Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941

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IN his memoir of defeat and redemption in the Philippine Islands, Stephen Mellnik summarized pre-World War II planning for the defense of the archipelago against an invasion by Japan, or "Orange," in the army's color-coded war plans of the day: "WPO [War Plan Orange]-3," the former member of General Douglas MacArthur's U.S. Army Forces in the Far East staff explained, "was prewar General Staff guidance to a small American force defending Luzon. It assumed—correctly, as it turned out—that the enemy would land at Lingayen and drive to Manila. It directed mobile units to slow the enemy's advance with a series of delaying actions while the main force gathered supplies and withdrew to defense positions on Bataan."

Army historian Louis Morton continued the story in his still-standard history of the Philippine Campaign of 1941-42. General MacArthur, recalled to active duty to command all military forces in the islands, discarded what he viewed as "the defeatist and defensive WPO-3" in favor of an active forward defense utilizing reinforcements from the United States and the soldiers of the Philippine Army. When these troops collapsed under the assault of the Japanese 14th Army in late December 1941, General MacArthur put WPO-3—"an old plan, well known to all U.S. Army officers who had been in the Philippines six months or more"—into effect, and Filipino-American forces began the retreat into Bataan.

thanks in part to MacArthur's ill-considered abrogation of WPO-3 earlier, they fell prey to disease, malnutrition, and the Imperial Japanese Army.

This long-accepted and unquestioned depiction of planning for the defense of the Philippines is as misleading and incomplete as it is entrenched in virtually all accounts of the Philippine Campaign. It gives an unwarranted impression of continuity from one Orange plan to the next and obscures the distinction between those authored in Manila and those prepared in Washington. There was, after all, a reason the Orange plans were variously numbered: In some ways, their contents differed. The Philippine Department's War Plan Orange-3 in particular differed substantially from its predecessor, WPO-2. Like Douglas MacArthur, Major General George Grunert, the Commanding General of the Philippine Department in 1940-41, was aware of the potential of the newly formed Philippine Army to underpin a distinctive, even historic, rewriting of the Philippine Department Orange plan. Indeed, there is reason to believe he journeyed to the islands for the third and last time precisely to act upon this insight. ³

Then a colonel, Grunert had arrived in Manila aboard the troopship Grant on a previous tour of Philippine duty little more than three years earlier, on 30 October 1936. The transport was an old ship, constructed in Germany in 1907, inadequate for the army's needs, and scheduled for replacement as soon as the War Department could obtain the funds to do so. ⁴ Still, it had not yet been built when Grunert had last seen the islands. Although he had entered the army as an enlisted man thirty-eight years earlier, Grunert had not served in the Philippines since 1904. In the intervening decades, he had distinguished himself in both war and peace: three years with the Army of Occupation in Cuba; at Cambrai with the British 40th Division; staff service with the American Expeditionary Forces; and graduation from the Army War College and from the Command and General Staff School (in that order). He had also taught at the Army War College from 1932 to 1936. Grunert wore the Distinguished Service Medal,

³. The perception that WPO-3 was merely a revision of a long-standing generic plan for the defense of the Philippines and the failure to explain (or even to perceive) that the General Staff in Washington prepared Orange plans and the Philippine Department staff in Manila prepared entirely different Orange plans (of which WPO-3 was one) form a common theme to literature on the Philippine Campaign. Although Morton's work does not make the War Department the author of WPO-3, he fails to make the distinction between various plans clear, and most authors credit their understanding of Philippine defense planning to him. Thomas M. Huber's article, "The American Bataan Campaign, December 1941 to April 1942," Army History 21 (Winter 1991-92), offers striking confirmation of how little the Philippine Campaign has been examined over the years. His "A Note on Sources" lists nothing published later than Morton's 1953 history.

Purple Heart, French Legion of Honor, and six campaign medals. He had not returned to the Orient.5

His second tour of Philippine duty saw the fifty-six-year-old Grunert take command of the Philippine Scout 26th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Stotsenburg. He was soon promoted to brigadier general and command of the 23rd Infantry Brigade at Fort McKinley, an organization also composed of Filipino soldiers. He completed his tour of duty on 3 November 1938. Little is known of Grunert's activities in 1937 and 1938, but he left the Philippines clearly determined to return as soon as possible. In a letter written in June 1939, outgoing Chief of Staff General Malin Craig informed Grunert that while he did not know what policy his replacement, General George Marshall, would follow with respect to the assignment of general officers, he saw "no reason why you should not be seriously considered for the Philippines if you wish it."6 Barely seven months later, on 14 February 1940, Grunert was back in Manila and in command of the Philippine Division. A major general since December 1939, Grunert became Philippine Department Commanding General on 31 May 1940, after Major General Walter Grant departed for the United States.7

One can only speculate on Grunert's motivation for seeking the Philippine command. His years in the archipelago corresponded to a

5. Details of Grunert's career are taken from the Army Register, the Army List, articles in the Philippines Herald (a Manila daily newspaper), and documents in the George Grunert Papers, United States Army Military History Institute [USAMHI], Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Several army officers assigned to the Army War College in 1934-35 participated in devising a military system for the Philippine Commonwealth, and it is tempting to speculate that Grunert may have been among them. Although then-Majors James B. Ord and Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote most of the plan for the Philippine military system, MacArthur claimed that the plan had taken shape under a "special committee" at the War College, and Eisenhower wrote that MacArthur had in fact initially given the task of preparing a detailed plan for a Philippine military system to a committee composed of "several of the ablest officers of the army" at the War College. See letter, MacArthur to Malin Craig, 9 July 1936, in AGO Central Files, Philippine Islands, 1926-39, Record Group [RG] 407, National Archives [NA]; and Eisenhower's six-page "draft" describing (among other things) the origins of the Commonwealth Military Mission, in Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries Series (Ann Whitman File), Eisenhower Library.

6. Craig to "George," 24 June 1939, Grunert Papers, USAMHI.

7. The Philippine Division, formed in 1921-22 and composed of infantry and field artillery regiments, was subordinate to the Philippine Department. Department headquarters was located at Fort Santiago in Manila's Intramuros; Division headquarters could be found further south of the city at Fort McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio). Each organization was commanded by a major general.

