OPERATIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL TANK GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
1941-1942

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I. BASIS

1. FOREWARD. No official or original records of the Headquarters of this unit or any of its components have been returned to this country. The following report has been compiled from memory, notes, and information available from survivors contacted. Such records and files in Group Headquarters which were not destroyed officially on 9 April 1942, prior to the surrender, were in the possession of the Group S-1 and Adjutant, Major Robert C. Pettit Jr, 0300166, ADC;(died at sea as a P.O.W., circa 24 Jan 1945). They were buried by him allegedly at Cabanatuan, Nueva Encija Province, Luzon (P.O.W. Camp), prior to his departure from the Philippines for Japan, via Bilibid, the latter part of 1944. No one privy to this action has survived. Of the Group Staff, only the commander (the undersigned), the Surgeon (Major Alvin C. Poweleit, 0-344805), the headquarters commandant (Major Edwin C. Rue, 0-334725), and the communications officer (1st Lt. John H. Allen, 0-660155), survive. The commanding
officers of the 194th GHQ Tank Battalion (Colonel Ernest B. Miller, 0-182955), the
192d GHQ Tank Battalion (Colonel Theodore F. Wickord, 0-345291), and the 17th
Ordnance Company (armored) (Lt. Colonel Richard C. Kadel, 0-239912) are alive. All
executives and/or seconds-in-command, of Group and its units, are dead. With the
exception of the two battalion commanders noted above, none of the field officers as of
9 April 1942 survives. Of the captains commanding companies, as of 9 April 1942, the
only survivors are Major John C Riley, 0-396950, Major Frederick C. Moffitt, 0-
287376, and Lt. Col. Richard Kadel (mentioned above); and of the unit staff captains:
Major Ferris G. Spoor, 0-347171, Joseph A. Rivak, 0-271285, Lyman E. Johnson, 0-
228_16, John S. Muir, 0-187343, and Leo Schneider, 0-264775, M.C. All of the above
and the Group Commander have been denuded of all papers of origin (1) prior to the
surrender, (2) prior to the removal as P.O.W.'s from the Philippines. In the latter
category were the emergency service records compiled by order of the undersigned,
from all available sources, at Camps O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, subsequent to 11 April
1942. Excerpts of GO's 5 and 10, Hq the Prov. Tank Gp, 1942 (Silver Star and Purple
Heart citations) were sent to the United States by civilian repatriates by the late Major
John C. Morley, 0-21731_, of the Group Staff (died at sea enroute to Japan as P.O.W.,
circa 26 Jan. 1945). Photostats of these were transmitted by the Group Commander to
the War Department in the fall of 1945, after his repatriation. No contact with any of his
officers as of April, 1942 or those who were present at Camp O'Donnell after the
surrender was had from 10 May 1942, (my departure therefrom for Tarlac) until arrival
at Mukden, 21 May 1945, when four lieutenants were found there. These officers were
immediately charged with the preparation from memory, and with the collaboration of
about 35 enlisted men of the Tank Group then present, of lists of unit personnel,
emergency service records for personnel present, deaths and places of burial, and any
other operational data available. Copies have been promised but to date only one
battalion roster has been received. Contact with all the survivors mentioned above
except five has been established: Colonel Miller only within the month; his data are
fragmentary. The only fairly authentic list received is for the 192d G.H.Q. Tank
Battalion, which shows survivors - officers and enlisted - to be 45%.

II. SUMMARY

2. PRE-WAR BRIEF. Any evaluation of the operations of this unit mast take into
consideration the precis, (See Addenda "A"), of its movement to the theater on the eve
of the outbreak of hostilities, its organization 17 days before that, and the consequent
lack of mutual acquaintance between the armored personnel and their supported
associates, in a strange land and climate, and with weapons new to them, as well as to
all present for the war except the Tank Group Commander. It was for this reason that he
asked to remain with the Tank Group when division command was proposed on his
arrival. In approving on 21 November, General MacArthur stated that he had asked for an armored division, to the command of which the Group Commander would succeed. The nucleus of this division was never augmented; although a medium G.H.Q. Tank Battalion had been completely equipped and was on 48-hour standby for departure for the Philippines when its orders were cancelled on 10 December 1941. ((Another light tank bn had been alerted))

3. POST 8 DECEMBER BRIEF. The recountal of the operations is preceded by a summary of the service of this unit as afforded in the two Presidential Unit Citations, specifically awarded, in addition to the general citation to all units of both military and naval forces of the United States and the Philippine Governments.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 101, WAR DEPARTMENT, 1945-

"1. The Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Composed of the following units:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

192d General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light)

194th General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light) (less detachments)

17th Ordnance Company (Armored)

is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the defense of the Philippines. Organized late in November 1941, it took battle positions on 1 December in the vicinity of Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg, from which it fought a notable action in the defense of these critical points in the initial hostile attack. In the course of the withdrawal into Bataan, its units were constantly in the field, covering the supporting four divisions of the North Luzon Force, and two of the South Luzon Force, its elements operating initially 150 miles apart. This unit contributed most vitally in all stages and under extraordinary handicaps to the protraction of the operations and the successful withdrawal. Its units were the last out of both North and South Luzon and the last into the Bataan Peninsula, on 7 January 1942.

2. The Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East, composed of the following units:
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment;

192 General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light);

194th General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light)(less detachments);

17th Ordnance Company (Armored)

is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the defense of the Philippines. During the period from 6 January to 8 March 1942, after covering the withdrawal of the Luzon Forces into the Bataan Peninsula, this group was charged with the support of the I and II Philippine Corps, the cordon defense of the coasts of Bataan, and the defense of three major landing fields. These measures prevented a projected landing of airborne and paratroop enemy, as well as several abortive thrusts across Manila Bay, any one of which would have meant early disaster in Bataan. Under constant air attack, these units, despite heavy losses in men and material, maintained a magnificent defense and through their ability, courage, and devotion to duty contributed in large measure to the prolonged defense of the Bataan Peninsula.

III. SITUATION

4. AT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. 8 December 1941. -- All tanks (108) and half-tracks (about 46) of the 192d and 194th G.H.Q. Tank Battalions (Light) were in battle position; the 192d North and East of Fort Stotsenburg main post; the 194th in the heavy growth and cogan under Watch Hill and the "island" between the two main landing strips at Clark Field. They had been placed in position equipped and ready for action on 1 December 1941, for a night alert in conjunction with Clark Field the night of 1/2 December; and were thereafter maintained there as a precautionary expediency in view of the activities along the same lines by the permanent garrison of Fort Stotsenburg, and the AA troops (200th CA) which had arrived on 26 September concurrently with the 194th Tank Battalion (less one company), and the 17th Ordnance Company (armored), assigned to the Provisional Tank Group USAFFE on 29 November. On that same date the C.O. Air Base Force at Clark Field, Major Daley, the only air officer contacted, told the Group commander that Clark Field had been directed to hold two alerts; one daytime on 30 November; one night, before daylight 2 December; and asked whether the tanks would participate in accordance with the scheme prepared by the tank command for the protection of Clark Field. Although attempted contact was not successful with either the tactical commander at Clark Field or the commanding officer, the 200th CA (AA), the daylight alert was carried out. It was at once obvious that a similar emergency move from the tank parks in darkness would be disastrous, the tank
position under Watch Hill being amongst hundreds of standard drums of 100-octane gas and the complete bomb reserve of Clark Field - those items being irregularly scattered throughout the thick cover singly and in twos and threes, and covered with grass and palm fronds. Movement of the tanks even daytime had been fraught with near disaster, both to them and to air and anti-aircraft material, vehicles, and communications, in the occupancy of alert positions and installations. Accordingly, the tanks and half-tracks were again placed in battle position on 1 December with crews remaining with the tanks and half-tracks from then on, and fed from the rear echelon in camp.

5. The warning of 27 November was not received by the Provisional Tank Group, either from USAFFE, or North Luzon Force. There was no indication from the ground commander at Clark Field that he had received that warning. The general change in command consumated after the Tank Group Commander's arrival on 20 November may have contributed to disrupted channels: F.E.A.F, North and South Luzon Forces, the Philippine Division, Clark Field (air and ground), Fort Stotsenburg --- all having new commanders; Hq. North Luzon Force having organized at Fort Stotsenburg after the arrival of General Wainwright shortly before 27 November. Hq. South Luzon Force, in South Luzon, was not set up until 13 December when a Tank Hq. reconnaissance was made to the South and West coasts of South Luzon.

COMMAND. -- The Tank Group, USAFFE, upon organization at Fort Stotsenburg, 21 November, was stationed there as a separate tactical command under the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Far East; for administrative report only being associated with the General Reserve, of which the major unit was the Philippine Division, Brigadier General Lough newly in command. In the initial report to him on 2 December, he was told of the tank dispositions. From his reply, "you'll have me scared yet", the inference is that he was uninformed of the warning message or was deterred from passing it on.

