Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth

RICHARD BRUCE MEIXSEL

The author is a member of the department of history at James Madison University.

In his posthumously published memoirs, *The Good Fight*, long-time Philippine political leader Manuel Luis Quezon offered this account of how and why he obtained Gen. Douglas MacArthur's services as military adviser to the soon-to-be-established Philippine Commonwealth government in 1934: "I had known General MacArthur for many years and a close friendship had grown up between us.... I needed the advice of a competent man on whose judgment I could depend as to the feasibility of adequately preparing the Philippines against the day that they should become independent." He asked MacArthur: "Do you think that the Philippines can be defended after they shall have become independent?" and MacArthur replied, "I don't think so. I know that the Islands can be protected." Quezon then inquired if MacArthur would be willing to come to the islands as military adviser. MacArthur answered that, since there was no "further constructive work" he could perform in the United States, there was "nothing [he] would like more" than to help the Philippines "organize [its] own defense."¹ Quezon's recollection has reappeared in virtually every

---

study of Philippine-American relations, every biography of Quezon, and most biographies of Douglas MacArthur to explain why Quezon sought MacArthur's aid, even though one historian of the period has pointed out that Quezon clearly did not write portions of The Good Fight and probably had not even read it in its entirety before his death in 1944.2

From the beginning, there was an alternative explanation for the purpose of MacArthur's military advisersh. To its critics, the conscription-based military system MacArthur devised for the Philippines did far more than militarize a peaceable people and deny a poor country resources better spent on social and economic development. The Commonwealth's military system, wrote one observer, was a "conspiracy" deliberately calculated "to keep the United States in the islands."3 A "secret" army evaluation of MacArthur's military system prepared for the War Department's War Plans Division in December 1935 concluded that the proposed Philippine military establishment "could have little or no value as an end in itself" but could only supplement "measures the United States might be induced to take" for the Philippines' defense. "This thought, openly expressed by some," wrote the study's author, Maj. Gen. Stanley Embick, "must be in the back of the minds of all informed proponents of such an establishment." Historians have virtually ignored these critics, at most merely repeating their accusations without elaboration.4 Admittedly, the secretiveness of the Quezon-MacArthur rela-

---


4. A copy of the study, "Military aspects of the situation that would result from the retention by the United States of a military (including naval) commitment in the Philippine Islands," Dec. 2, 1935, is filed with the Frank Murphy Papers (microfilm edition, reel 102), Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years (Chicago, 1979), 192, draws attention to Stanley Embick's views; James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 502-503, reprints a portion of the study.
tionship, the destruction of documents, and the conflicting nature of surviving records makes an evaluation of Quezon's account of the genesis of the military mission problematic. Yet ample evidence exists to suggest that the military system's critics, unwittingly or not, may well have discerned the true purpose of MacArthur's military mission to the Commonwealth.

Understanding Manuel Quezon's attitude toward independence is central to understanding the significance of the Philippine military system. Despite his reputation as the leading proponent of "immediate, complete, and absolute independence" from the time of his election to the newly formed Philippine Assembly in 1907—the "Paladin of Philippine Freedom," as Carlos Quirino subtilted his biography of Quezon—a consensus has emerged that Quezon did not favor complete separation of the Philippines from the United States. In an article published more than a decade ago, historian Michael Onorato reviewed Quezon's private papers and speeches and perceived that "the pledge of independence on July 4, 1946, was given to the Philippines in spite of Quezon's best efforts to prevent it." Quezon, Onorato asserted, had come to prefer "an American connection rather than sovereign freedom" for the Philippines. Historian Gerald Wheeler has argued that Quezon favored "dominion status." "The 'confidential' memoranda strewn throughout the War Department and State Department files," Wheeler wrote, "leave no doubt about Quezon's true stand" on the issue of independence for the Philippines. The author of a more recent and broader survey of Philippine-American relations built upon the work of these historians and concluded that "Quezon and his close associates were determined that Filipinos should exist indefinitely in a state of dependence on the United States." Quezon sought "an identification other than Asian," the late Frank Golay wrote, and was confident that he could sway the masses "by parroting the slogan 'immediate, complete, and absolute independence,'" while in reality pursuing policies that perpetuated an American presence in the Philippines.5

Accepting that Quezon did hope to maintain such a relationship with the United States, he confronted a twofold problem: On the one hand, he faced the difficult challenge of convincing Filipinos to accept a more nuanced definition of independence. On the other, he had to convince Americans of the value of a continuing link with the Philippines. Driven by the economic hardships of the Depression, Congress was determined by the early 1930s to free the islands, whether Filipinos wanted independence or not. "[A] truly irrational lobby," as historian Theodore Friend called it, of farm interests seized upon Philippine agricultural exports to the United States as an "external explanation" for collapsing U.S. farm prices. These powerful interests gave their "whole-hearted support" to Filipino and American efforts "to cut the Philippines loose." Anti-immigrant and labor groups proved equally determined to support Philippine independence as a means of excluding Filipinos from the United States, for both economic and racial reasons. In the face of such opposition, Quezon had to demonstrate that continued ties to the Philippines could benefit America as well. But what could make the Philippines valuable to the United States, and what terms would satisfy Quezon's need for equality of effort and mutual respect?

Debates culminating in the passage of two independence bills, one in 1933 and a second in 1934, focused Quezon's attention on the military dimension of American-Philippine relations. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, approved by Congress over President Herbert Hoover's veto on January 17, 1933, contained a provision requiring an independent Philippine government to provide the United States with land for military and naval bases. Quezon opposed the bill and successfully led the fight against its acceptance by the Philippine legislature. Although he complained about both military and economic provisions of Hare-Hawes-Cutting, most commentators have perceived Quezon's opposition as rooted mostly in self-interest. Should the bill be accepted, Quezon's political competitors who had negotiated it would get credit for having freed the Philippines from colonial rule. His political future required a new bill, or at least one that

---

had the appearance of being new. Despite congressional reluctance to reopen the debate on Philippine independence, Quezon managed to get a modified independence bill, the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 24, 1934, and accepted by the Philippine legislature on May 1, 1934. Quezon would subsequently win election, in September 1935, as president of the Philippine Commonwealth established under the terms of Tydings-McDuffie. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting and Tydings-McDuffie bills were similar but differed in one potentially significant respect. The former had stipulated that the United States could retain existing military (a word synonymous with "army" in prewar usage) and naval reservations; the latter required the transfer of military reservations to the Philippine government at the end of a ten-year transitional Commonwealth period and left the matter of naval reservations up to negotiations between the two countries at the time of independence.

Virtually nothing is known about how or why Quezon managed this particular change in the independence bill, and the tenor of virtually all writing on the issue, both by contemporaries and scholars, is dismissive. As one member of the Philippine legislature, Jose Romero, joked in his memoirs, fortuitously for Quezon, interim American elections had put new legislators at the heads of the relevant congressional committees, so Quezon could return with the same bill under a new name. But
whatever the reason for Quezon's focus on the military provision of Hare-Hawes-Cutting, the episode drew attention to the possible basis for a mutually profitable and psychologically acceptable partnership between the two countries. As early as 1907, Theodore Roosevelt had written that the Philippines would become the "heel of Achilles" for the United States in the event of war with Japan because the American people were not willing to bear the cost of maintaining an adequate American military and naval force in the islands. In 1923 Quezon had provided a response to Roosevelt's lament by observing that "the Philippines can only be a military asset if the Filipino people are friendly to the United States and are ready to fight for them." The independence debates served to underline the obvious: Filipino soldiers could turn a "source of military weakness," as Quezon had then said, into an asset. A Filipino army, financed by the Philippine government, its loyalty to the United States symbolized by the association of a prominent American but its "commander-in-chief" a Filipino, could demonstrate the value of the Philippines to the United States and serve both countries' interests.

So it was, as Quezon negotiated changes in the independence act in early 1934, that the Philippine political leader approached U.S. Army chief of staff Douglas MacArthur and asked him to play a role in devising a military system for the Philippines. Since the completion of his most recent assignment to the Philippines more than three years earlier, MacArthur had not remained in close touch with Quezon. Nevertheless, the two men had known each other for several years and "had often discussed the problem of Philippine security" during MacArthur's tours of duty in Manila in the 1920s. While serving in the islands in 1922-1925 and again in 1928-1930, MacArthur had

8. Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954), 5: 761-762; "Untitled Statement" (1923), Manuel L. Quezon Papers, Philippine National Archives, Manila (hereafter cited as Quezon Papers), quoted in Onorato, "Quezon and Independence," 225. Quezon's statement to newspaperman Roy Howard in mid-1933 also suggests the same line of thinking. Quezon expressed himself opposed to the retention of military and naval bases if America was to retain them "without adequate fortifications and garrisons." Quoted in Friend, Between Two Empires, 123.

shown himself unusually receptive to social intercourse with Filipino elites and desirous of associating Filipinos in the army's local defense plans. MacArthur reportedly became so admired in the Philippines in those years that the announcement of his promotion to chief of staff was seen by "many" Filipinos as an "indication of hostility" toward the islands by the Hoover administration. The Philippines was being punished by the removal of its popular military commander!  