General Grant, whose Philippine years have grown even more obscure than Grunert's, arrived in the islands to command Fort Stotsenburg in May 1938. At the time, he was heralded in the local press as a "great military strategist" whose arrival was demonstrative of a "new policy of appointing 'new blood' to strategic positions in America's far-flung insular defense posts." Philippines Herald, 14 May 1938.
period of increasing tension between the United States and Japan, but America's condemnation of Japanese behavior did not translate into military action. As commander of America's exposed military garrison in the Far East, there was little reason for Grunert to think that the War Department would be more sympathetic to his entreaties for men and materiel than it had been to those of earlier commanders. The one new development observed by Grunert from 1936 to 1938 had been the creation of the Philippine Army. With the commencement of Philippine Army conscription in January 1937, there was now the promise of a large, trained body of men, and until 1946 (when the islands would become independent under the provisions of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act) this army remained legally available for use by the United States government. Grunert's goal for the next year would be to provide these troops with the training necessary to make them a reliable component of America's Philippine garrison and to rewrite Philippine Department war plans to reflect the Filipino soldiers' availability.

An understanding of the highly personalized nature of war planning in the islands undoubtedly encouraged Grunert's return. At the time, the War Department drew a clear distinction between what it labeled defense "projects" and defense "plans," and it placed preparation of the latter entirely within the capable hands of the area commander. A War Plans Division memorandum dated 26 November 1919 explained that a "project" indicated "policy and usually form[ed] the basis of estimates and legislation." A "plan" presented a scheme "for attaining some definite end and consist[ed] of a detailed and methodical arrangement of the means or successive steps believed to be necessary or conducive to attainment of the object in view. . . . Responsible territorial and tactical commanders" prepared both projects and plans. Projects then required War Department scrutiny and approval. However, "the plan of defense which is concerned with the actual defense on the ground, tactical and strategical," Colonel LeRoy Eltinge, the head of the War Plans Division, confirmed, "is a function of the Commanding General of the Philippine Islands and is not ordered or in any way directed from Washington." The War Plans Division memorandum set the stage for a two-decades' long series of Philippine Defense Projects and Philippine Defense Plans.

8. Office of the Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, memo. no. 2, "Defense Projects and Plans," 26 November 1919, WPD 1798, RG 165, NA. The distinction was not always as clear as these directions suggest. Projects often included information which should have been restricted to plans, a fact irritating to War Department officials but beneficial to scholars. The army retained copies of several projects; few plans remain in their entirety.

9. Eltinge to Arthur Fischer (a Philippine government official and army reserve officer), 5 December 1924, WPD 1799-4, RG 165, NA.
The failure to make the crucial distinction between an Orange plan emanating from Philippine Department Headquarters (HPD) in Fort Santiago and one prepared in Washington has obscured the centrality of the local commanding general's role in determining defense measures. Plans for war with Japan generated by the service commands in Washington did include a "mission" statement which served to guide the disposition of Philippine-based forces, and only to this extent could WPO-3 be considered "General Staff guidance." Typically, the mission statement dictated maintaining control of Manila Bay and/or the Manila Bay area. In practical terms, however, the wording of Washington-designated missions for the army in the Philippines was essentially meaningless. If Manila Bay could be defended best by withdrawing the army into Bataan or rushing the infantry to Corregidor, so be it; if defending likely invasion points elsewhere on Luzon was the best way of safeguarding the Bay, the local commander was free to pursue that option. Thus, more optimistic or aggressive commanders, such as William Lassiter, Douglas MacArthur, and John L. Mines (Philippine garrison commanders successively from mid-1928 to mid-1932) prepared Orange plans which asserted the tactical and psychological need to avoid entrapment on Bataan. More pessimistic com-


11. From 1916 to 1928, the "joint mission" assigned to Army and Navy forces in the Philippines was "to defend Manila and Manila Bay." With the approval of JB 303, s. 298, in June 1928, the forces now had a "primary" mission of holding "the entrances to Manila Bay" and a "secondary" mission of holding the "Manila Bay area as long as possible consistent with the successful completion of the primary mission." The concurrent "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange" (JB 325, s. 280), dated 14 June 1928, did not provide a "mission" assignment specifically for Philippine-based forces. It did, however, include a "joint decision" which served the same purpose. It read: "to hold the Manila Bay area as long as possible with the military and naval forces in the Western Pacific at the outbreak of war and to deny this area to Orange as a naval base in case we cannot use it ourselves." This statement remained a part of Joint Board WPOs until mid-1936, but in June 1934 Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur had added "clarifications" to the "joint decision" which provided specific guidance for the operational use of army and naval forces in the Philippines. He was apparently attempting to force the local commander to adhere to the intent of the more offensive-oriented HPD Orange plans MacArthur had authored as commander of the Philippine garrison from 1928 to 1930. All documents cited can be found in Records of the Joint Board, microfilm ed., reels 4, 9, and 10.
manders, such as Ewing E. Booth (supported by his influential subordinate, Stanley Embick) and James Parker (commanding generals from mid-1932 to late 1935), directed the preparation of far more cautious defense plans.

"Philippine Department Plan—Orange (1936 Revision)—"its official "short title" was HPD WPO 2—was in effect when Grunert returned for the third time to the archipelago. A short "preliminary draft" of WPO-2 remains, as do complete copies of the complementary 1938 and 1939 Philippine Defense Projects. The 1938 revision of the Defense Project repeated the cautious phraseology of the current "Joint Army and Navy Basic Par Plan—Orange": the mobile force used "without uncovering the defense of the entrance to Manila Bay"; the enemy advance delayed "to the greatest extent possible without jeopardizing the timely withdrawal of the mobile forces and Department installations to Bataan"; and air resources employed "conservatively."

HPD did not ignore the Philippine Army. In accordance with the 1938 Project, the new army's troops (referred to as Philippine Scouts, once mobilized, in both the 1938 and 1939 Projects) would be assigned "to raise units of the IPF [Initial Protective Force] from peace to war strength and to new and reconstituted Philippine Scout units." The entire force would comprise "a small corps of two divisions and certain corps troops."

12. For a more detailed discussion of these officers and their war plans, see my dissertation, "An Army for Independence?: The American Roots of the Philippine Army" (Ph.D diss., Ohio State University, 1993), 102-21.

13. Successive HPD planners adopted conflicting numbering schemes (or used none at all), but the final scheme appears to have worked thusly: "Philippine Department—First Phase Plan—Orange, 1934" was WPO-1; "Philippine Department Plan—Orange (1936 Revision)" was WPO-2; and "Philippine Department Plan—Orange (1940 Revision)" was WPO-3.