6. SUPPLY AND PREPARATION. -- Restriction on release of tank gas (92-octane) and tank ammunition (37mm, .50, .30, and .45 caliber), incident either to combat reserve interpretation or the change in command at Fort Stotsenburg and North Luzon Force referred to above -- had operated to prevent shooting -- in the entirely unfamiliar ordnance of the tanks. On 30 November the Group Commander ordered Post Ordnance to issue the ammunition; but up until the opening of hostilities requested range facilities had not been made available. The allocation of tank gas initially made to the 194th Battalion after its arrival on 26 September --- 40,000 gallons --- was enough for less than 200 miles' operation of the 108 tanks. No further allocation could be secured after the arrival of the 192d; nor were the six carloads of spare parts, tracks, engines, etc., made available, until after arrival in Bataan in January '42. (They were stored in the ordnance
warehouse there--tanks and half-tracks being ordnance material-- and like the
ammunition, held as ordnance reserve unreleased to units in peacetime). Accordingly
tank operation was not accomplished to familiarize the personnel--35% new to any kind
of tanks, all new to the M-3 tank with its AA gun, fixed guns in sponsons fired by
remote control by the driver, and most important, with the new main battery--the 37mm
gun. The new tank (M3) weighed a ton more than the tank with which the GHQ
battalions had been equipped in the States; and twice as much as the 6 1/2-ton tank of
World War I (replaced in 1935, but described as the Tank Group standard equipment in
a widely syndicated article),

7. **THE M3 EMPLOYMENT CROSS-COUNTRY** and on roads and bridges was
subject to limitations unfamiliar to the several officers of tank experience and training
(all but one) prior to 1935) who were present in the theater-- a circumstance that
became embarrassingly apparent throughout the operations in the small missions
requested for minor exploits or adventures, wherein the possible results had to be
weighed by the tank command against the certain and irreplaceable losses jeopardizing
the overall tank mission, as imposed by USAFFE.

8. **FALLACIES OF INDOCTRINATION AND COOPERATION.** After the arrival of
the first tanks in the Philippines measures were taken with the hearty cooperation of the
commanding general at Fort Stotsenberg to familiarize the officers at that garrison with
the tanks; but despite that, one was known to have approached a Japanese light tank to
talk to the crew near Damortis, thinking it was an American tank; and a few days later
American tanks were reported as enemy tanks and fired on. By the arrival in Bataan,
troops were familiar with the tanks, particularly after a comprehensive battalion-by-
battalion, tank-with-infantry training had been instituted. (After the withdrawal to the
Pilar-Bagac line). Tank Headquarters circularized,through USAFFE publication, all
headquarters as to certain essentials in cooperative operations and missions; but was
unsuccessful in securing ground troops in support while tanks were in front line
operation. Crews suffered accordingly from a lack of rest for extended periods, there
being no covering troops -- as organic to an armored division. The tanks were
mistakenly considered invulnerable, self-sustaining fortress; capable of going anywhere,
surmounting extraordinary obstacles; and performing prodigies such as operations
against snipers, flushing enemy out of cane fields, patrolling against infiltration--
operations stymied by the inherent blindness of the tank, the noise of its operation, and
its considerable dead space, permitting approach to it by enemy with mines, grenades,
flame throwers--particularly in heavy vegetation, and when the tanks were immobilized
by blown tracks or bogging. Supposedly modest requirements for "just two or three
tanks" had to be filled with a company if physically possible: - a project wherein tank
use was remunerative at all, warranted the use of a company to insure enough power to

punch through, give mutual support, and insure the salvage by towing of the inevitable tank casualties. Only a company had the facilities for maintenance, supply, command, reconnaissance, and extended operations.

9. RECONNAISSANCE--Prior to the arrival in the Philippines of the balance of the Tank Group, the 194th had executed reconnaissance, incident to road marches, to Subic Bay, Lingayen Gulf, Mt Arayat, and to a limited degree--to Baguio. Upon the arrival of the 192d and Group Headquarters on 20 November the experience of the 194th was exploited in part. The Tank Group Commander and his headquarters detachment reconnoitered Highway 3 and 13 and the area on the Lingayen Gulf west and north of the Agno River, by half-track and 1/4 ton; the country around Stotsenburg from the ground and air, with particular reference to the possibilities of paratroop drops and landings thereabout and on the half completed field at O'Donnell; but 8 December found the Tank Group still greatly lacking in knowledge of the country, compared to other troops, and in particular to the officers of the established garrison.

IV. OPERATIONS: 8 December -- 7 January 1942

10. The initial attack. -- When word came early the morning of 8 December, of Pearl Harbor, the crews were at the tanks, the tanks were ready for action. At 0830, word came that "hostile planes were forth minutes away". All preparations were made and men stood by. At 1130 the planes which had taken to the air shortly after 0830 came in and landed, lining up convenient to the mess. Tank Headquarters learned subsequently that "the alert had been called off." The Tankers were eating in the vicinity of their tanks, at 1230 when a handsome V formation of 53 planes appeared from the north at between 20 and 23 thousand feet; and almost as soon as discerned began bombing Clark Field. Only the 108 AA guns of the tanks could be brought to bear, but their fire was of no effect at that range. The 108 37mm and 432 .30 cal guns of the tanks other than the AA guns were of no avail until the dive and glide bombing and straffing phase began. The open guns, .50 and .30 caliber, in the half-track proved very useful, although dangerous to serve. That day Technical Sergeant Zamon Bardowski, B/192d, brought down the first enemy plane to the credit of the Armored Force in World War II. The tremendous volume of fire at planes out of range, was largely wasted, except as it deterred the dive and glide bombers and prevented their landing to exploit. No tank was lost or seriously damaged, contrary to the enemy's radio boast subsequently that they had "annihilated the 192d Tank Battalion." The first armored soldier to die in World War II, that day, was Private Brooks of Company D, 194th (192). Lieutenant Burke was found by the Group commander, active and undeterred by a leg wound. Taken to the hospital, he was found a couple of hour later back with his company: "They had too much to do at the hospital". There were two other wounded. The tanks, being hidden
and camouflaged, were overlooked initially, in the enemy's concentration on the unconcealed planes conveniently lined up.

11. AFTER THE ATTACK -- which lasted about 40 minutes, the tanks were redisposed, the 194th being moved northeast of Clark Field about three kilometers to the barrier San Joaquin on the Malolos Road, where it had cover and distance; the 192d took hitherto unoccupied positions out of its comparatively exposed positions of the attack, -- this time covering the relatively unbroken south air strip, still under construction at Clark Field, but now become more feasible for subsequent hostile landing. A half-track platoon was sent to O'Donnell Field to guard it from airborne landings. A company of the 192d was moved to Dau to be more accessible to the main highway and railroad there.

12. There were two subsequent attacks on Clark Field -- on the 10th and 13th December; the latter destroying a half-track in the ordnance park and wounding two men of the Group Ordnance Company. The attack of the 13th caused considerable damage at Stotsenburg. During this interim tanks cooperated with units of the 26th Cavalry in an abortive chase of paratroopers alleged to have dropped near Arayat. Tank troops brought in the first prisoners (three aviators - apparently naval) rescued from the Negritos. They were questioned to no avail at Tank headquarters and eventually turned over to the P.M., Stotsenburg. Tank motorcyclists made a notable rescue of one of our aviators parachuted into the hills. Tank gas was now made available; a cache of 20,000 gallons at Dau, 10,000 gallons at Gerona, 10,000 more at Stotsenburg and 20,000 at Alabang in South Luzon.

13. On the 12th the Group commander was summoned to Manila to Headquarters, USAFFE. A courier plane was sought but none was made available; and 86 minutes after the call, arrival at No. 1 Calle Victoria was effected by motor. Landings were imminent on South Luzon. The 194th, being the most experienced, with seven weeks more service in the Islands, was alerted by 'phone and moved to a bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. The headquarters reconnaissance was completed late the 13th, advance agents of the 194th being spotted at Montinlupa, where the 194th was to rendezvous. The reconnaissance was then prosecuted to Nusugbu Bay, Balayan Bay, Batangas Bay, and east and north around Lake Taal, contacting the division commanders of the 41st and 51st Divisions, and securing guides therefrom. The 194th was checked moving into positions early on the morning of the 14th. On the 15th, C/194th moved to a position in readiness on Tagatay Ridge and dispatched reconnaissance parties to Nusugbu, Balangas, and Batangas Bays and their beach areas; also into the Lucena, Paglibo, and Lucban areas. The company was kept busy trying to run down flare activities of fifth columnist presumably operating at night. The
company remained in this activity until Christmas Eve, when it moved via the Taal Lake road to Santo Tomas and then near San Pablo to assist in the then developing operations around Lucena, Paglibo, and Lucban, where the South Luzon Force had become engaged-- critical landings being at Mauban and Antimonan. Headquarters The Provisional Tank Group had been ordered to Manila and opened there, at Headquarters USAFFE, on 15 December; the half-tracks of the Headquarters Detachment taking air-defensive positions on top the wall in the southeast angle of the Walled City. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment having no trucks, most of the Headquarters set-up at Stotsenburg had to be left there; as was the property of the 194th, unit and personal.

14. **RECOMMENDED TANK MOVE NORTH.** -- About mid-December the tank commander urged the move of a battalion to Lingayen Gulf--a company on either side of the Agno mouth, the balance behind the Agno. This was disapproved with the statement that the North Luzon Force "had too much up there already".