Just when MacArthur agreed to become military adviser and lead a military mission to the Philippines is unclear. In The Good Fight, Quezon appears to have combined into one episode two distinct incidents involving his contacts with MacArthur, one in early 1934 and the other near the end of the year. Quezon recalled that he had "sought a conference" with MacArthur as soon as Tydings-McDuffie had been "introduced" and after he "became certain that the new bill would become a law." MacArthur's encouraging response to Quezon's query on the defensibility of the archipelago led Quezon to proceed "at once" to gain President Roosevelt's and Secretary of War George Dern's approval of MacArthur's assignment as military adviser. This version is not quite what he told the newly

MacArthur's recollection, but Frazier Hunt, whose acquaintance with both MacArthur and Quezon went back many years, made a point of writing that "there is no record" the two had met at that time. In a 1936 speech, Quezon said he remembered meeting MacArthur in 1904 (although not at the Army and Navy Club, as MacArthur later recalled), but when he reminded MacArthur of the meeting, MacArthur told him he was mistaken and said that they had not met until the 1920s. See Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), 30; Hunt, The Untold Story, 123; and Messages of the President (Manila, 1937), vol. 2, pt. 1.123-124. On the two men's lack of contact after 1930, see MacArthur's letter to Philippine Governor-General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., April 16, 1932, in which MacArthur commented that he had "not heard from Manuel Quezon for sometime." in box 29, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

10. Governor-General Dwight Davis to Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief F. LeJ. Parker, Sept 16, 1930, in "Nicholas Roosevelt" Personal Name File, box 549, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, National Archives, College Park, Md. (hereafter cited as RG 350, NA). Box numbers are not always reliable since boxes have often been renumbered during moves to various archives. On MacArthur's rewriting of Philippine war plans to include larger numbers of Filipino soldiers, see Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997), 151-152, and Richard B. Meixsel, "Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941," Journal of Military History, 59 (1995), 307-308.

formed National Defense Council when it first met at Malacañan, the presidential palace in Manila, on November 18, 1935. On that occasion, he claimed that he had approached MacArthur after Congress had approved the independence act and that MacArthur, expressing his belief in the Philippines' ability to defend itself, said that he would be "delighted" to assist "as far as constructive policies or works are necessary during his term of office as chief of staff." He did not agree at that time to become the Commonwealth's military adviser.¹²

War Department documents and other evidence suggest that MacArthur made no definite decision to become military adviser until the end of 1934. Rather, he used his position—as he had promised Quezon he would—to devise a "constructive" military policy for the Commonwealth. In fulfillment of that promise, in July 1934 Brig. Gen. Charles Kilbourne, the head of the army's War Plans Division, cabled the Philippine garrison's commanding general, Maj. Gen. Frank Parker, asking his views on the "organization, strength, equipment, distribution, duties, and financial support of the Commonwealth forces, release of reservations to the Commonwealth for the use of such forces, [and] relations [of] federal forces and Commonwealth forces." Other senior staff officers were also asked to provide the War Plans Division with their thinking on the same topic.¹³

Ultimately, Kilbourne, himself a soldier of vast and sympathetic Philippine experience, would suggest to MacArthur that the army use the transition period "to exert an influence on the

¹². Quezon's comments to members of the council are found in an undated memorandum (but filed with other documents dated November 1935), box 71, series 8, Quezon Papers. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as MacArthur's assistant at the time, further complicates the issue. He accepts that when MacArthur asserted his belief that the Philippines could be defended, Quezon immediately asked if MacArthur would accept the military adviser post, and MacArthur answered "in the enthusiastic affirmative." But Eisenhower dates that exchange to spring 1935 (Quezon was in the United States from March to May of that year) and writes that "through correspondence [Quezon] had already expressed to General MacArthur a hope that the General would come to the Philippines Islands as 'Military Adviser.'" See Daniel D. Holt and James W. Leyerzapf, eds., Eisenhower: The Pre-war Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905-1941 (Baltimore, 1998), 287-288.

¹³. Assistant Chief of Staff (hereafter cited as ACS), War Plans Division (hereafter cited as WPD), to Chief of Staff, July 23, 1934, WPD 3251-20, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165, National Archives, College Park, Md. (hereafter cited as RG 165, NA).
nature of forces to be raised by the Commonwealth and to be maintained by the subsequent Republican government." During this "period of tutelage," Kilbourne believed, the army could guide the Filipinos through "every phase of the question of their national defense." Kilbourne suggested something similar to the national guard as a basis for a Commonwealth army. With "generous details of Regular Army personnel as commanders [and] inspector-instructors," a creditable military force would exist by the end of the Commonwealth period. The army could further build up a Philippine army by releasing all men of the Philippine Scouts (the U.S. Army's Filipino-manned regiments in the islands) who could be spared to the Philippine government and by leasing "for a nominal sum" the necessary military reservations for training and housing a Philippine army.  

Kilbourne offered this opinion to the chief of staff in mid-November 1934. MacArthur's response showed that he had by now agreed to become the Commonwealth's military adviser. He no longer had an interest in others' opinions about the Philippines' military future and acted to suppress any further army involvement in the matter. Although he had approved the original query in July, he now handed back Kilbourne's November memorandum and dictated a much different response from the one his subordinate had suggested. "No action will be taken," Kilbourne subsequently informed General Parker, "which could affect, in any way, the initiative of the Filipinos in determining the character of the defense forces to be developed." MacArthur approved this cable for transmission only after deleting the sentence that had ended Kilbourne's draft message: "Should [the Filipinos] ask advice or assistance, you will inform them they should submit [a] request to the War Department for the detail of the necessary officers." When Kilbourne raised the issue again soon after, MacArthur responded

14. ACS/WPD to Chief of Staff, Nov. 22, 1934, WPD 3251-22, RG 165, NA. Charles Kilbourne had won the medal of honor in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War, later commanded the first coast artillery unit assigned to Corregidor, served with the Philippine Constabulary, and even authored a boys' adventure story based on his Philippine experiences. He is the only American officer mentioned sympathetically and by name in E. Vallado Daroy's collection of stories about her childhood spent as an army dependent on Corregidor in the 1930s. E. Vallado Daroy, *Nobody Gathers Seashells and Gunshells Anymore* (Quezon City, 1981), 43-44.
with a handwritten note that read, "take it easy and do not force developments in this matter. We may be there [the Philippines] ten years—we may even be there indefinitely.”

By early 1934, as the reality set in that Congress would approve a Philippine independence bill, MacArthur had gone on record as opposing the retention of American military and naval bases in the Philippines; he was nevertheless not a proponent of Philippine independence. As a young army officer in the Philippines in 1903-1904, MacArthur had, in the words of biographer Frazier Hunt, "caught the vision of his father and the little group of able and far-sighted men . . . who had determined to build [t]here in the Western Pacific a sturdy outpost of American influence.” It was a vision that remained before him over the next three decades. In 1930, when MacArthur was completing his tour of duty as commanding general of the Philippine Department, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley had written a letter to Senator Hiram Bingham, chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, in which Hurley dismissed any thought that the Philippines could exist as a free nation. MacArthur promptly informed Hurley that the letter was "the most comprehensive and statesmanlike paper that has ever been presented" about the future political status of the islands and applauded with "unbounded admiration" Hurley's denunciation of the move for Philippine independence.

While most scholars have agreed that MacArthur's letter was merely an attempt to gain Hurley's support for his candidacy for army chief of staff, MacArthur's attitude did not

15. ACS/WPD to Adjutant General, Dec. 6, 1934 (modified and approved by General MacArthur, Dec. 7, 1934), and ACS/WPD to Secretary, General Staff, Dec. 14, 1934 (note signed by MacArthur, dated Dec. 17, 1934, attached), filed with WPD 3251-22, RG 165, NA.
16. Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Creed Cox to Secretary of War, Feb. 2, 1934. According to this memorandum, the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, MacArthur, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Cox had met on February 1 and agreed that all American military and naval forces should be withdrawn from the Philippines and the bases be abandoned should the islands become independent. Copy in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Office Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, microfilm ed., MF5728, pt. 3, reel 30.
17. Hunt, The Untold Story, 35.
18. Quoted in James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 342.
19. E.g., ibid.; Friend, Between Turn Empires, 78; Golay, Face of Empire, 291-292; Quirino, Quezon, 210.
change once he assumed the army's highest position. In one of his long-suppressed diaries, Dwight Eisenhower revealed that among his first duties as a "special assistant" to the chief of staff in early 1932 was the preparation of a report on Philippine independence based on Hurley's findings during a visit to the islands in September 1931. Hurley, who remained a vociferous opponent of Philippine independence, had toured the islands to confirm that Filipinos were woefully unprepared for any reduction of American control. Eisenhower dutifully advocated the "continuance of the status quo" in the islands and "denied the ability of the Filipino masses to express intelligent opinion" on important issues confronting their country. Eisenhower later revealed that MacArthur had "supervised [the report's] preparation in every detail." The report was, Eisenhower wrote, "completely negative." It suggested that the Philippines would never be capable of maintaining itself "as a completely independent nation." 20 For MacArthur, then, Quezon's offer presented an opportunity to realize old dreams of perpetuating the American presence in the Far East, an opportunity he had not foreseen but soon came to embrace. MacArthur had been surprised when Quezon asked him to return to Manila as military adviser. The army chief had already chosen his next military assignment and had "had no idea of being involved in this matter [of creating a Philippine military system]" until Quezon approached him unexpectedly in Washington. So MacArthur would tell the National Defense Council in Manila in November 1935. 21

