In 1935, Major Dwight Eisenhower was serving in the War Department as an aide to U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. By fall of that year MacArthur had been appointed to the new position of Military Adviser to the Philippines. His task was to create a Philippine army capable of defending the island nation once independence, planned for 1946, had been achieved. MacArthur, impressed with Eisenhower, virtually insisted that the major accompany him to the Islands. Eisenhower went, albeit reluctantly, and would spend the next four years in a difficult and ultimately frustrating job.
Eisenhower’s sojourn in the Philippines with MacArthur left him with a deep and indelible negative impression of the general.\(^1\) Ike’s disagreements with MacArthur were more philosophical than personal. The dispute was engendered over two significant issues. The first was how to build an army in a developing but still impoverished nation; exacerbating that disagreement was a deep difference over the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit, and endeavor to develop, in his subordinates.

Historians have differed over the years as to whether the conflicts between Eisenhower and MacArthur in the Philippines resulted in lasting ill feelings and estrangement, or were the normal irritations of two strong-minded men and were largely forgotten as the years passed. A large group of highly regarded historians have taken the latter view. Ike’s son, John S. D. Eisenhower, takes perhaps the most charitable view of the disputes between his father and MacArthur. He wrote, “I do not believe that everything he [Ike] said in those pages [Ike’s diary] represents his lifetime views of Douglas MacArthur.” John Eisenhower largely followed D. Clayton James, who in *The Years of MacArthur*, volume 1, *1880–1941*, notes the heated words over the Philippine parade incident of 1938, but asserts that the disagreements between the two men have been, as Eisenhower himself claimed, “exaggerated.” James goes on to emphasize the mutual respect they had for one another. John Gunther argues that there was “no real split at that time [Ike’s Philippine tour].” Stephen Ambrose has written a comprehensive account of the MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship, but Ambrose’s assessment is perhaps the most disappointing. In a passage that clearly summarizes the entire relationship, Ambrose argues that the descriptions of conflict and animosity are overdone and simplistic; the two men had a “rich and complex” relationship. He takes at face value Eisenhower’s later assertion of a “strong tie” to MacArthur. But in the following chapter on the Philippines, Ambrose forgets these comments and allows that the friendship had ended when Eisenhower left the Philippines. Geoffrey Perret in *Eisenhower* notes some of the disputes but charitably describes both men as victims of circumstance and the macro forces of history. Perret also wrote a biography of MacArthur before his Eisenhower work. In that volume Perret describes the relationship as strained but still respectful; Eisenhower especially was careful to stay on good terms with MacArthur. When Ike lambasts the general in his diary, it is because of strain and exhaustion. Richard Connaughton explains the differences between the two men by emphasizing the diverse nature of their military education, and their vastly different personalities. He accurately notes, however, that their clash was in the context of the difficult problem of creating the Philippine defense force. Nevertheless, their animosity may not have been permanent.\(^2\)

Another significant group of historians have argued that the relationship was permanently damaged during the Philippine years, but there is little agreement as to the cause of the animosity. Carlo D’Este describes some of the arguments between Ike and MacArthur, but ascribes their lasting estrangement to their mutual frustrations in building the Filipino army and their diverse personalities. Matthew Holland recognizes that the relationship between Eisenhower and MacArthur had been broken; he places the blame on MacArthur but does not go into great detail. Peter Lyon’s *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero* accepts Ike’s assertion that after the parade incident “our relationships were never really close.” Steve Neal agrees with Lyon. William Pickett correctly notes that Ike’s experiences with MacArthur resulted in their “essential estrangement.” In *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years*, Carol Petillo writes that in the Philippines, “seeds of their future rivalry and distrust had been sown, and a certain coolness in their relationship could be noted.” Mark Perry assesses the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship in *Partners in Command*, a dual biography of Eisenhower and George C. Marshall. Perry argues that Eisenhower’s Philippine years were agonizing and the antagonism between Ike and the general grew steadily worse. Perry claims that MacArthur was particularly “keen to build up the Philippine military,” a comment that would have caused Eisenhower’s temper to flare. He observes that in later years Eisenhower was polite to MacArthur, but he had little use for his old commander. In *Ike the Soldier* Merle Miller takes the view that there was certainly a “rift” between the two men that never healed, and that MacArthur was largely responsible because he believed the rumors that Eisenhower was angling for his job through certain influential Filipinos and never forgave Ike. Miller also asserts that Ike had had enough of MacArthur. Piers Brendon’s generally acerbic tone served him well in assessing the MacArthur-Eisenhower dispute. He argues that the animosity between the two men was deep and lasting. In *The Far Eastern General* Michael Schaller describes MacArthur’s jealousy of Eisenhower’s relationship with Philippine President Manuel Quezon. The general’s subsequent belief that his subordinate was angling for his job was “fatal” to their relationship. Michael Korda also notes that the enmity between the two men was serious and lasting but sheds little light on the reasons. Indeed, he inaccurately writes that MacArthur “never hesitated to let Ike get on with things, and never second-guessed him.” In an early biography of MacArthur, Clark Lee and Richard Henschel strongly argue that the ill feelings between Ike and MacArthur were permanent and stemmed from the Philippine years. In *American Caesar* William Manchester suggests the parade incident cooled the MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship and the passing
years only hardened their opinions. For Manchester the two men were incapable of understanding one another. MacArthur dismissed Eisenhower’s accomplishments in World War II because Ike had not commanded troops in the field; Eisenhower criticized MacArthur’s interference in political matters and supported President Harry S. Truman when he fired MacArthur in 1951. MacArthur once wrote of Eisenhower that he was like a younger brother; Manchester observed it was “more like the feeling Cain had for Abel.” Manchester notes MacArthur could not abide a subordinate who had risen to the heights Eisenhower had in the postwar world.3

The foregoing is a brief summary of the scholarship on this issue. In order to understand the Eisenhower-MacArthur animosity, it is necessary to take a brief look at the careers of the two men before the Philippine years, to understand the relationship between the United States and the Philippines in the 1930s, and to grasp the essentials of the American effort to help build a Philippine defense force.

MacArthur, still a relatively young man, became army chief of staff in 1930. In November 1929, as the stock market crashed, Eisenhower went to work for Major General George Van Horn Moseley in Washington. His job was to create the first full industrialization and mobilization plan the nation had ever possessed. His superb work garnered the attention of the chief of staff, who soon stole Ike from Moseley.4 Eisenhower worked for MacArthur in Washington in some of the darkest days of the Great Depression. The army budget was attacked as was the army itself in these deeply isolationist years. MacArthur fought to save what he could of the army. Ike thought that MacArthur may have erred in trying to save military personnel as opposed to equipment. But then he conceded that the general was probably right given that cutting deeply into personnel would have had a negative impact on morale.5 Nevertheless, Ike’s analysis of the situation and


his preference for equipment over men was a foreshadowing of the view he would take in the Philippines when the defense budget came under attack there. Strong-minded men both, MacArthur and Eisenhower had other disagreements in these Washington years, none more pointed than MacArthur’s decision to personally lead American soldiers against the so-called Bonus Marchers in 1932. Ike did not think the chief of staff should be leading troops through the streets of Washington. Nor did Ike appreciate the army’s seniority system for promotion. He preferred a merit-based system. MacArthur still liked the old way, arguing it kept favoritism out of the equation. Eisenhower acknowledged that, but thought it kept talent out of the equation as well. These disagreements certainly raised Eisenhower’s consciousness regarding the man for whom he worked. But they cannot be said to mark the estrangement that is so evident in the later Philippine years. Ike was too much the realist, too level-headed, to let the promotion issue become personal. On the same page of his diary that reflects his disagreement with MacArthur over promotions, he strongly asserts his respect for the general’s abilities, and his personal affection for MacArthur. Indeed, he remarks that MacArthur preferred the seniority system not out of malice to anyone, but rather, after long consideration of the subject, as “the lesser of two evils.”

In June 1933, Ike was offered a position with the Public Works Administration. He told MacArthur about the offer but was relieved when MacArthur “emphatically refused.” Eisenhower, clearly pleased that the general would not part with him, wrote “so that’s that!” “I am glad I am staying with the General.” When their service together in Washington ended in 1935, Eisenhower knew the general, like all men, was flawed, but he still respected him. That was not the case when Ike left the Philippines in 1939.

In 1935 MacArthur, whose term as chief of staff was soon to end, was designated the Military Adviser to the Philippine Government, the head of the American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands. His task was to create a Philippine defense force that could defend the islands once independence had been gained from the United States in 1946. Since the end of the Spanish American War in 1898, the Philippines had been an American colony, and an American governor-general had headed the civilian government. When the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934, the Americans created the Philippine Commonwealth and declared their intent to free the Filipinos in twelve years. MacArthur and Eisenhower, along with a small staff, arrived in the Islands in

8. Ibid.
10. Ibid. In the Chief of Staff Diary, 8 June 1934, note the respect with which Eisenhower describes MacArthur’s fight for the army budget.
October 1935. Even then, American military leaders were glancing nervously toward the Land of the Rising Sun.\textsuperscript{11}

Faced with the monumental task of building a Philippine defense system from virtually nothing in 1935, MacArthur allowed Ike to choose another officer to help him create the Philippine defense plan. Eisenhower chose perhaps the best man for the job, the man who would contribute most to the team. Major James B. Ord was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower’s. Raised in Mexico, Ord spoke fluent Spanish, the Philippines’ language of business and politics. The bespectacled and corpulent Ord was an energetic, sophisticated, and well-read man. He was attached to the Army War College where he chaired the Philippines Defense Planning Committee. Ord’s committee had already started work on the Philippine defense plan.\textsuperscript{12} He and Eisenhower continued working on it even as they prepared to leave Washington in the fall of 1935.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Connaughton, \textit{MacArthur and Defeat}, 43-47.
  \item Ibid., 63, 64.
\end{itemize}
Unfortunately, Ord and Eisenhower were ill-informed of the limitations of both money and talent in the Philippines which would dictate later revisions. Those revisions meant substantial reductions in the officer corps, in professional enlisted men, and in armaments and munitions. Eisenhower was typically reserved, if nonetheless prescient, in his judgments of the plan at this point. Both he and Ord told MacArthur that reducing the Philippine defense budget from 22 million pesos to 16 million would make the creation of a credible defense difficult “because of the lack of professional personnel.”

