Foreword

Self-preservation and military measures to insure the territory of the United States against violation by foreign powers— the subject of this book— ceased to be of serious concern to the United States Government and nation during the nineteenth century. In World War I, the Americans concentrated on the offensive. In World War II, as the authors of this book remark in their Preface, we passed to the offensive so soon and with such force after the United States became engaged that the military provisions for defense have been obscured from view. Other volumes in the present series sketch these defensive plans and preparations in their general context; this and a succeeding volume by the same authors focus on these measures and relate them to the evolution of American foreign policy in the period 1938-41. The experience acquired in preparing for defense when the danger of direct attack was regarded as constituting a state of emergency is one of great interest in our present state of danger when deterrence has become the policy of the nation and its armed forces.

Washington, D. C.
6 June 1958

R. W. STEPHENS
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Preface

This is the first of two volumes on the plans made and measures taken by the Army to protect the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere against military attack by the Axis Powers before and during World War II. The global character of American participation in the war, described in the many volumes of this series, tends to obscure the primary and basic concern of the United States Government, and consequently of the Army, for the safety of the continental United States. When in the late 1930's the coalition of aggressor nations foreshadowed a new world war that would inevitably involve the security of the United States, Army and Navy planning officers concluded that the continental United States could not be threatened seriously by either air or surface attack unless a hostile power first secured a lodgment elsewhere within the Western Hemisphere. To prevent that from happening, the United States adopted a new national policy of hemisphere defense. Between 1939 and 1942 the Army played a key role in executing this policy. The achievement of substantial security within the hemisphere permitted the United States to concentrate on the offensive soon after the Japanese attacks on Oahu and Luzon plunged the nation into open war in December 1941.

The first seven chapters of this volume describe the evolution of the policy of hemisphere defense in the three years before Pearl Harbor, the gradual merger of that policy into a broader national defense policy of opposing Germany and Japan by all-out aid to nations that were fighting them, and the quick transition in December 1941 to offensive plans and preparations for the defeat of those powers. These chapters have been designed to introduce not only the rest of this volume but also the second one being prepared for this subseries. Chapters VIII through XV of the present volume describe the military relationships of the United States with the other American nations in support of plans and preparations for continental and hemisphere defense, and Army ground and air action outside the continental United States not involving bases under exclusive American military command. Three of these chapters narrate the military relations of a general character with the Latin American nations, and five discuss in greater detail military, cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, and Canada.

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The second volume will proceed to a description of measures taken for the defense of the continental United States itself, emphasizing air and coastal defenses, the organization of Army forces for protecting the nation before and during the war, and the threats to continental security after Pearl Harbor. A section on Hawaii will be focused on preparations for the defense of Oahu and the Army's part in resistance to the Japanese attack and in securing the islands against invasion in the months thereafter. A separate chapter will discuss the part played by the War
Department and by Army commanders in planning the evacuation of American citizens and residents of Japanese
descent from exposed areas. Then each of the other major outpost areas will be treated in turn. The Alaska story
will describe defense preparations and then deal briefly with the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the only major ground
operation to occur within the Western Hemisphere during the war. Several chapters will describe the system of
Army defenses for the protection of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area, erected within the framework of
military cooperation with the Latin American nations discussed in this volume. Finally, the second volume will
take up Army defenses in the Atlantic bases acquired from Great Britain in the destroyer exchange of 1940, the
extension of Army operations to Greenland and Iceland during 1941 and 1942, and the wartime role of the chain of
bases along the Atlantic front.

The opening chapters of this volume cover substantially the same time span as the volume by Mark Skinner
Watson in this series, *Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations*, and the two volumes by William L. Langer
and S. Everett Gleason on *The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy*. Two other volumes in the Army series
parallel these introductory chapters in lesser degree, those by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, and by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics
and Strategy, 1940-1943*. In these books the authors are primarily concerned with the evolution of the offensive
strategy adopted as the conflict with the Axis Powers developed. In our work, repeating factual details already
published only when necessary, we have tried to offer a fresh approach to the prewar and wartime history of the
Army by focusing on continental and hemisphere defense and by using Army records that are essential to a full
exposition of this story. A description of the sources and secondary narratives used in the preparation of this
volume will be found in the Bibliographical Note.

This is a work of joint authorship and endeavor. The first twelve chapters and the conclusion are primarily the
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material contribution to this work of our professional associate, Dr. Rose C. Engelman, who is a coauthor of the
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and during the nation's participation in World War II has been under scrutiny. Without the free interchange of
information and criticism that such a program makes possible, the research and writing for this volume would have
been much more difficult and we would have presented our story with much less confidence.

In particular we are indebted to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Office of the Chief of Military
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Our effort in research has been facilitated first of all by the unfailingly cheerful and helpful assistance of Mr. Israel
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Leighton for the Index.

These acknowledgments of assistance are in no way delegation of responsibility for the contents of the volume. The
presentation and interpretation of events it contains are the authors' own, and we alone are responsible for faults of
commission or omission.

Washington, D. C.         STETSON CONN
6 June 1958              BYRON FAIRCHILD

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Immediately after the Munich crisis of September 1938, the United States moved toward a new national policy of hemisphere defense. Although one of the fundamental foreign policies of the United States was the Monroe Doctrine, with its admonition against any European or Asiatic political or military intrusion into New World affairs, the nation in the immediately preceding years had neither the desire nor the military means to engage in a unilateral defense of the Americas. After World War I the American people, influenced by the overwhelming preponderance of friendly naval and military power in western Europe, became increasingly isolationist and increasingly indifferent toward maintaining enough military strength to defend even their own continental and outlying territory against a strong adversary. The rise of aggressive dictatorships in Europe during the pre-World War II decade found the United States Army in condition to do no more than defend the continental United States, Oahu, and the Panama Canal Zone. The Navy, relatively much stronger than the Army, was tied down in the Pacific by Japan's naval expansion and aggressive action in China. Therefore, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared, six weeks after the Munich settlement, that "the United States must be prepared to resist attack on the western hemisphere from the North Pole to the South Pole, including all of North America and South America," 1 the Army and Navy were presented with a much bigger mission than they were then prepared to execute.

Until the President gave his "quarantine" speech the year before, on 5 October 1937, the avowed policy of the Roosevelt administration came near to being one of peace at any price, unless the United States was directly attacked. Under the circumstances, and in view of its own very limited strength, the Army at the beginning of 1937 held that its mission was confined to defense of United States territory against external attack, protection of the nation against internal disorder and insurrection, and maintenance, during peace, of a sufficient force to permit expansion to the
manded by an emergency. Current war plans did not envisage even the possibility of war with the European dictatorships. When, in the summer of 1937, with preludes to World War II already in progress in Spain and China, a War Department General Staff study expressed concern about the Army's state of preparedness for meeting "serious threats to the continental United States and its possessions," one officer underscored this clause and added the query: "How about threats to other nations in the Western Hemisphere?" His question remained unanswered.

When President Roosevelt recommended a substantial increase in appropriations for the Army in January 1938, he defined adequate national defense as "simultaneous defense of every part of the United States of America" and stated, "we must keep any potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits." The President extended national defense policy in more specific terms in an address at Kingston, Ontario, on 18 August 1938. "I give to you assurance," he said, "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire." His assurance recognized that the long unfortified border with Canada made it inevitable that the United States should consider Canadian defenses a part of the outpost line of its own continental defense system.

The President moved toward a broader policy as soon as he became convinced that the Nazis intended to liquidate Czechoslovakia. After listening to Adolf Hitler's broadcast on 12 September, President Roosevelt directed Harry L. Hopkins to make a personal survey of the west coast aviation industry and report on its capacity for expansion. Following the Munich agreement of 30 September, and particularly after Ambassador William C. Bullitt returned from France on 13 October with a firsthand report on the European situation, the President pressed an expansion of air strength with great vigor. The Hopkins survey, Mr. Bullitt's report, the
urgings of Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson and of the new Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, and the President's own realization that the technological development of airpower now posed a threat to the United States from any hostile Western Hemisphere base, all combined to forge not

only a new military air program but also the prewar policy of hemisphere defense. Both program and policy were settled upon at a momentous conference on 14 November 1938, at which the President announced his immediate goal to be an Army air force of 10,000 planes and an aircraft productive capacity of 10,000 planes a year. Observing that "our national defense machine . . . was weakest in Army planes," the President went on to say, "we must have a large air force in being to protect any part of the North or South American continent, and we must have a sufficiently large air force to deter anyone from landing in either North or South America."  

The next day President Roosevelt informed newsmen in general terms of what had been said at the conference, and specifically of the new determination of the United States to maintain continental security from Canada to Tierra del Fuego against any possible threat from other continents. In response to a direct question as to whether the problem of national defense had now become a problem of continental defense, the President answered: "Yes, but continental defense that does not rest solely on our shoulders."  

**Hemisphere Security and the Axis Threat**

As President Roosevelt recognized, the new national policy, and consequent military objective, of hemisphere defense needed the friendly and active support of other American nations in order to be effective. During the Munich crisis, the Department of State had begun to plan the strengthening of what Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle termed "the north-south axis."  

To the north, the way toward closer ties had already been prepared by meetings between the President and Canadian Prime Minister William La Mackenzie King and by informal military staff talks at the beginning of
1938. To the south, the United States availed itself of the general Pan-American conference that had already been scheduled to meet in Lima, Peru, in December 1938. The goal of the United States at Lima was to secure the adoption of a "hemispheric foreign policy," and Secretary of State Cordell Hull succeeded in obtaining unanimous adherence to a declaration that "affirmed the intention of the American Republics to help one another in case of a foreign attack, either direct or indirect, on any one of them." The Declaration of Lima became the cornerstone for later negotiations to insure the political, economic, and military cooperation of the Latin American nations against the threats of Axis and Japanese aggression.

These threats seemed very real in 1938 and 1939. In early 1938 the Department of State compiled a catalogue of German and Italian activities and used it as a basis for urging the War and Navy Departments to adopt measures for closer military collaboration with other American nations. Rumors of Japanese interest in offshore islands along the Pacific coast of the Americas, reports of Japanese reconnaissance under the guise of "fishing" along the Mexican and Central American coasts, rumors of German interest in Samaná Bay in the Dominican Republic, reports of German plots to foment revolutions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—these were typical examples of items that induced a growing alarm in administration circles during 1938. In addition, Nazi and Fascist propaganda against the United States in Latin America was violent and ceaseless, and Nazi barter techniques and clandestine subsidization by the German Government were making deep inroads in the Latin American market. After summarizing the variety of activities in which the Axis Powers and Japan were engaging at the time of the Lima Conference, Secretary Hull wrote in retrospect:

To me the danger to the Western Hemisphere was real and imminent. It was not limited to the possibility of a military invasion. It was more acute in its indirect form of propaganda, penetration, organizing political parties, buying some adherents, and blackmailing others. We had seen the method employed with great success in Austria and in the Sudetenland.
Chapter I: The Problem of Hemisphere Defense

The same technique was obvious in Latin America.\textsuperscript{13}

President Roosevelt took perhaps the broadest and most prescient view of the growing menace to the Americas. To a group of congressmen in February 1939, he expressed his opinion that war in Europe was almost certainly in the offing and that Hitler's immediate objective was the domination of Europe. But, he added, "as soon as one nation dominates Europe, that nation will be able to turn to the world sphere."\textsuperscript{14} Three months later, speaking to another Congressional delegation, the President reiterated his conviction that war in Europe was imminent, and he predicted that in the event of war there was an even chance that the Axis Powers would win over France and Great Britain. The President then went on to say:

In that case their first act would be either to seize the British Navy or put it out of action. Then they would establish trade relations with Latin America, put instructors in the armies, etc. They would probably not touch British, French or Dutch possessions in this hemisphere. But in a very short time we would find ourselves surrounded by hostile states. Further, the Japanese, who "always like to play with the big boys," would probably go into a hard and fast alliance. The combined German and Italian Navies were about the equal of ours and the Japanese was about eighty percent of ours. Therefore, the temptation to them would always be to try another quick war with us, if we got rough about their. South American penetration.\textsuperscript{15}

It was this specter of a victorious Axis triumvirate dominating the European and Asiatic continents, rather than any immediate military threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere, that was grimly disturbing not only to the President but also to his military advisers as they turned to their task of formulating new war plans to cope with the menacing world situation.

The *RAINBOW Plans*

The Army and Navy before 1939 had confined their war planning principally to calculating what they could do to meet a threatened attack on American
toward territory by individual nations. Only the ORANGE plan, which dealt with the contingency of a Japanese attack, had much relevance in the light of the international situation at the end of 1938 and the new national policy of hemisphere defense. Anticipating the President's formal enunciation of the new policy, the joint Board on 8 November decided to instruct its joint Planning Committee to make a thorough investigation of the "various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States, in the event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine, by one or more of the Fascist powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines." The planners were further told to base their study and recommendations on the assumptions:

(a) Germany, Italy, and Japan may be joined in an alliance.
(b) The action of any one or two of these Fascist nations will receive the sympathetic support of the others.

(c) Democratic nations will remain neutral as long as their possessions in the western hemisphere are unmolested.16

Such a survey would amount to a reassessment by the Army and Navy of what they could do in defense of the Western Hemisphere under the most unfavorable foreseeable development of world affairs.

The Joint Planning Committee went to work immediately on its exploration of the strategic position of the United States. An indication of the planners' approach to their task is contained in the following questions concerning cooperation with Latin America:

a. May cooperation with the United States be expected in the direction of resisting attempts by Germany, Italy, or Japan to dominate the internal political organization of these countries?
b. May similar cooperation be expected in the direction of resisting attempts to deflect the normal flow of trade away from the United States?
c. May similar cooperation be expected in the direction of resisting attempts to establish under any guise air bases or naval bases which may be used by the armed forces of either
Germany, Italy, or Japan?

d. To what extent may it be expected that the active cooperation of the United States in resisting foreign encroachment or invasion would be welcome?

e. To what extent may it be expected that air base or naval base facilities would be willingly offered for the use of the United States in the defense of the Western Hemisphere?

f. What practicable air base and naval base facilities now exist in each of these countries, and briefly, to what extent are they susceptible to development? 17

After five months' intensive study, the planners submitted their final report to the joint Board on 21 April 1939. The board properly described the report as a monument to its authors, since it provided a sound and comprehensive estimate that served as a basis for the detailed strategic planning that followed. 18

With respect to the Atlantic situation, the joint Planning Committee concluded that Germany and Italy might be expected to encroach progressively in Latin America, initially through intensive economic penetration, then through political interference that might reduce Latin American governments to subservient or even colonial status, and finally through establishment of military bases. The first military move of the Axis Powers would probably be an attempt to occupy the area around Natal, on the eastern bulge of Brazil, in order to strengthen their strategic position in the South Atlantic; subsequently, they might extend their military control to positions from which they could launch direct attacks on the Panama Canal. In the Pacific, Japan's objectives would be the seizure of the Philippines and Guam and the elimination of all Western influence from eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The report pointed out that, if Germany, Italy, and Japan were to strike simultaneously, their attacks would present the United States with a critical dilemma: Its existing naval power was certainly strong enough to fend off Germany and Italy in the Atlantic and possibly could be made strong enough to protect the American position in the western Pacific; it certainly could not do both simultaneously. The planners did not propose any
solution to this dilemma—which, fundamentally, called for a choice between hemisphere defense on the one hand and defense of American territory and interests in the western Pacific on the other—but they did insist that priority must be given to protection of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area, the position and region most vital to the defense of the United States.

The Joint Planning Committee ended its report of 21 April by recommending the measures that it considered most essential to the immediate improvement of American defenses. Briefly, these were the rapid completion of planned defense installations in Hawaii and the Canal Zone, steps to improve the security of the Panama Canal and to enlarge its locks, development of Alaskan and Puerto Rican defenses (neither of which had any worthy of mention at this time), development of Pacific naval bases, an increase in the Fleet Marine Force to fifteen thousand men, organization of a three-division emergency expeditionary force by the Army, and a rapid increase in naval strength, especially in vessels and aircraft for antisubmarine operations.

The Joint Board approved the report on 6 May 1939 and ten days later directed the joint Planners to begin work on a series of war plans that would match the varying situations that might develop. For planning purposes, this directive defined the Western Hemisphere "as including the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, American Samoa, and the Atlantic Ocean as far east as the 30th Meridian of West Longitude." The general concepts for each of five alternate RAINBOW plans were determined by the end of June, and RAINBOW 1, the basic plan, received official Army and Navy approval in August and President Roosevelt's assent in October. RAINBOW 1, the projected RAINBOW 4, and supplementary plans that evolved from them provided the principal bases for Army defense preparations until 1941.

RAINBOW 1 called for the protection of all United States territory (but no reinforcement of the Philippines) and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere north of latitude 10° south, a line that bisects South America, just below the Peruvian and Brazilian bulges. In accordance with the joint
Board's basic directive of November 1938, RAINBOW 1 assumed that the democracies of Europe and Latin America would remain neutral and that United States forces alone would be available to resist an attack. In contrast to RAINBOW 1, RAINBOW 2 and RAINBOW 3 envisioned active defense of American interests in the western Pacific. RAINBOW 4 was similar to RAINBOW 1, a principal difference being that it called for protection of the entire Western Hemisphere. RAINBOW 5 envisaged a war in which the United States would act in concert with Great Britain and France; in addition to doing all of the things called for in RAINBOW 1, RAINBOW 5 contemplated the dispatch of American forces "to either or both of the African or European continents in order to effect the defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both." So far as hemisphere defense measures were concerned, there was little difference among the RAINBOW plans of 1939- Each allotted the Army and Navy the primary task of defending the Western Hemisphere against military attack from the Old World; when the successful accomplishment of that task had been assured, American forces might then engage in offensive operations, either alone or in concert with those of other powers, against the aggressor nations.19

The Problem of Bares

The Joint Board's approval of the first RAINBOW plan in August 1939 brought to the fore the problem of securing permission for American forces to use military base facilities in other Western Hemisphere nations and in European possessions in the New World. To carry out the hemisphere defense missions of the Army and Navy as outlined in RAINBOW 1 the planners agreed that, in addition to new defenses recommended for Alaska and Puerto Rico, it was also necessary to obtain use of limited base facilities in various British possessions (Trinidad heading the list), in Brazil (at Natal and at other points on or adjacent to the Brazilian bulge), along the northern coast of South America (in Colombia and Venezuela), at Guayaquil in Ecuador and on Cocos and the Galápagos Islands, and at Samaná Bay in the Dominican Republic. Admiral Harold R Stark, the new Chief of Naval Operations, sent a copy of RAINBOW 1 to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on 14 Au-
August 1939 and asked the Department of State to enlist the cooperation of the nations concerned in making available base facilities for American military operations at the points enumerated. Steps in this direction were taken immediately after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. The British agreed to a limited use of base facilities in Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad by United States Navy vessels and aircraft assigned to the neutrality patrol of Atlantic waters; and the Department of State arranged with some of the Caribbean nations for emergency use of their facilities.

The question of acquiring new base facilities in the Western Hemisphere had been explored on various occasions before August 1939. In a thorough canvass of the problem in 1936, prompted by Congressional proposals to annex European possessions in return for cancellation of World War I debts, the Army came to the conclusion that no move of this sort would be wise. The Army assumed that it was against national policy to acquire new territory except for urgent strategic reasons. It also assumed that the Latin Americans would resent the territorial expansion of the United States within the Western Hemisphere, either in their own territory or in the possessions of the European powers. Any such move by the United States would be certain to raise anew the cry of "Yankee Imperialism" and undermine the friendly relations recently established through the "Good Neighbor" policy. The Army examined in turn every colonial area in North and South America and concluded that none of them had a military value sufficient to offset the disadvantages of American ownership. On the other hand in 1936, as well as later, the Army expressed its strong opposition to the transfer of any existing European possession to another Old World power.

The United States had taken a particular interest before 1939 in the Galápagos Islands, owned by Ecuador and located about 1,000 miles southwest of Panama. These undefended and almost uninhabited islands in hostile hands could become a serious threat to the Panama Canal. Conversely, an American base there would permit a wide aerial reconnaissance of the Pacific to guard against a naval attack on the Canal. Rumors circulated in the fall of 1938 that Ecuador wished to sell the Galapagos to the United States. At the beginning of 1939, Maj. Gen. David L. Stone, the commanding general
of the Panama Canal Department, recommended that the United States purchase both the Galapagos Islands from Ecuador and the intervening Cocos Island from Costa Rica, on the ground that they were essential to defense of the Canal. The War Department at first favored General Stone's recommendation but subsequently had to disapprove it because of the Navy's opposition and for broader political reasons. It also disapproved his later suggestion that the United States secure base facilities in these islands through a long-term lease.23

While General Stone's recommendation with respect to the Galapagos was under consideration in Washington, Under Secretary of State Welles called President Roosevelt's attention to unconfirmed reports that Chile might be willing to sell Easter Island to the United States.24 The President, noting that Easter Island was "a definite possibility as a stopping place for trans-South Pacific planes," stated, "it should, therefore, under no circumstances, be transferred to a non-American power." 25 Two months later, Under Secretary Welles announced the same principle with respect to the Galápagos Islands when he informed Congress, "any endeavor on the part of any non-American power to purchase or lease the Islands or to use any part of them for a naval, military, air, or even a commercial base under whatever terms would be a matter of immediate and grave concern to this Government." 26 These statements amounted to a strong reaffirmation of the nontransfer principle of the Monroe Doctrine, a principle so basic in prewar planning for hemisphere defense that Army officers sometimes defined the doctrine in that term alone.

From the viewpoint of the armed services, the most serious and pressing base problem in the summer of 1939 was that of securing the right to establish air and naval base facilities at or near Natal in Brazil, as proposed in RAINBOW 1. The developing range of aircraft made Brazilian territory at this point easily accessible from the western bulge of Africa and its adjacent islands. The Military Intelligence Division (G-2) estimated in midsummer of 1939 that Germany and Italy then had more than 3,000 planes capable of
flying the South Atlantic with a bomb load.\footnote{27} Northeastern Brazil had no land defenses, and in 1939 Brazilian land, sea, and air forces were wholly incapable of defending the Natal area against overseas attack. The Army and Navy agreed that a base at Natal was essential for the effective defense of the South American continent. In March 1939 the Navy urged "the absolute necessity for a base of operations in or near the eastern extremity of South America in case the South Atlantic is to be controlled by any force."\footnote{28} Three months later, in June, the Army's Air Board termed an air base at Natal a fundamental requirement for defense operations in South America.\footnote{29} One of the strongest arguments in favor of the projected Natal base was that if United States forces were sent there first, a hostile military expedition would find it difficult if not impossible to dislodge them, nor could German or Italian forces launch a major attack against any other part of the South American continent while the Brazilian bulge was protected by American forces; on the other hand, if Axis forces established themselves on the bulge first, it would require a formidable effort to dislodge them.\footnote{30} Despite the priority of Natal on the list of desired bases, it took nearly three years of delicate and involved political and military negotiations to secure Brazilian permission to station United States Army forces in the area.\footnote{31}

Except for its interests in the Galapagos Islands and Natal, the Army in 1939 was less concerned than the Navy with proposals to acquire the use of foreign areas for defense purposes. During May 1939, for example, the War Department held that neither Greenland nor the Dutch West Indies had sufficient military value to warrant their purchase.\footnote{32} The Air Board report of June recommended the establishment of an Army air base on Trinidad as well as at Natal,\footnote{33} but the Army was more immediately interested in the development of an air base on Puerto Rico, essential for the defense of the eastern approaches to the Caribbean and as a steppingstone toward South American air bases. When a deceptive stalemate followed Hitler's quick triumph over Poland, agitation by the Army and Navy for base expansion subsided, although planners continued to think in terms of hemisphere
defense operations by United States forces with access to such strategic base sites as might be necessary.

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The Army's State of Readiness in 1939

The War Department in Washington headed the Army's command organization for planning and directing the new operations for national and hemisphere defense that were in prospect in the summer of 1939. The War Department consisted of the Secretary of War's Office, the Office of the Chief of Staff assisted by a General Staff of five divisions, and the headquarters of the arms and of the technical and administrative services in the national capital. Although the Secretary of War exercised general administrative control over all Army activities, the Chief of Staff actually commanded the military forces at home and overseas and (from July 1939 onward, as required) reported directly to the President on matters relating to strategy, tactics, and operations. Of the General Staff divisions, the War Plans Division was the one most immediately and extensively concerned with planning and supervising new military operations; eventually it evolved into a wartime command post for the Chief of Staff, replacing the General Headquarters contemplated in the plans of 1939 and partially activated in 1940 and 1941. Below the War Department, the command and administration of Army ground forces in the United States were exercised through nine corps area headquarters, and (after 1 July 1939) four department headquarters of similar character contained most of the Army's overseas forces. The continental air forces came under the General Headquarters Air Force, established in 1935, and the continental ground forces for certain purposes were under four army headquarters, which were designed to become command headquarters in time of war.

The adoption of a new policy of hemisphere defense did not change the Army's basic mission of protecting the continental United States against military attack. Col. Frank S. Clark, a co-architect of the RAINBOW plans and principal Army planner, emphasized this point in early 1940 when he wrote: "The primary and inescapable requisite in our Doctrine for the
conduct of any war is the necessity that wherever and whatever operations may be in-

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dicated, no commitment of our armed forces shall be permitted to impair the defensive security of the continental United States." 37 Because the mobility of the United States Fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was a cornerstone of continental defense plans, the Army considered its mission of guarding the Panama Canal as secondary only to continental defense. In surveying the situation in 1939, Army and Navy planners decided that the continental United States and the Canal Zone could only be subjected to invasion or large-scale surface attack if such an attack was backed by airpower. Airpower in strength could not be projected directly across the oceans, but it could be launched from land bases within the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, the primary objective of the hemisphere defense policy, from the Army's point of view, was to prevent the establishment of any hostile air base in the Western Hemisphere from which the continental area or the Panama Canal might be bombed or from which a surface attack or invasion might be supported.

Between 1935 and 1938, before the adoption of the new hemisphere defense policy, the Army had been materially strengthened both in numbers and equipment in comparison with its situation during the early depression years. In active strength it numbered 189,867 individuals in military service on 30 June 1939. 38 During June Congress appropriated funds to enable the Army to increase its enlisted strength during the following fiscal year to 210,000, a figure that became the "authorized strength" of the Regular Army after 1 July. As of June 1939, the Army's mobile ground combat forces in the continental United States numbered about 82,000 and included four partially filled infantry divisions, two small cavalry divisions, six separate brigades "in various states of completion," and only a few specialized supporting units. Although these "field forces" were theoretically available for deployment to meet any threatened attack, the Army in fact did not have a single division among its continental forces ready for immediate action. 39
The major Army overseas garrisons, in the summer of 1939, were the Hawaiian (21,475), Panama Canal (13,451), and Philippine (10,920) Departments. The principal ground combat units overseas were the Hawaiian Division guarding the island of Oahu, the Philippine Division in the Far East, and two infantry and two artillery regiments in the Panama Canal Zone. The new department activated in Puerto Rico on 1 July had an initial strength of less than 1,000; Alaska, attached to the Ninth Corps Area, had less than 500. In theory, the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama-Puerto Rico line constituted the Army's "outpost" line for the defense of the "main position," the continental United States. The direct primary mission of these outposts was the protection of naval bases and other installations-most notably, of course, the Panama Canal-needed to maintain the Navy's freedom of action.

Before 1939 the Army had developed basic plans for expanding its forces if war threatened. Its principal reserves in 1939 were the National Guard, numbering approximately 200,000, and the Officers' Reserve Corps, which had a strength of about 110,000. The first stage in expansion called for the creation of an Initial Protective Force of 400,000, to be obtained by inducting the National Guard into federal service. The Army had the immediate supply goal in early 1939 of accumulating all types of munitions for the Initial Protective Force and of acquiring reserves of critical (that is, noncommercial) items for the larger mobilization contemplated in what was called the Protective Mobilization Plan. Under this plan, the initial force would be increased to a strength of 1,000,000.

Until 1939 basic strategic plans for guarding the continental area in an emergency provided for concentrating most of the mobile combat units in the United States into strategic reserves and seacoast defense forces of approximately equal strengths. These strategic plans were designed, as a War Department memorandum of October 1938 put it, to "avoid the fatal error of distributing our limited forces in- a weak cordon along all our frontiers" and to "maintain the maximum concentration of forces for effective defensive
operations in the area where the major hostile threat develops." 41 The hemisphere defense plans of 1939 and after also contemplated building up a strategic reserve of ground and air forces in the United States; but, instead of employing a large portion of the mobile forces for defense of continental coastal and land frontiers, the Army now planned to send them out in expeditionary forces as necessary to guard the hemisphere as a whole. This amounted to an extension of the main military position from continental to hemisphere frontiers. The principle of concentrating as many forces as possible in a strategic reserve was to be applied between 1939 and 1941 with particular rigor to the air forces, the first Army element to expand under the impetus of the new hemisphere policy.

Before President Roosevelt presented his recommendations for strengthening the Army's air arm to Congress in January 1939, he agreed (with con-

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siderable reluctance) to a much more modest figure than the 10,000-plane goal he had previously advocated. Accordingly, he requested a $300,000,000 appropriation to provide at least 3,000 more planes for the Army. Congress in its enabling and appropriations acts of April and June 1939 provided the authorization and funds to permit the Army to embark on an expansion of its air arm to be completed by midsummer of 1941. This first "hemisphere defense" air program provided for an initial doubling of Air Corps personnel strength and an eventual airplane strength of 5,500 (including 3,300 combat planes), and for the replacement of most of the existing equipment. At the time (June 1939), the Air Corps had about 1,700 planes. Actually, many months were to elapse before the air arm received much strengthening in equipment. At the end of 1939, its airplane strength was only 1,800; and by the following May, the Air Corps had received only 1,350 new planes.42 By then, too, the national policy of sharing airplane production with Great Britain and France was in full swing and was threatening to delay the completion of the Army's own air program on schedule.

While the new air program was taking shape, the War Department in March 1939 appointed an Air Board to consider the means by which the Air Corps
should carry out its enlarged mission. The board, headed by General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, completed its labors in late June. It recommended the addition of four new major air bases to the eight already in existence, the deployment as soon as they were available of about 2,000 combat planes in tactical units at home and overseas (with about 1,300 more in reserve), and an Air Corps personnel strength of 49,000.\textsuperscript{43} For the continental United States, the Air Board proposed the establishment of new major air bases in the northeast and southeast to bolster the air defense of the entire Atlantic seaboard of the United States and Canada. The northeast air base -- Westover Field, subsequently provided near Holyoke, Massachusetts-would permit long-range patrol and bombardment action to prevent the establishment of hostile air bases in eastern Canada and Newfoundland. The southeast air base -- MacDill Field, established later near Tampa, Florida-would permit the projection of Army air power to the eastern Caribbean and

provide the third corner, with Panama and Puerto Rico, for a triangular air defense coverage of the whole Caribbean area.\textsuperscript{44}

Overseas, the new "hemisphere defense" air program called for the air reinforcement of the Panama Canal and Hawaiian Departments and for the establishment of new major air bases in Alaska and Puerto Rico. The Air Board also forecast the probable necessity for a major Army air base at Natal, Brazil, with intermediate staging bases connecting the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Natal. Before the board completed its report the new air base for Puerto Rico had been approved, and the War Department planned to furnish it with enough long-range airpower to cover the eastern approaches to the Caribbean. Panama, which the War Plans Division described in May as "the Keystone in the defense of the Western Hemisphere," was to have the greatest overseas air strength, with the primary defensive mission of preventing the aerial bombardment of the Canal and the offensive mission of forestalling the establishment of any hostile air base in Central or South America within bombardment range of the Canal Zone. Army airpower in Hawaii, which War Plans termed "the indispensable bulwark" for the defense of the Pacific coast, was to be built up to a strength sufficient to insure the
retention of Oahu as a base for the United States Fleet. Alaska, in the 1939 plans, was to be provided with a major air base from which the Army could interdict the establishment of any hostile air base in Alaskan territory and also cover the northern flank of the Hawaiian establishment. These plans, if fulfilled, would give some meaning to the idea of an "Alaska-Hawaii-Panama" defensive triangle, a concept that meant little as long as Alaska had no military or naval defenses. The plans of 1939 envisaged no reinforcement of the slender Army air strength in the western Pacific.45

In prewar theory, the Army's overseas garrisons were supposed to be provided in peacetime with enough forces to deal with any emergency or war situation, but in planning the deployment of the new strength to be acquired under the air expansion program, the Air Board had to acknowledge the impossibility of providing each overseas base with enough airpower to meet any foreseeable need. Instead, it proposed to pool as much air strength as possible in a central reserve in the continental United States, to keep the air strengths at overseas bases at a bare minimum, and to reinforce them from the continental reserve in an emergency.46 This was a sound proposal, but

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when Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into war even the key bastion of Hawaii had fewer combat planes than the "bare minimum" planned for it in 1939.47

Though the United States Army in the summer of 1939 was stronger and better prepared for action than it had been in the earlier 1930's, it was numerically far weaker than the army of any other world power. On the other hand the United States Navy, somewhat favored over the Army in the initial rearmament program, had a strength just below that of Great Britain. While Japan's ominous naval expansion was making protection of American interests in the Pacific an increasingly formidable task, the Navy in general was ready to perform its traditional function of providing the first line of defense in a war emergency. Nor can the military power of the United States in 1939 be reckoned solely in terms of active Army and Navy strengths. Both services had partially trained reserve components, and the nation's industrial
might constituted a tremendous military asset. As World War II was to show, the military potential of the United States exceeded that of any other nation.

**Preparedness Measures: April-September 1939**

In 1939 the American defense problem was one of planning to meet any immediate threat with existing means, and of expanding those means as rapidly as public sentiment permitted and circumstances required to enable the armed forces to execute their new mission of hemisphere defense. The new Air Corps program was the first move in this direction. The second was initiated about the time that the joint Planning Committee completed its exploratory study of the strategic situation in April 1939, when the Chief of Staff instructed his advisers to investigate the methods that the Army should employ to improve its state of readiness "in the event that war develops in Europe." After consulting with the other staff divisions, the War Plans Division on 20 April recommended:

1. An increase of 40,000 in the Regular Army's strength to enable the Army to form "a small, balanced striking force immediately available for employment in support of our national policy in the Western Hemisphere."
2. The completion of the procurement of critical items for the forces to be provided by the Protective Mobilization Plan.

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3. An increase in the National Guard to full peace strength.
4. The recruitment of personnel from the Civilian Conservation Corps for the Regular Army.
5. Various additional measures, designed to improve the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components for employment in an emergency.

War Plans also emphasized the "immediate and vital importance" of carrying out the first and second of these recommendations. A further exploration of the expeditionary force proposal indicated that with its existing strength the Army could organize a mobile striking force of about 44,000, built around four streamlined peace-strength infantry divisions. With the
recommended augmentation of the Regular Army, a force of 63,000 could be formed. No action was taken on these proposals until August, when the civilian and military authorities became convinced of the imminence of war in Europe.

In early August President Roosevelt made a decision concerning the United States Marine Corps that had an important bearing on subsequent Army preparations for defense. The President directed that the marines be withdrawn from Hawaii, the Canal Zone, and "all like places-the Army to take them over"-and that henceforth Marine Corps units would be used only for emergency occupation forces in such places as Bermuda, Trinidad, and Wake Island. Since the marines were thus designated the prime expeditionary force, the Army was required thereafter to give them top priority in the supply of certain types of Army equipment and ammunition.

With the President and Secretary of State both on vacation, Acting Secretary of State Welles called an interdepartmental meeting on 17 August, at which he announced, "-the European situation is now so bad that I think we ought to be ready for the worst." This was the signal for the Army to set in motion a series of "Immediate Action Measures," already drafted and based to a large extent on the proposals made the preceding April. By 21 August the Army had decided what should be done as soon as the European war began. It wanted to increase the Regular Army to an enlisted strength of 280,000 (the full peacetime strength prescribed by the National Defense Act of 1920), to recruit the National Guard to full peacetime strength (also 280,000 enlisted) and double its training hours, to procure as rapidly as possible all of the items of equipment and munitions needed for the Protective

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Mobilization Plan force, and to reinforce overseas garrisons and speed up their current construction programs. In transmitting these proposals to the President, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring explained, "the purpose of the measures as a whole is to place the Regular Army and the National Guard in a condition of preparedness suitable to the present disturbed world
situation." "They do not," he added, "contemplate mobilization at this time but proceed only to the extent of completing its most important features." 53

In the early morning hours of 1 September 1939, the Army flashed word to its commanding generals at home and overseas that fighting had begun on the Polish border. Four days later, General George C. Marshall, the new Chief of Staff, announced that the President had approved an immediate increase in the Regular Army to the "National Defense" strength of 280,000—an announcement that proved premature, for the President actually confined his approval to a more modest increase that raised authorized enlisted strength to 227,000.54 The President also authorized a National Guard increase to 235,000 enlisted strength, and his proclamation of a limited emergency on 8 September allowed the War Department to step up both the armory and the field training of the Guard.55

Immediately after the war began, the Army made a variety of other moves to cope with possible emergencies. The Chief of Staff on 5 September confirmed the reinforcement of the overseas garrisons; air reinforcements for the Canal Zone had already departed, and ground units for this and other overseas outposts followed as rapidly as transportation could be provided.56 The commanding general of the Panama Canal Department was placed in charge of all Army activities-civilian as well as military-in the Canal Zone.57 On instruction from the President, the Chief of Staff notified the Chief of Naval Operations that arrangements had been made for Army Air Corps reconnaissance and bombardment planes to be available on call to the Navy to assist

in offshore defense of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.58 The War Department directed the commanding general of the Sixth Corps Area to begin a military guard of the Sault Ste. Marie Canal and its locks, and within a week a number of defensive measures were in effect there.59 All corps area commanders were told to prepare plans for troop protection of industries engaged in military production.60 The beginning of a general European war,
as these measures testify, had the effect of alerting the Army on many fronts.

The Army's "Immediate Action Measures" were but one phase of a broad program charted by President Roosevelt and his advisers on the eve of the European war. The fundamental objective set for national policy was to keep the United States out of the war. In order to achieve that objective, the United States had to keep the war out of the Western Hemisphere. But in addition the administration also wished to buttress the military power of Great Britain and France. Should the democracies of western Europe be defeated, the President and his aides foresaw an inevitable conflict between the United States and dominant European and Asiatic dictatorships. The President's greatest initial concern was, therefore, to secure a revision of the existing neutrality acts. After a hard struggle, Congress passed a new neutrality law on 4 November 1939, which permitted Great Britain and France (as well as any other belligerent) to obtain American arms on a "cash and carry" basis.

During August the President in consultation with the Department of State had decided upon more positive measures for keeping a European war away from the Americas. As soon as the war began, the United States would call a conference of the American republics to confirm the front of "continental solidarity" agreed upon at Lima the preceding December. The President also planned to institute an offshore patrol by the United States Navy designed, as he told Assistant Secretary of State Berle in late August, "to prevent an attack on any European colony in the New World, all the way from Canada to Guiana." He proposed to warn European belligerents to keep their warships on the other side of the Atlantic and, if they failed to do so, "he would then direct the Navy to make sure that no vessel came on this side of the Atlantic." When news of the German attack on Poland reached the President, he immediately instructed the State and Navy Departments to arrange for a Pan-American gathering and to establish the neutrality patrol. The patrol was to operate in a neutrality zone, within limits to be approved at the
Conference. President Roosevelt himself decided on 3 September that the zone should extend approximately three hundred miles seaward from the American continents.  

