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A DESPERATE GAMBLE: THE DECISION TO REINFORCE THE PHILIPPINES

Author: James A. Walker

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THE DECISION TO REINFORCE THE PHILIPPINES:

A DESPERATE GAMBLE

A Dissertation

Submitted to

the Temple University Graduate Board

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in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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by

James A. Walker

May, 1996

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ABSTRACT

Title: THE DECISION TO REINFORCE THE PHILIPPINES: A DESPERATE GAMBLE

Candidate's Name: James A. Walker

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Temple University, 1996

Major Advisor: Russell F. Weigley

The author contends that the decision to reinforce the Philippines in 1941 was made in order to support America's military strategy of Europe first. America's military and political leaders were fearful that a German victory in the Soviet Union, and continued Japanese expansion in the Far East would leave the United States surrounded and without allies. In order to discourage Japanese advances and keep the Allies in the fight the decision was made to reinforce the Philippines. A decision based in large part on the misleading reports of General Douglas MacArthur and in the prowess of the B-17 Flying Fortress.

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INTRODUCTION

On June 9, 1942, 140,000 American and Filipino troops surrendered to the Imperial Japanese Army. Historian Louis Morton concluded that the "successful, though hopeless, resistance ... demonstrated that the Japanese were not invincible, that they could be stopped."[1] Brigadier General William E. Brougher, Commander of the 11th Division, Philippine Army, developed a different conclusion in his prison camp diary:

> Who had the right to say that 20,000 Americans should be sentenced, without their own consent, and no fault of their own, to an enterprise that would involve them with endless suffering, cruel handicaps, death, or a hopeless future that could end only in a Japanese prisoner of war camp in the Philippines?[2]

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, did not want to condemn his soldiers to prisoner of war camps or provide a symbol to rally the American public when he ordered his staff to prepare plans to reinforce the

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[1]Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 584.

[2]William E. Brougher, South to Bataan, North to Mukden: The Prison Camp Diary of William E. Brougher, ed. by D. Clayton James (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 14-15.

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Philippines on July 17, 1941.[3] If this order raised any questions, it was because the decision to send additional men and material to the Philippines seemed to be at odds with the accepted American military policy. As late as April 16, 1941, in a summary of the American-British Conversations (ABC) that took place between January and March 1941, American officials stated that the United States would maintain a strategic naval reserve in the Pacific in order to discourage Japan from widening its aggression. The principal enemy was Germany. War in the Far East was to be avoided.[4]

Reinforcement of the Philippines also contradicted long-standing American Far East military policy. The Philippines were an enigma to American war planners. For almost forty years, with one exception, the Army and the Navy considered the garrison and islands a lost cause. Even after General Douglas MacArthur began his attempt to build a Philippine Army in 1935, little support was available or given to any plan that called for a commitment of resources. As far as most military planners were concerned, the diverse peoples who lived on the 7,100 islands that comprise the

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[3]Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, United States Army in World War II: The War Department, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 436.

[4]Ibid., 377.

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archipelago could not be defended. The United States Regulars in the Philippines were doomed to stand and fight a good fight in order to preserve American honor.

Over the course of many years Army and Navy staff officers completed numerous tactical and strategic reviews of Pacific war plans, but the defense of the Philippines remained an unsolvable problem. World events served only to increase the defense problems associated with the Philippines. By 1941 Germany had conquered Europe, and Japan was riding rough-shod over China and threatening European colonies in the Far East. The United States faced the possibility of simultaneous wars with Japan and Germany. The Joint Army-Navy Board's solution was a new set of war plans designated the RAINBOW Plans. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave oral approval to the new plans in 1941, he accepted the likelihood of war in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the fact that the United States could not fight an offensive war in two theaters for some time. On January 16, 1941, the President stated that we would "stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based in Hawaii."[5] This decision meant that the only resistance to a Japanese assault against the Philippines would be offered by the small garrison already stationed on the

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[5]Ibid., 124-125, citing memorandum, Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Subject: "White House Conference of Thursday, 16 January 1941," War Plans Division 4175-18.

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islands, and with whatever help MacArthur's fledgling Philippine Commonwealth Army might be able to offer. The capabilities of the Philippine Army carried little credibility in Washington. The long-held views and counsel of senior officers like Brigadier General Stanley D. Embick suggested that the Philippine Army, even fully developed, could not provide a successful defense against the Japanese.[6]

Marshall's efforts set the wheels in motion to reinforce the Philippines on July 17, 1941, despite the accepted arguments for abandonment of the small garrison. From President Roosevelt's perspective, the world that the United States faced was frightening one, and the defense of the Philippines offered one of the few options available to gain time. America was not prepared to wage an offensive war against Germany, much less a two-front war that included Japan.[7] By July 1941, a German victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union appeared to be within Germany's grasp. President Roosevelt also learned that a German victory was even more likely when intelligence gained from breaking Japanese diplomatic codes indicated Japan might invade the

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[6]D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970-1985), I, 1880-1941, 502-503, citing memorandum, Major General Stanley D. Embick to Chief of Staff, December 2, 1935, War Plans Division 3389-29.

[7]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 124-125.

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Soviet Union. A Japanese thrust into the Soviets' eastern flank, coupled with continued German successes in the West, would almost certainly knock a reeling Soviet Union out of the war. A German victory in 1941 meant that the German Army would be ready to take the offensive in 1942.

But that was not all. The Japanese were also preparing to march into French Indochina, from which they would stand poised to strike the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. Even more important to some in the American Department of State was the mounting pressure the Japanese were placing on the British at Singapore. They concluded that if the British lost Singapore the entire British Empire would collapse. Then too, there was China. By late 1941, renewed Japanese pressure appeared to be breaking the fighting spirit of that nation as well. Allowing the Japanese complete freedom of movement would mean almost certain victory for the Axis powers. The United States would stand alone, surrounded by the victorious armies of Germany and Japan, a full year before American forces were ready to fight.[8]

In this view the decision to reinforce the Philippines was linked to finding a way to forestall Japanese aggression

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[8]Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 98-99.

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and influencing the conduct of the war in Europe and Asia. Thus, the documents relating to Philippine reinforcement need to be reexamined in light of this probable linkage. Diplomatic historian Waldo Heinrichs began the process in Threshold of War. He contends that the decision to place an oil embargo against Japan would force the Japanese to give up a northern advance because of a lack of oil. This lack of oil would make the Japanese turn their attentions south to the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies. But, if the United States reinforced the Philippines, perhaps the Japanese might reconsider their southern options as well.[9] Equally important was the possible effect on Germany. Without Japanese assistance, the Germans would remain tied down in the Soviet Union, and the United States would have the extra time needed to mobilize and deal with its two enemies, one at a time. Thus, for a short time the Philippines could contribute to the defeat of America's primary enemy - Germany.

Given the long-standing American military policy surrounding the defense of the Philippines and the military realities of 1941, Marshall's orders to reinforce the Philippines seemed to reverse American military policy. Historians have offered two interpretations to explain this apparent policy shift. Mark Skinner Watson argues in Chief

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[9]Ibid., 142.

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of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations that the decision to reinforce the Philippines was neither sudden nor a reversal of United States military policy. Instead, Watson suggests that the United States always wanted to defend the Philippines, but could not do so until sufficient resources were made available. The availability of additional troops and equipment in 1941 allowed the Army to enlist more Philippine Scouts and detail additional American officers to aid in training the Philippine Army. Watson contends that the reinforcement effort appears sudden only when Marshall decided to commit Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers to the Far East.[10] In Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, Louis Morton makes a similar argument. Morton points out that there had been earlier proposals to reinforce the Philippines, "most of which had been rejected only because of a lack of funds."[11]

A second and more popular interpretation, based in part on the diaries of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, implies that there was a genuine reversal of policy. Historians such as Ronald H. Spector, author of Eagle Against the Sun, suggest that General Marshall and President Roosevelt were

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[10]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 440.

[11]Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First two Years, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 98-99.

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so impressed with the capabilities of the B-17 and the salesmanship of Secretary of War Stimson and General MacArthur that their minds were changed from accepting the War Plans Division version of sure defeat to Stimson's and MacArthur's recipe for victory.[12] The same argument is set forth in Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. The authors contend that the Secretary of War was the guiding force behind the decision to reinforce the islands because of the availability of B-17 bombers. Stimson believed that "we [the United States] suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great effective power."[13] Stanley Karnow reaches a similar conclusion in his history of the Philippines, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines.[14]

Businessman and war plans researcher Edward S. Miller, in War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, repeats the conclusion that Louis Morton reached in The Fall of the Philippines: that the decision to

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[12]Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, Louis Morton, ed., The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1985), 74-75.

[13]Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, Pearl harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 292-293, citing Henry L. Stimson Diary, 21 October 1941.

[14]Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballentine Books, 1989), 282-283.

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reinforce the Philippines was sudden and sharp.[15] In Fall of the Philippines published in 1953, Morton argues that the decision to reinforce the Philippines was a sudden policy reversal for reasons "nowhere explicitly stated."[16] Morton speculates, based upon Henry L. Stimson's and McGeorge Bundy's book, On Active Service in Peace and War, that the change in policy may have been made because of Stimson's belief in the capabilities of the B-17s and President Roosevelt's recall of MacArthur.[17] Ironically, Morton reversed his position in his 1962 volume, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years.[18]

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[15]Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 61.

[16]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 31, citing Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 388.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Morton suggests in Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 98-99, that B-17 bombers and the availability of additional resources allowed the Philippines to be reinforced in the hope that it might deter the Japanese from opening hostilities. He cites a memorandum from Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow to the Chief of Staff, 14 August 1941, Subject: "Reinforcement of the Philippines," War Plans Division 3251-55. In Fall of the Philippines, 31, Morton suggests that the policy change took many by surprise, citing from Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow's Office Diary, entry of 31 July 1941, Operations Plan Division Executive O; The Adjutant General to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE), No. 1197, 31 July 1941, Adjutant General 320.2 (7-28-41) Organization and Reinforcement for USAFFE.

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However, only one historian, Waldo Heinrichs, offers an interpretation that helps us to begin to understand that the decision to reinforce the Philippines was neither an abrupt shift in military policy nor an effort made because of the availability of additional military resources. His argument is that "In 1941, European and East Asian conflicts extended and interconnected, the world divided, and war became virtually global."[19] An interconnected but divided world meant that if Japanese actions in Asia could aid Germany in Europe, then American actions in Asia might strengthen the Allies' cause in Europe. If we review the decision to reinforce the Philippines under a global instead of a regional light, we can then begin to understand that the decision would make a difference in Europe as well as in Asia.

The options available to Roosevelt and Marshall were few. An oil embargo against Japan could have turned Japanese attentions south, away from the eastern flank of the Soviet Union. An oil embargo coupled with a reinforcement of the Philippines could do even more. The decision to reinforce the Philippines could aid the current naval strategy, which called for the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet to join the limited naval forces of the Dutch, British, and Australians in the Far East. For a president

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[19]Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 4.

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looking for a means to implement a military policy that would lead to a defeat of Germany and forestall war in the Far East, the reinforcement of the Philippines offered a possible way out. First, it would help the Soviet Union maintain its fight against the Germans without fear of a Japanese attack and keep the Soviet Union's ice-free ports open. Second, it would provide a way to aid the British, the Dutch, and the Chinese by supporting the combined Allied fleets already in the Far East without making a provocative move against the Japanese by transferring additional naval forces to Hawaii. Finally, it was an inexpensive way to accomplish everything that was required. The B-17 bombers, while certainly in demand elsewhere, were more readily available than men-of-war and could hopefully influence events to a far greater distance than naval ships. Moreover, MacArthur provided, to desperate American leaders, the key to the lock on the door with his 100,000 trained Filipino soldiers. They were soldiers who MacArthur claimed could, if provided with additional equipment, defend the entire archipelago against attack. If the Philippines could be defended, then they could serve as a base for strategic bombers that some political and military leaders believed could defend the archipelago, deter the Japanese, or if necessary attack them.

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Stopping the Japanese from moving south for oil or north against the Russians meant that Germany would remain locked in combat in Russia for the remainder of 1941. By keeping the Japanese and Germans tied down, the Americans could continue to prepare for war in Europe and temporarily bar the door against Axis aggression. In 1941 the bar to the door appeared to be in the Philippines. Their reinforcement would deter war in the Far East and thereby contribute to the defeat of America's primary enemy - Germany.

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CHAPTER 1

A HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE

> The archipelago, one of nature's glories, is indeed a brilliant tapestry of land, sea, and sky, fields, forests, mountains, wildlife and peoples.[1]

In 1890, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Warren Kimball devised a war plan for a possible conflict with Spain. The plan called for an American squadron to bottle up and destroy the Spanish fleet in the Philippines before the fleet could sail to the aid of its sister squadrons defending Cuba. Eight years later, on the morning of May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey's sailors went to general quarters aboard their ships. When Dewey leaned over the rail of the U.S.S. Olympia and issued his now famous order, "You may fire when ready, Gridley," to Captain Charles V. Gridley, the Olympia's commander, Dewey probably never imagined that a victory would create a defensive nightmare for future military

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[1]Karnow, In Our Image, 37.

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planners.[2] The Philippine Islands geography was no small part of the problem associated with their defense.

There are 115,000 square miles of rugged, mountainous land mass that is divided among 7,100 islands. The sprawling archipelago rests like so many irregular green dots in the southwest Pacific Ocean, just 500 miles from the Asian mainland. For a brief time in the waning months of 1941 and early in 1942, these rugged islands, and their diverse peoples who speak eight different languages, would fight alongside Americans in the opening days of World War II.[3]

Japan's Far East expansion in the nineteenth century and America's victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the annexation of Hawaii in the same year, and the cession

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[2]Ibid., 78, citing Louis S. Young, The Life and Heroic Deeds of Admiral Dewey (Springfield, Massachusetts: 1899), 72; John Grenville A.S. and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 174-176; Karnow, In Our Image, 89; James O. Richardson, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson as told to George C. Dyer, Publication of the Naval History Division, Department of the Navy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 76-77.

[3]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 4-8, citing Civil Affairs Handbook: Philippine Islands, 12 vols., Army Service Forces manual M-365-1 to 12; Karnow, In Our Image, 38-40; Ronald K. Edgerton, Philippines, a Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, The American University (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, 3d ed.), 61-64.

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of the Philippines to the United States in 1899 created an antagonistic relationship between the United States and Japan. Japanese and Americans viewed each other's actions in the Pacific as a threat that called for a corresponding reaction. In 1914 Japan expanded its empire 3,000 miles farther into the Pacific Ocean when it declared war on Imperial Germany and seized German colonies in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas (except Guam). The Allied Powers, despite protests from President Woodrow Wilson, legitimized Japan's new territories in 1919 by making them Class C League of Nations mandates of Japan in the Treaty of Versailles.[4]

By 1921 Japan was placing one-third of its national budget in naval construction. The United States, with the second largest navy in the world, was shifting most of its fleet to the Pacific Ocean and was contemplating expanding it fortifications on Guam and in the Philippines. Then, for a period of time, the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 and its attendant agreements seemed to check the Pacific arms race.[5]

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[4]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 13-18.

[5]Ibid., 16-17; Thomas G. Patterson, J. Gary Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A History / 1900 to present, 2 vols. (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988, 3d ed.), II, 239-244.

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The spirit that led to an arms agreement soon disappeared, however. In 1923 Japan placed the United States first on its list of potential enemies. The United States Congress retorted in 1924 with the American Immigration Act that forbade the entry of Japanese immigrants into the United States. Japan threw down the gauntlet in 1936 when its delegates walked out of the London Naval Conference and abrogated the earlier Washington agreements. American war planners were not surprised by this act of defiance, because it confirmed what they had always believed - "War with Japan was practically inevitable some day."[6]

The apparent inevitability of war with Japan reaffirmed the fears and the dilemma that the American war planners faced in regard to the Philippines. How to devise a realistic defense plan for 7,100 islands 7,000 miles from the nearest base of supply, with a paucity of military resources, and an evolving political relationship that would conclude with independence, appeared to be beyond the grasp of America's best military leaders. Historian Louis Morton

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[6]Patterson, Clifford, and Hagan, American Foreign Policy, II, 339-345; Waldo Heinrichs, Jr., "The Role of the U.S. Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., with the assistance of Dale K. A. Finlayson, Pearl Harbor as History: United States - Japanese Relations, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 202-203, citing transcript of The Reminiscences of Richard L. Conolly (New York: Columbia University Oral History Collection, 1962), 94.

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concluded in Strategy and Command: The First Two Years that America's military relationship with the Philippines was one in which "The nation committed itself to political objectives but would not maintain forces required to support these objectives."[7] In the final analysis, most of America's military leaders were less than hopeful about any sort of success for the Philippine defenders. The only sure conclusion that American military planners reached was that a war would come with little or no warning sometime during the Philippine dry season in January or February. The primary objectives of the Japanese invasion would be the city of Manila on the island of Luzon and the American defenses located in and around Manila Bay.[8]

Louis Morton observed that three ingredients were required for a successful American strategy in the Pacific: a strong Navy with the necessary support bases, an Army garrison equipped with mobile forces and coastal fortifications, and close cooperation between the two

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[7]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 22.

[8]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 61-62, citing Philippine Department Plan ORANGE, 1940 Revision, and discussions between Louis Morton and General George Grunert, Philippine Department Commander, General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Far East, and General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

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services.[9] But, almost everything about the Philippines - the islands' rugged terrain, its distance from bases of supply and tenuous line of communication, the absence of a Philippine industrial base, and the small American Army and Navy that operated on limited peacetime budgets - militated against acquiring all but one of those ingredients. The services could, if they desired, develop a spirit of cooperation with one another. With that goal in mind the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy had established a joint defense planning group in 1903 and designated it the Joint Board.[10]

The Joint Board first explored the question of Philippine defenses shortly after the Japanese attacked Russia in 1904. Chief of Staff of the Army Adna R. Chaffee proposed that the Joint Board develop a series of plans in the event of an emergency that might require cooperation between the two services. Chaffee's proposal led to the development of a series of plans designed to meet specific emergencies, known as the "color plans" because each

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[9]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 22.

[10]Ibid. The Joint Board was composed of eight officers, four from the Army and four from the Navy, who were appointed by the service secretaries. The eight men were supposed to study and coordinate all issues that affected both services and make recommendations to the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy. If the recommendations were accepted by each of the service secretaries they would become joint-service policy.

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potential enemy was assigned a color: black for Germany, green for Mexico, orange for Japan, and so on. The Army and the Navy were then to use the joint color plans as a guide to develop their own operations plans in the event of war. Thus, the Army's Philippine Department's ORANGE Plan was concerned with preparing for the defense of Luzon and Manila Bay against a Japanese landing, while the Navy's ORANGE Plan dealt with escorting the relief force to the Philippines and defeating the Japanese Navy.[11]

The first military review of how the United Stats might fare in a war to protect American Far East possessions wrought sobering conclusions. The threat of war with Japan in 1907 led President Theodore Roosevelt to order the Joint Board to prepare military options for his administration in the event of a Japanese attack on American interests and possessions in the Far East. The Joint Board recommended to the President that the U.S. Navy be sent to the Far East as quickly as possible and deploy itself to protect the Philippines. At the same time, however, the Joint Board's members cautioned President Roosevelt that: "The United States would be compelled ... to take a defensive attitude

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[11]Ibid., 22, citing a letter, General Adna R. Chaffee to the Secretary of War, 22 April 1904; Minutes, Joint Board Meetings, 23 May and 24 June 1904, in Joint Board 325 (1903-1905), series 16.

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in the Pacific and maintain that attitude until reinforcements could be sent."[12]

While President Roosevelt voiced the popular sentiment of the day by stating that he "would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them [the Philippines] up to Japan or to any other nation under duress," the reality of the situation was different.[13] It would take a great deal more than words to put a credible Far East military policy in place.

Precisely what was needed to put some kind of force behind American Far East policy was considered during a series of Congressional hearings that began in 1907. The stated purpose of the hearings was to find the answer to two questions: first, should a major base in the Pacific be constructed in the Philippines or in Hawaii; and second, if the base was placed in the Philippines, should it be located in Subic Bay or Manila Bay?

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[12]Ibid., 23, citing a letter, Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, The Adjutant General, to Major General Leonard Wood, Commanding General, Philippines Division, 6 July 1907, Adjutant General Files 1260092.

[13]Ibid., citing a letter, President Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, 21 August 1907, quoted by Henry Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), 408-409.

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The Army realized that its future military capabilities in the Philippines hinged on whether or not the Navy constructed a large base there. The Army presented a strong case for a major base in the Philippines, but the Joint Board rebutted the Army's plea. The Joint Board recommended to the Congress that the major fleet base in the Far East be built in Hawaii. A fleet base in Hawaii would allow the fleet to provide a defense for the Pacific coast of the United States and to establish a foundation for American naval supremacy in the Pacific. Congress accepted the Joint Board's recommendation and in May 1908 authorized the funds for the construction of a fleet base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The House Naval Affairs Committee touted that the new base would be "one of the strongest factors in the prevention of war with any powers in the Far East."[14]

When the Joint Board began to consider whether or not a naval repair station and secondary base should be located in the Philippines, both services quickly agreed that a repair station was needed. The spirit of cooperation soon ended, however, when the services began to discuss just where the installation should be placed. The Army wanted the Navy's facility to be located in Manila Bay because this area was

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[14]To establish a Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S. Congress, House Reports, No. 1385, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 4 April 1908, 2-3; Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 23-24.

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easier to defend. On the other hand, the Navy favored Subic Bay because it enjoyed easier access to the ocean. The Joint Board's compromise was to recommend placing the naval repair station and secondary operations base at Cavite, on the south shore of Manila Bay. Thus, the Army could plan its defenses around Manila Bay on the islands in its narrow neck. This decision led to the fortification of Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao. Not the defense of the entire archipelago but only the defense of Manila Bay and its surrounding area, along with the fortification of Corregidor, would guide all American planning in the Philippines until 1941.[15]

The Joint Board's assessment of American military power served notice on the President and the Congress that there were limits to American power in the Far East. The decision to base the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, made Hawaii along with the west coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal the primary foci of American naval forces in the Pacific.

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[15]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 24, citing cable, Major General Leonard Wood to Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, 1 November 1907; letters from Lieutenant Colonel Frederic V. Abbot and Captain Stanley D. Embick to Wood, 27 November 1907, Adjutant General files 1260092; Memoranda, the Joint Board for the Secretaries of War and the Navy, 31 January and 4 March 1908, Joint Board 325.

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Placing the major Pacific base at Pearl Harbor also established the defensive role the Philippines would assume in American military policy in the Far East. War plans researcher Edward S. Miller contends that the absence of a major fleet base in the Philippines undermined any future attempts to secure money for the islands' defenses and placed the Army's Philippine Department at the bottom of the list for defense funds.[16] Spending less money on troops and fortifications for the Philippines meant that more and more of the responsibility for defending the islands fell to the U.S. Navy. Therefore, it was imperative that if any successful defense of the islands was to be made, the U.S. Navy had to control the lines of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines. One of the strongest devotees of Philippine colonialism in the U.S. Army, Major General Leonard Wood, summed up the importance of the Navy when he declared that "once sea control is lost, the enemy can move troops in force and the question becomes one of time."[17] Just how much time it would take to gain control of the sea lanes was to become a point of contention between and within the Navy and War Departments.

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[16]Miller, War Plan Orange, 53-55, citing a letter, Commander-In-Chief Asiatic Fleet to the Office of Naval Operations, no date, April 1916, Cable 18129, #303, Series 49, Joint Board Records.

[17]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 24, citing a letter, Major General Leonard Wood to Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, 23 December 1907, Adjutant General 1260092.

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American naval officer concluded in 1909 that the Japanese could probably prevent the timely arrival of American reinforcements and therefore: "The local forces would merely fight a sacrificial delaying action to assure honor, promote public morale, and inflict some damage before passing into captivity."[18]

If the auguries for a successful defense and relief of the Philippines looked dismal in 1909, they appeared hopeless by 1914. The Japanese occupation of the Marshalls and the Carolines meant that the Japanese now had bases astride the American line of communications to the Philippines. In 1914 U.S. Navy Captain Harry E. Yarnell observed that when Japan seized the Marshalls from the Germans, the course of strategy in the Pacific was changed. The fleet was now in danger of interdiction by the Japanese, and Yarnell concluded that "It seems certain that in the course of time the Philippines and whatever forces we may have there will be captured."[19]

By 1921 the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps planners developed a proposal to recapture the Philippines

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[18]Miller, War Plan Orange, 54, citing Minutes of the Joint Board, "Strategy of the Pacific," 1919.

[19]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 25, citing a letter, Captain Harry E. Yarnell to Colonel John McA. Palmer, 25 April 1919, Joint Board 325, Series 28 C.

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that took the Japanese control of the Marshalls and Marianas into account. Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, a brilliant but eccentric Marine, argued that the only way that reinforcements could reach the Philippines was for American forces to secure the Marshall and Marianas Islands. Once these island groups were under American control, the line of communications to the Philippines would be secure and the American fleet would enjoy a safe anchorage in the Kwajalein Lagoon in the Marshall Islands. From there the Americans would launch an invasion to recapture the Philippines.[20] As far as the Army was concerned, however, Ellis's plan had one major drawback - since the relief force would not arrive for two years, the Philippine garrison would be condemned to certain defeat.

In 1922 those who were searching for a way to defend, and if necessary recapture, the Philippines were confronted with yet another problem. In order to convince Japan to accept a lower number of capital ships in their fleet at the Washington Naval Conference, the United States agreed to stop the construction of military fortifications in the Philippines and Guam. American navalists argued forcefully,

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[20]Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1991), 325, citing Major E. H. Ellis, "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia," Operation Plan 712 D, Headquarters Amphibious Forces 165.

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but to no avail, that if the islands were deprived of fortifications and the fleet was deprived of its battleships, the defense or recapture of the islands would be all but impossible. The Army's Philippine Department was ordered to draft a new set of defense plans that would take into account the incomplete fortresses.[21]

The Navy Department's war planners scrambled to try to find new ways to skirt the Washington Naval Treaty and provide some sort of naval support to the Philippines. One such plan proposed the deployment of a flotilla of coastal submarines and a submarine tender to the Philippines. It was hoped in the event of a Japanese attack, the submarines could ward off the attackers and allow the garrison to hold on until the relief force arrived.[22] Admiral William V. Pratt, the Chief of Naval Operations, quickly put an end to such planning when he informed the War Department that providing any type of additional support to the islands would be foolhardy. While Pratt admitted that a slow crawl

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[21]Miller, War Plan Orange, 54-55, citing Army War Plans Division to Deputy Chief of Staff, Subject: "Mission, Strength, and Composition of the Philippine Garrison," 20 October 1922; Secretary of War to Governor General, 4 November 1922, File Number 532, Box 22, Army War Plans Division Records.

[22]Ibid., 57, citing Asiatic Fleet War Plan, 1922. Commandant 16th Naval District, War Portfolio, Register Number 2, forwarded 26 March 1923, 198-37, roll 90, Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential Correspondence.