15. **BREN CARRIERS.** - About this time the Group commander was directed to prepare a plan for the utilization of some forty Bren carriers arrived in Manila on a fugitive British ship. The Bren guns were not available. The plans provided for the organization into two companies, the ordnance to install machine guns; the crews to be grounded aviation personnel; the units thus provided to operate with the tanks as much needed reconnaissance, holding, and . This plan was not implemented because of the rapidly developing situation. These vehicles joined the tanks in the field subsequent to the move to the north front of the Group Headquarters--on 24th December. 15 were allotted to each battalion initially, and 10 to the Group Headquarters. They were delivered and driven by air corps personnel and Filipino civilians. The Group S-4, Major Snell, by direction of Group Headquarters, stopped at Stotsenburg where destruction of supplies was in progress; halted long enough to load with high-octane gas in 5-gallon bidons and with small-arms ammunition. The latter with the transporting Bren carriers (about half) were turned over to the divisions and the 26th Cavalry. A few of these had been gunned by the Manila Ordnance Depot. Those retained by the tank units were eventually armed, as machine guns were salvaged from the tank casualties. While their cargo capacity was small, they were very handy in emergency supply, on cross country and on doubtful terrain before committing tanks. It was early discovered that heat-baked ground with every appearance of stability would not support even the Brens because of the high water table, just below the crust, impounded in the diked and terraced fields along the highways, usually paralleled by deep ditches full of water. Bridges except on Highways 3, 5, and 7 would not sustain tank traffic without eventual failure.

16. **21-22 December.** - On the evening of 21 December, at a staff conference at Hq,
USAFFE, notification was given of a major hostile landing impending between Bauang and Vigan on the west (La Union) coast. It was stated that there were 90 "boats" preparing to land the next morning. The tank commander, from association with the Navy in Fleet Landing Exercises 2 and 3, in '36 and '37, in the Caribbean and Pacific respectively, unwittingly took this literally as landing boats rather than ships. It is not known whether a similar interpretation was made by others, notably the CG, FEAF (a Naval Academy graduate). However he (General Brereton) left the conference about 2230 to radio the air (by then largely in Mindinao and Australia) to be over the hostile landing effort by daylight the 22d. It is presumed the intention was to fly from Mindinao. They did not arrive.

17. The Tank Commander was directed to send a staff officer to contact General Wainwright. This was ordered by telephone about 2300, the commanding officer of the 192d being designated. At the same time, according to the tank commander's recommendation, approved about 2245 by Hq. USAFFE, that battalion (less one company) was ordered to the Lingayen area by daylight for supporting moves as might be directed by the battalion commander after his contact with the commanding general North Luzon Force. Their march into the area and rendezvous therein was prescribed. The excepted company (the one at Dau), with USAFFE's concurrence and direction, was ordered to move at once (by midnight), regas, and refill bidons at Gerona, to regas again at Bauang, and meet the anticipated landing at daylight on the La Union coast to the north. The Group commander and advance party left Manila about midnight for the front.

18. 22 December. - The tank force dispatched to combat the landing was found, out of gas, at Rosario, some thirty miles from Bauang - an no gas to refill there for whatever their destiny was to be. They had been given controverting orders preventing the refill at Gerona, had been diverted on other missions - one allegedly to guard the rear echelon of the 11th P.A. Division. As all the officers of this company are dead, except one last with the company that day, their accounts of that day, and subsequently, to the tank commander are accepted. After the tank commander arrived, the North Luzon Force commander joined. The hostile aviation was active to the west but not in range of the tank half-track .50 caliber machine guns. Two companies of the 11th P.A. Division were engaged toward Damortis, and it was understood--a troop of the 26th Cavalry and a scout-car platoon. The landing had been made. Shortly a squadron of the 26th Cavalry moved out; and almost immediately a report came back from the troops at Damortis that an enemy cyclist or motorized unit was approaching Damortis. It was at this juncture that General Wainwright asked the tank commander what he could do. The tank plight had already been explained to him. The gas had not yet arrived. The resources of the company were pooled, a platoon of tanks was dispatched to meet the enemy threat;
Lieutenant Morin, the platoon commander, being instructed to proceed beyond Damortis but not beyond Agoo. This was the platoon that General Wainwright got when he "asked for a company". They were not 6 1/2 ton tanks, as he thought, but 13-ton. There were 17 to a company - not 16; and they had been operative under his orders: Quoting from Colonel Wickord's (Comdg 192d) recountal -- "Starting with your phone call from Manila, Morley and Hanes (Captains) and a reconnaissance group from Hq. Co. went that night to P.A. Hq. of Brougher's Regt. (sic) and then to Damortis. Hanes' unit followed. I left the next day with the battalion following. Twice I received instructions enroute from Lt. Col. Montgomery of Wainwright's staff."

19. The first tank vs. tank action. - Morin's platoon did not encounter the motorized unit approaching Damortis but pushed on to Agoo. There they ran into a counterthrust of hostile light tanks and had a fight with them on the road. The enemy tanks were of low silhouette, no turret, with sides sloped so that an impact close enough to normal to secure a penetration was hard to get. On the other hand, their 47-mm gun, either on the tank or off as an A T gun, was effective against our tanks with their perpendicular surfaces and high profiles--circumstances which had caused their rejection by our Allies before the war. The platoon commander's tank left the road to maneuver out of the trap, was hit, and burned; the first tank lost in World War II. It developed later that the officer and three men of the crew survived and were the first armored force prisoners in World War II. The other four tanks were brought back to Rosario -- all hit; a hit disabling completely the oil system of one; another hit through the main drive. All four tanks had to be towed out and all were lost later in the day by bombing and mishaps during salvage. The assistant driver, Private Henry Deckert, B/192d, of the platoon sergeant's (a Chicago policeman) tank, had been decapitated by a direct hit penetrating the forward deck of the tank at the ball-and-socket joint of the bow-gun mounting. This man was the first armored soldier killed in a tank vs. tank fight in World War II. Enemy tanks were hit but the shots were seen to ricochet off their sloping surfaces.

20. The dash to Damortis. - Hostile action vicinity Damortis in increasing violence made evident need for tank covering action. The tank company commander being a casualty at this juncture, it was necessary to take the 2d in command forward on reconnaissance with the Group Command to just short of Damortis, where the commanding officer of the 26th Cavalry was found in a very exposed position with fire of all types coming in, including very active dive and glide bombing which pinned the command half-track down repeatedly in efforts to turn and get back. After about two hours a start was made and return to Rosario effected, with the unabated attention of hostile planes. The road was cumbered in several places by dead 26th animals in considerable number as a result of bombing as they had moved forward. When the Group commander finally reached Rosario, the gas had just arrived, and the battalion
commander. The company was sent into the Damortis position with instructions to cover the withdrawal of the force engaged there--tanks to fall back one by one, "peeling" off from the front successively after the troops had withdrawn. General Wainwright had left, and the Group command got away about 1630 for Manila via Alcala and the CP of the 11th Division, P.A.. The situation in South Luzon was developing fast; but that to the north was more exigent, and the probability of redeployment of tanks from the South was pressing. This reinforcement occurred on the 24th December when the 194th (less C Company) was sent hurriedly north and placed on line with the 192d, extending on the latter's left, just south of the Agno River, west from Carmen (on Route 3).

21. North of the Agno. - after the withdrawal to Rosario on the 22d the tanks were put in position to the west and north thereof later that day; but were ordered out by the 71st Division Commander, to get south of the bridge east of Rosario about to be blown. The tank battalion commander states: "We tried to use the tanks but according to Morley (Staff Captain 192d now dead) Pierce's Ex Officer would not allow it. He supposedly said that it would clutter up their (26th Cavalry) action and insisted that the tanks be removed."

22. On 23-24 December the tank battalion commander, carrying out his orders to keep one company south of the Agno, was told at General Wainwright's headquarters that (quote) "I'm the immediate battle commander and you will take orders from me." And thus that company was sent north. All three of the line companies were operating north of the Agno when the main bridge at Carmen was bombed out. "A" Company's commander, Captain Wright, was killed at Urdaneta the night of 23/24 December. As only two highway bridges remained, the tanks had to make end runs to get south of the Agno on the night of 24/25 December, "A" Company coming out via Malasique and Balambang according to instructions: "If the bridge (highway) was blown-which did occur. They met Jap resistance early in the evening and came out next AM at about 1020." - report of the battalion commander. B/192 received a written order from one division commander to cover his withdrawal, which it did; the action taking it from a key point, when one of the other companies was far better situated to have carried out that particular mission. With his fighting element all north of the Agno in a mass of streams, with his main line of supply and evacuation broken, and the strong prospect of being caught there, with each general officer encountered becoming his "immediate battle commander", the battalion commander needed a free hand to do his best to carry out his mission rather than arbitrary orders. He had now lost a ninth of his tanks and two of his company commanders.

23. Tank Group Headquarters closed at Manila and moved north with the 194th (less C
Company, left with the South Luzon Force), arriving with it on Christmas Day. In accordance with USAFFE orders received on the Agno on 25 December to cover the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force on successive phase lines, the south bank of the Agno was to be held 24 hours with withdrawal on the night of 26/27 December to a line: Santa Ignacia--Gerona--Santo Tomas--San Jose; then to withdraw the night of 27/28 December to the line Tarlac--Cabanatuan; then on the night of 28/29, to the south bank of the Bambam River--Gapan; this line was being organized for a protracted defense and was to be held. On 24 December, C/194th moved via the Taal Lake Road to Santo Tomas to bivouac near San Pablo, to assist in the developing operations in the Lucena, Pagbilao, Lucban area.