MacArthur’s Mission was not the only element of the American army in the Philippines. Since the Spanish American War the U.S. Army had maintained a sizable contingent in the islands known as the Philippine Department. Headed by Major General Frank Parker, the department had been instructed to cooperate with the Mission. Unfortunately that cooperation was often withheld. Most American officers believed the effort to create a viable Philippine army was “ridiculous,” while some feared that such an army might turn on its creator. Among those who derided the effort, racism was common. Americans were not unaware of the average Filipino’s fighting qualities; indeed, many Americans admired the Filipino soldiers who served in the Scouts, the Philippine segment of the American army. But most Americans doubted that Filipinos could adequately command an army. MacArthur and Eisenhower held more progressive views. Making matters worse, the High Commissioner of the Philippines, Frank Murphy, was opposed to the entire purpose of the MacArthur Mission, and often thwarted the development of Philippine defense capability. Murphy was a pacifist who believed the Philippines were indefensible.

Eisenhower bemoaned the lack of cooperation between the Mission and the Philippine Department. He could not understand why the War Department, whose officers held many of the same beliefs as the Philippine Department, did not see the wisdom of cooperating with the Mission in creating a Philippine army. In his diary he chided the War Department:

The Tydings McDuffie Act [the law that mandated independence in 1946] so clearly contemplates the employment of the Philippine Army by the President of the United States, in the event of a

national emergency, that we believe the War Department could make a definite effort to develop the strength and efficiency of this military adjunct. For the next ten years complete responsibility for Philippine Defense resides in the American government, and since weakness in the local defenses would involve extreme embarrassment in the event of war, it seems to us to be the part of wisdom for the American government to take positive and appropriate action in the matter.  

Lack of support from the American army would form but one of the problems that brought Eisenhower and MacArthur into conflict.

The purpose of the revised defense plan remained “to assure the maximum local protection of the various islands.” Because the Philippines could afford only a token air force and no modern navy, each island would have to supply the recruits who would defend it. The army would engage in a “cordon defense” of each island; that is, the Philippine army would attempt to defeat an attacking force at the beaches behind an established line of defense. Eisenhower did not believe that such a defense, essentially a desperation defense, could stop a determined modern army supported by air and naval forces. Although MacArthur also made pronouncements about American responsibility to defend the Philippines, he became increasingly confident that given time, he could create a significant Filipino force that would cause any enemy to undertake a cost benefit analysis that would conclude that the Philippines were not worth the trouble. In the meantime, the United States would, MacArthur was sure, increasingly help with Philippine defense. As we shall see, it was this belief, in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary, combined with MacArthur’s unwarranted optimism regarding the creation of the Philippine army, and his lackadaisical and misguided efforts to improve it, which would form the nexus of the conflict between himself

22. Ibid.
and Dwight Eisenhower. MacArthur refused to countenance the possibility that his assumptions could be in error.\textsuperscript{25} Then, as time passed, he seemed to place less emphasis on the American element of his plan and more on the Philippine.

The Philippine defense plan featured nearly 1,000 professional officers and 7,000 enlisted men around whom would be raised substantial reserve units to be called to active duty as needed. The professional soldiers would be largely engaged in training the reservists. Beginning in 1941, 20,000 reservists were to be trained every six months, 40,000 per year.\textsuperscript{26} These reservists were to be drawn from the male population at the age of twenty and would be available for service for thirty years. They would serve for ten years in the “First Reserve” and then pass into the “Second Reserve.”\textsuperscript{27} Thus the Philippines would have a 400,000-man reserve army ten years from the time the plan was fully implemented.\textsuperscript{28} Graduates of the new Philippine “West Point” at Baguio would gradually augment the professional officer corps. Eisenhower took particular interest in this school as he knew the army would be only as good as its officers. The Philippine defense planners initially envisioned an air force of fifty bombers and thirty other aircraft. They hoped these planes would inflict inordinate damage on any fleet brave enough to invade Philippine waters and would also facilitate transportation between the various army outposts. The Philippine army was to be cheaply supplied with obsolete American weapons and equipment.\textsuperscript{29}

Most of 1936 was to be used in building the necessary infrastructure and training facilities for the army. Starting from virtually nothing, the original plan called for training only 6,000 recruits in 1937.\textsuperscript{30} The buildings, equipment, trained instructors, and money to train more men were simply not available.\textsuperscript{31}

The new Filipino army was to incorporate the existing Philippine Constabulary, the 6,000-man national police force. This consolidation would save money and enhance the police force while giving the army a base from which to build.\textsuperscript{32} Eisenhower found that there were men of ability in the Constabulary, but they had little experience “in the administration of large organizations.”\textsuperscript{33} The Filipino

\begin{itemize}
\item Connaughton, \textit{MacArthur and Defeat}, 67.
\item Jose, \textit{The Philippine Army, 1935–1942}, 35.
\item Connaughton, \textit{MacArthur and Defeat}, 52.
\item Connaughton, \textit{MacArthur and Defeat}, 60.
\item Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, \textit{Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries}, 294; Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands, 20 January 1936, in ibid., 304; Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 301; Diary entry, 6 February 1936, in ibid., 305; Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307.
\item Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, \textit{Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries}, 309.
\item Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, \textit{Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries}, 309; Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 300.
\item Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, \textit{Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries}, 301.
\end{itemize}
army was to have one regular division and eventually thirty reserve divisions. The Mission also organized a command structure for the Filipino army to be fleshed out with Filipino officers. These men would not be under MacArthur, who commanded no one but his own staff. He was the military adviser to President Quezon, nothing else.

Once the recruits had been inducted, their training was to take place near their homes, in keeping with the manner in which these soldiers would serve in an emergency. There was no transportation to move large bodies of men from place to place in either peace or war. The reserve units had to be trained and deployed on their home islands. This necessitated a large number of induction and training centers. The defense plan initially called for the creation of ten divisional districts, each with thirteen “training cadres” that would handle the training of 155 men each year or about 78 per class, two five-and-one-half-month classes per year. Mobilization centers were also needed, about fifteen per division.

In late December 1935, a gloomy Eisenhower lamented the Mission’s lack of progress. Eisenhower, generally optimistic, initially had high expectations for the Philippine army. Reality was sobering. Ike encountered significant problems in virtually all areas, including his commander. Difficulties loomed as the year came to an end: The Philippine General Staff, whose job it was to flesh out the basic defense plan, oversee recruiting, and codify army regulations, had yet to take shape. If these problems were not addressed soon, Eisenhower anticipated delaying the scheduled April 1936 registration of manpower. Ike noted in his diary that both he and Ord had:

learned to expect from the Filipinos with whom we deal, a minimum of performance from a maximum of promise. Among individuals there is no lack of intelligence, but to us they seem, with few exceptions, unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative and executive procedure. When any detail is under discussion, they seem to grasp the essentials of the problem, and readily agree to undertake accomplishment of whatever decision may be arrived at in conference. But thereafter it is quite likely that nothing whatsoever will be done. Moreover it often develops that the decision itself has not really been accepted by them, even though at the time they appeared to be in full agreement. The whole matter must then be gone over again. These peculiar traits we are learning to take into account, but obviously they impede progress.

35. Ibid., 35, 36, 37.
38. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in ibid., 297.
If progress were to be made, a general staff had to be chosen. In January 1936 Quezón finally made José de los Reyes, a former lieutenant colonel in the Constabulary, the chief of staff. Eisenhower quickly gave the new General Staff responsibility for creating the regulations of the army. Some progress was made, but Eisenhower was still uncertain that the induction machinery would be ready by April. Eisenhower and Ord were not happy with de los Reyes; by May 1936, MacArthur had secured the appointment of Major General Paulino Santos as his successor.39

One of the most difficult problems Eisenhower faced was to find men who could train the recruits. About 240 enlisted men from the Philippine Scouts received special training at Fort McKinley, the headquarters of the Philippine Department near Manila, and were then assigned as instructors for the Philippine army, but more were needed.40 Graduates of the academy at Baguio would not have an impact for four years. Meanwhile, a Reserve Officers Service School (ROSS), the graduates of which would help train the inductees, was also inaugurated at Baguio.41

Another reason for the Mission's lack of progress was that the United States simply did not know what to do with the Philippines. This problem arose almost immediately after Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1898, remained unresolved through the 1920s, and was exacerbated by the Great Depression which increased the financial straits under which the United States and thus the U.S. Army operated. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was a step toward resolution but it was by no means the final move. The United States was ostensibly committed to defending the islands for at least ten years, but both its army and navy were unsure how to defend the Philippines; indeed, many in both services were doubtful if they could, or should, defend the archipelago at all. Worse, those who assumed the islands must be defended tended to disagree as to how that defense might best be accomplished. Obviously, those who thought that the Philippines would be expendable should a major Pacific war occur were not about to support MacArthur's Mission; they deemed it foolish to put money and matériel into an indefensible outpost. Then too, there were those who would defend the islands but were opposed to arming the Filipinos for fear that they might turn against their American masters. Finally, some American politicians supported the basic idea of MacArthur's Mission but simply could not find the rationale to place it higher on the priority list. Philippine Department officers shared many of these views. No wonder Eisenhower and Ord felt as if they were the Robinson Crusoe and his man Friday of the U.S. Army—cast away on a Pacific island and largely forgotten—even by their commander.42 For the team-oriented Eisenhower this was maddeningly frustrating; MacArthur was more inclined to rely on MacArthur.