14. After becoming Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, in 1935, Brigadier General Stanley Embick, who was well known for his hostility to continued American occupation of the Philippines, agitated for a more restrictive mission statement for Army forces in the islands. Although an argument used against MacArthur's "clarifications" was that they took "initiative away from the Army Commander in the Philippine Islands," the provisions of the subsequent "Army Strategical Plan—Orange" (signed by Embick as Deputy Chief of Staff on 1 July 1936) attempted to restrict local initiative even further. The mission of the Army in the islands was now "to delay the enemy at Subic Bay and elsewhere as may be practicable without jeopardizing the timely withdrawal of mobile ground forces to Bataan Peninsula and to defend the entrance to Manila Bay." (This phrase would be repeated in the 1938 "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange.") As one Army officer on the Joint Planning Committee pointed out, however, the new wording reflected the desire of the commanding general in the Philippines. The wording continued to provide sufficient elasticity to accommodate a local commander, such as General Grunert, who preferred to take more aggressive action to defend his command. This episode can be followed in the appropriate development files found under "Philippines" in Special Projects—War Plans—"Color," 1920-1948, RG 407, NA.
The 1939 Project planned to use Philippine Army troops similarly. WPO-2 foresaw the use of Philippine Army soldiers only to increase the Philippine Department garrison to a war strength of 31,000 men. This force would then operate "defensively [i.e., on Bataan] for a period of six months."15

Tactically, WPO-2 was more offense-oriented than its 1934 predecessor, WPO-1. For example, WPO-2 divided Luzon into three sectors: North, South, and West (the latter encompassing Bataan and Zambales Province immediately to the north). An IPF consisting of one battalion of the 31st United States Infantry and portions of the Philippine Scouts' 26th Cavalry and 24th Field Artillery Regiments would cover likely landing areas in each sector. Most of the Philippine Division formed the Department Mobile Reserve (DMR). By contrast, the authors of WPO-1 conceded the value of beach defense but feared to act on that understanding. Mobile troops would take station behind a defensive perimeter in southern Bataan, moving forward to contest the enemy advance only "if time permitted." The 31st Infantry would move to Gorregidor "immediately for beach defense."16

No Philippine Army existed when HPD prepared WPO-1 in 1934, and the hesitation of WPO-2's authors to make greater use of the Philippine Army was understandable, given the army's still elementary organization. Planners in 1938 and 1939 had less reason for caution, and, within days of assuming command of the Philippine Department, a far more ambitious General Grunert informed the Military Adviser's office that he planned to hold a conference at eight o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1940 to begin the process of revising the Department's current war plan (WPO-2). He invited the Military Adviser to send representatives, and MacArthur designated Lieutenant Colonel Richard Marshall (his Deputy Chief of Staff) and Major William Dunckel to attend the conference in Fort Santiago.17

It soon became apparent that Grunert's interest centered on the availability of Philippine Army troops. A complaint by an officer of the Philippine Army that officers from the Philippine Department had been visiting

15. The 1938 and 1939 revisions of the Philippine Defense Project are found in Special Projects, RG 407, NA. WPO-2 is found in the same collection. This "preliminary draft" of WPO-2 is labeled "short title HPD WPO-3," but the accompanying annexes and appendixes are labeled WPO-2.

16. Ibid., and "G-3 Estimate of the Situation—Philippine Department, First Phase, Plan—Orange, 1934" (HPD WPO-1 G3E), in Special Projects, RG 407, NA.

17. Only Dunckel's participation is known for certain. The unnamed person who maintained the Military Mission's journal, which MacArthur biographer D. Clayton James concluded was "probably kept" by Marshall, was the other officer. James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 694 n. 26. Appendix "C" to the "Journal for June 1940" confirms that WPO-2 was the plan under discussion. Copy in RG 1, MacArthur Archives, microfilm ed., reel 3.
army headquarters to obtain information about the status of trainees (conscripts undergoing basic military training), reservists, and weapons had already been noted in the Military Mission’s official journal. Department officers were ordered to deal with the Philippine Army only through MacArthur’s office. An entry in the journal dated 26 June 1940 registered Philippine Army Deputy Chief of Staff (and retired Philippine Scout officer) Brigadier General Vicente Lim’s complaint that the Philippine Department was making plans for using soldiers of the Philippine Army, and clearly the Philippine Army was not being invited to participate in the planning. The mission responded weakly that the Department was not making plans for the Philippine Army “as an organization,” which of course was exactly Lim’s fear.

On 1 July Grunert met with MacArthur to discuss the new plan. The following day the Military Adviser told Lim that “so far we have no indication of what the [Philippine Department] war plan will be,” but by August 1st HPD had revised the basic Orange plan and on 19 August [1940] Grunert visited MacArthur to apprise the Military Adviser of its contents. He had found the existing plan “inadequate,” General Grunert said, largely as a result of the failure to make use of Philippine Army troops. Grunert summarized the new basic plan for General MacArthur: The regular army would conduct beach defense operations while the Philippine Army mobilized; Philippine Army soldiers would then relieve United States Army troops as well as contribute to a reserve force which would be “employed in expelling landed enemy forces . . . [or] in open land warfare.” Only the “limited forces necessary” would withdraw into Bataan “when and if” forced to do so.18

The transition from WPO-1 to WPO-3 and the Philippine defense planners growing reliance on the Philippine Army to justify an aggressive defense of Luzon can be seen in HPD G-3’s detailed evaluation of three distinct plans suitable for Philippine conditions (included as an appendix to WPO-3). “Plan 1” called for moving “the mobile troops to Bataan immediately.” The plan, obviously a rendition of WPO-1, had the primary advantage of ensuring that everyone got to Bataan in good health. Its many disadvantages included abandoning essential supplies elsewhere on Luzon; rapid enemy occupation of the strategic Pico de Loro area south of Manila Bay; weakening of civilian and military morale; and failure to make use of “any part of the armed forces of the Philippine Commonwealth.” Plan 1, G-3 concluded, “might well result in failure to accomplish the assigned mission.”

Under "Plan 2," a small portion of American forces met the enemy at the beach while the bulk of the mobile army remained in reserve. If Orange forces got ashore, the covering force would hinder their advance "as much as possible without jeopardizing the successful withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula of the forces designated for its defense." G-3 acknowledged that Plan 2 complied "with the assigned mission and undertook] the operations contemplated in the War Department Orange Plan" [emphasis added]. The numerical weakness of American forces undermined the advantages of this plan. Limited troop strength made it unlikely that the enemy could be resisted at the beach. Plan 2 was similar to WPO-2.