24. 25-26 December: This period was spent in organizing the tank defensive and holding position south of the Agno and on the 26th in active defense. As the units of the 192d regained the south bank of the Agno, they were stretched to cover the river from Carmen (on Route 3) to Tayug (NE of San Quentin), with individual tanks at most critical points -- some only in radio contact. Similarly, the two available companies of the 194th were disposed west of Carmen on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. Orders were given both battalion commanders late the 26th to hold that line until 0500, 27th December. The senior, Major Miller (194th), was authorized to order an earlier withdrawal for both if enemy action in force jeopardized the withdrawal to the two axial routes (Highways 3 and 5) - the only exits for tank movement to the next delaying position. Written operation orders for standard operating procedure, in the hands of tank troops by this time, provided for their occupancy of all roads -- side roads to cover minor roads from the north -- and sweep enemy avenues of approach, both by road and cross-country, at the same time being disposed to get out laterally to the axial highways, if egress directly to the South were not possible; platoon commanders to be at critical commanding points on the exterior road net; company commanders at similar points on the axial roads; when required to withdraw to gain the axial road, to do so by tank successively from the front, under cover of the next tank, and to proceed to the rear to the next position. Intensive reconnaissance of each day's successive positions and possibilities was made for tank command, field of fire, ingress and egress, alternate positions, and routes in emergency. Tanks lining the axial roads were particularly charged to stop any mechanized movement, and were instructed to take positions on alternate sides of the road, at turns and angles, to get maximum sweep with minimum exposure during fire and get away. During the afternoon of the 26th the tank commander reconnoitered the next position (Gerona line), which had been ordered held for two/three days by the high command. Tank CP was established the night 26/27 at Rancho Rosario at San Miguel, where USAFFE staff officers visited about midnight.

25. Night 26/27, 194th action, North Luzon. About 2230 Lieutenant Costigan of
A/194th arrived at San Miguel with the remnants of his platoon, to report that our lines had withdrawn from the right, that the enemy had come in that way, made a road block with AT guns covering at Carmen; that he had forced his way through, losing two tanks and three men. The other three were badly hit, but were regassed, repaired and sent back to report to the battalion CP at San Manuel on Route 3. He reported the new company commander, Lieutenant Burke and his sergeant apparently dead near the cross road in Carmen. (Burke, wounded the second time since the beginning, actually survived, and was captured--his tank being destroyed). The balance of A/194 made a spectacular dash out, one tank at least going across the whole front, with hostile fire impact and it own return fire making a pyrotechnic spectacle. Lieutenant Petrie, A/194th, "fought his way out and across the river before the bridge was blown, losing but one tank." This was, presumedly, at Bayambang on the Agno. D/194th had to come out cross country reaching Route 3 north of Moncada, about 0800: receiving fire from the highway as they approached, paralleling the railroad embankment running NW-SE. The two bridges at Moncada had been blown by the withdrawing infantry division. The major bridge crossed a stream with high banks, reconnaissance provided no way across and the company commander reluctantly ordered tanks dismantled of guns and radios, and destroyed according to SOP. Fifteen tanks had gotten out and were immobilized by the side of the road, to be reported there later by our air as enemy tanks. One platoon commander could not bring himself to major destruction (by shooting into successive tanks with the 37mm, a grenade in the engine compartment, or a can of gas), and merely pulled the wiring and rheostats, hoping eventually to salvage the tanks. The enemy did; and one of these tanks appeared later north of Baliuag on 31 December '41, and several in Bataan on 9 April '42.

26. Night 26/27, 192d action, North Luzon. - Colonel Rodman, of one of the divisions supported, informed Major Wickord, 192d Tank, that "Headquarters had changed their plan to a straight line: lines Carmen-Umigan." This uncovered the tanks and the river except for tank action. "On the next order you had been informed that the new line would not form until seven or so the next day", writes Wickord. "Again in checking the CPs of the units on line, they all had orders to be on the new line by midnight and were beginning to send people back by bus loads." (These busses might better have been used to salvage supplies throughout.) The tanks destroyed such major part of the 44,000 gallons of drummed 100-octane gas, at the advanced landing field near Carmen, as they could not get out on the 26th; and had reported several caches of 75mm ammunition on Route 3, which they could not move. This had been spotted for the use of the 75mm SPM's supporting the tanks on Route 3. 5 SPM's under Captain Gordon Peck did notable work at the San Manuel roadblock. A 75mm SPM had been in a house at the road junction at Carmen when last seen on the 26th; it had previously pulled out, been intercepted twice, and sent back (Tank Group Commander personal action). It was not
there unfortunately when the enemy came in and established his roadblock at Carmen about 2130, the 26th. At 2130 the right element of the 194th (west of Carmen) received a message (written) from the 11th Division, dated 1930, (signed 'Brougher' CG, 11th Div) that the line was pulling back at 1930, uncovering the Carmen-Tayug road; ordering the 192d tanks (in that division zone) to withdraw before the bridges therein, giving egress to the rear, were to be blown at 2330; Hence the disaster to D/194 (Captain Altman). His surviving men crossed the streams (two) at Moncada with the movable weapons, tank and personnel, and some radios, and were reported out to the Group Command at 0230, the 27th. One lieutenant (Hart) and his crew elected to remain on the line instead of coming out cross-country; and later sent a message to Group command by a Filipino reporting himself and his crew on 7 January '42 "continuing sabotage vicinity Stotsenburg". Hart died as a captain of guerillas sometime in '43, according to a Filipino's reporting, post-war.......of his assistance to Major Nelson of Group Staff, shot in attempted execution at Camp O'Donnell, 14th or 15th April '42. Nelson crawled out of a mass-burial pit in the night (a rain had deterred the enemy from filling it), and escaped to die later of other contributing causes.

27. 26/27 December, C/194th in South Luzon. - The 1st Platoon defending near San Pablo; the 2d Platoon (Lt. Needham) ........ road in advance of infantry. The lead tanks encountered a road block defended by an AT gun, shot it out, and overran the block; but was disabled by a direct hit from a hidden field gun firing from a distance. This immobilized the tank, took off Lt. Needham's leg, and killed part of his crew. Other tanks, including the rear tank were hit and immobilized. Those capable of moving could not turn around or get out. Lieutenant Needham, realizing his critical condition and the encumbrance he would be, refused evacuation. He remained with his tank, "buttoned in"; but was dead when the last surviving men returned to get him shortly before dawn, (Silver Star awarded posthumously) when Sergeant Emil S. Morello had organized his epic march to Manila by paths through the now enemy-infested country. Guided by a Filipino hired with the pooled resources of the survivors -- a 100 pesos -- Sergeant Morello arrived there with five wounded on 1 January, 1942, just ahead of the enemy; and left Private de Benedetti (SS awarded posthumously) who had a rivet in his throat, at a Catholic hospital. The made his way with others by banca to Corregidor. The enemy had been about the "buttoned up" tanks during the night, but had been too cautious on this, their first close-up, to try to get in; and left before dawn, evidently fearing a trap. Four enlisted men also died in this encounter. General Jones, reconnoitering north of Lucban near Piis, on the road toward Mauban, escorted by a 194th half-track commanded by Sergeant Lewis, was forced to the ground by fire from an enemy advance guard coming from Mauban. Under cover of fire from the half-track, he and his driver escaped. The half-track was immobilized; but the crew degunned it and fought their way out subsequently. They were recommended for DSC's by General
28. 29/30 December: - On the 29th orders were received for the occupancy and holding of the line behind the Bamban River, the first considerable defensive organization of the ground; with some fire trenches, obstacles - including wire, staked areas, and cleared fields of fire - with extensive leveling of cane crops. The Tank Commander was directed by USAFFE to organize the anti-tank defense of the Bamban line in collaboration with the North Luzon Force commander. The Tarlac line was evacuated that night. The Bamban line was to be held until further orders. North Luzon Force designated Magalang, west of Mount Arayat, as Group command post. This was not practicable, Group Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment consisting of one general officer, two field officers, two captains, and ten enlisted. These had to drive and serve two half-tracks, two 1/4-ton C&R cars, two sedans, two motorcycles, two radios -- both in 24 hour operation, six machine guns. They had no equipment to man a command post, no mess; lived a vagrant hap-hazard, bare existence--almost constantly mobile trying to do what in peacetime had been done for a lesser force by a Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company of 18 officers, 141 enlisted, 14 radios, half-tracks, scout cars, 1/4 and 1/2-ton C&R cars, trucks, etc., and two medium command tanks, aggregating 55 wheeled and track vehicles. The necessity of keeping in touch with tank units now covering four divisions of the North Luzon Force and two of the South Luzon Force, operating over 100 miles apart, with two radios--made imperative the actual contact and constant movement of the Group command, to effect the necessary coordination and cooperation, reconnaissance, and overall supply in this rapidly changing situation. Staging of tank gas, ammunition, and spare parts back from roadside caches constituted a major problem to the limited organic transport of the tank units. Efforts to supplement had been to no avail. The tank radio set-up in Group Headquarters at USAFFE had been abandoned because of last minute denial of a truck to carry headquarters equipment when Tank Headquarters left Manila 24 December. One extra sedan was secured. What could be had to be transported in the vehicles listed above. Group Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, without a mess or any of the supplies or equipment available to the permanent garrison (However lately organized, they came from fixed installations and were familiar with local resources)--were unwelcome pensioners with whatever unit in contact or associated. The Ordnance Company (armored) would have been a proper base company for headquarters but its rearward position (necessary because of its heavy mobile shop equipment, and isolation to permit its constantly increasing maintenance job, which now included the SPM's) prevented.