Ten months passed from when MacArthur agreed to accept the military advisership until the War Department publicly confirmed that MacArthur expected to return to the Philippines. During that time, the chief of staff had set his subordinates to work devising a Philippine military system. 22 Eisenhower, soon

22. The New York Times first reported in July 1935 that MacArthur might go to the Philippines. President Franklin Roosevelt was soon asked about the story at a press conference. Of course, the President had known all along about Quezon's offer and MacArthur's acceptance of it, but he now "smiled broadly" and merely admitted that he had "heard rumors to that effect, too." He invited the reporters
to become a member of the mission at MacArthur's insistence, wrote that in November 1934 the commandant of the Army War College was asked to set up a "special committee" to prepare "all necessary studies, plans, laws, proposed speeches and other essential documents" for a Philippine military system. Maj. James Basevi Ord, a West Point classmate of Eisenhower's serving as an instructor at the college, was placed in charge of the committee, on which sat "several of the ablest officers of the army." Such committees were not uncommon, but this one was short-lived. There is no record of it in war college files, and in the final version of what would become the introduction to the official mission diary, Eisenhower wrote that "the details of the original plan were worked out" by Ord alone, with "intermittent assistance" from others at the war college. 23

The Philippine military system would later be compared to the citizen-army of Switzerland, when, in actuality, Major Ord borrowed from recent French experience. Ord had been stationed in the Philippines with the 31st U.S. Infantry in Manila in 1926-1928 and was knowledgeable about existing military forces in the islands. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that Ord took steps to mesh his plan for a Philippine military system with Filipino expectations and capabilities, however poorly he might have understood them. Ord was a 1924 graduate of the École Supérieure de Guerre and had spent from 1928 to 1932 as an assistant military attaché at the Paris embassy. He drew on his considerable knowledge of French military practice to prepare the "necessary studies, plans, [and] laws" that would be translated into the Commonwealth's National Defense Act in December 1935. 24

MacArthur's specific contribution to conceptualizing an appropriate military system for the Philippines was to insist that "the defense system should be based primarily on universal con-

24. Ibid., 289; "Biographical Sketch of James Basevi Ord, Major of Infantry," dated April 10, 1928, MID 2550-129, RG 165, NA.
Neither MacArthur nor anyone else had mentioned conscription in the course of the general staff's preliminary investigation in mid-1934 as to how a Philippine government might go about meeting its security needs. Likewise, no evidence shows that MacArthur was bowing to demands by Quezon that conscription form the basis of the Commonwealth military system. The expectation of independence had generated vigorous public debate on military matters in the Philippines, and there had been expressions of support for compulsory military service, but local insistence that an independent Philippines would need to improve its defense posture had led to only two concrete proposals, and neither emphasized conscription. Quezon gave his blessing to a bill (vetoed by Governor-General Frank Murphy) that would create a bureau of national defense, and he approved doubling the size of the Philippine Constabulary, the government's long-service, semi-military, national police force. Of course, Quezon had already secretly arranged to have MacArthur appointed military adviser to the Commonwealth and knew that nothing would come of these domestically generated attempts to address national security concerns.

Do the provisions of the military system support the belief

26. A copy of the national defense bureau bill, with Murphy's veto message, is filed with WPD 3251-1, RG 165, NA. On the plan to double the size of the constabulary, see *Philippines Herald*, Feb. 28, 1935, and *Manila Daily Bulletin*, March 1, 1935. Quezon's Papers, box 368, series 7, include a thirty-one-page report prepared by government "technical adviser" L. Siguion Reyna, a former assemblyman from Pangasinan and author of several government-sponsored development-oriented studies in the 1930s, titled "Preliminary Study on the Problem of Our National Defense," dated May 25, 1935, which does emphasize conscription and to which some scholars have lent great credence. A two-page summation of it appears in Gopinath, *Manuel L. Quezon*, 144–146; the author concluded that "Quezon was determined to carry out the national defense policy along the lines of [Siguion Reyna's] plan" and "reiterated the soundness of the plan" when he spoke "at the inaugural session of the national assembly." But Quezon was referring to the military mission's plan, not Siguion Reyna's. Ricardo T. Jose, *The Philippine Army, 1935–1942* (Quezon City, 1992), 31, summarizes, although it does not emphasize, the Siguion Reyna report. However, the "three systems" purported to be Siguion Reyna's are actually those of Maximo Kalaw, spoken on the floor of the national assembly on December 12, 1935. Neither author mentions Siguion Reyna's main theme, which was that the Philippines should copy the "admirable military discipline" of Germany and Japan. Its mere survival in Quezon's much-damaged papers has given Siguion Reyna's report an importance it lacked in 1935.
that it was meant to justify a continued American presence in the Philippines? In outline, as approved by the Philippine legislature on December 19, 1935, essentially as it had been presented by the military mission, the Philippine military system was based on the concept of universal obligation to military service. Each April, beginning in 1936, every male Filipino celebrating his twentieth birthday during the calendar year was to register for military service. The next month (each May 15), a portion of those registered would be chosen by lottery to report the following year for basic military training lasting five and one-half months. A select few would be given the opportunity to receive additional training. Ultimately, about 40,000 conscripts a year were to be trained. The conscripts then passed into the first reserve. At age thirty-one, they entered the second reserve; at age forty-one through age fifty, the third and final reserve. Eventually, the reserve would include several hundred thousand trained men.

It is less the military system itself than the acceleration of its implementation that suggests an ulterior motive. In 1937, the first year of conscript training, Ord and Eisenhower had expected to call to service only 6,000 registrants. New officers, acquired through an array of commissioning programs, would practice their profession on this small contingent of trainees, 3,000 of whom would train from January to June followed by a second 3,000 from July to December. Not until 1942 was the army to have begun to accommodate the full 40,000 trainees per year ultimately called for in the mission’s plan. Even this scheme might have been overly ambitious, yet rather than conscript just 6,000 registrants in 1937, it was soon decided that 40,000 registrants be trained that year and every year thereafter. The original plan called for seven reserve divisions to be raised by the end of the Commonwealth period; now, thirty divisions were to be formed. As Eisenhower would write in a 1942 memorandum destined for President Quezon, this decision had momentous and entirely negative consequences. It caused "considerable changes in construction, in training and organization programs, and eventually resulted in a growing shortage of qualified instructors when trainees [concripts] reported to training camps." Moreover, he continued, "this change of planning . . . eliminated the financial reserve that was expected to pile up
Quezon and MacArthur

during the first few years and so created difficulties in the purchase of equipment that was desired."27 This decision—made at the very start of the system's implementation—effectively destroyed whatever chance the Philippine military system had ever had of succeeding.

Who made this decision, and why? In a diary entry written in May 1936, Eisenhower explained that MacArthur "quite suddenly" determined "to take in the full quota of forty thousand conscripts during the year [1937] instead of the total of six thousand contemplated under the original plan." Three years later, in April 1939, Eisenhower recorded the details of a lengthy conversation he had had with Quezon. In regard to a Philippine Army study he had been given, which questioned the continued training of large numbers of conscripts when the army faced more pressing needs, Quezon asked Eisenhower why the decision had been made in 1936 to increase trainee numbers. Eisenhower now remembered that he and Ord had been told in 1936 (presumably by MacArthur, although the general's name was not mentioned) that Quezon "believed the psychological reaction of the people would be bad if only a small number of trainees was inducted promptly after the first registration of military manpower." According to Eisenhower, in response "he [Quezon] just said, 'I never heard of such a thing.'"28

President Quezon had more military experience than is sometimes realized. He had witnessed the American assault on Manila in 1898 while a corporal in a Spanish volunteer unit and later had served as an officer in the revolutionary army. His experience had left him with little confidence in Filipino military expertise, however, and, at least at first, he deferred entirely to his military adviser when it came to the details of both the military system and how the army would be used to defend the archipelago (a related but different topic about which almost nothing is known and beyond the scope of this article).29 Still,

he had clearly been impressed by the registration turnout in April 1936. The army had expected about 134,000 registrants; there had been nearly 150,000. Having been initially apprehensive about public willingness to support the military system, the higher-than-expected registration figures left Quezon exuberant. He was "beginning to think," he wrote to Roy Wilson Howard, the influential president of the Scripps-Howard newspaper empire, "that, perhaps, there is more strength and more will power, more determination, on the part of the Filipino people than the world has suspected." He may well have now questioned why military training would be given to a mere 6,000 of the 150,000 young men who presumably were prepared to serve in the new army. By contrast, while gratified by the large turnout, neither MacArthur nor Philippine Army headquarters accepted that the 1936 registration numbers reflected genuine enthusiasm for military service. Army headquarters came to believe that the public had misunderstood registration requirements and that "many over and under aged men not knowing their exact age" had registered for fear that they would otherwise be prosecuted. MacArthur was quoted as having commented that the large number of registrants suggested to him that the Philippines' population was greater than commonly believed. Perhaps a new census was in order?