Immediately after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, invitations were dispatched to the Latin American nations for a conference to be held in Panama. The Panama Conference opened on 23 September, with Under Secretary of State Welles heading the United States delegation. Before its adjournment on 3 October, the conference adopted resolutions embodying principles of neutrality and provisions for inter-American political and economic cooperation that were completely satisfactory to the United States. Resolution XIV, usually known as the Declaration of Panama, provided for the establishment of the Neutrality Zone, from which all belligerent warships were to be excluded, extending about three hundred miles seaward from the Canadian-American boundary in the Atlantic, around North and South America to the Canadian-American boundary in the Pacific. Each nation was authorized to patrol waters adjacent to its own coast to secure compliance with this resolution. The conference also established inter-American neutrality and economic committees. Both committees began their sessions in the fall of 1939 and made it their business to help maintain the common policies on neutrality agreed upon at the conference and to consider the economic problems that war in Europe was certain to bring, especially to Latin America. The final resolution adopted at the Panama Conference paved the way for a conference at Havana in July 1940. It provided "that in case any geographic region of America subject to the jurisdiction of any non-American state should be obliged to change its sovereignty and there should result therefrom a danger to the security of the American Continent, a consultative meeting such as the one now being held will be convoked with the urgency that the case may require."  

While the Army had no direct hand in convening the Panama Conference, its spirit and actions were of vital importance to the development of closer military relations with Latin America. The cordial agreement among the American republics at Panama also indicated the probability of their co-
operation in emergency military measures deemed necessary by the United States in carrying out its plans for hemisphere defense. The conference's creation of the Neutrality Zone was less successful. Only the United States had the naval strength to carry out an effective patrol in waters adjacent to its coasts. The British naval operations that led to the self-destruction of the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* in Uruguayan waters in December 1939 highlighted the ineffectual character of the Neutrality Zone around South America. In 1940 the United States abandoned the idea of a specifically limited neutrality zone and adopted instead a policy of patrolling Atlantic waters as far out to sea as circumstances of the moment dictated. Under this revised policy the United States extended its patrolling to the mid-Atlantic in 1941.65

The Navy's neutrality patrol of the Atlantic coast went into action in early September 1939. The President himself helped Admiral Stark draft the initial operations plan on 3 September. By mid-October the Navy was operating a continuous patrol about two hundred miles offshore from Newfoundland to the Guianas. As its means increased, the Navy extended its patrol outward toward the 60th meridian of longitude and well beyond the three-hundred-mile limit; by January 1940 a patrol force operating out of Norfolk was covering western Atlantic waters as far east as Bermuda. To strengthen the patrol, the President ordered the overhaul of forty World War I destroyers—the beginning of a reconditioning program that was to make fifty of these vessels available in time for the destroyer-base exchange with Britain in 1940. By early December the forty destroyers were all engaged in the Atlantic patrol. The Navy conducted a patrol inside the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico as well as on the ocean, the Department of State in certain cases arranging for "collective patrolling" with the Latin American nations concerned. The effectiveness of the patrol was limited in part by the relatively meager naval strength then available in the Atlantic; it was also limited by the fact that patrol vessels were authorized only to report the location of belligerent warships or suspicious vessels and to keep track of them. The President on 9 October 1939 ordered the Navy to broadcast reports of sightings in plain English, a step that probably helped to persuade the German Navy to keep its submarines and surface raiders out of the western North Atlantic during the early months of the war. The Atlantic patrol continued in varying forms in 1940 and 1941 and was increasingly
extended with the acquisition and development of the British bases and with the heightening tension of the Battle of the Atlantic. After the establishment of the At-

lantic Fleet in February 1941, the Navy prepared to play a more active role in that contest.66

The naval patrol of Atlantic waters was not the only measure taken to keep belligerent action away from hemisphere shores. As an additional precaution, the President instructed the Department of State to maintain close surveillance over belligerent merchant vessels in Latin American ports and to report any suspicious movement or activity to the Navy. In practice, this surveillance seems to have amounted to a close watch on the seventy-five German merchant vessels caught in Western Hemisphere ports at the outbreak of war. The purpose, presumably, was to prevent these ships from rendering aid to German naval vessels in western Atlantic waters.67

The Strategic Outlook: Autumn and Winter, 1939-40

While the outbreak of war had the effect of initiating a variety of preparedness measures, the sequence of events in the late summer and fall of 1939 seemed to lessen the imminence of a military threat to the United States and other portions of the Western Hemisphere. In the first place, and contrary to the basic assumption of RAINBOW 1, Great Britain and France had accepted Hitler's challenge by declaring war. The British and French Navies now barred a Nazi move by sea against western Africa or South America; and Canada's declaration of war on 10 September put the northeastern front of the hemisphere on the alert. Secondly, after Germany's quick triumph over Poland, the European war settled into a lull that remained unbroken until April 1940. Pending a showdown between Germany and Anglo-French military power, there could be no real threat to the Americas. Finally, the Soviet-German pact of August 1939 had considerably reduced the chances of an early clash between Japan and the United States in the
Pacific. With the Soviet Union freed for the moment from involvement in the European war, the Japanese were plainly frightened by the prospect of a Soviet attack in the Far East. While not restricting their aims and actions against China, for the time being the Japanese adopted a policy of strict neutrality toward the European war and a more circumspect attitude toward the Far Eastern interests of the Western Powers. The general effect of these developments was to slow down the tempo of the Army's defense plans and preparations in the fall and winter of 1939 and 1940.

During that period the sympathies of the great majority of the American people were unquestionably with Great Britain and France. But even more evidently, the public wanted to avoid direct participation in a European war. President Roosevelt and his advisers had the same goal. Sometime during September 1939, when the President was shown a draft of one long-range scheme for military expansion, he is reported to have said: "Whatever happens, we won't send troops abroad; we need only think of defending this hemisphere." The President and his aides likewise foresaw that no serious threat to the Western Hemisphere could arise unless the British and French were pushed to the brink of defeat. In that event the United States would be faced with the grim choice either of supporting Great Britain and France, "as our outlying defense outposts," or of vastly increasing American naval power to "meet the ultimate issue between us and a Russo-German Europe bent on dominating the world, somewhere in the Middle Atlantic." In an informal discussion on 19 September, the President and Assistant Secretary of State Berle ranged the globe, forecasting the division of Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, wondering whether Western Asia was also to be divided, and guessing at the chance of an ultimate German foothold in the Atlantic. Both thought that if Germany won the war, Hitler would try to get his hands on the Azores or Cape Verde Islands, as bases for operations against the Americas. But both agreed that the war's main danger to this country lay in the alternative prospects of post-war economic chaos or a world economy dominated by the dictatorships.
No evidence has yet been uncovered of an actual German plan in 1939 for military expansion toward the Americas, though some Nazi leaders talked vaguely about the ultimate clash that might follow a German triumph in Europe. Pending that triumph, German interest coincided with American opinion in seeking to keep the United States officially neutral toward the European war.  

Colonel Clark of the War Plans Division in October 1939 wrote a penetrating analysis of the possible consequences of an Anglo-French defeat. He noted that, with the destruction of Anglo-French naval forces or their surrender to Germany, the United States would in time be faced with an extremely menacing situation, threatened by Japanese naval power in the Pacific and by German naval superiority in the Atlantic. Since it did not seem probable that Germany could win such an overwhelming victory without temporarily exhausting its military power, a considerable time would elapse before the Germans could launch a major attack across the Atlantic. In the meantime, they would undoubtedly step up their activity in Latin America. They might attempt to pave the way for later direct action by first overthrowing governments friendly to the United States. In any event, the United States
would have to resist every effort that Germany might make to acquire British or French possessions in the New World. Colonel Clark also foresaw the possibility of a German attempt to block the Panama Canal by sabotage or air bombardment while the bulk of the United States Fleet was in the Pacific, but he considered this an unlikely development unless Japan acted in concert with Germany in launching an attack. He ended his analysis with the observation that any estimate based upon a common-sense evaluation of the prospective strategic situation might very well be meaningless. "The outstanding menace to civilization today," wrote Colonel Clark, "is the fact that the human and physical resources of the German state are being controlled by Hitler and a small group of equally unscrupulous and abnormal associates, activated almost entirely by the purpose of increasing and perpetuating their own personal power." This being so, Hitler might very well launch an attack on the New World "in disregard of the demonstrable best interest of the German nation."74

Both Japan and Germany had the physical means in 1939 to launch air attacks against the Western Hemisphere. Japan had eight aircraft carriers, built or building, from which it could launch hit-and-run attacks or American positions in the Pacific. The War Plans Division believed that an attack of this sort was highly improbable so long as the bulk of the United States Fleet was in the Pacific. Germany lacked carriers, but it was believed to have a large bomber force capable of spanning the South Atlantic from African bases to the Natal area of Brazil. In re-estimating the Army's requirements for airpower in December 1939, the War Plans Division based its calculations on the air strength that would be needed to drive the Germans out of an established Brazilian base. If the Army Air Corps had enough tactical strength to accomplish this mission, it would also have more than enough to carry out other hemisphere defense missions (though of course not simultaneously), "such as meeting a possible Japanese attempt to land in Hawaii, or a threat based on the Maritime Provinces" of Canada. These calculations led to the conclusion that hemisphere defense needs could be met by increasing the planned combat strength of the Air Corps from 3,300
During the fall and winter of 1939-40, the Army continued to work on plans for mobilization and for the deployment of ground and air forces to guard the hemisphere against military attack. Though not yet authorized, the Army based its plans on the assumption that it would have a Regular enlisted strength of 280,000 at its disposal when an emergency arose. The detailed plans provided for three expeditionary or "task" forces: No. 1, a reinforced infantry division to be available for dispatch to the Natal area of Brazil; No. 2, a similar division for the west coast of South America; and No. 3, a reinforced corps (one cavalry and three infantry divisions) as a general expeditionary force reserve. Supporting air units were earmarked to accompany each of the forces. The three forces combined would require only 57,000 enlisted strength for both ground and air units, since the units concerned were to be at peace strength and not at war strength. A war situation that required the full application of RAINBOW 1 and its subordinate Army

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and Navy plans would lead to a general mobilization under the Protective Mobilization Plan, which would provide a 1,000,000-man army. The 1939 plans called for a general mobilization only if Great Britain and France were defeated.

For the same reasons that had slowed down the tempo of Army plans and preparations, American public and Congressional opinion became increasingly complacent toward the dangers inherent in the world situation. As the apparent military stalemate in western Europe continued into 1940, Congress was in no mood to approve further increases in military strength beyond those authorized in 1939. Indeed, General Marshall feared that the Army might be required to curtail its expansion considerably short of the planned "National Defense" strength of 280,000; similarly, he believed that there was no hope of securing a projected increase of the National Guard to an enlisted strength of 320,000, and in March 1940 felt obliged to shelve the proposal for obtaining an authorization of this move. What the Army
could do was mold a larger proportion of its existing strength into ground units ready for action. New divisions were organized, including the nuclei of two armored divisions. This reorganization progressed to the point where the Army could plan for corps and army maneuvers in the spring of 1940 involving the assembly of 70,000 troops. But the Chief of Staff was even more interested in obtaining Congressional authorization for purchase of reserves of guns and ammunition for the larger Army that a worsening of the war situation would certainly require. During February 1940, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, he said: "If Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere . . . [and] prepare ourselves against the possibility of chaotic world conditions." The Chief of Staff was even more interested in obtaining Congressional authorization for purchase of reserves of guns and ammunition for the larger Army that a worsening of the war situation would certainly require. During February 1940, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, he said: "If Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere . . . [and] prepare ourselves against the possibility of chaotic world conditions." These were prophetic words in the light of events soon to occur.


Endnotes

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2 Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Feb 37, WPD 3748-3.


7 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1938, pp. 598-600.

8 Alsop and Kinter, American White Paper, pp. 16-17.
9 See Ch. XIV, below.


11 See Ch. VIII, below.

12 The items mentioned were discussed at meetings of the Standing Liaison Committee (State-War-Navy) on 20 June and 14 November 1938 and at a meeting of its joint Secretariat on 26 September 1938. SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 12, 18, 19.


16 Ltr, JB to JPC, 12 Nov 38, JB 325, ser 634. The Joint Board consisted of the Chief of Staff the Chief of Naval Operations, and their principal deputies and planning assistants; the joint Planning Committee, of officers detailed from the two services' War Plans Divisions.

17 Memo, WPD for G-2, 16 Nov 38, WPD 4115-1.

18 Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, USN, MS, U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1939-1945 (hereafter cited as Kittredge MS), Ch. 4, App. A, p. 29.

19 The information in this and the three preceding paragraphs has been derived principally from: Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 May 39, WPD 4175; WPD Memo, 7 Aug 39, WPD 3493-13; JB 325, sers 634, 642, 642-1; and the Kittredge MS, Ch. 4, Apps. A and B: For a more detailed account of the inception and development of the RAINBOW plans, see Maurice Matloff

20 Kittredge MS, Ch. 4, App. B, pp. 51-52.

21 Memo, Adm Stark, CNO, for President Roosevelt, 4 Sep 39, sub: Summary of Current Items, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (FDRL). This memorandum announced that the Navy had obtained aviation bases for "routine training flights" in Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, for which nominal rentals were to be paid. On the Latin American arrangements, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 215-16.

22 Memo, DCoS for WPD, 1 Dec 36; Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Dec 36. Both in WPD 3977.

23 Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Oct 34, AG 601.1 (10-4-34); Notes on SLC Joint Secretariat mtg, 23 Nov 38, and on SLC mtg, 9 Dec 38, SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 21 and 26; Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, 5 Jan 39, AG 601.1 (10-4-34); Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Apr 39, WPD 3782-4; 1st Ind, TAG to CG PCD, 17 Jun 39, on Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, 2 Jun 39, WPD 3782-6; Ltr, TAG to CG PCD, 29 Jul 39, AG 601.1 (10-4-34).

24 Located roughly 2,000 miles west of Chile and 2,000 miles southwest of the Galapagos.

25 Ltr, Welles to President, 14 Mar 39; Memo, President for Welles, 25 Mar 39. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

26 Ltr, Under Secy State to SW, 12 May 39, AG 601.1 (10-4-34).

27 Tab B, par 12a, Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39, WPD 3807-41.

29 Tab X3, par 12, Air Bd Report, 26 Jun 39, WPD 3748-17.

30 This argument is developed in Tab X3, pars 1-5, Air Bd Report, 26 Jun 39, WPD 3748-17.

31 See Chs. XI and XII, below.


33 Tab F, par. 8, Air Bd Report, 26 Jun 39, WPD 3748-17.


36 The organization and prewar defense preparations of the Army's continental forces are dealt with in detail in Chapters I and II of the second volume of this subsersie (now in preparation), Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, (hereafter cited as Guarding the United States).

37 Draft study, n.d. (but about Feb 40), OPD Exec 4, Item 5.

38 Annual *Report of the Secretary of War, 1939*, p. 56.

39 Ibid., p. 35; Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War, Chart 1.
40 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939, pp. 35, 52.

41 OCS Memo, 27 Oct 38, WPD 1956-54.


43 Various papers, dated March June 1939, WPD 3748-17; WPD Aide-Memoire, 6 May 39, WPD 3807-31.


46 Tab F, Air Bd Report, 26 Jun 39, WPD 3748-17.

47 The Air Board in June 1939 recommended a minimum strength of 240 bombardment and pursuit planes for Hawaii; on the morning of 7 December 1941, there were 233 such planes in Hawaii, nearly half of which were obsolete. The 1941 figure is taken from tables presented by Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow of the War Plans Division to the Military Commission on 18 December 1941. WPD 4268-2. A somewhat lower figure for 1941 strength is given in Craven and Cate, AAF 1, p. 171.

48 Memo, SGS for WPD, 17 Apr 39, WPD 4161.

49 Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Apr 39, WPD 4161.

50 Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 May 39, WPD 4161-1.

51 Memo, Brig Gen George C. Marshall for Brig Gen George V. Strong
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WPD, 5 Aug 39. The copy of this memo is designated OCS 21081, but it is actually filed in OCS 15758-42.


53 Memo, Actg DCoS for WPD 18 Aug 39; Memo, WPD for CoS, 21 Aug 39. Both in WPD 4191. Memo, WPD for CoS, 21 Aug 39, WPD 4191-1; Memo, SW for President,---Aug 39, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. By mischance, no copy of this latter memorandum was kept in Army records. There is also a binder in the OCS files (Emergency Measures, 1939-40, Binder 1) that presents these proposals in chart form.

54 Memo, OCS for CoS et al, 1 Sep 39, WPD 4191; OCS Memo for Record, 5 Sep 39, WPD 4191-8. Despite the increase previously authorized in June the Regular Army did not start to grow beyond its 30 June strength until September, and it did not attain the newly authorized strength until February 1940. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1940, Table C, opposite p. 31.

55 *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War*, p. 2.

56 Correspondence in WPD 4191-3, WPD 4191-4, and WPD 4191-5.

57 EO 8732, 5 Sep 39.

58 Ltr, CoS to CNO, 9 Sep 39, WPD 4191-12.

59 Telg, TAG to CG Sixth Corps Area, 2 Sep 39; Ltr, CG Sixth Corps Area to TAG, 7 Sep 39. Both in AG 821 (9-1-39).

60 Memo, Chief Counter Intelligence Br G-2 for TAG, 2 Sep 39, AG 381 (8-24-39), Sec. 1.

61 President's Fireside Chat, 3 September 1939, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1939


67 Memo Under Secy State Welles for President, 4 Nov 39; Memo, President for Welles, 9 Nov 39; and Memo, Welles for President, 16 Nov 39. All in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

68 On the third point, see Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 291ff.


70 Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, p. 203, citing entry in Berle
Diary after conference on 3 September.


72 See Ch. III, below.

73 Tab B, par 9, Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39, WPD 3807-41.


75 Tab 1, WPD study, Oct 39, WPD 4078-3; Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39 and atchd Tabs B and C, WPD 3807-41.

76 Statements based on various WPD papers, including: Table 2, atchd to WPD study, 1 Nov 39, WPD 4175-2; WPD Interoffice Memo, -- Nov 39, WPD 3674-20; Memo, WPD for G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, 2 Feb 40, WPD 4175-11.

77 The staff study on the possible reduction of the Army is in WPD 3674-24; the plan for the increase in the National Guard, and its shelving in March 1940, is in WPD 3674-18.

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CHAPTER II

The Crisis of 1940

Germany broke the spell of the "phony war" on 9 April 1940 by invading Denmark and Norway. The United States by then had only partially completed its preparations under plans drafted in 1939 for maintaining American neutrality and at the same time forestalling military attack on the Western Hemisphere. In RAINBOW 1, the Army and Navy had an approved plan for hemisphere defense, but the ground forces and, even more seriously, the air forces of the Army were still considerably below the strength needed to execute/missions under the plan. American naval power was concentrated in the Pacific with only enough vessels in the Atlantic to maintain the neutrality patrol, because the United States since September 1939 had counted on British and French naval power to provide the bulwark against any German thrust across the Atlantic. Assisted by the neutrality act of November 1939, the administration was encouraging the British and French to make "cash and carry" purchases of American arms, with the primary objective of building up a balance of military power in western Europe that would minimize the chances of involving the United States in the war.

On the eve of the Scandinavian operations, it seemed to the Army and Navy planning staffs that Great Britain and France were catching up with the military might of Germany and consequently that the danger of American military involvement was less in the Atlantic area than in the Pacific. The Joint Planning Committee on 9 April therefore recommended to the joint Board that priority be given to preparation of basic and supplementary plans to meet RAINBOW 2 and 3 situations, leaving 4 to the last. Plans 2 and 3 dealt with situations that assumed major United States operations in the Pacific against Japan on the one hand and a more or less stabilized military situation in Europe on the other. The planners apparently considered a RAINBOW 4 situation-the "last ditch" hemisphere defense concept (the New World threatened by simultaneous attacks by Japan, Germany, and Italy, following the defeat of Great Britain and France)-the least likely to ensue. The Joint Board approved the planners' recommendations on 10 April, and its directive governed the work of the planning staffs until mid-May.1
The Defeat of France and Repercussions in America

Hitler loosed the full power of the German military machine against the West on 10 May 1940. When interviewed that day by newsmen, the President was no longer willing to say, as he had the preceding September, that he thought the United States could keep out of the war. Instead, he considered the chance of involvement to be "speculative." Four days later the German Army crashed through the Sedan gap, and the outlook suddenly assumed an ominous cast for the United States as well as for France and Great Britain.

The British and French realized at once that the German breakthrough threatened their imminent defeat on the Continent, and they made immediate and urgent appeals to the United States for aid. On 15 May the new British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, asked President Roosevelt to turn over to Britain thirty-five or more old-type destroyers, several hundred modern aircraft, and antiaircraft equipment and ammunition. He also wanted assurances that Great Britain could obtain American steel, and he requested that the United States dispatch naval forces to Irish ports and to the Singapore area. On the same day that the Prime Minister made his requests, he pledged that, regardless of what Germany did to England and France, England would never give up as long as he remained a power in public life, "even if England . . . burned to the ground." "Why," he added, "the Government will move to Canada and take the Fleet and fight on." President Roosevelt realized that compliance with these British requests would force the United States to shift from a policy of neutrality to one of nonbelligerency, if not open war. This he was unwilling to approve, though he and his advisers fully appreciated the gravity of the situation and prepared to meet it as best they could within limitations imposed by the existing military means of the United States and the state of public opinion.

The President and his military advisers in conferences on 16 May agreed that, for the time being, the bulk of the United States Fleet should remain in the Pacific and, in consequence, that the Army should have primary responsibility for air operations in the Atlantic area and along the east coast
of South America. Should France fall, they anticipated that Germany might secure immediate and free access to French African possessions. German air forces would then be in a position to launch a direct attack on South America, and should Germany also acquire the British and French Fleets it might be able to launch a ground force across the South Atlantic as well. In view of these alarming prospects, the Department of State hastily made the necessary arrangements for military staff conversations with the Latin American nations in order to plan measures for the common defense, secure the use of bases, and obtain other military assistance for operations of United States forces.\textsuperscript{4}

The War Plans Division on 22 May summarized what it termed the "imminently probable complications of today's situation." These it considered to be a Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil, similarly inspired disorders in Mexico, Japanese hostilities against the United States in the Far East, a decisive Allied defeat in Europe followed by German aggression against the Western Hemisphere, or "all combined." The Army planners noted that the United States had vital interests in the Far East, in Europe, and in Latin America; but with its existing armed strength the United States could not then undertake decisive military action either in Europe or in the Far East. They therefore concluded that, for at least a year, the United States Army and Navy would have to limit their activities to "offensive-defensive operations in South America in defense of the Western Hemisphere and of our own vital interests; . . . possible preventive occupation of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere; and the defense of the continental United States and its overseas possessions East of the 180th Meridian."

Given these assumptions and conclusions, the Army planners held that it was essential for the President and his advisers to decide "what we are not going to do" and "what we must prepare to do."\textsuperscript{5} On 22 and 23 May General Marshall discussed this War Plans summary with the President, with Admiral Stark, and with Under Secretary of State Welles. All agreed to the soundness of its analysis and recommendations. "They all felt," the Chief of Staff reported, "that we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not
concern ourselves beyond the 180 Meridian, and that we must concentrate on
the South American situation." 6

Since the War Plans Division knew that no Army forces were ready for
immediate employment in South America, it recommended on 22 May that

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naval vessels be sent to eastern South America to bolster Latin American
morale and be in position to take emergency action if necessary. The
President and his advisers approved this recommendation on 23 May and
arranged for a cruiser squadron, with marines aboard, to set out as soon as
possible. The Navy employed the cruisers Quincy and Wichita, which visited
South American ports during June. 7

The President and his military advisers were particularly concerned over the
possibilities of Nazi intervention in Brazil. Prompted in part by reports
received through the British Admiralty on 24 May that the Nazis might be
preparing to send an expeditionary force toward Brazil, President Roosevelt
on the following day directed the Army and Navy to prepare a joint plan for
sending an American force to forestall any such German move. The planning
staffs hurriedly prepared a plan, with the code name POT OF GOLD, over
the weekend of 25-27 May. It provided for the emergency movement of a
large expeditionary force to Brazilian coastal points from Belém to Rio de
Janeiro and for sending the first ten thousand men by plane to northeastern
Brazil as soon as an Axis move or pro-Axis movement occurred. Of course
the United States Government had no intention of putting the POT OF
GOLD plan into effect either in whole or part except in extreme emergency
and after consultation with Brazil. The services realized only too well that its
execution would revive Latin American fears of Yankee imperialism; the
Army, as the War Plans Division had pointed out on 22 May, had no units
that were really ready for expeditionary force use; the Army Air Corps was
certainly not equipped to carry out the contemplated air movement, and
existing airfields on the route to Brazil were wholly inadequate to handle an
air movement of this sort even if the equipment had been available; finally,
the plan would have required the transfer of a substantial portion of the
United States Fleet from the Pacific, a step strongly opposed by the Navy.  

Since they did not know the real scope and direction of German intentions, American military planners in May 1940 had to base their calculations on the known capabilities of the German war machine and on the unpredictability of the Nazi Fuehrer. The course of subsequent events and later revelations were to make emergency schemes such as the POT OF GOLD plan seem somewhat excessive, to say the least. But, as President Roosevelt had repeatedly observed since early 1939, the long-range threat was very real, and an immediate German victory over Britain as well as France would have made it very present. Speaking confidentially to a group of businessmen on 23 May, the President said that the defeat of France and Britain would eliminate a buffer that for decades had protected the United States and its way of life. "The buffer," he continued, "has been the British Fleet and the French Army." If they were removed, the American system would be directly and immediately menaced by a Nazi-dominated Europe. "And so," he concluded, "we have to think in terms of (protecting) the Americas more and more and infinitely faster."  

President Roosevelt's emphasis on the necessity of speedy action by the United States reflected the rapid deterioration of the Anglo-French military position. By 25 May a German land victory was certain. The Belgian Army surrendered on 28 May, and the epic evacuation of the British Army from Dunkerque followed immediately. 

The events of May forced a radical change in the schedule adopted on 10 April for development of the RAINBOW plans. About 20 May the Joint Planning Committee dropped its work on RAINBOW 2 and RAINBOW 3 and turned to a hurried development of a RAINBOW 4 plan. The committee completed the draft of a basic joint RAINBOW 4 plan on 30 May and submitted it to the joint Board the next day. The board approved the plan on 7 June, and six days later the Secretaries of War and Navy transmitted it to President Roosevelt. On 14 August 1940 the President gave it his formal approval. By then, the War and Navy Departments had substantially
completed their work on subordinate concentration and operations plans.\textsuperscript{10}

The new joint RAINBOW 4 plan was based on assumptions that clearly indicated the dire forebodings of Army and Navy officers at the end of May. It assumed that, after the defeat of Britain and France, the United States would be faced by a hostile German-Italian-Japanese coalition. Its combined naval power, bolstered by portions of the British and French Fleets, would considerably exceed that of the United States. Japan would proclaim its absolute hegemony in the Far East, and might seize the Philippines and Guam.

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Germany and Italy would occupy all British and French territory in Africa, and also Iceland. In Latin America, the Germans and Italians would use every means to stir antagonism toward the United States, and they might succeed in establishing pro-Axis governments in strategically located countries. Canada; remaining technically at war with Germany, would occupy Newfoundland, and the United States would have to join with Canada in the defense of Newfoundland and Greenland. Nevertheless, a considerable interval would probably elapse after the British and French collapse before the United States would be drawn openly into war.\textsuperscript{11}

The United States planned to counter these threats initially by occupying key British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions in the Western Hemisphere claimed by Germany and Italy as the spoils of war. Thereafter, its armed forces must be disposed along the Atlantic front of the hemisphere so as to prevent any lodgment by Axis military forces. In the Pacific, every effort would have to be made to avoid open hostilities with Japan; if they began, the United States should base its defense on Oahu and Alaska. The major portion of the United States Fleet would have to be withdrawn from the Pacific and concentrated in the Caribbean area. Though the original RAINBOW 4 concept had contemplated defense of the entire Western Hemisphere, the armed forces of the United States for the time being would have to confine their operations to North America and the northern part of South America (approximately within RAINBOW 1 limits), extending their
operations southward only as additional forces became available. While maintaining a defensive position in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the nation would have to increase its military power as rapidly as possible, with the eventual objective of limited offensive action.¹²

In presenting the RAINBOW 4 plan to the joint Board, the Joint Planners stressed above all the critical situation that would arise if the main elements of the British and French Fleets were surrendered to the Axis Powers. Should that happen, Germany and Italy would soon attain a naval strength in the Atlantic equal or superior to that of the entire United States Fleet. The planners estimated that the Axis nations would require a minimum of six months to recondition and man the surrendered vessels. For the United States, they pointed out, there would be two critical dates in this process: "The first is the date that either the British or French Fleet ceases to function, by reason

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either of destruction or surrender. The second is six months after that date .... The date of the loss of the British or French Fleets automatically sets the date of our mobilization."¹³

Decisions on National Policy

With war plans in the making that took into account the new and grave turn in the war situation, the services felt the need of obtaining the President's decision on a number of broad questions of policy in national defense. President Roosevelt laid the groundwork for more detailed decisions in an address delivered at Charlottesville, Virginia, on 10 June 1940. After affirming that "overwhelmingly" the American people had now become "convinced that military and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would endanger the institutions of democracy in the western world," the President announced that henceforth the United States would pursue two "obvious and simultaneous" courses: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and at the same time we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in
the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense."14 As the President subsequently pointed out, in June 1940 American industry was not yet geared to wartime production, and it would take industry time to change from a peace to war status. "To gain that time," he wrote, "it was necessary for Great Britain to maintain its defense, for if Britain were to fall it was clear that we would have to face the Nazis alone-and we were not physically prepared to do so."15 In a sense, the President's Charlottesville address constituted a public announcement of the impending shipment of large quantities of surplus Army stocks to the French and British.16

On the morning of the day that France sued for an armistice, 17 June, General Marshall and three of his principal staff officers met to discuss the situation. The Chief of Staff remarked that, among the various possibilities, it had occurred to him that Japan and the Soviet Union might suddenly team up in the Pacific and force the bulk of the United States Fleet to remain there to defend the American position. If at the same time the French Fleet were surrendered to Germany and Italy, the United States would face an extremely serious situation in the South Atlantic. The chief of the War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. George V. Strong, expressed the opinion that Germany might strike at eastern South America within sixty days, and that initially the Nazis might try to block the Panama Canal by sabotage in order to bottle up American naval power in the Pacific. General Strong and the chief of G-3, Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, recommended that the entire National Guard be inducted into federal service at once, so as to provide the troops that might be required to deal with the South American situation. At General Strong's urging the Hawaiian and Panama Canal Departments were alerted on this same day against the possibilities of surprise attack and internal sabotage.17 The alarm of 17 June also gave impetus to the garrisoning of Alaska, and the initial defense force for the new major base at Anchorage arrived there on 27 June.18
On the preceding day, 16 June, Army and Navy planning officers had collaborated in framing a paper entitled "Decisions as to National Action." It posed for the President's decision three possible courses of action for the United States: (1) to maintain a strong position in the Pacific; (2) to make every effort, including belligerent participation, to sustain Great Britain and France; or (3) to concentrate on hemisphere defense in order to "prevent or overthrow German or Italian domination or lodgement in the Western Hemisphere." The planners pointed out that if Britain and France were defeated in Europe and their fleets escaped across the Atlantic, the United States would probably become involved in the war automatically, since only the United States possessed the ports and base facilities from which these vessels could operate.19 Before General Marshall and Admiral Stark discussed the paper with Under Secretary of State Welles on 17 June, General Strong urgently recommended to the Chief of Staff that the third alternative be the one accepted. In turn, this would require maintaining a purely defensive position in the Pacific and halting the flow of material aid to Great Britain. The hemisphere defense policy recommended by General Strong would also involve

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. . . an increase in naval strength in the Atlantic — an increase of strength in the Regular Army, an early mobilization of the National Guard, a marked increase of production of munitions, immediate preparation for protective seizure of key British and French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, preparation for immediate active military support of existing Governments in other American Republics and the furnishing them at the earliest possible date of means of defense on long term credits. 20

The Joint Planners' paper of 16 June and other recommendations, such as those submitted by General Strong, became the ingredients for the major policy paper of this critical period—the joint memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations for the President, dated 22 June 1940 and entitled "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the National Defense." General Marshall and Admiral Stark discussed their joint memorandum with President Roosevelt on 24 June, and the President's decisions on the points presented were incorporated in a revision of 27 June. As stated in the revision, the basic decisions were: first, that if the French
Fleet passed to German control, the United States would have to maintain the
defensive in the Pacific and would probably have to move major units of the
United States Fleet into the Atlantic; and second, that the United States
would not release any additional military material to Great Britain, except for
small quantities that might be released if they "would exercise an important
effect in enabling Great Britain to resist until the first of the year." With
respect to measures for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the problems
and decisions were:

4. Hemisphere defense may involve the necessity for —

   a. The occupation of British . . . , French, Dutch, and Danish possessions
      in the Western Hemisphere (Atlantic and Pacific), after consultation with
      . . . the other American Republics and British Dominions concerned ....

      (1) This will be effected in time to prevent cession to
          Germany by the terms of a peace.

   b. Plans for the occupation of strategic positions in the Caribbean Area
      and in Central and South America, other than referred to above, when the
      agreements now under negotiation with the other American Republics
      provide therefor.

      (1) Action in accordance with the plans will be taken in
          ample time to accomplish, the purpose.

   c. The employment of armed force by the United States to sustain [that is,
      support] existing governments.

      (1) Decision to take this action will be made as necessity
          requires. In reaching the decision consideration will be
          given to the fact that until December 1940 our Army will
          not be in a position to undertake any operations south of
          the latitude of Venezuela, unless mobilization and
          Selective Service are made immediately effective ....

   d. The supply of munitions to Latin American countries.

      (1) It is decided that by providing small amounts of
          munitions at intervals, the urgent requirements of the
          Latin American countries may be met. Credits will be
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extended for the purchase of munitions.

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e. The adjustment of the economic relations between the United States
and Latin American States . . .

(1) Financial arrangements to accomplish this
adjustment will be made on the basis of accepting the
loss as a proper charge against our national defense.

5. The naval and military operations necessary to assure successful Hemisphere Defense
call for a major effort which we are not now ready to accomplish. Time is of the essence
in overcoming our unreadiness. To overcome our disadvantage in time, the concerted
effort of our whole national life is required. The outstanding demands on this national
effort are: — first, a radical speed-up of production, and second, the assembly and training
of organized manpower.21

General Marshall and Admiral Stark on 24 June had also asked the President
to approve a longer working week for war industry and the immediate
adoption of selective service. The President was loath to approve the former
so long as there were still large numbers of unemployed; he did approve the
idea of selective service but urged a system that the Army considered
unworkable.

An appendix to the joint memorandum of 27 June incorporated a decision by
the President that "the United States Government . . . considers all islands in
the Pacific east of the International Date Line as parts of the Western
Hemisphere coming under the application of the Monroe Doctrine." To
prevent the transfer of sovereignty of any of them to Germany, Italy, or
Japan, the United States was prepared (after consultation with the British,
French, Australian, and New Zealand Governments) to take possession of all
these islands except those under New Zealand control. It also would request
the Australian and New Zealand Governments to take the responsibility for
seeing that no British or French islands west of the International Date Line
fell into Axis or Japanese hands.22
The crucial points in the proposals and decisions made between 22 and 27 June were those relating to the disposition of the French Navy, to the discontinuance of material aid to Britain, and to the necessity for immediate and all-out mobilization. Action on these points was bound to be closely interrelated. If Germany secured the French Fleet, the United States would have to embark at once on full mobilization of its resources and manpower for hemisphere defense; therefore, it could not continue to send aid to Britain. In addition, the outlook for Great Britain's survival seemed exceedingly dubious. In late June, American Army and Navy experts were anticipating the probability of a British defeat or negotiated peace before the end of the summer. A joint planning paper of 26 June, for example, stated that it was

"doubtful that Great Britain . . . will continue to be an active combatant by the fall and winter of 1940." 23 President Roosevelt's decision of 24 June on aid to Britain represented a distinct qualification of the pledge he had made two weeks earlier in his Charlottesville address.

The President presumably considered this retreat necessary at least as long as the fate of the French Navy remained in doubt. Late in May he had warned the French that the United States considered retention of their fleet to be vital for the ultimate control of the Atlantic as well as for the eventual salvation of France. Before 10 June, both the French and the British repeatedly urged the United States to send strong naval forces to eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean waters to deter Italy from entering the war, but until the French armistice the United States held firmly to the policy of keeping its fleet in the Pacific. What it must do after that depended on what happened to the French Navy. On 19 June France's Admiral Francois Darlan gave his oath that the French Fleet would not be allowed to fall into German hands and that an armistice would be rejected if the Germans made such a demand. Continuing, Darlan asserted that if, subsequently, the Germans should attempt to seize any ship of the fleet, it would be scuttled by the French. 24 The United States Government put little faith in this pledge. Secretary Hull later told the French Ambassador that the terms of the armistice "apparently
threw the entire French fleet directly into German hands." 25

The British, who of course were more immediately concerned about what happened to the French Navy, had even less faith in Darlan's assurances. On 3 July the British issued ultimatums to all French naval commanders to put their vessels under British control or suffer the consequences. A substantial number of French vessels were then berthed in British-controlled ports and were taken over without much difficulty. The critical portion of the French Fleet not under British control was stationed at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria, and the commander of this force ignored the British ultimatum. Thereupon the British attacked, sinking or disabling most of the French ships and causing heavy loss of life—an action that produced a bitter breach in relations between the British and Vichy Governments. Secretary Hull in his Memoirs has written, "this was an action solely between the British and French." 26 It is now known that President Roosevelt discussed and approved the British

plans in advance with the British Ambassador, though apparently without the knowledge of the Department of State.27

The action at Mers-el-Kébir settled the French Fleet problem for the time being. Germany would not get possession of any significant portion of the French Navy, the British would continue to have naval superiority in the eastern Atlantic, the United States Fleet could remain in the Pacific as a check to Japan, and the Axis Powers could not, even if they wished, launch a sizable attack across the Atlantic until they defeated Great Britain.28

The heroic and successful British defense against the German air attacks that began on 10 July forms no proper part of this story. Nevertheless, in combination with the solution to the French Fleet problem, Britain's defense did enable the United States in September to return to the first of the basic policies enunciated by the President on 10 June—large-scale aid to Great Britain.
Mobilization

In the meantime, the United States embarked on a rapid and far-reaching mobilization of its industry and manpower. The American people quickly perceived that the danger was real and gave full backing to the unprecedented peacetime measures adopted for that purpose. Mobilization began with President Roosevelt's request to Congress on 16 May for large additional appropriations for national defense. In his message he emphasized the particular need for additional airpower to combat any attempt to establish a hostile air base within range of the Western Hemisphere, and called for an increase in the current twelve-thousand-plane capacity of the American aircraft industry to one of fifty thousand.

Congress responded in early June by appropriating or authorizing the expenditure of about $1,350,000,000-nearly two thirds of it for the Army. This total included a $200,000,000 Emergency Fund, to be expended or obli-

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gated at the President's discretion. Allocations from this fund subsequently provided the means to finance several hemisphere defense projects, for example the arrangement with Pan American Airways for airport development in Latin America. The President followed his initial proposal with supplementary requests for defense funds on 31 May and 10 July. By mid-September 1940, Congress had appropriated or authorized the expenditure of more than eight billion dollars during the fiscal year 1941 for Army and Navy expansion-nearly three fourths of it for the Army. The Army's portion alone about equaled the entire appropriations for maintaining the Army and Navy from the beginning of the Roosevelt administration to June 1940. The defense appropriations between June and September offer a striking measure of the genuine alarm that gripped the American people and their representatives in Congress after the defeat of France.