29. A company of the 192d had to be brought over from east of the Pampanga -- the 192d axis of withdrawal being Route 5 -- to supplement to 20 tanks left the 194th in its zone, of which Route 3 was the axis. East of Concepcion Lieutenant Reed and his
sergeant died under a bridge when their half-track was hit - Reed refusing evacuation in favor of other wounded. (29 December)(SS awarded posthumously)

30. 30/31 December.-- Hostile action became more aggressive east of the Pampanga. Tank reconnaissance counted 30 medium hostile tanks of the 35 reported by air, vicinity Cabanatuan, earlier. Later eight of these medium tanks were ambushed by a platoon of C/192 as they lined up north of the stream north of Baliuag waiting the restitution of a destroyed bridge. The remnants withdrew east, and as expected, accomplished a crossing elsewhere, coming into Baliuag at 1700 and engaging two platoons of C/192d in a running fight for two hours back and forth through the town. Our light tank proved its superiority over the enemy medium tank - in contrast to the difficulty in coping with his light tank. Our bag: - eight medium tanks; none of the rest appeared. Had it not been for this tank action, the plight of the 91st Division, would have been desperate, even after it was augmented by units of the 71st Division that date, after it had reported itself reduced to effective strength of 200. The tanks paid for themselves there; although the only credit given them, in a syndicated account, was a statement that "A Company of the 192 was sent in to help". At that time, the 192d, (less one company) was in sector entirely engaged; one company was on the western axis of withdrawal; the 194th (less the company in South Luzon) had been moved by USAFFE orders to a position in readiness at the barrio Apalit, N.W. of the Calumpit Bridge over the Pampanga, to insure the exit of the South Luzon Force, and that part of the North Luzon Force east of the Pampanga. It was prepared by the same order to go to Bacaue if necessary, to reinforce there C/194, which was to hold until the extrication of North and South Luzon Forces was insured. At this juncture also, two batteries of SPM's from Major Babcock's battalion were attached to the tank task force; the order was transmitted, acknowledged, later reduced to one battery (USAFFE order). No evidence of their joining has come to light.

31. 31 December '41-1 January '42. - The Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered the tanks out ahead, possible fearing more the enemy tanks known to be in the Pampanga Valley than the enemy following him, which had no tanks. The last of the foot troops came across the Pampanga about 0130, 1 January '42, last of the tanks at 0230. The bridge was blown immediately thereafter. Tanks were disposed to meet possible crossings of the Pampanga and its marshes to the north of Calumpit.

32. 2 January 1942. - The Tank Group was ordered by USAFFE to cover the withdrawal into Bataan to the Lyac Junction Covering Position, and thereafter to proceed to bivouac area. The 192d was passed through the 194th, which had a short respite, although now reduced to about 30 tanks. For the prosecution of the withdrawal into Bataan, the 194th (plus A/192 attached) was assigned Highway 7 as an axis. Its commanding officer,
being an engineer in civil life, was considered particularly fitted to cope with the succession of bridges, alternative and emergency crossings in lieu thereof, which in all probability be needed, as this highway crossed many tidal creeks in congested communities. The 192d (less A/192) was sent to cover the right (left?) (north and northwest flanks) via Angeles, Porac, San Jose, and Dinalupihan. At the bridge crossing into Bataan, the 194th force was to cross, covered by the 192d. The Tank Group was then to take position to support the occupancy and initial defense of the Lyac Junction Covering Position as a gratuitous mission beyond its assigned one. The withdrawal was accomplished as planned, there being no longer in question the premature destruction of the bridges, such as were left intact by the vicissitudes of all-out vehicular withdrawal into Bataan after the exodus from North and South Luzon, and from the Manila area: Bridge destruction was controlled by the Tank command; although it was required immediately after the withdrawal of the tanks, and the tanks were still required to withdraw as soon as possible.

33. The withdrawal execution. - The 194th (less C Company) moved initially from its position in readiness at Apalit to vicinity San Fernando to cover the withdrawal of the troops north of Guagua; and by 2 January was in position on Route 7 just southeast of Guagua; C/194th (less a platoon sent to ordnance for rehabilitation of both tanks and men) was northwest of Guagua on the Floridablanca Road. This company (Capt. Moffitt) had on the 26 December covered the withdrawal of our forces in the San Pablo area (South Luzon), then took positions near Santo Tomas, moving from there north to Pasig on the 29th; on the 30th, back to Tagaytay Ridge on Highway 17, arriving at 0100, 31 December; after refueling, moving out at once to vicinity Bocaue, southeast of Calumpit Bridge, arriving 0700, to give final protection for the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force across the Pampanga River. This fast traveling -- nonsleeping company crossed the Pampanga at 0230, 1 January 1942.

34. The 192d moved via Angeles - San Jose - Dinalupihan, A/192 joining the depleted 194th via the Porac -- Santa Rita Road, being denied entrance to Guagua by enemy action. This company, under Lieutenant Bloomfield, (SS awarded posthumously) attempted an abortive counterattack with elements of the 11th Division, which unfortunately mistook our tanks forward of the infantry lines for enemy, and fired on them with mortar fire -- as they did on the Group commander's 1/4-ton, in the course of his movement coordinating this effort. A/192 finally had to move by trail and cross-country to the Floridablanca Road, losing three tanks; but finally covering the withdrawal of the hardpressed 194th on the 5th January, and coming into Route 7 between Guagua and Lubao.

35. The 194th was under fire of various types all through the 4th and 5th January, on the
southern outskirts of Guagua; its half-tracks operating at critical points in the town and on the road net surrounding. Guagua was burning fiercely on the night of the 4/5 January; but Captain Beck of Major Ganahl’s battalion of SPM's supporting the tanks, was still directing fire from the church tower when last seen by the Group Commander. The latter went into the town about 2300 as far as the public square and did not find the enemy reported there several hours before. By this time, however, neither tanks nor half-tracks could get in, because of the general fire. The 194th was forced to start its withdrawal by the standard method, peeling off from the front, tank by tank, on the afternoon of 5 January - mission accomplished. Enemy rifle, machine gun, artillery and mortar fire throughout, was thickened by very active dive and glide bombing by day. At 1600, 5 January, C/194 moved into position on the road between Sexmoan and Lubao, where, on the outskirts of Lubao, it ambushed an enemy force estimated at 750 to 800 supported by artillery, machine guns, and mortars. This force was led by three Filipinos carrying white flags and presumably under duress. This force, bent on cutting the highway, lost 50% in the action. Had the result been different, disaster to our eventual withdrawal would have been inevitable. Four SPM's under Captain Gordon H. Peck supported the tanks in this fight with distinguished gallantry. This was the same battery which Captain Peck employed and withdrew successfully across country south of the Agno, 26/27 December, contributing notably to the defense of the road block established by the 194th commander, at San Manuel. For both of these exploits Captain Peck was cited. Lubao was also burning as the tanks cleared it. Tank troops assisted in separating ammunition cars sidetracked there, and isolated their effect as they subsequently blew up. Problems of retrieving tank gas in caches along this road were continuous.

36. The successive retirements continued to Remlus on the 6th. At 0230 6 January, hostile troops attacked at Remlus in force using smoke for the first time. The heavy action continued until 0500 when the enemy withdrew because of daylight and losses. There were a number of casualties, including Lieutenant Petrie, who had distinguished himself at the Agno by fighting his way across the river before the bridge was blown, with the loss of but one tank. He died of his wounds, as did Private Martella (SS awarded posthumously), who shielded his captain and took the shell fragment that would have gotten him. Two brothers were killed in one company about this time, Private Hennessey, who lost his lower leg in the fight survived to die at Cabanatuan as a prisoner. This fight was considered an all-out attempt to destroy the tank force at a particularly critical time.

37. The withdrawal across the river at Culia, into Bataan, was effected the night 6/7 January -- the 192d covering the 194th, and A/192d joining the 192d thereupon; the tanks going into position on readiness in the Lyac Junction Covering Position, the 194th
on the left. The 192d was the last of the American forces to cross the bridge before it was blown. There was no immediate enemy pressure or follow-up the night of 6/7 January. The provisions of a long-existent plan had been accomplished a month after the beginning of hostilities; we were in Bataan.

V. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 8 JANUARY - 26 JANUARY, 1942.

38. The first covering position in Bataan lay between Culo and Hermosa, with entry by the latter, over a road that soon became worse than none. Half-track rubber tracks were thrown repeatedly, making dangerous work for the ordnance detachments with each battalion—far they alone were equipped to retrack these ponderous vehicles; and shortly after daylight on the 8th enemy artillery fire was falling promiscuously all through the area, access to which to artillery observation on several considerable stretches. In the position-in-readiness tanks were well scattered, but the artillery fire was so general as to make all spots equally vulnerable. The artillery commander for the 71st Division (CP of which was to our right rear by about 3/4 mile) stated to the Tank commander that he was out of gun crews, that the infantry (31st) had broken in our front. It became obvious that it was idle to remain in this position, egress from which would soon be impossible; and use of the tanks to the front from their then position, equally impossible. Orders were given for a composite company (192d) under Captain Hanes to move out and cover the East Coast Road north of Hermosa, which had, it was feared, inadequate defense. It was vital that enemy mechanized be kept from overrunning it. The integrity of the bridges, in great number in the vicinity of Orani, was, dubious. The CP 71st Division was under fire and already in the process of displacement. Orders were given for the tanks to move under their covering detachment, as above, at dark, to a bivouac area south of the Abucay—Abucay Hacienda Road. Both tanks and men were in desperate need of rehabilitation. Tracks had been worn down to the metal. The great radial aviation type motors were long past their essential 400 hour overhaul. In the course of the months operation it had been necessary on the constant movement, or anticipated movement, to keep motors running or idling for protracted periods. Batteries were in a perilous state. If the tanks were to survive they had to have maintenance. The same applied to the officers and men. And with half-rations, of a sort-- mostly Filipino, beginning the 6th of January, the men were already feeling the loss of food. Eyesight was notably impaired.