Under "Plan 3"—WPO-3—"the major portion of all United States mobile forces" on Luzon would attempt to destroy the enemy at landing sites. Covered by this action, the Philippine Army mobilized and moved to the scene of battle. Most American troops would then withdraw and form a mobile reserve. "In the event of hostile landings," the mission would be "to eject the enemy, or, failing this, to limit his beachhead operations energetically until forced to withdraw. If forced to withdraw, to delay the hostile advance to the greatest extent possible without jeopardizing the successful withdrawal to Bataan of the forces designated for its defense." The many advantages of Plan 3 included the ability to gather more supplies; to make use of all of the air facilities on Luzon (rather than consigning them immediately to the enemy); to allow a more organized defense of the entrance to Manila Bay, "including the occupation and defense of the Pico de Loro area"; to maintain civilian and military morale and the prestige of the United States in the Orient; and to make "extensive use of the armed forces of the Philippine Commonwealth." The only disadvantage was "the initial dispersion of the regular mobile forces for a short period, pending the mobilization of the units of the Philippine Army." After "careful consideration of the three plans," the clear choice was Plan 3.19

The inclusion of the Philippine Army in a new HPD war plan was only one aspect of Grunert's attempts to build up the garrison's strength. From mid-1940, the Philippine Department commander began "hammering" (his word) the War Department with cables, memoranda, and personal letters to the Chief of Staff requesting ammunition, antiaircraft equipment with operating personnel, harbor defense equipment, airplanes, and more troops. According to an official army history of this period, General Grunert sent eight "warning reports and recommendations" in July and August 1940 alone. Distracted by growing responsibilities elsewhere and

19. G-3 Appendix to "Philippine Department Plan—Orange (1940 Revision)," in Special Projects, RG 407, NA.
uncertain of the Philippines' future in American defense efforts, the War Department responded with sympathy, but little else.\textsuperscript{20} In early November 1940, General Grunert sought the War Department's authority to call Philippine Army troops to active duty for training. Grunert believed that, as individuals, the Filipino soldiers were valuable additions to the garrison but that the Commonwealth's army was deficient in any kind of advanced training and weak in officer leadership. With such training, if an emergency arose, Grunert hoped "to utilize elements of the Philippine Army on the island of Luzon . . . in units not larger than a battalion." He would supply "one experienced American officer" to each infantry and artillery battalion. The department commander recommended that "organized and equipped units of the Philippine Army be mobilized now" and given "a year of training, under competent supervision." A limited stock of ammunition led Grunert to ask for only those units located on Luzon for the present. Eventually, however, he wanted to include all army units, both for operational purposes and to bolster civilian morale. He asked for five hundred United States Army officers to oversee the training. In mid-December, the War Department responded that the plan was "inadvisable under present conditions." It did offer to send seventy-five reserve officers to the islands "to assist in training activities and for such other purposes as [Grunert] may desire."\textsuperscript{21}

Within only a few days, the War Department abruptly adopted a more positive stance toward Philippine defense needs. The army notified Grunert that he could look forward to an increase in construction funds and in the manning levels of the Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry and

\textsuperscript{20} Mark Skinner Watson, \textit{Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations} (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), 414, 417-19.

\textsuperscript{21} Grunert to General Marshall, 2 November 1940, and Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 20 November 1940 (approved 13 December 1940), both filed under WPO 3251-39, RG 165, NA; Watson, \textit{Chief of Staff}, 422-23. Grunert would later summarize his activities in an intriguing letter to a friend, Colonel William C. Koenig, in August 1941: "I have been hammering for many months towards implementing the plan [of] which you have knowledge." Grunert wrote. "I took your proposals, whittled down the personnel and equipment [to what I thought I might obtain], and sent radio after radio" (Grunert to "Bill," 11 August 1941, Grunert Papers, USAMHI).

Exactly what Grunert meant by "your" proposals is unknown. A 1909 graduate of the Naval Academy who obtained a commission in the army's coast artillery arm, Koenig does not appear to have been stationed near Grunert (as indicated by the \textit{Army List}) until arriving in the Philippines in October 1937. He remained in the islands until November 1940, during that time serving as the commanding officer of the 91st and 60th Coast Artillery Regiments. Koenig was best known publicly for setting the course record on the officers' golf course on Corregidor's Topside. Perhaps the most that can be concluded is that there may have been a number of officers in the garrison who discussed the potential for change in the current war plans and shared—or sparked—Grunert's desire to shake up the garrison and provide for a more offensive defense.
coast artillery regiments. When sufficiency of supplies allowed, Washing-
тон would also ship antiaircraft and other guns. The change in attitude
was probably related to a concurrent request from the Commonwealth
government for more assistance in establishing the financially hard-
pressed Commonwealth army. Prodded by MacArthur, whose office
authored the message, in early August 1940 Philippine Commonwealth
President Manuel L. Quezon broached the topic of obtaining federal fund-
ing for military purposes in the islands. American High Commissioner
Francis Sayre transmitted the President’s request, in which Quezon asked
for support similar to that granted the National Guard. In a follow up
telegram of his own, Sayre, an admirer of neither Quezon nor the Military
Adviser, urged that "the expenditure of such funds [should the govern-
ment acquiesce] be under the full control of the United States War and
Navy Departments rather than of [the] Commonwealth government."23

President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially brushed off Quezon’s request,
responding through Sayre in early September that the issue was "of such
broad scope" that the government would have to give it "careful and symp-
pathetic study" before making a decision. The next month, Quezon asked
again, this time suggesting that sugar excise tax funds and dollar-devalua-
tion funds (monies which were to accrue to the Philippine government in
the United States) be made available "to push forward American defense
plans" in the islands. Again Sayre counselled caution and informed Wash-
ington that he expected to confer with the commanders of the Philippine
Department and of the 16th Naval District (the local United States Navy
command) to learn how the Commonwealth could best contribute to
"American defense plans." Grunert then told Sayre that "funds could be
advantageously spent by [the] Commonwealth Government in properly
equipping, arming and intensification of training of Philippine troops as is
now being done by National Guard troops in the United States."24

Passing along Quezon’s request to President Roosevelt, Secretary of
the Interior Harold Ickes expressed the opinion that the government
should give "sympathetic consideration" to the Commonwealth’s
entreaties. A few days later, Secretary of State Cordell Hull added his
weight, urging more strongly that Quezon’s offer be accepted. The Navy