Yet while the April 1936 registration may well have impressed Quezon more than it did MacArthur, the mission diary reveals that well before April, MacArthur was considering an enlargement of the plan. Eisenhower noted that, "as early as January [1936]," the mission had "initiated detailed conferences with the [U.S. Army's Philippine] department staff in an effort to have . . . considerable numbers trained in 1937 at the various army posts." Nothing came of the idea, but the decision to ac-

31. Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., Eisenhower, 308-309; Bulletin 64, Headquarters Philippine Army, June 1, 1940. MacArthur's comments were queried by a journalist in a press conference at Malacanan, July 10, 1936, box 76, series 8, Quezon Papers, and were confirmed by army chief of staff Paulino Santos. See Onorato, ed., Origins of the Philippine Republic, 91. MacArthur was right. When the 1939 census (the first taken in over two decades) appeared, it revealed that there had been about 166,000 Filipino males aged twenty in 1936. Thus, there had not been 16,000 registrants too many in 1936; there had been 16,000 too few.
Celereate the military system seems to have been MacArthur's. He remained determined to have a thirty-division army and repeatedly rejected any criticism of his plan to build one as rapidly as possible.33

33. Exactly how many Filipinos MacArthur expected to train is unclear, although 400,000 is a figure frequently mentioned as the size of the army's first reserve. The figure was presumably arrived at by adding up the 40,000 reservists to be trained each year over the Commonwealth's projected ten-year life span. Louis Morton, in the U.S. Army's official history of the 1941-1942 Philippine Campaign, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1953), 10, gives this total, citing an unpublished 1945 U.S. Army compilation, "The Philippine Army: Its Establishment, Organization and Legal Basis." But the unnamed authors of that document, citing speeches made by President Quezon, claim that MacArthur expected to produce 300,000 reservists by 1946 and almost one million over the next two decades. Various contemporaries gave the figures of 400,000 or 500,000 reservists by 1945 or 1946, with an additional one million or 1,250,000 men to have received some form of military training, either by the end of the Commonwealth period or over subsequent years. See Popper, "Creating a Philippine Commonwealth," 242; Vicente Pacis, National Defense: A Basic Philippine Problem (Manila, 1937), 25; Robert Aura Smith, "Filipinos Raise Draft Army," New York Times, July 5, 1936; Harold Fey, "Militarizing the Philippines," Nation, June 10, 1936; Fey, "Sabotaging Philippine Schools," Christian Century, Nov. 4, 1936; Fey, "Quezon Needs Gold for Guns," ibid., March 10, 1937.

These varied numbers underscore how poorly understood the most basic details of the military system were, even by those, like Vicente Pacis and Robert Aura Smith, well placed to have access to reliable information. But the official documents also give conflicting figures: An undated (probably 1936) memorandum, "Expansion of Plan," in Record Group 1 (microfilm edition, reel 1), MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Va. (hereafter RG 1, MacArthur Library), states that the "original program" called for the formation of seven reserve divisions totaling 63,000 men by 1945, with a total of twenty-one divisions created by 1965. Under MacArthur's accelerated thirty-division (raised over ten years) plan adopted in 1936, the first reserve was now expected to include 270,000 soldiers. A December 1939 Philippine Army general staff and military mission memorandum destined for Quezon (microfilm edition, reel 2, RG 1, MacArthur Library) raised this total to "about 300,000." However, an August 1940 memorandum that Eisenhower prepared for Quezon (reprinted in Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., Eisenhower, 468-488) stated that the thirty divisions of the first reserve would consist of "some 220,000 men," and by the time the entire ninety-division program had been completed at the end of thirty years, there were to be an estimated 650,000 men in the "field forces." The first reserve totals do not reflect the maximum number of men to be trained each year (40,000) multiplied by the number of years of the Commonwealth (ten), because the mission estimated that close to 25 percent of the men trained each year would not be qualified for assignment to a reserve division. On this, see Eisenhower's "Cost of Defense Plan" memorandum, June 15, 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., Eisenhower, 313. In the diary entry of October 8, 1937, ibid., 360-364, Eisenhower admits that the percentage was calculated in part to discourage MacArthur from pursuing the thirty-division program. MacArthur himself, in his Reminiscences, 104, used the 400,000 figure but now claimed there would be forty, not thirty, divisions.
Assuming one thought the Philippines needed an army to begin with, there was nothing intrinsically wrong with basing the Philippines' military system on universal conscription, whether the system was meant to encourage the United States to remain in the islands or not. Many observers in the Philippines thought that programs of national manpower and resource mobilization had worked wonders in other countries. Would not the Philippines experience the same results? A conscription-based military force provides an inexpensive alternative to a regular long-service force, but building any kind of military organization requires time. The problem in 1936 lay in MacArthur's insistence that large numbers of soldiers be called to service at once. One explanation presents itself: MacArthur was determined to demonstrate the usefulness of a Filipino army in meeting America's strategic needs in the Far East, and to do so quickly. In 1936 the Philippine Army was important as a symbol of what the Philippines could offer the United States; having an armed force that was well trained and competently run—something that would take many years to achieve—was secondary.

More explicit evidence that Quezon and MacArthur expected the availability of a Philippine military force to lead the U.S. government to reappraise its determination to sever its relationship with the Philippines is to be found in the two men's personal papers and those of their correspondents. Quezon's papers are the least revealing, but they do include one speech, undated and never delivered, in which the speaker explained that the Philippines would provide "manpower" to develop "a program of land defense" in coordination with the building of an American naval base in the islands.34

Quezon usually refrained from openly linking the military system to America's continued presence in the Philippines, but his confidants were less reticent. Newspaper president Howard had met Quezon during a visit to the Philippines in 1925 and over the next decade had kept in sporadic contact with the "delightfully interesting," albeit "thoroughly Machiavellian," Philip-

34. This speech was written sometime after passage of Tydings-McDuffie but prior to the formation of the Commonwealth, Manuel L. Quezon Papers (microfilm edition, reel 18), Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
pine politician. During negotiations in late 1933 and early 1934 leading up to the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Quezon had spoken often with Howard to discuss strategies for obtaining a "fairer deal" for the Philippines. According to Howard's diary, even after President Roosevelt had signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Quezon confided that "the Islands [would] be much better off under the American flag."\(^{35}\) Indeed, if Filipino journalist and long-time political insider Carlos P. Romulo is to be believed, it was Howard "who first suggested" to Quezon that MacArthur be approached about his willingness to return to Manila as military adviser with the inauguration of the Commonwealth.\(^{36}\) Neither Howard's nor Romulo's manuscript holdings confirm the recollection,\(^{37}\) but Howard was a keen proponent of continued Filipino-American ties. In a letter sent to a number of friends and associates, Howard asserted that he had had "long confidential talks about the Philippine defense situation" with MacArthur and Quezon, and he believed that the three shared a common vision. "With the lapsing of the [Washington] naval treaty [of 1922] next year," he wrote from Manila in November 1935, where he had gone to attend the Commonwealth's inaugural ceremonies, "our hands will be freed, and ... there will be nothing to prevent our modernization of Corregidor and our building of an adequate naval base and drydock in the Islands, which two actions combined with the development of an adequate Filipino land force, would completely change the present picture."\(^{38}\)

For his part, to both military and civilian correspondents in the United States, MacArthur made no secret of the larger pur-

\(^{35}\) Roy Wilson Howard diaries, entries of Oct 18, 1925, Dec. 10, 29, 31, 1933, Jan. 7, April 1, 1934. I am very grateful to Pamela Howard for the opportunity to consult her grandfather's diaries.


\(^{37}\) In addition to his diaries, which remain in the possession of the family, Howard left papers to the Library of Congress and Indiana University. Carlos Romulo's earlier papers (beginning mostly in the 1940s) are found at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. His later papers were (in 1994) held by the Ayala Museum Library, Makati, Metro Manila.