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across the Pacific would no doubt lead to the defeat of the Philippine garrison, he supported his Director of War Plans Division Rear Admiral Clarence S. Williams who claimed: "The sacrifice of all our forces ... would be justified by damage done to the enemy."[23]

General Leonard Wood learned that the Navy had all but written off the Philippines when he assumed his new role as the Governor-General of the Philippines (1921-1927). He quickly mustered his considerable political clout and forced the U.S. Navy to reconsider its slow crawl to the Philippines. Wood convinced the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, to review the strategy. Contz, unlike his predecessors, concluded that naval units could in fact execute in fact execute a quick

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[23]Ibid., 56, citing memoranda, Director of War Plans Division to Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: "Bearing of Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armaments Upon Defense of Our Overseas Possessions," 29 April and 1 June 1922, roll 116, Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential Correspondence.

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dash through the Central Pacific and bypass the Marshalls to effect a timely relief of the garrison.[24]

After Wood secured the cooperation of the Navy, he unveiled he cornerstone of his new Philippine defense plan - a large Philippine Army backed by Americans in strong fortifications and equipped with aircraft. Under Wood's tutelage all "defeatist" defense plans were to be discarded, and new plans were to be developed that insured the effective defense of Luzon.[25]

But whether the strategic situation called for the U.S. Navy to make a quick dash or a slow crawl, the mission of the 17,000 men of the Philippine garrison, known collectively as the Initial Protective Force (IPF), remained

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[24]Ibid., 56-57, citing the Joint Board Joint-Planning Committee Plans, May-July 1923; Acting Director War Plans Division to Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Survey of Pacific, 3 May 1923; Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Survey of Pacific, 3 May 1923; Chief of Naval Operations to Secretary of the Navy, same title, 10 May 1923, 198-26, roll 80, Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Conference Correspondence; Governor-General to the Secretary of War, 5 February 1923, number 305, Series 209, Joint Board Records; Asiatic Fleet War Plans, 1922, Commandant 16th Naval District, War Portfolio, Register Number 2, forwarded 26 March 1923, 198-37, roll 90, Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential Correspondence.

[25]Ibid.

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the same - hold the entrance to Manila Bay until relieved or to the last man.[26]

Between 1907 and 1938 there were many revisions to the ORANGE Plan but no one, in either the Army or the Navy, could devise a plan that offered a promise of hope to the Philippine defenders in the event of a war with Japan. Nevertheless, despite the apparent hopelessness of mounting a credible defense, the argument that began in 1907 continued. In Washington planners placed great strategic value on the Philippines and declared: "We should relinquish our bases only when we are prepared to relinquish our position as a nation of major influence in the affairs of Asia and the Western Pacific."[27] Senior officers stationed in the Philippines held a different view. They argued that "to carry out the present ORANGE Plan with its provisions for the early dispatch of our fleet to the Philippines would be literally an act of madness."[28]

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[26]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 61-64, citing Philippine Department Plan ORANGE, 1940 Revision (Short title: HPD WPO-3), Adjutant General 326.

[27]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 35, citing a letter, the Joint Planning Commission to the Joint Board, Subject: "Independence of the Philippine Islands," 28 February 1934, Joint Board 305, series 525.

[28]Ibid., citing memorandum, Brigadier General Stanley D. Embick to Commanding General Philippine Department, 19 April 1933, Subject: "Military Policy of the United States in Philippine Department," and first endorsement, Headquarters, Philippine Department, 25 April 1933, War Plans Division 3251-15.

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Essentially, the position of the two services was that the Army opted to defend a line that ran from Alaska to Oahu and Panama, while the Navy believed that it should undertake offensive actions against Japan as soon as a state of war existed between the two nations. The contradictions between the Army and the Navy mirrored the contradiction in national policy. America would not abandon the Philippines, yet it would not provide the military with adequate military resources to defend the islands.[29]

A generation of military leaders concluded that a battle for the Philippines was a battle that could not be won. In all likelihood the Philippine garrison was doomed. The best, though unspoken policy was to accept that eventuality and look toward winning the war instead of winning an early battle in the Philippines.

In 1935 yet another factor was added to the Philippine equation when General Douglas MacArthur arrived in the islands and picked up the guidon of Leonard Wood. MacArthur would ignore the geographic and social facts of the Philippines and disregard the counsel of those who argued that the Philippines could and should not be defended. Within six years MacArthur would convince some that he held the key to unlocking the strategic dilemma of the

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[29]Ibid., 43-44.

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Philippines and the United States. MacArthur's apparent accomplishments would become a critical factor in the decision to reinforce the Philippines.

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CHAPTER 2

MACARTHUR AND THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

> Serve notice upon the world that these islands are not to be subjugated.[1]

In the autumn of 1934 the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, arrived in Washington, D.C. to confer with Secretary of War George H. Dern, Maryland Democratic Senator Millard E. Tydings, Democratic Representative John McDuffie of Alabama, and MacArthur about sending a military mission to the Philippines.[2]

While MacArthur radiated extraordinary optimism to Quezon, most senior American military leaders thought that he was embarking on an impossible task. After all, if

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[1]The Sunday Tribune (Manila), 27 October 1935, 1.

[2]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 480-481, citing a letter, Manuel quezon to George H. Dern, 19 November 1934; Cordell Hull to Dern, 28 November 1934; Quezon to Senator Millard E. Tydings, 19 November 1934; Douglas MacArthur to Quezon, 4 December 1934, Record Group (RG) 18, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives (DMMA), Norfolk, VA (NVA); War Department Bulletin 4, 10 July 1936, Adjutant General 210.68. D. Clayton James believes that Quezon and MacArthur worked together to persuade others to allow MacArthur to head the military advisory mission. The letter which Quezon used requesting MacArthur's services as an advisor and the bill submitted to Congress authorizing the placement of the military mission in the Philippines were drafted by MacArthur.

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MacArthur had not been able to change American military policy in the Far East as Chief of Staff, it seemed unlikely he could effect a change as a military adviser.[3] On October 26, 1935, MacArthur arrived pier side in Manila aboard the S.S. President Hoover to receive a hero's welcome from President Quezon and members of the Philippine government. The general's party included his mother, Mary Pinckney Hardy MacArthur, and four aides, among them Majors James B. Ord and Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Philippine press corps reported the new adviser's arrival with banner headlines and stories about MacArthur, his career as a soldier, and his plans for the defense of the Philippines. President Quezon joined in the accolade and emphasized the importance of a strong national defense force for the Philippines.[4]

Events moved quickly once MacArthur arrived in Manila. Quezon embraced MacArthur and, presently, the Philippine Defense Plan with the fervor of a new convert. The Philippine President declared that the Philippine defense program would "serve notice upon the world that these islands are not to be subjugated."[5] On November 25, 1935, the Commonwealth's Legislature passed a conscription bill

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[3]Ibid., 481.

[4]The Philippine Herald, (Manila) 26 October 1935, 1.

[5]The Sunday Tribune, (Manila), 27 October 1935, 1.

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that required military training in the secondary school system for all male students between the ages of ten and eighteen. In addition, the bill required all able-bodied men over the age of eighteen to serve a brief term of active duty in a national army. On December 31, 1935 the Commonwealth officially designated MacArthur as the Military Adviser to the President of the Philippines.[6]

MacArthur unveiled his Philippine Defense Plan to the Philippine President and Legislature on April 27, 1936. The general told the Commonwealth's Legislature that if the Philippine government and people adopted his plan and carried it to completion, no nation, no matter how strong, could afford to invade the Philippines. If any nation tried, MacArthur declared, "The destruction (of the Philippines) would involve such a staggering cost to the aggressor, both in blood and gold, that even the boldest and strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such an undertaking."[7]

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[6]Letter, Quezon to MacArthur, 31 December 1935, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1. The former Chief of Staff would receive an annual salary of $18,000, annual representation expenses of $15,000, and furnished quarters for his services to the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This money was in addition to his regular U.S. Army pay.

[7]Douglas MacArthur, "First Report to the Philippine Government," 27 April 1936, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1, 16.

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MacArthur's plan for Philippine defense was deceptively simple. Modeled after the Swiss concept of a nation in arms and General Leonard Wood's ideas, the plan proposed a highly trained cadre of 930 officers and 6,500 enlisted men backed by a strong force of trained reserves. The peacetime missions of the professionals included training reservists who were subject to call-up during mobilization, providing the routine administrative and technical expertise required in an army, keeping ready for emergencies, and carrying out the work of a national police force. To assure the availability of an adequate supply of highly trained officers, MacArthur included a plan to establish a military academy on the order of the United States Military Academy at West Point.[8]

In times of national emergency, the small cadre of professionals was to be augmented by thousands of trained reservists. These reservists would be drawn by national conscription from all able-bodied Filipino men between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. In accordance with the 1935 conscription law, their initial training would begin in public school. For those Filipinos who did not attend public school, military instruction was to take place on

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[8]Ibid., 16-19.

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Sundays and holidays. On designated weekends all males of appropriate age were to attend refresher courses.[9]

The Philippine Defense Plan kept its reserve soldiers subject to call-up for thirty years. MacArthur reasoned that reservists committed to such a long-term program could afford to spread their training over a long period of time, thereby allowing the initial training period to be only five-and-one-half months. During the first ten years of a typical reservists service, including the five-and-one-half month training period, the soldier belonged to the First Reserve, that part of the reserve forces mobilized first in the event of a national emergency. After completing the requisite time in the First Reserve, the remainder of a reservist's time was to be served in ten-year increments in the Second and Third Reserves. Each year 40,000 men would be called, 20,000 in January and 20,000 in July. Thus, by the time the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the First Reserve would be fully manned. MacArthur assured the Philippine Legislature and President that his plan would afford "a maximum of protection at a minimum of strength and, ... was no more militaristic in nature than to make each island of the archipelago a citadel of defensive strength."[10]

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[9]Ibid., 22-23.

[10]Ibid., 22.

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MacArthur said his plan took into account the need to be frugal with the development of a Philippine defense force. In order to live within the Commonwealth's $8,000,000 annual defense budget, there were no plans to construct a battle fleet. Instead, the Philippines would rely upon motor-torpedo boats and medium-range bombers. These types of weapons were less expensive and easier to procure and would emphasize the defensive nature of the Philippine Defense Plan. Furthermore, MacArthur continued, the defense plan's army, characterized by high mobility and firepower, would also eliminate the need for a large fleet because the army could travel quickly to meet any threat.[11]

MacArthur envisioned a defense force that could move on all types of terrain and meet the enemy on the sea and in the air. If the Philippine Army was developed according to plan, it could foil the purpose of any attacker and engage him in a war of "relentless attrition."[12]

MacArthur did, however, caution the Philippine government about problems associated with the defense plan. Because the Philippines was a developing nation, there were deficiencies in internal communications, manufacturing

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[11]Ibid., 16-19.

[12]Ibid., 26.

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facilities, and of course, money.[13] But, MacArthur believed, these deficiencies could be compensated for and eventually overcome. He urged the legislators to push ahead with the development of internal communications. As for the lack of manufacturing facilities, that problem could be overcome by purchasing arms and munitions from the United States. MacArthur also urged the Philippine leaders to adopt a moderate procurement policy for artillery, vehicles, and machine shops.[14]

The plan's greatest weakness, MacArthur argued, was the lack of trained personnel. But with characteristic MacArthur optimism he assured the Philippine Legislature that this, too, could be resolved. In order to provide immediate relief for the officer shortage, MacArthur gave dual functions to staff officers. Thus, supply and personnel were under one assistant chief of staff, while war plans, the Philippine Army's Provost Marshal, and the Philippine Constabulary were under another.[15]

Officers for the new army were recruited from the Philippine Constabulary, and when possible from the Philippine Scouts. Those few Filipinos who had served as

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[13]Ibid., 27-28.

[14]Ibid., 39-40.

[15]Ibid., 41-42.

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officers in the U.S. Army were encouraged to serve as well. Because Constabulary officers were trained as policemen, MacArthur made arrangements to send six of these soldier-policemen to the U. S Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. When these six officers completed their training program, they would return to the Philippines and organize similar courses of instruction for their colleagues.[16]

Training for the citizens' army was to take place at 138 regional training centers built at a cost of $8,000 each. Each training center was to be staffed by an officer and eight to twelve enlisted men who would train 240 new inductees each year. The first group of 16,500 recruits was to be available on January 1, 1937, with another group of equal size to follow on July 1, 1937.[17] If all went as planned, the Philippine Army would have the first elements of its First Reserve trained and in place by the end of 1937.

MacArthur was intimately familiar with United States war plans that designated Japan as the primary threat, and he developed his plan accordingly. The Philippine Defense Plan was built upon MacArthur's interpretations of military

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[16]Ibid., 44-48.

[17]Ibid., 50-54.

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history and of the beliefs of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century military thought. The British disaster at Gallipoli, Turkey, for example, shaped his conception of amphibious warfare, a type of attack he saw as easily contained. Likewise, he apparently accepted General William Mitchell's argument that horizontal bombers would serve to defend any nation from sea attack. He also seems to have believed that a Japanese surface invasion force could be interdicted and largely destroyed by air forces. Any invaders who escaped the air attacks of the Philippine Air Force, MacArthur believed, would be met on the beaches by the Philippine Army and pushed into the sea.[18]

MacArthur concluded his report to the Philippine Legislature by stating that any penetration by enemy forces would encounter strong resistance "from the moment the troops left the transports."[19] Even, he assured them, should all of the islands but Luzon be occupied, an enemy invasion would be thwarted because Luzon's superior system of interior communications would permit rapid concentration

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[18]Ibid., 56-58. While MacArthur talked about the creation of an air force and an off-shore patrol squadron, he never requested or received sufficient funding for their development. Given MacArthur's experience as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army it is difficult to believe that he was not aware of the costs for such equipment. Therefore, the discussion about such items may have been designed to obscure the more glaring weaknesses in the Philippine Defense Plan.

[19]Ibid., 58.

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of forces to repel any landing attempt. A complete naval blockade could be overcome as well, he said, if the defense plan he laid before them was followed. The development of a "well trained citizens' army ... will compel every attack to assume the character of a major overseas operation.[20]

MacArthur's plan exhibited many deficiencies, and they were evident to many from the beginning. Its keystone was a citizens' army whose soldiers, in addition to defending their homeland, were also supposed to play a key role in the nation-building process. Unfortunately, the plan's noble ideals ignored problems common to the Philippines. While English and Spanish were languages spoken by educated Filipinos, the vast majority of the population spoke only one of many dialects of the native language, Tagalog. Therefore, any unit above the company level contained soldiers who did not speak the same language.

The Philippine education system was neither universal nor uniform. Instructors, therefore, were faced with training recruits at many skill levels, a problem compounded by a shortage of qualified instructors and exacerbated by a the widely disbursed regional training centers. The disbursed training centers also put an additional burden on MacArthur and his staff, who were forced to travel great

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[20]Ibid., 60.

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distances over difficult terrain in order to check and report on the progress of the Philippine Defense Plan.

The highly dedicated and professional Philippine Scouts were to be absorbed into the Philippine Army when the United States granted full independence to he Philippines. However, until that time came, the Philippine Constabulary would have to provide most of the Philippine Army's officers. Thus, at least initially, the Filipino soldiers would be officered by men who by virtue of their training were more policemen a than soldiers.

Just what MacArthur had in mind when he talked about a highly mobile army is questionable. Most of the Philippine Army units were infantry; therefore mobility would have to be provided by trucks, a luxury beyond the modest procurement capabilities of the Philippine Army's budget. A similar criticism can be made about field artillery. It too, would have to be transported around the islands in order to deliver its fire on an enemy invasion force. What role the fleet of motor-torpedo boats would have in all this is totally unknown, since outside of their mention, nothing was said about their employment. Absent totally from the plan was any consideration for reinforcing any of the citadels of defense. Just how a nation of islands could maintain a credible water transport was never discussed.

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Aircraft, while acknowledged as necessary, received minimal priority in the scheme of the defense program. In light of these failings, it must be concluded that MacArthur's primary concern in developing a defense plan for the Philippines was the development of an army - but how to use that army was given little thought. Naval and air force doctrine were things MacArthur seemed to care little about, so he mainly ignored them.

General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, directed Brigadier General Stanley D. Embick, Chief of the War Plans Division, to evaluate the Philippine Defense Plan. In his report Embick wrote that the Philippine Defense Plan served no useful purpose, except to exist as an end in itself. Even when the plan was completed, Embick concluded, it could never provide an effective defense against the Philippines' most likely aggressor - Japan. He pointed out that the plan also failed to consider the possibility of an armed revolt at the widely disbursed regional training centers. Embick observed that the geography of the Philippines, unlike Switzerland, prevented concentration of forces against a determined enemy who could whittle away the defenders, island by island. Furthermore, the lack of a domestic arms production capability, something MacArthur discounted, would force a poor nation to purchase arms overseas at costs it could ill afford. Embick believed that

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these problems were insurmountable. Therefore, the War Plans Chief concluded, the Philippines should concentrate on a force that could maintain internal order. The only nation that could and should defend the Philippines, Embick argued, was the United States, and this should be made known to the Philippines before independence was granted.[21]

On June 20, 1936, six months before the first draft of Philippine Army conscripts arrived at the regional training centers, members of the Philippine press corps questioned MacArthur about the ramifications of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. MacArthur's reply, carried under headlines proclaiming "No Ethiopian Fate for the Philippines," assured the Filipino people that an invasion could not happen because a the Philippine Army served as a deterrent and because the response of the Filipino people was "splendid beyond words."[22]

Exuberance, press statements, and confidence, however, do not train troops. By July 1937, only seven months after the first recruits reported for training, glaring weaknesses were becoming readily apparent to Major Dwight D.

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[21]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 502-503, citing Embick to the Chief of Staff, 2 December 1935, War Plans Division, 3389-29.

[22]"No Ethiopian Fate for the Philippines, Says MacArthur," The Tribune, (Manila) 20 June 1936, 1.

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Eisenhower, MacArthur's senior staff officer. Eisenhower communicated his problems and frustrations to his colleague Major James B. Ord, who was on an equipment-hunting expedition to the United States. Eisenhower's problems with MacArthur's new army ranged from equipment to recruiting. In July there were not enough canteens to go around to the second contingent of recruits.[23] Eisenhower also expressed concern about the veracity of the glowing recruitment reports, writing that he had "grave doubts as to the accuracy of that information."[24]

As the summer progressed, the situation got worse. In August, Eisenhower wrote that the July inspection of the training facilities on souther Luzon found conditions "very unsatisfactory." Some of the problems, Eisenhower observed, were attributed to heavy rains, but most of them were "directly traceable to the neglect on the part of cadre officers and in some instances on the part of our army headquarters."[25] Once the trainees were assembled at their regional training centers, all the problems associated with a developing nation asserted themselves. Illiteracy, lack of a common language, and ignorance of elementary sanitation

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[23]Letters, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower to Major James B. Ord, 8 July, 13 August 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

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procedures meant that the time devoted to military training had to be reduced. Language and sanitation classes occupied training time instead of military subjects. Moreover, most of the training requirements fell on the shoulders of Philippine Constabulary officers who had only recently been amalgamated into the Philippine Army and who had only a rudimentary understanding of what it took to become a soldier.[26]

A review of the Philippine Army Training Memoranda and Directives issued between 1937 and 1941 confirms that military training was fundamental at best. Subjects such as chemical and aircraft defense, as well as target practice, received only slightly more hours than sex hygiene. The largest block of hours was devoted to close order drill.[27]

The new soldiers themselves added to the organizational problems by not being careful with their scarce equipment. in 1937 all troops were chastised for an "excessive loss of equipment ... at all the regional training centers." In the same bulletin, the staff cautioned troops about being more careful with property accountability, especially the lack of

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[26]Letters, Eisenhower to Ord, 8 July and 29 July 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1.

[27]Philippine Army Training Memoranda and Directives, (Manila: Army Headquarters, 1937-1941), Directive 33. Memoranda and Directives are arranged in a loose-leaf binder in numerical order.

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receipts and "disappearing" ration allowances.[28] On top of that, post exchanges were giving unlimited credit to civilians.[29]

Ord could offer little encouragement to Eisenhower; his own mission seemed headed for dismal failure as he experienced denial after denial during his rounds of the War Department. When Ord asked for ammunition, his request was refused because of concern over security and proper storage facilities. The best he could do was elicit a War Department promise that sufficient ammunition would be provided to the Philippine Army in the event of an emergency, and a further promise of limited amounts of ammunition for training - but not stockpiling. Ord's requests for artillery and motor-torpedo boats were not filled because they were "premature." The Ordnance Department had yet to select a standard field piece for the U.S. Army; therefore it refused to release any artillery pieces until it decided which field pieces would be obsolete. The only artillery offered to Ord were several World War I British mountain guns. A similar problem existed with the motor-torpedo boats for the off-shore

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[28]Philippine Army Bulletins (Manila: Army Headquarters, January 1936 - November 1941), Bulletin 187. Bulletins are arranged in a loose-leaf binder in numerical order.

[29]Ibid., Bulletin 130.

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patrol force. The U.S. Navy was just beginning to experiment with developmental models in the Norfolk Navy Ship Yard.[30]

Major Ord had achieved only limited success when he reached General Malin Craig's office. The Chief of Staff agreed to sell enough equipment to the Philippine Army to meet the training requirements for 1937 and 1938. However, there were conditions attached to Craig's approval that amounted to refusal. Craig suggested that MacArthur develop all the necessary data required to forecast the material requirements for the Philippine Army. When the definitive list of required material was received, the War Department, Craig assured Ord, would investigate the Philippine Army's methods of storage, inspection, and material on-hand. Then, the Chief of Staff of the Army would lay down a policy for future sales and loan of equipment to the Philippine Army. All of this, Craig reminded him, would be done with the understanding that the Philippines and the United States must remain on friendly terms.[31]

Craig's policy toward equipment for the Philippines is important because it gives an indication of just where the

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[30]Letters, Ord to MacArthur, 2 July 1937; Ord to Eisenhower, 27 July 1937 DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1.

[31]Ibid.

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Philippines stood in the scheme of the United States national defense effort in 1937. It also calls into question the completeness of MacArthur's planning. Craig's policy was essentially a let's wait and see what happens approach to MacArthur's pleas. It also indicates that Embick's evaluation of MacArthur's plans was still accepted as valid, and the training memoranda show that the methods of storage and inspection were far from satisfactory. In short, a minimal amount of material would be provided to the Philippines, probably just enough to keep MacArthur from causing too much trouble in Washington.

MacArthur's money problems worsened. The 1937 projected budgets for equipment purchases for the first group of new recruits was inadequate. A sum of $500,000 was allotted to buy equipment for the first graduating class of 16,500. Unfortunately, that was only enough money to equip about 8,000 men.[32] Ord's information about the unavailability of the motor-torpedo boats proved to be advantageous. MacArthur quickly realized the cost of the boats would deplete the entire annual defense expenditure,

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[32]Letter, Eisenhower to Ord, 8 July 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1.

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and therefore directed Eisenhower to strike them from the budget.[33]

Even with the costs associated with the motor-torpedo boats removed from the budget, the projected deficit for 1938 was twice the $8,000,000 annual expenditure discussed when the Philippine Defense Plan was first presented. Nevertheless, MacArthur directed Eisenhower to submit the revised annual budget of $16,000,000 to Quezon. Eisenhower told Ord that Quezon was "dismayed and astonished" when he received the revised budget figures, and that he [Quezon] "believed that he had been deceived ... in view of the definite promises made two years ago, and I gather that only the intervention of more immediate officers had kept us hearing about it in a big way." Eisenhower defended the required increase to Ord and suggested perhaps he and Ord should have argued more forcefully for expenses of $22,000,000 when the plan was first prepared.[34]

MacArthur's justification for the increased military budget played on the hopes and fears of the Philippine

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[33]Letter, Eisenhower to Ord, 13 August 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1. Why MacArthur was unaware of the developmental status of motor-torpedo boats and field artillery is unknown. It is difficult to believe that any professional soldier would plan such important elements of a national defense plan around unproven equipment.

[34]Letter from Eisenhower to Ord, 1 September 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1.

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President. The Philippine Army adviser told Quezon that war could be avoided and peace maintained if the Philippine government followed a policy of neutrality and maintained an adequate national defense establishment. MacArthur continued his justification for additional resources by arguing that early independence carried with it certain dangers. For example, if war broke out between Japan and the United States, the Philippine Army must have "sufficient flexibility to readily meet and absorb such new changes as new conditions may demand."[35]

MacArthur faced more than budgetary and training problems in 1937. By the fall of that year rumors began to circulate that the general would be recalled from the Philippines. This presented a special problem for MacArthur because he had already reached the pinnacle of an American soldier's career. He had been the youngest Chief of Staff in the U.S. Army; therefore, his only options were less than attractive. He could accept a lesser position in the Army, or retire. There being only one choice in his mind, MacArthur choose the latter course. In September 1937 he

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[35]Letter, MacArthur to Quezon, 14 October 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1. MacArthur's defense of his 1937 budget contains the genesis of one of the most puzzling aspects of the First Philippine Campaign - Quezon's attempt to convince President Roosevelt to declare the Philippines neutral in 1942. Where these ideas about early independence and neutrality came from is unclear. They were, however, used by MacArthur as justification for his Philippine Defense Plan.

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submitted his request for retirement, to be effective December 31, 1937.[36]

MacArthur's future course was suddenly made easier by his Philippine benefactor. President Quezon issued an executive proclamation appointing MacArthur the permanent military adviser to the Philippines. The Philippine President's generosity was not a popular political decision. Quezon's fellow politicians were angered, and they charged their President with railroading the action through the Philippine Legislature and paying MacArthur too high a salary.[37] Quezon, taking a lesson in obfuscation from his military adviser, made public statements supporting his decision by declaring that there would be "unfortunate consequences" if MacArthur left before his important task of preparing the Philippine defense forces was complete. MacArthur responded to Quezon's proclamation declaring that the request by Quezon was "a call to duty I cannot fail."[38]

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[36]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 524. MacArthur had never discussed his plans for retirement publicly, except to suggest he might return to Milwaukee, Wisconsin and devote his full efforts to writing.

[37]"Resolution of the Philippine National Assembly Thanking General MacArthur for His Meritorious Services to the Commonwealth of the Philippines," 21 November 1937, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1. On 29 March 1937 the University of the Philippines conferred a doctor's degree upon MacArthur.

[38]"MacArthur Remains at Quezon's Request," The New York Times, 1 January 1938.

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While MacArthur's "call to duty" may have resolved his employment problems, it did little for the state of the Philippine Army's training, supply, and budget problems, and it may even have made them worse. After December 31, 1937, MacArthur was a retired soldier who no longer enjoyed the position of an active duty general officer with direct access to the Chief of Staff; from now on he would be forced to rely more and more on the generosity of the Philippine Department.[39]

MacArthur, despite evidence to the contrary, defined 1938 as a year of progress for the Philippine Army. He stated that "in every line of activity considerable advances were made." He went on to state that the only change in the initial plan was to separate the Philippine Constabulary from the Philippine Army.[40] His bravado was spread by the press. The Washington Star quoted "observers" who claimed, "The Philippines were ready to defend themselves and fully equipped for freedom."[41] The Manila Bulletin even went a step farther, proclaiming that the Philippine Army "was

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[39]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 525, citing a letter, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 21 January 1938, President's Personal Files 4771, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[40]Memorandum, MacArthur to Quezon, 13 April 1939, "A Memorandum on National Defense," DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 2, 1-5.