22. Watson, Chief of Staff, 423; James, Years of MacArthur, 1: 551-52.
dated 3 August, RG 1, MacArthur Archives, microfilm ed., reel 3; and Sayre to Inter-
ior Department, 6 August 1940, radiograms nos. 547 and 548, copies filed with JB
24. Sayre to Quezon, 7 September 1940, and Quezon to Roosevelt, 11 October
1940, in Manuel L. Quezon Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan,
microfilm ed., reel 20; Sayre to Interior Department, 14 October 1940, radiogram no.
739, and 16 October 1940, radiogram no. 747, copies filed with JB 305, serial 672,
and War Departments should study the matter, Hull wrote, and "make concrete suggestions." The Army-Navy Joint Board then considered the appropriateness of using these funds, which totalled about $52 million, for military purposes in the Philippine Islands. The Board concluded that the money should be spent, with United States Army and Navy oversight, for defense items "which will either immediately or ultimately belong to the Filipinos themselves." These included "equipment, munitions, installations, and the training of the Philippine Army." The Joint Board recommended that the President express his appreciation to the Commonwealth government for its willingness to spend these funds on defense measures and prod Congress to approve their use.25

While the process of obtaining the funds would be long and ultimately unsuccessful, an environment more supportive of improving Philippine defenses had been created. Speaker of the Philippine National Assembly Jose Yulo was in Washington, D.C., at the time, engaged in a "secret mission" in part to express Quezon's concern with Japanese aggression.26 Yulo's discussions with senior government officials contributed to greater awareness of the Commonwealth's defense needs. It was at this point that Grunert received word of the War Department's partial about-face in responding to his requests.

Grunert moved forward with augmenting the Philippine Scout troops in the garrison. The tactical needs of the Philippine Department had no bearing on the number to be recruited (nearly 6,000). The Army Reorganization Act of 1901 had decreed that a maximum of 12,000 Filipino soldiers could serve in the Scouts, and, since the Scout organization already numbered about 6,000 men, four decades later this arbitrary and outdated figure restricted Grunert's options. Philippine Scout recruitment strengthened the ability of the IPF to defend the coastline, but the increase was not only a means of building up the local United States Army garrison. The reserve ranks of the Philippine Army were to provide virtually all the recruits. Philippine Army soldiers who had already completed basic training would, after one year of service in the Scouts (rather than the normal three-year Scout enlistment), return to their reserve areas, well-trained and ready to assume leadership positions in their reserve units. The

25. Ickes to Roosevelt, 24 October 1940; Hull to Roosevelt, 4 November 1940; and JB 305, serial 672, dated 21 January 1941, all in Records of the Joint Board, microfilm ed., reel 6. According to Ickes's letter, in early June 1940 he had made a suggestion similar to Quezon's.

26. Aruna Gopinath, Manuel L. Quezon: The Tutelary Democrat (Quezon City: New Day, 1987), 71. Congress eventually authorized a portion of these funds for civil defense purposes after the outbreak of war. See David V. Dufault, "Francis B. Sayre and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 1936-1942" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1972), 385, and Watson, Chief of Staff, 434-35 n. 37. Quezon was also unsuccessful in obtaining Philippine participation in Lend Lease.
arrangement had been agreed upon following discussions between Grunert, Sayre, and Commonwealth government and Philippine Army officials. To minimize the impact on any one reserve area, the Philippine Department would send recruiting parties to Northern Luzon and to the major Visayan cities in the south. (Provincial recruiting also had the effect, as John Olson, then a lieutenant serving with the 57th Infantry, has revealed, of restricting Tagalog access to the Scouts.)

Numerous applicants presented themselves for service, and the army met its recruitment goal by the first week of April 1941. Of the more than 5,000 prospective recruits who reported to Philippine Division headquarters at Fort McKinley, the army selected 3,803 and assigned most of them to the 45th and 57th Infantry Regiments. The field artillery at Fort Stotsenburg received over 1,000 recruits, as did the 26th Cavalry. In that regiment, one officer recalled, "the relaxed life came to a sudden end."28

Throughout this time, the Philippine Army faced daunting obstacles in developing its officer corps and training cadres and in upgrading trainee standards, difficulties which reinforced Grunert’s determination to assume control of Philippine Army training. The army had largely met its goal of graduating 40,000 trainees from the training camps annually in 1937 and 1938, but thereafter the numbers fell, largely as a result of financial constraints and Quezon’s irresolute attitude toward national defense. Just over 10,000 conscripts reported for the July-December 1940 training session, and less than 6,000 would report for the January-June 1941 session.29 In other fields, however, Philippine Army development was more encouraging. Quezon had ordered the annual mobilization practice canceled for 1940 but at the same time had promised an ambitious mobilization exercise in 1941 and subsequent years. Two weeks of training at the end of March 1941 would see about 25,000 enthusiastic reservists called to active duty. Further emphasizing a commonality of purpose between the Philippine and United States Armies, General Grunert assigned thirty officers (mostly majors and captains from the 31st and 45th Infantry Regiments) to Philippine Army camps to assist in the reservists' training, and he arranged for many other officers to visit the camps as observers. Philippine Army coast artillery reservists would also report to Corregidor to

27. _Philippines Herald_, 3 February 1941, and letter, Olson to author, 25 September 1991. The Army, it seems, distrusted these inhabitants of Manila and the surrounding provinces.


29. For detailed trainee figures, see Headquarters Philippine Army bulletins no. 20 (1936 series), no. 67 (1937 series), nos. 84 and 148 (1940 series), and no. 57 (1941 series). Bound copies of Philippine Army orders and bulletins can be found in the Library of Congress and USAMHI.

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undergo refresher training with the United States Army's coast artillery regiments.  

Encouraged by the potential shown by the Philippine Army's soldiers during the March mobilization and training exercise but frustrated by the Army's logistical and leadership shortcomings, Grunert radioed the War Department in April and again in May 1941 urging the mobilization of the "organized forces of the Philippine Army on the island of Luzon" for at least two to four months of advanced training under "his complete command, supervision, and control." In a lengthy memorandum sent in mid-June, Grunert presented in detail his thinking on the use of the Philippine Army, leaving no doubt that WPO-3 reflected his ambitions for integrating the Philippine Army with the United States Army garrison in the islands and using the combined force to legitimize an aggressive defense posture. "A frank and realistic appraisal of the combat capacity of our U.S. War Garrison," Grunert wrote, "indicates the need for numerical increases and enlarged fire-power. The tactical possibilities, in our situation on Luzon, are those inherent in a position in readiness, with forces in observation in several sectors, and a central reserve, for operations on interior lines; this inescapable dispersion has the effect of weakening each element; the only remedy lay in early reinforcement; the most direct, and economical means, at hand, is the Philippine Army and its manpower. Our current W.P.O. is based on that conception."  