41. Ibid., 59, 60; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 12, 13.
42. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 48–52, 90–92; Linn, Guardians of Empire, 219–21, 226–46; Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, 184–86; Brands, Bound to Empire, 166. Some scholars believe, following contemporary criticism of MacArthur's Mission, that Quezón's
The first substantive crack in the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship appeared when the two men disagreed over what should be done about the lack of progress in the Mission's work, especially as that failure was due to poor cooperation from the War Department in particular and the United States in general. Eisenhower early recognized that the promised support for the Mission's work was simply not forthcoming. He believed that there was both ignorance and miscommunication involved in the impasse. Education was the answer and the teacher must be perhaps the grandest American military figure of the era: Douglas MacArthur. For Eisenhower time was crucial: MacArthur must return to Washington in 1936 and explain to officials the defense problems in the Philippines. Moreover, MacArthur could, Eisenhower was sure, obtain favorable clarification of the order to the Philippine Department mandating cooperation with the Mission. Although Major General Lucius Holbrook had just assumed command of the Philippine Department with orders stating "assistance to General MacArthur was the most important peacetime mission of your command," Eisenhower saw the Philippine Department as obstructionist and had little confidence that the change of commanders there would make a difference. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur to speak to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig and his civilian superior:

Jimmy [Ord] and I believe that if this whole matter were clearly explained to the American Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, that very substantial and effective assistance would be forthcoming.

For Eisenhower assistance would manifest itself in the form of weapons with which to arm the Filipino army: even obsolete weapons would give the Philippines a chance to defend themselves and inexpensively facilitate the American defense of its colony. But MacArthur refused to go to Washington in 1936. Ike was disappointed that his boss would shirk responsibility for the development of Philippine defense at this crucial time; incredibly, MacArthur seemed more concerned about his promotion to field marshal in the chimerical Philippine army than American support for the Mission. Instead of traveling to Washington, MacArthur ordered Eisenhower to prepare a paper that would explain to the War Department the "efficiency and soundness of the Philippine Defense Plan, and the idea that the

and MacArthur's purpose in creating the Philippine army was to surreptitiously keep the Philippines indefinitely subservient to the United States as a manifestation of American Empire. This interpretation does not bear scrutiny; and it certainly was not Eisenhower's view. For Eisenhower, Philippine reliance on the United States for defense was the only logical strategic option in a dangerous world, not a Quezon-MacArthur plot to keep the Philippines a colony. For a recent interpretation of this untenable view, see Richard B. Meixsel, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth," Pacific Historical Review 70, no. 2 (2001): 255-92; Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 372.

43. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 9.
45. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307.
American War Department should cooperate efficiently toward its development.”

MacArthur did not personally seek more U.S. assistance until the spring of 1937.

Clearly MacArthur did not perceive the same lack of progress, the same level of threat to the Philippines that Eisenhower did. Moreover, to MacArthur, the symbol of having a field marshal as the man responsible for Filipino defense was worth much in terms of motivation and cooperation in the Philippines. Eisenhower did not fully appreciate this view. He saw weapons as a greater priority. At the base of this burgeoning disagreement was the notion, gradually taking hold of MacArthur’s mind, that the Filipinos could one day defend themselves. This opinion was in keeping with MacArthur’s analysis of what an aggressive Japan might do. In a speech to the Command and General Staff School at Baguio in August 1936 he said:

> In the case of the Philippines, it would be an impossibility for any potential enemy to bring to the Philippine area anything like a preponderant portion of his army. He would indeed have difficulty in concentrating into the vital area as large a force as the Philippine Army which would oppose him. Any conceivable military force might actually find itself outnumbered.

MacArthur even suggested that the island nature of the Philippines would help in its defense. He seems to have discounted the advantage of the mobility a modern industrial power would have in taking the Philippines, mobility the Filipinos would not have. MacArthur added later in the speech, “when the Philippine Defense Plan had reached fruition, it will represent a defensive strength that will give hesitation to the strongest and most ruthless nation in the world.” Finally, he asserted the Philippines not only could thwart such a nation on its own but it must do so:

> If the Philippines does not prepare for its own defense, to maintain its own security and to preserve its own independence, how are these functions to be performed? If others are not to perform these functions for the Filipinos, certainly they must gird themselves for the task.

Meanwhile, Eisenhower was convinced that the Filipinos could not defend themselves without significant American aid, far more aid than was forthcoming, aid that would provide some basis in reality for MacArthur’s grandiose vision. It may well be that both men were a bit delusional: Eisenhower concerning the amount of help that might be secured from the United States, MacArthur regarding the capacity of the Philippines to defend itself, and his assessment of Japanese strategic logic.

46. Diary entries, 6 February, 1 March, and 29 May 1936, in ibid., 305, 308, 310.
49. Ibid., 101.
Eisenhower’s frustration with progress on the defense plan came to a head at the same time as his dispute arose with MacArthur over the general’s decision to accept field marshal rank in the Philippine army. Eisenhower could not quietly abide this manifestation of MacArthur’s ego. The decision seemed full of self-importance at the cost of more efficient defense. Unbeknownst to Eisenhower at the time, MacArthur had negotiated this promotion with Quezon before accepting the job as Military Adviser. But in early 1936, it appeared that Quezon was offering the promotion. Indeed Eisenhower, Ord, and Captain T. J. Davis (MacArthur’s aide) were also to receive promotions and commissions in the Philippine army. Ike convinced Ord and Davis that accepting these promotions would hinder the Mission’s success. Eisenhower confronted MacArthur, saying, “General you have been a four-star general . . . This is a proud thing. Why in the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshallship?” But the general “just gave me hell.” A seething Ike wrote in his diary:

In the first place, we [Eisenhower, Ord and Davis] believe that in a locality where we are serving with so many American officers, most of whom believe that the attempt to create a Philippine Army is somewhat ridiculous, the acceptance by us of high rank in an Army which is not yet formed would serve to belittle our effort. Moreover, it would seriously handicap every effort on our part to secure necessary cooperation from commanders and staffs in the American Army. Secondly, we believe that in dealing with the Philippine Army Headquarters our position is unassailable as long as we purport to be nothing but assistants to the Military Adviser. If, however, we should accept military titles in the Philippine Army, the authority and soundness of our advice would be measured, in the minds of the Philippine Army officers, by the rank held. We believe this would create an anonymous [anomalous?] situation and would handicap our efforts to assist, advise, and direct the efforts of Army Headquarters and subordinate officials.

Here is Eisenhower’s concern for the impact that a particular action might have on the cooperation between the Philippine Department and the Philippine army, and between the Mission and the army it was trying to create. For Eisenhower, MacArthur’s action would hurt the building of an effective team and a strong alliance. MacArthur hoped that his new rank would inspire the Filipinos to defend their islands. But for Eisenhower, any action which hurt the creation of an effective team was contemptible. This idea, so much a part of Eisenhower’s World War

52. Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 2.
54. Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero, 81.
II philosophy, did not come to him in the early days of that conflict, but was derived from his days as a football player at West Point and a coach of army football teams in the 1920s, and most important, from his mentor Fox Conner. Eisenhower's Philippine sojourn, however, was crucial in the seasoning of this philosophy in that it allowed him to test his team concept in the real world of competing military branches and departments, political infighting in his own government, and in relations with a foreign culture and government. MacArthur simply failed to live up to what Eisenhower thought an American army officer should be.

There was also a significant difference between Eisenhower and MacArthur regarding work ethic. The American army in the Philippines, and indeed most foreign posts, had developed a lackadaisical attitude toward work. Eisenhower had run into this disturbing tradition in Panama in the early 1920s and made himself somewhat unpopular because of his insistence that officers take their jobs seriously. The American army in the Philippines may have been still more lackadaisical. One lieutenant colonel, writing in 1910, remembered fondly:

This post [Fort William McKinley] is like a big country club. A little work in the morning. Golf, polo, tennis, riding in the hills in the afternoon. The Club at sunset. Dinner in the evenings. A lazy man's paradise.


The standards of the Philippine Department had hardly changed in twenty-five years. MacArthur, perhaps because he saw himself as semi-retired, fit right in. Eisenhower had to stand in the gap because of MacArthur’s absences, accepting responsibilities that would not normally be his. Among the duties MacArthur shirked was meeting consistently with Quezon. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur to meet with President Quezon at least once per week to secure agreement on the myriad details facing the Mission, but the general refused. Eisenhower surmised that MacArthur believed such meetings were beneath him. Clearly Eisenhower believed the Mission was suffering because of MacArthur’s ego, the opposite of the team approach that Ike favored. While Eisenhower sometimes enjoyed a leisurely afternoon playing bridge, there were long periods of intense work in the brutal tropical climate. In MacArthur’s absence, Ike, Ord, and the staff “had to run much of the routine business.” MacArthur and Eisenhower drifted apart as the Mission struggled on.