[41]P. W. Reeves, "Observers Say Filipinos Are Fully Equipped for Freedom," The Sunday Star, 3 December 1939, 20.

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ready for action" and could put 100,000 men on the beach to defend their homeland.[42]

It can be argued that the rosy picture painted by MacArthur was designed to encourage enthusiasm for the Philippine defense program, but his report to the Philippine Legislature raises questions of self-deception. Why MacArthur submitted such a misleading report to the very body that could help him resolve many of the problems with which he was wrestling is unknown. Perhaps he just did not know the real conditions that existed in the far-flung regional training centers.

By 1939 MacArthur's financial difficulties in equipping the Philippine Army worsened again. The military adviser was forced to inform the Philippine Army Chief of Staff, Major General Basilie J. Valdes, that "unexpected problems" affecting the government's income made it necessary to limit military expenditures. MacArthur directed Valdes to reduce barracks maintenance, clothing expenditures, target practice, gasoline purchases, library expenses, and any other items of expense that could be curtailed.[43] Perhaps the only advantage gained from the declining budget was the

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[42]Carlos Niveria, "The Philippine Army is Ready for Action," The Manila Bulletin, 20 February 1939, 1.

[43]Memorandum, MacArthur to Major General Basilio J. Valdes, 20 May 1939, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 2.

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decision to consolidate the regional training centers. Despite these problems, MacArthur continued to proclaim that the first objective of the Philippine Defense Plan was to defeat an enemy on the beaches - a goal he claimed could be met only through universal military service.[44]

However, by 1939, senior Filipino officers began to argue formally with MacArthur over the concept of the Philippine Defense Plan. The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (operations), General Fidel V. Segundo, a West Point graduate, sent a memorandum to MacArthur in which he argued that the Philippine Army should prepare its own budget. Segundo pointed out that the current budget and defense plans were simply not working. Even the First Division, originally intended to be the professional corps of the army, was composed almost entirely of trainees. The air corps and off-shore patrol, even when fully developed, Segundo believed, would be too small to accomplish their assigned missions. He also criticized tables of organization that listed units as fully equipped when in fact they were not. Finally, he objected to the lack of

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[44]Memorandum, MacArthur to Quezon, 8 December 1939, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1, 1-19.

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training ammunition and reserve ammunition that prevented any opportunity to practice.[45]

The Segundo memorandum was a direct attack on the Philippine Defense Plan and the way that it was administered. MacArthur responded by informing Segundo that the President of the Philippines believed that it was unnecessary to stockpile vast quantities of ammunition and supplies because they would become outmoded or deteriorate. Furthermore, MacArthur pointed out, when the U.S. Army withdrew from the Philippines in 1946, large amounts of material would be left behind. Therefore (despite having sent Ord to Washington in 1937) the quantities of supplies needed could not be determined until 1946. MacArthur went on to point out that more modern equipment could not be obtained for the Army at the present time because of the United States's material support for the conflict in Europe. He stated flatly that the development of the air corps was not limited by the budget, but by a shortage of trained pilots. As for the off-shore patrol, its problems would be resolved when unexplained procurement difficulties were worked out. The First Division would be up to strength, he promised, when the Philippine Scouts were integrated into the Philippine Army in 1946. MacArthur concluded his

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[45]Memorandum, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff Major General Fidel V. Segundo to MacArthur, 2 July 1940, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 2, 1-4.

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memorandum by informing the senior Filipino officer that: "It is not believed that General Segundo understands the scope of the air corps and the off-shore patrol or the General Headquarters Combat Group."[46]

There were several reasons for the near-open rebellion against the Philippine Defense Plan, not the least of which was what D. Clayton James terms "Quezon's increasing disillusionment with the plan and with his military adviser."[47] The strained relations may have begun in June 1938, when Quezon made a secret journey to Japan, where it is rumored that he was attempting to gain a formal pledge of neutrality for the Philippines in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. At the same time Quezon steered a bill through the National Assembly that divorced the Constabulary from the Philippine Army. This change was at direct odds with MacArthur's efforts to reduce the Constabulary and place its resources in the Philippine Army. By 1939 the personal relations between the two men had deteriorated. In May 1939, Quezon established the Department of National Defense to decrease MacArthur's power and access to senior Philippine officials. Thereafter, without express approval from Quezon or the newly appointed

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[46]Memorandum, MacArthur to Segundo, 2 July 1940, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 2, 4.

[47]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 535.

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Philippine Secretary of Defense, Teofilo Sison, MacArthur could neither order munitions, enroll trainees, or let contracts for construction projects.[48]

The ultimate repudiation, however, took place in June 1939. The Philippine defense budget was cut by 14 percent for 1940, and Quezon told the National Assembly that events in Europe had convinced him of the futility of spending money for national defense. Then at a public gathering at Rizal Stadium in Manila, Quezon informed his audience that: "The Philippines could not be defended even if every last Filipino were armed with modern weapons."[49]

The Philippine President continued to slash MacArthur's military program through the first half of 1940. He even went so far as to cut the free franking privileges of MacArthur and the Philippine Army headquarters. Then, in a

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[48]Ibid., 535-538, citing Report on National Defense in the Philippines: 1938 (Manila: Army Headquarters, 1939), 32; Annual Report of the Philippine High Commissioner: 1939 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 34; Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines. 1929-1946 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965), 160-168; James K. Eyre, The Roosevelt -MacArthur Conflict (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: The Craft Press, Inc., 1950), 28-32, 33; MacArthur to Quezon, 26 September 1938; Quezon to MacArthur, 22 January 1939, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1; MacArthur's statement, 27 June 1939, DMMA, NVA, RG 1, Box 1; Report on National Defense in the Philippines: 1939 (Manila: Army Headquarters, 1940), 38.

[49]Ibid., 537, citing untitled article in La Vanguardia, (Manila), 27 June 1940, 1.

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dramatic turnaround in August, Quezon, apparently concerned over the growing war clouds in the Far East, began the first steps toward civilian mobilization by declaring a limited state of national emergency.[50]

During discussions on how to proceed with the mobilization, MacArthur expressed his concerns to the commander of the U.S. Army's Philippine Department, Major General George Grunert. MacArthur was particularly critical about planning for civilian defense. He succinctly pointed out that for the foreseeable future the United States was responsible for the defense of the Philippines, and that there were not enough resources on hand to do the job. MacArthur then proceeded to tell Quezon that:

> It is quite apparent that until the basic plans of defense of the American government are known, no detailed intelligent program for civil and military defense of these islands can be made. A very different program would be necessary for a plan contemplating the defense of the entire archipelago than for one envisaging the defense merely of Luzon. It is beyond the bounds of possibility that a strategic abandonment may be planned by the American government.[51]

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[50]Ibid., 539-540, citing Annual Report of the Philippine High Commissioner: 1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 26; MacArthur Journal, entries of 5 June, 8 July, 9 and 12 August, 1940; Quezon to Roosevelt, 6 August 1940, Wwar Plans Division 3389-34; Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 419-420.

[51]Memorandum, MacArthur to Quezon, 12 October 1940, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1.

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MacArthur's memorandum to Quezon is important for what it does not say. The military adviser carefully left out any mention of the Philippine Army, an Army "splendid beyond words." While MacArthur may have been retired for three years, it is inconceivable that he was not aware of the ORANGE plans and precisely what they meant in the event of war in the Far East. Therefore, MacArthur had to know that the only defense planned for and possible with the resources at hand was that of parts of Luzon. It also shows that MacArthur had at least an inkling about the deficiencies of the Philippine Army that he avoided mentioning what role it might play in augmenting the shortages within the United States forces. At best MacArthur's memorandum to Quezon could be characterized as self-serving.

In the end the soldiers of the Philippine Army would comprise the majority of the forces who would defend the Philippines. The strategy these forces would employ in meeting the Japanese assault was based upon the strategy developed by MacArthur and sold to the President of the United States and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. One observation must be made - the Philippine Army was not ready, even with a massive transfusion of training and material, to deter aggression or protect the Philippines from a hostile force. The problem observed by contemporary critics of the Philippine Defense Plan - a lack of money, a

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shortage of instructors, and the absence of a domestic industry to support a defense establishment - were not and could not be overcome by the end of 1941.

MacArthur's concept of a citizens' army rushing to the colors to defend their homeland never materialized. After four years, the Philippine Army never grew beyond a few professionals, who tried and failed, through no fault of their own, to train thousands of people who were shuttled through regional training centers. The true conditions of the Philippine Army was known to the senior officers in both the Philippine Army and the American Army. No one, except perhaps for Douglas MacArthur ever contemplated using the Philippine Army as an instrument of American military policy in the Far East.

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CHAPTER 3

SUBJECT TO ANNIHILATION

> Unless or until the national policy requires the peacetime reinforcement of the Philippine garrison.[1]

In February 1940, the Germans, Italians, and the Japanese were on the offensive. Speaking before the House Appropriations Committee on February 23, 1940 General Marshall said: "If Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the western hemisphere."[2] The American military had a long way to go to set its house in order. It simply did not have enough resources to go around.

At the February 20, 1940 meeting of the Joint Board, the Navy's representatives requested General Marshall to consider the practicality of increasing Army aviation strength in the Philippines. The Navy's representatives

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[1]Memorandum, Brigadier General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff, 28 February 1940, Subject: "Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines," War Plans Division Files, 4192-3, item 1561, roll 39, microfilm collection, George C. Marshall Archives (GCMA), Virginia Military Institute (VMI), Lexington, Virginia (LVA), 1.

[2]House Appropriations Committee, 76th Cong., 3d sess., Hearings on HR 9209 (Washington, 1940), 3.

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contended that the United States would lose 90 percent of its tin and rubber imports if the Netherlands East Indies fell to the Japanese. Because England was facing the Germans in Europe, the Navy believed that the United States was the only nation "in a position to supply a deterrent to Japan." But, because the limited size of the Asiatic Fleet precluded its use as a deterrent, the Navy representatives posited that perhaps the Army could provide deterrence to Japanese aggression if it increased Army air power in the Philippines.[3]

At Marshall's direction, the War Plans Division considered the Navy's suggestion. Not unexpectedly, the staff officers reported that if American forces in the Philippines were to become a deterrent to Japanese expansion, more then just a few airplanes would be required. The staff believed that a total of 441 aircraft the same types already in the islands would have to be sent there. While sending the same types of aircraft already on hand would permit personnel to take advantage of the spare parts, extant knowledge, and existing infrastructure, the Army

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[3]Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting, 20 February 1940, Joint Board Papers, Office of the Plans Division, General Staff, U.S. Army, roll 39, item 1563, GCMA, VMI, LVA, 2.

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would also have to commit 22,195 personnel to protect and support the 441 aircraft.[4]

Brigadier General George V. Strong, chief of the War Plans Division, told Marshall that more than men and material were required. Not all of the infrastructure - landing fields, repair shops, and barracks - was in place; and the money and personnel to build it were not available either. The Navy, too, had to commit additional submarines and patrol aircraft, something it had been reluctant to do in the past. Strong also suggested mobilizing elements of the Philippine Army and Constabulary to provide surveillance and assistance at the beaches. If these steps were carried out Strong believed that:

> The combined forces thus to be provided could reasonably be expected to defeat one serious landing attack. [Underlined in original report.] This ... would deter Japan because it would face the U.S. Fleet before a second expedition could be made ready to invade the Philippines.[5]

Strong's 1940 analysis is important. The amount of men and material he believed necessary to allow the Philippines to serve as a deterrent against a Japanese attack were greater

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[4]Memorandum, Brigadier General George V. Strong to Chief of Staff, Subject: "Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines." The 22,195 personnel included a regular peacetime-strength division, 8,960 men; one antiaircraft regiment, 1,511 men; and 2,270 harbor defense troops. The 441 aircraft would require 9,454 support personnel.

[5]Ibid., 2-3.

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than those that could be delivered between July 1941 and the spring of 1942.

Equally important is the fact that in 1940 the staff recognized that air power constituted only a part of the equation necessary to turn the Philippine garrison into a credible deterrent. Achieving a credible deterrent force would require the presence of balanced Army and Navy elements to defend Luzon. The Navy would have to rethink its strategy of a slow crawl to the Philippines. And, because the Navy had not changed that position, Strong recommended to Marshall that:

> The CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] be informed that it is impracticable to increase the strength of Army Aviation in the Philippines unless or until the national policy requires the peacetime reinforcement of the Philippine garrison so as to afford a reasonable chance for a self-sustained defense, in which case, both Army Aviation and general troops should be reinforced at least on the scale in this paper.[6]

Strong correctly concluded that before committing additional military resources to the Philippines, the islands place in national policy should be decided. Marshall had no reservations about the place the Philippines occupied in national policy, nor the fate of its defenders if attacked in February 1940. He firmly and promptly declared that:

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[6]Ibid., 4.

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> Any increase in the air component of the Philippine garrison, as well as the rest of the garrison ... would be subject to annihilation or complete loss in the event of a Japanese attack.[7]

Marshall's concerns were directed elsewhere. On May 22, 1940, Major (later General) Matthew B. Ridgway of the War Plans Division sent his boss a sobering memorandum. Ridgway agreed that it was highly possible that the Japanese would attack the Philippines, but he believed that danger was overshadowed by the perils of Nazi-bred revolts in South America. If the Nazis succeeded in South America, Ridgway believed, then pro-German governments might permit the establishment of Nazi enclaves in the western hemisphere. The United States did not have enough military forces to disperse to all the endangered points in the world. The maximum effort that America could exert within one year would consist of:

> Offensive-defensive operations in South America in defense of the western hemisphere and of our own vital interests; such limited offensive operations in Mexico as the situation may require; possible protective occupation of European possessions in the western hemisphere; and the defense of the Continental United States and its various possessions east of the 180th Meridian.[8]

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[7]Ibid.

[8]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 105, citing memorandum prepared in the War Plans Division, 22 May 1940, Subject: "National Strategic Decisions," War Plans Division 4175-9.

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Historian Mark Skinner Watson believes that Ridgway's analysis "accepted as tolerable the loss of Wake as well as Guam and the Philippines.[9]

On May 23, Marshall reported to his staff that he had showed the memorandum to the President; Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations; and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. All the participants, Marshall reported, were in general agreement, especially Welles, who argued vociferously against involvement in a war against Japan and for a concentration of forces in South America.[10]

Marshall and his staff were afraid that the endless round of German victories would accelerate the threat of German encroachment in South America. And they also believed that events in Europe made Japanese aggression more likely. Therefore, Marshall asked his staff at a June 17, 1940 meeting: "Are we not forced into a question or reforming our naval policy, that is (into) purely defensive

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[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., 105-106, citing memorandum, Chief of Staff to Assistant Chief of Staff War Plans Division, 23 May 1940, War Plans Division 4175-10. Contained within the same files a note for record prepared by Major Matthew B. Ridgway.

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action in the Pacific with a main effort on the Atlantic side? ... Should not Hawaii have some big bombers?[11]

At the same time Marshall faced decisions about what he might need in the way of forces to defend American interests in the Atlantic and South America; General Grunert requested additional military resources for his command. The commander of the Philippine Department wanted antiaircraft material, ammunition reserves, an aircraft warning service, an increase in the strength of the 31st Infantry Regiment, and more Air Corps officers and aircraft.[12]

In response to Grunert's requests, the staff prepared a paper titled, "War Department Policy Reference Defense of Philippine Islands." The War Plans Division staff recounted the steps already taken to improve the defense posture in the Philippines. These steps included approving the Philippine Department's request for six months of ammunition for 31,000 men on September 5, 1940. The second priority, three months of ammunition for five Philippine Army

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[11]Ibid., 105, citing memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff War Plans Division to The Adjutant General, 17 June 1940, Subject: "Defense Precautions," War Plans Division 4322.

[12]Memorandum, Strong to Chief of Staff, Subject: "War Department Policy Reference Defense of the Philippine Islands," 10 October 1940, Office of the Chief of Staff 18136-30, also filed under War Plans Division 3251-37, item 1404, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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divisions, and the third, six months for the remainder of the Philippine Army, had not been approved. Also approved was the replacement of obsolete antiaircraft material on August 5, 1940. The War Plans Division recommended disapproval of the request for the aircraft warning system in accordance with Marshall's February decision not to spend additional money in the Philippines. Not acted on were Grunert's requests to increase the 31st Infantry by 1,653 people and for a full complement of modern aircraft and seventy-two pilots. Marshall returned both of these requests to the War Plans Division for further study. Marshall's staff also recommended that Quezon's request for an increase to aid the military training program for the Philippine Army be disapproved. Marshall returned this request, too, for further study.[13]

The staff did believe that the authority to increase the strength of the Philippine Scouts to their Congressionally authorized level of 12,000 should be granted to Grunert. Marshall returned that request with the note that "it could not be favorably considered at the present time."[14] The War Plans Division assessment of the Philippines was as dreary as a cloudy winter's day. The division observed that:

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[13]Ibid., 2.

[14]Ibid.

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a. The Philippine Islands may be attacked without warning;
b. Grave shortages exist in practically all defense reserves;
c. With additional funds, personnel, and equipment the defense of the Philippine Islands could be greatly improved;
d. A strong air and submarine force based on the Philippines would make operations difficult to the south and west of the islands; and
e. An attitude of defeatism is increasing in the Philippine Commonwealth.[15]

The staff reminded Marshall that the 1939 Philippine Defense Project recommended that if funds were available, efforts should be made to keep up existing strength in personnel and material for protection of Manila Bay. However, there should be "no further expense for permanent improvements unless thereby ultimate saving will result."[16] In other words, unless the Philippines held some vital place in national policy, no steps should be taken to modernize the defense of the islands or include funds in estimates for modern material, construction, or personnel, essential to a successful defense. The staff also reported that in March 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations had been told that it was not practical to increase strength in the Philippines. They also resurrected an August 21, 1939 memorandum that offered three possible sources of action in the Philippines: maintaining the status quo, withdrawing forces, or

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[15]Ibid., 3.

[16]Ibid.

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maintaining a position of strength in the Pacific and being prepared to enforce it.

The War Plans Division staff realized that a change had occurred in the international conditions under which the 1939 Philippine policy was made. Within a year Germany, Italy, and Japan had formed an alliance that, they believed, was "definitely aimed at the United States interests in the Far East." However, they also postulated that within a few years the results of the American naval expansion program would "permit us to take a firmer stand in the defense of our interests in that region" as would the increases in the Regular Army through conscription, the Federalization of the National Guard, and defense money. For the present, the staff concluded that the 1939 options were still applicable to the world situation in 1940 with one important exception: this time the planners stated that the status quo was "without merit." Keeping the status quo, they believed, would make no difference to the Japanese, and would only encourage a spirit of defeatism in the Philippines. A better solution, they urged, would be to withdraw American forces to the Hawaii-Alaska-Panama line. Such a strategic withdrawal would eliminate a "vulnerable salient in the lines," and permit a build-up of American forces under the best possible conditions. If, however, such a move was in opposition to national policy, then the islands should be

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reinforced to the "maximum extent possible." Any reinforcement effort, however, had to include the Navy and be carefully coordinated with the availability of men and material. Because it was most unlikely that men, material, and ships would be available, they recommended that American forces be withdrawn from the Far East.[17]

As decisive as the memorandum was, some of the staff believed it was not decisive enough. Three additional opinions were appended to it. Air Staff officer Colonel Joseph T. McNarney disagreed that the reinforcement of the Philippines should be carried out to the maximum extent possible. McNarney believed that the statement "to he maximum extent possible" meant nothing except a piecemeal solution and was therefore no real option. He believed that the proper military solution was to withdrawal. Lieutenant Colonel Harold F. Loomis agreed with the intent of the memorandum. He stated "that it is high time that a decision be made as to what our future military policy in regard to the defense of the Philippines should be." Lieutenant Colonel Loomis pointed out that foreign policy and national policy in the Far East were inconsistent and therefore the Joint Board should develop a recommendation. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson echoed the Loomis position. Anderson believed that any policy steps taken in regard to

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[17]Ibid., 6.

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the Philippines must be based on national policy. "The Army," Anderson wrote, "should specifically recommend this drastic action until such action is known to be compatible with our proposed foreign policy and with the best interests of the Navy."[18]

Clearly the War Plans Division wanted to force a decision about the place the Philippines should hold in American Far East policy. Emphasizing its belief that the garrison would face almost certain defeat if the status quo was maintained meant that there were really only two options: reinforce the garrison or withdraw the forces.

Historian Mark Skinner Watson in Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations suggests that the staff constructed this paper based upon military expediency, and that when its suggestion was formally advanced into the "more nervous atmosphere of October 1940," it did not win any support for an advance from the Far East and "quite probably was not intended to." Watson also suggests that the nonconcurrence by the Air Staff officers McNarney, Anderson, and Loomis are further proof the memorandum was prepared to force a

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[18]Ibid., citing memoranda appended to the cited document with the same subject located within the same file; 7 October 1940, Colonel Joseph T. McNarney to Colonel Richard W. Crawford; 8 October 1940, Lieutenant Colonel Harold F. Loomis to Colonel Crawford; 8 October 1940, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson to Colonel Crawford, War Plans Division file number on all documents 3251-37.

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decision quite different from that recommended.[19] Army historian Louis Morton writing in Strategy and Command: The First Two Years presents a different interpretation. He contends that this memorandum indicates a desire to reinforce the Philippines that was postponed because of a lack of funds.[20] There is also another possibility.

For several months Grunert had submitted material requests to the Army Staff. Its officers were duty-bound to provide Marshall with a well thought-out analysis of what the Army's position in the Philippines ought to be. If the staff sincerely believed that there was a real possibility to reinforce the Philippines, then it would have surely have offered a way to achieve that end. The War Plans Division, more than any other organization within the Army, was cognizant of the Army's current condition and its future direction and capabilities. It was also equally aware of the previous reinforcement considerations that had included aircraft and 12,000 additional troops on Luzon. But instead of offering a strong solution on the heels of its somber recommendation, it provided no solution at all. The War Plans Division was also aware that the Navy could not reach the Philippines in time to save the troops already there.

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[19]Watson, Prewar plans and Preparations, and a footnote on dissenting memorandum, 418, footnote 16, 419.

[20]Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 97-98.

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There were no plans for long-range bombers, no discussions about facility construction or calling-up the Philippine Army. There was only a rehash of earlier concepts and studies.

If the memorandum was intended to force a decision, then its authors lost or overlooked an opportunity to do so. The paper reached Marshall's desk and went no further. It was returned with a memorandum for record stating that:

> In view of a later decision to increase the Philippine Scouts, the infantry and the Coast Artillery components of the Regular Army Garrison, as well as to augment local defenses, no further action appears necessary on this study at the present time.[21]

While the War Plans Division was attempting to find an answer for Grunert, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was penning a letter to the President on October 12. Stimson believed that it was time for a "grave decision and [Stimson] decided to tell you [President Roosevelt] frankly what is in my head." Stimson was convinced that events in the Far East in 1940 closely paralleled the conditions that existed in May 1898, when the Germans threatened American interests in the Far East. In 1898, Stimson reminded the President, the Royal Navy had stood shoulder-to-shoulder

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[21]Memorandum for Record, "War Department Policy Reference Defense of Philippines," disposition slip, Office of the Chief of Staff, 21 February 1941, 18136-30, item 1406, roll 39, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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with the American Navy in a show of united strength against the Germans; at least such was the version of events that Stimson believed. The Secretary of War also believed that Royal Navy's presence had been instrumental in preventing a war between Germany and the United States. The Japanese, Stimson concluded, could be deterred from further advances in the Pacific if the United States fleet moved across the Pacific in a non-provocative way and base itself in Singapore. Positioning the American fleet in Singapore would change the entire strategic picture. The Japanese fleet would be deterred from joining with the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, British morale would improve, and the American Navy would be closer to any potential action. With just one move the Allies would hold command of the sea lanes, the power of China would be increased, Australia would be safe, and the lines of communications to the Far East would be secure.[22]

Stimson's letter to the President is important because it foreshadows his support for the decision to send bombers to the Philippines. It also shows that he appreciated the concept of a global war and saw a linkage between the

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[22]Diane E. Kaplan, ed., "Microfilm Edition of the Henry Lewis Stimson Papers," Yale University Library, 1973, Film 102, 12 October 1940 entry.

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actions of the Japanese in the Far East and the Germans and Italians in Europe.[23]

Despite the fact that the Secretary of War, the War Department, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and even private citizens saw the interrelationships between Europe and Asia and the need to hold Asia against German and Japanese aggression, no one discussed casting the Philippines as the locus of American power in the Far East. While many saw the American Navy making a difference, few envisioned a situation in which air power would serve as the instrument of American Far East policy. Neither Stimson, Marshall, the Army Staff, nor the President displayed any serious interest in making the Philippines a citadel of strength in the Far East. While many discussed the possible

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[23]Ibid. Stimson was not the only person who saw this linkage. On July 10, 1940 the Secretary of War received a letter from Vermont resident, Dorothy Thomson. Ms. Thomson told the Secretary that Great Britain, France, Russia and China were our natural allies and that Germany, and Japan were our natural enemies. On August 12, he sent a letter to Ms. Thomson agreeing with her analysis and suggested that a naval alliance should exist between Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, China he argued, served to pin down Japan. In another entry in the Stimson diary the Secretary noted the September 18, 1940 radio address of Admiral Harry E. Yarnell speaking to the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Among Yarnell's points were that the Philippines were an important trading partner of the United States and that the fleet should be based in Singapore, and that the Japanese feared the Russians. Letter from Dorothy Thomson to Henry Stimson, 10 July 1940; letter from Stimson to Thomson, 12 August 1940; notes on radio address of Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Stimson Diary entry of 18 September 1940.

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loss of the Commonwealth and wished to do more for its defense, the circumstances of the day dictated the Philippines fate. The Philippine garrison and the Commonwealth were not yet factors in national military policy.

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CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

> It might create in the minds of the Japanese a fear....[1]

Mobilization of the Philippine Army was one method of bolstering Philippine defenses. But at the same time the commander of the Philippine Department, Major General George Grunert, was requesting additional resources for his command, he was warning the Chief of Staff about the true state of the Philippine Army. Grunert believed that for some reason Marshall thought that the Philippine Army was a credible force upon which American Far East policy could be built.

On November 2, 1940, Grunert wrote directly to Marshall concerning a series of newspaper articles that indicated that the Philippine Army might be counted upon as a force to be reckoned with. Grunert's letter to Marshall about the Philippine Army was forceful and to the point:

> In my opinion, Reserve units of the Philippine Army, if they must be used as soon as they are

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[1]Memorandum, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow to the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Calling into active service of the United States some or all of the organized military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth Government," War Plans Division 3251-39, item 1403, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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> mobilized, can be considered as capable only of defensive operations involving little or no maneuver, and then only in units not larger than a battalion when closely supervised by experienced officers of he United States Army.[2]

The Philippine Department commander calculated that at a minimum 500 additional American officers would be required for at least one year to train the Philippine Army. Should the military situation dictate that mobilization of the Philippine Army was necessary, Grunert recommended that the entire Army should be mobilized. The purpose of mobilizing all of the Philippine Army, however, was purely for the sake of morale and training. Grunert intended to use only those elements based on Luzon as part of any American defense force.[3]

The War Plans Division reviewed Grunert's letter. The Tydings-McDuffie Act permitted the Philippine Army to be called into the service of the United States, and a coordinated draft request to do just that was already in the hands of the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy. Should an emergency arise, it was ready for transmittal to the President for his signature.