\(^{38}\) Howard to "Deak" [G. B. Parker], with copies to six others, Nov. 23, 1935, Roy W. Howard Archives, Indiana University, Bloomington.
pose of the military force he went to the Philippines to create. Indeed, he articulated a vision of Philippine-American military collaboration that went beyond Quezon's own expectation. In July 1936, for example, MacArthur told Hugh Drum, commanding general of the army garrison in Hawai‘i, that, thanks to "the development of [Commonwealth military forces], the American Army, for the first time in thirty-five years, will be in a position, not only to adequately protect [the Philippines] from predatory attack, but what is really important, to thoroughly protect a navy base." Drum understood the significance of MacArthur's words immediately. "Your proposal to amalgamate . . . the new local forces with our regular army... will possibly lead to a final agreement providing for mutual responsibility along defense lines. Such a bond would insure a link between the two countries beneficial to both."  

MacArthur sent a similar message to Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley. With the development of the Philippine Army, MacArthur wrote, "an adequate Navy base can be maintained here with perfect security." Enclosing copies of his 1936 report on Philippine national defense and a speech by Quezon on the same topic, MacArthur suggested in a letter to fellow Corps of Engineers officer John C. H. Lee that it would be clear "what neither of them contained" explicitly: that, "in addition to other purposes," MacArthur was building up the "left wing" of America's Pacific defense line. The United States should have naval bases in both Alaska and the Philippines, MacArthur stated, and the Philippine Army would defend the latter. "I hope, sooner or later," MacArthur wrote, that "there will be enough of a glimmering of intelligence in those in control of the American government to understand and comprehend what is taking place."  

MacArthur's openness was not restricted to old army comrades. The MacArthur Memorial Library includes copies of similar letters to a civilian friend, Frederick Payne, and to Secretary of War Dern.  

MacArthur got the attention of "those in control" but not the results he had anticipated. As the military mission and Philippine Army officers worked diligently to prepare for the first batch of conscripts scheduled to report for duty in January 1937, critics of MacArthur's activities stepped up their attacks. The scheme of national conscription and the diversion of such a large portion of the government's revenue to military spending had, from the beginning, drawn an array of domestic and American opponents. Well-known pacifist Harold Fey, serving in 1935 as the executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, had drawn unfavorable attention to MacArthur during the general's tenure as chief of staff in Washington and now opposed MacArthur's activities in Manila. Fey's criticisms reflected the pacifist community's concern with the worldwide trend toward militarization in the 1930s and specifically the suspicion that the implementation of a military draft in the islands was but a trial run for carrying out the War Department's Industrial Mobilization Plan in the United States.\(^4\) Fey's interest was also personal. He had taught at a seminary in the Philippines in the late 1920s and had met MacArthur at the time, a brief acquaintance that left Fey convinced that MacArthur was both dangerous and dishonest.\(^3\) Fey turned the spotlight again on MacArthur in mid-1936, when, in a brief article in the *Nation*, he called attention to the domestic and international implications—in his view all negative—of the general's unsupervised and unauthorized activities in the Philippines. In a much-quoted article, "Sabotaging Filipino Schools," that appeared near the end of the year in *Christian Century*, Fey labeled MacArthur's military system a "colossal fascist plan" that

---


43. Fey had written an article quoting from a speech he claimed MacArthur had given at the Manila Rotary Club in 1929 in which MacArthur had said that "war is inherent in our way of life" and had spoken pessimistically about the ability of nations to coexist peaceably. Asked to comment on the article before its publication, MacArthur recalled that he had merely been quoting "from a book under discussion." Fey responded with copies of newspaper articles in which MacArthur's words had appeared and affidavits attesting that no book had been under review that day. Fey's article, "Has Bernhardi Become Chief of Staff?" and the related correspondence are printed in *The World Tomorrow*, 14 (Oct 1931), 312-316. Fey recounted the episode in *How I Read the Riddle: An Autobiography* (St. Louis, 1982), 59-61.
was rapidly replacing the Philippine school system with a "huge military machine."44

Fey’s accusations took on new energy when they were picked up by the Foreign Policy Association. In a report published as part of the association’s Foreign Policy Reports series in December 1936, David H. Popper hypothesized that the only "reasonable" explanation for the Commonwealth government’s assumption of "a course of militarization [it] can ill afford" was that the Philippine Army was "intended to strengthen American military power in the Western Pacific in the event of war with Japan." If the Philippines were to become truly independent, Popper went on to write, it would "be necessary to combat what amounts to a covert conspiracy to keep the United States in the Islands."45 Popper’s claims made a big splash in the Manila papers. The Daily Bulletins front-page headline on December 22 read "P.I. [Philippine Islands] Defense Program Called 'Conspiracy' to Keep U.S. Here." A week later, the paper ran a lengthy article, again on the front page, that quoted extensively from Popper’s report. The Philippines Herald, which under Romulo’s editorship served as "the voice of … support of Quezon and MacArthur in all they hoped to do for the Philippines," kept the Popper story off the front page but ridiculed it at length in an editorial.46

For the most part, Quezon ignored what he labeled the "trivial" complaints about the military system made by domestic critics, but Fey’s and Popper’s hostile articles concerned him. Quezon told former Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison, who had recently returned to the islands as an adviser to the Philippine president, that he took Popper’s accusations especially seriously and felt he had to dispute them publicly. Oth-

44. Fey, "Militarizing the Philippines," 736-737; Fey, "Sabotaging Filipino Schools," 1454-1456.
45. Popper, "Creating a Philippine Commonwealth," 242-244. Popper was not a specialist on the Philippines. A recent graduate of Harvard, he had been hired by the Foreign Policy Association as a full-time writer and researcher in 1934. Over a period of five years, he authored or coauthored a dozen such reports, dealing with a wide array of topics, from U.S. Latin American policy to the question of aid for German refugees. See Frank W. Abbott, "From Versailles to Munich: The Foreign Policy Association and American Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1972), 101, 203-204.
erwise, Popper's claims might be believed in the United States, and "in consequence the War Department might be investigated by Congress." 47

Quezon went on the offensive. He called Col. Fidel Segundo, the University of the Philippines' long-time commandant of cadets, to his office and instructed him to prepare the cadet corps to serve as a suitably martial audience for an important presidential address. On January 18, 1937, before a large crowd of cadets and students, and backed by all of the senior officers of the Philippine Army as well as by Ord, Capt. T. J. Davis, and Capt. Bonner Fellers from the military mission, Quezon made a major policy speech denouncing the statements made in Fey's and Popper's articles. Point by point, he refuted their claims. Quezon specifically did not, however, reject the possibility that an American naval base might be built in the Philippines. He also stressed that "the idea of making Field Marshal MacArthur a Military Adviser to the Government of the Commonwealth" had been made by President Quezon himself, and "no one [else], either American or Filipino, . . . ever suggested the thought," although neither Fey nor Popper had claimed otherwise. 48 Since the accusations supposedly had no basis in fact, it was quite a display. A week later, on January 25, 1937, Quezon left for an extended trip to the United States.

Exactly what Quezon hoped to achieve in the United States is not clear. Ostensibly he was going to open talks on economic readjustment, as called for by Tydings-McDuffie. 49 From a mili-

49. He was also planning to enjoy himself. Quezon told Francis Harrison that he had, "through some friends," acquired $25,000 to spend on the trip and commented that this would be the first time he had visited America with a great deal of money at his disposal. Whatever else he did, Harrison recorded Quezon as saying, he intended "to stay away until I have spent it all on having a really good time." "Quezon Conversations" (microfilm copy of Harrison's unedited diary), entry of Jan. 20, 1937, Francis B. Harrison Papers, Special Collections, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville. Some authors have written that Quezon visited the United States at the invitation of Paul McNutt to attend the new high commissioner's appointment ceremony in Washington, but Quezon was already en route to Washington when Roosevelt unexpectedly chose McNutt to replace Frank Murphy.
tary perspective, however, two aspects of Quezon’s trip loomed large: independence and naval bases. Quezon advanced the idea that the Philippines should receive an early grant of independence (that is, an acceleration of the post-Commonwealth status promised by the terms of Tydings-McDuffie, which might include the continuation of an American naval presence in the islands). Quezon purported to believe that independence would allow him to “adjust the island economy” and ameliorate the loss of favored access to the American market called for by Tydings-McDuffie. Others have found in the demand for early independence the usual self-interest that drove so many of Quezon’s actions. In their view, Quezon wanted to be president of the Philippine Republic. To achieve that goal, he needed a new constitution granting him the right to seek reelection as the Philippines’ chief executive, something it would be “most embarrassing” for him to attempt while the Philippines remained under American control.