39. The move south again was precipitated by threatened bridge blowing by the division in whose area the tanks were; and the tanks were ordered out, by non-tank direction (at the time this was written the move had been ascribed to General's Selleck's orders. It was however, communicated to Captain Hanes by radio and originated with Lt Col Miller), about 2100 (including the composite company); and despite the presence of the
Group executive there to prevent such a contingency. The tanks were being continuously shelled, but not by observed fire. Their removal was warranted; but the withdrawal of the composite company placed to guard the East Coast Road might have been a catastrophe. However, as before and subsequently, the enemy's follow through was either very slow or very dumb; and all that was lost by the precipitant move was possible opportunity to score.

40. Respite. - In the bivouac just south of the Pilar-Bagac Road and about two kilometers from the East Coast Road, the tank units were reorganized, companies from the 194th being reduced from 17 to 10 tanks; platoons from 5 tanks to 3—a reduction shortly imposed on the 192d, which up to this point had lost about 10 tanks, to the 194th's 26. Extensive overhaul with turning or replacement of tracks and rehabilitation of power plants, communications, and weapons was expedited, the 17th Ordnance Company (armored) going into high gear on 3rd and 4th echelon work and bringing up long needed spare parts, tracks, motors, batteries, radios from the stores on South Bataan. For the first time since the beginning tank crews were fed at their kitchens, and a relatively normal field existence was enjoyed.

41. Support of II Corps, P. A., on the Abucay-Hacienda Main Battle Position. --On the 12th January C and D/194, under Captain Moffitt, were moved forward to the Cadre Road, to a position in readiness, to facilitate familiarization of the personnel with the roads and trails, and action positions and routes. Some hope for a chance to execute a foray through the Main Battle Position was dissipated when it was found its organization and mined areas gave no opportunities for tanks to get through. (Improved tank mines had been laid by PA troops in a belt in front of their positions and time, nor experience, had permitted any mapping of these. The enemy dispositions were such as to afford no remunerative tank mission warranting the inevitable losses that would have resulted in crossing the minefields.) Two ammunition dumps, the farthest 135 yards away, were blown in the course of heavy bombing and artillery fire on the area in which the tanks were -- continuing from 0700 to 1500. After dark these two companies moved back to the Bani Road; and on the 13th back to the Battalion bivouac area.

42. First action on West Coast. - 16 January, C/194 was sent to Bagac on a request from General Wainwright for a platoon to assist in opening the Moron Highway where General Segunda's forces had been denied movements south, by road, by hostile activities there on. The enemy had come from Moron, which had been cleared once by an infantry battalion and a troop of cavalry. The enemy reentering, General Wainwright previously had proposed moving two or three tanks along the beach and across a coastal creek, to overrun the town. Reconnaissance developed an AT gun sited to sweep the beach, with a strong likelihood of more; and the certainty of tanks bogging down. The
Group commander said it would take a company and the loss of a platoon. The project was abandoned. On the next occasion (16 Jan) the Group executive went along to secure proper employment of the tanks; but unfortunately, while the company was moved to an assault position at 0600 on the Moron Highway at Road Junction 159, only a platoon was desired for the attack with the infantry. The platoon (three tanks) moved forward from the conference point at Road Junction 162 but a few yards, before running into fire from an anti-tank gun. This was silenced, but the road block had to be reduced and cleared by the infantry. The platoon then proceeded about 600 yards, where land mines in the road disabled two tanks, thus blocking the road. They were finally towed out. Here was an instance where the entire tank company should have been used. The Group executive reported they were held for an organized attack planned to include the cavalry. The cavalry arrived about 0200 that night, four hours after the projected attack, which was not made. Segunda's force had to escape via the coast line, losing the bulk of its heavy equipment, most of it destroyed to prevent enemy use. Hostile air sought the tanks, to no avail the next day. 20 January an urgent call for a few tanks to save the 31 Division CP (west of the Bani Bani Road) reported encircled, was answered by sending a company. The message said a counterattack was being launched in twenty minutes. As this interim was over before the message came in, tank participation in another attack was planned. However, no attack was made nor necessary. The tanks were asked to cruise through neighboring standing sugar cane, but neither flushed anyone out or ran them down, so far as they could discern in the overwhelming dust. Another occasion for possible tank use having developed, the Group commander went back to take this company on the second mission. However, it had been ordered back and away by the Division Commander who, in common with many others, did not want tanks around unless the need was critical -- they drew too much artillery fire and bombing. The most incongruous call for tank use was their proposed employment against snipers north of the Abucay-Hacienda Line. Besides their inherent blindness, their only chance to get at snipers--by movement and search-- was precluded by lack of exit through the wire, ditches, mine fields in the area concerned. To trade a tank with crew for one sniper was not remunerative or permissible. 20 January D/194th was sent forward to the Hacienda Road on a chance for a move around the left (west) flank of the enemy, but was again stopped by mined areas. By the 24th the entire 194th (less Hq Co) had been placed in the Hacienda Road area to support troops there. Company D had a short engagement on the left flank. Meanwhile the 192d, on USAFFE orders, has been charged with East Coast security south from Magalang, at the eastern extremity of the main battle position: This was accomplished by tanks in alert position, but more generally by half-track patrols, all in the radio net.

43. Withdrawal from the Abucay-Hacienda Battle Position. - The 194th was charged with covering the withdrawal on the axis of the Back Road; the 192d on the axis of the
East Coast Road, which was in its zone of responsibility for beach defense. The bulk of
the withdrawal was to be by the inevitable bus; the screens in some parts straight back,
the busses by the East Coast Road. In addition to the officers of the II Corps checking
on the completeness of the withdrawal, the Tank Group established supplementary
check points at the Abucay (Gen. Weaver), at the junction of the Hacienda--Back Roads
(Lt Col Smyth), and of the Bani-Back Roads (Lt Col Miller). The 192d lined the East
Coast Road in its conventional covering position; the 194th, in the middle Hacienda
Road area, prepared to cover the withdrawal via the Back Road. The covering positions,
to be occupied by the tanks at daybreak the 25th, were generally the line: Balanga--the
Cadre Road--the Bani Bani Road. The withdrawal was to start at midnight, screens out
by 0200. Though the Corps checking officers reported all out, the Tank Group
executive, Lt. Colonel Smyth (the only Regular in the Group besides the Commanding
General) made memorable solitary checks, finding as many as 200 Filipinos in a group,
lost, without officers, and steering them out to one or other of the axial roads. It was
broad daylight before the Group Commander, at Abucay, could give the word for the
tanks to pull back, the ubiquitous busses still being on the roads. It looked likely that the
instructions to the tanks,SOP withdrawal, delaying,would be invoked again;
namely:--"Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible
enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be
fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking
positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons.
Considerations of personal safety or expediency will not interfere with accomplishing
the greatest possible delay." (Gen. Weaver's written orders).

44. Group withdrawal order provided for the tanks to continue in the covering position
area during the 26th and the night of 26/27, taking ambush positions in the heavy brush
and on side roads to exploit the enemy's usually delayed and then incautious advance.
The usual bug-a-boo of bridge and defile was not present except at Balanga. However II
Corps notified that all elements in the Corps area would be behind the new main battle
position--roughly the Pilar-Bagac Road--by daybreak the 26th, to permit artillery
covering fire.

45. 25/26 January, in covering position. - The enemy seemed to make no move to
follow on the 25th, his artillery fire did not come down until after the tanks were all
back in the covering position, about 1000 in the 192d sector, when a bridge at Balanga
was hit and destroyed, making the 192d's subsequent withdrawal circuitous by the
secondary roads to the west around the town. Bombing and heavy artillery fire started in
earnest about 1100, making the Tank Group OP in the church tower untenable.
Stragglers continued to come in until almost noon. The night 25/26th passed without
untoward incident except for the "homeless" and empty plight of the Group
Headquarters; radishes and a can of sardines for breakfast the 26th broke a long fast. Again the covering screens were slow in getting out. The tanks in the 194th sector were still in a covering position about a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road at about 0945 when a Filipino civilian came through the lines with the information that a considerable body of the enemy, in several columns, was approaching. Our troops were all behind the Bani Bani Road by 0400; but two of our tanks were lost through a bridge and by bombing and had not yet been salvaged. Major Ganahl's four SPM's were with the 194th, stationed on the flanks. When the enemy columns appeared through the brush every weapon, unit and personal, was brought to bear on the column in close formation. Of an estimated 1200, at least 500 were casualties. The fight and the following fire, as the enemy abandoned its mission and fled, lasted 45 minutes. (Lt Col Miller was in charge of this momentous action. Subsequently recommended for DSC. Got the LM-maybe SS) Had this force hit the scarcely occupied, let alone organized, main battle position at this time, there is little likelihood that they could have been stopped. Their air retaliation came promptly, hitting the tanks' withdrawal as it was on the Orion Cut-off south of the Pilar-Bagac Road. Their bombing was wild and their straffing gingerly executed--both with small effect. Two tanks were hit by bombs but not put out of commission. Captain Moffitt was wounded as the bridge over the Pilar River was blown when his vehicle started over it, by the battalion commander--the latter thinking he had been the last to cross. Again the tanks went into a well earned bivouac and long denied access to rear echelons and kitchens, The 194th, after a brief stay in a temporary bivouac, moved to KP 148, East Coast Road (Bataan), where its Hq and Hq Co stayed until 7 April.