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[2]Letter, Major General George Grunert, Commander of the Philippine Department to Marshall, 2 November 1940, Office of the Chief of Staff Files 18136-30, item 1402, roll 39, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[3]Ibid.

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Despite the preparation of the necessary call-up orders, the staff officers' comments suggest that no one had given any serious thought to such a move, or if they had, they were opposed to it. The State Department, for example, offered no opinion except to ask to be consulted before the final decision was made. The G-1 (Personnel) reported that qualified reserve officers could be obtained to train the Philippine Army. But the G-3 (Operations) officer objected because American service schools were filled to capacity and using reserve officers to train the Philippine Army would diminish training within the U.S. Army. There was also concern about the cost of such an undertaking, something Grunert apparently had not considered. Paul V. McNutt, the High Commissioner to the Philippines, was opposed to mobilizing the Philippine Army although he did not explain why. For its part, the War Plans Division believed that any call-up must be:

> Analyzed from the view point of the foreign relations of the United States.... It might create in the minds of the Japanese a fear that the United States had definitely decided to build up forces in the Far East.... In other words, War Plans Division believes that such action would further disturb the situation in the Western Pacific and tend to commit us to a policy which the forces available to us will be incapable of sustaining for a period of at least one year. Moreover, there can be little doubt that further commitment by the United States in the Western Pacific have been the basis for Axis policy for months past.[4]

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[4]Gerow, "Calling into Service the Philippine Army," 2-3.

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The War Plans Division concluded that while retaining Luzon as a naval and air base would be of:

> An inestimable value to the United States in the event we should become involved in an unlimited war in the Far East ... calling into active service of the United States the organized military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth Government would be inadequate for that purpose.... Moreover, in view of present world conditions, War Plans Division is unalterably opposed to any action which might result in committing us to war in two oceans.[5]

Everyone understood that the morale of the Philippine Department and the Philippines might be improved if the Philippine Army was mobilized but the consensus was that such an undertaking would contribute little to the defense of the islands and might well involve the United States in an effort it could not sustain. Equally important was the belief that any action taken in the Pacific might encourage German action in the Americas. Therefore, on December 13, 1940, Grunert was informed that his request for 500 officers had been carefully considered and such action "would be inadvisable under present conditions, but 75 qualified reserve officers would be assigned."[6]

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[5]Ibid., 3.

[6]Joint National Estimate, Section 1, Office of the Chief of Staff, no date, file number 14513-26, item 454, roll 15, GCMA, VMI, LVA 1. Similar concern was exhibited for the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, the fortification of Guam, and economic sanctions.

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The Army's response to Grunert's letter provides an insight into the place the Philippines held in America's defense policy during the last days of 1940. Since his arrival in June 1940, Grunert had requested men and material to improve his command's defensive posture. The letter to Marshall suggests that he was making certain that his Chief of Staff knew exactly what the conditions were in the Philippines. There is also every indication that Grunert was genuinely concerned that somehow, someone might be attempting to convince the Chief of Staff that the Philippine Army was a war-ready force. The Philippine Department commander's opinion that American officers would be needed down to the company level in order to bring the Philippine Army to a combat-ready condition was a direct attack on the capabilities of that army. His letter should have left small doubt in anyone's mind about the capabilities of the Philippine Army.

The War Plans Division's recommendation to Marshall was strong and to the point. The members categorically believed that to dispatch any reinforcements to the Philippines would create a dangerous environment for the United States. Moreover, if a war began, the forces already there could not be sustained. The real struggle that the American military was facing in late 1940 went beyond the issues associated

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with the Philippines; it concerned the strategic considerations associated with fighting a global war.

During the spring, summer, and fall of 1940, a series of joint-service discussions took place for the purpose of developing a global-war policy. By November, Admiral Stark had completed a series of plans for fighting a world war and presented them to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox for his consideration. Stark's strategic concept contained four American war options, designated Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog. In Plan Able, American military activity was limited to defending the western hemisphere. Plan Baker called for American military forces to fight Japan and give only secondary consideration to Europe. Plan Charlie was the most optimistic. It devoted equal resources and attention to both theaters. Plan Dog was almost a reversal of Plan Baker. It mandated a strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive war in the Pacific. After several rounds of joint-service discussions, both services agreed on Plan Dog - a strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive effort in the Pacific.[7]

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[7]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 119, citing memorandum, Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy, 12 November 1940, Plan DOG Memorandum, filed in Navy Department as Operations Plan 12 and identified as such in memorandum for Secretary of the General Staff for Assistant Chief of Staff War Plans Division, 13 November 1940, War Plans Division 4175-15.

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Clarification of just what position the Philippines held in national strategy in January 1941 was discussed in a memorandum detailing the immediate (underlined in original text) steps that the War Department should take if the United States was to become engaged in a two-front war in 1941. The War Plans Division recommended the continuation of military aid to Great Britain. Other steps would include increasing the garrison in Alaska by 4,000 men, and bringing the 1st Division up to full strength for possible expeditions to the Caribbean or Central or South America. It was also suggested that the Navy mine the coastal frontiers and that all coastal defense positions be fully manned.[8]

Air reinforcements were the most interesting part of the memorandum. Alaska was to receive twenty P-40s, nine B-18s, and four B-17s. Four B-17s were also to be sent to Puerto Rico, and four to Panama. All of the bombers for those bases were to come from squadrons within the United States. The staff's position on the Philippine garrison was that "no increase in the air garrison is proposed." The only glimmer of air reinforcements was in a marginal note that reads: "Hope to send a few modern bombers and

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[8]Memorandum, War Plans Division to the Chief of Staff, Subject: "British Holding Enemies: Axis Powers Including Japan," 18 January 1941, RG 165, NARA, Washington, D.C., Box 19, 422, Army Operations Office Plans Division, Executive Files 1940-45, Exec. File 4.

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squadrons of modern pursuit planes prior to M-Day [mobilization]."[9] The Philippines were not slated for any significant numbers of air reinforcements.

On January 16, 1941, the service chiefs met with President Roosevelt to gain approval of what would become American military policy in World War II. The meeting concluded with the President issuing the following guidance:

> That we would stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii; that the commander of the Asiatic Fleet would have discretionary authority as to how long he could remain based in the Philippines and as to his direction of withdrawal - to the East or to Singapore; that there would be no naval reinforcement of the Philippines; that the Navy should have under consideration the possibility of bombing attacks against Japanese cities.... That the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake it; that our military course must be very

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[9]Ibid. The distances involved in sending material to the Philippines also militated against their reinforcement. The Air Staff officer, Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson, concluded that sending aircraft to the Philippines reduced the possibility of their being utilized as a mobile reserve. If aircraft were based in Alaska, Hawaii, or the Caribbean, they could be moved quickly to the threat. However, once aircraft were committed to the Philippines, they were in effect isolated from use in any other theater of operations. The real concern, according to the author, was to increase the aircraft in Hawaii in order to improve the defenses of the Pacific Fleet. The list attached to the memorandum, however, shows Hawaii as the first priority and the Philippines as second, but only one pursuit squadron and one heavy bombardment squadron were planned for the Philippines. Memorandum, Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Subject: "Priorities for Supply of Aircraft," 20 February 1941, War Plans Division 4175-18, RG 165, NARA, Washington, D.C., Box 19, 422, Army Operations, Office of Plans Division, Executive Files 1940-1945, Exec. File 4.

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conservative until our strength had developed....[10]

The President's policy decision of January 16, 1941, the Plan Dog memorandum, and the Army's own studies seemed to suggest that all of the parties were in complete accord. In the event of a world war, Europe would become the primary theater of operations. When that policy became translated into the realities of men and material, it meant that the Philippines, as important as they might be, would not be reinforced at the expense of the European Theater.[11]

The joint-service position of Europe first was reaffirmed in a memorandum to the President on January 26 and 27 in preparation for discussions with the British. The clarifying memorandum stated that: "United States operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic and navally in the Mediterranean." Deterrence would be the order of the day in the Pacific with one very important proviso: unless

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[10]Memorandum, Chief of Staff to Assistant Chief of Staff War Plans Division, 17 January 1941, Subject: "White House Conference," Thursday, 16 January 1941, War Plans Division 4175-18, RG 165, NARA, Washington, D.C., Box 19, Army Operations, Office of the Plans Division, Executive Files, 1940-1945; see also Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 124-125.

[11]Ibid.

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the United States operations in the Pacific could be conducted to facilitate the principal military effort in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.[12]

These strategic policy decisions were agreed upon with the British on March 5, 1941, during the secret American - British Conversations (ABC-1). Thus, there was not only an agreement among Americans, but there was also an accord with Great Britain that concluded that if Japan entered the war, military operations would be defensive with the exception of United States naval operations in the Pacific. The Pacific fleet would be employed offensively in order to weaken Japan economically and divert Japanese strength away from Malaysia.[13] Following the ABC meeting, two documents were prepared to further clarify the agreement and emphasize that the Atlantic theater would be the primary theater of importance:

> Initial United States Naval operations will be to maintain a strategic naval reserve in the Pacific, in order to influence Japan against further aggression; and to relieve Great Britain of

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[12]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 372-373, citing statement by Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, 27 January 1941. Copies in War Plans Division 4402-89 (General Embick's set of Conference papers). Though dated 27 January, there is evidence in accompanying papers to show that this was the statement actually presented two days later.

[13]Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, Hearings, Pt. 3, 79th Cong., 2d sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 87.

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responsibility for security of shipping in the Western Atlantic, including the North Atlantic route to the British Isles.[14]

While Europe first was the policy of the United States, there also existed an understanding that deterrence of Japanese aggression might be necessary because of the impact such aggression might have in Europe. To achieve that, some men and material were required in the Pacific, but the rub was to determine just how much was needed to do the job.[15]

The implementation of Europe first would prove complicated. The Far Eastern Division of the Department of State was placing considerable pressure on the President to shift military assets to the Far East. So much pressure was applied that the Secretary of State was about to convince the President to make more commitments than the military could keep. To help the President to understand the extraordinary equipment and personnel shortages the Army faced, Stimson directed Marshall to prepare a memorandum for

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[14]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 381-382, citing an undated and unsigned memorandum prepared in the War Plans Division for use in connection with the conferences of 16 April 1941, War Plans Division 4402-9.

[15]Ibid., 382, citing a draft letter from Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to Special Navy and Army Observers in London, 4 April 1941, Subject: "Tentative Approval of the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1)," War Plans Division 4402-18. Letter was subsequently delivered to the British Chiefs of Staff on 21 April 1941.

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the President so as to educate him about three issues: first, the true strategic situation; second, exactly what military assets were available; and, third encouragement of the President to make some military decisions immediately.[16]

On April 16, 1941, Marshall presented the President with a forewarning about Army capabilities. The Chief of Staff explained that the Army was not prepared for offensive operations and the only American armed force that could conduct offensive operations was the U.S. Navy. Marshall concluded that: "In the Pacific, if Japan joins the Axis Powers in a declaration of war against us, we will probably lose the Philippines and the effect on Singapore and the Dutch East Indies is open to question."[17]

Therefore, as late as April 1941, the Army and the Navy, as well as senior government officials, were well aware that in the event of war with Japan, the Philippine Islands could not be defended. The only possible exception to that policy would take place if major actions in the

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[16]Notes of Conference in Office of the Chief of Staff, 16 April 1941, Chief of Staff Files, Notes on Conference, Binder 13, RG 165, NARA, Washington, D.C., 322, Box 18.

[17]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 389, citing memorandum initialed by Colonel J.W. Anderson for Chief of Staff, 16 April 1941, Subject: "Strategic Considerations," War Plans Division 4402-9.

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Pacific would somehow support Europe first. Just how important the United States considered the Europe first policy can be determined from a series of meetings with the Dutch and the British.

Beginning in October 1940, and continuing through January 1941, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, the Asiatic Fleet's commander, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Captain Thomas Purnell, met with British and Dutch military leaders on Java in the Netherlands East Indies. Little beyond statements of national positions emerged from these meetings. The Dutch were convinced that a Japanese attack would occur against the Netherlands East Indies. They were also sure that they would receive little help from the British, because the Dutch believed that the focus of British concern in the Far East was on Singapore and nowhere else. Hart's chief of staff assured that the Dutch that should America be drawn into the war, they could except the Americans to help "to the extent of attacking with all forces available. However, if the Japanese attacked only British and Dutch forces, then the best he could promise would be benevolent neutrality."[18]

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[18]Letter, Admiral Harold R. Stark to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, 22 October 1940 (in Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Part 16, 2248), and Stark to Hart on 12 November 1940; Summarized report of conversations held by Chief of Staff, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, with Netherlands East Indies Naval Authorities at Batavia, 10-14 January 1940, War Plans Division 440203.

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The Americans remained firm, despite strong British and Dutch arguments for some sort of American commitment in the event their colonial possessions were attacked. Neither the British nor Dutch representatives were promised aid. The British representatives were told that the United States would not provide material assets, because "The ultimate fate of Singapore will depend upon the outcome of the struggle in the European Theater."[19]

On April 2, 1941, Marshall sent Grunert a complete copy of the ABC-1 report and its five annexes. The Chief of Staff wanted his Philippine Department commander to have every opportunity to accomplish advance planning in concert with the Asiatic Fleet so that the areas around Manila Bay could be defended as well as possible. To further involve the Philippine Department with the overall strategic picture, Marshall ordered Grunert to send an officer to the ABC-1 meeting scheduled for April 14 in Singapore. When Grunert reviewed the minutes of the ABC-1 meeting, he informed Marshall that he did not have the capability to provide aid to anyone, or for that matter, to hold the Philippines. Moreover, his representative had consciously discouraged any British expectations concerning American

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[19]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 393, citing memorandum, U.S. Army Section for the Chief of Staff, 12 February 1941, Subject: "Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore," War Plans Division 4402-1.

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reinforcements being sent to the Philippines, or moving American air and ground forces beyond the archipelago in the event of a war. Grunert was also of the opinion that the British regarded the Asiatic Fleet as an adjunct of their own. He, like the Dutch, was also convinced that the British were concerned with little else beyond Singapore.[20]

The British view of the Philippines was different from the American one. They saw the American possessions as a base of operations and as an adjunct to their defense of the Malay Barrier. Thus, while American military leaders perceived the islands as a liability, the British regarded the Philippines as a base for air operations against Japan, a springboard for offensive operations in the Far East, a pivotal defensive position, a base of support for the

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[20]Ibid., 395-396, citing letter, Commanding General Philippines Department to Acting Chief of Staff War Plans Division, 2 May 1941, Subject: "American-Dutch-British Conversations of April 21-27 1941, held in Singapore"; letter, Secretary of British Military Mission, without attached address, 6 May 1941, War Plans Division 4402-18; memorandum, General Leonard T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, 3 June 1941; message 995 War Department Adjutant General's Office to Commanding General Philippine Department, 9 June 1941, all filed in AG 380.3 (4-4-41); summary quoted in Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 396, taken from 10 May memorandum sent by Brigadier General Harry J. Maloney, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, War Plans Division 4402-18.

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Chinese, and even a place from which subversive activities could be orchestrated.[21]

Marshall quickly deflated British expectations by telling his staff that: "Collapse in the Atlantic would be fatal; collapse in the Far East would be serious, but not fatal."[22] To put the British issue to rest once and for all, the Army and Navy chiefs, probably with Presidential approval, sent the following note to the British:

> The United States intends to adhere to the decision not to reinforce the Philippines except in minor particulars.... The principal value of the position and present strength of the forces in the Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will entail a delay in the development of an attack against Singapore and Netherlands east Indies. A Japanese attack in the Philippines might thus offer opportunities to associated powers to inflict losses on Japanese naval forces and to improve their own dispositions for the defense of the Malay Barrier.[23]

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[21]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 396, citing summary taken from 10 May memorandum sent by Brigadier General Harry J. Maloney, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, War Plans Division 4402-18.

[22]Ibid., 397, citing memorandum, Chief of Staff to Secretary of War, 20 May 1941, Subject: "Paper Presented by S.K. Hornbeck, Department of State," War Plans Division 4402-18.

[23]Ibid., citing letter, Secretary for Collaboration (Commander Lewis R. McDowell) to Secretary British Military Mission (Captain Alan W. Clarke), 7 June 1941, Subject: "Report of the Singapore United States-British-Dutch Conference, April 1941," War Plans Division 4402-18.

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The note was not idle talk. On May 22, the Chief of Naval Operations provided Marshall with his analysis of plans for overseas operations. The Asiatic Fleet was "based on Manila initially and the Malay Barrier subsequently. The Navy does not plan to augment this force." Stark's understanding of the Philippine garrison was that "No augmentation of this force is contemplated."[24] Stark also wanted to make sure that he fully understood how much shipping he would have to make available to move the 300,180 Army troops based in the continental United States to the appropriate locations when the war began. Places like Panama and Iceland were on the list, but not the Philippines, which indicates that in May 1941 the American military was steadfast with its decisions about the Philippines could not be held unless they received adequate reinforcements. In the most likely event, a war both in Europe and the Pacific, the Philippines would hold the dubious honor of fighting a brave battle that would end in defeat for the small garrison stationed there. Only if the islands could lend support to the European theater of operations would they be considered as a candidate for reinforcement.

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[24]Memorandum, The Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: "Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions," 22 May 1941, Box 67, War Plans, U.S. Naval Archives and Records Center (USNARC), Washington Navy Yard (WNY), Washington, D.C. (WDC).

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In June 1941, the place of the Philippines in Far East policy remained what it had always been. Despite a desire to assist the British with the defense of the Malay Barrier, and the Dutch with the defense of their tantalizingly rich oil fields in Java, and not to allow an allow an American possession to go down in defeat, Marshall continued to accept the recommendation of his staff - the Philippines could not be held and should not be reinforced.

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CHAPTER 5

MODEST INCREASE

> We are doing everything we can for you; I am sure you understand our limitations[1]

The first months of 1941 witnessed a worsening of the international situation. Reports of a possible Japanese invasion of Indochina coupled with the continuing German successes in the Battle of the Atlantic offered little comfort to the American military and political leadership. Congressional debate over lend-lease constrained any meaningful actions by the President, who according to historian Robert J. Dallek, could not send the American fleet to Singapore or to cruise near the Philippines. Instead, the President could only lecture the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, about the dangers of rousing American anger. An attempt at strengthening American-Japanese discussions with military muscle occurred when naval visits were made to New Zealand and Australia and open staff discussions were conducted with British, Dutch, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian officers in April.[2]

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[1]Letter, Marshall to Grunert, 11 February 1941, George C. Marshall Papers (GCMP), VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34.

[2]Robert J. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 272-273.

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President Roosevelt was attempting to maintain a delicate balance on a diplomatic tight rope. The prevailing Atlantic breeze pushed the President and his military leaders to shift the balance of America's modest power to the Atlantic. But in January 1941 a stiffening Pacific breeze forced the President to trim the sails.

In January 1941, the President received word that the Chinese defenses might crumble around Nanking in the face of a new Japanese offensive. In response the President encouraged a plan to provide long-range bombers to China. Only after Marshall and Stimson refused to endorse it did the President drop his support. Instead of bombers, Roosevelt ordered that China be provided with 100 pursuit planes to keep the Chinese fighting and discourage Japan from expanding its aggression in French, British, or Dutch Far East possessions. The President realized that American policy in the Far East was a defensive one, but emphasized in a letter to Japan Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in January:

> We cannot lay down hard and fast plans. As each new development occurs, we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.[3]

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[3]Ibid., 271, citing Franklin D. Roosevelt Personal Letters, 1928-1945, 1093-5.

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A way had to be found to avoid a two-front war, by slowing down or deterring Japanese aggression. The President and his Secretary of War would begin to look for new and novel ways to marshal America's limited military power and use it more effectively. For the first time, because of second thoughts among American military leaders, such an opportunity seemed to exist in the Philippines.

On January 9 1941, the War Plans Division proposed that the Philippine garrison be increased by raising the number Philippine Scouts from 6,000 to 12,000 and bringing the 31st Infantry Regiment up to its wartime strength of 1,635 men (an actual increase of only 546 men). Additional increases were also suggested. They included increasing the Philippine Department's 59th and 60th Coast Artillery Regiments from 1,489 to 2,954 personnel each (an actual increase of 312 and 1,173 men); sending an aircraft service warning company consisting of sixty-six officers and 194 men; and sending twenty 3-inch antiaircraft guns, ten 155MM guns, and fifty 75MM guns to the islands. Along with men

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and material, $1,250,000 were also recommended to be added to the Philippine military construction budget.[4]

While the staff was busy working out the details of the modest strength increases to the Philippine garrison, Marshall was presenting his proposal to the Secretary of War. On January 10, Marshall explained to Stimson that he believed it was necessary to bring the garrison to full strength, which meant "full strength in the white organizations now in the Philippines, which means an increase of 2,000 men, and doubling the Philippine Scouts, an increase from 6,000 to 12,000."[5]

In the same letter Marshall discussed the antiaircraft guns, but for some reason did not mention the additional artillery that would be sent. The 546 troops to be added to the 31st Infantry could hardly be expected to make a real difference, for they would bring the garrison only to its inadequate wartime strength. To underscore the modest

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[4]Memorandum from Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Defenses of the Philippine Islands," 9 January 1941, Adjutant General File 320.2, also in Philippine Department War Plans Division, 3251-39, item 14022, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA, 1-3. These recommendations were based upon Grunert's requests dated 8 July, 9 and 11 September, and 11 October 1940. Authorization to increase the 31st Regiment and Coast Artillery was given on 22 and 23 January 1941.

[5]Memorandum, Marshall to Stimson, Subject: "Important Projects Now Underway," 10 January 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 84, Folder 3.

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nature of the effort in the Philippines, Marshall also discussed a request he was not approving: that is, sending a National Guard or a Regular engineer regiment to Hawaii. Marshall told the Secretary of War he did not want to do that, because "I wish to hold all our regiments for possible use in the Caribbean theater, in Canada, or in Alaska."[6] By January 27, 1941, all of the Philippine Department defense increases were approved.[7] Marshall told Grunert that the Secretary of War had approved the requests for additional men and material and he fully expected the President to approve the recommendations as well. Therefore, he ordered Grunert to begin to prepare for the additional men and material.[8]

While the Army staff was busy finding the military equipment for the Philippines, the Joint Board began the necessary preparations to place the Philippine Army into the active service of the United States, should that become necessary. The Joint Board members directed their staff to prepare a letter for the President's signature, should a call-up be required. The first draft, which followed

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Defenses of the Philippine Islands," 27 January 1941, War Plans Division 3251-39, item 1402, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[8]Letter, Marshall to Grunert, 8 February 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34.

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Grunert's recommendation to call up the entire Philippine Army, was rejected in favor of a revision that allowed the number and size of the mobilization to remain optional.[9]

Meanwhile, the search for war material to be sent to the Philippines was not going well. On January 27, 1941, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, informed Marshall that there would be delays in shipping the antiaircraft and field artillery to the islands because of manufacturing difficulties and because the current distribution plans did not allow for shipping increases until January 1942. The only alternative, Gerow reported, was to transfer equipment already in the hands of the Regular Army and National Guard to the Philippines. By juggling the available military inventory and unit allotments, Gerow reckoned that he could outfit the Philippine Department with its allotted quota by July 1941.[10]

Some of Marshall's staff thought Gerow's idea was not such a good one, for they too, were struggling to meet the

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[9]Joint Board Meeting Minutes, 22 January 1941, Joint Board Papers, Operations Plans Division Files, item 801, roll 39, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[10]Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Defense of the Philippine Islands," 27 January 1941, Office of the Chief of Staff, 18812-46, Adjutant 320.2, Philippine Department, War Plans Division 3251-39, items 3410-134, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA, 5.

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demands of preparing an army for war. The acting chief of the G-3 Division (Operations), Colonel Harry L. Twaddle, for example, did not concur because he believed that removing guns from the hands of the Guard and the Regulars would jeopardize their training.[11] Nevertheless, the Army began the process of rounding up the necessary equipment for the Philippine Department.

Neither a change in military policy nor the availability of additional men and material contributed to the decision to bring the Philippine garrison to its wartime strength. The events of the day required that America not appear too weak in the Pacific, lest the Japanese might become too bold. At the same time, the United States must not appear threatening and thereby cause the Japanese to strike early. The policy of Europe first required America to avoid war with Japan as long as possible.

Thus, international diplomacy rather then improving Philippine defenses out of belief in their possible military effectiveness was the motive behind the public but shallow increase of forces in 1941. When the January 1941 increases are viewed through that lens, the Scouts and Regulars become

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[11]Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Subject: "Defense of the Philippines," 29 January 1941, Office of the Chief of Staff, 18812, G-3/44816, War Plans Division 3251-39, items 3414-15, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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diplomatic tools. Marshall's February 14 instruction to Grunert provide a clear indication that diplomacy, not a change in military policy, was the reason:

> For international effect during the next few days it is desired that you give evidence of genuine activity in developing the Scout Force to 12,000 strength. Later radio will probably carry instructions for the same reason, regarding retention of officers now due to return to the United States, and the commencement of reduction of women and children.[12]

Increases in forces were meant to discourage the Japanese from advancing into Indochina. When this modest display is linked to those other diplomatic efforts already discussed; open conferences with the Far East allies, and American naval visits to Australia and New Zealand - it is apparent that the President was attempting to place some substance behind his lectures to the Japanese.

There is additional evidence that supports the diplomatic rather than the military thrust behind the movement of troops to the Philippines. Admiral Stark was concerned that the Americans might be showing too much resolve to the Japanese. Stark reminded the Secretary of the Navy that "The undefended Navy Yard at Cavite is incapable of properly caring for even the present Asiatic

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[12]Radio Message, Marshall to Grunert, Office of Plans Division, Exec. Files 4, Box 114, RG 165, NARA, Washington, D.C.; also quoted in Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, 424.

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Fleet, and all construction material used is carried there from the United States." Stark understood that in a global war the ultimate concern was Europe and the survival of Great Britain. That meant, in his opinion, that the United States should avoid war with Japan. By reinforcing the fleet in the Philippines, Stark warned, we could force Japan to make a move against the Netherlands and still not have a fleet large enough to defend the Philippines themselves.[13]

Marshall wanted antiaircraft guns to be placed in the Philippines because he was painfully aware that the Army was responsible for the air defense of fleet anchorages. For some time the Navy's leadership had been pressing Marshall to provide more security, especially antiaircraft defense, for the Cavite Naval Station.[14] In February, Marshall recorded that there was "not an AA gun to defend Cavite anchorage. Not one....," and that "the defense plans for the Philippines were very archaic." While he believed that increase numbers of antiaircraft guns would not offer a complete defense, they could "have the effect of boosting morale and of preventing Japanese planes from just being

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[13]Memorandum, Stark to the Secretary of the Navy, Subject: "Recommendation Concerning Further Reinforcement of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet," 17 January 1941, Box 91, Files 1937-1941, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

[14]Memorandum, Subject: "Notes on Council Meeting," 19 February 1941, U.S. Naval Records in the Pacific, Box 67, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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contemptuous in their approach." These guns, Marshall explained, were being withdrawn "very quietly" from other Army organizations and were being sent to the Philippines. Such weapons shipments were not confined to the Philippines. The Navy was broadsiding Marshall with demands for antiaircraft guns for Wake and Midway too. The Navy appeared to frustrate the Chief of Staff, who at one point declared that: "It was up to the Navy to decide just where the most important fleet anchorages were located."[15]

Marshall was so concerned about his responsibilities that he told General Henry H. Arnold that:

> [The] security of the fleet must now be given the first priority consideration in the allocation of planes to units.... I intend to give the Navy the opportunity to indicate their desires in the mater to the extent of stating where the first shipments should go -- Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, Philippine Islands.[16]

Once again the evidence suggests that there was no change in military policy regarding the Philippines. The Chief of Staff was concerned about protecting fleet anchorages. He was also willing to let the decision about which anchorages should receive the antiaircraft guns up to the Navy. Thus, it was a Navy recommendation that would

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[15]Memorandum, Subject: "Notes on Council Meeting," 19 February 1941, U.S. Naval Records in the Pacific, Box 67, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

[16]Ibid.