But independence had an important implication for the development of MacArthur’s military system. As defined by Quezon, “independence” did not mean that the United States and the Philippines could not continue some kind of special relationship. What it did mean was fulfilling the provision in Tydings-McDuffie calling for the removal of land-based U.S. armed forces. In other words, early independence would enable the Commonwealth to gain access to the personnel and training areas of the U.S. Army’s Philippine Department. As seen by his note to General Kilbourne in December 1934, MacArthur was ambivalent about the departure of U.S. ground forces from the Philippines, despite the wording of Tydings-McDuffie. Certainly, MacArthur had expected to retain his authority as chief of staff for several months after departing Washington for Manila in October 1935, and he had fully intended to use that authority to draw on the availability of U.S. Army posts and soldiers to implement his Philippine military system. To do so, MacArthur had arranged for an extraordinary letter to be sent to General


Parker, the commanding general of the U.S. military garrison in the Philippines in 1935. Under the signature of the army's acting adjutant general, these "confidential instructions" informed Parker that the establishment of "an adequate native national defense for the Commonwealth" was "hereby made the most important peacetime mission of [his] command." In pursuit of that mission, Parker was to furnish MacArthur "every reasonable assistance and give every possible help." The military adviser, Parker was told, had been "empowered to use his own judgment and call upon you for whatever assistance he may require." In short, MacArthur had given himself carte blanche to raid the Philippine Department's resources. Parker told Governor-General Murphy that he had never "seen such orders in his entire career."52

General Parker had almost immediately questioned the legality of the instructions. Writing to Secretary of War Dern, Parker complained that "the use of United States funds or property . . . in aid of the mission would appear to be a direct violation of statute. . . . The foregoing applies equally to the use of Army personnel."53 Parker left the islands in December 1935, and General Kilbourne, MacArthur's friend and commander of harbor defenses, temporarily took over the Philippine Department until Parker's official replacement arrived.54 As head of War Plans Division in mid-1934, Kilbourne had recommended placing American soldiers and facilities in the islands at the disposal of the Commonwealth government. Now, the two generals worked out a "plan whereby the Regular United States Army in the Philippines [could] assist in the organization of the Army of the Philippines." The Commonwealth government would fund an officers' training school at Fort McKinley, Philippine

52. Acting Adjutant General Brigadier General E. T. Conley to Commanding General, Philippine Department, Sept. 18, 1935, microfilm edition, reel 1, RG 1, MacArthur Library; Fine, Frank Murphy, 187.
53. Parker to Dern, Nov. 14, 1935, WPD 3389-30, RG 165, NA.
54. The normal length of a Philippine assignment was two years, but Brigadier General Kilbourne's fifth and final tour of Philippine duty lasted less than twelve months, from March 19, 1935, to February 22, 1936. Could MacArthur have arranged Kilbourne's transfer to the islands to ensure the presence of a supportive senior officer in the American army garrison? Kilbourne had to have made a special request for Philippine duty, since his last assignment to the islands had ended less than three years earlier, in late 1932.
Army officers would be attached for training at other department posts, and those enlisted men destined for cadre duty would first be assigned to Philippine Scout units to observe the "normal routine of barracks and mess management, care of equipment, and . . . rules of health and sanitation."\footnote{Philippines Herald, Feb. 10, 1936.}

Kilbourne remained only a short while in Manila. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Lucius R. Holbrook, one of the U.S. Army's most senior officers when he assumed command of the Philippine Department in February 1936. Holbrook had graduated from West Point in 1896 and had served three previous tours of duty in the islands, including service in the Philippine-American War. According to newspaper reports, Holbrook prided himself on having kept up on local affairs, even to the extent of continuing a subscription to a Manila newspaper after completing his most recent tour of duty in the Philippines as commanding general of Camp Stotsenburg (the future Clark Air Base), Pampanga, from 1926 to 1929. Like MacArthur, Holbrook was a much-decorated veteran of World War I in which, again like MacArthur, he had served as a brigade commander with the American Expeditionary Forces. Holbrook would head the Philippine garrison until February 1938, during the crucial founding years of the Philippine Army.

At first, Holbrook appears to have been suspicious of the military mission. He had hardly moved into the commanding general's spacious office in Fort Santiago before Eisenhower noted in the mission diary that "Department Headquarters has shown a disposition to question the legality and propriety" of MacArthur's September 1935 letter of authority.\footnote{Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., Eisenhower, 308. For details of Holbrook's service, see Philippines Herald, Feb. 8, 13, 1936, and the Army Register.}

In his biography of MacArthur, one of the few books that says anything about Holbrook and his relationship with MacArthur at this time, D. Clayton James has opined that Holbrook resented the military mission's demands on the Philippine Department's personnel and resources and attempted to thwart MacArthur's activities. The more MacArthur asked of the local American army garrison, James concluded, the more Holbrook's annoyance threatened to turn into outright hostility.\footnote{James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 514-515.}
Recently, historian Brian McAllister Linn has focused on Philippine Department war planning at the time of Holbrook’s command to offer a somewhat different view of Holbrook. Accepting that “Holbrook and MacArthur clashed over equipment and personnel,” Linn has argued that nevertheless both men "shared an unswerving belief in their ability to defend the archipelago." Quoting from letters Holbrook sent to Gen. Malin Craig, MacArthur's successor as army chief of staff, Linn portrays Holbrook as determined to implement a "new strategy" of aggressively defending the Philippines, or at least Luzon island. Holbrook's new war plan eschewed the "retreat-to-Bataan tactics" of earlier commanders and committed the garrison to a forward strategy of beach defense. Holbrook purported to believe, he told Craig, that the Commonwealth army made "an ever increasing potential Reserve for the American forces in the Philippines" and insisted that "full use" would be made of Philippine Army personnel. 58

Captain Fellers, a member of the military mission from 1936 to 1938, has left an intriguing account of Holbrook's activities in the Philippines that calls into question the sincerity of Holbrook's commitment to reinvigorating Philippine defenses and supporting the new army. Fellers recounted a visit with Holbrook in June 1936 at which Holbrook announced that the Philippine Department would play an important part in developing the Philippine Army, revising war plans frequently to keep abreast of its growth and readily contributing Philippine Scouts to help train the army. Fellers wrote that Holbrook's attitude was a "180 degree reversal" of opinions that the commanding general had expressed earlier and implied that the changed attitude was a result of MacArthur's having spoken sharply to "the Great Holbrook." Fellers concluded by commenting that MacArthur thought Holbrook's conversion insincere. 59

On the surface, MacArthur may have welcomed Holbrook's desire to overturn the tepid war plans of previous commanders and return to something reminiscent of the military adviser's own late-1920s defense scheme. Furthermore, Holbrook may have been sincere in claiming to perceive a commonality of pur-

59. Bonner Fellers to Dorothy [his wife], June 20, 1936, box 1, Record Group 44A (hereafter cited as RG 44A), MacArthur Library.
pose between the activities of his headquarters and of the military mission. On the other hand, Holbrook may have been reprising a strategy used by a World War I-era commander of the Philippine Department to fend off the Philippine government’s attempt to draw on the army’s resources in order to establish a Philippine national guard division. The commanding general at that time, Brig. Gen. Robert K. Evans, had on his own initiative reorganized the garrison, an action that had the effect of ensuring that the army’s personnel and equipment would be unavailable for the proposed Filipino military force. As then Governor-General Harrison and the citizen-soldier officers of the national guard readily perceived, this was precisely the purpose of the reorganization, although Evans presented his actions as calculated to enhance the islands’ defense. Similarly, Holbrook’s enthusiasm—real or feigned—for shaking up the usually somnolent U.S. Army garrison in the Philippines worked against MacArthur. His approach ensured that army resources would be unavailable to the Commonwealth except on Holbrook’s terms. Worse still, it challenged MacArthur’s claim to be the senior military authority in the Philippines. Compliancy and subordination were what MacArthur needed in a Philippine Department commander.

60. This episode can be followed in Ralph W. Jones’s unpublished exposé, “The Truth About the National Guard,” BIA 2275-321A, RG 350, NA. Jones was one of the guard’s senior American officers.

61. Unfortunately, little is known about MacArthur’s relationships with the commanders of the Philippine Department, and the existing secondary sources addressing the topic are largely misleading. According to James, MacArthur’s dealings with Holbrook’s successor, Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes, were “reasonably harmonious.” With Hughes’s successor, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, MacArthur found “at last... an old and trusted friend” at the head of the Philippine Department. The two men, James writes, “conferred frequently and, because of their deep mutual esteem, made the amalgamation of the U.S. and Philippine military establishments much smoother when that action became necessary in mid-1941.” See James, The Years of MacArthur, 1:533-535. (Another officer, Maj. Gen. Walter S. Grant, actually served as Grunert’s immediate predecessor, not Hughes, but James does not mention him.) MacArthur told Philippine Army Brig. Gen. Vicente P. Lim, however, that the military mission was being kept in the dark about Grunert’s activities, and MacArthur complained to Quezon about being excluded from conferences the president was having with Grunert and other civil and military authorities. MacArthur forced Grunert’s return to the United States within three months of being recalled to active duty in July 1941. See Meixsel, “Major General George Grunert,” 310, 320. One of MacArthur’s wartime intelligence chiefs, Elliott Thorpe, adds the detail that MacArthur was incensed to learn that the Philippine
mean the removal of the American army command in the islands, which would free up men and material for use by the Philippine government and expedite the implementation of the Philippine military system.62

The "American" garrison itself consisted mostly of Filipino soldiers, the 6,000-strong Philippine Scouts. While the War Department never publicly voiced a definite opinion concerning the disposition of the Scouts, both Filipinos and Americans assumed that these well-trained cavalry, infantry, artillery, and sup-

Department was spying on him in the late 1930s, a discovery that of course did little to harmonize the relationship between the mission and department headquarters. See Elliott Thorpe, *East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939–49* (Boston, 1969), 97–98.

