it comes today, in the middle of a recession that is the most severe global downturn since the 1930s. Hell let out for lunch as a direct result of the Great Depression. Today we see one of the chief victims of Depression-era aggression showing very disturbing tendencies of its own.
-- William D. O'Neil