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influence just where the Army should place its limited supply of antiaircraft guns, not some change in American military policy in the Philippines. General Grunert was also aware of this thinking.

In March, in response to the Philippine Department commander's continuing requests for additional men and material, Marshall wrote him a firm but reassuring letter. He assured Grunert that his requests for men and equipment were not:

> ... being handled in a routine and perfunctory way ... in regards to ammunition, antiaircraft, and aircraft ... there is nothing new in the offing. We are doing everything we can for you, and I am sure you understand our limitations.[17]

Grunert replied that he understood the exigencies that Marshall faced, but he also reaffirmed his own desperate military situation. Grunert reported that it would take two months to prepare the new aircraft, and that he had extended the tours of duty for personnel who had been scheduled to rotate to the United States. He also continued to press his requirements for additional personnel, advised that he had imposed a heavy training schedule on the new Philippine Scout recruits, and reported that he had a serious short-

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[17]Letter, Marshall to Commanding General Philippine Department, 11 February 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34; also cited in Watson, Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations, 422, also citing Memorandum, Chief of Staff for TAG, 11 February 1941, OCS 15036-9.

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fall in ammunition. He advised Marshall that he had cut his ammunition expenditure to the bone. Grunert also renewed "his plea" for a military police company because he did not want to deplete his combat troops. "In time of emergency," Grunert wrote, "hastily organized native organizations won't do. It takes double-fisted Americans." In addition to those requests he asked for two additional general officers to handle his increased air forces, and for air warning and air defense organizations.[18]

Grunert also provided his observations on MacArthur's request for additional defense equipment. While Grunert reported the presence of "a unity of purpose between the two commands," he believed that:

> The Commonwealth Defense Plan and the Department's 1940 revision of WPO (War Plan ORANGE) have the same basic conception of how to defend the island of Luzon but that is as far as my plan goes because of a lack of munitions, particularly ammunition. I am in accord with the Commonwealth Defense Plan for the archipelago as a whole, and as soon as the necessary munitions are forthcoming, the Department's plan will be expended.[19]

The Philippine Department commander reminded Marshall a second time that neither the Commonwealth's Army, Air Force, nor Navy was a credible force. While they "may have the

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[18]Letter, Grunert to Marshall, 1 March 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34.

[19]Letter, Grunert to Marshall, 3 March 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34.

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personnel and the paper organization, they are not complete with equipment nor the requisite training." Grunert also recommended that MacArthur's request for coast defense guns, while a worthwhile project, should not be accomplished at the expense of diverting assets from defending Luzon.[20]

Marshall's thoughts about the defense of the islands as well as the Army's limitations are easily seen on the margin notes to Grunert's March 1, 1941 letter, as well as in his more stilted personal communication. To the G-1 (Personnel), Marshall wrote: "We should add more reserves and regulars." He also directed his staff to radio Grunert a tally of how much ammunition was on its way and asked his G-3 (Operations) officer, "Can't we give him this?"[21]

Marshall advised his field commander that he had personally reviewed the staff papers detailing what could be sent to the Philippines and that:

> On both of these papers the action was considerably short of your recommendations, which have been denied in part only because at present we are unable to stretch our available resources far enough to meet the tremendous pressure we are subject to from all directions. This is particularly true in the matter of planes, although the staff is exploring every possible way

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[20]Ibid.

[21]Letter, Grunert to Marshall, 1 March 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34. Marshall's margin notes suggest that he was exploring every possible way to find at least some of the resources Grunert requested.

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> to get modern bombardment equipment for your bombardment squadron as well as meet your deficiencies in defense reserve.[22]

The first three months of 1941 did not substantially change the unenviable position the Philippines held in American Far East strategy. They were neither a part of American strategy, nor were they in line for enough defense assets to achieve even the defense of Luzon. Only superficial changes were made for diplomatic purposes. There is no indication that the small increases were considered at the time as the portent of greater things to come. In fact, the opposite seems to have been the case. The real change that occurred was more subtle and perhaps unrecognized by the participants themselves. Ever so slightly, some began to perceive that there might be some value in the Philippines. Instead of a military liability, some began to think of them as a diplomatic tool that might serve to make the Japanese rethink continuing their Far East adventures.

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[22]Letter, Marshall to Grunert, 27 March 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 69, Folder 34.

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CHAPTER 6

FROM DIPLOMATIC EFFECT TO DETERRENCE

> A highly reliable source indicates that the Japanese expeditionary force to south Indochina will comprise 40,000....[1]

By March 1941, the situation in the Far East took another turn for the worse. American code breakers learned that Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering was urging Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka to convince his government to attack Singapore. The specter of a Japanese southern advance into the Netherlands East Indies and Malaysia was drawing closer.[2] The likelihood of a Japanese southern strike increased sharply when word was received on Sunday, April 13, 1941 that the Japanese had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.[3]

The Chief of Naval Operations had the job of distributing America's limited naval forces. On April 3, 1941, Stark told his fleet commanders that the staff

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[1]Memorandum, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Chief of Intelligence to Marshall, Subject: "Movement Southward of Japanese Troops," 25 July 1941, War Plans Division Office, item 410, roll 317, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[2]Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 36-37.

[3]Ibid., 50-54.

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conversations with the British had been completed and the Navy's Basic War Plan RAINBOW Number 5, founded on a joint British-American plan, would be distributed shortly. The basic war plan was this: The United States would withdraw forces from the Pacific Fleet in order to reinforce the Atlantic, while the British, if necessary, would transfer forces to the Far East to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced but would depend upon the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii for any offensive operations against Japan. Such a deployment, Stark believed, would provide the best defense of the United States, especially if the British Isles fell to the Germans. Stark reminded his admirals that: "From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war."[4]

American naval policy was not constructed in a vacuum. The Chief of Naval Operations's desire to place the fleet in the Atlantic was being undermined by the British, who were adamant about "the vital importance of holding Singapore,

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[4]Memorandum, Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chiefs of the U.S. Pacific, Asiatic, and Atlantic Fleets, 3 April 1941, Subject: "Observations on the Present International Situation," Harold R. Stark Papers, Serial 038612, USNARC, WNY, WDC, Box 62.

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and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India."[5] Stark believed the British were urging the Americans to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore, a proposition Stark rejected outright. If such a fleet movement was allowed to take place, operations in the Atlantic would face almost sure defeat. Deployment, Stark argued, must be based upon the situation that exists at the time. "Elasticity and fluidity of planning," he said, "are therefore assured."[6]

Stark reckoned that the United Kingdom faced two immediate threats - the dreadful loss of shipping occurring in the Atlantic from German submarine attack, and the deterioration of British production and morale through heavy German bombing. British shipping losses could be reduced if American naval forces could be used in the Atlantic. Unfortunately, defending British ships against U-Boat attacks would occupy most of those American Navy ships. Stark also believed that the Japanese would play a role in the Atlantic war by tying down American forces in the Far East. Therefore, America's top naval leader speculated that it was necessary to avoid, until the last possible moment,

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[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

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any indication that the Americans might transfer any part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic.[7]

Stark's memorandum to his fleet commanders also conveys that the Philippines were not part of any grand strategic planning process during the first part of 1941. The primary mission of the Asiatic Fleet was not to defend the Philippines, but to join the British Navy in defense of the Malay Barrier. Nor would the Pacific Fleet, the strength of America's naval power in the Pacific, lead the charge to defend or relieve the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet would be whittled down to cover the Atlantic, while the remainder of it would be used for offensive strikes against the Japanese. Stark's communication also suggests that the Chief of Naval Operations was being pressured to commit more naval forces than he thought prudent for the protection of British Far East possessions. While Stark understood the linkage between events in Europe and Asia, he firmly believed that the majority of America's ships and men should be devoted to operations in the Atlantic.

The events of the day were never in sharp focus. The continuing confusion about the goals of Japanese diplomatic, military, and domestic policies created a blurred image for those who had to make American military and foreign policy

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[7]Ibid.

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decisions. Secretary of State Cordell Hull lamented that Japanese diplomats asserted that there were two faces in Japan: one liberal, peaceful, and civilian, and one military and expansionistic.[8] The State Department personnel saw the blurred images differently than those in the military.

In May 1941, Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Department of State's political adviser for Far Eastern affairs, prepared a snapshot of what he thought might occur if the United State withdrew naval forces from the Far East. He contended that any sort of withdrawal would signify American abandonment of that theater. If a perception of American abandonment was coupled with a German victory in Egypt, Hornbeck believed that the Japanese would then attack Singapore and in conjunction with the Germans apply increasing pressure against the Soviets, who would in turn stop aiding China. If such a series of events occurred, it would mean that Germany would control Europe and the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union would be isolated, Japan would be intact, and the Tripartite Alliance would move from the East and the West against the United States. The world, Hornbeck believed, would be sharply divided, with Japan,

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[8]Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, 276.

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Germany, and Italy versus Great Britain, China, and the United States.[9]

The only way to prevent the formation of such an unholy alliance was for Great Britain, the United States, and China to control the vital points of conflict. According to Hornbeck, these points were the British Isles, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Singapore, and China. Singapore, Hornbeck believed, was second in importance only to the British Isles. If the Germans captured the British Isles, they would destroy the center of the British Empire; if the Japanese captured Singapore, they would divide the British Empire and thereby control the western and southern Pacific and the Indian Oceans, while becoming a direct threat to the western hemisphere.[10]

Hornbeck discounted the importance of the Mediterranean. He believed that the world's greatest supply of manpower and resources lay in the western hemisphere and the Far East. If Britain lost the Near East and Singapore, then the Axis powers would enjoy direct access to one another. Any attempt to blockade Germany would fail, and America's economic threat to Japan would be completely

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[9]Memorandum, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Desk, May 6, 12, and 14, War Plans Division Files, items 1345-47, roll 103, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[10]Ibid.

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nullified. Thus, Singapore was the key to the control of the Far East and Europe. A Japanese capture of that city would give them control of most of the Far East. The port of Rangoon would be closed, and the Burma Road would be rendered worthless, causing the collapse of China's resistance, and thereby placing Japan in direct confrontation with the United States.[11]

Hornbeck's strategic vision called for a concentration of Allied naval forces (Dutch, British, American, and Australian) in the port of Singapore. A naval buildup of this magnitude, he believed, would prevent a Japanese move against Singapore and keep Allied lines of communications open so that China could continue to receive supplies even if the Suez was lost, and would continue to tie down Japanese forces. With Singapore secure against a Japanese attack and China fully supplied, the United States could devote its forces to the security of the western hemisphere, and allow Great Britain to focus its army and navy against Germany and secure the Atlantic for the United States.[12]

Hornbeck's strategic vision did not consider a role for the Philippines, but it did advocate a much larger and more active American presence in the Far East then either the

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[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

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Army or Navy envisioned or were capable of. When Hornbeck's strategy is reviewed in conjunction with Admiral Stark's communique' to his fleet commanders, a division is evident between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments about the appropriate way the United States should marshal its limited military resources. Some who advised the President linked the salvation of Europe directly to British hegemony in the Far East; on the other hand, the military saw the survival of Europe tied to the control of the Atlantic.

Despite the internal government discussions about the Far East, America's military leaders paid little attention to the Philippines. Their attention was riveted on the western hemisphere and Europe. At a May 19 meeting between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War there was grave concern about the possibility of a German invasion of Martinique. Marshall decided that he would hold as many B-17 bombers within the United States as possible for action in the western hemisphere and strongly considered whether any bombers should be sent to the Hawaiian Department.[13]

Marshall's concern over Martinique and reconsideration about sending heavy bombers to the Hawaiian islands suggests

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[13]Meeting Minutes for Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, Subject: "Martinique," 19 May 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 56, Folder 1.

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that the Far East was still not high on the Army's list of priorities. The Army's immediate paramount interest was the defense of the western hemisphere. As late as May 1941, there were no discussions or thoughts about sending heavy bombers any farther west then the Hawaiian Islands, and even that deployment was in danger of being stopped.

Meanwhile, planners placed the final touches on Joint Army - Navy Basic War Plan - RAINBOW Number 5. The plan's authors stated that: "The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers [the United States and the British Commonwealth] will be the defeat of Germany and her allies."[14] For Great Britain, "A cardinal feature of the British strategic policies was the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."[15] The principal offensive action against the Axis (Germany and Italy) would consist of economic pressure, a sustained air offensive, and the early elimination of Italy. The plan stated that:

> Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis powers, the Atlantic and European area is

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[14]Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - RAINBOW Number 5, Joint Board No. 325 (Serial 542-5), Revision 1, Copy 92, Strategic Plans, USNARC, WNY, WDC, Box 147 G. The Secretary of War approved the final plan on 2 June 1941 and the Secretary of the Navy on 28 May 1941. Presidential approval occurred on 19 November 1941.

[15]Ibid.

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> considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.[16]

It was determined that even if Japan did not enter the war, forces would have to be maintained in the Far East to discourage that country's expansion. Even when, or if, Japan entered the war, America would not increase its present strength in the Far East. Only the Pacific Fleet would move offensively so as to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia.[17] Additional British forces would fight in the Pacific with the aid of American augmentation in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, thereby freeing up British forces for duty in the Far East.

The Army and the Navy would cooperate to defend the Philippine coastal frontier. The Navy would raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces. The Army's offensive mission was to conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within the tactical operating

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[16]Ibid.

[17]The plan defined Malaysia as the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The Malay Barrier included the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia.

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radius of available bases. The forces charged with the responsibility to execute this plan would consist of the Philippine garrison and the Philippine Army. The Asiatic Fleet would raid Japanese sea communications, support the land defense of the Philippines as long as the defense continued, and protect the sea lanes.[18]

To clarify the Navy's role in the Philippines, Stark wrote Marshall a memorandum explaining that in the event of hostilities the Asiatic Fleet would, at some undetermined time, move to the Malay Barrier and there join Allied naval units. Stark also reminded Marshall that the Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced by elements of the Pacific Fleet. That fleet would operate as an independent force and conduct raids in the area of the Carolines and the Marshalls. Stark again confirmed his understanding of Marshall's concept of Philippine operations: "No augmentation of the Philippine garrison was to be contemplated."[19] The RAINBOW Plan was transmitted to the President by the Secretaries of War and Navy on June 2, but was returned without approval because the ABC-1 discussions had not yet been approved by the British. A note was appended to the plan stating that in

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[18]Ibid.

[19]Memorandum, Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: "Analysis of plans for overseas expeditions," Reference Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW Number 5, 22 May 1941, Strategic Plans, Serial 058212, USNARC, WNY, WDC, Box 67, Folder 6.

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case of war the papers would be returned to the President for his approval.[20]

In early June 1941, both the Army and the Navy understood that the Philippines was neither part of some grand strategy currently under consideration, nor possessions that warranted the disposition of fleet units to aid in their defense. Then, on June 21, 1941, a new variable was inserted into the strategic equation - Germany invaded the Soviet Union. As early as June 23 some members of the Department of State linked events in the Soviet Union with the Japanese intentions in the Far East.

Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Far Eastern Division, wrote a memorandum in which he expressed the view that the German invasion of the Soviet Union expanded Japan's options, because she was now free from a Soviet threat (the situation achieved by the Germans' tying down the Soviets). Hamilton postulated that the Japanese now enjoyed two options. They could renew their attempts to extend control into Indochina and perhaps the Netherlands East Indies; or even more ominously, they could cooperate with Germany and

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[20]Letter, Secretaries of War and Navy to the President, 2 June 1941, and Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: "Joint Board Number 325 (Serial 642-5) - Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - RAINBOW Number 5 and Report of the United States British Staff Conversations," Harold R. Stark Papers, USNARC, WNY, WDC, Box 67, Folder 6.

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launch a coordinated advance against the Soviet Union. Hamilton believed that while an advance against the Soviets would remove the immediate threat of a Japanese strike in the Pacific, it would probably weaken or neutralize Soviet resistance against the Germans. By allowing a quick German victory in the Soviet Union, it would make Allied strategy of destroying Germany first more difficult to execute. Therefore, he concluded, the best United States policy would be to:

> Immobilize Japan both as regards to an attack upon Siberia as regards an attack against Singapore or the Dutch East Indies ... in this instance the object would be to deter a Siberian attack by rendering Japan uncertain in regard to the intentions of the United States and Britain.[21]

On July 10, 1941, the Chief of Staff seemed to have agreed with Hamilton's hypothesis when he dictated aa situation report from the military attache', Colonel Philip R. Faynonville in the Soviet Union to Sumner Welles. Marshall relayed that the German advances were greater than anticipated and that the best, though tenuous, long-range estimate was about one-third of the Red Army "might be able to reorganize behind the Volga and possibly make winter there, but more probably in Western Siberia." While the thrust of Marshall's conversation with Welles dealt with the

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[21]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 276-280; see also Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 96.

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situation in the Soviet Union, the Far East was apparently in the back of the Chief of Staff's mind. He finished his message to Welles with the note that: "Unconfirmed reports indicate about ten divisions from the eastern Siberian Army moved to the west. If this is so, the Japanese military position in Manchuria will be greatly strengthened."[22]

Marshall's concerns seemed to shift from defending the western hemisphere to hastily finding methods of aiding the Soviet Union, and to keeping all of the promises he had made to Grunert and the Navy about defending air bases from air attack. On July 16, he gave the following order to General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps:

> Please make it perfectly clear that as the Chief of Staff I am unalterably opposed to the release of any U.S. pursuit planes and light and medium bombers until we have established units of these types in the defense of the islands [Philippines]. We have been trying for six months to meet the Navy's demands, the Army Commander in the Philippines, that the obsolescent planes be replaced at the earliest possible moment with modern types. At the present moment, with Japan's known preparations to move south, the Philippines become of great strategic importance, as they constitute both a Naval and Air Base upon the immediate flank of the Japanese southern movement.[23]

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[22]Memorandum, Marshall to Mr. [Sumner] Welles, Subject: "Reference our telephone conversation late yesterday evening, " 10 July 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 85, Folder 50.

[23]Memorandum, Marshall to Arnold, Subject: "With Reference to the Position that Some of Our Army Pursuit Planes be Turned Over to Russia," 16 July 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 65, Folder 10.

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The Far East now had Marshall's attention. The information gained from decoding Japanese radio messages suggested that on July 19 the Japanese military authorities in Canton, China believed that the object of the Indochina occupation was to provide a springboard for an attack against Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Malay Peninsula.[24] It is apparent that Marshall was acting on knowledge of these reports even before they were formally transmitted to him. On July 17 Brigadier General Gerow provided Marshall with a memorandum that recommended that the President call the Philippine Army into the active service of the United States, appropriate money for the project, finance the training from sugar excise taxes, and send 425 reserve officers to the Philippines to help train the Philippine Army. All the necessary draft letter and legislation were attached to the memorandum.[25]

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[24]Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 123.

[25]Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Emergency Mobilization and Training of the Philippine Army," 17 July 1941, War Plans Division 3251-52, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Executive Papers 8, Book A, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C. Contained within the same file is a memorandum from Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Chief of Intelligence, to General George C. Marshall, Subject: "Movement Southward of Japanese Forces," 25 July 1941. Miles reported that a Japanese expeditionary force of some 40,000 troops was en route to South Indochina and that the same intelligence resource stated that a Japan had concluded an agreement with France that would allow Japanese occupation of Indochina-China form three to five years.

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For Marshall the impending Japanese movement into Indochina left him with few options regarding the Philippines. The status quo so often discussed in earlier memoranda had changed in January, when a decision was made to use the Philippines as a diplomatic tool. Now Marshall had to find some way to continue an American presence in the Far East. Surely an American withdrawal in the face of Japanese aggression was now unthinkable. But while Marshall may have realized the gravity of the Far Eastern situation as the need to continue the steps began in January, the President was deeply concerned over finding additional material for the Soviets.

On July 18, Marshall received a message that detailed aid to the Russians. A proposal to send twenty-eight P-40Bs to the Russians appears on the same page as the aid proposal for the Philippines, which states: "50 P-40Es to be delivered in August direct from factories to PI. (25 on Aug 24 ship and 25 on Sept 4 ship)"[26] On the 18th, Marshall also sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, in which he expressed his frustration with the actions of his political leaders. He told Lovett of a telephone call from Welles on the evening of July 17, during which Welles expressed President Roosevelt's deep

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[26]Note, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Executive Papers 8, Book A, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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concern over the fact that some members of the military had rejected the proposition to turn over aircraft to the Russians. Therefore, the President "ordered a token release to Russia of P-40s and light bombers, and an effort to have the British do likewise."[27]

Marshall believed the United States faced "four serious pressures" regarding the allocation of the same type of aircraft: (1) the importance of placing pursuit planes and light bombers in the Philippines to protect the fleet base and threaten Japanese lines of communications; (2) the importance of having the same types of aircraft work with troops to develop air-ground team work; (3) the need to station pursuit and light bombers in Natal and the State Department's demands for twelve light bombers to Brazil; and (4) the urging of some to release similar planes to China. In final exasperation, Marshall wrote:

> I feel that this should be discussed with the President personally in order that he may have a complete picture of our present dilemma in this matter. Are we to risk the Philippine situation or the Brazilian situation, or the clamor of the press in this country or the purely military requirements of training our field forces in this country.[28]

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[27]Memorandum, Marshall to Assistant Secretary of the Air, Robert A. Lovett, 18 July 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 74, Folder 38.

[28]Ibid.

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Marshall's note shows the kaleidoscope of issues that confronted both the President and the American military leadership in mid-1941. The flurry of activity concerning grand strategy and its attendant conferences with the British were critical to placing the American armed forces on a path to war readiness. At the same time, the orderly effort to stay on that path was being disrupted equally by German and Japanese advances and Presidential promises and commitments made without consultation with the military. But even while attention was shifting to the Far East, the Army mission in the Philippines was to protect the fleet base and provide the garrison with the capability to hold off at least one determined Japanese attack in order to make the Japanese think twice before invading the Philippines. For the Navy, the Army's ability to defend the Asiatic Fleet base meant only that the Navy would have a more secure anchorage from which it could sortie to join forces with Allied naval units. There was no indication of a change in American policy regarding any reinforcement of the Philippines. The only indication was that the steps taken might forestall a Japanese attack, and therefore prevent America's premature entry into a war with Japan.

On July 14, Brigadier General Gerow sent a Memorandum to Marshall in which he summarized American support to the Philippines. Gerow listed the steps that had already been

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accomplished: (1) the preparation of legislation for the Congress to permit sugar excise tax funds and currency devaluation funds to be used to improve Philippine defenses; (2) a study for the President that considered calling the Philippine Army into American service; and (2) sending an additional 425 officers to train the Philippine Army in addition to the seventy-five already sent there. The Chief of the War Plans Division also reminded Marshall of MacArthur's July 7 suggestion to mobilize the Philippine Army and to create a higher command in the Philippines. MacArthur contended that such a move would improve the psychological climate as well as morale in the Far East. Gerow concluded that: "General MacArthur's views as to the training of the Philippine Army are essentially questions of local command."[29]

The July 14 memorandum was based on a communication appended to it dated May 29, 1941, in which Marshall advised Grunert that: "It becomes increasingly advisable to keep in close contact with MacArthur and members of his staff."[30]

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[29]Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Philippine Islands," 14 July 1941, War Plans Division 3251-52, Office of the Chief of Staff, Miscellaneous Correspondence, item 1501, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA, 1-2.

[30]Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Consultation with the Military Advisor to the Philippine Commonwealth by the Commanding General Philippine Army," 29 May 1941, War Plans Division 3251-49, item 1306, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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No doubt Marshall was aware that the Philippine Army was about to be mobilized, and in a roundabout way he was urging Grunert to open communication with MacArthur. Still, as late as July 14, the communications pointed to one conclusion - no reinforcement of the Philippines was planned beyond that required to accomplish War Plan ORANGE 3.

The realization that negotiations with Japan must be backed by some display of military force and the need to improve the defenses associated with the fleet anchorage led to the decision to mobilize the Philippine Army. On July 25, the Secretary of Was sent a letter to the President that began: Due to the situation in the Far East, all practical steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippine Islands." The letter included requests for the call-up of 75,000 men of the Philippine Army into the service of the United States, appropriation of $52,000,000 in sugar excise taxes, and allocation of $10,000,000 in training money from the President's emergency fund.[31] The actual order mobilizing the Philippine Army was issued by the Adjutant General on July 26, but was transmitted on July

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[31]Letter, Henry L. Stimson to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 25 July 1941, War Plans Division 3251-52, Miscellaneous Correspondence, item 1211, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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30.[32] On July 26, General Grunert received word that General Douglas MacArthur and not he would command the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE).[33] One day later MacArthur was formally apprised of his recall from retirement and appointment as commander, USAFFE.[34]

There is no evidence suggesting that the oil embargo was the reason behind the creation of USAFFE or any evidence that the mobilization of the Philippine Army was for any other purpose than to defend the Philippines. On July 28, Brigadier General Gerow sent a radiogram on behalf of the Secretary of War to MacArthur advising the USAFFE commander that the mission of his command was that developed in the 1940 revision of War Plan ORANGE 3. Moreover, Gerow told MacArthur that:

> No additional forces, except approximately 400 reserve officers to assist in training of the Philippine Army, or additional equipment over and above that now authorized will be available for your command in the near future. Shortages will be filled and authorized defense reserves will be

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[32]Letter, The Adjutant General to the U.S. Army, Subject: "Military Order Mobilizing the Philippine Army," 30 July 1941, Adjutant General 381, item 1407, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[33]Telegram, Chief of Staff to Major General George Grunert, 26 July 1941, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Book A, Executive Files, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[34]Telegram, War Department to MacArthur, 27 July 1941, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Book A, Executive Files, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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furnished in accordance with established priorities.[35]

Marshall, through his Chief of Plans, Gerow, was reminding MacArthur that there was no guarantee of future assistance in terms of men and material. At first glance the forces MacArthur had in his stable looked impressive, over 101,550 troops. However, when those numbers are reviewed in detail, the force is less then imposing. The Coast Artillery Corps consisted of 4,400 men, mostly based around Manila, Corregidor, and Cavite. The Air Corps consisted of only 1,700 infantry. The Philippine Division was composed of 8,500 men, and there were 5,200 support troops available. The remainder of the 101,550 personnel included 4,000 Regular Philippine Army troops and 76,000 Philippine Army Reserve troops.[36] Marshall had every reason to worry, because the U.S. Army's morning report placed the total strength of the Army at 502,071 personnel.