As finalized on 1 April 1941 (with several penciled changes dated 10 June 1941), War Plan Orange-3 continued to adhere to the tripartite format of earlier HPD WPOs: beach defense, withdrawal to Bataan, and static defense of the peninsula. Thus, when on the night of 23/24 December 1941, word passed that "WPO-3 was in effect," many officers may have known to commence withdrawing into Bataan, even though WPO-3 was hardly an "old" plan. Beach defense had failed, and Grunert had appro-

30. See Exhibit "H" to "Journal for June 1940," RG 1, MacArthur Archives, microfilm ed., reel 3; Philippines Herald, 10, 11, 12 and 18 March 1941; Manila Daily Bulletin, 12 March 1941; and "Philippine Army Coast Artillery," Coast Artillery Journal 81 (July-August 1938): 310. Philippine Army coast artillerymen usually trained at Fort Wint on Subic Bay, a United States Army fort which had been in caretaker status for many years until refurbished by the Philippine government in 1938.

31. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 163-64. Morton adds that "nothing more was required," but War Plan Orange may not have been as well known as he suggests. In an interview with the author, General Leonico S. Tan (AFP, Ret.), a 1928 graduate of the Philippine Constabulary Academy who was serving as G-3 of the 11th Division, PA, in December 1941, recalled that the withdrawal message included detailed instructions for the retreat to Bataan and concluded (inconsequentially, it would seem) with the phrase "WPO-3 is in effect." He did not know what WPO-3 meant, nor
priately provided for that contingency by incorporating withdrawal provi-
sions into WPO-3. But where other war plans had paid only lip service to
defending likely points of landing, using such limited resources that
enemy landings would inevitably be successful, WPO-3 had stipulated a
genuine effort to destroy the enemy when it attempted to land. Only "as
a last resort" would the forces designated for Bataan's defense retreat into
the peninsula.

Although he emphasized its use in beach defense, Grunert envisioned
multiple roles for the Philippine Army in WPO-3. As outlined in the open-
ing section of WPO-3 (the "General Plan"), Philippine Army troops would
"relieve and supplement IPF units." Those troops not moved to Luzon
from off-island mobilization centers would "conduct such operations as
are practicable under the existing conditions" on their home islands. The
"bulk" of the Department Mobile Reserve would include both United
States troops and "certain" Philippine Army units. These units would, if
necessary, eventually compose a Bataan Defense Command. "When and if
troops designated to defend Bataan retire[d] thereto," the remaining
Philippine Army units would be "organized into detachments for the con-
duct of such warfare as available supplies and munitions [would] permit." Their American officers and men were to leave them and join the forces
on Bataan.

As events in the Far East grew more ominous, General Grunert pro-
vided a resolute and comforting presence in Manila. American High Com-
missioner Sayre had become a fervent admirer, lauding Grunert's hard
work, "common sense, and good judgment" in a letter written to General
Marshall in November 1940. A few months later, Sayre recommended
Grunert's promotion to lieutenant general. The Department commander,
Sayre enthused to both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and the Chief of
Staff, was such a "splendid leader that he richly deserved" three stars. "All
of us feel happy that we have in the Philippines so competent and able a
leader," the High Commissioner wrote.33

On the occasion of the Commanding General's sixty-first birthday (21
July 1941), the *Philippines Herald* included a sixteen-page "General
did Division Chief of Staff Colonel Juan Moran (a twenty-year veteran of the Philip-
pine Scouts), nor, according to Tan, did Brigadier General William E. Brougher, the
Commanding General (interview conducted at Camp Aguinaldo, Metro Manila, 1
December 1993). James Milling, a long-time civilian employee of the Philippine
Department of Education before the war, wrote that he learned of WPO's provisions
along with other civilian officials from President Quezon in late 1940 or early 1941.
But after the war, Milling interviewed "hundreds of men who fought [on Bataan]" and
discovered that "practically none had heard of the Orange plan." J. A. Milling, *Land

33. Sayre to Marshall, 20 November 1940; Sayre to Marshall, 19 April 1941; and
Stimson to Sayre, 15 May 1941, in Francis B. Sayre Papers, Library of Congress.

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Grunert Birthday Supplement." High Commissioner Sayre, President Quezon, Philippine Army Chief of Staff Major General Basilio J. Valdes, Chief of Constabulary Brigadier General Guillermo B. Francisco, and other civic and military leaders (but not General MacArthur) offered felicitations. General Grunert contributed a reassuring message for the Filipino people. "Hardened by vigorous training, the troops, both American and Filipino, have been forged into an efficient combat team, ready now to guard these islands against an aggressor," he reported. Two days later, in a letter to General Marshall, Grunert apologized for appearing to "push himself forward." He had been unaware that the Herald planned such a generous tribute, but after all, he reasoned, personal prestige and reputation counted for much in the Orient.  

Grunert's depiction of a combat-ready Filipino-American military force was premature, and his attempted encroachment on HPA's authority was not welcomed by all. The Commanding General's interest was in the short-term defense of an American colony; HPA's was in the long-term development of the Philippine Army. After heated debate, Brigadier General Lim and other army officers had convinced Quezon that too much money and effort had been wasted on training large numbers of conscripted enlisted men while many officers remained, as Lim put it, "not even half baked." At least in part, the reduction in trainee numbers in 1940 and 1941 reflected the beginning of a reorientation of the army away from providing (rather superficial) training for the many in favor of more in-depth training for the few. President Quezon stated publicly that the defense-building process was being slowed because the army had "been training men so rapidly that there [was] a lack of trained officers." Grunert, of course, emphasized the garrison's immediate need for infantrymen, not the gradual strengthening of the Philippine Army officer corps. Lim complained to MacArthur that "we need a lot of protection because Grunert and his staff do not care what happens to the Philippine Army as long as they can use the force to fight against Japan." MacArthur agreed and revealed that he had "had some heated arguments with Grunert about this." 