The President on 28 May appointed an Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense-a group of experts drawn from the ranks of industry and
labor to advise on mobilization of the nation’s resources. The Advisory
Commission and representatives of the armed services collaborated during
June in working out a munitions program to guide the mobilization process.
In its final form of 30 June, the munitions program called for procurement by
1 October 1941 of all items needed to equip and maintain a 1,200,000-man
army; procurement of reserve stocks of critical items sufficient to equip a
2,000,000-man force; creation of an industrial capacity adequate to supply a
4,000,000-man army on combat status; and an eventual strength of 18,000
planes for the Army Air Corps with expansion of the aircraft industry to an
18,000 yearly capacity for the production of Army planes.32

When Hitler struck at western Europe in April 1940, the Regular Army, had
an enlisted strength of 230,000, approximately that authorized the preceding
September. Following the President's messages of 16 and 31 May, Congress
in early June authorized an increase in Regular Army enlisted strength to
375,000. Until mid June the Army had planned to reach this strength as
rapidly as possible through enlistment of volunteers rather than through
adoption of a selective service system, but the French collapse convinced
General Marshall that a selective service system must be adopted. Prompted
by the urgings of a group of influential civilians (including Henry L.
Stimson, soon to become Secretary of War), Senator Edward R. Burke

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and Representative James W. Wadsworth on 20 June introduced a bill
proposing a selective service system similar to that embodied in current
Army plans for rapid military expansion. On 24 June General Marshall and
Admiral Stark recommended to President Roosevelt the "immediate
enactment . . . of a Selective Service Law along the lines of existing plans, to
be followed at once by complete military and naval mobilization." 33 As
noted previously, the President approved the recommendation in principle
but objected to the system that the Army wanted to adopt. By the time that
Secretary Stimson assumed his new office on 10 July, the President had
yielded his objections to the selective service bill then under discussion in
Congress, and General Marshall was able on 12 July to make a forthright
statement in its favor and also one for the immediate induction of the
National Guard into federal service. After extended debate, Congress on 27 August authorized the induction of the National Guard and the calling up of the Army's Organized Reserves. On 14 September it passed the Selective Service and Training Act. These measures, together with an additional authorized increase in Regular Army strength, were designed to produce a 1,000,000-man army by the beginning of 1941 and a 1,400,000-man army (200,000 larger than contemplated in the 30 June munitions program) by 1 July 1941.  

The air program actually approved by the War Department in June 1940 fell somewhat short of the eighteen-thousand-plane strength indorsed by President Roosevelt on 18 June. On 25 June the War Plans Division recommended a program that would provide a total Army airplane strength of 12,835 modern planes by 1 April 1942. This total would permit the constitution of sixty air groups, of which fifty-four would be combat groups. General Marshall approved the new program on 26 June. It thereafter became known as the "First Aviation Objective" but was often referred to as the "54-group program." The new air program was designed to provide adequate protection for the United States, its outlying territories (except the Philippines), and the Caribbean area, and also to provide a force of about 1,000 tactical planes for use, in cooperation with the Navy, in establishing and maintaining effective air control in South America.  

In addition to its supply and manpower aspects, the Army's mobilization in 1940 included the installation in July of a new top civilian team, under Secretary of War Stimson, which brought a new element of harmony into the civilian direction of the War Department. Organizationally, the Army established a separate Armored Force on 10 July, and on 26 July it created the nucleus of a General Headquarters to direct the training and emergency deployment of the greatly enlarged Army that was in prospect. The four field armies in the continental United States, hitherto existing principally on paper, were presently given separate commanders and staffs and the immediate responsibility for training ground combat units as well as for
planning the defense of the continental United States against external attack.

The plans and measures for Army expansion to meet the crisis of 1940 were matched by a naval expansion program, designed to provide the United States with a "two-ocean" Navy that could cope simultaneously with Japanese naval power in the Pacific and with the naval power that Germany and Italy had or might acquire in the Atlantic. On 7 June, the Navy's General Board proposed a building program that would about double the existing strength of the Navy in combat vessels. Congress approved the program on 19 July, and by the fall of 1940 the Navy had begun construction on more vessels than it then had in actual service.

Outside of the military services, mobilization called forth a host of new civilian agencies under the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense to supervise the gradual transformation of the national economy from a peacetime to a wartime basis.

The Fate of European Possessions

Germany's continental land victory and threatened invasion of the British Isles brought to the fore two parallel and interrelated problems: the fate of the Western Hemisphere possessions of the European nations engulfed or menaced by Germany, and the need of the United States for new bases along the Atlantic front to fend off the threat of a Nazi onslaught on the New World. The new RAINBOW 4 war plan, hastily tailored to fit this emergency, had provided for the immediate occupation of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere and the deployment of United States forces for the protection of major defense positions from Newfoundland to the Brazilian bulge, both in European possessions and at strategic points in other Western Hemisphere nations. When the Germans failed to get the French Fleet, and also failed to carry out an immediate ground assault on
Great Britain, the situation eased. The full scope of the RAINBOW 4 plan with respect to bases and possessions never had to be invoked, but its intent was partially realized in two political agreements of profound significance for hemisphere defense: the Act of Havana of 27 July 1940 and the Destroyer-Base Agreement with Great Britain of 2 September 1940. Although the Army played a comparatively minor role in the actual negotiation of these agreements, it had a good deal to do with their inspiration and a very large interest in their consummation.

Until the war's quick turn in April and May 1940, neither the military nor the broader national interests of the United States appeared to justify forthright moves toward acquisition of new bases for purposes of hemisphere defense. In late March the Army's War Plans Division undertook a new detailed review of the potential military value to the United States of all European possessions in the Western Hemisphere, as well as of Cocos and the Galápagos Islands. It reached the conclusion that, from the Army's point of view, the only areas of any real military value to the United States were: Newfoundland (or a base site thereon) or, alternately, St. Pierre and Miquelon; Bermuda; the British Virgin Islands; Trinidad; and Cocos and the Galapagos Islands. But, the Army study held, "the potential military value of the areas listed above is insufficient, when weighed in the light of political and economic considerations, to justify their acquisition" at that time.41

During the same month, President Roosevelt informed the Navy that he had no intention during peacetime of approving the purchase or lease of any base sites in foreign territory in the vicinity of the Caribbean, because he believed "in the event of war independent Republics bordering on the Caribbean would be on the side of the United States" and would permit American forces to use their base facilities without further question.42

Germany's occupation of Denmark raised immediate problems for the United States with respect to the future of Greenland and Iceland. The Danish colony of Greenland was completely unprepared to resist a German attack or occupation. Since Greenland was considered a part of the Western
Hemisphere, the United States opposed its military occupation by British or Canadian forces; such an occupation might give the Germans an excuse to attack this northern flank of the hemisphere. At the same time, the United States Government was as yet unwilling to commit itself to protection of Greenland with its own forces. It limited its actions to opening a new consulate at Godthaab, the Greenland capital; to the establishment of a Greenland patrol by Coast Guard cutters; and to the sale of a small quantity of arms and ammunition to Greenland authorities to be used for protection of the cryolite mine at Ivigtut.43

Iceland, unlike Greenland, was not generally considered to lie within the bounds of the Western Hemisphere, yet Iceland's location on the northern flank of the main sea lanes between North America and the British Isles made its control of concern to the United States as well as to Canada and Great Britain. The Icelandic parliament simplified the situation by asserting its virtual independence of Denmark on 10 April 1940. A month later British troops landed in Iceland. To keep in touch with developments, the United States promptly arranged with Icelandic authorities for the exchange of consular representatives.44

The German occupation of the Netherlands and the prospect of a Nazi victory over Great Britain and France posed an immediate and grave problem for the United States in regard to the fate of possessions of these three nations in the New World. Shortly before Hitler struck at the West, President Roosevelt had been presented with a suggestion that the United States acquire the Guianas-British, Dutch, and French. Both the President and Under Secretary of State Welles rejected this idea on the ground that a move to acquire sovereign or exclusive control over any European possession in the Western Hemisphere would not only be contrary to existing national policy against territorial expansion but also would be sure to arouse the suspicion and resentment of the Latin American nations. Instead, the President and Mr. Welles agreed that if European possessions had to be taken over to keep them from falling into German hands, the action should be accomplished by establishing a Pan-American trusteeship administration to supervise their temporary occupation and control.45

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Before there had been any further definition of American policy on this score, the British and French precipitated a minor diplomatic crisis by landing forces on the Dutch West Indian islands of Curacao and Aruba on 11 May 1940. The Department of State registered a strong protest with British Ambassador Lord Lothian. As in the case of Greenland, the United States was opposed to the occupation of any Western Hemisphere territory belonging to a conquered or occupied nation by the armed forces of other belligerent powers. Secretary Hull finally persuaded the British to announce that they had no intention of occupying these Dutch possessions permanently and that they would withdraw their forces as soon as sufficient Dutch troops were available to defend them.\footnote{46}

The rapid German advance in France inspired more forceful proposals for dealing with the problem of European possessions. On 21 May one of General Marshall's staff officers recommended that "this country . . take immediate steps to acquire British and French possessions in the Atlantic,"\footnote{47} and, as noted above, the "possible protective occupation of European possessions" was one of the main items presented by War Plans to the Chief of Staff for decision on 22 May.\footnote{48} On 23 May Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, urged the President to get in touch with the British and French Governments to see if they would "sell and assign certain of their possessions in this hemisphere which are vital to our defense in consideration of the relinquishment of their obligations to us."\footnote{49} These proposals, coupled with the British report that a German force of 6,000 troops had been embarked and might be headed for the South Atlantic with designs on either the Guianas or Brazil, persuaded the President on 24 May to direct the Army and Navy to prepare an emergency plan for occupation of all British, French, and Dutch possessions, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of Germany by surrender or cession. While the Army and Navy staffs were working on the plan, General Marshall asked the Department of State to make diplomatic arrangements with the British Government so that, if necessary, American forces could be quickly established in, all British possessions except Labrador.\footnote{50}
The Navy War Plans Division, after collaboration with Army planners, submitted an emergency plan for occupying European possessions to Admiral Stark on 28 May. It proposed that, if Germany demanded the cession of any British, French, or Dutch possessions, the United States should immediately and without advance publicity assert its sovereignty over these possessions and occupy them forthwith. The joint Army and Navy RAINBOW 4 plan completed on 30 May contained approximately the same proposal. "Joint Task No. 1" in that plan was to "establish United States sovereignty in British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions in the Western Hemisphere," including those in the Pacific east of the 180th meridian. The plan also proposed that the United States Government secure immediate approval of the governments concerned for American occupation of their possessions.51

While the Army and Navy planners were getting to work in June on the detailed subordinate plans to implement the joint RAINBOW 4 plan, the Department of State took the initiative, on the one hand in advertising the adamant opposition of the United States to any move by Germany or Italy to gain a foothold in the New World and on the other in working for the adoption of a Pan-American trusteeship scheme in substitution for the action proposed by the military services. Secretary Hull asked Congress to introduce a joint resolution declaring that the United States would not recognize the transfer of any Western Hemisphere possession from one European power to another, and that, in case anything of that sort were attempted, the United States "would immediately consult with the other American Republics on measures necessary to safeguard . . . common interests." 52 This resolution was introduced on 17 June, the day that France asked for an armistice. On the same day, the Department of State officially informed Germany and Italy that the United States would not recognize or acquiesce in any transfer of Western Hemisphere territory "from one non-American Power to another non-American Power." Secretary Hull, also on 17 June, invited the foreign ministers of the other American republics to a consultative meeting at Havana, Cuba, to be assembled as soon as possible, in accordance with the final resolution adopted at Panama the preceding October.53
The foreign ministers convened on 21 July 1940. Secretary Hull, as head of the United States delegation, found a difficult situation facing him at Havana, the Latin American delegates being all too aware that the existing armed forces of the United States were not adequate to make any real defense of the southern portion of the hemisphere. Mr. Hull's opening address was fortified by the President's simultaneous request to Congress to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by $500,000,000 to aid in marketing Latin American products cut off from their normal European outlets. After a sharp diplomatic struggle, the delegates on 27 July reached agreement on methods for dealing with European possessions threatened by German or Italian engulfment. The Convention of Havana provided for an inter-American administration of European possessions should it become necessary to take them over in order to prevent the Axis Powers from gaining control of them. More important was the adoption of the Act of Havana, which called for the appointment of an interim emergency committee to function until the inter-American administrative regime could be established. The act also provided that, "should the need for emergency action be so urgent that action by the committee cannot be awaited, any of the American Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the Continent requires." This last provision amounted to an authorization for the United States and its armed forces to undertake unilaterally the steps contemplated in RAINBOW 4, except for the assertion of sovereignty. The problem thereafter was one of developing the means to carry out temporary occupations of European possessions if such actions became necessary.

Before the Havana Conference convened, the United States had to tackle the specific problem of France's New-World possessions—the tiny islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland's southern coast, French Guiana in South America, and the West Indian islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. For a variety of reasons Martinique was overwhelmingly the most important. It was the administrative center and economically the most productive of the French colonies. Furthermore, when France sued for an armistice on 17 June,
several French warships scurried to Martinique's good harbor and capital, Fort de France. One, the aircraft carrier *Bearn*, was carrying a load of 106 pursuit planes of American manufacture en route to France at the time of the armistice. Another vessel brought in nearly a quarter billion dollars of the French Government's gold reserve, the bulk of which was then being rushed to the Western Hemisphere under United States Government and Navy auspices. Martinique also sheltered two French cruisers, one

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a faster ship than anything the United States Navy had in the Caribbean area, as well as other naval and merchant vessels. When France surrendered, Admiral Georges Robert, who had been appointed High Commissioner for France's New World possessions in 1939, promptly asserted his unswerving loyalty to the Vichy regime of Marshal Henri Pétain.

American action toward Martinique was precipitated by British moves to insure that the naval vessels, gold, and airplanes there did not fall into German hands. On 1 July, after the Department of State learned that the British planned to establish a blockade of Martinique, Under Secretary Welles warned Lord Lothian that the United States would not permit Great Britain to occupy the French Antilles. When the British issued ultimatums to other French naval commanders on 3 July, they refrained from delivering one to Admiral Robert. Nevertheless, on 4 July they instituted a naval blockade of Martinique. The next day Secretary Hull protested to Lord Lothian that any British attempt to seize Martinique or the French naval vessels anchored there would "involve real trouble between your Government and mine." On 6 July President Roosevelt directed the Navy to send a cruiser and six destroyers to Martinique, with the somewhat incongruous result that by mid July Martinique was guarded by an inner British naval patrol and an outer American one. On 5 July General Marshall and Admiral Stark had directed the joint Planning Committee to prepare an emergency plan for the occupation of Martinique and Guadeloupe by United States forces, "should events render this necessary to prevent control of these strategic islands by Germany or by French authorities under German direction." The plan, completed on 8 July, contemplated dispatch of an expeditionary force from
New York on or about 15 July. The 1st Marine Brigade was earmarked to provide the initial assault force, to be followed by a task force built around the Army's 1st Infantry Division.59

With American military forces being readied to take such action toward Martinique as might become necessary, the State and Navy Departments during July and August negotiated a temporary compromise to relieve the tense situation. Although Admiral Robert resisted both British and American attempts to persuade him to release the airplanes and gold, or to throw in his lot with the Free French forces, he did agree on 24 July to discuss matters with an American naval representative. Rear Adm. John W. Greenslade was sent to Martinique, and by the end of August he and Admiral Robert had worked out an informal agreement that provided essentially for the maintenance of the status quo in France's Western Hemisphere possessions. On the one hand, Admiral Robert agreed to permit the stationing of an American naval observer at Fort de France and the establishment of United States consulates in Martinique, in French Guiana, and in St. Pierre and Miquelon. On the other hand, Admiral Greenslade promised that the United States would supply the French possessions with needed food and oil.60 The effect of this understanding was to immobilize the French forces at Martinique. Great Britain withdrew its naval units and discontinued efforts to get Admiral Robert (and the ships, planes, and gold) into the British camp. The United States Navy continued an active surface and air patrol of the island to insure that the French authorities abided by their agreements. But the Martinique problem was far from settled and was to flare anew in late October 1940.61

**The Destroyer-Base Agreement**

The Anglo-American Destroyer-Base Agreement of 2 September 1940 was the spectacular end product of the measures taken during the preceding summer to protect the New World from Nazi intrusion. Actually, its principal
stimulus seems to have been an American desire to bolster British naval strength against the threatened invasion of England, rather than an immediate military interest in the particular bases acquired in the deal. Since the spring of 1939 both the Army and the Navy had planned to acquire additional bases when needed for their hemisphere defense missions, and they certainly did not want the British possessions in which bases were obtained in September 1940 to fall into German hands under any circumstances. But the Army was still too small to warrant promiscuous deployment of its forces to all areas that conceivably might be threatened by Axis occupation. Unknown to the American public, the Navy already had limited access to base facilities in Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad that helped to support the patrol of the western Atlantic, and it therefore had no immediate and pressing need for additional facilities. In effect, what happened in September 1940 was that the Army and Navy were handed base sites in British possessions and were told to fit them into their plans and preparations for hemisphere defense. Potentially, the base sites were far more valuable to the United States than the destroyers for which they were exchanged, but at the moment Army and Navy officers were inclined to view their acquisition as little more than a convenient expedient to make the destroyer transfer politically acceptable to the American Congress and people.

It was, then, the British quest for destroyers, rather than an American overture for new bases, that inspired the destroyer-base transaction. From 15 May 1940 onward, Prime Minister Churchill made repeated requests for the "loan" or sale of old destroyers—the recommissioned World War I type of vessels then engaged in the Navy's neutrality patrol in the western Atlantic. Whatever disposition President Roosevelt and his advisers may have had to act on these requests was soon curbed by Congressional action. Section 14(a) of the Naval Expansion Act, passed on 28 June, read:

Notwithstanding the provision of any other law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat aircraft, munitions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United States has title, in whole or in part, or which have been contracted for, shall hereafter be transferred, exchanged,
sold, or otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of naval material and the Chief of Staff in the case of military material, shall first certify that such material is not essential to the defense of the United States.

This limitation was followed by a provision that copies of any "contract, order, or agreement" made for the disposal of Army or Navy material must be deposited with Congress within twenty-four hours of the time that the transaction was completed. These new legal restrictions appeared to present a formidable barrier to the transfer of recommissioned destroyers to the British, as well as a sharp restraint on the future assignment of surplus Army and Navy stocks to them.63

The partial solution of the French Fleet problem in early July, coupled with the impending threat of a German invasion of Great Britain, made the President and several of his advisers increasingly receptive to the idea of transferring destroyers to Britain, if some way could be found to do so. Benjamin V. Cohen, one of Mr. Roosevelt's most trusted legal advisers, suggested such a way in a memorandum of 19 July, in which he concluded that neither American nor international law barred the sale of destroyers to Great Britain "if their release [would] strengthen rather than weaken the defense position of the United States." President Roosevelt expressed his frank doubt of the validity of Mr. Cohen's argument, "in view of the clause in the big authorization bill [Naval Expansion Act] . . . which is intended to be a complete prohibition of sale." He added, "I fear Congress is in no mood at the present time to allow any form of sale." In expressing these views to Frank Knox, the new Secretary of the Navy, he nevertheless suggested that Mr. Knox explore the idea of getting Congressional approval of a "sale of these destroyers to Canada on condition that they be used solely in American Hemisphere defense, i.e., from Greenland to British Guiana including Bermuda and the West Indies." This, the President observed, "would release other ships for other purposes.” 64
The first concrete proposal linking the transfer of destroyers to the acquisition of bases came from the Century Group, as the New York branch of the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies was called. Members of the group assiduously circulated their proposal, particularly in its revised form of 25 July, among civilian and military officials in Washington, including Ambassador Lothian. Two months earlier, in late May, the British Ambassador had himself suggested that Great Britain volunteer to lease areas in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad to the United States for the construction of air and naval bases. The British Cabinet had rejected this suggestion, partly because of the refusal of the United States at that time to turn over some of its destroyers to the British Navy. In late July the British Cabinet reversed its decision and agreed to offer limited base rights to the United States without requiring any quid pro quo. On 31 July Prime Minister Churchill addressed a new and urgent appeal to Mr. Roosevelt, stressing the desperate need for fifty or sixty destroyers as well as for motor torpedo boats and naval planes. Then on 1 August, representatives of the Century Group formally presented their proposal for exchanging destroyers for bases to the President.

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It was in this setting that President Roosevelt and his Cabinet examined all aspects of the problem on 2 August. Secretary Knox proposed that Britain sell some of its possessions to the United States as a consideration for the transfer of fifty or sixty destroyers. Secretary Hull objected on the basis that a purchase of British possessions would amount to a violation of the recently adopted Havana agreements. The President himself suggested that instead of a purchase of territories the United States might lease bases in them, thereby securing an extension of the limited access to base facilities obtained in 1939. With respect to destroyers, the President and his Cabinet agreed unanimously that Britain was in desperate need of them, that their transfer could not be accomplished without the enactment of new legislation, and that Congress would not pass enabling legislation unless the United States received an ironclad guarantee from Great Britain that its fleet would continue the fight from American waters should Britain fall after a Nazi
Three days later the British Ambassador submitted a list of what Great Britain wanted and of what it was prepared to give in return. Britain wanted ninety-six destroyers, twenty motor torpedo boats, fifty naval patrol bombers, an unspecified number of naval dive bombers, and 250,000 Enfield rifles. In return, Great Britain offered: (1) a "continuation" of the agreement made in 1939 for limited use by the United States Navy of waters and shore facilities at Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad; (2) United States Army aircraft to be allowed to land on Jamaica, British Guiana, and Trinidad; (3) Pan American Airways to be allowed to lease a small area in Trinidad where it could store supplies and erect a radio station; (4) Pan American Airways, as the agent of the United States Government, to be allowed to lease airfield sites in Jamaica and British Guiana; and (5) United States Army aircraft to be permitted to make occasional training flights to Newfoundland.70 A comparison of these terms with those actually included in the agreement of 2 September 1940 indicates clearly how much negotiation and compromise was required during August to reconcile the British and American positions.

When Under Secretary Welles presented the British terms to President Roosevelt on 8 August, they contained two additional points. First, the British agreed that Prime Minister Churchill would reiterate the public pledge given on 4 June with respect to the British Fleet; and, second, the British insisted that their commercial airlines must have equal rights with United States airlines during and after the war at airfields constructed by Pan American Airways in British possessions. On the first point, Mr. Welles observed that the 4 June pledge had been given in the name of the Churchill administration and not in the name of the British nation and that it therefore would not satisfy the President's demand for a guarantee.71 With respect to the second, the British demand scotched the initial intention of having Pan American Airways develop airfields in British Caribbean possessions; although Pan American undertook some preliminary work on air bases in
Trinidad and British Guiana, these projects were taken over and completed by the Army and Navy, and the airfields developed in other British possessions were strictly military projects.\(^72\)

At some time during the next five days, President Roosevelt jotted down the concessions that he felt Great Britain must make in order to receive the destroyers:

1. Assurance on the part of the Prime Minister that in the event that waters of G.B. become untenable for British ships of war to remain, they would not be turned over to the Germans or sunk, but would be sent to other parts of the Empire for continued defense of the Empire.

2. Agreement that G.B. will authorize use of Newfoundland, Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and British Guiana as naval and air bases by the U.S., in the event of an attack on the Am. Hemisphere by any non-American nations. And in the meantime US to have right to establish such bases and use them for training and exercise' purposes. Land necessary for above to be bought or leased for 99 years.\(^73\)

On 13 August the President first discussed these terms with an inner circle of his advisers and then transmitted them to Mr. Churchill. If the British agreed to them, Mr. Roosevelt stated, the United States would promise to furnish in exchange fifty destroyers, some motor torpedo boats, and ten naval aircraft. The Prime Minister on 15 August accepted the President's proposals in principle but with one significant exception: he offered only to "reiterate" the pledge he had given on 4 June and not to issue a new and more binding pledge with respect to the British Fleet. He also observed that it would be necessary to consult with Canada about the Newfoundland base. Nevertheless, Mr. Churchill now felt sufficiently confident of the successful conclusion

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of the negotiation to begin the movement of British crews to Halifax to take over the destroyers.\(^74\)
At a Cabinet meeting on 16 August the President discussed his proposals with Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, and the next day Mr. Jackson addressed a letter to Secretary Knox that concluded:

I understand that negotiations are now pending looking towards the transfer of certain old destroyers to the Canadian Government conditioned upon the granting by the British Government of certain naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States. It is my opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations may, and should, certify under section 14(a) [of the Naval Expansion Act] that such destroyers are not essential to the defense of the United States if in his judgment the exchange of such destroyers for strategic naval and air bases will strengthen rather than impair the total defense of the United States.75

This opinion, it will be noted, presented the same argument advanced by Mr. Cohen on 19 July. By now accepting that argument, President Roosevelt and his advisers relieved themselves of their previous conviction that new legislation would be necessary- to authorize the transference of the destroyers.

Mr. Jackson's letter also indicates his understanding that the earlier idea of transferring the destroyers initially to Canada was still alive on the eve of President Roosevelt's meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King at Ogdensburg, New York, on 17-18 August. At Ogdensburg the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the immediate establishment of a Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Mr. Roosevelt also talked to Mr. Mackenzie King in some detail about his recent negotiations with Great Britain, and the two chief executives discussed the mechanism of transferring the destroyers at Halifax. Apparently they did not discuss an intermediate transfer of the destroyers to Canada, only their transfer through Canadian waters to British crews.76

After the Ogdensburg meeting Under Secretary Welles, at the President's direction, prepared drafts of notes to be exchanged between the United States and British Governments and handed them to Lord Lothian. Mr. Welles's draft of the British note contained three parts: First, Great Britain pledged

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itself not to surrender or sink its fleet. Second, the British agreed to 99-year leases on bases in the possessions previously enumerated, with the United States exercising sole judgment in the selection of base sites "for purposes of defense as well as for peacetime training"; Mr. Welles's draft also specified that "the British Government . . . will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory and waters above mentioned to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the British Government and its agents of such sovereign rights, power, and authority." And, third, "the British Government will accept as in full compensation for the leases . . . the following naval and military materiel," with specification of the latter left blank.\(^77\)

The second Welles's draft was a formal acknowledgment by the United States Government of the above note and a pledge to transfer forthwith to the British Government the naval and military material listed in the note. In return for the acceptance of these terms, the United States offered to turn over to Great Britain fifty destroyers, twenty motor torpedo boats, five Navy patrol bombers, five Army B-17 heavy bombers, 250,000 Enfield rifles, and 5,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall on 20 August approved the proffer of the Army items involved.\(^78\)

These proposals drafted on 19 and 20 August by no means reflected the terms upon which the British had previously indicated their willingness to settle. To date, Mr. Churchill had consistently refused to make any change in his 4 June pledge, and he seems to have been particularly disturbed by the insertion of the word "sovereignty" into the proposed agreement. In a public address to Parliament on 20 August, the Prime Minister denied that "any transference of sovereignty" had ever been suggested during the negotiations. In a message to the President of 22 August, Mr. Churchill again refused to alter his 4 June pledge, and also objected to the proposal that the United States exercise exclusive judgment in the selection of base sites. Indeed, he now took the position that he and his government had never contemplated any formal bargain or exchange; the British Cabinet had decided to offer the bases "without stipulating for any return," and it was prepared
to make good its offer even if the United States decided against transferring the destroyers and other war material.\textsuperscript{79}

The Prime Minister's message of 22 August created a temporary impasse in the negotiation. On the preceding day, Admiral Stark had written the President that he would sign the necessary certificates to permit the transfer of the destroyers and patrol bombers, but only if they were exchanged for bases and if an assurance that money for the development of the bases would be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{80} With Admiral Stark reconciled to the deal, the President and his advisers had agreed among themselves on the terms to be offered Britain and on the method of executing the agreement. The new British proposal, that the bases be handed over to the United States as a "gift" and that the destroyers and other items be transferred to Great Britain as a separate but more or less simultaneous "gift," came as something of a shock to American officialdom. The Department of State told Lord Lothian that it would be "utterly impossible" to make a gift of the destroyers, and the President talked to Mr. Churchill in the same vein by transatlantic phone.\textsuperscript{81}

At this point, Secretary Hull returned to Washington from a three weeks' vacation and took up the problem of resolving the wide differences that still remained between the American and British points of view. The impasse was broken on 26 August when the Department of State suggested that the two North Atlantic base sites-Newfoundland and Bermuda-be accepted from Britain as outright gifts, and that only the Caribbean base sites be specifically exchanged for the destroyers. The British Government agreed to this idea and voluntarily added Antigua to the list of Caribbean bases. Other compromises followed. At British insistence, all reference to "sovereignty" was dropped from the draft proposals. In place of the American demand for exercise of "exclusive judgment" in the selection of base sites, it was agreed that the sites would be chosen by a joint commission of experts who would make the selection "by common agreement"; on the other hand, the final agreement spelled out the general locations desired as base sites (for example, "on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda"), whereas the 19 August draft had merely named the various British possessions in which bases were to be
established. Finally, the United States agreed that the guarantee with respect to the British Fleet reed not be made an integral part of the agreement, but that it could be given in a separate but simultaneous exchange of notes. On the British side, Mr. Churchill finally

accepted a formula for a guarantee pledging that Great Britain would never surrender or scuttle its fleet—the commitment that the President and his advisers had insisted upon as an essential *quid pro quo* since the negotiation began. With almost all details agreed upon, the Attorney General submitted to the President a formal legal indorsement of the transaction, except for the proposed transfer of motor torpedo boats, which he ruled illegal.82

The several notes that constituted the Destroyer-Base Agreement were signed on the evening of 2 September, and, in compliance with the act of 28 June 1940, President Roosevelt transmitted the two principal notes to Congress the next day. The separate notes containing the British Fleet pledge were not sent to Congress but were announced coincidentally in the press.83

The agreement, as signed, provided only for the transfer of destroyers, apparently because the President failed to tell Secretary Hull that he had approved the transfer of other Army and Navy material as well. Before Lord Lothian signed, he protested to Mr. Hull that he had understood that other military items were also involved. The Secretary insisted that he was not acquainted with the President's decision to include any other items than the destroyers. With some reluctance, the British ambassador signed the notes as they were presented to him.84 Newsmen on 3 September immediately noted the discrepancy between the wording of Secretary Hull's and Lord Lothian's notes, but a Department of State spokesman insisted "that while the destroyers represented inadequate payment for the bases, the agreement to deliver them completed the transaction." 85

The Army subsequently turned over 250,000 Enfield rifles to Great Britain, and in February 1941 it also agreed to" fulfill a promise made by General Marshall in June 1940 to furnish Great Britain with an additional 50,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. In neither instance was the transfer tied to
the destroyer-base deal. As for the B-17's, while the British did not get the five out of existing Air Corps stocks that had been promised, they did receive an alternative consideration of much greater value. On 16 September, after the President and the majority of his Cabinet had decided against an attempt to reopen the destroyer-base negotiations in order to include in the

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agreements the bombers and other material originally proffered, Mr. Roosevelt ordered the Army henceforth to split new B-24 bomber production with the British on a one-for-one basis, instead of the current distribution of two for the United States and one for Great Britain.86

In order to reconcile the acquisition of bases in British possessions with the Havana agreements entered into six weeks previously, Secretary of State Hull insisted that a circular note be sent to the Latin American governments informing them of the transaction and announcing that "the resulting facilities at these bases will, of course, be made available alike to all American Republics on the fullest cooperative basis for the common defense of the hemisphere." 87 This gesture led to a British query as to whether Mr. Hull's note was not really designed as a move to secure additional bases in Latin American territory. Further, the British wished to know whether they would have rights of equal access in any Latin American bases that might be obtained by the United States. The latter question was answered by a polite negative, but the fact that the British had raised it perhaps had something to do with the strictly American development and use of the bases in Britain's Atlantic possessions.88

Under oral instructions issued by Admiral Stark on 20 August, the Joint Planning Committee undertook a preliminary study of the prospective British base sites and completed it a week before the Destroyer-Base Agreement was actually signed. The Navy also took the initiative in establishing the board of military and naval experts that (in accordance with the terms of the final agreement) would select, jointly with the British, the actual sites to be developed as bases. This Army-Navy board departed for Bermuda on its first
survey mission on 3 September 1940, the day that the Destroyer Base Agreement was announced.\(^89\)

In transmitting the Destroyer-Base Agreement to Congress, President Roosevelt characterized the acquisition of base rights in eight British possessions as "an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger."\(^90\) In contrast, the Chief of the Air Corps observed "that the transfer of destroyers to the British in exchange for bases is good publicity but that it does not amount to nearly as much as it appeared, because these bases we have obtained are no good and will require millions of dollars for development."\(^91\) The real value of the new bases as defense posts for the Army perhaps lay midway between the two estimates. The Army valued most highly those acquired in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad, and was less impressed with the potential value of the other Caribbean sites except as locations for staging fields. When developed, the new bases would extend the Army's outpost line of defense eastward into the Atlantic by from several hundred to one thousand miles and add materially to the mobility of air defense operations that might be undertaken along the Atlantic front. The Caribbean bases not only would provide additional protection to the Atlantic approaches of the Panama Canal but also would facilitate the extension of Army airpower toward the bulge of Brazil.

The Destroyer-Base Agreement unquestionably met with the approval of the overwhelming majority of the American people and of their representatives in Congress. Before details of the proposed agreement had been made known to the public, opinion polls had recorded that more than four fifths of the American people favored acquiring the British possessions involved or at least bases in them; and a nearly two-thirds majority in mid-August approved the idea of transferring destroyers to England. Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate, and other leading Republicans had indorsed both ideas during August. While there was a good deal of criticism in and out of Congress of the method employed by the President in arranging the agreement and much doubt expressed about its legality under either
national or international law, the terms obtained seemed so advantageous to the United States-eight new bases for fifty old destroyers-that the American people accepted the destroyer exchange as a genuine bargain, without, of course, having more than a vague comprehension of its long-range implications. The British appear to have accepted it with equal enthusiasm, not only because they badly needed the destroyers but also because they needed even more a definite sign of open American support against the threat of Nazi invasion.

The significance and implications of the destroyer-base deal were clearly recognized by Germany and Japan. As rumors of an impending agreement reached Berlin, the German Foreign Office noted that the intention of the United States to "bail out" Great Britain was becoming increasingly obvious.92 Until the Destroyer-Base Agreement was announced, Hitler seems to have been convinced that the United States would remain neutral so long as he did not touch the Western Hemisphere. Now both he and Benito Mussolini realized that they had to face the possibility of eventual American intervention in the war. The Germans privately called the destroyer transfer "an openly hostile act," but they did not choose to accept the challenge and force the United States into the war.93 On the other side of the world, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew reported that the Tokyo militarists were equally impressed with the destroyer agreement as an indication "that Britain and the United States are steadily drawing closer together in mutual defense measures" and that, consequently, Germany might not defeat Great Britain after all.94

The exchange of destroyers for bases had a profound effect on the development of prewar policy. Whatever rationalizations the United States Government may have advanced at the time, it is now generally agreed that the exchange marked a clear departure from the path of neutrality and a clear confirmation of intent to give all aid to Great Britain short of declaring war. The United States had, indeed, entered into a limited participation in the war, and its national policy henceforth moved toward broader objectives than...
those associated strictly with hemisphere defense.  

American Military Preparations and the War Outlook July-October 1940

The war plans and defense measures adopted by the United States in the summer of 1940 have been reviewed in the preceding pages as if they were interrelated aspects of a single program for national and hemisphere defense. Actually, the Army had adopted two programs: the first, an immediate program of emergency measures to be taken in the event of imminent military threat; the second, a long-range program to make the United States and the rest of the hemisphere reasonably secure from military attack by the autumn of 1941 and thereafter. Mr. Charles R. Stillman, business manager of Time magazine, after a month's research in Washington during June and July 1940, submitted a shrewd analysis of these two programs to the Chief of Staffs office for comment. Mr. Stillman failed to elicit the desired comment, but staff observations on his points provide an illuminating insight into Army thinking and planning at the time.  

The immediate program provided for the deployment in 1940 of about 100,000 troops to strategic points from Newfoundland to the Brazilian bulge. It was designed to meet a RAINBOW 4 situation as defined in the new joint war plan of June 1940- that is, the defeat of Great Britain as well as of France and the surrender or destruction of the British and French Fleets. It did not contemplate operations by United States forces south of the Brazilian bulge. The Army units to be used were to be drawn principally from the National Guard, and it was partly for this reason that the Army from June onward urged immediate induction of the Guard. To execute these measures would have required very close collaboration and cooperation with the forces of Canada to the north and Latin America to the south. The staff conversations undertaken in haste in June and July 1940 were of course aimed at achievement of these ends. The Army considered the Havana agreements of July 1940 of "enormous importance" in carrying out the
immediate program in whole or in part, if it became necessary to do so.
Finally, this program was a fluid one, the requirements for which changed
from day to day as the war situation changed. The Army's conviction from
September 1940 onward that Great Britain would probably hold out at least
through the winter of 1940-41 meant that the immediate measures would
probably not have to be carried out.98

The goal of the long-range or "big" program was to expand the Army as
rapidly as possible to a 1,400,000-man total in order to give the United States
a first-class Army as well as a first-class Navy to defend the Western
Hemisphere against Old World aggression. This program was "based on a
power policy in contemplation of an indefinite period of armed peace or semi-
war" for the United States.99 Whether or not the United States could carry it
out depended primarily on maintenance of Anglo-American naval supremacy
in the Atlantic. The decision in July 1940 to keep the bulk of the United
States Fleet in the Pacific to check Japan and guard the supply of vital raw
materials such as rubber and tin was made on the assumption that the fleet
could be moved swiftly to the Atlantic if necessary. The Panama Canal was
therefore considered the key to the successful build-up of American military
strength—the Army expressing its vehement concurrence in Mr. Stillman's
characterization of the Canal as "the most strategic spot in the world today." 100

So far as the Army was concerned, the principal conflict between these two
programs was the necessity under the immediate program of keeping an
effective fighting force in being as against the need under the long-range
program of using the existing Regular Army as a training and cadre nucleus
for the expanded army that was being forged. When inducted, the great
majority of National Guard units were found to be far from ready for
emergency deployment to strategic points along the Atlantic front; they, too,
needed to be trained. Because of this conflict, it looked to outside critics as
though the long-range program had been more or less foisted on the Army's
General Staff and that, if left to its own devices, the staff would have
preferred to concentrate on immediate rather than future preparedness.101
Actually, the General Staff in July 1940 considered both programs essential and was working with equal fervor for fulfillment of each. Though the Army's military leaders were something less than enthusiastic about giving much material aid to Britain, they were well aware that the longer the British held out, the lesser the likelihood of their having to execute the immediate program and the greater the amount of thought and energy they could devote to carrying out the long-range program.

In any case, the armed services as well as the President felt in July 1940 that they needed better information on the chances of Britain's survival. They appointed special observers who, after a personal briefing from President Roosevelt, went to Great Britain in early August to survey the situation. The Army's emissaries were General Strong, chief of the War Plans Division, and Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force. Generals Strong and Emmons, when they returned to Washington about 20 September, expressed a general optimism over Great Britain's prospects, though General Emmons was less convinced than General Strong that Britain could successfully resist an invasion.