Disputes between Eisenhower and MacArthur ranged over a wide array of topics. Some, like the development of the Philippine army, were issues they could affect if not completely control; others were entirely out of their spheres of influence. In the summer of 1936 they argued over Kansan Alf Landon’s chances in the presidential election. MacArthur, citing a Literary Digest poll, believed Landon would win in November. Eisenhower, a Kansan with friends in his hometown of Abilene who kept him apprised of politics and a host of other local topics, thought Landon would not even carry his home state. Listening to one of MacArthur’s monologues on the election, Eisenhower disagreed with the general over Landon’s chances. MacArthur exploded, nearly hysterical; he blasted Eisenhower, who was dumbfounded at this response. Then MacArthur let slip that he had informed Quezon to shape his plans for a visit to the United States on the basis of a Landon victory. In November 1936, Eisenhower was proved correct and MacArthur had to “back pedal” to Quezon. But the general never apologized to Eisenhower. Ike though the entire incident “most ridiculous.”

The registration of twenty-year-old Filipino men went forward as planned in April 1936. The registration far exceeded Quezon’s hopes; the president was proud of the job his department workers had done.
of his Filipino brothers. Quezon decided, so MacArthur told Eisenhower, to draft and train the full 20,000-man contingent beginning in January 1937. The 20,000 figure was the target number for a fully operational training system. The defense plan did not envision reaching that number until 1941. In fact, under the original plan only 3,000 recruits were to be called in January.

When MacArthur informed Eisenhower of the decision to train 20,000 recruits at the beginning of the year, Eisenhower was incensed. He explained to MacArthur there was no money to build the training infrastructure for so many recruits, there was no money to pay them, and there were too few instructors to train them. In fact, the sites for the training camps had not been selected. Eisenhower even had doubts that 20,000 recruits could be fed. Then MacArthur launched into Eisenhower with one of his venomous tirades, a show Eisenhower had already seen all too often. MacArthur and Quezon were thinking in terms of “generalities”; it was Eisenhower’s and Ord’s job to take care of the details.

The “details” were daunting. The 1936 defense budget was already gone; the money for the construction of training facilities awaited special funding from the National Assembly. Even that request did not envision training 40,000 men in 1937. Eisenhower estimated the overall cost of the additional men to the ten-year plan at 10 million pesos, more than one year’s budget. Ike knew what real training required. He had significant experience training soldiers, even officers, in World War I. MacArthur’s program seemed all about show, little about substance. But what could Eisenhower do? MacArthur and Quezon, it seemed, were of one mind; there was nothing left but to do one’s duty. Then too, the general still had some impact on Eisenhower’s imagination. Ike later remembered, “General MacArthur’s amazing determination and optimism made us forget these questions [expense and efficacy of the defense program] at times, but they kept coming back in our minds.”

66. Ibid., 55; Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 60; Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands, 29 May (first entry) 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 309. Jose and Connaughton assert that the decision to train the full 20,000-man contingent was Quezon’s. Eisenhower thought it was MacArthur’s. It may have been either way but clearly both men agreed, and Eisenhower received the news through MacArthur. I suspect that Eisenhower is essentially correct: MacArthur convinced Quezon of the wisdom of training 20,000 men in January 1937. Indeed, MacArthur seems to have been considering increasing the number of recruits since at least January 1936.

68. Diary entry, 29 May (first entry) 1936, in ibid., 309.
69. Diary entry, 20 January (second entry) 1936, in ibid., 304; Diary entry, 29 May (second entry) 1936, in ibid., 311.
70. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 60.
71. Eisenhower, At Ease, 131–33; Miller, Ike the Soldier, 166, 167.
73. James, The Years of MacArthur, 509.
Eisenhower's frustration grew over the development of the training program and the way his boss led the Mission. Ike noted in his diary that the "hasty way we went at the job [out of necessity given the MacArthur decision to train 20,000 men in January] boosted costs, which, even without the aggravation [of training more men] are much higher than we originally estimated."\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, most of the camps lacked adequate water, roads, and light. A weary Eisenhower lamented, "most of our stations will not be ready for receipt of recruits in January."\textsuperscript{75} He and Ord remained convinced the plan "emphasizes strength and numbers too much at the expense of efficiency."\textsuperscript{76} The training offered at the camps would be far below the quality Eisenhower deemed essential, and the cost would overwhelm the 16 million peso budget. Ike again took these problems to MacArthur. This time the general acknowledged the cost overruns, but preferred to pressure Quezon to come up with the money. Eisenhower was to plod ahead with the program.\textsuperscript{76}

The military training provided during the five-and-one-half-month program was necessarily shallow.\textsuperscript{77} This was due in part to the lack of funds, but also because the recruits had to be taught so much more than soldiering. Half of them were illiterate so the army endeavored to teach them rudimentary reading skills. There were also courses on sanitation; nevertheless, 52 recruits died of disease in the first half of 1937. One observer wrote:

General MacArthur, must have his tongue in his cheek when he sounds off about them or else he does not visit the training camps. I have visited a few here in the provinces. The state of affairs is indescribable. They put a poor miserable third lieutenant, with at the most six months training, in charge of several hundred of these savages who have never known a moment’s restraint nor discipline in their lives . . . they have no common language, it was quite impossible.\textsuperscript{78}

As Eisenhower had feared, there were not enough qualified instructors. Nevertheless, over 19,000 trainees “graduated” in May 1937.\textsuperscript{79}

In the summer of 1937, Eisenhower inherited Ord’s responsibility for the Philippine army budget while Ord was in Washington, D.C., attempting to garner greater cooperation from the United States in building Philippine defenses. Eisenhower, concerned since the beginning that the defense plan emphasized sheer numbers over quality and efficiency, pointed out to MacArthur that the budget provided only 1 million pesos for mobilization equipment such as tents

\textsuperscript{74} Diary entry, Christmas 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, \textit{Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries}, 329.

\textsuperscript{75} Diary entry, Christmas 1936, in ibid., 329.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 329.

\textsuperscript{77} Jose, \textit{The Philippine Army, 1935–1942}, 79.

\textsuperscript{78} Letter from a British manager of a sugar estate, 25 August 1937, File: Philippine Islands, Box 154, Pre-Presidential, 1916–1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, EL.

\textsuperscript{79} Jose, \textit{The Philippine Army, 1935–1942}, 78, 79.
and mess kits. Eisenhower surprised Eisenhower with an order to add 3.5 million pesos to the budget for such equipment. Failure to supply recruits with these implements, MacArthur intoned, would “defeat his whole plan.” Eisenhower, surprised by MacArthur’s impractical reaction, “objected strenuously” to the added expense. He wondered where he might find the money and what the implications for training would be. Ike was not opposed to the decision on the basis of merit; the army should always have been supplied with such equipment, and trained fewer men. But now MacArthur was demanding a quick reorientation of the budget without commensurate savings. MacArthur met Eisenhower’s objections with the view that this budget change was imperative for psychological reasons. Eisenhower then reworked the budget to save 1.5 million pesos. In presenting the new plan, Ike warned MacArthur that the potential for running out of funds and being forced to lay off recruits and officers before the end of 1938 was real. Meanwhile, Eisenhower requested mobilization equipment from the United States.

Unfortunately for all concerned, the mobilization equipment dispute was minor compared to the fact that the Philippine army was simply out of money by mid-1937. Nor could the principals take comfort in the midst of the budget crisis in the hope that the world would leave the Philippine Islands alone, enjoying an era of peace and prosperity while moving sonorously to independence. The Philippines were precariously located on the fringe of shifting empires and thus were an inviting target. In July 1937, the Japanese invaded northern China, involving that unhappy land in both a civil war and a war against a modern imperial nation. The Philippines were far too close to the Land of the Rising Sun to rest easily.

The Philippine army sought a special appropriation from the National Assembly in the summer of 1937 to cover its deficit. Meanwhile Eisenhower, with Ord still in the States, set out to write a 1938 budget that would pay for MacArthur’s defense plan. Eisenhower’s final figure was 25 million pesos, 9 million more than the figure MacArthur had promised Quezon in 1935. In discussing the defense plan with the general over the previous months, Eisenhower consistently asserted that there was not enough money. MacArthur assured Eisenhower that world conditions, the Filipinos’ desire for early independence, and perhaps money from the United States would all work in favor of the new budget; if not, he

81. Diary entry, 21 June 1937, in ibid., 335.
82. Diary entry, 23 June 1937, in ibid., 336.
83. Diary entry, 14 July 1937, in ibid., 344.
84. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 74.
86. Diary entry, 1 September 1937, in Holt and Leyzerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 357.
would demand more money from the Filipinos. Ord, having returned to the Philippines in the fall, told Quezon of the new budget. Quezon was apoplectic and confronted MacArthur who feigned ignorance of the escalating costs. The next day MacArthur called a conference of his aides; Ord, Eisenhower, Davis, and Bonner Fellers, who was to report to Quezon, attended. MacArthur asserted he had never authorized a budget over 16 million pesos, and that the new budget made him look like “a fool or a knave.” MacArthur continued the tirade, accusing his staff of “arguing technicalities to defeat the conceptions of the high command.” However, the primary cost problems were MacArthur’s decision to train the full 40,000 men in 1937, and the general’s grand desire to have a reserve army of thirty divisions. As MacArthur ranted; Eisenhower seethed. Later that same day he wrote:

I've got to decide soon whether I can go much further with a person who, either consciously or unconsciously, deceives his boss, his subordinates and himself (probably) so incessantly as he does. I wonder whether he believes there is one atom of truth in his statements of this morning. I wonder whether egotism, exclusive devotion to one’s own interests (in this case a 66,000 Peso salary, plus penthouse and expenses) can finally completely eliminate a person's perception of honesty, straightforwardness, and responsibility to the Philippines for whom he is working.