34. Grunert to Marshall, 23 July 1941, Grunert Papers, USAMHI.
35. Adelaida L. Perez, ed., To Inspire and To Lead: The Letters of Gen. Vicente Lim, 1938-1942, introduction by Edilberto G. de Jesus (Manila, 1980), 58 (letter dated 14 April 1939) and 89 (letter dated 25 January 1940). This book consists of a collection of letters written by General Lim to family members in the United States which Lim intended to form the basis of a Philippine Army history. Lim did not survive the war, and the letters appear to have been used prior to publication only by Juanito Rimando in his unpublished master's thesis, "Brigadier General Vicente Lim and the 41st Division in Bataan" (University of the Philippines, 1978).
36. Philippines Herald, 19 September 1940.
37. Perez, ed., To Inspire and To Lead, 175 (letter dated 28 July 1941).
In his specially built suite atop the Manila Hotel, referred to by a disdainful High Commissioner Sayre as the general's "ivory tower," MacArthur presented an image of solitude, publicly ignored by President Quezon, privately scorned by some senior Philippine Army officers, and seemingly marginalized by Grunert's vigorous efforts to gain control of MacArthur's own creation, the army of the Philippine Commonwealth. MacArthur was not, however, prepared to remain on the sideline as American interest in Asia quickened. In a letter to General Marshall in early February 1941, he outlined a scheme for establishing strong gun batteries at strategic positions in the archipelago and requested guns, ammunition, and search lights from the United States. In March he asked his former aide, Major T. J. Davis, to deliver letters to President Roosevelt's secretary Steve Early, Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall, and Roosevelt's military aide Brigadier General Edwin Watson in which he offered his services should a military emergency arise. By May (or possibly earlier) General Marshall had decided to seek MacArthur's recall to active duty "as the logical selection for the Army Commander in the Far East should the situation approach a crisis." He informed MacArthur of this decision in June and asked that the news be kept confidential. MacArthur, it seems, had already let it be known locally that he expected an imminent recall to active duty. When Quezon heard the story, he told his executive secretary, George Vargas, that he did not believe it.

38. Francis Bowes Sayre, Glad Adventure (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), 208. Copies of MacArthur's letters to Davis, dated 21 and 29 March 1941, can be found in the Thomas J. Davis Papers, Eisenhower Library. On MacArthur's attempts to rekindle the United States Army's interest in his services, see Watson, Chief of Staff, 425-26, 434-36; James, Years of MacArthur, 1: 584-86; and Carol M. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 196-97. Marshall's letter to MacArthur, dated 20 June 1941, is reprinted in Watson, Chief of Staff, 435-36. Adding to the information provided in these accounts is General Lim's revelation that during Joe Stevenot's meeting with Stimson in Washington in May, Stevenot, a politically well-connected American businessman in Manila with a long-time interest in Philippine military affairs, complained that "Grunert and the President [Quezon] have been trying to ignore MacArthur." Stevenot later bragged that this had gotten MacArthur recalled to active duty. Lim did not know whether or not to believe the story, since Stevenot "is often boastful and arrogant" (which is roughly the meaning of Lim's phrase "mayroong kayabangan ito"). My thanks go to the staff of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation, Makati, Metro Manila, for this consensus translation. See Perez, ed., To Inspire and To Lead, 180 (letter dated 28 July 1941).

39. "Memorandum of the Conference held today, May 15, 1941, between His Excellency, the President and General MacArthur, [at] Baguio," in Manuel L. Quezon Papers, series 8, box 94, Philippine National Library, Manila. This memorandum, a poorly typed four-page document, appears to have been first cited in Ricardo T. Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935-1942 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), 181-82.
Yet MacArthur's rather frantic activity suggests that he remained uncertain of his position. At his own insistence, on 15 May he met with Quezon and (according to a memorandum of the conversation in Quezon's papers) demanded to know if rumors concerning the content of Quezon's conferences with Sayre and Grunert (from which MacArthur had been excluded) were true. Grunert, it was said, was to be named military governor in the event of war. MacArthur also promised to get out the military vote if Quezon decided to seek reelection later that year. In response, Quezon dismissed the rumor concerning Grunert and expressed outrage at the Army's involvement in any political activity. Responding to what he thought was MacArthur's real concern, Quezon told his military adviser that no one under contract with the Commonwealth government could be guaranteed employment beyond the end of the year. MacArthur was free to return to the United States anytime after July 1st to seek other work, and the government would still pay his salary until December 31st.40

Despite Quezon's added assurance of continuing "personal affection" for the Philippine Army's Field Marshal, MacArthur cannot have drawn encouragement from the meeting. Soon after, he wrote to General Marshall and stated his intention of closing down the Military Mission since (he purported to believe) "the Philippine Army [was] to be absorbed by the United States Army in the near future." If his intent was to force the issue of his recall to active duty, he succeeded. It was at this point that General Marshall assured MacArthur that he was "the logical selection" as area commander should conditions in Asia worsen.41 MacArthur hung on, and one month later, on 26 July 1941, President Roosevelt ordered Commonwealth military forces into the service of the United States. At the same time, MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in command of United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The news, Sayre recalled, "fell like a bombshell on Manila."42

Although clearly disappointed at his failure to retain the senior command in the islands, Grunert pledged to his old mentor, General James G. Harbord, that he would support MacArthur with "one-hundred percent loyalty and efficiency." Nonetheless, he expected to hold significant authority. HPD remained intact, and "as Department commander," Grunert informed Harbord, "I still retain the responsibility for the training of the regular troops, and the training of the inducted Philippine Army

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 182; James, Years of MacArthur, 1: 585-86.
42. Sayre, Glad Adventure, 209. The President's order placed United States and certain Philippine military forces under the command of an unnamed "general officer," and some newspaper accounts assumed that Grunert was the officer to whom the order referred. See, for example, the 26 July 1941 issues of the Bulletin (Philadelphia) and the Sun (New York). Clippings in Quezon Papers, Philippine National Library.
troops." The first contingent of Filipino infantry troops reported for duty on 1 September 1941, and Grunert began an active round of cantonment inspection and training oversight. The peacetime army's emphasis on close order drill, parades, and spit-and-polish, were to "go by the board," Grunert instructed. All training was to be "combat training."43

General MacArthur's assumption of command was followed by War Department promises of men and equipment for the islands. A front-page story in the Philippines Herald on 29 October 1941 reported that General Marshall had declared before a congressional appropriations subcommittee the previous day that reinforcement of the Philippine garrison had become the War Department's number one priority. The garrison's needs, however, no longer included General Grunert. Only two days earlier, the same paper had revealed that Grunert had received orders to return to the United States. What the Herald did not reveal was that MacArthur had requested General Grunert's recall. "It would be advantageous to relieve him," the USAFFE chief informed the War Department in mid-October, "as I am loath, as long as he is here, to contract the functions of the Department commander." Publicly, the War Department offered the excuse that the Philippine Department Commanding General had completed his normal overseas tour of duty and was therefore being reassigned.44

The order caught Grunert by surprise. Three weeks earlier he had written his sister that he did not know when he would leave the Philippines, but he did not expect to depart soon. He reminded her that his assignment under normal circumstances would expire in February 1942 but felt that his services could probably not be spared.45 The War Department's dissembling fooled no one, since all knew that Grunert's two-year tour of duty was not scheduled to end for several months. Many officer transfers already had been put on hold; Grunert's was accelerated. The garrison commander who had done much to prepare the islands' people


44. Philippines Herald, 27 October 1941. MacArthur is quoted in Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 23. General Wainwright wrote that sometime in late July or early August he was told by MacArthur that Grunert was to command the military forces north of Manila, while Wainwright commanded those in southern Luzon. Then, "one day in September," Wainwright learned from MacArthur that Grunert was returning to the United States. Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, ed. Robert Considine (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1946), 11-12.