The reports from Britain helped in the formulation on 25 September of a new joint Army-Navy estimate of the war situation and its bearing on the position of the United States. The planners assumed that Germany and Italy could not launch a major military attack against the Western Hemisphere until they had defeated Great Britain and gained naval control of the eastern Atlantic. It now appeared that British naval power based on the British Isles could be maintained at least for another six months. Even if the Axis Powers then gained control of the bulk of the British Fleet, it would take them six additional months to assimilate British naval strength and prepare it for offensive operations across the Atlantic. The United States, therefore, probably had at least a year's grace in which to complete its military preparations. By the end of that year (roughly, by October 1941), American mobilization under the long-range program was expected to produce the 1,400,000-man Army and enlarged Navy that would be strong enough to
resist successfully any Old World military aggression against the New. During this year, too, the United States could afford to keep the bulk of its fleet in the Pacific to check Japan. On the other hand, if, as seemed increasingly probable, Japan should in the meantime strike southward in the western Pacific, the United States could not afford to commit a major portion of its naval strength in an effort to stop Japanese aggression. American naval power must be kept mobile, free to shift to the Atlantic to deal with any emergency that might arise there. 103

Even if the British Isles and the British Fleet did not succumb, the United States had to be ready to meet specific Axis advances with suitable countermeasures. If Germany moved into Spain and Portugal or threatened their Atlantic islands, the United States might have to occupy the Azores. If Gibraltar fell, permitting the Italian Fleet to debouch into the Atlantic, and if also the Germans moved into French North and West Africa, particularly if they made Dakar a naval and air base, the armed forces of the United States would undoubtedly be required to protect the airfields and ports of northeastern Brazil against a Nazi attack. Even if the Nazis made no move toward French West Africa, they might inspire widespread subversive activity within the Latin American nations. In that event the nations to the south might be expected to call on the United States for military assistance. If, on the other hand, and against expectation, the British Fleet were destroyed or surrendered, then within three months the United States would have to secure "all Atlantic outpost positions from Bahia in Brazil northward to include Greenland." Should none of these particular contingencies arise during the ensuing year, the United States could engage in an orderly expansion of its military power and build up its existing overseas outposts and the new bases acquired from Great Britain. 104

Japan's formal adherence to the Axis on 27 September 1940 did not materially alter this outlook. The United States did not need the new Axis pact to remind it of the dangers of becoming involved in a war with Japan in
the Pacific or of joining openly in the war against Germany and Italy in the Atlantic. War with Japan would not only throw the long-range mobilization program out of gear but also would virtually stop further aid to Great Britain. With the bulk of American naval power being maintained in the eastern Pacific, ostensibly as a deterrent to Japanese aggression, the Navy was as unprepared as the Army for action in the Atlantic.

The safety of the United States nevertheless seemed far better assured by early October 1940 than it had appeared to be during the hectic days of May and June. This assurance flowed not so much from a substantial improvement in the immediate military preparedness of the United States as from the stanchness with which the British were defending their homeland. It now appeared that the United States would have time to prepare its defenses. It needed time. At a conference in early October, General Marshall spoke of the Army's tactical air force as "non-existent, as it has been turned into a school." The United States, he continued, had practically no antiaircraft ammunition, and there were critical shortages in other types of munitions. General Strong observed that supply and shipping shortages would make it impossible for the Army within the succeeding fifteen months to send anywhere emergency expeditions of more than sixty thousand men in fully equipped units. While this situation lasted-and, irrespective of aid to Brit-

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ain, it would last in declining measure until the fall of 1941-the defense of the United States would have to depend primarily on what. General Marshall called "our magnificent fleet." Even Secretary of War Stimson, who customarily advocated more forceful policies than his military advisers, "accepted the proposition that our Fleet was the only reserve we had for national defense . . . and, in consequence, it should not be committed in any theater unless or until it developed that our national existence was at stake in that theater."106

When President Roosevelt said in an address on 12 October that the United States "wants no war with any nation," he presumably spoke with sincerity.107 In June he had insisted that the mobilization then being initiated
was "a defensive program, not aimed at world affairs which do not concern the Western Hemisphere." The difficulty lay in the fact that a totalitarian conquest of the Old World would inevitably concern the nations of the New and menace their freedom and security. The best hope of preserving the security and freedom of the United States, pending the completion of its own military preparations, now seemed to lie in buttressing Great Britain as the remaining bulwark against the military might and unprincipled leadership of Nazi Germany.

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Endnotes

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Endnotes for Chapter II

1 JB 325, sers.642 and 642-1; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, App. A, pp. 133-37.

2 New York Sun, May 10, 1940.


5 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 40, WPD 4175-7.

6 Memo, CofS for WPD, 23 May 40; WPD Aide-Memoire, 23 May 40. Both in WPD 4175-10.

7 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 10, WPD 4115-15; Ltr, Rear Adm Andrew C. Pickens to Adm Stark, Rio de Janeiro, 26 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Also references cited in footnote 6, above, and Hull, *Memoirs*, 1, 821.

8 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, pp. 161-62, and notes 29-32; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, pp. 95-96, 106.. It is possible that the services prepared the POT of GOLD plan at the President's insistence but with no real conviction that its execution might be necessary. On the same day that the draft plan was submitted, Admiral Stark wrote a personal letter to Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in which he indicated that the maximum foreseeable diversion of vessels to the Atlantic would be less than the number that would probably be required for the POT OF GOLD plan. *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 39 parts (Washington: 1946).
(hereafter cited as *Pearl Harbor Attack*), Pt. 14, p. 944.

9 Notes, title: Meeting With the Business Advisory Council . . . 23 May, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

10 JB 325, set 642-4; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, pp. 163-65; Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Jun 40, WPD 4175-12. See also Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning*, 1941-42, pp. 11-21, on war planning and the development of the situation in May and June 1940.


17 Memo, Gen Strong for Gen Marshall, 15 Dec 45; Notes on Conf in OCS, 17 Jun 40. Both in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 15, pp. 1908-10, 1929-31. The alert messages of 17 June are in AG 381 (6-17-40), and the follow up papers are in WPD 4322 (Hawaii) and WPD 4326 (Panama). See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Chs. IV and X.
18 Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 28 Jun 40, OCS 14943-24. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. VII.

19 Memo, Jt Planners for CofS and CNO, 16 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.


21 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. This copy is marked "Final revision." For the earlier version, dated 22 June, and the President's informal comments and decisions made on 24 June, see Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, pp. 110-13.


23 Report, JPC to CofS and CNO, 26 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.


27 Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to isolation*, p. 573, quoting note, Lord Lothian to President Roosevelt, 4 Jul 40.

28 During a visit of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, to Washington, 7-11 July 1940, the President decided to keep the fleet in Hawaiian waters for the time being. The Army at this time was still urging that strong detachments of the fleet be sent to the Atlantic to implement the RAINBOW 4 plans then being prepared. Kittredge MS, Ch. 12, p. 277.

29 A nationwide poll conducted about 1 June 1940 by *Fortune* magazine indicated the following state of American public opinion: nearly 94 percent of those questioned approved spending "whatever is necessary to build up as quickly as possible our army, navy, and air force"; 63 percent believed that Germany would try to seize territory somewhere in the Western Hemisphere;
and 45 percent thought that it would attack American territory as soon as possible. Only 27 percent favored entering the war either at once or if Britain and France seemed sure to lose without United States armed intervention. Nearly as many favored absolute neutrality, with no aid to Britain or France whatsoever. Special Supplement to *Fortune* magazine, July 1940.

30 See Ch. X, below.

31 FDR *Public Papers and Addresses, 1940*, pp. 192, 199-205, 253, 291.

32 Watson, *Prewar Plant and Preparations*, pp. 168-82, presents a comprehensive account of the evolution of this program.

33 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 22 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

34 Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Ch. VII.


36 Tab B, Memo, WPD for CofS, --Jun 41, WPD 3807-83.

37 See Greenfield and Palmer, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-42," in *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 5ff. Initially, the War Plans Division proposed to transfer its detailed planning functions and control over theater and task-force operations to General Headquarters about 15 September 1940. With Britain's stout resistance to German attacks, the likelihood of extensive early operations faded, and General Marshall deferred the activation of General Headquarters as an agency-for planning and directing operations until the following summer. Pets Ltr, Gen Strong to Gen Marshall, 6 Aug 40; and Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Aug 42 (and notations thereon). Both in AGF file, Miscellaneous Correspondence, AGF Drawer 603.
38 See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. II.


41 Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Mar 40, WPD 3977-2.

42 Memo, President for SN et al., 8 Mar 40, JB 326, ser 652-1.

43 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 31 May 40, WPD 4313; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 429-33. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIII.


45 Memo, President for Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, 4 May 40; Memo, Mr. Welles for President, 6 May 40. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


49 Ltr, Davies to President, 23 May 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

50 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 40, and pen notations thereon, WPD 4175-9; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, notes 25-27.

51 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, p. 161 (text) and pp. 124-25 (fns.); Jt A&N
RAINBOW 4, JB 325, set 642-4.

52 Hull, Memoirs. 1, 816.

53 Hull, Memoirs, I, 791-92, 816-18; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 550, 627; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8.

54 Hull, Memoirs, I, 822-24; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to isolation, pp. 688ff.; Memo, Asst Secy State Berle for President Roosevelt, 18 Jul 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

55 Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939 June 1940, II, 95.

56 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 697.

57 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 818-20.

58 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 690.

59 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, p. 188 and fns.; Memo, WPD for ACsofS G-3 and G-4, 11 Jul 40, WPD 4337.

60 Hull, Memoirs, 1,818-20; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 691. The manner in which supplies to Martinique were to be controlled is illustrated by the following: On 12 August 1940, "it was agreed that the Navy should give the State Department figures of what they considered the necessary amount of gas and oil to be sent to Martinique, and the State Department would arrange with oil companies to restrict shipments to that amount." Notes on SLC mtg, 12 Aug 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 55.

61 See Ch. IV, below.

62 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 24ff.; Kittredge MS, Chs. 7, 9. When the European war began in 1939, the United States had about 153 old "four-stackers," almost all of them in storage; most of these were recommissioned as destroyers or converted to other types of vessels between September 1939 and the fall of 1940. After the destroyer-base deal, the United States had left
eighty-three of the vessels, either in commission or available for recommissioning as destroyers. Statistics compiled from *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1939, 1940, and 1941 editions (New York: The Macmillan Company).

63 Memo, CNO for President, 21 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Kittredge MS, Ch. 9, p. 198.

64 All of the above quotations are from Memo, President for SN, 22 Jul 40, and annotations thereon, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

65 On the work of the Century Group, see Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 746-49.


69 President's notes on Cabinet mtg, 2 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Diary of Henry L. Stimson, entry of 2 Aug 40. A microfilm copy of the Diary was examined at the Sterling Library, Yale University.

70 Memo, Lord Lothian for President, 5 Aug 40, copy sent to Under Secretary of State Welles, same date, and inclosed in Ltr, Welles to President, 8 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1, 831.

71 Ltr, Welles to President, 8 Aug 40, and incls, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

72 See Ch. X, below.
73 Memo, undated and unsigned, in President Roosevelt's handwriting and attached to Welles' memo of 8 Aug, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


75 Ltr, Attorney General to SN, 17 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

76 Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Aug 40; Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 357-58. See Chapter XIV, below, for the background of the Ogdensburg meeting and for further details of Canadian-American defense negotiations and the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense thereafter.

77 Ltr, Welles to President, 19 Aug 40, and inclosed Drafts A and B, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


80 Memo, Adm Stark for President, 21 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


83 New York *Times*, September 4, 1940.
84 Memo of Conv between SW and Mr. Arthur B. Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission, 10 Sep 40; Pets Ltr, SW to Secy State, 14 Sep 40. Both in Stimson Diary under these dates. These two items reviewed all of the circumstances surrounding this omission and urged that it be rectified.


86 Notes on Conf in OCS, 17 Sep 40, OPD Records; Stimson Diary, entry of 1 Oct 40; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Ch. I. See Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 306ff., for the subsequent development of airplane allotments to Great Britain.

87 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 842.

88 Kittredge MS, Ch. 11, pp. 254-55, recording discussions between Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley and the British Bailey Committee, 17 to 19 September 1940.


90 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, p. 391.

91 Notes on Conf in OCS, 6 Sep 40, OCS Conf Binder 3.


93 United States Navy Department, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1940, 2 vols. (Office of Naval Intelligence: 1947) (hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences, 1940), II, 17-21 entry of 6 Sep 40. Two additional volumes covering 1941 and one volume covering 1942 (hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences, 1941 and Fuehrer Conferences, 1942) were also published in 1947. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had weighed the probable German reaction in advance and had decided that Hitler would not

94 Telg, Ambassador Grew to Dept of State, 12 Sep 40, United States Department of State, *Peace and War*, p. 569.


96 OCS brief of Stillman Memo, 19 Jul 40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Jul 40; and other papers. All in WPD 4250-5. See also *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War*, p. 5.

97 On 4 June the War Plans Division had proposed the initial induction and training of thirty-two Guard regiments of various sorts that were to be deployed if necessary to Alaska, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Trinidad-Venezuela area, and the Natal area. Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Jun 40, WPD 4310-1.

98 This and the following two paragraphs are based principally on the references cited in footnote 96, above.

99 OCS brief of Stillman Memo, 19 Jul 40, WPD 4250-5.

100 *Ibid*.

101 Mr. Stillman made this surmise in July 1940; Hanson Baldwin stressed the same point in his book, *United We Stand*, written in or before February
1941.


103 Memo, WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, WPD 4321-9, Sec. 1, sub: Estimate of the Position of the United States in Relation to the World Situation. This estimate was probably the joint handiwork of Colonel Clark of the Army War Plans Division and Capt. Russell S. Crenshaw of the Navy War Plans Division.


107 *FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940*, p. 464.

108 Pets Ltr, President to SW Woodring, 20 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
In assessing the danger to American security from Axis aggression in 1940 and early 1941, President Roosevelt and his advisers always considered Nazi Germany the greatest menace. They believed that Fascist Italy held no threat at all, at least to American interests in the Western Hemisphere. They viewed Japan as a very real threat to American interests in the Pacific, but not one of the same magnitude as that presented by Germany in the Atlantic. Events were to prove that Japan had both the means and a more immediately deadly intent to challenge the United States. Nevertheless, American leaders were probably correct in focusing their attention on Germany and its unpredictable Fuehrer, and therefore on the Atlantic aspects of the war, at least until after the Nazi-Soviet conflict began in June 1941. Until then, German land and air forces available for operations in the Atlantic area were much greater than those of Great Britain and the United States combined. If Germany's Navy had been relatively as large as its land and air forces, the story of World War II might well have been very different.

The German Position, Summer 1940

Although the United States based its plans and preparations for hemisphere defense on the assumption that the Nazis and their partners in aggression had embarked on a calculated scheme of world conquest, a scheme that would inevitably bring the New World under military attack, it is now known that Germany in 1940 and 1941 had no specific plans for attacking any part of the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the basic objective of German policy toward the United States until Pearl Harbor was to keep it out of direct participation in the war. On the other hand, the general attitude of the Hitler regime was at least as hostile toward the United States as that of the Roosevelt administration and of the great majority of the American people was toward Germany.
To say that Germany had no specific plans for attacking the United States or any other part of the New World is more or less beside the point in appraising the measures taken at the time to meet the possibility of German military action. When the Germans won their quick land victory over France and Great Britain in June 1940, they had no specific plans for attacking anywhere else, but they did have the means. They had a military machine overwhelmingly powerful in land and air forces, backed by an immediate war industrial capacity far greater than that of any other nation. These means were at the disposal of leaders utterly devoid of a sense of international morality. Given this military preponderance and type of leadership, it was inevitable that the German nation, hindered rather than aided by its Italian partner, would strike out in new directions after the fall of France. Whatever the professions of Hitler and other Nazi leaders, the German military machine was not likely to stop until it was defeated. This was the German menace.

Until the summer of 1940, Hitler and his principal advisers gave but scant attention to the possibility of American intervention-direct or indirect in Europe. The German leaders had taken the neutrality acts of 1935 and 1937 more or less at their face value and had assumed that the United States would maintain an isolationist position so long as Germany made no move that could be interpreted as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Hitler expressed the opinion in 1939 that the United States would never intervene in another general European war because of the "unpleasant experiences" and financial loss it had suffered in World War I. In July 1940 he reiterated this last point, observing that the United States "lost" $10,000,000,000 by participating in the first world war and "got back" only $1,400,000,000. Although the German military attaché in Washington transmitted reasonably accurate estimates of American military preparations, his reports carried little weight among German military leaders. They were convinced that the United States Army of 1939 was too small to take an active part in a European war, that it would take the United States several years to develop substantial military strength, and that even if the Army were rapidly increased in numbers it would still lack experienced leadership and therefore be no match for the Wehrmacht. In any event, Hitler expected to complete his European conquests before the United States could possibly intervene.
Despite their generally contemptuous attitude toward the American military potential, the Germans after war began in September 1939 tried to avoid military incidents that might be interpreted by the United States as hostile acts. On Hitler’s repeated orders, the German Navy until the spring of 1941 carefully respected the Atlantic neutrality zone patrolled by the United States Navy. The Nazis did engage in manifold activities to stir up trouble for the United States in Latin America, and within the country they went as far as they could to sow dissension among the American people; but these activities seem to have had the negative objective of weakening the United States and undermining the front of hemisphere solidarity, rather than the positive aim of preparing the New World for German conquest.

When the Nazis launched their attack on the West in the spring of 1940 they acted on a carefully calculated operational plan that achieved a quick and decisive victory far sooner than they themselves had anticipated, and therefore they did not have ready any plan for operations thereafter. Hitler in May and June 1940 seems to have hoped to end the war in the West as soon as possible, to persuade both France and Great Britain to make peace on reasonable terms, and then to consolidate his position as master of western Europe. In part, his plans were shaped by the pressure President Roosevelt was bringing to bear on both Italy and Germany to curb their aggressive actions. In a letter to Mussolini on 3 May, a week before the assault on France, Hitler remarked that he thought “the undertone of threat ringing through all of Roosevelt's utterances is sufficient grounds for us to be on our guard and bring the war to a close as quickly as possible.” The President's Charlottesville address of 10 June made a great impression on Hitler. Through a devious channel, he hastened to assure the United States Government that his policy was “Europe for the Europeans and America for the Americans,” and he also disclaimed any desire to destroy the British Empire. America's announced policy of aiding Britain and the other nations fighting Germany and Italy brought a new conviction among German leaders that the United States would eventually intervene in the war if it lasted.
The French request for an armistice on 17 June found the Germans unprepared to give an immediate answer since they had not decided on either the temporary or the long-range demands that they would impose on France. After consulting with Mussolini (and rejecting his proposals), Hitler presented relatively lenient armistice terms to the French on 21 June. He did not ask for control of the French Fleet, nor did he require the French to open their African territories to German occupation. To the Italians, Hitler explained that he wanted to keep the French Fleet out of British hands. He also felt that the presentation of harsher terms might have led to a withdrawal of the new Pétain government to North Africa. Hitler's primary aim was to get the French out of the war in order to widen the rift that had developed between the French and British and thus to weaken Great Britain's ability further to resist. The Germans expected the British people to see the hopelessness of their military position, to overthrow the Churchill ministry, and to make peace on terms that would leave the British Empire virtually intact but impotent to interfere with Germany's mastery of western Europe.¹⁰

Before the downfall of France, Hitler had not planned an invasion of Great Britain.¹¹ By the end of June, the Germans began to realize that the British were determined to fight on. "Britain probably still needs one more demonstration of our military might before she gives in and leaves us a free hand in the East," General Franz Halder, the Chief of the German Army's General Staff, recorded in his journal on 30 June 1940. On 16 July Hitler ordered the immediate preparation of detailed invasion plans. The decision to fight it out with England reoriented the whole German outlook toward the Atlantic front. To beat Britain to its knees would require a German-controlled front extending from the North Cape to Morocco. The Germans also planned to seize Iceland, occupy strategic positions in West Africa, and claim the French Congo and Belgian Congo as war booty. ¹²

Before the decision to invade Great Britain had been made, the German
Naval Staff prepared a general program for base expansion and ship construction designed to make Germany a pre-eminent naval power in the Atlantic. In plans prepared for conferences with Hitler on 20 June and 11 July, the Navy advocated annexation of Iceland and its exploitation as a naval and air base; development of bases either in the Azores or in both the Canary and Cape Verde Islands; creation of a large united German colonial empire in central Africa; and construction of an Atlantic battleship force that would neutralize British and American naval power.\(^{13}\) In his discussion with Hitler on 11 July, the commander in chief of the German Navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, pointed out the particular importance of Dakar as a base for conducting warfare in the Atlantic. Hitler at this time seems to have gone no further toward approving these proposals than expressing a desire "to acquire one of the Canary Islands from Spain in exchange for French Morocco."\(^{14}\) Until he decided to invade England, Hitler himself seems to have taken comparatively little interest in plans for expansion into Africa or extension of German naval power in the Atlantic. His brief interest in Iceland expired when he was told by his advisers that it would be impossible to construct airfields there. As already noted, Great Britain had begun a military occupation of Iceland on 10 May, and by the end of July relatively strong British and Canadian contingents had been brought in to defend the island—a factor that undoubtedly also contributed to the German decision not to attempt its invasion.\(^{15}\)

The other measures advocated by the German Navy became more attractive to the Nazi Fuehrer, primarily as adjuncts to a showdown fight with Great Britain. Fortunately for the United States, Hitler seems to have had very little realization of the strategic significance of German bases in French West Africa and on the eastern Atlantic islands for their own sake. Germany's military attaché in the United States during the prewar period, General Friedrich von Boetticher, stated after the war that, following the fall of France in 1940, he had stressed in his reports the strategic significance of controlling the South Atlantic-African-Red Sea belt. But, he added, Hitler
and his intimate advisers

. . . had no clear idea of the geographical requisites for a world war. The significance of the British Empire's life-line through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, and the importance of the Middle East were not grasped at the time .... There was also no clear idea of the strategic significance of the narrowing of the Atlantic Ocean between Brazil and Africa, and of the land and air routes across central Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.¹⁶

On 10 July the German Air Force began its assault in force on Britain. After 16 July the German Army and Navy staffs worked feverishly on invasion plans, for they realized that an invasion must either take place in the early fall or be postponed at least until the following spring. At the same time, the Germans attempted to secure a revision of the armistice arrangements with France in order to obtain French consent to the establishment of German bases in southern France and along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of French North Africa.¹⁷ From their beginning Hitler appears to have viewed the preparations for a full-scale Atlantic war with misgivings. On 13 July General Halder recorded in his journal:

...the Fuehrer is greatly puzzled by Britain's persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain's hope on Russia, 'and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States and others.

Very quickly Hitler came to the conclusion that Britain's reason for continuing the war was its hope for aid from the United States and the Soviet Union. He discounted the ability of the United States to render much aid to
Britain, and he assumed that the British did also; the Russians were another matter. As of 21 July, the Nazi Fuehrer felt that Britain's obduracy could best be overcome by confronting the British with a political front embracing Spain, Italy, and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18}

Ten days later, after the German Army and Navy had presented their blueprints for an invasion of England, Hitler arrived at a very different decision. While the Army and Navy told him that they could undertake an invasion in September, provided that Britain had been sufficiently softened up by air bombardment, that the Germans had gained air superiority over the invasion area, that the weather was extremely favorable, etc., etc., it was rather clear that neither the German land nor sea forces had any stomach for the invasion project. Neither did Hitler. The alternative to invasion was a long, drawn-out effort to reduce the British Isles by air and submarine action, which would take at least a year or two. Again observing that Britain's hope for survival lay in the prospect of aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, Hitler came to the conclusion that by beating the Russians first he could knock out both props that sustained the British: by eliminating the Soviet Union as a Far Eastern power, he would enormously strengthen the power of Japan, and by thus increasing the peril to American interests in the Pacific, would stay any American intervention in the European war. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, initially the partner-in-conquest of Nazi Germany, had shown increasing signs of restiveness and distrust since the fall of France. "With Russia smashed," Hitler is reported to have said, "Britain's last hope would be shattered." Therefore, the Fuehrer concluded: "Russia's destruction must . . . be made a part of this struggle. Spring 41.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite Hitler's stated decision on 31 July 1940 to turn against the Soviet Union, preparations for the English invasion went on during August and early September, the period of the "Battle of Britain." But the German Air Force did not knock out British airpower, the first and most important
prerequisite for a successful invasion. In mid-September Hitler virtually decided on the indefinite postponement of the invasion of Great Britain, though at the same time he ordered a continuance of invasion preparations and kept these in motion until mid-October. The air bombardment of Britain was also maintained, but on a diminished scale after October.

\[\textit{The Tripartite Pact and Japan}\]

Hitler's decision to postpone the invasion of Great Britain coincided with the negotiation by the European Axis partners of a tripartite alliance with Japan, signed on 27 September 1940. This pact provided that a military attack on any member of the new Axis triumvirate by any nation not then engaged in either the European or the Sino-Japanese war would invoke the political, economic, and military assistance of the other two. It was aimed primarily at the United States, secondarily at the Soviet Union. By it, Germany and Italy gave a much freer hand to Japanese aggression in the western Pacific, at the same time securing at least a paper promise that Japan would attack the United States if the United States attacked German or Italian forces in the eastern Atlantic theater. By the pact the Nazis hoped to keep the United States out of the European war and away from all-out preparations for war until Germany had completed its conquest of Europe.

The signing of the Tripartite Pact also coincided with the expansion of the war in both the European and the Asiatic theaters. In mid-September the Italian Army launched its North African drive against British forces in Egypt, and in late October Mussolini began the invasion of Greece. The Japanese made their first overt move outside of China in these same months by occupying northern French Indochina, ostensibly as a means of prosecuting the Sino-Japanese War, actually to prepare Indochina as a base of operations against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.

In the Japanese plans and actions of 1940 and early 1941 there was less
immediate but more ominous future danger to the United States than in the German. Germany's victory in Europe had once more aroused the militant Japanese advocates of expansion. Capitalizing on the distress of the Western Allies, the Japanese in July forced Britain to close the Burma Road and France to yield concessions in Indochina. In a series of fateful cabinet meetings extending from July to early October, Japan forged the decision to attack southward as soon as circumstances permitted. This decision envisioned the establishment of Japanese control in China and the colonial expansion of Japan to include Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch and British East Indies. The Japanese hoped to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in order to guard their northern flank during the southward advance. They also wanted to negotiate a nonaggression treaty with the United States, in which the Americans would agree to stop encouraging Chinese Nationalist resistance to Japan, acquiesce in Japan's establishment of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" with dimensions approximating those specified above, and in return accept a Japanese guarantee of Philippine independence. If, instead, the United States insisted on resisting Japan's expansion, then the Philippines and Guam were to be added to Japan's Far East empire. 

Ambassador Grew reported from Tokyo in December 1940 that in his opinion Japan had become "openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations" and that only "insuperable obstacles" could stop the Japanese from pushing their southward advance. The Japanese, recognizing the slight chance of obtaining American acquiescence in their expansion, began in January 1941 to hatch the plan for a surprise and crippling attack on the United States Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base. Rumors of this plan reached the Department of State before the end of January but were dismissed without much ado. The United States also knew that the Japanese were gathering detailed information about American defense preparations, particularly those along the Pacific coast and in the Pacific outposts of Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. The Navy was kept busy investigating rumors that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering in Pacific waters, especially in the vicinity

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of Hawaii. The Japanese were indeed beginning their preparations for war against the United States; but because these preparations would require many months to complete, and because the Japanese preferred to carry out their expansion if possible without a war with the Americans, they authorized their new ambassador to the United States to negotiate an agreement toward this end. Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, after a preliminary talk with President Roosevelt on 14 February, began his discussions with Secretary Hull in March. The arrival of a new ambassador in Washington eased the tension over the Far Eastern situation that had characterized the preceding few months, though sober analysis should have indicated the small chance of a mutually satisfactory American Japanese agreement.

**The Gibraltar-Africa Project**

After Japan's adherence to the Axis in September 1940, Hitler concentrated on plans for a limited offensive in the Mediterranean area that could be carried out before his projected attack on Soviet Russia. At the end of July German Army leaders had agreed that a decisive blow to British power in the Mediterranean, by the capture of Gibraltar and Suez, was the best immediate alternative to an invasion of Great Britain. An attack on Gibraltar seemed the most feasible initial step, if Spanish collaboration could be secured. Spain was already bound to Germany by a treaty of friendship and had shown its kinship with the Axis partners by seizing the international zone of Tangier in June 1940. German inquiries in Spain in late July led to a Spanish overture, transmitted through the German ambassador, proposing entry into the war on the side of Germany and Italy. Spain would attack Gibraltar, in return for extensive German military and economic assistance, and also for a German guarantee that in the peace settlement Spain would acquire Gibraltar, French Morocco, Oran, and an expansion of Spain's central African possessions. General Francisco Franco also made known his terms to
Mussolini, who gave them a vague blessing. During August Hitler and his military advisers tentatively approved a plan for a Spanish attack on Gibraltar, with large but camouflaged German air and artillery support. Spain made these overtures, it may be noted, at a moment when the early defeat of Great Britain seemed assured. Later, when Britain's downfall appeared less likely, Spanish ardor for entering the war cooled, while at the same time German enthusiasm for the Gibraltar operation mounted.

During the next two months the German plan for an attack on Gibraltar broadened into a project for an operation that, if it had been carried out successfully, would have naturally led to the establishment of German control in northern and western Africa and the adjacent Atlantic islands, and ultimately to the reconstruction of a German colonial empire in central Africa. During the unsuccessful British-Free French attack on Dakar on 23-25 September, the Pétain government retaliated by bombing Gibraltar. These incidents further embittered Anglo-French relations and opened to Hitler the prospect of pursuing the Gibraltar-Africa project with Vichy French as well as with Spanish collaboration.

Hitler himself was particularly anxious to establish German forces in the Cape Verde and Azores Islands. The former would cover the establishment of a German naval base at Dakar, and the Azores would become a base for future air operations against the United States, if it became more directly involved in the war. Fortunately for the United States, neither the German Navy nor the Air Force believed at this time that it had the means to capture and hold positions in the Azores. Besides their quest for bases and colonies, the Germans wanted to gain military control of North Africa in order to prevent the execution of any current or future British or American plans for invading this area and using it as a base of operations against the European continent.

Germany had plenty of military means to carry out the projected Gibraltar-Africa operation and probably could have done so in the fall and winter of
1940-41 without unduly interfering with the projected Soviet invasion scheduled for 1941. The real check came when Hitler tried to reconcile the conflicting interests and claims of Italy, France, and Spain. Not having asked for control over French African possessions at the time of the armistice, Hitler now had the difficult task of persuading the French to "cooperate" by allowing the Germans access to key positions in French Africa and also persuading them to permit transfer of certain French territories to Italy and Spain. If Hitler pressed the French too severely, he believed that their African leaders might switch to the British camp. On the other hand, to satisfy both Italian and Spanish minimum pretensions would have absorbed most of French Africa, leaving nothing for Germany itself. Besides, the Gibraltar-Africa scheme could not be carried out except collaboratively with Italy and Spain, and from the military point of view both nations were dangerous liabilities. By early October, it appeared that a "reconciliation of conflicting French, Italian and Spanish interests in Africa {was} possible only by a gigantic fraud." 32

Hitler's much-publicized meetings with French, Spanish, and Italian leaders during October appear to have been a personal attempt to lay a groundwork for this "fraud." Nevertheless, in the end this undertaking proved too much for even Hitler's mastery of the art.33 What Hitler apparently hoped to do was to satisfy everyone after Britain's defeat at the expense of Britain's African empire. He conferred with Mussolini on 4 October, and thereafter he talked with German Army and Navy commanders about military plans for Gibraltar and Africa. On 22 October, he discussed prospects for French collaboration with the Vichy vice premier, Pierre Laval. On the following day, Hitler met General Franco at the Spanish border. During their conversation Franco gave an oral pledge that Spain would join the Axis and enter the war at an undetermined future date-provided Germany promised approximately the same considerations that Spain had demanded in August.34 On 24 October, Hitler talked with Marshal Pétain. The marshal agreed to issue an official announcement stating that France had an identical interest with Germany in seeing the defeat of England, and that the French
Government would "support, within the limits of its ability, the measures which the Axis Powers may take to this end." 35 Actually, Hitler's conferences had failed to produce an explicit agreement on the terms of collaboration or on the subsequent division of the spoils, and Spain had not really committed itself to enter the war in the near future. Nevertheless, on 4 November the Fuehrer instructed his commanders to go ahead with detailed planning for the Gibraltar operation.36

Operation FELIX, as the Gibraltar project was christened, contemplated a German entry from occupied France into Spain about 10 January 1941. Simultaneously, German planes from France would attack British shipping at Gibraltar in order to drive British naval support away from the fortress; they would then land at newly prepared Spanish airfields to provide air support for the attack. An artillery barrage-primarily by German guns secretly emplaced in advance-would begin at the same time. About three weeks later (on or after 1 February), German ground forces would arrive before the Rock to spearhead the attack. The Gibraltar assault force would be followed through Spain by two German divisions-one armored and one motorized-that would cross the strait into Morocco to seize control of its Atlantic littoral. Three more German divisions were to cross Spain to the Portuguese frontier, where they would be in position to counterattack a British landing in Portugal. Spain, with the aid of German guns, would reinforce the Canaries to guard them against an anticipated British attack. After Gibraltar's capture, the Germans planned to garrison it themselves and also to maintain German artillery on both sides of the strait to insure that the western exit of the Mediterranean remained closed to the British. Only after Britain's defeat would Gibraltar be turned over to the Spaniards. Plans and the necessary reconnaissance for subsequent operations in northwestern Africa and against the Atlantic islands had not been completed when FELIX was presented to Hitler for his approval on 5 December. By then, the German Army, Navy, and Air Force had reported to Hitler that their plans for FELIX were complete, and the German High Command on 2 December informed its staff that General Franco had agreed that operations should be launched at the beginning of February. 37

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At this point, the Germans demanded that Franco give his express approval to the commencement of operations on or about 10 January 1941. The Spanish dictator on 7 December refused to do so, or to agree to Spanish entry into the war at any early date in the future. Since the Germans had throughout considered Spanish collaboration an essential to the execution of their project, Hitler felt he had no alternative but to postpone *FELIX* and turn German military power in other directions. He made half-hearted attempts in January to reopen the question with Spain, but when his military advisers informed him that it would take two months to remount the Gibraltar project and that the units involved would therefore be unable to complete their task in time to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union then scheduled for May 1941, the Nazi Fuehrer reluctantly abandoned Operation *FELIX*. He had to content himself with expressing the conviction "that the situation in Europe can no longer develop unfavorably for Germany even if we should lose the whole of North Africa."  

The execution of the Gibraltar-Africa project of 1940 would have posed a very serious threat to the security of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. While the British had expressed optimism about their chances of defending Gibraltar successfully, the Germans had been at least equally confident that they could capture it with relative ease and that thereafter they could keep the western Mediterranean closed and could control northwestern Africa. If the Gibraltar plan had succeeded, Britain's position would have been seriously weakened, morally as well as materially. The entry of German military forces into Morocco would have given Germany a hold over Vichy France that it had hitherto lacked and would have eliminated the constant threat that French North African leaders might throw in their lot with Great Britain should the Germans push the Vichy Government too far. Spain's refusal to carry out its tentative promises of collaboration had the effect of definitely turning German military power eastward, first into the eastern Mediterranean and then against the Russians. This eastward shift in the surge of German military might was of incalculable advantage to the military preparations of the United States in 1941, and it left the door open for the Anglo-American North African offensive in 1942.
German control of French North and West Africa would have had a profound influence on the Latin American nations and would have made it necessary for the United States greatly to accelerate its plans and measures for defense in the Latin American area. No evidence had been uncovered that Hitler or his military advisers developed their Gibraltar-Africa project to the point of planning any transoceanic attack on the Brazilian bulge, though to American military observers that seemed the logical sequel to a German thrust toward the South Atlantic. When a similar German drive through Spain seemed imminent in the spring of 1941, President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisers considered that it would be a very grave threat to American security. The records of the preceding autumn do not reflect a similar concern, presumably because the President and his advisers never obtained a real inkling of the concrete nature and precise scope of the German plans and preparation of 1940. 41

Thus the two specific German moves planned after the land victory in June 1940 that appeared to threaten the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere immediately—the invasion of Great Britain and the Gibraltar-Africa project—failed to materialize. A third and continuing threat—German air and submarine action against Britain and British shipping lanes—was to have a good deal more to do with the gradual involvement of the United States in the Atlantic war from the fall of 1940 onward. The major menace—German military might at loose ends under irresponsible and amoral leadership—was first stalled and then slowly diverted toward secret preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Japanese rather than the German decisions of 1940 were to bring the United States into the war full-scale at the end of 1941, though Japan acted then in response to the opportunity created by Hitler's European aggressions.
Endnotes for Chapter III

1 German efforts from 1940 onward to establish and maintain weather stations on Greenland's east coast might be construed as an exception to this generalization.


3 Dept of State Interv with Dr. Erich Kordt, 15-16 Dec 45, OCMH Geog M-Germany-383.6.

4 WD Interv with Field Marshal Hermann Goering, 25 Jul 45, OCMH MS ETHINT-31; *Fuehrer Conferences, 1940*, I, 81.


7 Various items in the 1940 and 1941 volumes of *Fuehrer Conferences; Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-41*, pp. 40ff.

8 Quoted in Halder Journal, III, 189, entry of 4 May 40.


11 "We did not think about the possibility of invading England until after the surprisingly rapid and complete victory over France and the British auxiliary forces." Statement of General Alfred Jodl, 28 Jul 45, OCMH MS A-914.
Actually, the German Navy had drafted preliminary plans for conducting a cross-Channel invasion soon after the war began in 1939. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, pp. 301-02.

12 Halder Journal, IV, entry of 13 Jul 40; WD Interv with General Warlimont, 28 Jul 45; Helmuth Greiner, *Operation SEELOEWE and Intensified Air Warfare Against England up to 30 October 1940*, OCMH MS C-059a. The Greiner manuscript contains a complete resume of German plans for the English invasion, July-October 1940.


16 Statement of General Friedrich von Boetticher, 27 Apr 47, OCMH MS B-484.


18 Both *Fuehrer Conferences*, 1940, I, 81, and Halder Journal, IV, 126-27, contain reports of the 21 July conference.

19 Halder Journal, IV, 144.


21 One reason for the curtailment of German air attacks against Britain was the German wish to conserve and build up their air strength against American aircraft production, which was scheduled to get into its stride by the spring of 1941. "We shall have to keep an air fleet and strong fighter forces in readiness against that time." Halder Journal, IV, 224, entry of 7 Oct 40.


25 Ltr, Ambassador Grew to President, 14 Dec 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


28 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 160, 171ff.

29 Halder Journal, IV, 140-41, entry of 30 Jul 40; Memo of German Ambassador in Madrid, Berlin, 8 Aug 40; Ltr, Franco to Mussolini, 15 Aug 40; Ltr, Mussolini to Franco, 25 Aug 40. Last three in United States Department of State, The Spanish Government and the Axis (Washington: March 1946), pp. 3-8. Helmuth Greiner, Operation FELIX, OCMH MS C-065h; British Cabinet Office, Hist Br, "Operation FELIX: German Plans for Spain and the Capture of Gibraltar (June 1950)," Pt. I, Political Considerations, pp. 7-8, in Axis Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, September 1939-February 1941. The following paragraphs are also based in part on information derived from these four sources.