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[35]Telegram, Secretary of the Army to Commanding General, American Forces Far East, 31 July 1941, War Plans Division 4559, Miscellaneous Correspondence, item 1409, roll 34, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

[36]Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Forces in the Philippines," 30 July 1941, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Book A, Executive Files, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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Of that number, some 126,500 were based in foreign garrisons.[37]

The Army was not he only service that thought about deterring the Japanese and avoiding war. On July 24, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, that while he suspected the Japanese Fleet would use its Indochina bases for action against the Burma Road, the Japanese would wait and consolidate their positions and test the reaction of the world to their move into Indochina. Stark speculated that:

> Of course there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless [underline in original text] we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been opened many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime Provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain.[38]

The time between January 1941 and July 30, 1941 was crucial to the role the Philippines would hold in America's foreign and military policy. Until January there was every

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[37]Memorandum for Record, Subject: "Telephone Conversation Between Major C.K. Gailey and Major E.L. Harrison," 7 August 1941, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 15 December 1941, Book A, Executive Files, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[38]Letter, Stark to Hart, 24 July 1941, Stark Papers, Personal Correspondence, USNARC, WNY, WDC, Box 6, Folder 17.

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indication that in the event of war, the Philippine garrison would be left to meet its fate as a peacetime strength organization. Then, in January 1941, diplomatic and military initiatives by the Japanese forced a reappraisal of the islands'. While that reappraisal did not suggest any meaningful reinforcements, it did support a negligible increase in the garrison's forces for diplomatic purposes. The pre-1941 concept of the status quo was broken in order to demonstrate against the Japanese threats of southern expansion into Indochina. For a period of time it was learned that the Japanese would move into Indochina with the permission of the puppet French government. Then, and only then, did Marshall direct fulfilling those requests developed by Grunert from June 1940 until June 1941.

In the final analysis, however, none of those modest steps changed the mission of the Philippine garrison or its place in military policy. The hope was that by making highly publicized efforts, the United States could force the Japanese to think twice before invading the islands. But with those increases, perhaps unknowingly, Marshall was setting the stage for the Philippines to become something more than a deterrent, for he was putting the pieces in place for the Philippines to become a base for offensive operations.

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CHAPTER 7

SILVER WINGS

> Strategic considerations demand that Japan ... remain ... non-belligerent[1]

The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of War, and the President of the United States had not and would not change American military policy; Europe would remain the primary theater of operations. What would change, however, was the role the Philippines would play in support of the European Theater. Exactly when those leaders began to cast the Philippines in that role is difficult to determine. However, it was and would remain primarily an Army show throughout; even the Chief of Naval Operations was not fully informed of the intent or breadth of the reinforcement effort as late as July 31.

Admiral Stark relayed his concerns about the strategic situation to Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., commander of the U.S.S. Pennsylvania, on the last day of July 1941. Stark believed that the entire situation in the Far East had

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[1]Memorandum, Gerow to the Secretary of War, Subject: "Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands," 8 October 1941, War Plans Division 3251-60, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Executive 8, Book A, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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changed because of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese occupation of Indochina. Stark's view was that the United States should "consider along with the British a joint-protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent the spread of war in the Far East." He believed that the loss of raw material from the Dutch East Indies was not the critical issue. He contended that instead, "The real problem is a British one - hence our consideration." While the Philippines could never be provided with adequate defenses, Stark was happy that the twenty-eight PBY Catalina patrol aircraft and eleven submarines were there and "delighted with the Army putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this." It was the Chief of Naval Operation's belief that because the air defenses were being supplemented, "... the Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away."[2]

Stark, like Marshall, also believed Far East military decisions were complicated by the lack of direction in military policy. He wrote:

> To some very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a

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[2]Letter, Stark to Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr. with copies to Admirals [Husband E.] Kimmel and [Thomas C.] Hart, 31 July 1941, Harold R. Stark Papers, Box 57, Folder 33, "Pearl Harbor Investigations," USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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> "Betty, please don't ask me that." Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered it [resignation as Chief of naval Operations] more than once.[3]

Only those who were stationed in the Philippines believed the policy had changed. MacArthur was elated! For the first time since 1935 he seemed to have gained the ability to outfit and train his Philippine Army without the encumbrances imposed by the small Commonwealth's budget and the political whims of President Manuel Quezon. With characteristic enthusiasm MacArthur went to work forming his new command. He selected his staff, as could be expected, from his military advisory group, including Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland, whom he appointed as chief of staff. He quickly capitalized on the newfound interest in the Philippines. Requests for material and news of departing shipments kept radio operators busy in Manila and Washington during the summer and fall of 1941. A study of men and material requests shows that at first their purpose was to develop a land force trained to carry out the mission set forth in War Plan ORANGE 3, the defense of Manila Bay.

Then, on July 31 Marshall telegraphed MacArthur that:

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[3]Ibid.

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> Plans are maturing to send you the following reinforcements, one squadron of nine of the most modern B-Seventeen (B-17) flying fortresses from Hawaii as soon as availability of staging fields at Wake Island and New Britain are secured, advance reports indicate such fields now available....[4]

In addition, MacArthur was told that twenty-five 75MM guns mounted on half-tracks were being placed on transports scheduled to leave the United States on September 18; they would be followed by an equal number departing the United States in October. The USAFFE was also to receive a company of light tanks, a regiment of National Guard troops trained in antiaircraft defense, 24,000 rounds of antitank ammunition, and 425 reserve officers.[5] Marshall's matter-of-fact statement about the delivery of nine modern B-17s to the Philippines belies the dramatic change this decision made. Only a few weeks earlier Marshall was disturbed that he would not have enough B-17s in the western hemisphere in the event of a German take-over in Martinique.

Marshall next directed his staff to provide him a memorandum detailing specifically what equipment ought to be sent to the Philippines. On August 1, his staff presented a

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[4]Radiogram, War Department to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Far East, 31 July 1941, The Adjutant General's Office, Subject: "Organization and Reinforcement of the U.S. Army Far Eastern Forces," 28 July 1941, item 4997, roll 317, GCMA, VMI, LVA; copy dated 1 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[5]Ibid.

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memorandum entitled, "Considering the proposition of sending material only to the Philippines." Under the heading of advantages, the staff concluded that sufficient equipment was already available in the Philippines to train new units and that the training could start immediately with instructors from the 60th Coast Artillery and some Philippine Scout personnel. Then the newly inducted Philippine Army units would be trained and ready when their new equipment arrived. The staff devoted an extensive amount of analysis to the shipment and positioning of antiaircraft guns. It also recommended sending an additional twenty-four 3-inch antiaircraft guns, along with thirty searchlights and associated radio equipment.[6]

On August 14, Marshall called for yet another staff paper on the Philippines. His War Plans Division staff restated the three options it offered in 1940: maintaining the status quo, withdrawing entirely from the area, or building up the Philippines with a force of "sufficient strength to assure enforcement of our policies, and to protect our interests in the Far East." The staff posited that if there was to be a reasonable chance for a successful defense, the minimum reinforcements that should be sent must

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[6]Memorandum, Gerow to Chief of Staff, Subject: "Considering the proposition of sending material only to the Philippine Islands," 1 August 1941, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Office of the Chief of Staff, 18812-62, War Plans Division 3251-55, item 912, roll 34, GCMP, VMI, LVA.

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include a composite air wing, an infantry division, an antiaircraft regiment, and 2,300 additional harbor defense troops. By mid-August the Philippine Scouts had been increased from 6,415 to 12,000; strength of the 31st Infantry was increased from 1,560 to 1,763; 1,500 harbor defense troops were added; an additional antiaircraft warning company was sent; thirty-five P-40s were on the islands and fifty additional pursuit planes were scheduled to arrive in September. Added to that were the preparations to ship nine B-17s, airfield improvements, additional ammunition, calling the Philippine Army into service, drafting legislation for additional money to defend the islands, sending a National Guard tank battalion, fifty 75MM antitank, and sixteen 37MM antiaircraft guns.[7]

The staff's reaction to the reinforcement of the Philippines suggests it was struggling to figure out just why all of this was taking place. On August 14, for example, the staff told its boss that the rationale for not increasing the shipments to the Philippines earlier "is no longer entirely controlling." Men and material could now, it claimed, be delivered as shipping space permitted.[8]

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[7]Memorandum, Gerow to Chief of Staff, Subject: "Reinforcement of the Philippines," 14 August 1941, Office of the Chief of Staff 18812-62, War Plans Division 3251-55, item 920, roll 34, GCMP, VMI, LVA.

[8]Ibid.

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That was an ironic statement coming from a group of officers who only a few months before had suggested withdrawing from the Philippines. Gerow apparently decided he needed to bring his staff more fully into the picture; the next day he called his staff together for a meeting about the reinforcement of the Philippines. He told the assembled officers that "... the following plans were made, which the Chief of Staff approved verbally." Those plans included sending the 194th Tank Battalion, less one company; fifty-four tanks; a company from the 19th Ordnance Battalion; and the 200th Antiaircraft Regiment. Additionally, orders were issued to the Coast Artillery to fill all shortages in the Philippines. Appended to the August 15 letter were the detailed men and material requirements. When reinforced, the total troop strength was placed at 122,700 personnel. The categories included 30,700 American troops, 12,000 Philippine Scouts, and 80,000 Philippine Army troops. Most interesting was Gerow's comment that only one squadron of heavy bombers was to be sent, because only one suitable airfield was available.[9]

Gerow's memorandum indicates that the staff still looked upon the Philippines in terms of its 1940 analysis

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[9]Memorandum, Colonel Richard W. Crawford to Gerow, Subject: "Reinforcement for the Philippines," 15 August 1941, Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Executive 8, Book A, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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and was not privileged with information about the full intent of the air build-up. The staff was, however, suggesting that if the reinforcements arrived in time, the garrison might be able to deter or even defeat a Japanese attack. The staff believed the Japanese would continue to move south and eventually attack the Philippines. Reinforcement would therefore: "Give reasonable assurance of holding Manila Bay, thus, further prompt reinforcement of the Philippines is essential." To achieve the objectives set forth in War Plan ORANGE 3, Gerow recommended sending the 200th Coast Artillery, more antiaircraft units, the 41st Infantry Division, replacement of obsolete aircraft, and fifty-four tanks from the 194th Tank Battalion. The War Plans Division received concurrences from the Chief of Operations, the Chief of Logistics, and the Chief of the Army Air Forces.[10]

The August 1, 14, and 15 memoranda are important because their construction suggests that the intent of the War Plans Division was to improve the defenses of the Philippines to achieve only the objectives set forth in ORANGE 3. The August 14 memorandum also indicated that the staff was testing the waters by advising that if additional ground and air units were sent, Manila Bay and perhaps even

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[10]Gerow to Chief of Staff, "Reinforcement of the Philippines," 14 August 1941, 3.

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all of Luzon could be secured. There is no indication, however, that anyone in the War Plans Division envisioned reinforcing the Philippines to the detriment of or in support of other theaters of operations. For example, while the staff recommended sending the 194th Tank battalion to the Philippines, one company of that battalion was also sent to Alaska. And, while the staff concurred with replacing obsolete aircraft, it did not suggest sending B-17 bombers. The staff considerations did not go beyond those postulated in earlier Philippine strategy discussions. On the face of it, it seems that Marshall had not discussed any purpose behind the reinforcement of the Philippines beyond the garrison's most basic mission.

Meanwhile, MacArthur's staff continued to bombard Washington with requests. On August 9, MacArthur requested two additional brigadier generals, ten colonels (of whom seven were to command Philippine Army divisions), thirty lieutenant colonels slated for regimental command or instructor duty, and 104 lieutenant colonels or majors to serve as infantry field officers. Other requests for personnel included two adjutant generals, twenty quartermasters, ten engineers, four ordnance officers, and four signal officers.[11] On August 22, the USAFFE

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[11]Radiogram, Colonel Carl H. Seals to War Department, 9 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

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Quartermaster sent a request for enough equipment to outfit ten Philippine Army divisions. That list included 19,500 Garand rifles, machine guns, additional 75MM guns, and ancillary equipment such as field glasses and aiming circles.[12] On September 2, 1941, USAFFE requested 300 more officers, this time with experience in antitank warfare. That request also contained demands for additional machine guns and communications equipment.[13] Later that same day MacArthur's staff asked for 127 infantry officers.[14] Sometimes MacArthur personally wrote out the request. For example, on November 17, 1941, the USAFFE commander wrote a personal letter to Marshall asking for two regiments of 155MM howitzers, three regiments of 105mm howitzers, an additional regiment of antiaircraft personnel, and a signal company.[15] Additional USAFFE staff requests included a 250-bed hospital and 180 sets of regimental infirmary equipment.[16]

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[12]Radiogram, Seals to War Department, 22 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[13]Radiogram, Seals to War Department, 2 September 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[14]Letter, MacArthur to Marshall, 17 November 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-2.

[15]Radiogram, Surgeon General to Adjutant General, 23 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

[16]Radiogram, War Department to Quartermaster, USAFFE, 24 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

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During the early stages of the build-up in the Philippines there were at least three unrelated goals. The War Plans Division worked to make the Philippine garrison ready to deter or defeat a Japanese attack. MacArthur's goal, while perhaps not fully evident to the Washington staff, was to fulfill the objectives he had set forth in his 1935 defense plan for the Philippines. The third goal, probably not understood by the Army staff or MacArthur, was to make the Philippines a base for deterrence, and if that failed, a base for offensive operations. Just how important the Philippine defense build-up had become can be seen by its effect on the Army's logistical system.

In early June 1941, less than one month before Marshall formed USAFFE, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow reported to the Chief of Staff that "... the First Division reinforced is the only triangular division we have which approximates readiness for combat service involving a landing on a hostile shore."[17] Historians Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley conclude in Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 that the Army was "... something less than ready to meet its commitments under the new

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[17]Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, United States Army in World War II: The War Department, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 71.

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American war plans."[18] When the requirements to reinforce the Philippines are entered into the bleak prewar supply equation, the demands imposed on the Army appear overwhelming. A lack of adequate freighters worsened the situation. Historians Leighton and Coakley conclude that the shipment of supplies to the Philippines was "The largest single additional burden placed upon military shipping during this period."[19]

Marshall almost pulled out the stops for anything dealing with the Philippines. For example, on September 5, Marshall told MacArthur that he was considering sending him one "first class National Guard Division to the Philippines, 18,000 men." Such a movement of men, Marshall went on to explain, would have a serious impact on the strained shipping in the Atlantic and cause convoy problems in the Pacific. After explaining to MacArthur the gravity and difficulty of such a large troop movement, the Chief of Staff nevertheless asked MacArthur: "How quickly do you need the division?" In the same telegram Marshall went on tell the USAFFE commander that he was to receive nine more

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[18]Ibid., 71-72.

[19]Ibid., 73-74.

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B-17s in October and unspecified numbers of fighter planes and light bombers.[20]

Four days later, on September 9, the Chief of Staff sent a memorandum to the President and the Secretary of War informing them of the progress made on the reinforcement of the Philippines. The memorandum contained a generous quotation from MacArthur, who wrote that President Roosevelt's proclamation had a "momentous effect throughout the Far East and that you, Secretary Stimson, and the President may congratulate yourselves on the excellent timing of the action." Following MacArthur's words, Marshall listed the equipment already on the way.[21]

The B-17s were the most significant material contribution and indicative of the new status the Philippines now held in American military policy. On September 12, 1941, Brigadier General Carl A. Spaatz prepared a memorandum for the Chief of Staff detailing the plans for reinforcing the Philippine Department Air Force. Spaatz wrote:

> In accordance with verbal instructions of the Chief of Staff [author's underline], September 5,

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[20]Telegram, Marshall to MacArthur, 5 September 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 74, Folder 48.

[21]Memorandum, Marshall to the President, with a copy to the Secretary of War, 9 September 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 80, Folder 30.

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> 1941, that an additional bombardment group be sent to reinforce the Philippine Defense Air Force, it is believed that the Philippine Department should be reinforced ... in order to provide the necessary service organizations for the augmented Air Force.[22]

Spaatz then wrote that the "Secretary of War directs" the transfer of air units already in service, and the constitution, activation, and training of additional air units to the Philippines "at the earliest practicable time."[23]

The Philippines were slated to become something more than a deterrent to Japanese aggression. In addition to a shield, the islands would have a sword as well. Giving that sword to USAFFE was a much of a surprise to Marshall's air planners as the ground reinforcement was to his War Plans Division. The Spaatz memorandum for record clarifying verbal orders by the Chief of Staff is unique. It seems to have been written to help Spaatz understand the intent of his own orders and to provide a record for decision. The staff officers who were charged with the responsibility to plan for the movement of the B-17s to the Philippines had been taken aback by the sudden shift in priorities. Colonel Orvil A. Anderson, an Air Staff officer, was asked in a

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[22]Memorandum, Gerow to the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Plan for Reinforcing the Philippine Department Air Force," 12 September 1941, Office of the Chief of Staff, 14528-16, A.A.F./297, item 455, roll 14, GCMP, VMI, LVA.

[23]Ibid.

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postwar oral history interview what event or which person precipitated the movement of the heavy bombers to the Philippines. He replied that he was given verbal orders by General Arnold to prepare a way to ferry bombers to the Philippines. Anderson assumed that Arnold's orders came from the Chief of Staff [Marshall].[24]

Anderson was involved in many of the prewar staff studies concerning the use of aircraft in war. His memory on those events was concise and detailed. His recollection about the abrupt decision to send B-17s to a previously unplanned-for location was that it was unique in all the war. Anderson claimed that the only bombers ever previously discussed for the Philippines were light bombers for defensive operations.[25]

In addition, there were the daily situation reports concerning the B-17s for the Philippines sent to the Secretary of War. Each day Stimson received a one- or two-line report on the location of the bombers and their

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[24]Donald Shaughnessy, "Oral History Interview with Major General Orvil A. Anderson," 27 October 1959, Albert F. Simpson Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, 53-57.

[25]Ibid.

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projected time of arrival in the islands.[26] At no other time did the Secretary of War exhibit this level of interest in the Philippines, a fact that leads one to suspect that Stimson was personally involved and committed to the effort.

The urgency of getting the bombers safely to the Philippines is further demonstrated by orders to the Corps of Engineers. The first bombers were scheduled to arrive in September. The route they would have to fly, to the Philippines via Midway, Wake, and Guam, brought them within range of Japanese fighters based in the Japanese Mandates, the Marshalls and Carolines. Therefore, on October 4, 1941, the War Department directed the Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Eugene Reybold, to begin work on the construction of airfields in the South Pacific and to complete the task as soon as possible. Reybold was informed that the project was urgent and that: "It must be thought of in weeks and not years, every possible expedient must be

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[26]Notes, Marshall to Stimson, 25 July - 3 November 1941, Secretary of War Folder, Philippines, item 2668, roll 115, GCMA, VMI, LVA. Each note consists of one or two lines of text that provide the location and estimated time of arrival on each leg of the B-17s' flight.

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visualized and utilized.[27] The War Department authorized $5 million for the task that would include construction on Christmas Island, Fiji, and New Caledonia; two installations in Australia at Townsville or Rockhampton and Darwin; and Fort Stotsenburg in the Philippines. Plans called for at least one 5,000 - foot runway that could take heavy bombers at each location. These initial runways were then to be lengthened to 7,000 feet, and two additional runways with support structures were to be added at each location. The project was assigned the highest priority with the Corps of Engineers. The initial phase of the Project was to be completed by January 15, 1942.[28]

The decision to place offensive bombers in the Philippines was significant for it flew in the face of earlier plans, and carried with it a commitment in resources that could affect the defense of the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line as well as operations in the Atlantic. Nor were air reinforcements composed of extra aircraft not needed in

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[27]Letter, The Adjutant General to Engineer, Army Ground Forces Pacific, 4 October 1941, Subject: "Ferry Route 1," Miscellaneous Messages and Papers, 1 July - 18 December 1941, Executive 8, Book A, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.; see also Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 45-48.

[28]Letter, South Pacific Division Engineer to the Chief of Engineers, 17 October 1941 appears in same file.

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other places. Further plans included sending 165 B-17 bombers to the Philippines by February 1942. The total United States production run for the same time period was 220 bombers![29] This was in stark contrast to the modest commitment of aircraft discussed in earlier months.

There were only a handful of people who made the decision to place front-line, long-range bombers in the Philippines; and the Army Staff was certainly not part of the decision process. Nor was it likely that Admiral Stark was aware of the reasons behind the decision to send bombers and reinforcements to the islands. In fact, Stark was still in the dark as late as September 12. On that date the Chief of Naval Operations asked Marshall: "What are we doing in the Philippines?" Marshall replied that on August 26, a regiment of antiaircraft troops departed San Francisco for the Philippines, and then proceeded to advise Stark of the projected material and personnel build-up slated for October, November, and December. Marshall, however, did not mention the projected size of the bomber reinforcement, and

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[29]E. Kathleen Williams and Louis E. Asher Fellow, "Deployment of the Army Air Force on the Eve of Hostilities," The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942, eds. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 179; see also Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 105.

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simply concluded his note with: "You may have word of this already."[30]

The final decision was made by the President, most likely with strong encouragement from Secretary of War Stimson, and in the presence of Generals Marshall and Arnold. It was probably made on August 7, 1941, at the Argentia Summit. However, it would seem that most of the

[30]Memorandum, Marshall to Stark, 12 September 1941, Harold R. Stark Papers, Box 4, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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participants arrived at the conference prepared to help make, or at least agree with, the President's decision.[31]

The use of heavy bombers to serve as deterrents in defense of America's overseas possessions was not a novel idea. Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson placed the concept before Marshall in 1939, with a study that discussed the efficacy of substituting Flying Fortresses as battleships. Flying Fortresses, Anderson believed, could fulfill the role of battleships by extending the power of the United States

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[31]Henry H. Arnold Papers, Argentia Conference Notes, Box 181, Library of Congress; also appears in Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1949), 249-250; Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 105-106, contends that August 7 was the first time the President heard of it, thereby implying that it was not his decision, but rather that of the Army Air Force; Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941, Revised Edition, (Lawerence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1969), cites the Henry H. Arnold Papers and Arnold, Global Mission; Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 98, and Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 440, contend that it was the airmen's argument that paved the way for reinforcement of the Philippines; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 148, citing the Arnold Papers and Global Mission, states that "Prominent in the review was his [President Roosevelt's] decision to increase the number of planes from a squadron of nine planes to a group of thirty-six." The actual number of planes recommended for the Philippines was decided on July 18 by General Arnold. He suggested that 272 B-17s with another sixty-eight in reserve and two more support groups of 130 P-40s would fulfill the air defense and offense needs of the islands. Arnold Papers, Box 153; see also Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 178; Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 105, places the date of July 27, "if not earlier when the Air Corps had begun work on ferrying B-17s to the Far East"; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 144-145, using Arnold's papers sets the date of recommending bombers for the Philippines at July 18.

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from its land bases.[32] The European war provide American air advocates with an opportunity to combat-test the prowess of the B-17, crewed by British airmen, in bombing raids over Germany. The results were less than satisfactory, and the British so informed the Americans. But American aviation experts discounted British claims of material weaknesses in the aircraft and instead attributed the less-than-spectacular bomber performance to improper British aircrew training. Some political and military leaders became more convinced than ever of the importance of the B-17 and attributed the failure of British operations in Crete and Norway to a lack of control of the air. Thus, by July 1941, many were, if not convinced, at least open to the suggestion that perhaps the B-17 was the key to unlock the strategic dilemma faced by the United States. These same people, historian Waldo Heinrichs concludes, viewed the Philippines as the place to base the B-17s in order to provide a "web of air power that might give new meaning to the concept of a Malay Barrier and supply the deterrent force which the British and American navies were unable to provide."[33]

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[32]Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, 88, footnote 100, 100-101, citing memorandum, Colonel J.W. Anderson to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, 15 March 1939, Subject: "Employment of Aviation," War Plans Division 3748-17.

[33]Heinrichs, Threshold of war, 143-144.

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The power of aviation was not only advanced by the Army Air Corps officers. On June 6, 1941, Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, a highly respected member of Marshall's staff, suggested that if American aviation could be joined with submarines, it would be possible to close narrow strategic routes and at some point in the future interdict shipborne operations over the high seas. Embick contended that when these technologies were supported by an industrial base, then these "two developments ... have a most profound influence upon strategy [underlined in original text], and therefore upon the future poltico-military organization of the world [underlined in original text]."[34] Aviation, submarines, and industrialization, Embick believed, meant that any nation that relied upon long lines of sea communications could not survive. Technology would now make the projection of power by moving armies from one continent to another much more difficult. The result, Embick believed, would be to segregate the globe into distinct geopolitical entities. Because Japan required long sea lines of communication, a combination of air and submarine assets could interdict its lines of communication and shrink its industrial production.[35]

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[34]Memorandum, Embick to Marshall, Subject: "Memorandum on Influence of Aviation and Industrialization," 6 June 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 56, Folder 1.

[35]Ibid.

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Two eminent historians reach two different conclusions about the decision to send B-17 bombers to the Philippines. Historian Michael S. Sherry concludes that there was a new mixture of urgency and opportunity that took B-17s away from guarding the Atlantic sea lanes, protecting other outposts, training new crews, and bolstering the allies. The distances involved in moving B-17s to the Philippines, the Pacific Ocean's harsh climates, and poor landing fields also placed a heavy strain on the equipment. Sherry contends that sending the bombers to the Philippines was a bold decision that was opposed to Europe first and was a measure of desperation.[36] Historian Waldo Heinrichs suggests that the German-Soviet war had intensified Japan's expansionism, opportunism, and unpredictability. Therefore, by sending heavy bombers to the Philippines, America would demonstrate a firmness of purpose that would enhance the application of diplomacy and economic embargoes. Japan might be boxed in, and while the risk of war would increase, the risks of inaction were higher.[37]

Sherry is, in part, correct. The decision to increase forces in the Philippines was a desperate move. But the move was not in opposition to Europe first; it was in support of it. Heinrichs is also correct. The Japanese had

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[36]Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower, 105-106.

[37]Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 145.

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to be boxed in, but not only because of he possibility of a Soviet defeat. No single event would cast the Philippines in the role of supporting America's Europe first policy. If America could hedge its bets, war could possibly be averted and the forces of aggression held in check until the United States was ready for war. By late summer of 1941, a panoply of events suggested that the place to bet on was the Philippines.