45. Grunert to "Sis," 6 October 1941, Grunert Papers, USAMHI.
for the coming ordeal had now become an impediment. On the morning of 31 October, elements of Grunert's old command—men from Fort Stot-
senburg, Fort McKinley, and the Post of Manila—gathered to bid the gen-
eral farewell. His parting speech scarcely disguised his bitterness. Grunert
lamented that his "hurried departure" left "no time to bid adieu to many
of my friends." He saved his final words for the people of the Philippines:
"I find it quite difficult [he said] to sever the ties made since 1936, and I
am at a great loss for words to express my regrets that I must leave these
friendly shores with their good hearted people who have become one with
us in promoting National Defense wherewith to safeguard our liberties."46

Historically, the reorientation of Philippine defense away from HPD's
"defeatist" War Plan Orange to USAFFE's "aggressive plan whose object
would be the defeat of any enemy that attempted the conquest of the
Philippines" is inextricably linked to MacArthur's assumption of command
of Filipino-American forces on 26 July 1941.47 That was not a conclusion
shared by General Grunert. "I had the entire defense plan revised,
brought up to date, and implemented insofar as men, equipment, and
munitions permitted," Grunert asserted in a speech given on the occasion
of Army Day 1942, "and I am much gratified that MacArthur accepted this
plan, practically in its entirety, and that its provisions and the preparatory
measures incident thereto served his purposes so well."48 Others felt the
same. "Until you got behind the war plans and the Philippine Army, the
progress was literally by inches," Major General J. Gareshe Ord wrote in
early March 1942. "I suppose you will have to be reconciled to not receiv-
ing any credit for that work," Ord surmised. People needed a hero, and the
"present commander" was being "heaped with praise," wrote another
comrade, Colonel John T. H. O'Rear, who had arrived in Manila with
Grunert in February 1940 and had served as the Department intelligence
officer, "but we who were present and daily saw the defense grow in power
will ever hail you as the commander who clearly saw the problem and did
something about it." It was "one man's opinion," Colonel O'Rear declared,
that Grunert deserved "ninety percent of the credit" for preparing the
defense of the Philippines.49

As the area commander, General MacArthur did not need War Depart-
ment approval to discard his predecessor's plan of defense and write his
own—WPO-4, had he cared to give it that title. What he did need was a
new attitude in Washington. Both the latest Army-Navy Orange plan and

46. Philippines Herald, 31 October 1941.
47. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 64.
48. Speech given at "Union League Club Celebration of Army Day, April 6, 1942,"
copy in Grunert Papers, USAMHI.
49. Ord to Grunert, 6 March 1942, and O'Rear to Grunert, 5 March 1942, both in
Grunert Papers, USAMHI.
its Rainbow successors, as Morton points out, "accepted implicitly the loss of the Philippines." When MacArthur insisted that mobilization of the Philippine Army and air reinforcements arriving in the islands allowed "an active defense of all the islands in the Philippines," Washington decided that the archipelago could be defended, and thus MacArthur exulted to his subordinates, "they are going to give us everything we have asked for."

The subsequent distinction between the provisions of Grunert's WPO-3 and "The MacArthur Plan" (as Morton labels it) may be more apparent than real. The Military Mission had completed war plans earlier, but MacArthur now made little or no use of them. And, despite the rhetorical emphasis he placed on defending the entire archipelago, MacArthur concentrated virtually all American and Philippine Scout troops and eight of the eleven Philippine Army divisions (including two of the four Visayan divisions) on the island of Luzon. Certainly Grunert did stress the need to keep open access to Bataan and prepare for a possible siege despite the


51. When asked about the Military Mission's pre-1941 war planning by Louis Morton, William Dunckel confirmed that "the Military Adviser had detailed plans for the Philippine Army, Air Force and Off-Shore Patrol to be used in event of wars," but "it was [his] understanding that [the United States Army] used [only] the Visayan and Mindanao Sector Plans of the Philippine Army in so far as troop units and materiel permitted." Dunckel's four-page, handwritten letter to Morton, dated 11 May 1948, can be found in the Louis Morton Collection, USAMHI. A short account of Dunckel's Philippine service is provided in the Philippine Army's monthly journal, *Citizen Army*, May 1941, 13.

General Lim told an entirely different story. According to his letters, Philippine Army War Plans Division had by mid-1940 "already decided how the Philippine Army [was] going to be used in conjunction with the American army." The Philippine Army had reconnoitered "all of Luzon" and had determined which beaches to defend; had "indicated in general" what to do in the Visayas; and was in the process of hashing out with an obstreperous Military Mission representative (Major Dunckel?) exactly how to prepare for the defense of Mindanao (Perez, ed., *To Inspire and To Lead*, 109, letter dated 24 May 1940).

General Wainwright's testimony adds to the confusion. After writing that "[a]lmost from the date of his assumption of command, MacArthur began to think about replacing WPO-3 with a new plan," Morton—citing Wainwright's autobiography—adds in a footnote that "Wainwright mentions . . . he worked during May, June and July 1941 to secure revisions of WPO-3" (*Fall of the Philippines*, 64-65). This is not exactly what Wainwright claimed. At the time commanding the Philippine Division, Wainwright wrote that, after army dependents left the islands in May 1941, "I went to work then in what I guess was opposition to the philosophy of WPO-3. A defense must be active, damn it, not passive! . . . So during the last days of May, through June and most of July we worked at perfecting the offensive combat training of the Philippine Division" (*General Wainwright's Story*, 10). Of course, Wainwright was at the time under Grunert's command, not MacArthur's. Did he mean to write that he worked in active opposition to what he assumed to be his commanding general's philosophy of defense?
commitment of troops to beach defense. MacArthur, by contrast, made no provision should the enemy land successfully and repulse USAFFE counterattacks. Thus, when his confidence in the ability of the American-led Commonwealth army proved unfounded, he made use of the provisions for withdrawal to Bataan contained in Grunert's WPO-3, for he had none of his own.