Having confronted the human condition in his relationship with MacArthur, Eisenhower considered his future:

For some months, I've remained on this job, not because of the General, but in spite of him. I've got interested in this riddle of whether or not we can develop a W.D. [War Department] and an army capable of running itself, and I prefer to dig away at it to being on a “mark time” basis somewhere else. But now I am at a cross road. If the Marshal is to persist in his arbitrary methods, and is going to make things as unpleasant, if not impossible as today’s homily indicated, then I'm for home. We should be able to get a better line on the situation within a few days! Right now I am disgusted and in something of a temper, a bad state of mind in which to make any decisions.

Here in these passages are many of the qualities of mind that Eisenhower admired in an army officer: the elevation of duty above one’s own interests, willingness to take responsibility for problems or failure, and determination to make hard decisions

88. Ibid., 360, 361, 362.
89. Ibid., 360, 361.
90. Ibid., 362.
91. Ibid., 362.
92. Ibid., 363.
and to make them in a calm and objective manner, not on the basis of theories or wild imaginings. MacArthur, for Eisenhower, was the opposite of what a leader should be. These personality traits were already well established in Eisenhower, but his island sojourn with MacArthur emotionally and powerfully imbedded them still deeper in his mind. Ike knew there was little sense of “team” in the Mission, or in the relationship between the Mission and the U.S. Army, still less between the United States and the Philippines. MacArthur had indelibly impressed upon Eisenhower, through negative example, the necessity for a commander to accept responsibility for his actions and decisions. MacArthur could not admit to mistakes and so blamed aides when he made them. This MacArthurian character trait was often on Ike’s mind while in the Philippines. In writing Lucius Clay’s efficiency report in 1938 Eisenhower noted, “Willingly assumes responsibility.”

Moreover, MacArthur would dramatically repeat the lesson before Eisenhower left the Philippines. The general now found himself in an uncomfortable position. He had denied the realistic budget to Quezon, and verbally bludgeoned his aides over it. But the crisis was real, and MacArthur could not escape it in his penthouse or at the movies, a pastime he so enjoyed. In spite of the fact that he would appear to be a functionary of his aides, at some point he decided to use all of the arguments he had rehearsed in front of Eisenhower to convince Quezon that the new budget was necessary. The president would have been a “fool or a knave” if he had not now entertained doubts about his military adviser.

Quezon, as egotistical and ambitious as MacArthur, was neither fool nor knave. But he too was faced with a difficult choice: disavow MacArthur and stick with the original plan, or ask the National Assembly for more money using MacArthur’s arguments. Quezon would need a compelling argument for the Assembly, some of whom believed the whole plan was wrong-headed, that the Philippines were indefensible. MacArthur and Quezon turned to Eisenhower to draft the speech. This was no surprise; if one quality could be singled out in explaining how Eisenhower had made a name for himself in the U.S. Army, it was his ability to think and write clearly. In the 1920s he had written the Guide to American Battle Monuments in France for General John J. Pershing when others had failed; in the early 1930s he had written the nation’s first comprehensive industrial mobilization plan for General Moseley. Again, others had failed. This stellar work brought him to the attention of Chief of Staff MacArthur, who soon put Eisenhower to work on numerous writing projects, including his annual report.

Now Ike set out to convince the Filipino legislature to increase the defense budget.


Eisenhower’s draft of Quezon’s speech emphasized the deteriorating world conditions, the Filipino desire for early independence (thus the necessity for a greater defensive capability), and the escalating costs of raw materials. Eisenhower also noted that more of the defense budget than originally planned was being spent on sanitation education, literacy, and vocational training. He also assured the nervous legislators that the standing army, a point of contention, had actually been reduced, and that the defense budget would not unduly impinge upon the people. He wrote:

Furthermore, regardless of the aggregate authorized for the full development of our National Defense, the annual appropriation will be adjusted each year to the annual revenue, so that all other authorized government services and activities may develop in harmony with the growth of the population and the expansion of our culture.

Clearly, if anything about the paragraph may be said to be clear, Eisenhower intended to leave the impression that the defense budget would not unduly encumber the Filipino people. What is interesting about the paragraph was that his ability to use words to obfuscate, so remarked upon while president, was not accidental but calculated; this talent was well established and useful during his Philippine years. Moreover this paragraph subtly describes Eisenhower’s governmental philosophy; he did not think the military budget of the Philippines should be as large as it had become, and, even more important, that the Mission should not spend more than its budget allowed. Human services and defense should have some sort of harmony. For Eisenhower, the Filipinos could not defend themselves. The United States was supposed to address deficiencies. MacArthur preferred to press the Filipino government to spend more money on defense.

Although the budget increase was approved, the army had to make sacrifices. MacArthur’s dream of thirty reserve divisions had to be scrapped for a more realistic fifteen-division plan. And MacArthur apparently realized that he had seriously offended his right-hand man. The general decided to officially make Eisenhower his chief of staff. That was fine with Ike, but it did not mollify him. He insisted that MacArthur delineate his responsibilities and clarify the organizational chart of the Mission. Indeed, Eisenhower wrote his own duties and asked MacArthur...
to sign off on the list. This is not the behavior of a man confident in the wisdom of his boss, or intimidated by him. MacArthur signed off.106

This decision to make Eisenhower chief of staff occurred at the same time that MacArthur decided to retire from the American army, which had ordered him to return to the United States to accept a clearly subordinate command of a corps area under Chief of Staff Malin Craig. MacArthur preferred his field marshal rank to the two stars he would wear in the U.S. Army.107 In August 1937, when MacArthur had received news of his recall, Eisenhower endured another MacArthurian rage against his enemies in the War Department, foremost among them, the army chief of staff.108 Surely the “Chaumont crowd” had torpedoed his Mission and was jealously bent on reducing his stature.109 Craig was in fact opposed to MacArthur’s recall, but the decision was out of his hands. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had decided. MacArthur did have political enemies, former High Commissioner Frank Murphy among them, who apparently believed his pronouncements, activities, and influence with the Philippine people in building a national defense system were helping to destabilize that region.110

For our purposes, it is Eisenhower’s response to MacArthur’s decision that is instructive. Ike tried to keep MacArthur from reacting impetuously without knowing who or what was behind the decision. Far from being too pliant to confront MacArthur, or anyone else for that matter, Eisenhower’s circumspect and balanced mind considered alternative scenarios to the general’s conspiracy theory and offered these in an effort to conciliate, to unify, as opposed to inflaming conflict. Surely General Craig was an “honorable person,” Ike argued.111 For Eisenhower it was always the team, the Mission, the defense of the United States that mattered. But failure to fully empathize with MacArthur’s sufferings inevitably brought his wrath upon the voice of calm in his midst. Eisenhower wrote:

Every time one of these tempests in a teapot sweeps the office, I find myself, sooner or later, bearing the brunt of the General’s displeasure, which always manifests itself against anyone who fails to agree in toto with his theories and hypotheses, [underline Eisenhower’s] no matter how astounding they may be. These comic

106. Diary entry, 15 October 1937, in ibid., 367, 368; see footnote 1 in diary for further information.
109. The “Chaumont crowd” was ostensibly a clique of officers who had served in General Pershing’s headquarters at Chaumont, France, during World War I and were determined to undermine MacArthur; Diary entry, 25 August 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries*, 355 and footnote 1. Eisenhower denied that such a clique existed. See Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 6.
opera wars never center around any problem incident to the job we are on. They invariably involve something personal to the Gen.; I could be the fair-haired boy if I'd only yes, yes, yes!! That would be so easy, too!!112

In his assessment of this tempest Eisenhower entertained the thought that he was complicit in MacArthur’s rages, a notion that could only have fueled his determination to leave MacArthur: “The chief assistant to the Genl. . . . has become a (or maybe always has been) a master bootlicker.”113

Even Clayton James, MacArthur’s sympathetic biographer, wrote that MacArthur’s decision to retire hurt the Mission because that institution was folded into the Philippine Department, its voice thus muffled in bureaucracy.114 Eisenhower bitterly lamented that MacArthur’s ego and greed had hurt the Mission and that the general had made the decision to retire in order to protect his salary and emoluments:

From the beginning Jim and I have been practically isolated in thought, attitude, and intention. We did not want to come to the P.I. but were willing to do so because we thought we would have a wonderful professional opportunity. Once on the job we have concerned ourselves with trying to develop for this government and country the best possible army with the means at hand. We have been beset on all sides by difficulties arising from personal ambition, personal glorification, personal selfishness of the hot shot (66,000 pesos a year and a penthouse), [MacArthur] etc., etc. When we have objected strenuously to measures which we believe unwise such as the Field Marshal-ship, the 1937 calling of 20,000 trainees, the 1938 boosting of the budget; we’ve been finally told to shut up.115

For Eisenhower, all of the above decisions were a manifestation of MacArthur’s ego, his selfishness. Moreover, they compromised the defense of the United States in the Far East and were thus unforgivable. In addition to Eisenhower’s disdain for MacArthur’s behavior, he continued to disagree with the general’s budget. Not only was it unwisely raised, but it also wasted money on areas that offered poor returns. Worst of all, MacArthur spent more money than he had. The Philippines could not afford MacArthur’s program.116 Eisenhower feared this ongoing financial problem was a brewing crisis that might boil over in 1939; he wrote, “sooner or later there must be a day of reckoning.”117 Eisenhower believed more effort should have been

112. Ibid., 355, 356.
113. Ibid., 355.
116. Dwight Eisenhower memo to Manuel Quezon, 8 August 1940, in ibid., 468–88; Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 190.
made to secure equipment, money, and cooperation from the United States. It was clear to Ike that the Filipinos could not defend themselves. The United States must offer more help. MacArthur’s trip to the United States to secure that help had been both delayed and ineffective; Ord had achieved some real results but not enough.\textsuperscript{118} In 1938 Eisenhower would try his hand at securing American aid.