33 Halder Journal, IV, 232-33, entry of 15 Oct 41, contains a good summary of the conflicting claims of France, Spain, and Italy. Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, Chapter III, provides a detailed account of Hitler's October negotiations and their aftermath.

34 Halder Journal, IV, 244-45, entry of 24 Oct 40. Halder subsequently recorded (V, 6, entry of 4 Nov 40) that General Franco confirmed this oral pledge in a letter to Hitler, and that on 11 November the Spanish Foreign Minister signed a protocol substantiating Franco's oral pledge.


36 Helmuth Greiner, Draft Entries in the War Diary of the National Def Br, Wehrmacht Operations Office, August-November 1940, entry of 4 Nov 40, OCMH MS C-065j; *Fuehrer Conferences, 1940*, II, 33-34.

38 Halder Journal, V, 60-62, entries of 8 and 9 Dec 40; Greiner, Draft Entries in the War Diary of the National Def Br, Wehrmacht Operations Office, Dec 40-Mar 41, entry of 10 Dec 40.

39 Report of Conf between Adm Raeder and Hitler, 8-9 Jan 41, Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 1, 1-4.


41 For German moves in 1941, see Ch. V, below.

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The policy of hemisphere defense merged from September 1940 onward with the broader policy of supporting the active opponents of Axis aggression. The two policies were complementary. Germany could not launch any major attack against the New World so long as Great Britain maintained naval superiority in the eastern Atlantic. To maintain that superiority, the British Navy had to be based on the British Isles. With the position of Britain much better assured than it had appeared to be during the dark days of June, the United States Government now considered it vital to bolster that position by supplying arms and other equipment to the maximum extent compatible with essential requirements of its own expanding Army and Navy. American officials also judged that a policy of strong and overt support of Britain would be the one best calculated to stay Japanese armed aggression in the Far East. By December the United States had decided to extend more open aid to China as well. In a pre-election speech on 26 October 1940, Secretary of State Hull summarized the new military policy in two simple terms: "One, to rearm to the utmost; two, to help the Allies with supplies." 1 As the Secretary subsequently acknowledged; by the end of 1940 the United States was "acting no longer under the precepts of neutrality, but under those of self-defense." 2

Secretary Hull had sound reasons for justifying the supply of arms to nations fighting Axis aggression on the ground of self-defense. The military and naval forces of the United States were far from ready in the fall of 1940 to carry out a policy of hemisphere defense. The Army, in fact, was not prepared to do much more than conduct a static defense of United States territory in the Western Hemisphere. Despite the Army's growing numbers, it had no large ground or air units ready for offensive employment in terms of either training or equipment. It would be many months before the Army could be ready to carry out the measures in defense of the hemisphere that a RAINBOW 4 situation-the collapse of Great Britain-would require.
Although the Navy was far better prepared than the Army for immediate action, national policy continued to dictate that the bulk of American naval strength remain in the eastern Pacific as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression. Construction of ships for a two-ocean Navy that could provide protection for both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts of the New World was just beginning. Until the United States could rely on its own forces to protect the Western Hemisphere from Axis aggression, the nation's leaders believed that its security depended on keeping the Axis Powers in check by supporting the armed forces of the British Empire and of China.

**Emergency Expeditionary Force Plans**

Under these circumstances there was little that the United States could hope to do to counter a movement of German forces through Spain toward the South Atlantic. Marshal Pétain's announcement on 24 October that Vichy France would support the Axis war effort against Great Britain had seemed in Washington to presage easy German access to French North and West Africa. Hitler's meeting with Franco had suggested the likelihood of Spanish collaboration with Germany as well. If assured of French and Spanish collaboration, the Germans could easily overawe or overrun Portugal and occupy strategic positions in the Portuguese as well as the Spanish islands. Once emplaced in French West Africa and on the Atlantic islands, the Germans—whether they had originally planned to do so or not—could launch an attack across the South Atlantic against the bulge of Brazil. This was the very danger that had so impressed American military planners in 1939, but which United States forces in the fall of 1940 were still virtually impotent to meet.

The United States was particularly concerned about the fate of the Portuguese Azores Islands. As early as March 1940 President Roosevelt had discussed the danger of German action against the Azores with the American minister to Portugal, then home on leave. A report to the President during June elicited the following opinion from Secretary of State Hull:

The attached letter . . . seems to involve naval and possibly military action on our part in
preventing the occupation of the Azores by German, Italian, or possibly Spanish forces. For practical reasons I do not see that there is anything that this country can do, as much as we might like to.\textsuperscript{3}

During July the Department of State instructed its representatives in Lisbon and Madrid to inform the Portuguese and Spanish Governments of the "deep concern" of the United States for the status of their island possessions in the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{4} In August the German Foreign Office took note of negotiations between the United States and Portugal, concerning the Azores and guessed that they were being considered for a joint Anglo-American naval base.\textsuperscript{5} British proposals for combined Anglo-American operations in the Atlantic (in case the United States entered the war), drafted in June 1940 and discussed with the American naval representative in London during September, contemplated the occupation of the Portuguese islands by United States forces.\textsuperscript{6} As already noted, the joint estimate of 25 September held that an American entry into the Azores might be necessary if German forces moved into Spain and Portugal, and in October Army and Navy staff officers drafted a plan for a quick occupation of the Azores by an American force built around a reinforced division supported by a sizable naval squadron containing at least one aircraft carrier.\textsuperscript{7} Aside from considerations of policy, the obstacles to carrying out this plan were the lack of a division ready to undertake the task and the lack of available naval forces to support the operation.

A more feasible and realistic emergency expeditionary force plan evolved out of concern over the status of French possessions in the New World. Immediately after Pétain's announcement of 24 October, the United States sent a sharp warning to Vichy stating that any French connivance with Germany "would most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples" and implying that such French action would justify American occupation of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{8} This strong message offended the French, but it also helped to dampen their enthusiasm for collaboration with Hitler. The British had
wanted the United States to take an even stronger stand: they wanted backing for Free French uprisings in French possessions in Africa as well as in the New World. The United States and Great Britain were both gravely concerned over the possibility that the Vichy French might permit units of their Navy at Dakar and at Martinique to join the Axis in operations against the British Navy. The United States went so far in November as to offer to buy two unfinished French battleships, one located at Dakar and the other at Casablanca, in order to keep them out of German hands. The Vichy Government rejected the offer, though it repeated its earlier pledge not to allow French naval forces to be used offensively against the British. As for France's New World possessions, the United States really preferred to let them alone.

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provided the agreement for maintaining the status quo, informally negotiated in August with Admiral Roberts, the French governor, could be maintained.9

Pending the receipt of satisfactory assurances from Vichy, the United States prepared to occupy Martinique and Guadeloupe. President Roosevelt in late October directed the Navy to draft a plan for an emergency operation, to be executed on three days' notice. The Navy drew up a plan calling for an assault on Martinique by a strong naval force (including two battleships and two carriers) but with only twenty-eight hundred marines as the landing force. The Navy asked the Army to be prepared to support the landing with two reinforced regiments totaling sixty-eight hundred men and to schedule them to sail from New York five days after the operation began. This plan assumed that the assault would meet with no more than token opposition. At this time there were between seven and eight thousand French soldiers and sailors on Martinique, and its principal port, Fort de France, had strong harbor defenses well supplied with ammunition. The Army planners therefore objected to the assumption of token resistance and urged that an expeditionary force of twenty-five thousand, properly trained and equipped, be readied before the United States undertook any operation such as that contemplated against Martinique. The War Plans Division assumed that the French, heartened by their success at Dakar the preceding month, would
resist; it held that a defeat in the first American military operation of the war would have most serious repercussions in Latin America and might "destroy all progress in consolidating the Western Hemisphere made to date." The Army planners therefore recommended that the United States should first invoke the procedure for emergency occupation of European possessions prescribed at the Havana Conference and in the meantime maintain a tight blockade of Martinique and give the Army's 1st Infantry Division intensive training in landing operations in Puerto Rico.10

Both General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson shared the doubts of the Army planners that an immediate operation against Martinique was feasible, and they also doubted its wisdom even if it were feasible. They feared that the Navy plan might result in a repulse comparable to the British-Free French fiasco at Dakar. Further, Mr. Stimson pointed out, precipitate American action might have a very harmful effect on the critical situation then pending in North Africa; it might, indeed, drive French Africa right into the arms of Germany.11 The Army nevertheless alerted the 1st Division and requested its commander to formulate a plan for expediting its training and availability for emergency action. On 2 November General Marshall asked the joint Board to revise the earlier joint plan for a Martinique operation in order to provide an overwhelming force that would insure quick success, should an occupation become necessary.12

The Joint Planning Committee undertook the revision of the Martinique plan during November, and the 1st Division drafted a subordinate plan for establishing three task forces (A, B, and C), each built around one of its infantry regiments. Task Forces A and B numbered about five thousand men each, Task Force C about seven thousand. Only Task Force A had reached a state of training that permitted its assignment as part of the assault force in the projected Martinique operation; Task Force B might be used in a landing against lightly held Guadeloupe, and Task Force C constituted little more than an untrained reserve. This was all that the Army's best trained infantry division could contribute to an emergency expeditionary force at the end of
Fortunately, from the point of view both of policy and of military readiness, no operation against Martinique had to be undertaken. The Navy had sent Admiral Greenslade, who had previously arranged the existing informal understanding with the French Governor, Admiral Robert, back to Martinique with instructions to negotiate a new agreement that would guarantee the maintenance of the status quo. Faced with the alternative of an American bombardment and occupation, Admiral Robert on 3 November accepted a "gentleman's agreement": the governor promised not to move any of the French naval vessels at Martinique except on two days' notice to the consul and the naval observer of the United States at Fort de France and then only for purposes of maintenance or (in the case of one small ship) administrative contact with the other French West Indian colonies; he promised also the continued immobilization of the airplanes and gold stranded on Martinique in June; finally, he promised to notify American representatives if the Vichy authorities proposed his replacement. In return, Admiral Greenslade agreed to continue the supply of essential foodstuffs and fuel to the French West Indies. With slight modifications, this agreement remained in effect until the summer of 1943, though on several occasions after November 1940 the United States was to question the reliability of Admiral Robert and to prepare again for the forceful occupation of Martinique.

President Roosevelt in mid-November offered the French ambassadorship to Admiral William D. Leahy, then governor of Puerto Rico, and when Admiral Leahy reached Vichy in January 1941 he found the situation very different from the one that had so greatly alarmed the United States during October. On 13 December 1940 Marshal Pétain dismissed Laval from his posts of Vice Premier and Foreign Minister. Further, Pétain refused to attend the collaboration ceremony the Fuehrer had planned to stage in Paris on 15 December; instead, he sent a message to President Roosevelt reiterating his solemn promise that the French Fleet would be scuttled before it would be
allowed to fall into German hands, and otherwise indicating his decision to avoid any active collaboration with the Nazis.\footnote{15} With these assurances in hand, the President instructed Admiral Leahy to tell the Vichy authorities that American policy toward the French West Indies and French Guiana would continue to be the maintenance of status quo, so long as the United States was assured that "neither those possessions nor their resources will ever be used to the detriment of the United States or the American republics."

The hurried planning for an assault on Martinique had a beneficial effect on Army preparations for emergency operations, despite the indefinite postponement of the Martinique operation itself. In June the Army had arranged for the 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, respectively, to receive special equipment for training in landing operations in order to prepare them for use as emergency expeditionary forces. The Army also hoped to train the two divisions in joint amphibious exercises with the Navy.\footnote{17} Little had been done to carry out these arrangements before the Army started to plan the projected operation against Martinique. In October the War Plans Division had recommended to the Chief of Staff a broader plan, involving the establishment of an expeditionary corps on the Atlantic coast to consist of one Regular Army and two National Guard divisions with six supporting coast artillery regiments and necessary service units. Units of the corps were to be exempted from furnishing cadres for training other forces and were to be given equipment priorities. The requirements of the rapidly expanding Army made adoption of such an ambitious plan impracticable, and General Marshall approved the exemption and equipment priority only for the Regular Army division and for one antiaircraft regiment. The 1st Division and the 68th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) Regiment were then earmarked for use in emergency expeditionary forces with these exemptions and priorities. The other units were to form the expeditionary force reserve.\footnote{18}

During the winter and spring of 1940-41, both the 1st Division on the
Atlantic coast and the 3d Division on the Pacific managed to obtain landing equipment that permitted limited amphibious training, though plans for joint training with Navy and Marine forces remained in abeyance. The general emergency expeditionary force plan that was developed during this period, based on RAINBOW 4, called for the reinforced 1st Division to be ready to engage in any landing operations that might be required in defense of the Caribbean area or Brazil; preparation of the reinforced 30th Infantry Division to relieve the 1st Division after it had been engaged, in order to free the 1st Division for a new operation; designation and preparation of the reinforced 44th Infantry Division as a defense force for Newfoundland; and continued amphibious training of the 3d Division on the Pacific coast as a nucleus for an expeditionary force to be dispatched if necessary to northwestern South America. While the Martinique project had acted as a spur to the development of this general plan, actual training of the many units involved continued to lag; in fact, until the summer of 1941, the 1st Division and its supporting units (a force numbering about 25,000) remained the only Army ground organization even relatively well prepared for action against armed opposition along the Atlantic front.19

New Definitions of National Policy

The nation's lack of readiness to take military steps to deal with Axis threats in the Atlantic, even those close to American shores, was paralleled by objections to using American naval power as an effective check to Japan's aggression in the Pacific. Prime Minister Churchill on 4 October 1940 suggested to President Roosevelt that he send a substantial detachment of the United States Fleet to Britain's Singapore base. His proposal met with

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strong opposition from the admirals and from General Marshall, though Secretary of War Stimson urged the President to shift the bulk of the fleet to Singapore forthwith.20 Admiral Stark and his staff questioned whether the United States could continue indefinitely to rely on British naval power to maintain control in the eastern Atlantic. In any event, the Navy felt that if the United States had to undertake new military operations in the Atlantic area, it
would have to move a substantial part of the fleet into the Atlantic to assure continued naval control there.\textsuperscript{21} General Marshall, believing as he did that "if we lose in the Atlantic we lose everywhere," wished to keep American naval strength in the Pacific available for a quick shift to the Atlantic in case the situation worsened.\textsuperscript{22} President Roosevelt apparently favored some sort of naval demonstration in the Pacific that would clearly indicate to the Japanese that the United States Government had no intention of being bullied by them.\textsuperscript{23}

The President and his advisers, though ignorant of the details of Axis war planning, had a fairly accurate appreciation in October 1940 of the dangers to the national security that loomed in the none-too-distant future. Nevertheless, they also realized that the nation's military and naval forces would not be ready to deal effectively with these dangers for many months to come. They knew, too, that a large majority of the American people were opposed to direct participation in the war, except in actual defense of Western Hemisphere territory. October 1940 also saw the climax of a Presidential election campaign in which both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Willkie felt compelled to say that they had no intention of getting the United States into the war or of ever permitting American boys to be sent overseas to fight. Secretary of State Hull on the other hand, had the courage to speak publicly before the election of the dangers facing the United States, and of their logical consequences:

There can be nothing more dangerous for our nation than for us to assume that the avalanche of conquest could under no circumstances reach any vital portion of this hemisphere. Oceans give the nations of this hemisphere no guarantee against the possibility of economic, political, or military attack from abroad. Oceans are barriers but they are also highways. Barriers of distance are merely barriers of time. Should the would-be conquerors gain control of other continents, they would next concentrate on perfecting their control of the seas, of the air over the seas, and of the world's economy; they might then

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be able with ships and with planes to strike at the communication lines, the commerce, and the life of this hemisphere; and ultimately we might find ourselves compelled to fight
on our own soil, under our own skies, in defense of our independence and our very lives.24

The situation called for a new definition of national policy and for military planning in accordance with that definition. Army and Navy planners needed something more specific to act on than Mr. Hull's definition of American policy toward Japan, which was described in late November as a "policy of slowing Japan up, so to speak, as much as we could by fighting a rear guard diplomatic action, without doing it so stringently as to drive her to get her supplies by making an attack on the Netherlands."25

An Air Corps staff analysis in November 1940 stated that there appeared to be three national military policies in prospect, any one of which might be put into effect in the near future: Western Hemisphere defense; an offensive in the Far East; and an offensive in Europe, in association with Great Britain. It went on to state that "the uncertainty as to which National Military Policy will be put into effect and the wide disparity between the possible lines of action that may be undertaken make the acceptance of any one of these Policies by the military authorities, without the definite advice of the National Government, a matter of questionable procedure." But since the lack of any basic policy would lead to chaos, this analysis recommended that the Air Corps accept Western Hemisphere defense as the most probable and at any rate the most essential policy to guide its preparations. General Marshall approved the recommendation on 29 November 1940.26

The impetus for a new definition of national policy came from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. After discussing the war outlook with Secretary Knox in late October, Admiral Stark and his staff drafted a detailed analysis of the situation facing the United States. He stated his understanding of current major national objectives as the "preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and political interests in the Far East." In conclusion, Admiral Stark presented for consideration and decision by the President and
the War and Navy Departments four alternate courses of action. Plan A proposed that the United States concentrate its military effort on Western Hemisphere defense; the United States would continue to supply material aid to the allied forces opposing the Axis Powers, but even if drawn into open war its armed forces would send only small detachments overseas to assist the allies in the fighting. Plan B called for a full offensive by United States forces against Japan in the western Pacific, coupled with a strictly defensive posture in the Atlantic. Plan C envisaged full-scale offensives by American military forces across both oceans. Admiral Stark dismissed Plans B and C as impracticable, even though the latter was the only course of action that (if successful) would insure attainment of the major national objectives with which he had premised his analysis. Plan D contemplated a major offensive across the Atlantic while maintaining the defensive in the Pacific; initially, American participation would be principally naval, but eventually it would probably have to include action by a large ground force in a major offensive to be launched from African or western European bases. Although Admiral Stark recognized that the American people were at this time opposed to sending a large expeditionary force across the Atlantic, he concluded nevertheless that Plan D was "likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the war at an early date." Despite this conclusion, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended that "until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full forces in war," it should "pursue a course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of both the Army and Navy, that is to say, adopt Alternative (A) without hostilities." Whatever the decision, Admiral Stark believed it essential that Army and Navy officers be authorized at once to engage in secret staff conversations with British and Dutch military representatives to insure a unified and coordinated military effort "should the United States find it necessary to enter the war." 27

The Army planners concurred in general with Admiral Stark's analysis and conclusions, though they objected to his definition of major national objectives as being too broad to be sustained by the nation's existing military and naval strength. Instead, they proposed a definition of national objectives...
in the following terms:

a. Preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States.

b. Aid to Great Britain short of war.
c. No military commitments in the Far East.
d. Preparations for an eventual unlimited war in the Atlantic in support of Great Britain.28

The Army planners pointed out that the Stark memorandum ignored the possibilities of air action against the Axis Powers, and they also observed that Great Britain did not then control any land area from which a large-scale ground offensive could be launched against the enemy. The Army planners indorsed Plan D, modified to include intensive air support, as the best course for the United States should it enter the war on its own initiative. But, like Admiral Stark, the planners recommended that the War Department support Plan A—hemisphere defense—until such time as the United States decided to participate in military operations. They also recommended that the joint Planning Committee draft a revised version of the Stark memorandum for presentation by the joint Board to the President for decision.29 A few days later General Marshall asked the joint Board to prepare a "National Estimate" along the lines of the Stark memorandum. The President, after reading Admiral Stark's paper, had said that he would like to have the State, War, and Navy Departments draft a joint estimate. This led to the Navy's subsequent insistence that official Department of State approval of the joint Planning Committee's estimate, transmitted to the joint Board on 21 December, be secured before its submission to the President.30 In the meantime, Mr. Roosevelt had authorized secret staff conversations with the British, and Admiral Stark on 2 December invited the British to participate in staff conversations in Washington.31 The prospective Anglo-American conference provided an additional reason for clarifying the national and military policies of the United States.
The services had reason enough already to ask for a new definition of policy. The only current and approved joint war plan-RAINBOW 4-constituted the basis for the Army's existing Operations Plan and Concentration Tables. But this joint plan had been adopted in June 1940 and had been predicated on the probability of Britain's defeat and on the necessity of the

United States acting virtually alone in defending the Atlantic front of the Western Hemisphere. Since June Britain's prospects had greatly improved, though the British position was still far from being fully assured; on the other hand, Japan's intentions had become much more evident and ominous. The Army recognized that the existing RAINBOW 4 war plans were out of date and was engaged in revising them. What the Army and Navy really needed was a new joint war plan, one that would accord with the conclusions and recommendations of the Stark memorandum, as amended in the joint Planning Committee's estimate of December. In essence, the Army and Navy now anticipated the probability of a period of transition from a RAINBOW 4 to a RAINBOW 5 situation. The RAINBOW 5 concept called for establishment of a firm defensive position in the Western Hemisphere and maintenance of the defensive in the Pacific, and thereafter projection of American military power offensively in the eastern Atlantic in association with the forces of Great Britain. Almost no work had been done on the joint RAINBOW 5 plan, and yet it was the one most similar to the services' new estimate of the way the situation was most likely to develop.32

At the beginning of December 1940 it appeared to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy that, unless the United States took more decisive steps to support Great Britain, the British might be doomed to early defeat. To combat the steady pounding of German air and sea attacks, Britain needed more airplanes and more escort vessels. The state of aircraft production in the United States would not permit any great increase in plane deliveries for some time to come, and the Secretaries had been informed even if the United States had wished to turn over more destroyers to England, the British did not have the crews to man them. To the three Secretaries, the only solution appeared to be direct naval participation in convoying goods to England.
In an Army-Navy conference on 16 December called by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark found themselves unanimously agreed "that this emergency could hardly be passed over without this country being drawn into the war eventually," and also "that the eventual big act will have to be to save the life line of Great Brit-

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ain in the North Atlantic." Their agreement was precipitated by Admiral Stark's prediction that in view of its current rate of shipping losses Great Britain could not hold out longer than six months. They jointly agreed that the President should be urged immediately to "consider some method for our Naval cooperation in the convoying of shipping to the British Isles."  

President Roosevelt, during a West Indian cruise in early December, had reflected on the means by which the United States could increase its aid to Great Britain, and he returned to Washington on 16 December with a plan introduced in Congress on 10 January as House Resolution 1776, which became known after its passage two months later as the Lend-Lease Act. That the President had also thought deeply on the broad strategical problems facing the United States is evident from a letter he wrote to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre, on the last day of 1940. "For practical purposes," he stated, "there is going on a world conflict, in which there are aligned on one side Japan, Germany and Italy, and on the other side China, Great Britain and the United States." While the United States was not involved in the hostilities, it had a very great interest in the fortunes of the nations with which it was aligned. Great Britain was on the defensive everywhere, not only in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, "but wherever there is a British possession or a British ship- and that means all over the world." Current American help to the defense of the British Isles was not enough. "They are defended," continued the President, "not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and wide-spread economic, military, and naval activities which both diminish the vital strength of their enemies and at the same time prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and nerve center of the Empire." Since in the nature of things the
British strategy had to be global, the American "strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply and other theaters of action will not be denied to the British." Within its means and by measures short of war, the President concluded, the United States ought to support the British everywhere, including the Far East where a southward

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advance by the Japanese would certainly diminish Great Britain's chances of winning the war.37

A week later, the President in his annual message to Congress asserted, "the future and the safety of our country are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders," and "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today." The United States, he said, had adopted a policy of all-out national defense, of full support to all nations resisting aggression "thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere," and of refusing to acquiesce in any peace dictated by aggressors or sponsored by appeasers.38 The third element in this definition of policy had a far-reaching implication: the British could avoid such a peace only by winning the war, and American observers were now convinced that Great Britain could not win the war unless it received far greater military support from the United States.

The Army and Navy presented their joint estimate of the situation to the Department of State on 3 January 1941 for official Department of State approval, in accordance with the President's wish expressed to Admiral Stark in November. Secretary Hull called the joint paper excellent and indicated his general agreement with it, but he did not want to give a formal blessing to what he called "a technical military statement of the present situation." General Marshall and Admiral Stark had to content themselves by leaving a copy of the estimate with Secretary Hull and affirming to him the necessity of a very definite statement of national policy upon which they could "base
detailed plans for cooperation between our own Army and Navy and between the British and ourselves, if we should enter the war."³⁹

President Roosevelt made the necessary decisions on national and military policy in two separate actions during January. On 16 January, at the conclusion of a lengthy conference with Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, the President issued an oral directive. First, he stated that the Navy should stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the United States Fleet based on Hawaii and should not attempt to reinforce its Asiatic Fleet. Second, the President ordered the Navy to continue its Atlantic patrol and to prepare to convoy shipping to Great Britain. Third, he said "that the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake it; that our military course must be very conservative until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin-American governments against Nazi inspired fifth column movements." This part of the President's directive had the effect of increasing the Army's concentration on preparations for military operations in the Caribbean and toward the South Atlantic. Finally, the President stated that even in the event of sudden and simultaneous action by Germany and Japan against the United States, the nation should make every effort to continue the supply of war material to Great Britain .⁴⁰

As a second step, the President ten days later approved a statement of national and military policy submitted to him by the joint Board. This statement, designed as a guide for the conversations that were to begin with British staff officers three days later, defined "the present national position of the United States" as follows:

(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control.
(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany.
(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

The statement also included an assertion, "the American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain." But "should the United States be compelled to resort to war" (the President's own phrasing), its broad military objective would be the defeat of Germany; if Japan should also enter the war, United States operations in the Pacific "would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean." Under all circumstances, the United States would need to maintain adequate military dispositions to "prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power."  

The New Outlook Toward the War

In charting the course of American policy toward the war, the President and his advisers had acted in accordance with the existing state of public opinion. A large segment of the American people still seemed clearly opposed to military participation in the war, except in defense of Western Hemisphere territory. This was recognized by General Marshall and Admiral Stark in the policy statement approved by the President on 26 January. One of the strongest proponents of material aid to Great Britain, William Allen White, late chairman of the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies, could write in early January that he was against American convoy of ships, against sending American ships loaded with contraband of war into belligerent waters, and "bitterly opposed to our entrance into the war as matters stand now until we are attacked." Even those administration leaders who advocated the early establishment of a
North Atlantic escort-of-convoy system acknowledged that it would first be necessary to rouse responsible public opinion in favor of it.\textsuperscript{44}

The national policy decisions of January 1941 did not change the position of Western Hemisphere defense as the basic military policy. Hemisphere defense remained basic, but from January onward the nation's political and military leaders built upon it a superstructure of further plans and measures that they regarded as necessary to insure the security of the United States. After January 1941 the Army ceased to defend its manpower requirements, which were currently fixed at 1,400,000 men, on the ground of hemisphere defense alone. The last study that did so, written in January, noted that the current Army "defense objective" called for fifty-four groups of combat aviation, twenty-seven infantry divisions, four armored divisions, two cavalry divisions, and essential corps, army, and GHQ troops. "A fighting force of this size," it argued, "is barely sufficient to meet defense responsibilities and to provide limited task forces for the support of South or Central American Governments threatened by Fifth Column activities." Projecting augmentations of the Army to 2,800,000-man and 4,000,000-man totals, it defended them as possibly necessary "to conduct operations throughout the wide expanse of two continents."\textsuperscript{45} Such validity as this study had lay in the fact that the United States Army did not know what Hitler's real intentions were. The Chief of Staff, for example, found a sharp divergence of opinion within the Military Intelligence Division. One of its most trusted observers believed that Hitler would continue the Drang nach Osten and engulf the Soviet Union, that he would eschew conquests for which naval power was an essential, and therefore that the United States need have relatively little fear of a direct German military advance toward the New World. Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the chief of G-2, disagreed with his subordinate. He thought "that Hitler's idea for a new order is a world order dominated by the Germans, linked with Japanese supremacy in the Far East." Hitler could not achieve that position without gaining control of the Western Hemisphere-"it must be a world conquest or nothing." General Miles added that his analysis did not imply the
The likelihood of a German attack on the Western Hemisphere during 1941 or even 1942.46

The United States Army had good reason in any event to continue to concentrate its attention on hemisphere defense plans and measures for many months to come. The initial Army defense force for the first of the new British bases to be occupied, Newfoundland, did not depart until January 1941, and none of the other British bases received Army combat troops before April. Work on the projected military air routes in Latin America had hardly begun. Alaska remained almost defenseless. Even under the best of circumstances it was anticipated in January 1941 that the 1,400,000-man Army could not be properly trained and equipped until March 1942. To Secretary of War Stimson, the immediate outlook seemed somber indeed. The chance of losing Great Britain and the British Fleet still loomed very large. If the British Fleet were eliminated, Secretary Stimson believed that the Germans could project their air and naval power across the Atlantic to South America or even to Newfoundland; once established in these positions, they could launch air attacks against the Caribbean and the northeastern United States. Should Germany and Japan attack simultaneously, the United States would not be able to withdraw its naval strength from the Pacific to fend off the German attack in the Atlantic. And the Panama Canal, essential to fluidity of naval movement between the oceans, was itself vulnerable to sabotage and to surprise air attack.47 In the face of these circumstances and possibilities, while it behooved the United States to do all it could to aid Great Britain, it was also mandatory to push defense preparations in the Western Hemisphere as rapidly as possible.

In the Anglo-American military staff meetings, known as the American-British Conversations (ABC) and held in Washington between the end of January and the end of March 1941, the American representatives held fast to the political and military policies approved by the President during Janu-
resort to war, it must in all eventualities maintain military dispositions that would prevent any Old World nation from extending its political or military power in the Western Hemisphere, the area of the world in which the United States had "paramount territorial interests." With hemisphere defense assured, the broad strategic objective of the United States, as of its associates, would be the defeat of Germany and its allies. The Atlantic and European area would be the decisive war theater, even if Japan embarked on armed aggression against British, American, and Dutch positions in the Far East.48

The ABC-1 report contained as an annex a "United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan," which prescribed Atlantic and Pacific areas within which American military forces would have primary responsibility if the United States joined in the war. In the Pacific, the American area of responsibility would extend westward to include the Japanese home islands, but it would exclude the Philippines and other Far Eastern territories in the path of Japan's projected southward advance. Within this area, the Army's role would be almost wholly defensive, on a line extending from Alaska (including Unalaska but excluding the outer Aleutians) through Hawaii to Panama, and from thence down the west coast of South America. In the Atlantic, the American area would consist of the two western continents and adjacent islands (including Greenland), and most of the Atlantic Ocean west of longitude 30°. Within this Atlantic area, which corresponded roughly to the eastern limits of the Western Hemisphere as currently understood, the plan allotted Army ground forces the tasks of repelling enemy external attacks; supporting Latin American republics "against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere"; relieving British forces in the Dutch West Indian islands of Curacao and Aruba; garrisoning the new British bases; and building up forces for an eventual offensive against Germany. Army air forces would have the additional mission of aiding in destruction of Axis sea communications. Within the British area of responsibility in the eastern Atlantic, United States Army land and air forces would relieve the British in Iceland; Army air forces would be established in Great Britain for offensive operations against Germany; one rein-

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forced infantry division would relieve British troops in Northern Ireland, and one reinforced infantry regiment would be sent as a token force to the United Kingdom; and American air and naval bases in the British Isles and elsewhere would be protected by Army ground and air detachments. The United States Navy, in addition, accepted responsibility for occupying the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, if those operations became necessary. The plan specified that the Army commitments in the British Isles and Iceland could not be undertaken before 1 September 1941.49

The ABC-1 report and joint War Plan gave the United States Army a general mission and specific tasks that included all of its existing plans and projects for hemisphere defense, and added thereto large-scale preparation for offensive operations against Germany together with several additional tasks not contemplated in existing Army war plans—the defense of Curacao, Aruba, and Greenland in the Western Hemisphere and of Iceland and bases in the British Isles in the Eastern Hemisphere. ABC-1 was the implementation of Admiral Stark's Plan A of November 1940, with provision for transition to Plan D as rapidly as circumstances required and permitted—the course of policy decided upon by the United States Government in the winter of 1940-41.

On the basis of ABC-1, Army and Navy planners proceeded to draft a joint RAINBOW 5 war plan, which they submitted to the joint Board for approval on 30 April 1941. The initial draft of the Army RAINBOW 5 Operations Plan, produced during May, projected Western Hemisphere Army deployment and garrison strength in numbers virtually identical with those provided in the existing RAINBOW 4 Operations Plan.50 ABC-1 and joint RAINBOW 5 in effect provided a long-range blueprint for the deployment and action of the armed forces of the United States—after their existing state of training and equipment had been substantially improved—in the event that the United States entered the war or continued along the road toward direct participation in the war.

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Endnotes
Endnotes for Chapter IV

1 Hull, Memoirs, I, 866.

2 Ibid., II, 919.

3 Memo, Secy State for President, 18 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

4 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 738.

5 Halder Journal, IV, 170, entry of 23 Aug 40.

6 Kittredge MS, Ch. 11, pp. 248-55.

7 A copy of this plan is in WPD 4422.


10 Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Oct 40, WPD 4337.

11 Memo, SGS for CofS, 31 Oct 40, OCS Conf Binder 6; Stimson Diary, entries of 31 Oct and 1 Nov 40.

12 WPD Memo for Record, 29 Oct 40, WPD 4337; Memo, CofS for JB, 2 Nov 40, WPD 4337-1.

13 Various papers in AG 381 (11-12-40) and WPD 4337-1, especially Incl to Ltr, CG 1st Div to WPD, 3 Dec 40, WPD 4337-1.

14 Memo of Adm Robert, Fort de France, 17 Dec 41, sub: Confirmation to [Rear Adm Frederick J.] Horne of Robert- Greenslade Agreements, WPD 4337-9; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 32.
15 Rad, President to Adm Leahy, 16 Nov 40, *FDR Personal Letters*, II, 1080-81; Tel msg, White House to Warm Springs, Ga., 15 Dec 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


17 Memo, WPD for G-3, 11 Jun 40, WPD 4232-3; Ltr, TAG to CG First Army, 26 Jun 40, WPD 4161-3.


19 In February 1941 the reinforced Ist, 30th, and 44th Divisions were designated Task Forces A, B, and C, and subsequently, as Task Forces 1, 2, and 3. The above summary is based on various papers, dated November 1940-April 1941, in WPD 4161-3, WPD 4161-4, WPD 4161-6, and AG 381 (11-12-40).

20 Notes on SLC mtg, 5 Oct 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 58; Ltr, SW to President, 12 Oct 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

21 Kittredge MS, Ch. 12, pp. 295-96, paraphrasing a personal letter of Admiral Stark to Admiral Ghormley, dated 16 October 1940.


23 Stimson Diary, entry of 8 Oct 40.

25 Stimson Diary, entry of 29 Nov 40.


27 Memo, Adm Stark, CNO, for SN Knox, 12 Nov 40, WPD 4175-15. The first version of the "Plan Dog Memorandum," as it was called, was dated 4 November 1940; copies of both versions went to the President, as well as to the War Department. See Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 25-27, for further details about Admiral Stark's paper and its aftermath.

28 Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Nov 40, WPD 4175-15. This memorandum omitted from a. the rest of Admiral Stark's phrase, "plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere." Whether the omission was accidental or intentional is not known. The joint estimate of December (see below) restored Admiral Stark's phraseology.


31 Memo, CofS, for CNO, 2 Dec 40, WPD 4175-15; Kittredge MS, Ch. 13, p. 318.

32 Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Nov 40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 Dec 40. Both in WPD 4175-15. Memo, Lt Col William P. Scobey for Gen Gerow, WPD, 22 Nov 40, reviews briefly the current status of the RAINBOW war plan.;; and Memo, Col Joseph T. McNarney for Gen Gerow, WPD, 19 Dec 40, summarizes the currently projected deployment of Army forces under existing RAINBOW 4 plans. These memorandums are in OPD Exec 4, Item 5, RAINBOW Plans Folder.
The Navy at this time wished the Army to subscribe to a RAINBOW 3 plan that the Navy had drafted, but the Army refused to do so, preferring not to commit itself in any way to the concept of an offensive against Japan. See Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, pp. 121-22.

33 Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Dec 40, reporting his discussion with Knox and Hull.

34 *Ibid.*, entry of 16 Dec 40. The meeting was called by Secretary Stimson in order to establish a common Army-Navy front on strategy to guide discussions with President Roosevelt.

35 Memo, unsigned, 16 Dec 40, recording discussion at Army-Navy conference of this date, WPD 4175-18.


37 Pets Ltr, President to Sayre, 31 Dec 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; published in *FDR Personal Letters*, II 1093-95.


41 Paper, 27 Jan 41, title: Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff (text revised and approved by President Roosevelt on 26 January 1941), WPD 4402.

42 Baldwin, *United We Stand*, p. 48.


44 Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Dec 40.

45 WPD study, Jan. 41, title: The Possible Necessity for an Army of 1,400,000 Men and One of 4,000,000 Men, OPD Exec 4, Item 5, Army Folder. The figures used in this study are identical with those in the revised statement of "defense objectives" issued by The Adjutant General on 18 February 1941. AG 381 (2-17-41).

46 Notes on Conf in OCS, 27 Jan 41, OCS Conf Binder 8.

47 Memo, SW for President, 22 Jan 41, and Incl, title: Resume of Situation Relative to Bill 1776, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 20, pp. 4275-80.

48 The ABC-1 report, with annexes, is printed in full in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1485550. See Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 367-82, and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 32-41, for accounts of the ABC meetings.


50 Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 May 41, WPD 4175-22; Charts atchd to Memo; WPD for CofS, 15 May 41, WPD 3493-11.
The Atlantic Crisis of 1941

The critical world situation confronting the United States in the spring of 1941 raised questions that were not answered by drafting long-range war plans. The most pressing of these questions was how to help insure the survival of Great Britain. Britain's weakness in early 1941 stemmed primarily from its increasingly critical shortage of merchant shipping. In March and April the British lost ships to Axis submarine, surface, and air attacks at an annual rate of about 7,300,000 gross tons; with a current British shipbuilding capacity of 1,250,000 tons, continuing losses at that rate would result in a net loss to Britain of about 6,000,000 tons a year, or about one fourth its available merchant fleet. The British Isles simply could not long survive continued losses of this magnitude. The shipping crisis had been the basis for Admiral Stark's prediction in December 1940 that Britain might not be able to hold out for more than six months. A month later Secretary Hull, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the proposed Lend-Lease Act, asserted the necessity for control of the high seas by law-abiding nations and called such control "the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere." Enactment of the lend-lease bill on 11 March did not in itself furnish much relief for Britain's immediate plight. In fact, the great bulk of military material furnished to Great Britain during 1941 consisted of items ordered before the bill was passed. The Lend-Lease Act nevertheless had a very great significance in the evolution of American policy toward the war. It meant the abandonment of any pretense of neutrality, though it did not necessarily and inevitably mean open participation in the war. Secretary Stimson called the Lend-Lease Act a "limited alliance with a warring democracy," and found its justification in the law of self-defense, not international law. The Axis Powers in their quest for world domination had knocked the bottom out of international law, said Mr. Stimson; Congress had
now shown that it realized the true situation and had pierced through the legalistic shadows that had been checking American efforts. The Lend-Lease Act had a subtle but profound effect on the attitudes of the American people. Its general acceptance made them more receptive toward other forthright moves to bolster the British position. During April and early May, public opinion surveys indicated that although a substantial majority of the people still opposed direct military action outside the Western Hemisphere, an even larger majority indorsed the measures taken during March and April to help England. Even when it was expressly pointed out in the questioning that continued aid to England would probably lead to war with Germany, three fourths of those questioned approved continuing the aid.