Although he says nothing explicitly about either Hughes or Grunert, Linn’s innovative exploitation of war planning records for the period 1936-1940 leads to insightful observations about the relationship between the two commands but also to dubious conclusions. Linn believes that Holbrook's WPO (War Plan Orange)-2 began a process by which Holbrook and his successors were allowed to base "much of their defense plans on the Commonwealth army," an irresponsible policy that Malin Craig (and by implication, his successor, George Marshall) fostered "by his timidity," failure to perform "his duty, as chief of staff," and "lack of direction." This seems overdrawn. As Linn acknowledges, Craig made clear his opposition to Holbrook's plans and denied him the resources to put them into effect. (See Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 234, 237.) That, combined with the knowledge that the ailing Holbrook's tour of duty would soon end, might account for Craig's supposed "timidity." In fact, WPO-2 included provisions for incorporating only a small portion of the Philippine Army into the department defense plan, and as Holbrook's successor, Hughes seems to have done little or nothing to build upon Holbrook's schemes. By contrast, Grunert's 1940-1941 war plan (WPO-3) marked a clear break with previous local defense plans, but even he began to receive modest support from Washington for his more ambitious use of the Philippine Army only in 1941.

62. Supporting the famous island fortress of Corregidor and the other Manila and Subic Bay coast artillery forts would have been beyond the Commonwealth's means (even the United States kept gun batteries on the harbor forts in caretaker status during the 1920s and 1930s), but other army posts would be far more useful to the Philippines and did not require considerable expense to maintain. The reservations of Stotsenburg, fifty-five miles north of Manila and at the time one of the largest U.S. Army posts in existence, the smaller but still extensive Fort McKinley, adjacent to Manila, and Camp Keithley, on Mindanao, would provide more than adequate space for large-scale Philippine Army maneuvers and permanent garrisons. Stotsenburg's significance as a training site is explored in Richard B. Meixsel, "Camp Stotsenburg and the Army Experience in the Philippines," *Bulletin of the American Historical Collection*, 22 (July-Sept. 1994), 13-15, 29-30. The limitations placed on the expansion of Philippine Army activities as a result of the inability to use existing U.S. Army facilities are brought out very clearly in Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., *Eisenhower*, 300-301.
port regiments would form part of a Filipino army. MacArthur had expected to expedite the creation of the Philippine Army by using these units to serve as cadres around which local military forces could be raised. Instead, to benefit from these resources, he found himself having to rely entirely on the sympathy and goodwill of whoever happened to be garrison commander. No role suited MacArthur less than that of supplicant. Independence would end this subordination.

The other significant aspect of Quezon's trip to the United States in early 1937 was his intent to reach an agreement with President Roosevelt over the issue of building a U.S. naval base in the Philippines. Although this matter drew relatively little attention in the United States, in the Philippines people viewed resolution of the naval bases clause of the Tydings-McDuffie Act as one of the main purposes of Quezon's visit. When asked at a press conference in Manila in December 1936 if "negotiations looking to an establishment of American naval bases" were not "incompatible" with Tydings-McDuffie's provision for neutralizing the islands, Quezon responded that a "neutralization treaty, at least for the time being, has lost all attraction" for him. Manila papers quoted legislators as speaking publicly in favor of providing naval base sites to the United States, and one provincial paper concluded that the reason MacArthur was accompanying Quezon on the trip was "in connection with the proposed establishment of American naval bases in the islands," an observation also made by at least one American newspaper. Such


64. "Press Conference at the Office of the President of the Philippines on Dec. 16, 1936," box 74, series 8, Quezon Papers.

65. *Philippines Herald*, Dec. 28, 1936; *Bacolod Commoner*, Jan. 21, 1937; *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 18, 1937. A clipping from the latter paper reporting that "the purpose of MacArthur's trip [was said to be] to support Quezon's proposal that the United States establish a permanent naval base in the Philippines" was passed along to Frank Murphy by Stanley Embick, who wanted to bring the "disturbing" news about "MacArthur's intention" to the High Commissioner's notice. See Embick to Murphy, Jan. 26, 1937, reel 32, Murphy Papers.
speculation appeared in private correspondence as well. On the eve of Quezon's departure, long-time Quezon supporter Arsenio Luz informed Roy Howard that the Commonwealth president was "now ready openly to advocate the establishment of American naval bases in the Philippines."  

Following some controversy over whether Roosevelt would even meet with Quezon, the Philippine president arrived in Washington, D.C., on February 26, 1937, and lunched the same day at the White House. Several accounts of the meeting exist from which almost any conclusion might be drawn. During the hour-and-a-half meeting, Quezon raised the issue of an American naval base in the islands. He reportedly later told Col. Frank Hodsell, a Manila-based British businessman, that he was "delighted with the interview," during which Roosevelt had said "that the United States would always require a naval base in the islands." But, like the word "independence," the word "base" was open to interpretation. According to a memorandum Quezon prepared for his executive secretary, Jorge Vargas, Roosevelt had replied that he had "already made up his mind," when asked if he "had any idea" on the matter of a naval base. He wanted a "safe port" where naval ships could retreat for "some wholesome" vacation, but "under no circumstances" did he want the place to be fortified. Fellers, who accompanied Quezon to the United States, prepared a lengthy memorandum of the meeting. In it, Quezon is recorded as having expressed himself "elated" with his meeting with Roosevelt, but there is no mention of naval bases. Roy Howard later saw Quezon and commented that Quezon seemed "evasive." To Howard's surprise, Quezon had not spoken forthrightly with Roosevelt about the Philippine leader's desire to perpetuate Philippine-American ties, nor is there mention of Quezon having raised the topic of naval bases. Based on comments Roosevelt made to his cabinet members after introducing Quezon to them at the White

68. "Memorandum of My Conference with the President of the United States held on Feb. 26, 1937, between 1 and 2:25 p.m.," box 82, series 8, Quezon Papers.
House, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes wrote in his diary that Roosevelt told them that he would "like to see the neutrality of the Philippines recognized by the Great Powers." Ickes thought that the President had probably "stimulated Quezon to work for something in that direction." The Washington Post, however, quoted Quezon as saying after the meeting that he was "for the withdrawal of United States military forces at once," but, as for the navy, "that [was] impossible now" and could be discussed later. As for neutrality, Quezon said that he had no objection to it, but the Philippines was "not relying on any treaty of neutrality." 69

Reflecting from afar on Quezon's four-month trip to the United States, former Governor-General Harrison concluded that "an unfavorable reception for Quezon had already been contemplated" in Washington before Quezon ever left Manila. High Commissioner Murphy, Harrison suspected, had arrived before Quezon to undermine whatever the Philippine president hoped to achieve in Washington, and Quezon had not helped matters by his conduct during the trip to the United States. To the chagrin of American officials, he had been "feted and flattered" in China, Japan, Hawai'i, and California and made speeches as if he were the leader of an already independent state. Roosevelt's decision to choose this time to appoint a new high commissioner, Paul V. McNutt, without bothering to ask Quezon's opinion first, Harrison believed, was a clear signal that Quezon would find few friendly faces in Washington. 70

Aside from the creation of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs which, in Friend's words, pointedly separated the "economic" aspects of Philippine independence "from political variables," Quezon and MacArthur had little to show for their lengthy trip to the United States and repeated visits with Roosevelt and other administration officials. 71 Instead, barely two months after his return to Manila, MacArthur was or-

dered to leave the military mission and return to the United States. "No known evidence exists which names the culprit behind the move to oust MacArthur," MacArthur's leading biographer, D. Clayton James, has written, but he speculated that likely "culprits" included Secretary Ickes, who wanted his department to assume oversight of Philippine affairs and may have thought MacArthur an obstacle, or High Commissioner Murphy, who from the beginning had disapproved of the military mission's unrestrained authority.