Disgusted as Ike was with MacArthur’s budget, the next blow-up with him almost sent Eisenhower home. Always enamored with theater and prestige, MacArthur decided to parade his growing army down the streets of Manila. The general hoped that when the Filipinos saw what a grand force their money was buying, their morale would be boosted and they would begin to believe, as many did not, that they could defend themselves. But such a parade would cost an enormous sum. Quezon discovered MacArthur’s plans and asked Eisenhower about them. An astonished Eisenhower, who had assumed Quezon knew all about the parade, informed the president. Quezon grew angry. He called MacArthur and voiced his displeasure while Eisenhower returned to his office. The general again blamed his subordinates for exceeding his orders, subordinates who had told him there was no money for such a display. MacArthur’s massive ego, his belief that he was a man of destiny, would not permit him to admit a mistake.\textsuperscript{119} MacArthur told Quezon that he had merely suggested a study be done on the idea. This interpretation of what had happened was “certainly news to us,” Eisenhower wrote. Once again MacArthur had refused to accept responsibility for a mistake. Three decades later Ike recalled the impact of this event on him: “This misunderstanding caused considerable resentment—and never again were we on the same warm and cordial terms.”\textsuperscript{120} Though Ike’s son John argues that his father’s rift with MacArthur has been overblown, he admits that the most important thing Ike learned from MacArthur was to accept “blame for failure” while “giving credit for success to others.”\textsuperscript{121} These disagreements with MacArthur often ended in a heated exchange; Eisenhower remembered, “Probably no one had tougher fights with a senior man than I did with MacArthur. I told him time and again, ‘Why in the hell don’t you fire me? Goddammit, you do things I don’t agree with and you know damn well I don’t.’”\textsuperscript{122} As historian Carlo D’Este has noted, such an outburst risked his career.\textsuperscript{123} Men do not take such chances, or exchange such words, without lasting resentment. Both men hid their antipathy well, but it was real. Eisenhower later told Robert Eichelberger, who served under MacArthur during World War II, that the parade incident was the end of his respect for MacArthur.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Eisenhower, interview by James, 3, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Eisenhower, \textit{At Ease}, 225, 226; Jose, \textit{The Philippine Army, 1935–1942}, 98; Connaughton, \textit{MacArthur and Defeat}, 81; James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 526.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Eisenhower, \textit{General Ike}, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{122} D’Este, \textit{Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life}, 239.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 239, 240.
\end{itemize}
A far worse and more personal blow soon followed. Jimmy Ord died in a plane crash in late January 1938 while attempting to fly into Baguio. Eisenhower felt Ord’s death more than any other non-family loss of his life. He wrote of Ord:

Many people have lost a close companion and an intimate friend. I’ve lost this, also my right hand, and my partner on a tough job, who furnished most of the inspiration needed to keep me plugging away. With him gone much of the zest has departed from a job that we always tackled as a team, never as two individuals.  

Even in the midst of deep personal grief, Eisenhower noted the loss to the team.

In the summer of 1938 Eisenhower and his family would travel home to visit friends and relatives, and to get a break from the Philippine climate. He would also journey all the way to Washington, D.C., where he hoped to convince the War Department to more substantially help defend the Philippines. But before Ike left for home, he once again experienced the vicissitudes of working for MacArthur.

The general again disrupted the budget by returning to his dream of training large numbers of men at the expense of equipment and efficiency. But he also adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward his top aide, listening carefully to Eisenhower’s views and actually following some of his advice. MacArthur even remarked to Eisenhower that “nothing that occurs around here with respect to you is to be considered a precedent. In all respects you represent a special case, and it is my hope to keep you here a long time.” Eisenhower was so astonished by the apparently long-lasting change that he wrote, “The atmosphere has cleared to such an extent that this job, at long last, has become personally agreeable to me as well as professionally interesting.”

Meanwhile Quezon and Eisenhower found several opportunities to discuss the army. The two men increasingly respected each other and found themselves chatting frequently, partly because MacArthur did not place a high priority on conversation with the Filipino president. Eventually Eisenhower and Quezon discussed their philosophies of government and other subjects. Eisenhower explained his views on taxes, education, and ethics, and Quezon did likewise. MacArthur learned of these discussions and of the growing respect between the two men and was not pleased. Indeed Quezon may have inadvertently precipitated the general’s jealousy when he sought to raise Eisenhower’s Filipino pay by 1,000 pesos per month and improve his living quarters. MacArthur now ordered Eisenhower to ignore many of the president’s invitations. By the time Eisenhower returned from his stateside trip, MacArthur’s attitude toward him had hardened still further. But that was in the future. For the moment, Ike was hoping his trip home, with his wife, Mamie, and
John alongside, would provide both rest for himself and progress for the Mission. The Eisenhowers left for home in June 1938 aboard the *Coolidge*.\footnote{Diary entry, 6 April 1938, in ibid., 380; Eisenhower, *At Ease*, 228.}

Eventually Ike made his way to Washington. One scholar has argued that Eisenhower was disappointed with the response he received from the War Department, that his entreaties were largely unsuccessful as the War Department was still hostile to the idea of providing arms to the Philippines.\footnote{Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect*, 110.} But Ord's trip in 1937 had persuaded some that the Mission was doing important work, this in spite of rumors in Washington that the Mission's officers were unpopular among Filipinos, that the Philippines might be granted independence in 1939, and continued opposition to the Mission from a few officers in the War Department.\footnote{Jim Ord to Dwight Eisenhower, 27 June 1937, 18 July 1937, and 17 August 1937, File: OLN-ORG (misc.), Box 87, Pre-Presidential, 1916–1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, EL.} Nevertheless, by mid-1938 the situation in the War Department had changed to a more favorable view of MacArthur's Mission. Eisenhower was actually pleased with the results of his trip.\footnote{Dwight Eisenhower to Douglas MacArthur, 16 September 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries*, 399–401; Diary entry, 19 September 1938, in ibid., 402.} Writing to MacArthur from Denver, Colorado, Ike reported:

> I feel that my Washington trips were very successful, and I obtained much information on the mortar question . . . All the people I talked to in the War Department feel that you are making much more progress out there than they originally believed possible. They have become convinced [largely because of Eisenhower] that you are doing a worthwhile job, and in a fine way.\footnote{Dwight Eisenhower to Douglas MacArthur, 30 September 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries*, 408. Eisenhower actually made two trips to Washington, D.C., from Denver, Colorado.}

The Eisenhowers returned to Manila on 5 November 1938. Ike quickly discovered that the improved work relationship he had had with MacArthur in the few weeks before he left on his Washington trip had ended. In his absence, MacArthur had reorganized his staff, eliminated the chief of staff position that Eisenhower had so capably filled, and essentially marginalized Ike. Eisenhower was to be in charge of plans, training, and mobilization, but was not to run the Mission as he had been doing, and was not to have any official liaison role to Quezon. Before Eisenhower had left for the United States, some Filipino legislators had talked about getting rid of MacArthur and asking Eisenhower to be the military adviser. MacArthur, prone to believe in conspiracies—particularly if they seemed directed against him—learned of this maneuvering and was convinced that Eisenhower was behind the movement. MacArthur now saw Eisenhower as disloyal and decided to reduce his responsibilities while retaining a lasting contempt for his subordinate. Ike believed MacArthur had rearranged his duties specifically...
in order to keep him from seeing Quezon. Eisenhower suspected MacArthur was afraid that he was losing “face” with Quezon and that Ike was growing in stature. Eisenhower was correct that MacArthur feared losing Quezon’s respect. But MacArthur should have known that Eisenhower had nothing to do with the maneuverings of a few Filipino politicians. Indeed, when Ike learned of this plot he confronted those involved, saying that unless they dropped the idea he would request a transfer home.133

Eisenhower wished he had never returned to the islands and bitterly castigated MacArthur in his diary, calling him a “d--- fool.” MacArthur was equally venomous, calling Eisenhower a “traitor” (to MacArthur). Ike saw that those who did best with MacArthur were willing to flatter his imperial ego: “He’d like to occupy a throne room surrounded by experts in flattery.” Ike was particularly galled that MacArthur had made these moves behind his back; he was determined now to leave MacArthur and the Philippines and even regretted the “campaign I conducted in the States to make him appear a wise counselor, an asset to the Philippines, and splendid man in his present post.” Eisenhower had made these arguments in the sincere hope that more American aid and improving policies in the Philippine Mission, no doubt under his own influence, would lead to a better defense plan for the Philippines. Now, whatever aid came to the Philippines would not be used as it should be. More than ever, the general was determined to build his thirty-division reserve army, even at the expense of any semblance of a regular army other than a general staff and training cadres. Eisenhower lamented that MacArthur was “willing to scuttle anything and everything real. Will I be glad when I get out of this!!”134 Moreover, the essential communication between the Mission and Quezon, given MacArthur’s aloofness and lackadaisical work routine, would no doubt decline.135 Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determined that his disappointment not show, that it not hurt the Mission. He wrote, “On the surface all is lovely, I will not give him the satisfaction of showing any resentment.”136 Perhaps this is why John Eisenhower, Ike’s son, downplays the rupture between MacArthur and his father; the latter hid his anger well.137

In the midst of this upheaval, Eisenhower wrote to Major Mark Clark confirming his desire, mentioned in an earlier meeting with Clark during