Independently of the Lend-Lease Act, the United States took steps in March and April 1941 that made available to Great Britain about 2,000,000 additional tons of merchant shipping. Although American shipyards could yield little new tonnage for months to come, the United States seized 600,000 tons of Axis-owned and Danish-owned shipping then lying idle in American ports and turned the ships over to the British, and it succeeded in persuading the other American republics to follow suit. The government also took possession of ships engaged in coastwise traffic and intercoastal operations via the Panama Canal and put them into military service. On 11 April President Roosevelt declared the Red Sea no longer a combat zone, thus permitting American shipping to replace British in carrying materials by way of South Africa to the Middle East. The government also used its best efforts to secure ship repair facilities for damaged British merchant craft in private American shipyards.

The United States gave other highly important and immediate aid to Great Britain during March 1941 when it opened American naval and private shipyards to damaged British warships. Lend-lease funds paid for the cost of their repair. The first damaged British warship steamed into New York Harbor on 19 March. By opening its shipyards to British naval vessels, the United
States helped to strengthen Britain's means of protecting merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, and therefore the move provided an additional method of cutting British ship losses.\textsuperscript{7}

During March the United States made the first moves toward increasing and eventually taking over the air ferrying of military planes to Great Britain. These moves also promised some relief to the shipping shortage since the more planes that were flown, the fewer that would occupy transatlantic shipping space. By May the President and his advisers had decided that as soon as possible the United States Army should take over all transatlantic aircraft ferrying, both to Great Britain in the North Atlantic and to western Africa in the South Atlantic.\textsuperscript{8} To carry out this decision would require many new airfield facilities like those Par. American Airways was already beginning to construct between the United States and the Brazilian bulge. New facilities along the northeastern route would have to be provided in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland, and the development of these facilities was to be one important factor in stimulating the projection of American military power toward the northeast and Great Britain in the summer of 1941. By an agreement of 9 April the United States guaranteed the security of Greenland, and on 19 June—a month later than planned—an Army Engineer construction force with artillery support sailed for Greenland to begin work on the first of its military airfields.\textsuperscript{9}

**Naval Plans and Preparations**

The Navy during March was preparing itself for a duty that, if undertaken, promised the greater measure of assistance to Great Britain that the United States could give at this time. That duty was to participate in the escort of convoys across the North Atlantic. Since the beginning of the European war, the Navy had maintained an increasingly wide and effective patrol in the western Atlantic, and in October 1939 the President had ordered the patrol to broadcast the location of suspicious vessels in plain English.\textsuperscript{10} To avoid incidents with the United States the German Navy kept out of the western part of the North Atlantic until early 1941, when Hitler (on 25 March) ordered an extension of the war zone to Greenland and south-
westward to the 38th meridian of longitude. Thereafter it appeared probable that the Germans would push their submarine and surface raider operations even further westward in the near future. Great Britain and Canada did not have the naval strength to extend their existing escort system westward to protect convoys all the way across the North Atlantic. Since the United States had decided that its own security demanded British survival, and since Britain could be saved only by maintaining a reasonably secure life line across the North Atlantic, the logic of the situation seemed to demand that the American Navy enter the Battle of the Atlantic.

Army and Navy leaders had reached this conclusion on 16 December 1940, and Navy planners drafted their first escort-of-convoy plans during the same month. President Roosevelt sanctioned this planning in his oral directive to Admiral Stark of 16 January 1941. On the following day, the Navy War Plans Division informed Admiral Stark that the Navy could be ready to begin escort duties across the Atlantic to Great Britain by 1 April. Effective 1 February, the Navy reorganized its forces and soon thereafter began to train them for convoy work in the Atlantic. The United States Fleet was redesignated the Pacific Fleet, and the Navy established a separate Atlantic Fleet under the command of Vice Adm. Ernest J. King. Two weeks later Admiral Stark directed the creation of the Northeastern Escort Force (renamed Support Force during March), which began intensive antisubmarine training about 1 March. By 20 March Secretary Knox was able to present to the President a broad plan for Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Atlantic and to state that the Navy was ready to execute the plan as soon as directed, although it could do so more effectively if allowed six or eight weeks more for special training. Under the plan the United States Navy would assume escort duties in the eastern as well as western Atlantic and would establish naval and naval air bases in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and, eventually, in Iceland. These naval plans and preparations had the hearty indorsement of Secretary of War Stimson. He and Secretary Knox were "agreed that the crisis is coming very soon and that convoying is the only solution and that it must come practically at once."
Thus matters stood when President Roosevelt returned to Washington on 2 April from a Caribbean cruise. After lengthy conferences with Admiral Stark on 2 and 3 April, the President orally approved the Navy's Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1, upon which the escort plans and naval dispositions proposed by Secretary Knox on 20 March had been based. He gave similar assent to the transfer of three battleships and other units from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet, a move necessary to strengthen the latter for its enlarged mission. A week after giving preliminary approval to the Navy's convoy plan, with its risk of early involvement in the Atlantic war, the President changed his mind. Several Cabinet members who had recently been "out West" had warned him on 4 April that American public opinion was not yet ready for extreme measures. Secretary of State Hull likewise counseled a less aggressive course of action. The rapidly changing international situation undoubtedly also influenced the President. During the week the British military position in the Mediterranean deteriorated markedly. In Libya the British Army was withdrawing rapidly toward the Egyptian border. On 6 April the Nazis launched their Balkan offensive against Yugoslavia and Greece, and three days later they captured Saloniki. By 16 April the Germans had overrun Yugoslavia, the British Expeditionary Force in Greece was in full retreat, and the German Afrika Korps was at the Egyptian border. The uncertainty of the Japanese situation may also have helped stay the President's hand. The Japanese Cabinet was reshuffled on 4 April, and the Army and Navy were given stronger representation. Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, having just completed an ostentatious mission to Berlin and Rome, was stopping off at Moscow on his way home. The result of his Moscow visit was the Soviet Japanese nonaggression pact signed on 13 April.

Whatever the reasons that may have influenced the President, he decided on 10 April that the Congress and the American people were not ready to approve the escort of convoys by the United States Navy. Instead, he proposed to draw a line down the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, to have the Navy patrol west of that line, and to instruct the naval patrols to follow convoys and to notify them of any German vessels discovered nearby. The patrols were also to notify British warships so that they could track down the German vessels. The President communicated these intentions to Prime
Minister Churchill on 11 April and invited him to tell the American Navy about

British convoy movements in the future so that American patrol vessels could seek out Axis ships in the vicinity of convoys. The President at first proposed to draw the line down the 25th meridian of longitude, but he changed this a few days later to the 26th meridian. He also declared that the American defense zone would include all of Greenland, the protection of which the United States had just assumed. Initially, the President intended to announce the new patrol plan publicly, but on 15 April he told Secretary Stimson that he had decided not to do so-instead, he would simply give the Navy orders and allow its actions to speak for themselves.

On 15 April the President had met with his principal military and naval advisers to discuss a modified Navy plan presented by Admiral Stark and designed to accomplish the patrol missions proposed by the President five days earlier. General Marshall apparently left the meeting without knowing that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan without any public announcement and, anticipating another White House meeting at which he might be called upon for further advice, gathered his principal advisers together on the morning of 16 April to consider what that advice should be. General Marshall evidently thought that even the modified Navy plan, if publicly announced, might lead to war in the very near future. He therefore asked his staff: (1) "If we have gotten to a point where we can no longer operate on a peacetime status, should he recommend a war status?" (2) "Is immediate action necessary?" These were embarrassing questions for the Chief of Staff to ask, for he realized that most immediate actions would have to be undertaken by the Navy and not by the Army. General Marshall's questions produced a quick analysis by the War Plans Division of the advantages and disadvantages of an immediate American entry into the war. The principal advantage, as the Army planners saw it, would be that "the United States would be awakened to the gravity of the current situation and brought together in a cohesive effort that does not prevail today." The principal disadvantage was that the Army was not yet prepared to undertake
operations except on an extremely minor scale. The planners concluded that a decision for war should be taken only if it were necessary in order "to avoid either a loss of the British Isles or a material change in the attitude of the British Government directed toward appeasement." 20

General Marshall discussed the War Plans analysis and broader aspects of the war situation at a second conference on 16 April. Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, a senior Army planner who had been summoned to Washington by General Marshall to help advise the President on the Army's position, was present. The planners pointed out that, in the event of an immediate entry into the war, the 1st Division was ready, and two more Regular Army divisions would be ready by 1 May, to undertake the Western Hemisphere missions specified in ABC-1. Ammunition for the Army was critically short and would continue to be so until January 1942. General Embick expressed a rather strong personal opinion, from the military viewpoint, against immediate entry into the war. The Army planners reiterated their stand in favor of decisive American action, if that was deemed necessary to save Great Britain. In answer to a question by General Marshall, the acting chief of the War Plans Division stated that an immediate entry into the war would not seriously jeopardize the Army's future freedom of action, since the immediate Army commitments could not be great.21

The Navy embodied the President's decision on action in the Atlantic in its Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 2, promulgated on 21 April 1941. Since the President himself edited the final draft of the plan, it represented an officially approved policy and program for action by American armed forces. The plan declared that the Western Hemisphere extended from longitude 26° west in the Atlantic to the International Date Line in the Pacific, and included (east of longitude 26°) all of Greenland and all of the Azores. Within the Western Hemisphere so defined, the armed forces of the United States were to regard the entry of belligerent naval vessels or aircraft, except
those belonging to powers possessing Western Hemisphere territory, "as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward the territory or shipping of American Powers." The armed forces of the United States that discovered belligerent naval vessels or aircraft of the proscribed variety within the Western Hemisphere were to be instructed to trail them and to broadcast their movements "for the purpose of warning American Powers of a possibly hostile approach." The approach of such belligerent naval vessels or aircraft within twenty-five miles of any Western Hemisphere territory, except the Azores, would be considered presumptive evidence of intent immediately to attack that territory; American armed forces would at once warn the vessels or aircraft, and, if the warning went unheeded, attack them. American naval forces were not to be scattered promiscuously in the Western Hemisphere portion of the Atlantic Ocean but were to cruise along the established ocean trade routes. The Atlantic Fleet's Operations Plan No. 3 carried this plan into effect as of midnight, 24 April 1941.22

The Army promptly drafted instructions to its base commanders in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad that faithfully followed the intent and phrasing of Navy Plan No. 2. The Department of State thereupon urged a more cautious phrasing, and Secretary Stimson finally had to redraft the message without further consultation with the President or the Department of State. It read:

In case any force of belligerent powers other than of those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory attacks or threatens to attack any British possession on which any United States air or naval base is located, the commander of the Army base force shall resist such attack, using all means at his disposal.23

Curiously enough, the Army does not appear to have sent comparable instruc-
tions to its older and larger overseas garrisons in Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone.

Despite the President's decision not to authorize actual escort of merchant shipping in the Atlantic, on 18 April he approved the allocation of $50,000,000 of lend-lease funds for construction of American naval and naval air bases in Northern Ireland and Scotland. United States naval officers had selected the base sites during March when the Navy was actively preparing for escort duty across the Atlantic. On the other hand, in mid-April the President withdrew his earlier approval of the movement of a sizable detachment of the Pacific Fleet into the Atlantic and limited the transfer for the time being to one aircraft carrier and one destroyer squadron. Admiral Stark explained these apparently conflicting decisions by pointing out that although Mr. Roosevelt had recently reasserted his intention of following Plan D (defensive in the Pacific, preparation for an eventual offensive in the Atlantic) as a long-range objective, both the President and Secretary Hull wanted to maintain the existing naval balance in the Pacific until Japan's intentions had been further clarified.24

The War and Navy Departments (Stimson, Marshall, Knox, and Stark) took vigorous issue with the President and the Department of State on the fleet question. The service chiefs wanted the main fleet in the Atlantic not only because they wanted to make the patrol system more effective but also because they thought the United States might have to undertake expeditionary tasks in the very near future that would require strong naval protection—probably in the southern Atlantic, where Anglo-American naval power was then weakest. They believed, too, that the Japanese would be more impressed by an American Navy in action in the Atlantic than by an idle fleet held in the eastern Pacific. Secretary Hull, on the other hand, wanted to keep the Pacific Fleet intact until he received an answer to overtures he had made to Japan in mid-April. The President supported Secretary Hull. In addition, he expressed a belief that a strong naval force was needed to guard Hawaii. He also wished to follow out his earlier idea of sending detachments of the Pacific Fleet on westward cruises to keep the Japanese guessing. Nevertheless, the President himself admitted that "there was not going to come much good to the British in the patrol . . . with the number of ships available" in the Atlantic.25
This particular issue of "grand strategy" was hotly debated for about three weeks. General Marshall answered the President by asserting his opinion that

Hawaii was impregnable whether there were any ships there or not; Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox both concurred. The President then took the position that the Pacific Fleet should not be diminished unless the British acquiesced in the proposal. British naval representatives at first insisted that the United States ought to keep at least six battleships in the Pacific at all times, but after they consulted Prime Minister Churchill they reversed their stand and agreed that the transfer of the bulk of American naval power to the Atlantic would be of great advantage to Great Britain. After the Japanese responded to the Secretary of State's proposals on 12 May, Mr. Hull also took a more favorable view toward the movement of the fleet. About the same time Admiral Stark adopted a more cautious attitude. The net result was that while the President on 13 May finally approved the transfer of the three battleships and other vessels as originally planned in early April, the proposal to move a larger naval force to the Atlantic was postponed for later decision. The ships transferred, representing about one fourth of the Pacific Fleet's strength, reached Atlantic waters before the end of May. By then the British and Canadians had instituted a transatlantic escort system with ships available to them for the purpose.26

The Crisis of May 1941

The extension of naval patrol and other measures taken by the United States during March and April 1941 were evidences of the government's determination to support the British Commonwealth in its struggle against the Axis. In May, amidst a quick succession of ominous events and rumors, it looked very much as if the United States would soon have to plunge into open participation in the war in order to back up its commitments. Today, the war crisis of May 1941 seems much less real than it did at the time. What American and British leaders did not know then was that the Germans were on the point of concentrating their military might against the Soviet Union. The Nazis were very successful in making it appear during May that they
were again getting ready to drive southwestward toward French West Africa and the South Atlantic.

The Germans actually had no immediate intention of moving through Spain, though Hitler and his associates had not lost their interest in a future southwestward drive. The German Navy considered it highly important to

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gain control of northwestern Africa as soon as possible, both for its own operational use and to keep Great Britain and the United States from getting a foothold there—the Germans themselves believing that an African operation would offer the United States the best opportunity to intervene in the war effectively. The Germans had their eyes on Dakar, but they could not get to Dakar except by agreement with the French. In mid-March Hitler stated that there was no hope at the moment of negotiating with either France or Spain and that Germany would have to wait until it completed its conquest of the Soviet Union before forcing a decision of the French "problem" and the Spanish "question." He expected to be able to move toward northwestern Africa by autumn 1941.27 At the end of March Hitler harangued his subordinates for more than two hours on the reasons for smashing the Soviet Union first. "Only the final and drastic solution of all land problems," he stated, "will enable us to accomplish within two years our tasks in the air and on the oceans with the manpower and material resources at our disposal." 28

The German tide of victory in the eastern Mediterranean during April reopened the prospect of securing French collaboration. In late April Marshal Pétain let the United States know that the Germans were inquiring about French willingness to permit passage of German troops through unoccupied France and French North Africa so that they could reach Spanish Morocco and attack Gibraltar, and both Pétain and Vice Premier Admiral Darlan privately expressed the fear that Vichy would not be able to resist German demands of this sort. Although Marshal Pétain repeated to President Roosevelt his earlier assurances that France would not agree to any form of collaboration with Germany beyond the terms of the armistice agreement of 1940, Admiral Leahy advised the President that even if Pétain refused to
agree to new German demands it "would have little or no deterrent effect upon the Germans."  

The Nazi Fuehrer summoned Admiral Darlan to a conference at Berchtesgaden on 11 May, and Darlan brought back to Vichy a general agreement for French collaboration with the Germans. Despite American warnings,

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Marshal Pétain announced on 15 May that the Vichy ministry had unanimously approved the agreement. He also expressed the hope that further negotiations on the details of collaboration would produce a more specific understanding that would permit France to "surmount her defeat and preserve in the world her rank as a European and colonial power." President Roosevelt at once warned the marshal against any voluntary military collaboration with Germany, and the United States emphasized this warning by seizing eleven French ships then in American ports, including the liner Normandie. Whatever the marshal's true intentions may have been at the time, the President and the Department of State certainly had very little faith in Main's ability to resist German demands, and Secretary Hull justified the ship seizures on the ground that French collaboration had already gone beyond the terms of the armistice agreement. A succession of exchanges between Washington and Vichy finally produced a new French note, delivered to the Department of State on 27 May 1941, promising that the Vichy Government would not surrender French warships or colonial territory to Germany and that French collaboration with Germany would not go beyond the terms of the armistice. Nevertheless, on the very next day Admiral Darlan and the German ambassador signed three protocols providing for a variety of collaborative measures. Among them was a provision that German submarines might be based on Dakar from 15 July 1941 onward and that German surface and air forces could be based there at some later date as well. The Vichy Government at first approved the Darlan protocols and then, on 8 June, reversed its position and disapproved them. Hitler by then was starting the large-scale movement of German forces toward the Soviet frontier, and for the time being he ignored this French
recalcitrance. A fortnight earlier, on 22 May, Hitler and some of his principal advisers had engaged in an extensive canvass of the Atlantic situation. They agreed that the Canary Islands must be reinforced to prevent seizure by British or American forces. They also agreed that Germany had the means to capture the Azores, but that it probably did not have the means to hold them indefinitely in the face of strong British or American attacks. At any rate, to capture and hold the Azores would require a concentration of all available German naval forces in the Atlantic, including submarines, and this would mean abandoning the Battle of the Atlantic. Hitler himself was still anxious to occupy the Azores as soon as possible, "in order to be able to operate long-range bombers from there against the United States," and he hoped the opportunity to do so might arise by autumn 1941. But while he sympathized with his Navy's plea for permission to take more drastic action against American naval and merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, he refused to grant permission. Hitler said he believed that President Roosevelt's attitude toward full participation in the war was still undecided, and under no circumstances did he want to create incidents that would lead to American entry into the war, "especially since Japan will probably come in only if the United States is the aggressor."

Marshal Pétain's announcement on 15 May that France had agreed to collaborate with Germany had had an almost electrifying effect in Washington. President Roosevelt and his advisers interpreted it as a portent of German intentions to launch an immediate drive toward the South Atlantic and of Nazi determination to follow up recent victories in the eastern Mediterranean with an all-out effort to knock Great Britain out of the war. The President decided he ought to address Congress on the gravity of the situation facing the nation and indicate what he believed should be done about it. On 16 May he told Secretary Hull that he wanted to send a special representative to Lisbon to find out what Portugal intended to do with respect to the Azores. On the same day General Marshall, with Department of State
approval, sent his chief Latin American planner, Lt. Col. Matthew B. Ridgway, posthaste to Rio de Janeiro to seek permission for the immediate entry of Army forces to assist in the protection of northeastern Brazil.\textsuperscript{32}

Across the Atlantic, it occurred to Mr. Churchill on 16 May that the United States ought to occupy Martinique at once in order to prevent it from being turned into a German submarine base. Four Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a public statement on 17 May urged this course.\textsuperscript{33}

When General Marshall reached his office on Monday morning, 19 May, he called in the chiefs of his War Plans and Intelligence Divisions to get their estimates of the French and Caribbean situations. The chief of G-2 said that it looked as though Vichy had capitulated to the Germans and that "we can expect them to do anything the Germans want." While he did not think the Germans would try to land troops anywhere in the Western Hemisphere in the near future, he agreed that a German seizure of Dakar would have a profound effect on the attitude of Brazil. The War Plans chief then reviewed the Martinique plan for General Marshall and discussed with him proposals for rushing Army air reinforcements to the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{34}

After this briefing, General Marshall went to the first meeting of Secretary Stimson's new War Council. The Chief of Staff told the council (which consisted of the Secretary and his principal civilian and military advisers) that the Army had about 40,000 troops available for overseas emergency expeditionary force use, and he urged, in view of the uncertainty in the attitude of French West African officials and of the German threat toward Dakar, that negotiations with Brazil be pressed and more troops be sent to Trinidad.\textsuperscript{35}

While the Army was thus re-examining its ability to deal with an emergency, the President was seeking advice on the position he should take in his proposed address to Congress. On this same day, 19 May, he asked Under Secretary of State Welles to draft a message that would in effect have extended the Monroe Doctrine to include western Africa and the eastern Atlantic islands. The President had also solicited the professional advice of
the eminent geographer Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, as to what the generally recognized division between the Old and New Worlds was in the Atlantic. Dr. Bowman advised that a mid-ocean line drawn along the 25th meridian was geographically defensible at every point except with respect to the Azores, which were generally recognized as a part of the Old World, but urged the President to consider whether or not it was wise to take a stand on any fixed line. The United States, Dr. Bowman felt, might be in a better position to act if it had not limited its sphere of action in advance. Both Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull argued against the idea of extending the coverage of the Monroe Doctrine across the South Atlantic to Africa. As Mr. Hull put it, a German occupation of West Africa would pose a threat to the Western Hemisphere that had "better be stated nakedly without raising a technical Monroe Doctrine issue."36

It appeared to Secretary Stimson as well as to others that President Roosevelt during these tense days was finding it difficult to make up his mind as to how American policy toward the Atlantic threat should be defined. The Secretary of War was worried "because the President shows evidence of waiting for the accidental shot of some irresponsible captain on either side to be the occasion of his going to war." Instead, Mr. Stimson thought that the President "ought to be considering the deep principles which underlie the issue in the world and . . . [which have] divided the World into two camps, [in] one of which he is the leader," and that the President ought to define these principles clearly in his forthcoming speech.37 In fact, the President had an extremely difficult decision to make. He believed the situation was sufficiently critical to require a strong statement of policy, but he also knew that American military means to back up such a statement were still very limited. First he decided to drop the idea of extending the scope of the Monroe Doctrine beyond the recognized bounds of the Western Hemisphere. Then he decided to deliver a radio address to the nation rather than a more official message to Congress. When the President learned on 24 May that the Germans had loosed their monster battleship Bismarck into the western North Atlantic, and that after sinking the British battle cruiser Hood the
Bismarck had disappeared, he also decided to proclaim an unlimited national emergency.³⁸

The President delivered his address on 27 May. He painted the British military position in dark colors and stated that the war was "approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere itself" He asserted that German occupation of any of the southern Atlantic islands, or of Iceland or Greenland to the north, would place portions of the Western Hemisphere in immediate jeopardy and ultimately would threaten the security of the United States itself. Observing that the Axis Powers could never achieve their objective of world domination unless they first gained control of the seas, the President termed control of the seas "their supreme purpose today." To dominate the Atlantic, the Nazis had first to capture Britain. Once masters of the Atlantic, the Axis Powers would "then have the power to dictate to the Western Hemisphere." In effect, the President was saying that henceforth the United States would have to be assured of friendly control of the oceans-not just the Western Hemisphere portions of them-and that the maintenance of such control would thereafter be the crucial factor in determining the defense measures of the United States. To assure friendly control of the seas, the United States would have to "give every possible assistance to Britain and to all who, with Britain, are resisting Hitlerism." The President concluded his speech by announcing that, in order to strengthen American defense "to the extreme limit of our national power and authority," he had issued a proclamation of unlimited national emergency.³⁹

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The President's speech and proclamation had much more of a dramatic than practical effect. The Army's Judge Advocate General could not discern how the new proclamation "changed our status one iota from that which we held during the limited emergency" proclaimed in September 1939.⁴⁰ In a press conference on 28 May, the President himself indicated that he had no intention of following up his speech with any new or drastic defense measures. Yet to Army observers the current military outlook seemed bleak indeed, and the need for action of some sort mandatory. A few hours before the President spoke, representatives of all the General Staff divisions and of
General Headquarters met in a secret conference to discuss the war outlook. They acknowledged among themselves the probability of England's defeat, and they unanimously agreed on predictions that the British would lose the Suez Canal within six weeks and control over the Strait of Gibraltar within three months. They also agreed that the most the United States Army could do in the Atlantic before November 1941 was to deploy one small, unbalanced force, without combat aviation, and that even this force could not be used within one thousand miles off the coasts of Europe or Africa.\footnote{41} On the day of the President's address, the American military attaché in London, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, confessed his firm conviction that, while Britain probably could resist a direct invasion, he could not see how the British Empire was ever going to defeat Germany "without the help of God or Uncle Sam."\footnote{42} Four days later the executive officer for administering the lend-lease program, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, informed the White House that in his opinion the time had come to "face the all-out effort and to place odds on such a basis."\footnote{43}

The Azores and Brazil

During the last week of May it looked very much as though the next military step to deal with the Atlantic crisis might be the dispatch of United States ground and air forces to protect either the Azores or northeastern Brazil.

After President Roosevelt asked Secretary Hull on 16 May to sound out Portugal's attitude with respect to defense of the Azores, the Department of State first consulted with the British (since Portugal was Britain's ally) to determine their reaction to the President's proposal. At Ambassador Halifax's request, the Department of State agreed to let Great Britain make the approach to Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar of Portugal to discover what his government proposed to do in the event of a German attack and whether he would be receptive to the idea of a temporary protective occupation of the Azores by United States forces. On 22 May, before
answers to these questions were received through the British, President Roosevelt directed the Army and Navy to prepare a joint plan that would permit an American expeditionary force sufficiently strong to insure successful occupation and defense of the Azores under any circumstances to be dispatched within one month's time.44

The Army and Navy had been considering for many months past the possibility of being called upon to occupy the Azores. They had drafted the first informal joint plan for such an operation in October 1940. In early 1941 the Army War Plans Division, in reviewing the earlier plan and assessing the current situation, had concluded that an American occupation of the Azores was not essential to hemisphere defense and should not be undertaken unless the United States openly entered the war in concert with Great Britain. Although the Azores lie athwart the shipping lanes between the United States and the Mediterranean and between Europe and South America, the Army considered them too far north in the Atlantic to be of any value as a defensive outpost against a German approach toward South America via Africa. The islands had a much greater potential strategic value for Great Britain than for the United States since, if Gibraltar fell, they would provide the British with an alternative naval base from which to cover the shipping lanes in the eastern Atlantic. At the beginning of 1941 the Azores were virtually defenseless, and the Army planners believed that the chief threat to American forces that might be stationed in the islands would be from German airpower based in France. Air defense of the Azores would be difficult since the islands then had no airfields capable of handling modern combat planes.45

Under the ABC-1 War Plan, the Azores and the other Atlantic islands (Madeira, the Canaries, and the Cape Verdes) would, in case of open war, fall within the British area of primary responsibility, although American naval forces might be requested to assist the British in the occupation of the Azores and the Cape Verdes. Until the President issued his directive of 22 May, neither the Army nor the Navy anticipated that Army troops would be
called upon to help secure the Azores. The President and the Navy knew that the British had plans for occupying both the Azores and the Cape Verdes as soon as possible after a German move into Spain. While the Army's 1st Division in mid-May was earmarked for an Azores expedition, as well as for many other possible operations, there had seemed little likelihood of employing it for this purpose.

President Roosevelt's order of 22 May led to hasty Army and Navy planning during the next five days to line up the proposed expeditionary force and arrange for it to receive as much preliminary training as possible. One of the principal difficulties was to find enough suitable shipping to transport it. As finally worked out, the plan called for an expeditionary force of 28,000 troops, half Army and half Marine, with strong naval and naval air support. The Army and Marine 1st Divisions were to supply the infantry contingents. To move the force would require a total of forty-one transports and other noncombatant vessels. The expedition was to be commanded by Admiral King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic fleet, and the landing force by Brig. Gen. Holland M. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division. At first, the services planned to send twelve combat landing teams (nine Marine, three Army) to the north shore of Puerto Rico for joint amphibious training. On 26 May this idea had to be abandoned because of the lack of sufficient shipping to carry the troops to and from Puerto Rico. Instead, limited amphibious training exercises were to be held at Atlantic coast points closer to the Azores—for the Army's 1st Division combat teams, in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. The shipping shortage was thereby solved, but the ammunition supply was certain to be short of estimated requirements. Nevertheless, by 27 May the general terms of an Azores expeditionary force plan that could be executed in time to meet the President's deadline of 22 June had been agreed upon. The planners thereupon drafted a formal joint plan (code name, GRAY, which the joint Board approved on 29 May, though an effort also to get the President's approval of it on the same day failed. 49
Six days before the Army received the President's Azores directive, attention had hurriedly been turned in another direction—toward Brazil. The Army and Navy had agreed since the initial RAINBOW planning of 1939 that the most vital region to be defended in South America was the Natal area of Brazil. By May 1941 the military airfield program being sponsored by the United States Army was well under way in the Caribbean area and along the northeastern coast of Brazil. The air base sites and partially developed fields in Brazil were virtually unprotected, and if left undefended might offer a Nazi air invasion from Africa a ready-made approach route to the Caribbean, instead of serving their intended purpose of providing an American air defense route to the Brazilian bulge. During the fall and winter of 1940-41 the Army had discussed with Brazilian military authorities the possibility of placing American air base security detachments at the various airfield sites, but it had not been able to persuade the Brazilians to agree.\(^50\) Brazil's first open military collaboration with the United States was with the Navy. The Navy's Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 2 had provided for cooperative action with Brazilian naval forces in the patrol of the South Atlantic. Although Brazil did not immediately participate in the patrol, it did agree in April to open two Brazilian ports to American naval vessels, and thereby it established a precedent for the entry of Army forces into Brazil.\(^51\) A month later, the prospect of an imminent German drive southwestward had led to Colonel Ridgway's urgent mission to Rio de Janeiro.

While Colonel Ridgway was talking with Brazilian authorities, the War Plans Division was formulating the Army's view as to "the most \textit{practicable} immediate course of action to prevent the entrance of Axis military power in the Western Hemisphere."\(^52\) The Army planners currently viewed the war situation and the probable course of German action in these terms:

\begin{quote}
II. The \textit{Situation}. Germany is now engaged in a struggle for control of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the oil fields of Iraq and Iran, and North Africa. Prospects for German success are good. By her air force, Germany now holds the initiative in the Western and Central Mediterranean. There are repeated reports of German infiltration
\end{quote}
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toward Dakar. The Vichy Government has finally submitted to German domination. French West Africa is open to use by Germany for bases for extension of Nazi power to South America.

III. Assumption. That immediate and vigorous preparations are being made to extend Axis political, economic, and military power to South America.

IV. Axis Courses of Action. The first and most logical Axis step to project Axis power into South America would be to establish a base on the West Coast of Africa. The obvious advantages of a base in the Dakar area, coupled with the fact that Dakar is in French hands and Axis domination of France is increasing, make it apparent, without further exposition, that Dakar would be the prospective Axis base site.

The most effective response to this German threat would be to dispatch a large expeditionary force to Dakar, or to British West Africa further to the south. But the Army had already calculated that such a force would have to number between 100,000 and 115,000 troops—far beyond existing Army means—in order to assure success. A force of this strength could not be sent to Africa before November 1941 at the earliest. Yet the planners believed that the United States ought to do something— as their study put it, "there is almost universal opinion that BLUE [the United States] should adopt some course of action in the immediate future to forestall Axis intentions toward South America." The United States had the means to develop naval and air bases in Brazil, and that was the immediately practicable course of action that War Plans recommended to General Marshall on 27 May.53

In considering the Azores and Brazil projects, Army planners had to bear in mind the qualified commitment already made in ABC-1 to send Army forces to the British Isles and Iceland sometime after 1 September 1941. Current and prospective shortages of air and antiaircraft artillery forces, and of ammunition, made it appear unlikely that the Army could carry out effectively more than one of these projects before early 1942. As between the Azores and Brazil proposals, only the latter would be of direct advantage in hemisphere defense. The Azores operation would detract much more than the Brazilian from American ability to carry out the ABC-1 commitment. On the basis of these observations and assumptions, a War Plans study of 27 May contended that the United States would have to choose between "two mutually exclusive courses of action which can be undertaken effec-
tively with the Army forces available during the coming summer and fall."
These were:

(1) To protect our interests and the Western Hemisphere by assisting the
British to maintain their position and ultimately defeat Germany.
(2) To postpone Army aid to the British in order to insure the immediate
security of the Western Hemisphere against possible Nazi attack or political
control [through subversion] in Brazil.

This study concluded by recommending the second course of action, to be
implemented on the one hand by the immediate dispatch of a balanced
United States Army force to the Natal area and on the other by making every
effort to prepare the forces required to carry out the ABC-1 commitment at
some date later than 1 September 1941. If this recommendation were
disapproved, then the British should be consulted as to their preference
between an Azores expedition and carrying out the ABC-1 commitment
during 1941, since the United States Army could not do both. If the decision
were for the Azores, the expedition should be postponed at least until 15
August 1941 in order to assure its success through adequate training and
preparation.54

The Crisis Resolved

President Roosevelt left Washington for Hyde Park on Thursday, 29 May,
without having made a final decision as to the immediate course that the
United States should follow to combat the Nazi menace in the Atlantic. Eight
days later, on 6 June, he announced to Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox
certain vital decisions, both as to what should be done in the Atlantic and as
to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Fleet.55 The most significant of these
decisions was that American troops should be sent as soon as possible to
replace British forces then occupying Iceland.

Before announcing his decisions, which fixed a line of action that, for the
time being, excluded the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to the Azores, the President had on 4 June approved the Azores plan. But it was a qualified approval, for at the same time he directed the armed forces to prepare an alternate plan for an unopposed garrisoning of the islands.\textsuperscript{56} Before taking this action, the President had received word through the Navy that, although the Azores had been substantially reinforced by troops from Portugal, these forces and the Portuguese Government would probably welcome an American occupation if the Germans invaded Portugal itself.\textsuperscript{57} Also, at the President's suggestion, the Department of State had invited Brazil to contribute a token force to any expedition that might be sent either to the Azores or to the Cape Verdes.\textsuperscript{58}

On the same day that the President approved the Azores plan, Under Secretary of State Welles presented him with information that would in all probability have postponed American action in any case. On 30 May Mr. Churchill had informed the President that Great Britain was prepared to occupy the Cape Verde Islands, Grand Canary, and one of the Azores, should the Germans march into Spain. The Prime Minister had stated then that he would welcome American collaboration in the occupation of the Azores. On the same day Portugal informed Great Britain that while it might accept the aid of its British ally it did not want that of a nation with which it had no existing political commitments. The President's address of 27 May, said the Portuguese ambassador to London, had alarmed Portuguese public opinion, and Prime Minister Salazar felt that any invitation to the Americans would have to be deferred. The British therefore suggested to the United States on 2 June that it bow out of the Azores picture for the time being.\textsuperscript{59}

The Iceland decision had more of a political than military background, although it grew out of the commitment in the ABC-1 plan that, if the United States joined in the war, American troops would be sent to relieve the British garrison there, though not before 1 September 1941. As of 22 May, the Navy wanted to drop this commitment, and at the end of the month the Army
proposed that the British be asked to release the United States from it.Army planners held that Iceland had little strategic value as an outpost from which to defend the Western Hemisphere.

But Iceland did have great strategic value for the defense of the British Isles and the North Atlantic seaway. After the British and Canadians extended their escort system across the Atlantic in the late spring of 1941, Iceland served as a much needed intermediate naval and air base. In the President's speech of 27 May he had taken the position that successful hemisphere defense depended upon the salvation of Great Britain and its oceanic life line across the North Atlantic. From this broad point of view both friendly control and effective military use of Iceland were vital to the national security of the United States.

On the eve of his unlimited national emergency address, President Roosevelt had approached Mr. Churchill on the subject of Iceland, and on 29 May the Prime Minister responded that he would cordially welcome an immediate relief of the British forces there. On 30 May the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant, arrived in New York to make a personal report on the situation and also to deliver to the President some confidential papers addressed to him by the Prime Minister. The ambassador was told by telephone from Hyde Park to go on to Washington and stay at the White House. Mr. Winant subsequently told Secretary Stimson that the two principal objectives of his visit were, first, to make sure of the safety of convoys of foodstuffs and munitions to Great Britain and, second, to arrange to have United States naval strength on hand in the North Atlantic "when the attack is made on Great Britain later on by way of invasion." From Mr. Churchill, the ambassador brought specific requests for an extension of American naval activity in the North Atlantic and for American troops to replace British forces in Iceland.

On Monday afternoon, 2 June, Mr. Harry Hopkins (who then resided in the
White House) asked Secretaries Stimson and Knox to join him in a discussion of the British situation and the steps that the United States ought to take to remedy it. One can only surmise that Mr. Winant may have already intimated to Mr. Hopkins the contents of the report and messages that he had brought from London. According to Secretary Stimson's record of this meeting, the discussion turned to a consideration of "further and more effective means of pushing up the situation, particularly by action in the northeast." Secretary Knox suggested American action with respect to Iceland, and both Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hopkins heartily concurred in the suggestion. According to the Secretary of War, General Marshall also indorsed it immediately after the White House conference. At the War Council meeting the next morning, Mr. Stimson asked General Marshall to investigate the "possibilities in case we take vigorous action in the Northeast," by which he meant sending an expeditionary force to Iceland. Later on the same day,

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Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox met with Secretary of State Hull and were at least partially successful in persuading him to support the Iceland project. After this meeting, General Marshall delivered to Mr. Stimson a staff report on the relative merits of an Iceland, as against an Azores, operation and expressed his preference for the former.

President Roosevelt returned to Washington on 3 June, and at noon Mr. Winant joined him to deliver his report and the messages from Prime Minister Churchill. After discussing matters with the ambassador, the President indicated his tentative approval both of the Iceland proposal and of more vigorous American naval activity in the North Atlantic. On 4 June the Army planners were told to prepare a plan for the immediate relief of the British forces in Iceland. It was at once clear to them that there was not enough shipping to carry out the Azores and the Iceland operations simultaneously. Three days later the Army suspended its planning and preparations for an Azores expedition. The investigation of Army capabilities quickly convinced the President that the Marine Corps would have to contribute the initial contingent even for Iceland, and on 5 June he
directed Admiral Stark to prepare a reinforced Marine brigade for dispatch to Iceland within fifteen days. On 6 June the President confirmed his decision to send a United States force as soon as the Icelandic Government requested American protection, and he tentatively decided also to order the transfer of a second quarter of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic.  

These decisions in all probability reflected the President's new conviction that the Nazis were preparing to launch an all-out attack against the Soviet Union. Ambassador Winant told the President that before he left London British Intelligence sources had indicated the likelihood of a Nazi-Soviet struggle. During the first week of June the Department of State likewise received what Secretary Hull has called "convincing cables" from its representatives in Bucharest and Stockholm asserting that the Germans would invade the Soviet Union within a fortnight. Should these reports be true, the United States could act with comparative safety along very different lines from those proposed during late May. It need no longer fear an immediate German drive toward the South Atlantic, and it probably could take much more forceful action in the North Atlantic without risking German retaliation or open involvement in the war.