Throughout the summer of 1941, Chiang Kai-shek, through the Department of State, was urging the United States and Great Britain to exert additional pressure on Japan, claiming that Kunming was about to fall, and that only the use of heavy bombers would prevent a Chinese defeat. While the President wanted to issue an ultimatum to the Japanese, Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that "... there is no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department."[38] The War Plans Division analyzed the Far Eastern situation vis-a'-vis Chiang Kai-shek's request for bombers and reported that American Army intelligence did not support the Chinese military's conclusion that a major Japanese assault on Kunming could be

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[38]Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting, 3 November 1941, Box 147 J, Strategic Plans, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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defeated only by the use of heavy bombers. While the War Plans Division staff thought the fall of Kunming would be a serious blow to the Chinese, it would not force them out of the war, and the staff concluded that:

> The most effective air aid to China can be given by units in the Philippines; there are at present many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which will militate against a sustained effort; logistical difficulties, aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of U.S. Army Air Force units in China.[39]

On November 5, Stark and Marshall prepared a joint memorandum to the President in which they outlined the Army's and Navy's position on aid to China. Both senior leaders believed that the Chinese had an opportunity to defeat the Japanese because they held a solid defensive position on good ground. They also pointed out that the insertion of such direct aid as heavy bombers could lead to war in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy, Stark wrote, was not in a position to engage in the strategic offensive in the Pacific. Marshall reported that the full complement of bombers would not arrive in the Philippines until February or March 1942. Not until then, Marshall cautioned, would there exist a deterrent to a Japanese assault in the Far

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[39]Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Subject: "Far Eastern Situation," November 3, 1941, Army Documents, Miscellaneous, Read into Record Papers of Admiral Harold R. Stark, Series XIII, Pearl Harbor Investigations, ABC Conversations, Box 83, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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East. Both military leaders concluded that if war came early, the United States should fight only a defensive war in a coordinated action with the British and Dutch forces. Therefore, Marshall and Stark recommended that while no forces should be sent to China, war material and aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated.[40]

The Philippines were also seen as a way to aid the Soviet Union. Historian Waldo Heinrichs, author of Threshold of War, concludes that the reinforcement of the Philippines "was linked in the President's mind with the Russian situation." By placing a strong American presence in the Philippines, the United States would force Japan to think twice about advancing south to the oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies or north into the Soviet Union.[41]

There is additional evidence that supports this thesis. At a September 16 conference concerning British-United States industrial production there were lengthy discussions about keeping a supply route open to the Soviet Union. The

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[40]Ibid.

[41]Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 148, citing long-hand notes from Argentia Conference, Box 181, Arnold Papers; Arnold, Global Mission, 249-250, record of discussion among Marshall, General John Dill, and Brigadier General Vivian Dykes, Public Record Office. The evidence includes a handwritten note on which there are two columns under the heading Russia. In one column is a list of aircraft for Russia, and in the other of aircraft for the Philippines. The note is also in the War Plans Division Files.

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only three available routes led to the northern ports, which are ice-free only at certain times of the year; Vladivostok and Persia. The study group concluded that the northern ports would remain closed until June, and only about 200 tons a day could be sent through Persia. Thus, the only reliable port that could take enough cargo to keep the Soviets in the war was Vladivostok. The study team reported:

> We can rely on getting 2,500 to 3,000 tons per day through Vladivostok provided there is no Japanese interference. After consultation with the Russians we may very well be able to increase this amount.[42]

The Americans were not the only ones concerned about a northern advance by the Japanese. An October 21 intelligence report prepared by the British postulated that the Japanese would not advance south because of the possibility of entanglements with the United States and Great Britain. However, because the new pro-military Japanese cabinet is "wholly pro-German.... It is believed that the Japs will advance on Vladivostok and the Maritime

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[42]Conference on British-United States Production, Subject: "Supply Routes to Russia, a report by the Transportation Sub Committee," 16 September 1941, Strategic Plans, Box 118, Anglo-American Cooperation, Miscellaneous, USNARC, WYN, WDC.

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Provinces the minute the Soviet disintegration appears imminent."[43]

Stark saw a strong connection between events in Russia and the Japanese. Stark told his Asiatic Fleet commander, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, that negotiations between the United States and Japan were not going well and would probably depend on the turn of events in Europe, especially in the Soviet Union:

> If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of an agreement with Japan.[44]

Stark said that he was "personally delighted" reinforcing the Philippines and that "I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention - or, if not, then in execution."[45] Stark believed that if Japan attacked Siberia, the American and British response would be unclear, in part because everyone was preparing for staff conversations with the Soviets. As far as Pacific

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[43]Paraphrase of Code Cablegram Received at the War Department at 1433, 21 October 1941, Box 118, Anglo-American Cooperation, Miscellaneous Papers, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

[44]Letter, Stark to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, 22 September 1941, Harold R. Stark Papers, Box 54, Serial XIV, Op-10-MD, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

[45]Ibid.

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operations were concerned, the "operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from operations of the Asiatic Fleet, and the British, and Dutch Forces in the Far East."[46]

There is no question that the President and the military shared a deep concern over finding some way to provide support to the British and the Dutch. On November 21, Marshall sent MacArthur a memorandum that officially informed him that negotiations were underway between the British and Americans concerning the development of strategic operating plans for air and naval forces in the Far East. The memorandum stated that: "Heretofore, contemplated Army action in the Far East has been purely of a defensive nature." However, Marshall went on to say that the improvements in the Army Air Corps in the Philippines could now allow offensive air operations in furtherance of the strategic defensive combined with the defense of the Philippine Islands as an air and naval base. If the British accepted the latter, then MacArthur was empowered to enter into agreements with them.[47]

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[46]Ibid.

[47]Memorandum, Chief of Staff to MacArthur, Subject: "United States-British Cooperation in the Far East," 21 November 1941, Far Eastern Affairs, Box 84, Serial XIII, Pearl Harbor Investigation, Defense of Pearl Harbor, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton write in "And I Was There" that the build-up in the Philippines was in line with Winston S. Churchill's recommendation that called for America, Britain, and the Soviet Union to join together and issue an ultimatum for Japan. Layton argues that Stimson and the President thought that a scratch force of bombers and a few British warships could be transformed into a diplomatic club against Japan. This effort, Layton concludes, was a de facto treaty with the British.[48]

On November 27, 1941, Marshall and Stark sent the President a memorandum that outlined the Far Eastern situation. In the memorandum America's military leaders told the President that while the reinforcements were being rushed to the Philippines, it was imperative that the United States forestall war with Japan until the reinforcements could be put in place. The longer the delay, they argued, the longer the Japanese would be hindered from moving south or to the Soviet Union and China. War, Marshall and Stark said, should be considered only if Japan threatened the

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[48]Edwin T. Layton with Roger Pineau and John Costello, "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking Secrets, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 132-135.

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territories of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies.[49]

The leaders' strong suggestions to the President indicate that there were many purposes behind the reinforcement of the Philippines. Keeping the Soviet Union and China in the war would tie up the German and Japanese armies. Helping the Dutch and the British hold on to their possessions in the Far East would deprive the Japanese of oil and keep the lines of communications open to Australia and New Zealand, thereby keeping Allied intentions focused on Europe. The European connection was postulated to the Secretary of War on October 8. The War Plans Division concluded that:

> Unexpected opposition to the German attack in Russia, continued resistance by the Chinese, and economic pressure by the Americans, Dutch, and British have forced the Japanese to hesitate. Moreover, it was important that Japan remain a non-belligerent, thus permitting the bulk of the military resources of the associated powers to be employed in the principal theater of - the Atlantic and Europe.[50]

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[49]Memorandum, Marshall and Stark to the President, Subject: "Far Eastern Situation," 27 November 1941, Far Eastern Affairs, Box 84, Series XIII, Pearl Harbor Investigation, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

[50]Memorandum, Gerow for the Secretary of War, Subject: "Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands," 8 October 1941, War Plans Division 3251-60, Executive Files, Book A, 1 July - 18 December 1941, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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By placing strong forces in the Philippines, any Japanese move to the south would be blocked. Japanese attempts to move east, around the islands, and beyond the range of Philippine-based bombers would be subject to attack by the Pacific Fleet. And, it was thought, even if the Japanese bypassed the Philippines and evaded the Pacific Fleet, they would still have to confront the Allied forces operating out of British and Dutch possessions. The War Plans Division went on to explain that if Japan attempted to reduce the Philippines, the cost would be too great. Even a move against the Soviets could be countered because our bombers could also fly out of the Soviet Union. The memorandum concluded with: "The action taken by the War Department may well be the determining factor in Japan's eventual decision and, consequently, have a vital bearing on the course of the war as a whole."[51]

The world that America faced in 1941 was bleak and fraught with danger. The key was to delay the war, at least in the Pacific, and at the same time keep those who were

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[51]Ibid. On September 5 the War Plans Division's estimate concluded that Germany would be preoccupied with the Soviet Union, that Great Britain was unable to take the strategic offensive, and that Japan was "beset with uncertainties and therefore could do one of several courses of action to include striking the Maritime Provinces, seeking a decision in China, or perhaps even withdrawing from the Axis." Memorandum, Miles to the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation," 5 September 1941, Strategic Estimates, War Plans Division, Volume 2, copy 13, Box 75, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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fighting in the thick of it. The most attractive and perhaps only method to achieve that goal in mid-1941 was to reinforce what once was a strategic write-off - the Philippines. In the second half of 1941, the grand strategy had not changed, Europe was still first and American political and military leaders had decided that the way to keep Europe first was to assume a strong stance in the Philippines.

The responsibility to execute that strategy was vested in one man, General Douglas MacArthur. He would have to forge alliances between the Army and the Navy, the British and the Dutch, and mold his growing fleet of bombers, men, and material into an effective fighting force.

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CHAPTER 8

EIGHT WOODEN WHEELED 75s

> The Secretary of War and I were highly pleased to receive your report that your command is prepared for any eventuality and that you and Hart have worked out plans for effective coordinated employment ... of all forces.[1]

By September 1941, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and the President seem to have already envisaged the Philippines as an island fortress from which hundreds of bombers could either deter attack, protect the islands, or if necessary strike offensively against the Japanese for the bold strategic purpose of keeping the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain in the war. Meanwhile, the Army staff labored over production schedules and material inventories; pried loose the necessary men and equipment from other defense projects; and scoured shipping schedules to locate enough ships to carry the men and material to the Philippines.

Translating the aircraft into a specter of winged deterrence, gaining acrimonious Army and Navy cooperations, and molding the Filipino-American Army into an effective

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[1]Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 November 1941, Executive Files 8, Book A, 1 July - 18 December 1941, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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defense force would require a strong hand, a stronger sense of reality, and a balance of thought and purpose to overcome decades of neglect. Unfortunately, those abilities would not be found in the Philippines, nor would their absence be sensed in Washington.

Earlier plans to craft the Philippines garrison into an effective deterrent took the Philippines' meager infrastructure and support elements into account; but the decision to place B-17s on the islands did not. In July 1941, there were only two airfields on the island of Luzon: Nichols Field, just south of Manila, and Clark Field, about 50 miles northwest of that city. While Nichols Field enjoyed the distinction of being the only paved airfield in the islands, its runway, like the turf strips at Clark, was too small to take B-17s. Grunert had begun planning for a series of modern airfields, four on Luzon and two on Mindanao, in 1940; but it would not be until July 1941 that construction approval would be given and money appropriated for the projects. Moreover, the construction of the airfields as well as other defense projects were hampered by

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a shortage of construction companies and the unavailability of skilled labor and equipment.[2]

MacArthur also realized that airfield construction was critical. On August 4, 1941, he issued General Order Number 4, which placed a high priority on construction of the facilities for airplanes. The order also placed command of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) "directly under the control of the Commanding General of USAFFE." Like other command arrangements, it placed routine administration and supply under the Philippine Department.[3] The following day USAFFE headquarters issued General Order Number 5 ordering the Philippine Army Air Corps into the service of the U.S. Army.[4]

Good intentions, however, could not compensate for endemic problems. On top of skilled labor and equipment shortages, the construction effort was also slowed to a crawl by the November monsoons. The rainy season compounded

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[2]Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, 57-72; see also Hugh J. Casey, Engineer Memoirs, Publication of the Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 145-146; see also Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1951), 26-27.

[3]General Order Number 4, 4 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[4]General Order Number 5, 5 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

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the equipment shortages. The paucity of Army construction equipment forced USAFFE engineers to borrow equipment from the Philippine Department of Public Works. Unfortunately, when the November floods came to the Philippines, the equipment had to be returned to the Public Works Department, and work on the airfields as well as other projects slowed appreciably.[5] The lack of adequate airfields to which bombers could be disbursed would prove to be critical weakness in the opening hours of the war.[6]

While the lack of adequate supplies is correctly cited as an important factor in the failure of the forthcoming First Philippine Campaign, military planners in the United States made every effort to meet the voluminous supply needs of the burgeoning garrison. MacArthur himself expressed praise for the supply effort to John C. O'Laughlin, editor of The Army-Navy Journal by saying that the action of President Roosevelt in forming the Far Eastern Command was "electrical" and that morale had risen appreciably throughout the islands. MacArthur was quoted thus: "I am

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[5]Letter from V. Frangante, Director of Public Works to Colonel Harold H. Stickney, Philippine Department, 21 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

[6]Why the FEAF was destroyed on the ground nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor remains a matter of debate among historians. MacArthur, to his credit, developed or directed the development of a plan that would have based the B-17s beyond the range of Japanese aircraft. Memorandum, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 November 1941, War Plans Division 3489, item 1553, roll 39, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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confident that we can successfully resist any effort that may be made against us.... No field commander could have received better support from a chief of staff than I have from Marshall."[7]

In fact, the greatest single impediment to the reinforcement of the Philippines was a shortage of shipping. The War Department planned to ship an additional 20,000 troops in November to augment the 5,000 already on the way. But the reinforcement of the Philippines caught the Navy in the midst of converting passenger ships to military use. On top of that, six large liners were about to be sent to the Indian Ocean on British service. Some seventy separate shipments were required to carry the .9 million measurement tons scheduled to be sent to the Philippines, quantities far beyond the capacity of the Army's transport fleet. Consequently, the Maritime Commission had to be involved in the time-consuming task of assembling transports for most of the supply requirements, as so it was not until November 1941 that the supplies requested in August and September began their long journey across the Pacific.

To help speed up the flow of material across the Pacific, the Navy instituted convoying between Honolulu and

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[7]Letter, MacArthur to John C. O'Laughlin, 6 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

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Manila with convoys departing at twelve day intervals beginning in September. Despite every effort only seven freighters and five passenger vessels carrying small amounts of cargo would reach Manila during September and October. In November only five freighters and three passenger vessels arrived.[8] E. Kathleen Williams and Louis E. Asher Fellow argue in The Army Air Forces in World War II that planners in Washington failed to understand the logistical requirements and the defense needs necessary for heavy bombers.[9]

Whether the Washington planners failed to understand logistical requirements or overlooked them, they also neglected or overlooked just how the bombers were to be employed once they arrived in the Philippines. The omission would turn out to be greater than any logistical one.

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[8]Quartermaster Report of Operations, Annex XIII, U.S. Army Forces Far East-U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, Reinforcement of the Philippines (Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1946), 7-11; see also Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 35-37; Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan, United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, Publication of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 1-8.

[9]Williams and Fellow, "Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities," I, Army Air Forces in World War II, 176-178.

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Just what Marshall and Stimson envisioned the mission of the B-17 bombers would be once they arrived in the Philippines is difficult to discern. When the decision was made to send the first group of bombers Marshall commented that the presence of these planes "would give the Japanese some bad moments."[10]

There was an indication on September 30 that Marshall was also contemplating moving the bombers to other locations in the Far East. Marshall sent a radiogram to MacArthur in which he suggested that the air defenses of the Philippines - Australia - Dutch East Indies - Singapore Area could be strengthened if bomber detachments and supplies were either sent or made available for the United States at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby. To that end Marshall directed MacArthur to obtain permission from the British command in Singapore to place "immediately two missions of 500-pound bombs and ammunition at Singapore and Port Darwin, and a similar amount at Rabaul or Port Moresby, or divided between the two for one heavy bombardment group of 35 planes."[11] These supplies were to be shipped from

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[10]Secretary of War Conference, 28 July 1941, Chief of Staff Secretariat, RG 165, Box 885, NARA, Washington, D.C.; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 144.

[11]Radiogram, Secretary of War to Commanding General USAFFE, Secretary of War Folder, Philippines, 3 October 1941, item 2668, roll 115, GCMA, VMI, LVA; Paraphrased copy of Secretary radiogram dated 30 September 1941 also located in Strategic Plans, Box 147 J, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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existing Philippine stocks with replacements scheduled to leave the United States in December. Marshall advised MacArthur that:

> One airfield between Singapore and Manila is essential for operation of B-17 bombers. Request you urge the British to develop one airfield in North Borneo at earliest possible date.... One field between Singapore and Manila suitable for B-17 operations is essential to our probable operations.[12]

Marshall then announced that he planned to increase Philippine air units as rapidly as airplanes and units became available.[13] Gerow informed Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Richard C. Moore that "projected movements to the Philippines have been based on the concept that maximum results will be obtained from air reinforcements and priority has been given to the movement of air units."[14]

Within a few days after learning of the arrival of the first nine B-17s, MacArthur, to his credit, ordered Brigadier General Henry B. Claggett, the commander of the V Interceptor Command, to study possible Japanese targets within the range of his bombers. On September 11, Claggett reported that there were sixty-one major land targets and

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[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Memorandum, Gerow to Deputy Chief of Staff, Subject: "Philippines," 8 October 1941, Secretary of War Folder, Philippines, item 2668, roll 115, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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900 Japanese naval targets within non-stop B-17 range of the Philippines. Claggett calculated that in order to destroy all of those targets, a force of 262 aircraft would be required to operate for a period of twenty days. Logistical requirements included fifty-six airfields, 13,559,900 gallons of aviation gasoline, 67,998 gallons of oil, and 7,192 tons of bombs.[15]

MacArthur called for another target study on October 10, specifically for the purpose of bombing Tokyo. Claggett's staff concluded that Tokyo could be bombed only if permission could be secured from the Soviets to land in Vladivostok. Since permission for that was unlikely, Tokyo was out of the question for the time being. The industrial areas in southern Japan, however, were considered possible and were marked for further study. While Marshall, Stimson, Arnold, and even Secretary of State Cordell Hull apparently speculated about which targets the FEAF should strike, there is no record of the Air Staff's providing MacArthur or his

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[15]Memorandum, Brigadier General Henry B. Claggett to MacArthur, 11 September 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-14. The land targets included fourteen on Formosa, thirty-two in Indochina, and seven in the Japanese islands of the Pescadores, Pelew, Waichow, Amoy, Itu Ada, Patas, and Hainan.

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staff a list of preferred targets.[16] What is most interesting about the MacArthur and Claggett list is the absence of the Japanese Mandates, the Carolines and Marshalls. The Japanese accession of these islands in 1914, it will be recalled, led to the drastic revision of the Navy's War Plan ORANGE and the belief by many that the fleet would first have to seize those islands before advancing to the Philippines.

Both Marshall and Arnold realized that there was no qualified general air officer in the Philippines to make the FEAF ready for combat. MacArthur was provided a field of three officers - Major General Lewis H. Brereton, Major General Jacob Eufickel, and Brigadier General Walter H. Frank - was qualified to be the commander of the strategic bomber forces.[17] Almost as if to underscore the need for such an officer, MacArthur was informed that twenty-six bombers were to be sent in addition to those on hand and the

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[16]Memorandum, Claggett to MacArthur, 10 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-3. It is difficult to determine if MacArthur and Claggett were developing their own list of targets or they were ordered to prepare a list of targets. Michael Sherry presents evidence that shows a series of discussions between Marshall and Stimson in which Japan is listed among the list of possible targets. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 110-115; Waldo Heinrichs also presents evidence that suggests Marshall, Stimson, and even Cordell Hull were thinking of Japan, the Mandated Islands, and the Malay Barrier. Heinrichs, Threshold of War, 196.

[17]Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 September 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

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ten en route from the 19th Bombardment Group. MacArthur choose Brereton as his commander for the Far East Air Force.[18]

Brereton was informed of his new job on October 5, 1941, and according to his post-World War II diary, welcomed his new command with something less than enthusiasm. He also claimed to have advised General Arnold that he considered it "extremely hazardous" to place heavy bombers in an area that lacked sufficient fighter protection and long-range warning equipment.[19]

The new FEAF commander arrived as his post on November 4, and was met by MacArthur and his chief of staff, Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland. Immediately upon his arrival Brereton handed MacArthur a note from Marshall, who, in according to Brereton, read the note and then quickly turned to Sutherland and exclaimed: "Dick, they are going to give us everything we need."[20] Later that day, when Brereton asked Sutherland about the possibility of war,

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[18]Memorandum, Major H. G. Quinn to MacArthur, 30 September 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

[19]Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 to 8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), 6.

[20]Ibid., 19-20.

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the USAFFE Chief of Staff replied that he did not think war would happen before the spring of 1942.[21]

Brereton found little to allay his concerns during his first inspection tour of the FEAF crews and facilities. He quickly concluded that there was an acute shortage of qualified personnel including medical, communications, and weather officers. Brereton set to work. He instituted a new training regimen with a heavy emphasis (40 percent) on night flying and placed one squadron of bombers and one squadron of fighters on constant readiness.[22] By November 6 Brereton published his staff assignments for the FEAF, and his command structure was in place.[23]

Brereton, however qualified, never took a firm hold on what targets his bombers ought to go after. He revved up the training and readiness program and rode roughshod over the construction crews charged with building the air facilities, but he spent little time with mission planning. Historians E. Kathleen Williams and Louis E. Asher confirm Brereton's heavy training schedule and conclude that there was "a new urgency in defensive preparations in the

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[21]Ibid., 22.

[22]Ibid., 22.

[23]General Orders Number 6, 6 November 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

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Philippines, especially to threaten the Japanese with strategic bombing."[24]

Unfortunately, except for General Claggett's two bombing studies, Brereton seems to have given little thought to exactly what and where his heavy bombers should attack. It was a dilemma that would be resolved by the Japanese on December 8, when they caught the FEAF bomber force on the ground while Brereton was seeking permission to strike Formosa, an area for which the information required for such a mission was incomplete.[25]

The document that MacArthur received from Brereton was a memorandum that in addition to permitting him to work with the British, also directed him to "act in cooperation with the Commander-In-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet on the basic war plan."[26] War Plan ORANGE required a naval relief force and the Army to defend to the last man the harbor in which the Navy would anchor. Nevertheless, Army-Navy

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[24]Williams and Fellow, "Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities," Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 176-178, 185-193.

[25]Allison Ind, Bataan: The Judgment Seat (New York: Van Nostrand, 1944), 92; also cited in Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 89-90.

[26]Memorandum, Chief of Staff to MacArthur, Subject: "United States-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East," 21 November 1941, War Plans Division 4402-112, item 1322, roll 115, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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cooperation was poor. General Arnold, the commander of all U.S. Army Air Forces in World war II, devoted only a few pages in his postwar memoirs to the reinforcement of the Philippines. He suggests, however, that many of the problems faced by Brereton's command were caused by arguments between the Army and the Navy over who had command and control of air units.[27] The interservice rivalry was explicit, and there would be little cooperation between the two services in the Philippines.

The Navy's primary concern was to protect the Philippine coastal waters and engage the Japanese Fleet. The Army's mission was to protect the fleet base at Cavite. As late as November, Stark was still concerned that the Army could not protect the fleet when it was in port. At the November 3 meeting of the Joint Board, Stark complained that: "Manila is not yet a secure base for the fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage."[28]

Meanwhile, Hart made the first overture for better Army-Navy cooperation in August 1941, when he suggested to MacArthur that they form a joint operational command to

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[27]Arnold, Global Mission, 268.

[28]Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting, 3 November 1941, Strategic Plans, Box 147 J, USNARC, WNY, WDC.

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control Army aircraft more effectively when they were flying over the water. MacArthur apparently thought Hart was proposing that all aircraft should be placed under the control of the Navy. Hart quickly corrected that notion, explaining that he was referring only to the joint command of "facilities."[29] Hart's request was not unrealistic, nor should it have been ignored by MacArthur. Facilities and communication equipment were in great demand. Any method, even the Army and Navy sharing the same facilities, should have worked to the advantage of both services.

There is no record of a reply to Hart's letter of August 14. The request for joint facilities appears to have been overshadowed by a larger event - the shore patrol incident. Sailors serving as shore patrol (naval police) arrested two Army personnel on leave in Shanghai. Since MacArthur had authority over all Army personnel in the Far East, the matter was elevated to his attention. MacArthur sent a nasty letter to Hart in which he testily complained of Navy interference in Army affairs. There is no record of a response to MacArthur's letter concerning the shore patrol incident.[30] However, Hart continued to pursue Navy-Army cooperation.

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[29]Letter, Hart to MacArthur, 14 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2, 1-2.

[30]Letter, MacArthur to Hart, 19 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2, 1-2.

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Four days later Hart sent the USAFFE commander another letter. This time Hart suggested that the Navy control all scouting, patrol, and reconnaissance missions flown over the water and assist in attacks on all foreign military expeditions that threatened the island of Luzon. If any attack took place in an area where Navy ships were operating, Hart believed that the Navy should assume direct control of all aircraft operating in the area.[31]

Hart's second letter may be interpreted in two ways. The most obvious of his desires was to gain control of the Army aircraft. The second is an honest concern over the safety of naval vessels operating with Army aircraft. There was a willingness on the part of Hart, on two occasions, to discuss joint operations and adhere to the policy set forth in RAINBOW 5.

Unfortunately, MacArthur choose the first interpretation. He sent a blistering letter to Hart that sank any subsequent attempts at improved Army-Navy cooperation. MacArthur's opening salvo informed Hart that after careful consideration of Hart's letter of October 23, he found the plan for naval control of all Army Air Corps activities over water "entirely objectionable." The mission

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[31]Letter, Hart to MacArthur, 23 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-3.

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of the Army, MacArthur declared, was to defend the Philippine frontier in cooperation with the Navy, to conduct air raids against the enemy, to support the Navy in raiding hostile sea communications, and to cooperate with associated powers. The Navy's mission, MacArthur went on, was to support the Army in defense of the Philippines and to protect the shipping of the United States. MacArthur then told Hart: "The mission of the Asiatic Fleet so far as its strategic employment is not known to me nor have I been informed as to what you have in contemplation."[32] MacArthur continued his diatribe by reiterating the role of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines. MacArthur informed Hart that the mission of the aircraft was to strike an enemy force committed to attack the Philippines or a force in position to execute such an attack. Only under "the most extraordinary circumstances," MacArthur wrote, "could units of the Army Air Corps operate with units of the Navy."[33]

MacArthur's final salvo destroyed any chance for real Army - Navy cooperation. In his concluding paragraph, MacArthur declared that the term "fleet" could hardly be applied to the two cruisers and one division of destroyers that comprised the surface elements of the naval command.

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[32]Letter, MacArthur to Hart, 7 November 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-4.

[33]Ibid.

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"This is especially striking when judged against the potential enemy naval forces in the western Pacific or the air force of this command." Thus, MacArthur concluded, it was "manifestly illogical" to assign control or tactical command of such a powerful air strike force to an element of "such combat inferiority as your command."[34] Hart's only reply to MacArthur's letter was that he disagreed with MacArthur's evaluation of the situation. He offered no new suggestions.[35]

Reports of MacArthur's tactless dealings with Hart reached Washington by November and led to messages from Marshall to MacArthur admonishing him for his October 13 letter to Hart. Marshall wrote: "He [Stark] has been wholehearted in his approach to these matters, and we hope very much that you and Admiral Hart can find a genuinely amicable basis for the conduct of affairs in the Far East."[36] Marshall's message as clear - work together. In the interim MacArthur informed Marshall that he and Hart had worked out all the plans for effective employment of forces

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[34]Ibid.

[35]Letter, Hart to MacArthur, 12 November 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-3.