Eisenhower’s trip to the United States, to leave the Philippines. He asked Clark if it were possible to be assigned to the Third Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. Clark worked toward this goal.138

MacArthur’s scheme to separate Eisenhower and Quezon failed, and Ike’s decision to leave ran into both Quezon’s admiration for him and army red tape. Quezon and Eisenhower saw each other frequently. They both enjoyed playing bridge and conversation.139 Quezon pleaded with him to stay in the Philippines and provided him emoluments that irritated MacArthur.140 The U.S. Army informed Eisenhower that his tour would not end until February 1940; the four months Eisenhower spent in the United States did not count toward the four-year overseas tour.141 For his part MacArthur seems to have forgotten his ill-usage of Eisenhower. Though he had told Ike he was “free to seek other assignments if he chose,” in January of 1939 he indicated his hope that Eisenhower would ask for an extension of his tour of three months. Eisenhower was surprised.142

Meanwhile, Quezon’s and MacArthur’s priorities separated.143 Severe labor unrest and political instability led Quezon to divert defense funds to the Constabulary, which had once again been separated from the Philippine army in late 1938.144 MacArthur ranted against Quezon for every slight and indiscretion, while Quezon’s doubt of MacArthur’s defense plan deepened.145 In agreement with Eisenhower, Quezon believed that only the United States could defend the Philippines and that it had the responsibility to do so until independence was granted.146 He further accurately believed that there was little indication that it would do so effectively. In early 1940, after Eisenhower had left, MacArthur admitted that defense of the Philippines was the “ultimate responsibility” of the United States. The Philippine defense force was but a reserve for the U.S. Army.147

In March 1939 Eisenhower had the opportunity to give the commencement address to the graduating Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) class at the University of the Philippines. This speech reveals the mature thought of Dwight
Eisenhower on the profession of arms. Preparation was one of the cherished ideals that Eisenhower spoke of that day. For Eisenhower, a young officer prepares himself through study and field exercises to be the best soldier possible. Each officer must cultivate the characteristics that would ensure his own success and that of the army: loyalty to superiors and subordinates, honesty, fairness, and “he must learn to make firm decisions and to accept responsibility for them without seeking to shift it either to superior or subordinate.”\(^{148}\) It was up to each individual to pursue this course.

Finally, Eisenhower asserted, the soldier must be subject to the civilian government. It was not his lot to get involved in the policies of that government, to complain, to disobey its dictates. He was explicit on this point:

As members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps you are primarily citizens, and secondarily soldiers. In the first of these capacities you enjoy all the rights and privileges of any other citizen; in the other you are compelled to forego such of those rights and privileges as involve participation in the political activities, decisions and policies of your nation. This distinction must be meticulously observed, because, in a democracy, the military is and must remain subordinate to civil power.\(^{149}\)

Too many times had Eisenhower seen MacArthur involve himself in political matters, attempting to supersede the civilian authority. From the 1932 Bonus March, in which MacArthur ignored President Herbert Hoover’s orders, to his attempt to force the Philippine government to spend more on defense, MacArthur powerfully inserted himself in civilian politics.\(^{150}\) This was MacArthur’s way; it was not


\(^{149}\) Ibid.

\(^{150}\) In 1932 Hoover had ordered MacArthur to send a detachment of troops to the Bonus Marchers’ scene of disorder in Washington, D.C.; to cooperate with the local police in restoring calm; and to surround the demonstrators and clear them from the area, while showing “every consideration and kindness” to women and children. Moreover, Hoover did not want U.S. troops to cross the Anacostia Bridge and destroy the Marchers’ camp. MacArthur well knew of the president’s basic humanitarian views regarding the Bonus Army. In the midst of the conflict, Hoover grew concerned that events were escalating beyond his intent and sent new orders to MacArthur to refrain from crossing the Anacostia Bridge. Eisenhower himself told the general that new orders from the president had arrived. It does not matter whether MacArthur heard those orders or not. He knew that new orders from the president were at hand and chose to ignore that fact. MacArthur believed Hoover did not fully appreciate the threat to the United States the Marchers presented. MacArthur then ordered troops across the bridge and used substantial force in routing the Bonus Marchers. President Herbert Hoover to General Douglas MacArthur, 28 July 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries*, 237; ibid., 425–29; Eisenhower, *At Ease*, 217; Dwight D. Eisenhower, interview by Raymond Henle, 13 July 1967, EL.
Eisenhower’s. Indeed, MacArthur’s behavior was contrary to the cherished ideals of the U.S. Army. Most army officers did not even vote; Eisenhower meticulously followed this tradition.

Ike’s talks and bridge games with Quezon continued. On the evening of 28 March 1939, Quezon called Eisenhower to Malacanang, the presidential palace. The president was disturbed over a problem with a General Staff letter, and problems with the officer corps. During the course of the conversation, Quezon was astonished to learn that Eisenhower was no longer MacArthur’s chief of staff. The conversation further revealed that it had been MacArthur’s idea to train the full complement of reservists in 1937, as opposed to spending money on officers and trainers and a more well-rounded military, and to make MacArthur a field marshal. Of course MacArthur had maintained that these decisions had come from Quezon. Now it was apparent to Eisenhower that MacArthur had simply lied. Before the conversation ended, Quezon promised to have Eisenhower re-instated, if it were possible, as liaison between himself and the Mission. It took some time, but eventually MacArthur’s unwillingness to communicate regularly with the government led a frustrated Secretary of Defense Jorge Vargas to insist that Eisenhower be reappointed to his old liaison job; MacArthur acquiesced.

As we have seen, Ike was determined to leave MacArthur and the Philippines once the general had removed him from his role as chief of staff. Even before this Eisenhower had vacillated between his interesting and challenging job in the Philippines and his longing to serve with troops, to obtain a field command. As the likelihood of war approached, and his disgust with MacArthur increased, that decision was constantly receiving confirmation.

In May, Major Clark delivered for Eisenhower. Ike never forgot the favor, and Clark would benefit from it in the years ahead. Ike’s new orders directed him to the 15th Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington, effective no later than November 1939.

Eisenhower was ecstatic. Quezon did not want Eisenhower to leave and literally offered him a blank check to stay. Many other Filipinos shared that sentiment. Eisenhower had turned down better-paying jobs in the past in order to pursue his dream of serving his country on the battlefield in a major war; he did it again now.

151. Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 425–29. Eisenhower drew a distinction between an active duty officer interfering with or ignoring his civilian superiors and a retired officer running for office.
156. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 197, 198, 199, 200.
MacArthur protested as well, but Ike did not take him seriously. Eisenhower was determined to leave: “I don’t give a hoot who gets credit for anything in the P.I. I got out clean—and that’s that!” Finally, the Eisenhowers were allowed to leave the Philippines in November. Quezon arranged “a beautiful farewell luncheon,” and MacArthur was gracious as his one-time chief of staff boarded the President Cleveland and left America’s Far Eastern frontier.

Eisenhower’s disdain for MacArthur was not temporary, was not born of the heat of the moment, and was not based primarily on the larger uncontrollable circumstances surrounding their work in the Philippines. Eisenhower’s antipathy was the direct result of MacArthur’s decisions both in regard to Philippine defense and his own conduct, especially his failure to accept responsibility for his own decisions. Eisenhower thought many of MacArthur’s decisions were dimwitted, and his conduct reprehensible. Moreover, Eisenhower could hold a grudge.

The passing of time did not soften his opinion of the general. Well over two years after he had left the Philippines, after he had proven himself during the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941, and after Army Chief of Staff George Marshall had brought him to the War Department, Eisenhower still held a deeply critical view of MacArthur, a view he repeatedly recorded in his diary. MacArthur, who had been recalled to active duty with the U.S. Army in July 1941 as tensions with Japan increased, commanded both the Philippine Department and the army of the Philippine Commonwealth. On 8 December 1941, Philippine time, Japanese forces struck the Philippines. Within the week, Eisenhower was in Washington, summoned there in part because of his knowledge of the Philippines and its defense capabilities, and also because of a long list of interwar accomplishments. As deputy and then head of the War Plans Division, his primary concern was how best to aid the Philippines without compromising the ability of the United States to some day win the war.

On 19 January 1942 Eisenhower wrote in his diary, “In many ways MacArthur is as big a baby as ever. But we’ve got to keep him fighting.” On 23 January Eisenhower described Major General Richard Sutherland, his replacement in the Philippines, as one of MacArthur’s “bootlickers,” the kind of aide MacArthur

157. Eisenhower, *At Ease*, 231. In the years between the wars Eisenhower turned down opportunities coaching football, working in journalism, and helping Jews relocate. All of these jobs paid substantially more than army majors earned.


preferred.\footnote{165} Four days later, Eisenhower responded to a “flood of communications” from MacArthur. Eisenhower thought these letters betrayed MacArthur’s refusal “to look facts in the face. An old trait of his.” MacArthur wanted more resources for the Philippines and the Far East. Two days before, Eisenhower had written in his diary concerning the necessity to win in Europe first.\footnote{166} Eisenhower thought MacArthur could not see the big picture and was “jittery.” On 3 February, Ike wrote, “Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I am hoping that his yelps are just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor.”\footnote{167} A few days later Eisenhower recorded his irritation at having to send a long letter on strategy to MacArthur. The latter had sent a condescending message urging a flank attack that Eisenhower thought was fit only for “plebes.”\footnote{168}