While Secretary Stimson strongly favored an Iceland expedition as well as other vigorous lines of action in support of Britain, the Army planners would have much preferred to have nothing to do with expeditions either to Iceland or to the Azores. As late as 6 June, they were composing strong arguments against an Azores expedition, but they would have preferred an Azores to an Iceland operation. With the GRAY plan suspended, War Plans chief Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow on 19 June characterized the proposed Iceland expedition as "a political rather than a military move," and asked General Marshall to try to persuade the President to call it off. General Gerow believed that it was impracticable at this time for the Army to engage in any operations "which might involve engagements with the German forces," and
he and his staff were therefore opposed to any movement of Army forces outside the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{74}

No matter what else was done, both Secretary Stimson and the Army General Staff also wanted to move a small security force (about 9,300 troops and 43 planes) to northeastern Brazil as soon as possible. On 17 June General Marshall pointed out to Under Secretary Welles that, as of 10 June, there was not a single American naval vessel within 1,000 miles of the eastern tip of Brazil, and no United States Army forces within twice that distance.\textsuperscript{75} In an estimate submitted to General Marshall on 18 June, G-2 expressed its belief that the German push southwestward had reached ominous proportions: ten thousand Germans were believed to be in Spain; it was "reliably reported" that the Germans had concentrated transports in southern French ports ready to move four divisions to Portugal; German artillerymen, equivalent in strength to two regiments, were believed to have moved into Spanish Morocco; and G-2 was certain that German submarines were being supplied from the Canaries, and probably from French West African ports as well.\textsuperscript{76} If this G-2 estimate were anywhere near accurate, it certainly behooved the United States to take some sort of quick action to protect the Brazilian bulge. This was the view presented by Secretary Stim-

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son and General Marshall to the President in a bedside conference on 19 June, and the President told them he would direct the Department of State to find ways and means of getting American troops into Brazil.\textsuperscript{77}

The day before this conference with the President, the Secretary of War had received some "very upsetting news" to the effect that the tentative decision to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet had been reversed. Mr. Stimson drafted a protest to the President, stating "we are confronted with the immediate probability of two major moves in the Atlantic [Iceland and Brazil] without sufficient naval power there to support them." Continuing, he wrote, "the menace of Germany to South America via Dakar-Natal requires that the hold by American sea-power upon the South Atlantic should be so strong as to be
unchallengeable. Although Secretary Knox shared Mr. Stimson's views on the question of Atlantic Fleet reinforcement, the President was impervious to the Secretaries' pleas. On the other hand, at the 19 June conference the President asked Mr. Stimson and General Marshall whether the Army could immediately organize an expeditionary force of 75,000 men for use in several theaters—Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verdes, or elsewhere. In effect the President was told that, because of legislative restrictions on employment of Reserve and National Guard troops outside the Western Hemisphere, this could not be done without completely destroying the efficiency of all Army combat units. Aside from that, the Army had neither the equipment nor the ammunition available to mount such an expeditionary force and still leave anything for the Army units remaining to defend the continental United States. In short, at the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the United States Army's offensive combat strength was still close to zero.

On the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union a German submarine almost precipitated open war with the United States by chasing and trying to attack the battleship Texas and an accompanying destroyer southeast of Greenland and within the war zone that the Germans had proclaimed. The U-203 trailed the Texas and the destroyer on the night of 19-20 June for about 140 miles but could not launch its torpedoes because of poor weather conditions and the evasive action of the American ships. After the sinking of the American freighter Robin Moor in the South Atlantic a month earlier, Hitler had forbidden further attacks on United States merchant and naval vessels outside the war zone. When he learned about the Texas incident on 21 June, Hitler, in order to prevent incidents that might bring the United States into the war, directed the German Navy to stop all attacks on naval vessels in the North Atlantic war zone until after the Eastern Campaign was well under way.

The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The next day, in a letter to the President, the Secretary of War called the event "an almost providential occurrence." In the letter Stimson stated that he had met with General Marshall and his War Plans staff, and they had estimated that the Germans would now be thoroughly occupied in the Soviet Union for a period
of from one to three months. While so involved, the Germans could not invade Great Britain, nor could they attack Iceland or prevent American troops from landing there. The Germans would also have to relax their "pressure on West Africa, Dakar and South America." The General Staff officers with whom Mr. Stimson had consulted were unanimously of the opinion that the United States ought to take advantage of this golden opportunity "to push with the utmost vigor our movements in the Atlantic theater of operations." Secretary Stimson interpreted this to mean the execution of the Iceland project, American naval reinforcement in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the movement of American security forces to Brazil.82

War Department officials, military and civilian, were undoubtedly united in the opinion that the United States ought to act with vigor during the period that Germany was heavily involved in the Soviet campaign, but the

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new war outlook had not wrought any miraculous change in the Army's very limited means for action. A June estimate of Army capabilities, under preparation since late May but adjusted to take the German attack on the Soviet Union into account, concluded that the United States could not for many months do much more than conduct "a citadel defense of the Western Hemisphere including the line Greenland, the Atlantic bases, Natal, the Amazon Valley, Peru, Hawaii, and Alaska." Beyond that, it could probably carry out its ABC-1 commitments to England, including a "subsequent" complete relief of British forces in Iceland: Similarly, it could carry out a limited reinforcement of the Philippines. The United States probably could land holding forces in the Azores, but it probably could not occupy and hold any of the other southern Atlantic islands or any foothold on the western coast of Africa. In time, the United States might accumulate sufficient military strength to secure southern South America. In the still more distant future, it might be able "to take action against our main enemies in Europe." 83 Army planners under the circumstances would have preferred to limit immediate Army action in the Atlantic to the dispatch of security forces to Brazil.
In spite of the Army's prime interest in Brazil, the plan to send troops there ran into various snags that prevented any action for the time being other than the initiation in July of formal Brazilian-American joint staff planning. With a different point of view from that of the Army planners, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy urged Mr. Stimson to concentrate Army action toward what he termed the main strategic area of the war—the British Isles, and their North Atlantic approaches. To gain control of the northern and southern flanks of these approaches, he advocated placing troops in both Iceland and the Azores before undertaking any Brazilian operation. "The focus of the infection lies to the northeast," he wrote. "With that insulated, South America presents no problem."  

Although the Army's lack of readiness made it hesitant to advocate measures that would lead to open involvement in the war, the United States Navy was ready to take the risk. Two days after the Germans launched their new attack, Admiral Stark went to the President and urged him to approve the immediate assumption by the American Navy of convoy responsibilities in the North Atlantic. The Chief of Naval Operations recognized that this step would almost certainly involve the United States in the war, but he considered "every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival." Only a war psychology, Admiral Stark believed, would speed wax production and thereby permit the United States to initiate decisive measures in the Atlantic.  

President Roosevelt at first leaned toward the Navy's school of thought. He had no intention of dropping the Iceland project, and on 1 July, when the Icelandic Government agreed to the terms upon which American troops were to be received, the President ordered the initial Marine contingent to sail. On 2 July, he tentatively approved a new Navy plan for North Atlantic operations (Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 3) that would have involved American naval escort of all sorts of shipping from the Halifax-Newfoundland area to the longitude of Iceland, to start as soon as American
forces landed in Iceland. On 5 July the President told Mr. Stimson that he was again planning to order a second increment of the Pacific Fleet into the Atlantic to implement this Navy plan. But when it became clear that the Japanese had decided to continue their southward advance the President for the second time postponed naval reinforcement of the Atlantic and instead instructed the Navy to adopt a more modest projection of its current North Atlantic activities. The Navy thereupon put into effect its Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 4, which provided specifically only for the escort of United States and Icelandic shipping to and from Iceland. 

The real impact of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on the security of the Western Hemisphere derived not from the immediate but from the longer range development of the situation. Instead of a breathing space of one to three months duration, the United States and the rest of the New World were to be free henceforth from any great danger of German surface or air aggression in the western Atlantic. The Nazi-Soviet conflict had a contrary effect in the Pacific. Japanese decisions and actions from early July 1941 onward showed that the Japanese also considered this conflict a "providential occurrence," and they proceeded to take full advantage of it by pushing the erection by force of a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" with all speed. The United States in consequence was to be brought fully into the war not as a result of measures taken to combat the Nazi menace in the Atlantic, but by Japanese aggression in the Pacific.

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3 For example, less than 100 of the approximately 2,400 airplanes delivered to the British between 11 March 1941 and the end of the year were sent under lend-lease. Craven and Cate, A AF 1, pp. 318-19. Secretary of War Stimson had predicted as much when he advised the President in January, "whatever benefit Britain would derive during that period [before 1942] would be mainly in the increased morale which such passage would undoubtedly give to the British people," since American munitions output could not be greatly increased until 1942. Ind to Memo. SW for President, 22 Jan 41, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 20, pp. 4275-80.

4 Statement of Secretary Stimson as recorded in Min of a Conf in OSW, 17 Mar 41, OCS Conf Binder 11.


6 Winant, *Grosvenor Square*, pp. 254-56; Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 927-28; Memo, President for Secy Knox, 1 Apr 41, Roosevelt Papers; Ltr, SN to President, 21 Mar 41, summary in Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book IV, item 1. Last two in FDRL.

7 Ltr, SN to President, 24 Mar 41; Memo, President for SN, 1 Apr 41. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, p. 407.

8 Stimson Diary, entries of 7 Mar, 8 and 11 Apr, and 22 May 41; Winant,
9 See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIII.

10 See Ch. I, above.


12 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 44-55; Memo, SN for President, 20 Mar 41, SW file, Navy Dept.

13 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Mar 41. On the same day Admiral Stark remarked, "if England is to be saved, we will have to get in and quickly," and went on to say that there were things the United States would have to do "which may cause war." Notes on SLC mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, item 13.

14 Kittredge MS, Ch. 14, p. 375, and Ch. 15, App. A, pp. 312-14; information obtained from Captain Kittredge, USN, JCS Hist Sec, in written commentary for OCMH Strategy Sec.

15 Stimson Diary, entry of 4 Apr 41.

16 Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, p. 415.


The President's scheme may have been based in part on a proposal contained in a memorandum to Harry Hopkins from his assistant, Oscar Cox, on 10 April 1941. Cox suggested "that if the Western Hemisphere is defined either in legal or geographical terms the definition be such that it would keep German raiders out of it, permit the convoys by American naval vessels of British and American ships to the end of the Western Hemisphere, and the delivery of goods in the Western Hemisphere for trans-shipment to Great
Britain." Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book IV, Item 3, FDRL.

18 Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Apr 41.

19 Notes on Conf in OCS, 16 Apr 41, OCS Conf Binder 13.

20 Memo, WPD for CofS, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4402-9. The final clause quoted above referred to reports of the difficulties faced by the Churchill ministry because of the disasters overtaking the British armies in the eastern Mediterranean. The preceding day, Secretary Stimson had protested to General Marshall about criticisms of the Churchill government being made by Army officers. "I pointed out that the success of the United States depended on the safety of the British fleet; that the safety of the British fleet and its preservation depended on the preservation of the Churchill government and the life of the promise made by Churchill last summer to keep the fleet at all odds; therefore, in circulating . . . such comment, they were attacking the vital safety of the United States." Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Apr 41.

21 Notes on Conf in OCS, 16 Apr 41, OCS Conf Binder 10. The record of these 16 April conferences does not disclose General Marshall's own answers to the questions he had posed, nor has any evidence been uncovered that he or General Embick presented the Army's views, as developed in these meetings, to the President. For a more detailed account, see Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, pp. 386-90.

22 Memo, CNO for SN, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6. Though dated 16 April, this copy in Army files contains changes made by the President during the weekend of 19-21 April. Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Apr 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6, indicates the President's approval of the plan as revised "for planning purposes." The Fleet's operations plan is dated 18 April 1941, but could not have been issued before the President's weekend decisions. A personal letter of Admiral Stark to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 19 April 1941 (printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 16, pp. 2163-65), is the best source on the circumstances of the plan; but the postscript of the letter could not have been written before Monday, 21 April. Captain Kittredge has treated this episode in detail in Chs. 14-16 of his monograph. That the British were promptly notified is indicated by Churchill in *Grand
Alliance, p. 142, though they could not have been notified as early as 18 April, nor was the plan "announced."
Technically, the terms of this plan would have been applicable to Japanese naval vessels and aircraft operating east of the International Date Line. In practice—before December 1941—the Navy did not apply the plan or the plans that superseded it during 1941 to Japanese craft. See Ch. VI, below.

23 Telg, TAG to CG's First Army and CDC, 10 May 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6. Information about the drafting and transmission of this message has also been derived from other papers in this file and from Stimson Diary, entry of 10 May 1941.

24 Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, pp. 408-09; Ltr, CNO to CinC Pacific Fleet, 19 Apr 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2163-65.

25 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Apr 41.

26 Aide-Memoire, Gen Marshall for President Roosevelt, 24 Apr 41, sub: Def of Hawaii, WPD 3672-32; Stimson Diary, various entries for period 23 Apr-14 May 41; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 386-87; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 56-58; Butler, Grand Strategy, II, 502-03.

27 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 1, 28, entry of 18 Mar 41. A German staff study dated 11 March proposed an attack on Gibraltar, by troops and equipment withdrawn from the Eastern Front, as soon as German forces had penetrated to the Kiev-Smolensk line. British Cabinet Office, Historical Branch, "Operation FELIX: German Plans for Spain and the Capture of Gibraltar (June 1950)," Pt. I, Political Considerations, in Axis Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, September 1939-February 1941, pp. 29-30.

28 Halder Journal, VI, 41, entry of 30 Mar 41.

29 Ltr, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill; 4 May 41, FDR Personal Letters, II, 1148-50. See also Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 144-45.

30 Langer, Our Vichy Gamble. pp. 159, 407-08; Langer and Gleason,

31 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 1, 62-76, entry of 22 May 41.

32 Memo, Maj Lemuel Mathewson for Gen Gerow, WPD, 21 May 41, WPD 4224-150; Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow, 23 Jul 41, WPD 4115-52.

33 The effect of Pétain's 15 May announcement has been gauged primarily on the basis of various items in the Roosevelt Papers, FDRL, and on entries in the Stimson Diary. For Churchill's note, see Grand Alliance, p. 765.

34 Notes on Conf in OCS, 19 May 41, OCS Conf Binder 15.

35 Notes on War Council mtg, 19 May 41, SW Conf Binder 1.

36 Memo, Secy State Hull for President, 25 May 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. On the proposed Monroe Doctrine extension, see also Hull, Memoirs, II, 959-60, and "Memo of Interview with the President, Tuesday, May 20, 1941," Stimson Diary. On the approach to Dr. Bowman, see Ltr, Dr. Bowman to President Roosevelt, 19 May 41, and other papers in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

37 Stimson Diary, entry of 23 May 41.

38 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 296.


40 Memo, SGS for CofS, 29 May 41, OCS Conf Binder 15.

41 Memo, G-2 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 28 May 41, GHQ 381, Sec. 1.

42 Ltr, Gen Lee to Ambassador John G. Winant, 27 May 41, quoted in

43 Memo, Gen Burns for Mr. Hopkins, 31 May 41, Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book III, Item 7, FDRL.


45 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Jan 41; WPD study, n.d. [early February 1941?]. Both in WPD 4422.

46 WPD Memo for File, 16 May 41, WPD 4422-2; Memo, CNO for CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Operations, OPD Exec 13, General Malony Binder 1.

47 Msg, Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, 24 Apr 41, Churchill, *Grand Alliance*, pp. 143-45; Msg, Adm Ghormley to CNO, 7 May 41, cited in Kittredge MS, Ch 16, note 45, p. 326.


50 For details of the negotiations with Brazil during this period, see Ch. XI, below, and Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, pp. 518ff.

51 Pars. 2 and 3, Navy Western Hemisphere Def Plan No. 2, 16 Apr 41, copy
in WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6; Notes on SLC mtg, 21 Apr 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 20.

52 Study dated 22 May 1941, inclosed as Tab A to Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 41, WPD 4224-155.

53 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 41, and atchd Tab A, WPD 4224-155. War Plans had produced a study on the possibilities of a Dakar operation on 7 May 1941 (copy in OPD Exec 13). The planners also dismissed an occupation of the Cape Verde Islands as a practicable alternative to the Brazilian proposal; unless United States or other friendly forces also held Dakar and the adjacent African coast, the Cape Verdes would be untenable. Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Jun 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 7.

54 Memo, Lt Col Lee S. Gerow for Gen Gerow, 27 May 41, and Incl, WPD 4422-5.

55 Stimson Diary, entry of 6 Jun 41.

56 President's notation, dated 4 Jun 41, on Ltr, JPC to JB, 28 May 41, JB 325, set 694; Memo, WPD for ACsofS G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, 6 Jun 41, WPD 4422-8.

57 Cablegram, ALUSNA Lisbon to OPNAV, 26 May 41, copy in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

58 Memo, President for Secy State, 31 May 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Hull, Memoirs, II, 940.

59 Ltr, Under Secy Welles to President Roosevelt, 4 Jun 41, inclosing Memo, British Embassy for Dept of State, 2 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

60 Memo, CNO for CofS, 22 May 41, OPD Exec 13, General Malony Binder 1; Memo, OCS for CofS, 31 May 41, WPD 4175-22.

61 Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Jun 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 7.
62 Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 523.

63 Winant, Grosvenor Square, pp. 194-95. In timing the incidents of this period, the author has also profited from an examination of the President's appointment books in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

64 Stimson Diary, entry of 5 Jun 41.

65 Winant, Grosvenor Square, p. 203.

66 Stimson Diary, entry of 2 Jun 41.

67 Notes on War Council mtg, 3 Jun 41, SW Conf Binder 1; Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Jun 41.

68 Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Jun 41. There is an unsigned and undated report in the GHQ-OPD INDIGO "A" file, discussing the merits of the two operations. It concludes that unless the United States were prepared to enter the war as an active belligerent, it should not undertake either an Iceland or an Azores expedition. If one had to be undertaken, the report favored the Azores. This may be the staff report delivered by the Chief of Staff to Mr. Stimson on 3 June.

69 Stimson Diary, entry of 5 Jun 41.

70 Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Jun 41, OPD Exec 13; Gerow Diary, entries of 4 and 7 Jun 41. For a detailed survey of the Iceland operation and its background, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIV.

71 Information obtained from Captain Kittredge, USN, JCS Hist Sec, in written commentary for OCMH Strategy Sec; Stimson Diary, entries of 6 and 18 Jun 41, and "Memo of Talk with Sec Knox at Woodley, 20 June 41"; Butler, Grand Strategy, II, 507.

72 Winant, Grosvenor Square, p. 204; Hull, Memoirs, II, 973.
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73 WPD draft of Memo, CofS for CNO,--Jun 41 (dated in pencil, 6 Jun 41, and stamped "Not used") and Incls, WPD 4422-7; unsigned and undated staff report in GHQ-OPD INDIGO "A" file.

74 Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41.

75 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 17 Jun 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

76 Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4516.

77 Stimson Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Memo, CofS for WPD, 21 Jun 41, WPD 4516.

78 Draft of Ltr, SW to President, 19 Jun 41, in Stimson Diary. Instead of sending this letter, Mr. Stimson presented his views in person when he went with General Marshall to see the President on 19 June.

79 Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41.

80 The Army Air Forces rated the General Headquarters Air Force at zero strength as of 1 July 1941—that is, there were no trained combat air units in the continental United States available for employment with overseas expeditionary forces. Memo, AAF for WPD, 7 Jul 41, WPD 3774-28. The Air Forces was in the midst of a tremendous expansion that absorbed all of its available combat planes in training.

In general, the Army's weakness in effective combat strength at this time was due to factors beyond its control. The Army's numerical strength had increased fivefold during the preceding year, a pace the expansion of the American munitions industry simply could not match. Furthermore, a large proportion of the American munitions output was going to Great Britain. Marine combat forces had priority in the munitions supply that was available. General Marshall summarized the Army's predicament when he remarked, "whether we will have anything left after Britain and the Marines get theirs, I do not know." Notes on War Council mtg, 3 Jun 41, SW Conf Binder 1.

81 United States Navy Department, translation of Befehlshaber der
Unterseeboote War Logs for period 1 January 1941 to 31 December 1943 (hereafter cited as B.d.U. War Logs), entry of 20 Jun 41; Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 1, entry of 21 Jun 41.

Under this directive as clarified, submarine commanders were permitted to attack naval vessels in the war zone only when the vessels were "definitely established as enemy ships from cruisers on up," or when the vessels themselves were unmistakably attacking. Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 3, entry of 10 Jul 41.

82 Ltr, SW to President, 23 Jun 41, original in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL, and printed in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-04.

83 This summary of the June 1941 estimate was embodied in a paper circulated at a conference in the Secretary of War's office on 16 September 1941. Copy in OCS file, Conferences (9-21-41).

84 See Ch. X1, below.

85 Memo, ASW for SW, 24 Jun 41, SW file, War Plans.

86 Ltr, Adm Stark to Capt Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN, 31 Jul 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, p. 2175.

87 Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 574-75; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 74-79; Kittredge MS, Ch. 19, pp. 539-52; Stimson Diary, entries of 5, 8, and 21 Jul 41.

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CHAPTER VI

From Nonbelligerency to War

When President Roosevelt ordered the marines to sail for Iceland on 1 July 1941, neither he nor any of his advisers were in a position to predict the future course of American action toward the war. The United States, to be sure, had gone far since the preceding summer in implementing its basic policy of hemisphere defense, though its armed forces were still not ready to carry out this policy alone. The nation was rapidly becoming the "arsenal of democracy" forecast by the President at the end of 1940. By mid-1941 the national policy comprehended not only material support of the nations fighting Axis aggression, including the Soviet Union, but also preservation of the British Isles as the major Atlantic bastion of America's position. Britain's salvation depended upon securing the supply life line across the North Atlantic. What the United States in the months to come could and would do in furtherance of these basic policies depended primarily on the success or failure of German arms in the Soviet Union and on what Japan decided to do in consequence of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. Writing to Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada on 1 July, President Roosevelt observed, "if the Russians should fail to hold out through the Summer, there may be an intensified effort against Britain itself, and especially for control of the Atlantic," and added, "we may be able to help a good deal more than seems apparent today." How much more depended not only on American public opinion, still far from reconciled to open participation in the war, but also on Japan's decision.

The President and his advisers knew only too well how crucial Japan's decision would be in determining American policy and action toward the war. Having broken the Japanese codes, they also had the means of learning what Japan proposed to do. The President on 1 July wrote:

...the Japs are having a real drag-down and knock-out fight among themselves and have been for the past week-trying to decide which way they are going to jump-attack Russia, attack the South Seas (thus throwing in their lot definitely with Germany) or whether they will sit on the fence and be more friendly with us. No one knows what the decision will be but, as you know, it is terribly important for the control of the
Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round — and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic.  

The Japanese broke the suspense almost immediately. On 2 July at an Imperial Conference they decided that Japan should pursue the plan developed in the summer and fall of 1940 for a southward advance to secure domination of eastern and southeastern Asia. Diplomatic conversations with the United States were to be continued, but simultaneously preparations for war were to be advanced as rapidly as possible. Soviet Siberia would be attacked only if the Russians' seemed on the point of collapse. The Japanese planned to occupy southern Indochina immediately, and they had intended to present the French authorities with an ultimatum to this effect on 5 July; when news of this move leaked out, the Japanese postponed action, but only for another week.

Apparently fearing immediate American retaliation, the Japanese had ordered their merchant shipping to clear the Atlantic as soon as possible. The United States Army and Navy interpreted this move as possibly portending a surprise attack on American defense positions in the eastern Pacific, and on 3 July the army ordered the Panama Canal closed to Japanese shipping to prevent sabotage by vessels in transit. An alert went out the same day to Alaska. Intercepts decoded between 5 and 7 July helped clarify Japanese intentions. Ambassador Nomura had been told on 2 July that his government proposed to advance on southern Indochina and Thailand at once. Though Japan intended to use "every means available . . . in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be Japan shall act in accordance with the three-Power pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed."

American policy and action toward Japan stiffened as soon as the Japanese made their next overt move. On 24 July forty thousand Japanese troops sailed for southern Indochinese ports to begin the construction of air and naval bases from which further military attacks could be made against
Malaya and the East Indies. The United States responded on 26 July by freezing Japanese assets and by other orders that in effect ended American oil shipments to Japan—a move long advocated by exponents of a "get-tough" policy. Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific were again alerted to the possibility of Japanese retaliation, and the alert message informed them that the Philippine Army was being called into active service. By the end of July the United States had decided to reverse its policy of standing on the defensive along the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line; instead it would reinforce and defend the Philippines, though this defense was not to be permitted "to jeopardize the success of the major efforts . . . in the theater of the Atlantic."6

Operations in the North Atlantic

The Japanese decisions and actions of July, as previously noted, helped to delay the execution of more vigorous action by American naval forces in the North Atlantic. During June the American and British naval staffs had agreed on plans under which the United States would undertake the escort of convoys of all types of shipping from the Halifax-Newfoundland area to the longitude of Iceland. The Navy had prepared to carry out the assignment by drafting a new Western Hemisphere defense plan that would require transfer of more ships from the Pacific Fleet. The news from Japan caused the President to reverse his tentative approval of these measures.7 He also rejected Secretary Stimson's plea for a forthright explanation of American purposes in Atlantic operations in his report to Congress on the Iceland landing. Mr. Stimson wished it made clear that the "broader and more powerful reason" for the Iceland operation was protection of the North Atlantic convoy route to Great Britain and that the United States proposed to do everything within its naval and air means to protect that route from Axis marauders. He also wanted the President to announce that, with Brazil's consent, the United States proposed to establish bases there to resist Nazi aggression toward South America.8 But the President in announcing to Congress on 7 July that American forces had landed in Iceland explained the move as necessary to prevent German occupation and establishment of air
and naval bases from which the Western Hemisphere could be attacked. He said

nothing about escort plans, or about Brazil, although both plans were still very much alive.

American forces established in Iceland naturally required escort of American and Icelandic shipping engaged in transporting troops and supplying American forces and the native population. This began immediately. On 19 July, twelve days after the marines had landed, the Atlantic Fleet issued orders that in effect permitted its ships "to escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join United States or Iceland flag convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland." Thereafter, as Professor Samuel E. Morison has observed, many ships of other nationalities chose to join the American convoys going to and from Iceland and its vicinity. Furthermore, Canadian and Free French vessels cooperated with the United States Navy in escorting the convoys. While the British and Canadians continued to have exclusive escort responsibility on the direct transatlantic run until two months later, the American Navy from 19 July onward was increasingly engaged in the protection of shipping destined not only for Iceland but also for the British Isles, and it had orders to capture or destroy "potentially hostile vessels . . . actually within sight or sound contact of such shipping or of its escort." 9

Though it is clear that the President approved issuance of these orders, his failure to announce them or explicitly to authorize them left American naval commanders in something of a quandary: they were not certain until September whether, when they detected or sighted a hostile vessel, they ought to fire first or await attack.10 German submarine commanders had more positive orders. Hitler, in emphasizing on 10 July that he wanted to postpone American entry into the war "for another one or two months," again directed that American naval vessels in the war zone must not be attacked unless they attacked first and also that attacks on American merchant ships should be avoided.11
At the Atlantic Conference held at the United States base at Argentia, Newfoundland, 9-12 August, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their naval advisors discussed and settled upon the division of labor in Atlantic escort operations. Indeed, this was the only significant strategic or tactical matter settled at the Atlantic Conference, though others were discussed. Actually, the naval plans approved there were practically the same as those drafted two months previously and envisaged primary American responsibility for escort duty in the western Atlantic. The President at Argentia

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drew a line on an Atlantic map that ran generally along the 26th parallel from south and east of the Azores to south of Iceland and then veered northeastward to longitude 10° east of Iceland; the American sphere of action was to be west of this line. The plans, when executed, permitted release of fifty British destroyers and corvettes for duty in the eastern and southern Atlantic. Despite the complete agreement reached at Argentia, the President still hesitated to make any public announcement of it until an "incident" occurred; furthermore, he wanted to get the system in full operation before it was publicly acknowledged or officially ordered.12

On 4 September a German submarine fired two torpedoes at the United States destroyer Greer, which was en route to Iceland and about 150 miles southwest of it. The Greer had been pursuing and maintaining contact with the submarine in collaboration with an Iceland-based British plane, which had been attacking the submarine with depth charges. Thus began the de facto naval war waged between American and German craft in the North Atlantic during the three months preceding Pearl Harbor. The President in a speech on 11 September seized upon the Greer incident as the appropriate justification for announcing American intentions to engage all German and Italian naval vessels thereafter discovered in the western reaches of the Atlantic. Within a fortnight the United States Navy had begun to escort transatlantic convoys to mid-ocean. On 28 September the Navy issued its Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 covering these extended operations and ordered it into effect on 8 October after Admiral King had reported his
Atlantic Fleet in a full state of readiness to carry it out.\textsuperscript{13}

Successful submarine attacks on the destroyers \textit{Kearny} and \textit{Reuben James} during October—sinking the latter with heavy loss of life—signalized the intention of the Germans to modify their policy of avoiding incidents that might bring the United States openly into the war. With a quick victory over the Russians no longer in prospect, the Nazis extended their submarine operations into the western Atlantic as far as Newfoundland. During late October and early November American Navy craft and Army planes helped in an attack on a submarine pack that had found good hunting around New-

\textsuperscript{14} On 13 November Congress voted to repeal the provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939 that prohibited the arming of American merchant ships and their entry into combat zones. As Mr. Churchill notes, this action, coupled with the Navy's escort operations, would have inevitably led to "constant fighting in the Atlantic between German and American ships."\textsuperscript{15}

By 5 December the Atlantic Fleet and the British Home Fleet had reached complete agreement on responsibilities and measures for dealing with German surface raiders in the North Atlantic.\textsuperscript{16} The Battle of the Atlantic had become an American battle, though nominally the nation was still at peace.

\textit{The German Threat in the Southern Atlantic}

It appeared during the summer of 1941 that the task of securing control of the Atlantic could not be confined to its northern reaches. As the British, Canadian, and American Navies tightened their hold on the North Atlantic life line, German submarine activity swung southward. In June 1941 more than half of the British merchant shipping losses in the Atlantic occurred within a 1,000-mile radius of the Cape Verde Islands.\textsuperscript{17} The continuance of these depredations through the summer seemed to American military observers to indicate an early renewal of the Nazi military threat to French West Africa and South America that had loomed so ominously in May. This
threat was in fact very real in July 1941. Hitler and his commanders had expected to smash Soviet military power in a lightning summer campaign, after which they intended to turn their attention to the Mediterranean and Africa. It will be recalled that this timing had been agreed upon in March, and that German negotiations with Admiral Darlan in May had been intended to lay the groundwork for an advance to Dakar after the Russians were defeated. Though General Maxime Weygand, French commander in North Africa, had been able in early June to persuade Marshal Pétain to reject the Darlan protocols, the Germans fully intended to pursue their objectives of capturing Gibraltar and occupying bases in North and West Africa and on the eastern Atlantic islands as soon as they could release sufficient forces (especially air forces) from the Soviet front. Their main purpose would be to establish a

chain of Atlantic bases from which British and American control of the Atlantic could be successfully challenged.\(^\text{18}\)

Whether the Germans could launch a drive toward North and West Africa during 1941 depended on two factors: first, their success in encircling the mass of Soviet military manpower before it could withdraw; and second, collaboration with France. During July, while the outcome on the Soviet front was still in balance, the Germans renewed their demands on Vichy for North African bases.\(^\text{19}\) About the same time the German Navy was urging upon the Fuehrer its views that a "final clarification of the Mediterranean problem" and military collaboration with France in order to gain control of strategic bases were absolutely essential to "a successful continuation of the Battle of the Atlantic." Hitler answered that there was "absolutely no reason for the concern" expressed by the German Navy. He had not changed his mind about the importance of maintaining the submarine and air offensive against Britain with all vigor. Though he earnestly desired to avoid actions that would lead to open war with the United States while the Eastern Campaign was in progress, nevertheless he was determined to march into Spain and send panzer and infantry divisions from there into North Africa "as soon as the U.S.A. occupies Portuguese or Spanish Islands."\(^\text{20}\)
Since the first condition essential to the launching of a southwestward drive did not materialize, the question whether the Germans could have "persuaded" Vichy France to collaborate must remain unanswered. The Germans failed to trap the main Soviet forces, and by mid-August the German Army began to realize that it was in for a long and exhausting battle on the Eastern Front.21 A month later a strategic estimate prepared by the German Army High Command and approved by Hitler acknowledged the necessity of recasting German military plans. Irrespective of whether Soviet forces succumbed during the fall or winter of 1941-12, the German Army would be too shattered and exhausted to permit its regrouping for a major offensive elsewhere until well into 1942. Even in the midst of the titanic Nazi-Soviet struggle, the Germans considered the defeat of Great Britain their main goal in the war. A successful invasion was the one sure means of defeating Britain, but it would be at least late summer 1942 before the operation could be carried out. Nor would German ground and air forces "be available for

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decisive operations in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic, and on the Spanish mainland before spring, 1942." Until then the High Command urged that Germany do everything it could to maintain and improve its political relations with France and Spain and to block their collaboration with Great Britain and the United States. From the German military point of view, the greatest strategic danger in sight was an Anglo-American drive to secure sea and air domination of the Mediterranean and control of the North African littoral from the Atlantic to Suez, but Germany could not undertake any decisive moves to control this situation or to gain control of the Atlantic until the Russians were defeated.22

The United States Army's initial estimate that the Soviet Army would probably collapse within one to three months' time was shared by the British as well as by the Germans themselves. Early in July G-2 predicted that, if the Russians were defeated during the summer or fall of 1941, Germany would concentrate on consolidating its hegemony in Europe, expelling the British
from the Mediterranean, and intensifying the Atlantic war of attrition against British commerce. At this same time General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, who had been serving as British commander in the eastern Mediterranean, estimated that the Nazi-Soviet struggle gave Britain a minimum of six weeks' grace, and that thereafter the Germans would first move through Spain to close the western Mediterranean and then drive against Suez. General Lord Gort, commanding at Gibraltar, reported increased clandestine military activity south of the Strait all the way to Dakar. He believed that the Germans would advance into French Africa as soon as they could release the necessary forces from the Eastern Front, and that they might "well go to Morocco and West Africa through Italy, rather than Spain." At an Anglo-American staff meeting in London on 11 July, the British stated their opinion that the German plans included occupation of French North and West Africa before the end of 1941, but they also expressed doubts as to whether the Germans had sufficient resources in ships and planes to establish and maintain this position if American and British forces collaborated in resisting the advance.

While American and British political and military chiefs at the Atlantic Conference were discussing concrete ways and means of dealing with the prospective German drive toward the southern Atlantic, in Washington Mr. Hull was asking the War and Navy Secretaries what the United States could do "if the Germans march on Dakar as they are preparing to do now." It was a hard question to answer because, as Mr. Stimson noted, the United States and Britain simply did not have enough available naval strength to support effective military countermeasures in the southern Atlantic area. On 15 August Secretary Stimson, in a radio address, said, "Germany has been pushing into North Africa and we have reason to believe that a major advance will be made by her into that continent." He then emphasized the threat of such an advance to Brazil and the Western Hemisphere.

Brazil, as War Plans chief General Gerow explained to President Roosevelt
on 31 August, was the southern key to the Army's scheme of hemisphere defense, and the Army planners and General Marshall wanted more than ever to put security forces at strategic airfields on the Brazilian bulge. In mid-September G-2 held that a German move into French North and West Africa, whatever its main purpose, would provide Germany with the opportunity to extend its influence in Latin America-perhaps to infiltrate physically-and would necessitate prompt action in the Natal area by the United States and in the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands by the United States and Great Britain. Not until October did the Army planners come around to the belief that the immediate threat to North and West Africa had passed. Though they still expected that the Soviet Union would be defeated by the spring of 1942, until that happened they believed Germany could not invade England or launch any other major offensive.

The German threat to the southwest had led in August to a revival of the joint Army-Navy expeditionary force plan for the Azores that had been hurriedly developed at President Roosevelt's direction in late May and then suspended in early June both because of the decision to send troops to Iceland and because of the unfavorable reactions of the Portuguese Government toward the idea. The revival of the Azores project found the Army planners opposing it almost as strongly as before, and for the same basic reasons: neither the use of the Azores nor their denial to the Axis Powers was essential "to the static defense of the Western Hemisphere"; and their occupation and defense against opposition would absorb all of the Army's "immediately available resources in seasoned combat troops." Nevertheless,

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since the President and some of his advisers were known to have a keen interest in the Azores as well as in the more distant Cape Verdes, the Army had to consider an Azores expedition as a continuing possibility. By early July, G-1 had drafted three alternate plans for military government in the Azores, and two months later War Plans placed the Azores at the top of the list of areas for which military government personnel should be trained.
Whether these plans would have to be applied depended not so much on what the President or the armed services planned to do as on the still unpredictable outcome of the great Nazi-Soviet battle.34

In mid-July the President had the Department of State dispatch a letter to Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal designed to dissipate the "misunderstandings which have regrettably arisen during recent weeks between our two Governments" and to pave the way for a Portuguese request for American protection of the Azores and other Portuguese possessions in the event they were threatened by Germany. The United States would invite Brazil to participate in any such operation and would categorically guarantee to respect Portuguese sovereignty and to withdraw its forces as soon as the war was over. The President's letter had a good effect in Lisbon, and Dr. Salazar's response acceded somewhat left-handedly to Mr. Roosevelt's proposals. The Portuguese Government, it stated, planned to retreat to the Azores in case the Germans threatened Portugal itself, and while it would count as usual on British protection in accordance with its traditional alliance, if British forces were too busy elsewhere American assistance in the Azores and Cape Verdes might be accepted.35

With these exchanges in hand, the Azores project became a prime topic of conversation at the Atlantic Conference, along with other operations that might be undertaken to counteract a German move into Spain. The President read Dr. Salazar's letter to Prime Minister Churchill, and they both agreed that it opened the way for a peaceful American occupation of the islands. Mr. Churchill then disclosed that the British planned to seize the Canary Islands about 15 September 1941, that this operation would absorb all British forces available for action in the southern Atlantic area, and that he would therefore welcome American landings in the Azores and the Cape Verdes about the same time. The Prime Minister agreed to persuade Dr. Salazar to send the necessary direct invitation to the United States so that the Azores operation could be carried out promptly. He also promised to protect the operation from German interference by covering it with a large naval
screen (which would, of course, also cover the Canaries operation) between the islands and the Portuguese coast. Mr. Churchill then carefully pointed out that a Canary operation in September might precede a German move into Spain, and that this operation by itself would almost inevitably provoke a crisis in the Iberian Peninsula that would make an Azores operation mandatory. President Roosevelt agreed to go through with the Azores project no matter what the circumstances requiring it. He explained that the United States did not have enough trained forces to send troops to the Azores and Cape Verdes simultaneously, so the Prime Minister agreed that the British would occupy the Cape Verdes initially and then turn them over to the United States.³⁶

Following the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion, the American and British military chiefs considered the Azores and related operations in staff conversations on 11-12 August. Neither the British nor the American Army and Navy chiefs seem to have been as enthusiastic or as certain about the Azores-Canary undertaking as the President and Prime Minister evidently were. Sir John Dill of the British Army doubted the necessity of occupying the Azores or Cape Verdes if the Canaries were held. Admiral Dudley Pound of the British Navy questioned the feasibility of the Canary operation if it were postponed beyond September and spoke as though there were a distinct uncertainty of its being executed during that month. Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark appear to have felt that the question of which nation should occupy the Azores was still open to future decision, though General Marshall agreed that should an American operation be decided upon the Army would furnish the necessary forces. The Cape Verdes were to be considered a British responsibility.³⁷

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Before news of the Argentia discussions reached Washington, the War Plans Division sent a copy of the original joint expeditionary force plan for the Azores to the newly activated operational staff of General Headquarters and requested that it get to work on a defense plan for an Army occupation force. After General Marshall's return, he directed General Headquarters to speed work on an Azores relief plan, to be based on the assumption that the Navy
and Marine Corps would make the landings and that the Army would thereafter provide a local defense force only. 38 By the time General Headquarters completed this plan in September the prospect of a peaceful occupation had faded. A new joint plan prepared and amplified during September and October contemplated using the Atlantic Amphibious Force (1st Army and 1st Marine Divisions) in the initial landing and provided for an Army relief force of about twenty-six thousand to defend the islands after their occupation. By early November the Azores operation was looked upon less as a defensive move than as a preliminary step to an occupation of northwestern Africa. The Azores in American hands would provide a base for checking Axis submarine activity against the Atlantic trade routes and would guard the supply lines to Morocco and the Mediterranean. 39

The military services were under considerable pressure in September and October 1941 to develop plans for the occupation-peaceful or otherwise-of the more distant Atlantic islands and of French West and North Africa. President Roosevelt in September evinced his interest in the possibilities of American military expeditions to the Cape Verdes and Dakar, in addition to the contemplated dispatch of forces to the Azores and to the Natal area of Brazil. 40 Although United States forces in the Cape Verdes could have helped to interdict Axis air operations that might be launched from the Dakar area against Brazil, the Army considered the islands of value primarily as bases from which to protect the southern Atlantic shipping lanes and to support an American or British operation against Dakar. The occupation of the Dakar area by American or British forces would have blocked the only practicable line of approach by Axis military forces to South America, but the planners believed that neither the Cape Verdes nor Dakar had any appreciable value as bases from which British or American forces could advance to North Africa or the Mediterranean. That line of approach went through the Azores and the Canaries. By the end of October some Washington authorities—but not the Army planners—were considering the possibility of following this line in the near future and landing a large American force in Morocco. 41
Chapter VI: From Nonbelligerency to War

The Army had good reason to resist proposals for the early projection of American military power into French Africa. In the first place, if the United States were permitted to place small security forces on the Brazilian bulge none of the projected Atlantic island or African operations could be construed as essential to hemisphere defense. It would be far simpler, and less costly in trained manpower and in shipping, to put American troops into Brazil than to carry out any other southern Atlantic operation. In the second place, the Army did not have enough trained and equipped troops to do more than occupy either the Azores or the Cape Verdes—not both. Dakar and Morocco were quite beyond current Army capabilities. Actually, all of the projected southern Atlantic operations (except Brazil) contemplated using the same force—the Atlantic Amphibious Force, with a strength of about 30,000 men. The United States could not spare enough shipping to transport and maintain a mid-Atlantic or transatlantic force any larger than that before the end of 1941. Since even an unopposed landing in the Dakar area was believed to require at least 50,000 troops, the Army now considered that operation well beyond its means until the spring of 1942 at the earliest; landing 150,000 American troops in Morocco was far beyond its ken.  