As it happened, the graduation of the first class of Philippine Army trainees in July 1937 corresponded with Japan's attack on China and the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. Angered by Japan's actions (which before the year was out included the sinking of the USS Panay), some Americans began to urge the government to respond assertively to Japanese aggression. Many others, however, remained anxious to do nothing that might lead to conflict. Not until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the collapse of France in 1940 did the United States move to confront Japan, a decision that would ultimately send air and ground reinforcements to the Philippines and bring the Philippine Army into American service.72 But for the moment, the buildup of Philippine military forces—regardless of their underlying significance—had begun to be viewed with alarm by State Department officials concerned that MacArthur's activities might complicate America's relationships with other Asian states and its ability to oversee Philippine affairs until 1946.73

If decision makers in the nation's capital failed to discern the dangers posed by MacArthur's and Quezon's actions, there were those ready to point them out. As Harrison had surmised, outgoing High Commissioner Murphy had visited Washington

in December 1936 and insisted that the military mission be "abandoned as soon as practicable." The nongovernmental but well-connected executive committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, to cite another example, had authorized Harold Fey "to spend a little time in Washington" during Quezon's visit, "using such influence as could be brought to bear against the MacArthur plan of militarizing the Philippines."  

Given the timing, it seems logical to conclude that the primary cause of MacArthur's recall was the presence of the general and his Philippine patron themselves in the United States, a presence that served to highlight the many criticisms that had been made of the Philippine military system. Surely it is no coincidence that MacArthur had not even returned to Manila before General Craig was being sounded out about the possibility of ordering MacArthur back to the United States. In a memorandum to the White House dated May 17, 1937 (MacArthur would not arrive in Manila until May 30), Craig noted that "the man you have in mind" would "probably retire or even resign rather than give up his present position and prospects," which Craig had been "reliably informed are worth in actual money to him more than three times his salary as an Army officer."  

It is not clear to what extent Craig might have been involved in the effort to force MacArthur's return to the United States, but eventually, on August 2, 1937, Roosevelt's secretary

74. Fine, Frank Murphy, 196-197; "Minutes of the Executive Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation," March 3, 1937, box 2, series A, FOR Records. One member of the FOR committee was John Nevin Sayre, older brother of Assistant Secretary of State, later High Commissioner to the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre, who chaired the Interdepartmental Committee on Philippine Affairs in early 1937. The belief that the purpose of Quezon's visit to the United States had something to do with future military collaboration between the Philippines and the United States was so widespread that an article to that effect even appeared in an Italian military journal. See Robert Sandiford, "The United States and the Philippines," Le Forze Armate, June 2, 1937, trans. Oliver Spaulding (Army War College, July 1937). A copy of the translation is in the USAMHI Library.

75. Craig to Edwin Watson, May 17, 1937, Harry Woodring Papers, Kansas Collection, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence.

76. James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 522-523, wrote that Craig and the new Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, "were the only ones in the War Department who knew about the move" to recall MacArthur and that MacArthur was assured by "friends in Washington" that Craig had nothing to do with the matter and did not support it. Using additional War Department records, Linn, Guardians of Empire, 236-237, concluded that Craig was concerned about both MacArthur's and Holbrook's activities and "sent clear messages, at least to Holbrook, emphatically
Stephen Early again approached Craig and queried him about the legal status of army officers on duty with the Commonwealth government. In response, acting judge advocate general Col. Allen W. Gullion conducted a quick and surreptitious search of the army's files. The next day Craig informed Early that, in essence, MacArthur had written his own orders to the Philippines in 1935. MacArthur had "handled the matter" of his appointment as military adviser by himself and left behind "practically no records" of the affair in the War Department. Or, as Gen. George Marshall would later put it, "MacArthur fixed up things over there so we couldn't get at him." Nevertheless, Craig concluded, there was no "military basis" on which the "present incumbent" in the military adviser's office (MacArthur was not mentioned by name) might be withdrawn. Of course, should the President so desire, the War Department would "issue the necessary instructions" to bring MacArthur home. General Craig repeated his belief that "the present incumbent" would simply retire or resign, however, "and continue in his present capacity."

Two days later, on August 5, 1937, Early notified the Secretary of War that MacArthur was to be informed that he was "needed for service in the United States" and therefore his assignment to the Philippines was to be terminated. Precisely what "service" the government required was unclear. The Secretary of War was instructed to offer MacArthur any command the general wished and even to transfer other officers "as may be necessary to permit General MacArthur to take over the post he most desires." As Craig had predicted, MacArthur...
stead retired from the army, effective December 31, 1937, and continued in the Philippines as the well-compensated but increasingly marginalized military adviser to the Commonwealth government.

Quezon's embrace of the Philippine military system noticeably lessened as a result of the 1937 trip to Washington. Roosevelt had not rejected absolutely the notion that the United States might be willing to continue some sort of navy presence in the archipelago, and Quezon grasped at this straw to feign satisfaction at the outcome of his Washington visit. But Quezon must have realized that Roosevelt would only have been alarmed at the suggestion that the nascent Philippine Army provided an opportunity to reappraise the administration's position on placing an American navy base in the islands. It might be that Quezon could still salvage a special relationship with the United States that would keep "the American flag in the Philippines," as Roy Howard recorded him as saying at this time, but clearly not on the basis of a military-naval partnership.\(^78\) MacArthur certainly got the message. He returned to Manila in mid-1937 to tell the Filipinos that they were "the only ones who will defend the Philippines." So distant had the two men become that by the end of the year Quezon could say at a succession of press conferences that he had not seen MacArthur recently and had no idea what the Field Marshal's plans were.\(^79\)

Why had Quezon and MacArthur thought a Philippine military force might prove attractive to Washington? Eisenhower offered one possible explanation. In the military mission diary, he related MacArthur's faith in a *Literary Digest* poll, which con-

\(^78\) Howard diary, May 26, 1937.\(^79\) MacArthur is quoted in *Philippine Magazine*, July 1937. Quezon's comments are found in news conferences of October 20, November 3, and November 17, 1937, in box 79, series 8, Quezon Papers. For a cogent summary of the much-reported steps in the deterioration of the Quezon-MacArthur relationship from 1938 on, see Golay, *Face of Empire*, 392-393. Golay argues that one reflection of Quezon's growing disdain for MacArthur, overlooked by other scholars, was the selection of Maj. Gen. Basilio Valdez (more commonly spelled Valdes) to replace. Paulino Santos as Philippine Army chief of staff in January 1939. Golay sees Valdes, a medical doctor until tapped by Quezon to be the new chief of the Philippine Constabulary in 1934, as a military professional less intimidated by MacArthur's credentials. But Eisenhower considered Santos the "much abler man" and credited his replacement to racial politics: Santos was Malay; Valdes was, like Quezon only more so, a Spanish mestizo. Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., *Eisenhower*, 419.
cluded that Roosevelt would lose the November 1936 election. Eisenhower and the general's aide, T. J. Davis, had pointed out that *Digest* subscribers did not include "the great mass of people" who presumably intended to vote Democratic. MacArthur responded with a "hysterical condemnation" of the two that left Eisenhower perplexed, until MacArthur "let drop" that he had urged Quezon "to shape his plans for going to the United States" on the premise that a Republican would be back in the White House. Of course, everything might then be different. One could not foretell the future, but maneuver room might exist to renegotiate terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act should the Republicans return to office.

More generally, Quezon's hiring of Douglas MacArthur as military adviser represented the perpetuation of a clientelist relationship that had proved endlessly manipulable—and successful—over the course of three decades of Philippine-American relations. In a speech made soon after President Roosevelt had signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Carlos Romulo observed that Quezon had succeeded in obtaining a new independence bill by working through influential and reputable intermediaries. These unnamed men (Romulo presumably meant Roy Howard, first among them) "could put in a good word" for Quezon, and their prestige was such that Roosevelt "had to listen to them." Similarly, MacArthur was to be Quezon's "pawn in dealing with the authorities in Washington, D.C.," once the Commonwealth had been established. MacArthur's connections and military credentials could not help but authenticate and draw attention to the usefulness of a Philippine military system to the United States. Quezon, however, had gambled on the wrong issue and on the wrong man. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth President had very publicly saddled himself with a burdensome military system and a high-priced military adviser, neither of which he

80. Holt and Leyerzapf, eds., *Eisenhower*, 328. Eisenhower also wrote that MacArthur was apparently trying to wager a substantial sum on the outcome of the election.

81. Speech made before the Iloilo Rotary Club, March 26, 1934, copy in box 65, series 8, Quezon Papers.

could now afford to repudiate without undermining confidence in his own leadership.

Quezon's actions after 1937 give credence to the old accusations that the purpose of the Philippine military system—albeit only in the minds of its originators—was to "keep the United States in Asia." If the Philippine military system were not calculated to be a vehicle for Philippine-American partnership beyond 1946, and if MacArthur's advisership were nothing more than the voice of disinterested military expertise, then why should Quezon distance himself from the Field Marshal and allow the military system to decline once the U.S. government had shown that it had no interest in the possibility of a mutually beneficial military-naval collaboration with the Philippines (not until 1941, anyway)? If acquiring MacArthur's services had reflected Quezon's legitimate concern for the defensibility of a truly independent Philippine republic, would not that concern have been even greater after 1937 and the indications Washington had given of its commitment to Philippine independence, unimpeded by the retention of American bases?