In February, as the situation in the Philippines deteriorated, President Franklin Roosevelt discussed MacArthur’s fate with his closest advisers. The president, following Marshall’s advice, was convinced that the United States could not allow the Japanese to take MacArthur prisoner if it could be avoided. Eisenhower wrote the order to MacArthur to leave the Philippines. But Eisenhower himself disagreed with the decision. In a rare lapse of judgment, Ike allowed his own deep animosity toward the general to block his recognition of the obvious psychological importance of getting MacArthur out of the Philippines. Eisenhower believed that MacArthur would better serve the country by remaining at his post. He doubted MacArthur’s ability to effectively lead a highly complex and diverse military force in the Southwest Pacific. Moreover, Ike believed the self-important and Caesar-like MacArthur would not fit well in a command structure that necessarily included presidents, prime ministers and a half a dozen chiefs of staff, not to mention scores of lesser planners.\footnote{169} Finally, on 21 March Eisenhower wrote that he had “expurgated” the diary’s previous day. He was ashamed that he had grown so angry on that page and so tore it out. Of course we cannot be sure what the cause of Ike’s anger was, but the context in the diary is MacArthur’s successful escape from the Philippines and Eisenhower’s fear that the general would be able to command greater resources for the Far East than could safely be allocated. He wrote, “Urging us in that direction now will be: Australians, New Zealanders, our public (wanting support for the hero), and MacArthur. If we tie up our shipping for the SW Pacific, we’ll lose this war.”\footnote{170} Interestingly, while Eisenhower ripped out his angry page, he did not take out the comments noted above. Indeed, whenever Ike mentions MacArthur in his diary in these early days of 1942 his comment is always negative, and he lets those comments stand. No exhaustion, no frustration, and no distraction could account for these repeated vituperations in the Eisenhower diaries over so many years.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] Diary entry, 23 January 1942, in ibid., 44.
\item[166] Diary entries, 27 and 29 January 1942, in ibid., 45, 46.
\item[167] Diary entry, 3 February 1942, in ibid., 46.
\item[168] Diary entry, 8 February 1942, in ibid., 47.
\item[169] Diary entries, 22 and 23 February 1942, in ibid., 49.
\item[170] Diary entries, 19 and 21 March 1942, in ibid., 51, 52.
\end{footnotes}
It was well known in Washington that Eisenhower and MacArthur had parted on poor terms and had little use for one another. Robert Sherwood argues this antipathy was even a minor factor in President Roosevelt’s decision in late 1943 to keep Marshall as chief of staff instead of giving him the Overlord command. If Marshall had received the Overlord post, Eisenhower was to succeed him as chief of staff, but his relationship with MacArthur was an obstacle.

The mutual ill-will persisted after the war. Eisenhower’s accomplishments as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe brought out the worst in MacArthur. He seemed unable to abide a former subordinate rising to such heights. Of Ike’s military record he said, “He let his generals in the field fight the war for him. They were good and covered up for him. He drank tea with kings and queens. Just up Eisenhower’s alley.” MacArthur moved from the ridiculous to the petty when, upon learning the Canadians had named a mountain after Ike he remarked, “You know, it’s a very small peak, considering the Canadian terrain.” On another occasion he castigated Eisenhower’s leadership in North Africa and Europe. Echoing Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery he said, “the European strategy was to hammer stupidly against the enemy’s strongest points.” Perhaps MacArthur summed up his view of Eisenhower when he remarked, “best clerk I ever had.” Eisenhower was no less caustic. In a casual conversation, a woman voiced her admiration for MacArthur and asked Ike if he knew the general. He responded, “Not only have I met him Madam, but I studied dramatics under him for five years in Washington and four in the Philippines.”

In addition, Eisenhower was unsympathetic when President Truman fired MacArthur, his Far Eastern general, on 11 April 1951. Ike remarked, “I hope he will not return to the United States and become a controversial figure. I wouldn’t like it to lead to acrimony.” Commenting on why Truman had fired MacArthur, Ike said, “when you put on a uniform, there are certain inhibitions you accept.” In the early 1960s Eisenhower, recalling MacArthur’s behavior during the Bonus March of 1932, said, “I told that dumb son-of-a-bitch he had no business going down there.” Indeed, Eisenhower thought so little of MacArthur in part

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172. Manchester, American Caesar, 478.
173. Ibid., 438.
174. Ibid., 166.
175. Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 99. Some scholars have questioned the accuracy of MacArthur’s famous line “Best clerk I ever had,” and Eisenhower’s remark that he had “studied dramatics” under MacArthur. Though primary sources for these two comments still elude scholars, they were published at least as early as 1952 in the Lee and Henschel work on MacArthur. The two men in question had considerable time to deny having made them. They did not do so. Moreover, as I have shown, the two comments are in keeping with what each man thought of the other. Finally, in regard to the remark attributed to Eisenhower, his son John wrote of it, “I know they [the words in the quote] represent his views; Eisenhower, General Ike, 33. There is no reason to believe the quotes are apocryphal.
177. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect, 98.
Eisenhower and MacArthur in the Philippines

because Ike believed the general reflected so poorly on the U.S. Army. He said, “I just can’t understand how such a damn fool could have gotten to be a General.”178 Eisenhower summarized his views of his former boss when he said, “I certainly don’t want to be put in the same class with MacArthur. What makes anyone think MacArthur is a great man?”179 Of course there were the occasional respectful comments toward one another. Both men realized a public dispute between two great soldiers would have served no purpose and damaged them both. Thus Piers Brendon was surely correct when he wrote that these cordial comments were “ringingly insincere expressions of mutual regard.”180

In conclusion, Dwight Eisenhower believed that Douglas MacArthur fell short of the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit. MacArthur was more interested in his own advancement, his own prestige, his own ease, and hearing his own voice. MacArthur too often left relations with Philippine President Manuel Quezon to chance, and was all too ready to believe his own superficial analysis of the relationship of the Philippines to the rest of the Far East. Too often MacArthur sacrificed the team—the American Military Mission and the Philippine army it was trying to build—to his dream of a 400,000-man Philippine army worthy of a field marshal. Eisenhower’s differences with MacArthur were not over the kinds of things that are later forgotten; the catalyst for these disagreements was a significant and philosophical disagreement over how best to build a Filipino army. That dispute then developed into Eisenhower’s lasting disgust for MacArthur’s command style. Particularly galling was MacArthur’s refusal to accept responsibility for his decisions. As Supreme Allied Commander for Europe during World War II, Eisenhower wrote a press release before each major operation, to be used if the action was unsuccessful. The notes informed the world the operation had been a failure and that he alone was responsible.181 The note he wrote for D-Day, 6 June 1944 reads:

> Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone [italics mine].

Fortunately these notes were never used, but the man who wrote them remembered Douglas MacArthur.

178. Ibid., 97.
179. Brendon, Ike, 70.
180. Ibid.
A more complete analysis is in my article “A New Estimate of U.S. Torpedo Successes in World War II” scheduled for publication in the forthcoming April issue of The Submarine Review.

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Dr. Sturma declines to respond.

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To the Editor:

In a recent *JMH* article (“Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines,” *JMH* 74/2 [April 2010]), pp. 449-50, note 42), Professor Kerry Irish identified me as one of “some scholars” who has argued that Douglas MacArthur’s “purpose in creating the Philippine army was to surreptitiously keep the Philippines indefinitely subservient to the United States as a manifestation of American Empire.” “This interpretation does not bear scrutiny,” Professor Irish continues, and he refers readers to an article I wrote for “a recent interpretation of this untenable view.” I do not know who these other scholars are, but could Professor Irish clarify for me just whose view he finds untenable? Mine or General MacArthur’s? In “Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth” (published in the *Pacific Historical Review* 70/2 [2001], pp. 255-92, and accessible through JSTOR), I took as a starting point the thesis—and this has been advanced by other scholars before me—that Commonwealth President Quezon felt, as his American confidant Roy Wilson Howard penned in his diary in early 1934 even as Quezon negotiated changes to the Philippine independence act, “that the Islands [would] be much better off under the American flag.” I wrote that Quezon wanted to demonstrate that a Philippine connection could be “valuable to the United States” but sought to do so on “terms that would satisfy [his] need for equality of effort and mutual respect[.]” Then—and here I launched out on my own, or so I thought—drawing upon a wide array of primary sources (many of them seldom if ever used by either MacArthur’s—or Dwight Eisenhower’s—many biographers and some, like Howard’s diaries, unused in a published work by any other scholar), I further argued that in Quezon’s view, a Philippine army, “its loyalty to the United States symbolized by the association of a prominent American but its ‘commander-in-chief’ a Filipino, could demonstrate the value of the Philippines to the United States and serve both countries’ interests.” “For his part,” I pointed out, “MacArthur made no secret of the larger purpose of the military force he went to the Philippines to create.” As he wrote to fellow officer John C. H. Lee in September 1936 (to repeat one of several examples I gave), “MacArthur was building up the ‘left wing’ of America’s Pacific defense line. The United States should have naval bases in both Alaska and the Philippines, MacArthur stated, and the Philippine Army would defend the lat-
I did not say that I found either Quezon’s or MacArthur’s expectations to be realistic, but I did try to explain why they may have thought so within the context of the two countries’ historical—and their personal—relationship.

Richard B. Meixsel
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Harrisonburg, Virginia

Dr. Irish responds:

I apologize if my remarks were taken to suggest that Professor Meixsel’s work was unoriginal or lacking in primary sources. That was not my purpose. I took exception to his thesis which I believe I have accurately described in the footnote he cites. His article clearly opposes the view that the primary purpose of the American Military Mission to the Philippines was to assist in developing a defense force that would facilitate independence. As this issue is quite tangential to my work on Eisenhower, I regret that I cannot take the time to explore it further. I do suggest that JMH readers who are interested in this issue read Professor Meixsel’s article.