VI. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 27 JANUARY - 8 APRIL 1942.

48. Beach defense was assumed 28 January and continued throughout active operations as primary and contingent missions; 192d from Pandan Point to Limay, 194th from Limay exclusive to Cabacaben. 192d had a contingent mission to support subsectors A and B; 194th, Subsectors C and D. Instructions were, for beach defense: - tanks to be moved from covered positions (platoon) at dark to covering positions (tank), intervals to be patrolled by half-tracks, radio contact to be maintained with in-shore and off-shore patrols and by liaison with beach patrols. A communications center was established with II Corps, with the tank radio system the backbone, and with tank liaison officers with Corps. For the support missions, extensive and intensive reconnaissance, particularly new route reconnaissance, was instituted. The difficulty in supporting the interior subsectors was accentuated by the narrowness of the new trails. South of the Pilar-Bagac Road there was little reclaimed ground. Besides the coastal roads there were only old timber roads or vague tracks, very dusty and leading nowhere. On 31 January General Wainwright asked for a "few tanks" to patrol the road in his sector--against
infiltration. Tank tracks were now in precarious shape and tank gas was getting scarce. The Group commander proposed to furnish ten half-tracks and 1/4-ton C&R, which would not only do the work where the tanks were unfitted, but be able to negotiate the new roads forward without blocking them. The possibility of using tanks in the heavily wooded difficult terrain was not suggested. That night a message was received from Colonel Irwin of USAFFE, by phone, to send a battalion less a company to the West Coast. This was dispatched with orders for support—specifically to carry out any request of I Corps commander that was possible. The next morning (1 Feb) the Tank Command was notified that the tanks sent to the West Coast had been attached to I Corps. 194th had hurriedly taken over the East Coast defense in its entirety. B/192d was held in reserve and charged with the South Shore of Bataan, along with the 17th Ordnance Company (armored). Beach defense was kept active by repeated threats and alarms off-shore and in-shore. There were frequent tracers and flares fired from shore apparently as signals. Fire from Manila Bay seldom reached shore. Knowledge that the tanks were there and why was admitted by the enemy field commander in his conference with the Tank Group commander on 9-10 April. He left no doubt that their presence deterred hostile landings from the Manila side. If successful the end of Bataan would have been quicker and more inevitable.

47. Defense of the landing fields. - The armored troops took over on their own initiative, on 1 February, the protection of the three landing fields: Cabcaben, Bataan, and Mariveles. The inadequacy of the protection and the few weapons of the grounded air personnel as well as the high rate of sickness—56%—made this imperative in the probability of hostile airborne or paratroop ventures. It was known (reported) they had some 12,000 airborne troops in Formosa or to the north. A composite platoon of tanks and half-tracks was well hidden at each field, with positions and plans carefully figured for several types of action possible. These fields were repeatedly looked over by hostile air, but seldom attacked, leading to the belief that the enemy hoped to use them eventually. The major alert occurred early in March when 73 planes came over.

48. The rocket fights. - Arriving on the West Coast the 1/2 February, the 192d (less one company) was immediately employed in the Aglalome and Anyasen River valleys, between the West Coast Road and the China Sea. The stories might best be told by the citations won there, and by the mounting list of casualties in both tanks and men. Here again, as on 29 December '41, in Luzon proper, an entire tank crew was lost with tank—this time by burning, the crew being buried in the tank by the dirt waste from the foxholes dug under and about the tank, which had become the center of a maze. The tank was salvaged. The 2-5 February, Lieutenant John Hay with his platoon made as many as five attacks a day, some protracted to five hours; sometimes coordinated with the infantry—usually not, as he broke trail.
Quoting the citation:

"During this period and in the terrain involved--a rugged dense jungle wherein tank movement had to be limited to the space cumulatively cleared by repeated charges of a few yards each--Lieutenant Hay's gallantry, persistence, and complete disregard of personal danger, in an entirely new phase of tank warfare, preeminently contributed to the ultimate success of the tanks and the troops which they supported."

Captain Morley, S-2 of his battalion, when sent into the north front of the I Corps sector in Bataan, P.I., to coordinate the tank action in the front of two divisions made possible by his gallant reconnaissance and actual leadership, on occasion on foot across the front, the employment of tanks under what appeared to be impossible conditions, and contributing thereby immeasurably to the success of the operations; remaining voluntarily at the front under fire since February 6, 1942, and inspiring both tank and supported troops by his disregard of danger." (2-14-42), (the Tuol Pocket in the 11th Division sector, eventually was wiped out completely.)

"Captain Burholt, S-3 of his battalion, when sent into the Anyasen River area, West Coast of Bataan, P.I., to coordinate the tank action in that difficult terrain, with that of other troops operating therein, remained continuously in that area during subsequent tank relief; and by his gallant efforts for the period 3-11 February 1942, during which he effected noteworthy joint action, he contributed to the eventual success of by his reconnaissance, planning, and leadership under conditions demanding a high degree of persistence and daring."

49. Citations. - These are but a few of the citations and a few of the dead. In two G.O.'s Hq Tank Group USAFFE, that have come to light, there are 15 citations for the Silver Star, in the Group, and 22 Purple Heart awards for one battalion--in the period 25 January-6 February, 1942. Two officers and two men got their DSC's, only one now surviving (Gen. Weaver). On one post-war recommendation there were 7 Legion of Merits, 3 Silver Stars, 15 Bronze Star Medals. There were others.

50. Fatalities. - Lieutenant Winger, 192d, killed in the Tuol Pocket after his tank, blinded by the enemy's first use of flame and oil throwers jammed between two trees, and had to be abandoned. Sgt. Hopple DSC, shot by snipers. Seventeen others in one battalion, and not previously mentioned, are a part of the killed in action while in Luzon, from Rosario to the south end of Bataan.

51. February-March. --While the 192d (less a company) was working on the West
Coast, attached to I Corps, its companies had to be rotated with the reserve company (at Group Headquarters), successively rehabilitated and overhauled. By March the Surgeon reported the daily ration amounted to but 950 calories. Each battalion had so many sick with dengue and malaria that emergency battalion dispensaries took care of the men—they were too badly off to get to the base hospitals. Three types of worms contributed their share of misery. To the tanks—mostly working forward, apart from their rear echelons and kitchens, food was cold and precarious, and not white man's provender. Gas allowance for all purposes other than tanks was cut to 15, then to 10 gallons a day per battalion, making the prosecution of reconnaissance, administration, and services about impossible. The armored troops had been ordered by Group on January 27, to support in every way the defense, forgetting conventional tank employment; using tanks as pillboxes in the front line, if required. The half-tracks were so big as to defeat their purpose in close country and on narrow, congested trails. They offered little protection and invited fire.

52. Projects denied. - Before General Wainwright went to Corregidor in March, it was suggested by Group command that a platoon of tanks be sent there. Not favorably considered at that time, their lack was regrettable later as the enemy attack was prosecuted thereon. On the East Coast a venture with 1/4-tons pulling wheeled 37-mm's and crossing the front by emergency means for surprise, penetration, and raid was negatived;--the 37's were not yielded by the artillery command. Projects off-shore with barge-carried tanks were negatived for various reasons.

53. The armored troops had to take over more and more of the beach defense as the ineffective rate of the Filipinos increased and the enemy activities and threats became more intensive. A comprehensive instruction by battalion was instituted by the armored troops amongst the Philippine Army troops, and a high degree of cooperation and coordination effected in plans and operations. Bombings were frequent near tank bivouac and combat areas but only a few got in. The tanks had learned by this time to cover and camouflage. Movement was at a minimum because of gas lack; no longer was 92-octane gas available. The only thing the armored troops had was ammunition. The ordnance had contributed to tank action by converting considerable AP 37-mm to HE and cannister, more useful in the absence of hostile armored vehicles. After the Baliuag fight, enemy tanks were never seen more than three at a time--usually less; and this only in April, in the closing phases when our artillery and AT had been virtually reduced to inaction, after their marvelous show before they lost observation.