[36]Memorandum, Marshall to MacArthur, Subject: "Army-Navy Relations, Far East, 29 November 1941, Executive Files 8, Book A, 1 July - 18 December 1941, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C.

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in the Philippines.[37] Whatever the arrangement was that MacArthur alluded to, it did not include keeping two cruisers, eight destroyers, the carrier U.S.S. Langley, a destroyer tender, or a tanker in Manila. On November 26, the War Department was informed that those ships, along with Admiral Hart and his staff, would move to Balikpapan in the Netherlands East Indies and cooperate with the British Fleet. That left five destroyers, twenty-nine submarines, and eighteen fleet auxiliaries in Manila.[38]

While Brereton struggled with the development of the FEAF, and the threads of Army-Navy cooperation came apart, MacArthur devoted his energies to the subject that he felt

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[37]Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 November 1941, GCMP, VMI, LVA, Box 40, Folder 27.

[38]Memorandum, Unsigned to Colonel Crawford, Subject: "Movement of the Asiatic Fleet," 26 November 1941, Executive Files, Book A, 1 July - 18 December 1941, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C. Back-channel communications may have fueled the fire between the two Philippine commanders. On October 13, Gerow prepared a memorandum for the Chief of Staff in which he suggested that a supreme commander be appointed in the Far East. Gerow postulated that: "Since the Army will furnish the main striking force, it should have command of all the available Army and Navy forces that can contribute toward making the blow more effective." Gerow concluded his memorandum with: "It is recommended that you request Admiral Stark to accept Army command over all U.S. Naval forces in the Philippines, including the Asiatic Fleet." While MacArthur's letter was more harsh in tone than Gerow's memorandum, the construction of MacArthur's letter closely parallels Gerow's that it would appear there was at least collaboration between two officers. Memorandum, Gerow to Marshall, Subject: "Command in the Philippines," 13 October 1941, Executive Files 8, Book A, 1 July - 18 December 1941, RG 165, Box 40, NARA, Washington, D.C., 4.

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most comfortable with - mobilizing his Philippine Army. On October 1, the USAFFE commander requested permission from the Adjutant General to increase the sphere of Philippine defenses:

> The Philippines Islands are now being organized into a potential theater of operations.... The strategic mission as formally visualized ... should be broadened to include the defense of all the Philippine Islands ... the strength and composition of the defense forces are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mission.[39]

MacArthur's request, given the circumstance of the day, is incredible. Only three months into his new command and with only a portion of forces on-hand, and no firm cooperation with the Navy, he requested permission to enlarge the defense sphere to include the entire archipelago. Even more puzzling is why the Chief of Staff would approve such a request, as he was to do. All the evidence suggests that the poor conditions that pervaded the Philippine Army could not be changed overnight. Somehow MacArthur perceived and communicated an entirely different view.

The mobilization orders issued to the Philippine Army on July 26 for ten regiments and their training cadres in each of the ten Philippine Army districts called for them to

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[39]Letter, MacArthur to The Adjutant General, 1 October 1941, War Plans Division Files, Operations Plan R-5, WPD 4175-18, item 502, roll 39, GCMA, VMI, LVA.

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report to their regional training centers by August 31.[40] On August 30, MacArthur informed Marshall that the mobilization of the entire Philippine Army could be expected before the end of the year when the new training camps would be finished. MacArthur concluded his report with characteristic optimism: He acknowledged that the Philippine Army units had poor training above the battalion level, but he claimed that the "whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds."[41]

From the field, the program looked different. The officers who were assigned to train the expanding American and Philippine Armies had two missions: first, keep the U.S. Army units including the Philippine Scouts and the troop units arriving from America, in a combat-ready condition; and second, continue the training program for the Philippine Army.[42] To some of the Army Regulars none of the National Guard units looked particularly good. Colonel William Braly, 92d Coast Artillery, who would be responsible

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[40]Letter, MacArthur to Quezon, 1 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[41]Letter, MacArthur to Marshall, 30 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[42]George Grunert Papers, Memorandum, Grunert to Chief of Staff, 22 August 1941, Box 1, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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for training a new Guard outfit, observed that from the looks of them "they will need plenty of it."[43]

In addition to their training duties all of the troops were on some level of alert, which meant that they were restricted to their training camps. Colonel Clinton Pierce, commander of the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, complained that morale was not good because:

> They have been hearing wolf too long and doing the same thing regulars have been doing for years with the added restrictions to their recreation time that makes training camps into a type of concentration camp.[44]

American officers were universal in their condemnation of the condition in which they found the Philippine Army. Major General Clifford Bluemel, commander of the 31st Division of the Philippine Army, complained that when the division was organized on November 18, rations had to be purchased by the individual companies. The only uniforms the men had were blue fatigues and canvas shoes, along with a minimal amount of divisional equipment. Bluemel found that in one battalion each man had fired a total of only thirty-five rounds of rifle ammunition, and none of them had ever fired a trench motor or a .50-caliber machine gun.

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[43]William Braly Papers, Letter to wife, October 1941, Box 1, UASMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

[44]Clinton Pierce Papers, Letter to wife, October 1941, Box 1, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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Bluemel's conclusion has been used in many books, including Louis Morton's Fall of the Philippines, but it is worth repeating:

> All of the enlisted men were supposed to receive five and one-half months of training. They appear to have been proficient in two things; one, when an officer entered a room to stand up and yell attention in a loud voice, jump up and salute, the other, to demand three meals per day.[45]

By November 1941, the Philippine Army had not corrected the deficiencies observed by General Segundo in 1940 or General Grunert in February 1941. When the training and equipment conditions prevalent in the majority of the defense force are added to the problems inherent in the transition of a garrison army to a theater of operations command, the difficulties were insurmountable.

In an effort to cope with the administrative problems, MacArthur divided his command into two distinct elements, operational and logistical. All operational control including the administration of supply and maintenance rested with the Philippine Department.[46] While the administrative arm of the Philippine Department was no doubt

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[45]Clifford Bluemel Papers, Letter to wife, 18 November 1941, Box 1, USAMHI, Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania; see Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 30.

[46]Memorandum, Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff, USAFFE to Commanding General Philippine Department, 7 October 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

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efficient, it was staffed to handle the troops in the Philippine Department, not the nearly 200,000 soldiers of an expanding field army. Such an arrangement caused delays and confusion. For example, when USAFFE was formed, communications support came from the Philippine Department; in fact the message center on Corregidor was assigned to direct control of USAFFE. However, all message traffic associated with matters related to routine supply and maintenance were left under the control of the Philippine Department.[47]

The division of authority was not confined to support functions within the headquarters. On August 28, 1941, the USAFFE staff created the Philippine Coast Defense Command. Like the message center, it too, was placed under direct control of USAFFE except for routine administrative matters, which were handled by members of the Philippine Department.[48]

The officers in the field were confused and frustrated over the hastily improvised administrative and command arrangements that often resulted in confused and countermanded orders. Colonel Pierce concluded that:

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[47]USAFFE General Order number 9, 30 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

[48]USAFFE General Order Number 7, 26 August 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 1.

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"Things over here are in a bit on the frantic side. The situation is evidently one to make the boys higher up rush into grandiose preparations without the tools."[49] Others, like Colonel William Braddock were less generous in their letters home. On November 16, less than three weeks from the beginning of hostilities, Braddock wrote:

> The only reason it has succeeded at all is that everyone pitched in with the greatest good will in the world, and has been doing his damndest.... We all have three bosses, USAFFE Headquarters, Philippine Department, and the Philippine Army. Manila has not yet made up its mind what it is going to do far less how its going to do it.[50]

Thus, the "sufficient forces" about which MacArthur told Marshall about may have been sufficient, but could hardly be termed efficient. While the newly arriving National Guard units were probably not as poor as some of the Regulars portrayed them, the Philippine Army, on the other hand, through no fault of its own, was seriously short of training and equipment - the same training and equipment shortages that had dogged the Commonwealth's defense force since its inception. Nevertheless, MacArthur forged ahead.

On November 1, in anticipation of receiving Marshall's approval to scrap the old defense plans for the Philippines,

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[49]Pierce Papers, Letter to wife, 11 October 1941, Box 1.

[50]William Braddock Papers, Letter to wife, 16 November 1941, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box 1.

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War Plan ORANGE 3, MacArthur began to implement his own plans to defend the entire archipelago. He created three forces: the Northern Luzon Force (NLF), the Southern Luzon Force (SLF), and a general reserve force of three divisions. Two of the three reserve divisions were to be located in the Visayas and one in Mindanao.[51] The NLF was placed at first under Brigadier General Edwin P. King, Jr., later under Brigadier General Jonathan M. Wainwright. The NLF, with headquarters at Fort Stotsenburg, was composed of the Regulars at Fort Stotsenburg, the 86th Field Artillery, and four divisions of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Pilar. The NLF was rounded out with the newly mobilized 21st, 41st, 61st, 71st, 81st, and 91st Field Artillery units of the Philippine Army.[52]

MacArthur placed the command of the SLF with Brigadier General George M. Parker, who located his headquarters at Fort William McKinley. Parker's command was composed of one regiment of the Philippine Constabulary, and engineer cadres from Candelaria and Camp Murphy, as well as three divisions of the Philippine Army.[53]

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[51]USAFFE General Order Number 20, 1 November 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid.

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The Visayan-Mindanao Force was commanded by Colonel William Sharp who located his headquarters on Cebu at Fort San Pedro. The Visayan-Mindanao Force included all elements of the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Military Districts on the Philippines.[54] By November 30, 1941, military personnel in the Philippines included 31,095 Americans and almost 100,000 Filipinos. In addition, MacArthur had thirty B-17 bombers, 107 P-40 fighters, and fifty-two P-35 fighters. Of that number, all would be operational at the beginning of the war. In addition, he would still have the obsolete aircraft that existed before the build-up began.[55]

Even with those forces at his disposal, MacArthur's concept of operations for the defense of the Philippines was radical when compared to ORANGE 3. ORANGE 3 envisaged that most fighting would take place on the plains of central Luzon. In that plan the Philippine Division, designated as the Initial Protective Force (IPF), was to meet the enemy on the beaches. However, if its commander found the invading force too strong he was to fight a delaying action in order to gain time for the remainder of the garrison to move supplies and set up strong defensive positions on the Bataan Peninsula. The defenses of Bataan were recognized as the last opportunity to keep a toe hold in the Philippines and

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[54]Ibid.

[55]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 49-50.

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were to be defended as such. While the latest versions of the ORANGE Plan that MacArthur scrapped recognized the existence of the Philippine Army, it also recognized that Army's weaknesses. As such, those units of the Philippine Army that were mobilized would form the part of the defense forces that would fight from prepared positions.[56]

Despite the significant differences between the new plans and those that had been reviewed and accepted for many years, Marshall approved MacArthur's request to expand his sphere of defense. On December 3, MacArthur assigned command of the NLF to Wainwright and made King his chief of artillery. Wainwright's command was placed on the most likely axis of attack, the central plains of Luzon and Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales coast, and the Bataan Peninsula. MacArthur directed Wainwright to protect the airfields and prevent hostile landings especially along the points that opened on to the central plains and the road net to Manila. If the enemy did land, MacArthur ordered Wainwright to destroy the enemy on the beaches, that there would be "no withdrawal from beach positions," and that the beaches "were to be held at all costs." Immediately upon receipt of his

[56]Ibid., 63.

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orders Wainwright was to make a reconnaissance of the beaches and began the preparation of new beach defense.[57]

The SLF remained under the command of Parker, and his mission was similar to Wainwright's. Colonel Sharp's command, the Visayan-Mindanao Force, was ordered to defend the remainder of the archipelago. This would be done by protecting the airfields under construction in the Visayas and by preventing hostile raiding parties from terrorizing cities and destroying public utilities. Responsibility for the defense of the entrance to Manila and Subic Bays was given to General George F. Moore, whose forces were augmented by the Philippine Coast Artillery Command.[58]

MacArthur's order of battle is interesting in the light of the importance he placed on beach defense, especially in the NLF's area of responsibility. Why a commander who greatly emphasized beach defense would deploy his least

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[57]Letter, Commanding General USAFFE to Commanding General Philippine Divisions, Subject: "Defense of the Philippines," 3 December 1941, AG 381 Philippine Records, copy cited contained with a letter from Major General William C. Dunckel to Louis Morton, 17 May 1948, Louis Morton Papers, Box 2, "Postwar Correspondence and Interviews," Folder: Miscellaneous, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; see also Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 69-70; MacArthur's first troop disposition orders were issued in General Order Number 20, 1 November 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, 1-2; Report of Operations of USAFFE and United States Forces in the Philippine Islands (USFIP), Annex III-XVIII (Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1946)

[58]Ibid.

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experienced troops to hold those important positions is unknown. While it may be speculated that he left his most experienced troops in the general reserve area to rush to the center of gravity, just how they were to get there given the shortage of transportation is unknown. The Philippine Army units in the NLF were in no better state of readiness than any other Philippine Army units. Richard C. Mallonee, an American officer who served as an adviser to the Philippine Army's 71st Division, wrote: "I left behind the 12th Field Artillery, fine, bright, intelligent, interested young men with little training or experience."[59]

MacArthur's order of battle begs the question of whether or not he really intended to mount a successful beach defense. In the account of another American officer, Colonel Steven Mellnik, the impression is given that MacArthur did not want to engage the Philippine Army units so early in the campaign. Mellnik recalls MacArthur's expressly ordering as late as December 18 that: "We must not forget our primary task is to preserve USAFFE for the decisive engagement. Since we can't stop the major attack, we will use combat ready units to harass the enemy. Under

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[59]Richard C. Mallonee and Richard C. Mallonee, II, ed., The Naked Flagpole: The Battle for Bataan (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1980), 8.

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no circumstances will we commit untrained units to combat. It would destroy them at this stage of development."[60]

Unfortunately, Mellnik provides the only recollection of MacArthur's supposed desire not to commit untrained units to combat. In fact, Mallonee argues the opposite. He personally recalls setting up thinly defended beach positions under the command of Philippine Army officers who ignored twenty years of studies. In a mood of frustration he wrote: "We were to occupy positions selected during a 48-hour trip of 120 kilometers to a front by a major in the Constabulary and a reserve captain of limited experience."[61] Louis Morton, writing in Command Decisions, believes that MacArthur's stated purpose of defending the Philippines on the beaches may have been for public consumption. Morton suggests MacArthur's staff may have been making efforts to move the troops back to Bataan even before the Japanese attack.[62]If we accept Morton's conclusion, we must accuse MacArthur of making one of the most dramatic about-faces in military history.

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[60]Steven Mellnik, The Philippine Diary (New York: Van Nostrand and Company, 1969), 44.

[61]Mallonee, Naked Flagpole, 20.

[62]Louis Morton, et al. "The Decision to Withdraw," Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield, Publication of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 157.

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The entire effort to reinforce the Philippines is a journey into a surrealistic world of hopes, dreams, and chance. Two American officers unknowingly summed it up best in their letters. On September 5, 1941, when the first B-17 bombers touched down on Luzon, Colonel Clinton Pierce, commanding the 26th Cavalry Regiment, observed that: "It was a real thrill and gave us all a feeling that our boys are good and Charlie better watch out."[63] On December 7, 1941, the last full day of peace in the Philippines, Colonel Clifford Bluemel, perhaps in frustration wrote: "Today the troops of the Philippine Army received eight wooden wheeled, 75MM guns, without fire control equipment, and the unit was raised to its full level by inducting men with little or no training."[64]

The reality of the Philippines was much like the observations of Colonels Pierce and Bluemel. On one hand, those in Washington, like Colonel Pierce, deluded themselves into believing that the B-17s and the meager reinforcements would somehow convince the Japanese not to attack American or European possessions in the Far East. The delivery of each ton of supplies and each plane gave everyone a better feeling about the power of America in the Far East. The

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[63]Pierce Papers, Letter to wife, 16 September 1941, Box 1.

[64]Bluemel Papers, Letter to Wife, 7 December 1941, Box 1.

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reality of the situation, however, was different. It was too little, too late, with no firm direction in the Philippines and none given from Washington.

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CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

At 0355 on December 8, 1941, General Douglas MacArthur was awakened and told of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He immediately assembled his staff and informed them that a state of hostilities existed between Japan and the United States. MacArthur ordered all of USAFFE forces to their assembly points and placed the Philippine Constabulary under military control. The Constabulary put anti-sabotage measures into effect and began the round-up of all Japanese and anyone suspected of Axis leanings.[1]

At approximately 1230, nine hours after news of the attack on Pearl Harbor and four hours after an air attack on Baguio, Luzon, a klaxon sounded an air raid alert at Clark Field, the only operational field for heavy bombers in the Philippines. High overhead a wave of Japanese bombers dropped their ordnance in a diagonal pattern across the field. A second wave of bombers followed, and soon the entire field was afire. A squadron of Japanese pursuit aircraft dropped low over the field and strafed every plane that was not destroyed by the bombers. In forty-five

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[1]General MacArthur's Journal, 8 December 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

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minutes most of the operational strength of American air power in the Pacific was destroyed.[2]

The first landing by Japanese troops, totaling 4,000 in number, took place on December 10 at Vigan and Aparri in northern Luzon. The NLF opposed the landings with a few scout cars from the 26th Cavalry Regiment and the few remaining aircraft left in the FEAF. Wainwright had three Philippine Army divisions, a Philippine Scout regiment, and one battery of field artillery thinly spaced in defense positions along the 625 mile front. Two days later 2,500 Japanese landed unopposed at Legaspi in souther Luzon. The sixty-mile-long front was defended by two Philippine Army divisions. The only opposition mounted was a strafing attack by two FEAF pursuit aircraft.[3]

On December 13, MacArthur informed General Marshall that Admiral Hart believed the islands were doomed and that:

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[2]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 80-89. The controversy about the destruction of the bomber squadron on Clark Field is surrounded in confusion and covered with alibis. The official Air Force account of the attack is contained in Williams and Fellow, "Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities," I, 201-214; see also Brereton, Diaries, 38-44; another side of the story is contained in an article by Walter E. Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," The Atlantic, (July 1951), 20-33; Allison Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat (New York: Van Nostrand, 1944), 92.

[3]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 102-112.

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> I do not know the grand strategy, but I do know acutely what will follow here unless an immediate effort conceived on a grand scale is made to break the Japanese blockade. If Japan ever seizes these islands the difficulty of recapture is impossible of conception.... The Philippine Theater of operations is the locus of victory or defeat and I urge a strategic review of the entire situation least a fatal mistake be made.[4]

After only four days of war and only limited ground attacks the FEAF was almost destroyed and the Japanese were landing with near impunity. MacArthur's army was falling apart only a few weeks after he had received permission to enlarge his sphere of defense. At the same time Wainwright reported that the NLF had nearly exhausted its ammunition supply, the G-2 (Intelligence Officer) complained that front line units were providing little usable intelligence, and the G-4 (Logistics Officer) complained of transportation units mishandling scarce transportation equipment and that instructions were being taken too lightly.[5]

By December 21 the FEAF consisted of two P-40s on Mindanao, and eleven P-40s, eight P-35s, three P-49s, and two A-27s spread throughout the islands. The remaining FEAF aircraft, fourteen B-17s, two B-18s, and one C-39 had been

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[4]Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 December 1941, DMMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[5]Memorandum, E.T. Halstead to All Forces, 18 December 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2; Chief of Staff's Log, entry for 15 December 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, 8; Training Memorandum Number 3, 15 December 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

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sent to Australia.[6] The naval forces, which had consisted of four destroyers, twenty-seven submarines, three sub tenders and repair ships, six gunboats, five minesweepers, two tankers, three salvage vessels, one floating dry dock, and thirty-four patrol planes, were withdrawn from the islands on December 8 with the exception of the submarines and motor-torpedo boats.[7]

The main Japanese landings occurred on December 21 at Lingayen Gulf just as two generations of American war planners had forecast. The 43,110 Japanese soldiers of the 14th Army landed at three points: Bavang, Aringay, and Agoo. Despite the heroic resistance of the 26th Cavalry Regiment, the Japanese advance pressed forward, leaving the 71st Philippine Army Division in shambles.[8] On the evening of December 23, the Filipino-American Army on Luzon received the message from USAFFE Headquarters that "War Plan ORANGE 3 was in effect."[9]

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[6]Aircraft Status Report from Captain J.R. Manerow to MacArthur, 21 December 1941, DMA, NVA, RG 2, Box 2.

[7]Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931 - April 1942, 14 vols. (Little, Brown, and Company, 1947-1962), II, 158-166.

[8]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 128-138; Jonathan M. Wainwright and Robert Consedine, ed., General Wainwright's Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1946), 36.

[9]Wainwright and Consedine, Wainright's Story, 36.

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The end was only a matter of time. In order to keep MacArthur from falling into enemy hands, President Roosevelt ordered him, despite the general's protests, to leave the islands. The order was carried out on March 11, 1942. The Japanese began their final assault on Bataan on April 3, and General King surrendered all forces there on April 9. Corregidor fell on May 6. With its surrender all organized American and Filipino resistance officially ended.[10]

Few troops in American military history have had to endure the hardships that the Filipino-American forces did during the First Philippine Campaign or the horrible captivity that followed it. Who had the right to send Americans there, asked William Brougher? In the final analysis it was the President who had the right and most likely agreed to the decision to reinforce the Philippines. But the President was not lacking for support. Stimson's unsolicited letters to the President about changing strategy in the Far East and remaking a winning combination with the British were something he believed in. The Department of State also supported action in the Far East. The Secretary of State and Stanley Hornbeck perceived a global strategic picture that hung on the British remaining firmly based in Singapore. Admiral Stark encouraged the Army to find some way to improve the defenses of fleet anchorages and

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[10]Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 568-580.

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applauded the Army's decision to increase the defenses of the islands while not attempting to review the Navy's roll in that theater.

The Army must also share its part of the responsibility. There almost seemed to be an audible sigh of relief from the Chief of Staff to the senior staff members when the decision was made to reinforce the islands. The Army Air Corps officers who somehow forgot to figure out just what their planes ought to do once they got to the islands must also be held accountable. Without a doubt the most enthusiastic leader of all was General Douglas MacArthur. Since 1935 he had created an army and kept it alive despite attempts by the Philippine government to allow it to die. When fate created the opportunity to prove the skeptics wrong, he attempted to do so.

The strategy employed by MacArthur was deeply flawed. It ignored the paucity of his own resources. His order of battle is open to question as well. If he intended to meet the enemy on the beaches as he had proclaimed for years, who did he place those defenses in the hands of his least trained troops? Why did he leave his most experienced soldiers in the reserve areas with little transportation available if their mission was in fact to serve as a credible reserve? Louis Morton offers one answer: Perhaps

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MacArthur planned all along to withdrawal to Bataan. On the other hand, D. Clayton James' observation about the increased responsibility and autonomy MacArthur's staff enjoyed opens another possibility.[11] Was MacArthur fully aware of his staff's actions? Did they make decisions without his knowledge? Why did MacArthur refuse to cooperate with the Navy? Did he fail to plan adequately for the missions of the B-17s because he thought Brereton would assume that role without command approval? But not all the failure of flawed strategy rests with MacArthur. Washington, and particular the War Department, must also share in the responsibility. Marshall and his staff officers, despite years of evidence to the contrary, chose to allow MacArthur to engage in planning far beyond the known capabilities of the Philippine Army. Marshall and the

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[11]James, The Years of MacArthur, I, 571; see also The Louis Morton Papers, Office of the Chief of Military History Collection, Postwar Correspondence, Morton Interview with Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, 12 November 1946, Box 2, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 26. Sutherland contends that MacArthur delegated all strategic and tactical matters to his staff and personally concerned himself only with political issues and matters of the press. Contained within the same collection and box are interviews with key participants in the First Philippine Campaign. Major General Clifford Bluemel believes that no one was aware of any plan for the defense of the Philippines other than Plan ORANGE 3. Morton Papers, Letter, Bluemel to Morton, 14 April 1948, Box 2. Major General William C. Dunckel was the Plans Officer for the Military Advisors Office to the Philippine Army. In a 1948 letter to Morton, Dunckel declares that MacArthur's plans were put in effect in isolated places such as the Visayas and Mindano because there were no U.S. Army plans to defend those islands. Morton Papers, Letter, Dunckel to Morton, 17 May 1948, Box 2.

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Secretary of War also provided a field commander with extensive military hardware and no direction.

Michael Sherry is too harsh when he writes of the decision to send B-17s to the Philippines: "Any historian's case for such a provocative strategy must remain speculative in light of a documentary record that does not clarify whether Roosevelt's intentions were complex and devious, simply confused, or both."[12] The answer is found in the realties of 1941. The United States was in danger of being surrounded by its enemies, and there were few outposts left to stem the enemy tide. In Europe a beleaguered England stood alone with the Germans just across the English Channel. France and the Netherlands were gone. The Soviet Union and China seemed to be teetering.

For President Roosevelt and America's military leaders, it was not a question of "if" America would go to war, but "when." What the President needed was time - time to convince America it would have to fight, time to build an Army and Navy, and time to strengthen American outposts. To accomplish that, the President and the military had to keep the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain in the war and deprive the Japanese of oil. They could do the latter in

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[12]Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 114.

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two ways: institute an oil embargo, and at the same time, strengthen the American military power in the Far East.

Samuel Johnson is supposed to have said that a man's life becomes wonderfully clarifying when he is about to be hanged. While the rope may not have been around America's neck in the summer of 1941, the President must have believed that the gallows was under construction. In that clarifying moment, the answer seemed to be in an American outpost that was once a liability, but now had "a vital bearing on the course of the war as a whole"[13] The readily available supply for manpower in the Philippine Army meant that the still-growing U.S. Army would not have to be used so far away from Europe to defend the islands as a base of operations. Likewise, the power of the U.S. Navy would be multiplied. The Pacific Fleet could raid the Japanese, the Asiatic Fleet could join forces with the British, Dutch, and Australians to stop Japanese incursions into the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore. The risk to America was high. The diversion of most of the heavy bomber production to reinforce the Philippines deprived the Atlantic of submarine patrol planes and bases close to the United States of long-range bomber for defense; but the possible benefits outweighed the dangers. Japan might be contained; Great

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[13]Memorandum, Gerow to the Secretary of War, Subject: "Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands," 8 October 1941.

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Britain, China, and the Soviet Union might remain in the war; and America might gain time.

To America's beleaguered leaders, MacArthur's Philippine Army, a technological marvel known as the B-17, and the strategic location of the Philippines must have appeared to be winning combination. Hope, despite long-term evidence to the contrary, was kept alive because bombers were available and perhaps because people, even those who should have known better, were hearing good news instead of bad. After all, a promise of over 100,000 soldiers ready to defend United States interests was impressive to the leaders of a nation whose Army would not be ready to fight until 1943.

Using the Philippines as the keystone for strategy failed for a variety of reasons: naivete on the part of America's military and political leaders, poor planning, personality clashes, arrogance, wanting to believe that it would work despite evidence to the contrary, and just bad luck. William E. Brougher and 100,000 of his comrades were part of a desperate gamble to slow down Germany and contain Japan until America was ready to fight. They would pay a terrible price, but Japan did not attack the Soviet Union, China, and Britain remained in the war, and the United States and its Allies achieved the final victory. One could

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conclude that while the execution of the strategy was flawed, the strategy was sound.

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