54. April 3.--The occasion of a defunct Nipponese emperor's anniversary of dynasty assumption was made the beginning of an all-out offensive to close out the Philippine situation. It was evident at once in the increased hostile activities. The 194th took its
contingent mission as primary: A/194, Pandan Point and Damilog Trail; D/194, to support 31st Infantry. The bombing on the front was terrific. The enemy pressure eased on the East front comparatively, and an obvious drive to break through east of the Panglingan, and via the Panglingan corridor, developed. On the 4th, C/194 was sent to the aid of General Lough's D subsector, where the 41st Division was being driven back. All of its artillery had been lost previously. Group S-3, Major Morley, had been sent into the II Corps sector to coordinate the tank support to the optimum advantage. A/194 was fighting a losing fight on the axis of the East Coast Road; it was ordered reinforced by elements of D/194, while other elements were ordered to take over C/194th's mission in subsector C(General Bluemel). C/194th, with Lt Col Miller, arrived on the boundary between corps, was ordered to support a counterattack at daybreak the 6th by the 45th Infantry, P.S., north via the Panglingan corridor. Group commander left south Bataan at 0200, 6th, for this operation. The East Coast of Bataan looked like a fiesta, with the tracer and flare activity--evidently from fifth columnists or infiltrated enemy. Major Morley, picked up at 0400, enroute, reported tank operations rather desperate; any move blocked the trails already cumbered with south bound materiel and troops; similarly every move, in the intense dust aroused, invited immediate bombing. The troops were all intent on staying away from the tanks. The 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company's proffered assistance in a last coordinated counterattack. Tanks were being bombed on and off the trails and severely punished without opportunity to fight back. As the Group commander went through the subsectors, he encountered increasing movement of Filipino soldiers to the rear--mostly without arms, in favor of small parcels of rice. The cry was "I'm seeck," "Malaria", "I'm hunting my officer" "Going to the concentration point." A message was sent to the CG II Corps of this, suggesting dispatch of MP units to form a straggler line or control points to stop this cumulative movement. The situation on General Lough's front was not favorable. He was out of contact with I and II Corps, and with the 45th Infantry, which since arrival had not yet established contact with the broken troops on its right, and in front of D Subsector. The 45th, well to the front in the Panglingan valley, on Trail 29, was backed up by the tanks (C/194th) with Lt. Colonel Miller and Captain Moffitt coordinating. They were receiving fire from three directions--apparently from our I Corps troops across the Panglingan, as well as the enemy. Two trips were made by the Group commander between General Lough and this task force. Snipers were infiltrating, and hostile air was attempting to bomb Trail 3. The last trip back, Lough's CP was starting to move west. The 45th withdrew at dark to Trail 8, C/194th covering. Group command, estopped from return across the front to the east, had left about 1600 to contact II Corps via I Corps, and to apprise the 11th Division of the activities on their right to prevent further misdirected fire on the 45th task force. This was accomplished, but contact with II Corps via I Corps communications was not successful: (wires were out). Accomplished by Group commander about 2030 that night.
55. 7 April, the 45th headed by four tanks, made an effort to the east along Trail 8, to support the 57th Inf., P.S., encountering AT weapons at Junction Trail 8 and Trail 6, which blasted the lead tank off the road, knocking out the tank officer. This tank was hit five times. Fire from the jungle on the north side of the road became intense; progress was blocked and the effort reversed. The remaining tanks covered the withdrawal west, under 30 minutes' continued fire from the leading disabled tank, now commanded by Pfc. R. Peeples (SS awarded later). The last enemy tank seen on the front was destroyed by our tanks 37's near Junction Trails 8 and 9. C/194th, on arrival in I Corps sector, was attached to the 192d. It had seven tanks left. The company commander received two wounds. (Captain Moffitt, SS awarded)

56. Afternoon 8th April. - General King and General Parker were out of contact with the front. Tank command moved a radio truck into Bataan Force Headquarters, and sought contact with the divisions through tank radio channels and tank liaison. General Bluemel, when last contacted about 1630, was virtually alone, attempting to re-establish the line northeast of Cabacab on Trail 20; the Alingan line had evaporated. The Group executive, Lt Col Smyth, reaching him, arranged for a plan of tank employment. The remnants of A and D/194th were involved in desperate resistance along the East Coast Road axis. The 192d was ordered to send a company to help--the situation in the I Corps sector being quiescent. First refused by the I Corps commander, the order was executed beginning at dark. By the time the company commander checked in with Group command on the road leading to Group CP it was too late, although a notable march had been made: - the 700 gallons of tank gas depended on for necessary refueling had been abandoned by the fuel dump people and had been utilized unwittingly by the SPM's. The company was ordered stopped outside the now very congested area, and turned back.

57. Cabacab line.--The remnants of A and D/194th, as darkness fell, joined the remnants of Colonel Ganahl's SPM's near Cabacab and on the feeder roads into the South Coast Road, to prevent the enemy from cutting in from Trail 20. About 1830 General King acknowledged the situation as very critical. Secret messages were sent by Group to the major unit commanders, substantially as follows:

"You will make plans, to be communicated to company commanders only, and be prepared to destroy within one hour after receipt by radio, or other means, of the word CRASH, all tanks and combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, gas, and radios; reserving sufficient trucks to close to rear echelons as soon as accomplished."

58. The decision.--At about 2230 General King announced to the three general officers present (McBride, Funk, Weaver) that further resistance would result in the massacre of
the 6,000 sick and wounded in the area and the 40,000 refugees now congested closely
about; that he was out of touch with any troops that might still be resisting behind the
closely drawn lines; that there were less than 25% effective of those now holding; that
at most he could not hold more than the next day; that he was going to send a flag
across the line at daylight; that he would take this action on his own responsibility.
Asked by the tank commander if any help was in prospect, he stated, "no". Destruction
of the main ordnance dumps was to commence at 2340. Troops would destroy their
arms and equipment and cease resistance at 0700 the 9th.

VII. CLOSING PHASE: 9 APRIL-

59. April 9th.--Colonel Williams and two other officers left at 0400 with a white flag, in
a tank 1/4-ton; and returning after contact, took General King across the line at 0700.
The signal CRASH was sent out by radio, telephone, and courier at 0535. Reports
subsequently received indicate complete compliance. The tank radio at Bataan Force
Headquarters was secreted; the Group commander proceeded to his own CP, where all
present were directed to prepare for an unknown future, ready to move with bellies and
canteens full. Trucks were hidden out for such use as might be possible; papers and
maps of use to the enemy were destroyed. The Group commander went back to Bataan
Force Headquarters, as per General King's request, to implement such instructions as
might be sent back. At about 1530, no word having been received from General King,
the Group commander proceeded to the motor pool (to join his CP), where he
encountered a Nipponese officer and patrol. It was indicated that he was to be taken to
General King. Insistence on using his own car was successful. The Chief of Staff (Gen.
Funk), Bataan Force, was picked up shortly thereafter; and a start was made, ostensibly
for Cabacaben and General King. Traffic was uncontrolled, termite-like, and in
extraordinary congestion; with Filipino refugees moving out under enemy direction,
prodding, and organized stripping; and enemy troops of all categories moving in. Three
times our party was turned about on meeting various interpreters and staff officers.
About 2100 we arrived at General Hospital No. 1, Little Gaggio, where the enemy tank
general (who claimed to be field commander in Bataan) had established his CP under
the protection of the gr.. Geneva Cross, newly illuminated by his orders. His tanks were
all about. Five varieties of light tanks were observed.

60. The conference.--Through a Nipponese Spanish-speaking interpreter the Tank
Group commander was questioned for about an hour, the party being seated on the
cross. The most insistent question was where our tanks were. The reply was that they
were destroyed. Questioned as to when, answer was "Before the surrender this
morning." Location of the armored troops was indignantly demanded. This was given--
apparently to be checked on. Engineer maps, old but official, were in the enemy hands
and were used to locate Tank Group last positions. Inquiry then turned to Corregidor and the location of the tunnel to Bataan. The tank Group commander told the Japanese "I am a soldier and you are one. You know that I cannot give you information. But so far as I know there is no tunnel between Corregidor and Bataan." The Japanese commander evinced disbelief, whereupon the Group commander jumped to his feet, shouting, "What!" The Nipponese then explained that since there was a telephone to Corregidor there must be a tunnel. No information was given and the enemy general intimated that despite the claimed slight opportunities an American general should know more than the Group commander did or appeared to. Professional interest then developed in our tank tactics. Persistent inquiry into why we maintained a tank cordon guard on the East Coast of Bataan developed the assurance that it had saved Bataan from invasion that way; and that the threat of tank action had been a deterrent all through the campaign. The melange of tank tactics in tank groups and armored divisions gave him plenty to sort out and evaluate to no advantage. Adjournment was made to next morning, for further conference. This did not develop nor the projected trip to the armored troop positions. Apparently information thereupon had been checked during the night. General Funk had been interviewed separately, in the hospital. The Group commander and his aide, Major Pettit, were quartered that night (9/10) in the Nurses' Quarters vacated at 0400 the 9th. The next morning other Bataan Force Hq officers were brought in, and US cars assembled for their move. The Group commander insisted on sending for his staff. Major Pettit was allowed to proceed and brought back the executive, the communications officer, and the headquarters commandant, with a 1/4-ton C&R, and a truck with Headquarters personnel baggage on it. Up to the time of moving out for an undisclosed destination treatment had been satisfactory and fairly courteous. Excellent further treatment was promised by the Nipponese commander. It ceased at Balanga.

VIII. Conclusions

1. The Fil-American effort had done what it could.

2. The Armored Troops had paid for themselves.

3. The Nipponese had feared most the tanks and the artillery.

4. The tanks had by their cordon coastal guard saved Bataan from invasion from Manila Bay.

5. The enemy had over-estimated our tank strength, from 33 to 900% (158 to 1080).

*radio, and written subsequently.
6. The enemy had about 200 tanks, inferior in armor, but better adapted to tropical terrain than ours and better armed as to main battery, having a very effective 47-mm gun. Report and recommendation on armored equipment was radioed to the War Department, by direction, sometime after the withdrawal to Bataan; and should be available. (Probably Ch. of Ordnance)

7. That the service rendered by the troops of this armored force was as grilling in its continuity, severity, and exactions as any rendered in either war by any arm.

JAS. R. N. WEAVER

Brig. Gen., USA

Formerly commanding

The Provisional Tank Group, USAFFE.

NOTES:

For further reading see:


3. In addition, there is an excellent documentary video, featuring interviews with survivors, titled "**In the Hands of the Enemy**". For more information, visit [http://www.enemyhands.com](http://www.enemyhands.com)

This report was copied on a manual typewriter from the original document, borrowed from the Army Office of the Chief of Military History in 1960. It was subsequently retyped into electronic form in 1994. There are a few omissions that were unreadable or
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