Secretary of War Stimson opposed the Atlantic islands and African projects both for the reasons advanced by the Army staff planners and for another reason more compelling to him. Mr. Stimson (probably with the support of General Marshall and certainly with that of General Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air Forces) wanted to concentrate on the projection of American military power to the northeast. He strongly opposed any moves that would get the Army "bogged down" in such "side issues" as the Azores and Dakar; instead, he urged Army action along what he called "the direct line of our strategical route towards victory," by completing the relief of British forces in Iceland and also by taking over the garrisoning of Northern Ireland from the British.  

With the Army in particular unwilling and unable to launch immediately effective transatlantic measures to counter the German threat to French North
and West Africa, the United States did what it could by diplomacy to persuade the French to resist German infiltration into their African possessions. In July President Roosevelt sent a sharp warning to General Weygand that the United States would do all that it could to prevent the Germans from obtaining the use of any French African ports as military, naval, or air bases. Mr. Hull talked to the Vichy ambassador in similar terms during September. The United States knew that the French were reinforcing their West African defenses, but whether they were doing so to protect them against Axis or Anglo-American moves remained unknown. The actual German infiltration into French North and West Africa was comparatively slight.

In November German pressure finally forced Marshal Pétain to dismiss General Weygand, and a new crisis in Franco-American relations loomed thereafter. Ambassador Leahy recommended that if this move were followed by any evidences of increased Franco-German collaboration, the United States ought to recall him and announce its intention of dealing with France's New World and African possessions in the manner most advantageous to American defensive preparations. The Army wanted France's Western Hemisphere possessions demilitarized at once. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the United States demanded that the Pétain government guarantee that Weygand's policy of resisting German infiltration into French Africa would not be altered. Vichy supplied the guarantee on 12 December 1941. Of course, since late summer Soviet military stamina had provided the most realistic guarantee against a major German drive toward the southwest during 1941.

_Military Policy and Army Readiness, Autumn 1941_

The events of mid-1941 required the United States to reassess its position toward the war. Before the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the nation's leaders had decided that the national security depended on the salvation of Great Britain. The fall of Britain and the disintegration of the British Empire would have left the United States virtually alone to face a hostile Old World possessed of military power far greater than America could hope to match for years to come. Even if Britain were saved, it was difficult until the fall of 1941 to foresee how the Axis forces could be defeated no matter what contribution the United States made. The eight-point Atlantic Charter of mid-
August, agreed upon and announced by the President and the Prime Minister, referred hopefully to "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny" and

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to the necessity of disarming the aggressor nations. During the month following, as it became apparent that the Russians might be able to continue effective resistance to the German military machine, American military leaders for the first time could visualize with some confidence ways and means of achieving these goals. The very name applied to the massive estimates of these ways and means-the "Victory Program"-reflected that confidence. The Victory Program was not a plan for getting the United States into all out war; rather, it was an over-all estimate of the current war situation, and on the basis of that estimate a prediction of what the United States would have to do to achieve victory if the nation chose to join fully in the struggle against the Axis.46

As a backdrop for the Victory Program, and for other military estimates and plans prepared during the fall of 1941, the military planners had to delineate their conceptions of current national and military policies. They named hemisphere defense as the first and basic policy. The Joint Board's estimate of 11 September defined this policy as the "preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere."47 The War Department Strategic Estimate of October used somewhat stronger language: "Resist wherever necessary and with all available resources the economic, political, and military penetration of the Axis and Associated Powers in the Western Hemisphere. Enforce the Monroe Doctrine."48 The other major policies, as the military planners understood them, were: to maintain the security of the British Isles and the integrity of the British Empire; to uphold the American doctrine of freedom of the seas, in particular by insureing delivery of munitions and other supplies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union; within American means and the abilities of the recipient states, to give material assistance to all nations and peoples fighting the Axis Powers; to contribute in every possible way to the defeat of Germany, short of declared war; to keep Germany engaged in the Soviet Union for as long a time and at as costly a rate to Germany as
possible; and to resist Japanese expansion in the western Pacific by means short of war, but to avoid war with Japan until the

European situation had been "clarified or liquidated." Finally, the Joint Board's estimate set forth a longer range national objective: the "eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of a balance of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic and individual liberty."49

Pursuing these policies, the United States by the fall of 1941 had become a major though still limited participant in the war. When and whether it could or would do more of its own volition depended on several factors: the American estimate of the capabilities of the other major military powers; the military readiness (or better, current unreadiness) of the United States itself; the will of the American people, veering in their opinions toward support of all-out participation but still reluctant to take the final plunge; and the purpose of their leaders, particularly of President Roosevelt, who also was reluctant to accept the implications of all-out participation.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their joint estimate of 11 September made it clear that there was not much hope of defeating Hitler unless the United States threw its full military weight into the balance. They were still not certain that existing American policies and actions would insure Britain's survival. The service chiefs and their advisers thought it unlikely that Soviet forces could hold Germany in check beyond early 1942. If Britain fell thereafter, the United States at best could look forward only to a period of armed "peace" with European and Asiatic conquerors, a peace that would almost inevitably end in war under less favorable circumstances than those subsisting. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations therefore recommended all-out preparations for a large American war-effort. With such preparations made, the nation could hope to wage war successfully either in the Old World as an associate of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China or, in the event of their defeat, in the New World in collaboration
with Canada and the Latin American nations. The Army believed that the first course would require that large American ground forces eventually come to grips with the German armies on the continent of Europe.\textsuperscript{50}

The United States Army in the fall of 1941 was still very far from being ready to undertake a transatlantic offensive, and its current policies were not calculated to prepare it for action of that sort. The Army, after a year of rapid growth, had attained a numerical strength of 1,455,565 on 30 June 1941. This total represented an approximate achievement of the goal set in the summer and fall of 1940 for an Army sufficiently strong to defend the hemisphere against all eventualities. Between July and December 1941 the Army's rate of growth slowed, and it was calculated to have a strength of 1,643,477 on 7 December 1941.\textsuperscript{51} After June, the Army concentrated not on expansion but on the improvement of its existing units. Between August and November 1941 its four field armies engaged in maneuvers that not only improved their combat readiness but also disclosed faults needing correction. A fortnight after Pearl Harbor General Headquarters rated half of thirty-four divisions then in the United States as ready for combat.\textsuperscript{52} This was true only in a limited sense: most divisions lacked their full complements of equipment, most of them needed more combined arms training, and the Army did not have the supporting air and ground units necessary to weld them into effective corps and armies ready for offensive action. As of 1 October 1941, using a stricter measurement, the General Staff rated only one division, five antiaircraft regiments, and two artillery brigades as ready for offensive action. On the same date, the Air Forces had only two bombardment squadrons and three pursuit groups ready. The staff planners anticipated that by the end of the year about double this number of ground and air units would be fully prepared for task force use, and by April 1942 the Army hoped to have ready two complete corps (of three divisions each), with proper ground and air support.\textsuperscript{53}

Legislative restrictions, Army plans for releasing selective service and
Reserve personnel, and the shortage of shipping would in any event have prevented the deployment overseas of a large Army force in 1941. Congress extended the Selective Service and Training Act in August by the narrowest of margins and continued in effect the ban on sending selectees outside the Western Hemisphere. Most Army combat units had a large proportion of selectees within their ranks and therefore could not have been sent outside the hemisphere without severe disruption before their departure. The Army's own plans in the late summer of 1941 called for release of the older selectees and replacement of all selective service and National Guard enlisted men after eighteen or twenty months' service. Indeed, the Army was planning to retire all National Guard units from federal service, though it hoped to recruit by enlistment as many trained men as possible from their ranks. Army personnel plans in September contemplated only about a 10 percent increase in future ground force strength. As late as November General Marshall and his advisers assumed in their planning that no more than sixteen divisions would be made ready for overseas employment so long as the nation remained at least technically at peace.\footnote{As for shipping, there was hardly enough available during the fall of 1941 to move a task force of even one reinforced division, though the War Department hoped that there would be enough by the end of the year to move and maintain a force of fifty thousand men and that thereafter new tonnage would become available to move and supply sixty-eight thousand additional men per month.} President Roosevelt called upon General Marshall in September to defend the current and planned strength of the Army. The President was looking for ways and means of allotting more combat equipment to Soviet forces, and one method suggested had been to reduce American combat ground forces and Army overseas garrisons in order to cut their needs for equipment. On 22 September General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and the President went over, item by item, the Army's existing and projected overseas garrison strengths and its planned strength for task forces, air forces, field armies, and continental defense and housekeeping purposes. The net result was Mr. Roosevelt's approval of the Army's current strength plans and the Chief of
Staffs conclusion that the President had no real intention of seeking a reduction of the Army. 56 Conversely, until December there was certainly no initiative either from the President or from the General Staff to increase the Army much beyond its existing strength. General Headquarters in October proposed a scheme for Army expansion and for multiplying the number of trained divisions; but, as a War Department G-3 (Operations and Training Division) representative commented on 5 November, this plan would have required "a reorientation of the national objective from Hemisphere Defense to an all-out `beat Hitler' effort."57 Nothing came of this proposal until after 7 December 1941-a lack of action that led Lt. Gen.

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Lesley J. McNair of General Headquarters to comment with some asperity the day before: "I do not profess to understand the precise military objective of our Army, but assume as obvious that it must be more than passive hemispherical defense." He then went on to urge that the United States begin "the mass production of trained divisions" so that it could exercise "a decisive and perhaps dominant influence on the outcome of the war."58

The Army managed during 1941 to build up the Alaskan, Hawaiian, Panama Canal, and Puerto Rican garrisons to their authorized peace strengths in men, though not in equipment. Army plans developed in May and June for reduction of the authorized war strengths of these garrisons under the RAINBOW 5 plan came to naught; though ground strengths were reduced, corresponding increases in projected air garrisons virtually restored the cuts ordered in the summer of 1941. Iceland and the newer hemisphere defense garrisons along the Atlantic front remained well below their authorized peace strengths. As of mid-November it would have required the deployment of two hundred thousand additional troops (or as many again as were then stationed overseas) to bring the Army's outlying garrisons up to the war strengths then authorized under current RAINBOW 5 plans.59

Whatever the policies recommended by the service chiefs, therefore, the Army's current means and state of readiness gave it little choice but to carry
out the garrisoning of existing overseas bases and prepare itself for comparatively small overseas expeditionary efforts of an essentially defensive nature. This was the conclusion of the Army's October estimate: "Regardless of the course we pursue, our present forces are barely sufficient to defend our military bases and outlying possessions. If the Axis Powers were in a position to attempt a major military operation against the Western Hemisphere, our current military forces would be wholly inadequate. Obviously we are not now prepared to undertake major military operations in far-flung theaters." A War Plans section chief developed this same argument in more detail. Noting that the Victory Program visualized a great offensive, he commented:

Successful offensives are not initiated until ready .... The associated powers have been forced on the defensive. A defensive strategy should be pursued until victory forces are available .... The present strategic situation is such that the United States should adopt

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as an immediate objective the formation of forces necessary for hemisphere defense after an Axis victory in Europe. While forming such forces every reasonable effort should be made to continue Russia, Great Britain, and China in the war. When it appears that these friendly forces can continue no longer greater emphasis must be placed on building hemisphere defense forces. Such forces as are necessary for hemisphere defense must not be sent to a distant theater until victory is assured. Expansion beyond hemisphere defense forces provides the forces necessary for the offensive designed to bring about victory.61

Of the sixteen divisions that the war planners in November 1941 wanted ready for emergency use overseas as soon as possible, one was earmarked for Iceland, two for garrison duty in the British Isles, and three for a strategic reserve; the remaining ten were designated for expeditionary movements that might have to be undertaken to the east and west coasts of South America, to the Atlantic islands, and to French West Africa.62 This was in accordance with the revised War Plans' estimate of the same month, which concluded: "While waiting for the time when our troops, shipping and maintenance supplies will have reached a level to permit large scale operations in overseas theaters, there are several preliminary operations which may be undertaken which will strengthen our position in the Western Hemisphere and prepare
the way for further action in Europe or Africa when the situation warrants."
These "preliminary operations" were itemized as the completion of the
Iceland occupation, the defense of bases in northeastern Brazil, the
occupation of Dakar, and the protective occupation of the Azores, the Cape
Verdes, and the Canaries. If its operations had been guided by its own
judgment only, the Army presumably would have carried out a much more
extensive deployment for hemisphere defense, and in a generally different
direction, than actually occurred.

The Approach to War

President Roosevelt in a Labor Day address delivered on 1 September 1941
expressed his determination and bespoke that of the American people "to do
everything in their power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces." Commenting
editorially the following day, the New York Times observed that the nation
now had taken a position from which it could not retreat and that would also
inevitably force it into direct participation in the war if its current policies
proved insufficient to beat Hitler. The armed services in

their September Victory Program estimates were united in the opinion that
Germany could not be defeated under existing American policies and
measures. If the United States wanted to beat Hitler, it would have to become
a direct participant in the war as soon as possible. In default of such
participation, Secretary of War Stimson advised the President, not only could
Britain and its associates not hope to win but also they could not expect to
survive indefinitely "no matter what industrial effort is put forth by us."

When Mr. Stimson personally presented his own and the other service
recommendations to the President on 25 September, Mr. Roosevelt entered
into a frank discussion of "what would happen if and when we got into war."
The President agreed that a recognized state of war would greatly stimulate
the national defense effort. But he also expressed his dislike of the
implications of all-out war—that is, of the ultimate necessity of American
forces invading and crushing Germany. Apparently, the President still preferred to wait for events to shape the American position toward the war. Writing to Prime Minister Mackenzie King two days later, he remarked: "I have to watch this Congress and public opinion like a hawk and actual events on the ocean, together with my constant reiteration of freedom of the seas, are increasing our armed help all the time." The President knew that neither Congress nor the American people were ready for a declaration of war. When Mr. Churchill had asked for such a declaration at Argentia in August, the President (as the Prime Minister remembered it) had answered: "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months." The President in a sense "made" war in the fall of 1941 by indorsing actions that put the United States Navy and merchant marine into the Battle of the Atlantic. There can be no question about Mr. Roosevelt's determination to use every means he conceived to be practicable to strike at Hitler, but as late as mid October it seemed to Mr. Stimson that the President was being unduly influenced by people who thought other nations could win the war with American weapons.

There seems to have been a nice correspondence during the fall of 1941 between the President's position and that of the American people at large. The President's own popularity was near its prewar peak, and an even larger proportion of those questioned in public opinion polls expressed approval of his foreign policy, particularly of his policy toward Germany. To judge by the polls, the American public really feared Hitler and German militarism. A poll in August showed that a large majority of Americans believed that Hitler would not be satisfied short of world conquest, and in November another disclosed that more than three fourths of those questioned thought any Hitler "peace" in Europe would be highly inimical to the United States. The extension of American naval operations in the Atlantic, the "shoot on sight" orders to the American Navy, the arming of American merchant ships and their entry into combat zones-all of these were approved in polls by margins of two-to-one or better. One poll conducted in November showed that nearly
four fifths of those questioned approved in general of the government’s conduct toward the European war, and almost as large a majority answered in the affirmative when asked whether the United States ought to do everything it could to defeat Germany, even if that meant eventually getting into the war. The polls also showed that most people expected the United States to get into the war eventually. Despite these sentiments, too manifest to be doubted on grounds of polling inaccuracies, the American people in October were still strongly opposed to an immediate declaration of war against either Germany or Japan. \(^{70}\)

Two developments in October helped to tip the scales toward an earlier outright participation in the war. One was the real opening of the North Atlantic "shooting" war with German submarine attacks on destroyers *Kearny* and *Reuben James*. In between these attacks, the President delivered a Navy Day address that bristled. Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, then speech drafter extraordinary and subsequently compiler of the President's papers, has stated that, by the time of the 27 October address, President Roosevelt had become convinced American entry into the war was "almost unavoidable" and "nearly inevitable."\(^{71}\) The other October event was the installation of a new Cabinet in Tokyo bent on war unless the United States backed down. "Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now," recorded Mr. Stimson on 5 November. Two days later Admiral Stark said substantially the same thing when he wrote: "Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific."\(^{72}\)

Neither the Army nor the Navy wanted a showdown in the Pacific, at least not until the Army's program for reinforcing the Philippines had been completed. That would not be until spring, 1942. The Navy had carefully refrained from applying shooting orders in Pacific waters, except against German and Italian naval vessels in the southeast Pacific, in order to avoid any incident with Japan, and in general the armed services were ready to go to considerable lengths to avert or at least postpone hostilities with Japan.
Admiral Stark, to be sure, thought a declaration of war against Germany so necessary that he advocated it even if hostilities with Japan must in consequence be accepted. Nevertheless, he joined General Marshall in advising the President on 5 November that war with Japan ought to be avoided unless Japan attacked United States, British, or Dutch territory, or invaded the Kra Peninsula with intent to march on Singapore. The United States Pacific Fleet was not strong enough to challenge the Japanese Navy, and Army airpower in the Philippines would not be strong enough to provide an alternate deterrent until March 1942. Acting presumably on the basis of this advice, the President and his Cabinet on 7 November unanimously agreed that the American people would back belligerent action by the United States to check Japanese aggression against the territories that the service chiefs felt it essential to defend.

Reduced to simpler terms, the situation in November 1941 was approximately this: In the Atlantic, the United States Government and the American people wanted to help beat Hitler because they viewed Hitler as the prime menace to the security and well-being of the United States. They were willing to engage in an ever larger war effort in order to defeat Germany. A November poll indicated the readiness of a substantial majority of the American people to dispatch American naval and air power to "any place where it could best help to defeat Hitler," and a large minority approved sending Army ground forces as well. But for the time being Hitler did not want a recognized state of war with the United States. Admiral Stark had observed in October that Hitler had "every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to . . . . When he is ready, he will strike, and not before." In an interview, the German charge d'affaires expressed doubts that Germany would break its diplomatic relations with the United States, though he recognized the possibility that his government might eventually "tire of the undeclared war." Hitler himself had begun to realize that he might not be able after all to overwhelm his existing antagonists, and he certainly did not relish the prospect of having to cope with another and potentially greater
one. In the Pacific, the United States wanted to avoid war with Japan unless Japan attacked American territory or vital areas in and around the East Indies. But Japan was ready to strike at the United States if that were necessary to stop American intervention in the Far East. The Japanese were determined to secure a free hand in China and to dominate the very areas that the United States considered it vital to try to defend.

At an Imperial Conference on 6 September, the Japanese had decided that an advance toward the south should be launched before the end of October if a final round of negotiations with the United States and Great Britain proved fruitless—a decision and deadline prompted by the American oil embargo of July. The Japanese militarists had to get oil soon or give up, and they had no intention of giving up. Naval training for the attack on the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii began in September, and during the month the Japanese completed the "war gaming" of their plans and intensified the training of their land, sea, and air forces for the descent upon the Philippines, southeast Asia, and Indonesia. There were still strong voices in Japan against the course of forceful aggression charted by the Army and Navy chiefs—sufficiently strong to cause a temporary impasse in October that produced a cabinet crisis and postponed the deadline for action by six weeks.

The United States in the meantime was beginning to execute its new policy of Philippine reinforcement. Heavy bombardment planes—modern B-17's—were to provide the backbone of this reinforcement. The planners believed that if at least two groups (or 136) of these planes could be stationed in the Philippines, they would provide a positive and effective deterrent to Japanese southward expansion. The strategic concept for their employment envisioned use of Soviet and British as well as of Philippine bases. With only nine of the bombers on hand in the Philippines, and other reinforcements just beginning to move across the Pacific, an October War Plans' study concluded:

Consideration of Japanese forces and her capabilities, leads to the conclusion that the air and ground units now available or scheduled for dispatch to the Philippine Islands in

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the immediate future have changed the entire picture in the Asiatic Area. The action taken by the War Department may well be the determining factor in Japan's eventual decision and, consequently, have a vital bearing on the course of the war as a whole.\(^81\)

The strategic estimate of the same month doubted the likelihood of major Japanese aggression in the near future because of the heavy involvement of Japanese forces in China. Such aggression "would become feasible only with a radical depletion of the Russian Far East forces and the almost complete involvement of U.S. forces in the European theater."\(^82\) When the Konoye Cabinet fell in mid-October, the President and his principal military advisers took serious note of the worsening of the situation, and the Navy alerted its fleet commanders to the possibility of hostilities. The Army's Intelligence and War Plans Divisions disagreed with the Navy and informed Army Pacific commanders that while Japanese-American relations remained tense no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appeared imminent.\(^83\)

The policy of the new Tojo Cabinet was in fact precisely the same as its predecessor's. At an Imperial Conference on 5 November the Japanese decided that unless the United States and Great Britain accepted Japan's demands by 25 November, Japan would go to war.\(^84\) While this new and final ultimatum was en route, President Roosevelt apparently still hoped for a peaceful settlement with Japan, or, that failing, for the opportunity to continue his current policy of "stalling and holding off" Japan; but he realized also that the Japanese situation might "blow up in the very near future."\(^85\)

The events that followed the arrival in Washington on 17 November of the new Japanese envoy, Saburo Kurusu, have been recounted in detail elsewhere in this series, in many other narratives, and in the massive published record of the Pearl Harbor investigations.\(^86\) It is sufficient to record here that by the deadline date, 25 November, American civilian and military leaders had tentatively agreed among themselves on the terms of a *modus vivendi* to be proffered the Japanese envoys. When consulted, the Chinese expressed
violent opposition to the terms, and the British were reluctant to accept them. It is very doubtful that Japan would have accepted them either, even as a basis for further negotiation; but Japan was given no choice in the matter, since the President and Secretary of State decided not to present the *modus vivendi* to the Japanese envoys. The statement of American principles that they received instead was rejected by Tokyo and the decision for war reaffirmed. The die had been cast.

The President and his principal advisers were well aware by late November that the Japanese might strike almost at once and without warning. The service chiefs expected the first Japanese moves to be made against Thailand and the Burma Road, though they considered an attack on the Philippines a distinct possibility.87 No one in authority in Washington gave more than a passing thought to Pearl Harbor and the fleet. An Army intelligence estimate being prepared at the end of November stated that Japan was "completely extended militarily and economically," with sixty of its seventy-one divisions tied down on the Asiatic mainland; this being the case, Japan was "momentarily unable to concentrate anywhere a military striking force sufficient to ensure victory" in any new major offensive. Germany, G-2 contended, would for the next four months "remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives," though it was unlikely to do so during this period.88 As for the American people, while they did not want to go to war with Japan, they were certain that if such a war came the United States would win it; and polls on the very eve of Pearl Harbor disclosed that a substantial majority believed a war with Japan would be easy and, by a three-to-one margin, that it would be short.89

Neither the military nor the public estimates of Japan's capabilities took into account the crippling of the Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941. What might have followed had that not happened can only be conjectured. Nevertheless, initial fleet and air losses in Hawaii and the Philippines, however tragic in themselves, assured a united and all-out war effort by the United States Government and people against the aggressor nations. In itself this was the best guarantee of final victory.
Endnotes for Chapter VI

1 *FDR Personal Letters*, II, 1179.

2 Ltr, President to Secy Harold L. Ickes, 1 Jul 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


4 Gerow Diary, entries of 3, 9, and 10 Jul 41; Rad, TAG to CG PCD, 3 Jul 41, AG 800.2 (7-3-41).


7 Stimson Diary, entries of 5 and 8 Jul 41; information obtained from Captain Kittredge, USN, JCS Hist Sec, in written commentary for OCMH Strategy Sec.

8 Study, unsigned and undated, title: Draft Suggestions for President's Report to Congress, SW file, White House.


10 *Ibid.*; Stimson Diary, entry of 21 Jul 41.
11 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 3, entry of 10 Jul 41.

12 Memo, Col Bundy for Gen Marshall, 16 Aug 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 10; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 358, 370-71; Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 249-52; Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 441, 449; Memo of Hopkins, 13 Sep 41, abstracted in Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book IV, Item 10, FDRL.

13 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 79-80; Kittredge MS, Ch. 19, pp. 594-96; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1047; Msg, Prime Minister Churchill to Gen Jan Christian Smuts, 14 Sep 41, Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 517; Pers Ltrs, Adm Stark to CinC's Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, 22 and 23 Sep 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2209, 2212.

14 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 94-95; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 382-83. The first Army air attack out of Newfoundland apparently occurred on 27 October. Stimson Diary, entry of 28 Oct 41.

15 Msg, Prime Minister Churchill to Gen Smuts, 9 Nov 41, Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 593-94.

16 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 81-82.


18 See Ch. V, above. On Weygand's role, see Hull, Memoirs, II, 962-64; and Ltr, Adm Leahy to President, 28 Jul 41, Leahy, I Was There, p. 461.

19 Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 177n.

20 Notes on Conf between Adm Raeder and Hitler,,25 Jul 41, and Annex I to these Notes, Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 13-18.

21 Halder Journal, VII, 36, entry of 11 Aug 41

22 "Extract from an OKW Memorandum on the strategic situation as of late summer, 1941, approved by the Fuehrer," Halder Journal, VII, 94-99, entry
Endnotes for Chapter VI

of 13 Sep 41.


25 Kittredge MS, Ch. 18, p. 515, and Ch. 19, pp. 556-58.

26 Stimson Diary, entry of 12 Aug 41.


28 Gerow Diary, entry of 31 Aug 41.

29 Memo, G-2 for WPD, 18 Sep 41, WPD 4494.

30 WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4494-21.

31 See Ch. V, above.

32 WPD Draft Memo, n.d., [written between 9 and 18 Aug 41], WPD 4422-11.

33 Memo G-1 for CofS, 8 Jul 41, OCS 21176-10; D/F, WPD to G-1, 16 Sep 41, WPD 4160-20.

34 "The Navy (and the Army) make much of having sufficient ships ready at all times for the carrying of an expedition to the Azores or the Cape Verdes or Brazil. It is my thought that no human being can tell when or if such an expedition will ever be ordered." Memo, President for Adm Emory S. Land, 1 Aug 41, *FDR Personal Letters*, II, 1193.

35 Memo, Under Secy Welles for President, 11 Jul 41; Ltr, President to Dr. Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal, 14 Jul 41; Ltr, Welles to President Roosevelt, 31 Jul 41. All in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Ltr, W. Averell


The President's unqualified commitment to send troops to the Azores whenever the British chose to move against the Canaries must have sorely tempted Prime Minister Churchill, who was undisguisedly anxious to have the United States enter the war. This seems to have been a carefully calculated commitment on Mr. Roosevelt's part.

37 Memo, Col Bundy for CofS, 20 Aug 41; Memo, Comdr Forrest P. Sherman, USN, for CNO, 18 Aug 41, recording staff convs of 11-12 Aug 41. Both in OPD Exec 4, Item 10.

38 Memo, WPD for GHQ, 11 Aug 41, WPD 4422-3; Reports of 12 and 18 Aug and 9 and 17 Sep 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf's Binder 1; Entries of 18 Aug and 11 and 17 Sep 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Memo GHQ for WPD, 22 Sep 41, WPD 4422-3.

39 Reports of 18 Sep and 7, 10, and 14 Oct 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf's Binder 1; Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Oct 41; Memo, WPD for GHQ, 16 Oct 41. Last two in WPD 4422-3, Annex, Sec. X, Nov 41, to WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4510 Theater Studies.

40 Report of Conf in OCS, 20 Sep 41, WPD 4594; Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Sep 41, WPD 4422-17; Stimson Diary, entry of 29 Sep 41.


42 Memo, WPD for SW, 18 Sep 41, WPD 4494;Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Oct 41, WPD 4511-12. Also references cited in footnote 41, above.
43 Stimson Diary, entries of 29 Sep and 3, 6, 9, and 10 Oct 41.


46 The Joint Board, Army, separate Army Air, and Navy estimates were presented to the President en bloc on 25 September 1941, though some portions had been transmitted to him before then. On the Victory Program, see Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Ch. XI; Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning, 1941-42*, pp. 58-62; and Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43*, Ch. V.

47 Study, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Estimate of U.S. Over-all Production Requirements, Sec. II, par. 5, in Kittredge MS, Ch. 19, App. C. The Stark memo of November 1940 had used an almost identical phrase.

48 WPD 4494-21.

49 These points have been summarized from the following documents: JB Estimate, 11 Sep 41, and WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, cited in preceding two footnotes; JB 325, ser 728, 18 Oct 41; Memo, WPD for SW, 20 Oct 41, OCS 21090-51; and Annex, Sec III, Nov 41, to WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4510 Theater Studies.

50 JB Estimate, 11 Sep 41, cited in footnote 47, above.

51 The 30 June 1941 figure is from Annual *Report of the Secretary of War*, 1941; the 7 December 1941 figure, from table compiled by Returns Sec Misc Div AGO, copy in GHQ Secret Papers Binder 1. Neither figure includes Army nurses, who numbered about 6,800 on 7 December 1941.


53 WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, Sec. VI, WPD 4494-21.
54 Memo, G-3 for SGS, 9 Sep 41, OCS 18251-63; Report of Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, 18 Oct 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf's Binder 1; Notes, 5 Nov 41, title: Conference on Demobilization of the National Guard and Increase in Strength of Army, OPD Exec 4, Item 6.

55 Annex, Sec. II, Nov 41, to WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4510 Theater Studies.

56 Notes on Conf in OCS, 20 Sep 41; Memo, CofS for Col Robert W. Crawford, WPD, 22 Sep 41; Memo, CofS for President, 22 Sep 41, and revised version, 21 Oct 41. All in WPD 4594. Stimson Diary, entry of 22 Sep 41. The original of the 22 September memorandum, bearing the President's annotations, is in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL, and a copy in this form is in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1636-38. Of the various copies in Army files, only that in OCS 21176-18 is dated.

57 Notes on Conf, 5 Nov 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 6.

58 Memo, CofS GHQ for G-3, 6 Dec 41, GHQ 320.2 Strength of the Army Binder 2.

59 On the planned reduction in garrison strength, see: Memo, WPD for CofS, 28 May 41, WPD 4175-18; and Ltr, CofS to CNO, 27 Jun 41, WPD 4175-22. The originally projected RAINBOW 5 strengths are given in charts inclosed in Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 May 41, WPD 3493-11; the November 1941 current and authorized peace and war strengths, in Tab A to Memo, G-3 for CofS, 19 Nov 41, AG 381 (11-19-41).

60 WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4494-21.

61 Memo, Col Donald Wilson, Chief Jt Requirements Sec WPD, for Col Thomas T. Handy, WPD, 7 Oct 41, WPD 4494-21.


63 Annex, Sec. IV, Nov 14, to WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4510
64 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1941, pp. 365-69; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 369.

65 Ltr, SW to President, 23 Sep 41, SW file, 1848a.

66 Stimson Diary, entry of 25 Sep 41.

67 FDR Personal Letters, II, 1216.

68 Msg, Prime Minister to Gen Smuts, 9 Nov 41, Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 593-94.

69 Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Oct 41.


71 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1941, pp. 444-45.

72 Stimson Diary, entry of 5 Nov 41; Ltr, Adm Stark to Adm Thomas C. Hart, 7 Nov 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, p. 2456.


74 Jt Memo CofS and CNO for President, 5 Nov 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2222-23.

75 Stimson Diary, entry of 7 Nov 41.


80 Ltrs; SW to President, 22 Sep and 21 Oct 41, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 20, pp. 4430-31, 4442-44. Originals in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. For the details of this reinforcement, see Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, Ch. III.

81 WPD study, 8 Oct 41, sub: Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands, WPD 4175-18, Sec. 2. Tenses as in the original. A copy of the study went to General Douglas MacArthur by Memo, 13 Oct 41, describing it as "an indication of present War Department thought on this subject."

82 WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, Sec. II, WPD 4494-21.


84 *Far East Judgment*, pp. 962-63.

85 Memo, Harold Balfour (British Under Secy State for Air) for Harry Hopkins, 10 Nov 41, recording Balfour's conversation with the President the preceding day, Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 420-21.

86 Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Ch. XV. Among the best of the more detailed narratives are: Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, Chs. XXVI-XXVIII; Walter Millis, *This Is Pearl! The United States and Japan-1941* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1947); and Feis, *Road to Pearl Harbor*. 
87 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Nov 41, OPD Exec 8, Book A.

88 Preliminary draft of G-2 Memo, sub: Brief Periodic Estimate of Situation, December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942, received in General Headquarters for comment on 28 November 1941, GHQ 381, Sec. 2; revised estimate, transmitted by Memo, G-2 for CofS, 5 Dec 41, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Pt. 14, pp. 1373-84.

CHAPTER VII

The Shift Toward the Offensive

The Japanese struck Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December. As soon as news of the attack reached Washington, the Army and Navy put the RAINBOW 5 war plan into effect against Japan. On 8 December Congress declared war on Japan, and on the same day the Army and Navy directed subordinate commanders to prepare to carry out RAINBOW 5 tasks against Germany and Italy as well, since there were indications that the European Axis partners were about to declare war on the United States. Germany and Italy finally made their declarations of war on the United States on 11 December, and Congress responded the same day with a unanimous vote for war against them. Formal invocation of RAINBOW 5 in the Atlantic area followed.

Thus by 11 December the United States was fully in the war, and for its own national security and salvation the nation was in the war to win. Congress quickly removed all restrictions on foreign service, and the Army immediately abandoned its plans for releasing the National Guard, other Reservists, and selectees. The Victory Program estimates of September had charted the hard course ahead—an all-out mobilization of manpower and material resources. From the beginning the armed services were determined to strike at the enemies’ main forces overseas as soon as possible and to carry out the basic RAINBOW 5 principle of beating Germany first. How soon the nation could concentrate on the execution of these fundamental military objectives was not clearly seen in the days immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack and the almost simultaneous Japanese strikes against the Philippines and southeast Asia.

The Reaction to Pearl Harbor

The Japanese in one stroke had upset the balance of naval power in the Pacific, a balance that had hitherto assured the relative invulnerability of the American position in the eastern Pacific. Relying on the defensive superiority of the United States Fleet and the seeming impregnability of
Oahu, its mid Pacific base, the administration since 1939 had encouraged the location and

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expansion of major military aircraft factories on the Pacific coast. Now the aircraft factories, and key naval installations more vital than ever in view of the exposed position of Oahu, were open to the threat of Japanese carrier attacks. To the southward, little had been done before 7 December to protect the Panama Canal against a naval air attack launched from the Pacific. The Japanese had used six carriers in their strike against Oahu, and for the moment it appeared perfectly feasible for them to make further use of carriers in strikes against the exposed Pacific front of the continent.

The imbalance in Pacific naval power threatened briefly to alter the fundamental American strategy of supplying munitions to the nations fighting Hitler. There was talk on 8 December of enacting legislation that would divert all lend-lease appropriations to United States forces. The next day Mr. Stimson pointed out to the President "that our ability hitherto to fulfill the Lend-Lease program had depended upon our ability to rely upon the former defense of the west coast by the Navy and Hawaii." Now, he added, the United States must build its continental defenses on a new basis.1

The Army had enough trained manpower to deal with the immediate situation, but not enough equipment. Therefore, all lend-lease and foreign contract shipments of munitions were stopped on 7 December 1941, and for a month thereafter the United States released to its military associates only those items for which its own armed services had no immediate need.2 On or after 7 December, for example, the United States seized 479 military aircraft and 798 airplane engines belonging to the British Government and later paid $80,000,000 for them.3 By such expedients, and by temporarily diverting aircraft from training, the Army built a 54-group combat air force almost within the month of December. Similarly, many Army ground force units received unexpected allotments of equipment that made them ready at least for defensive deployment. During December a great many of the newly
equipped Army ground and air units were rushed to the defense of the Pacific coast. By the end of December the Navy had also redressed its defensive strength in the eastern Pacific, primarily by shifting three battleships and one carrier the same vessels moved to the Atlantic the preceding May—from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet. These measures and the clarification of the military outlook permitted resumption of foreign aid shipments in early January 1942.

The military outlook had appeared much grimmer in the second week of December when the War Plans Division prepared its first strategic estimate of the war situation. This estimate considered that Japan had already gained undisputed control of the western and mid-Pacific regions, and that the Japanese were in a strong position to dispute control of the eastern Pacific. On the other side of the world, Germany appeared to be stabilizing its position on the Soviet front and could thereafter release a hundred divisions and the bulk of its air force for operations in western Europe and Africa. The Soviet Union had already made known its intention of remaining neutral in the Pacific conflict, and War Plans suggested the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet negotiated peace in the near future. In the immediate future the planners anticipated the probability of intensified German air activity in the North Atlantic, including the possibility of air raids along the Atlantic coast of the United States, and they believed a German occupation of French North and West Africa more likely than a German drive against the Middle East. The occupation of Africa might be abetted by the increasingly subservient attitude of Vichy toward Germany. If Germany also obtained the remnant of the French Fleet, it could follow up the African operation with a military strike across the South Atlantic.4

In the Pacific, as General Gerow observed on 9 December, the Dutch East Indies appeared to be the prime Japanese objective, but Japan could most readily insure their capture and retention by occupying Oahu, or at least by containing and neutralizing America's Hawaiian outpost. The War Plans Division therefore anticipated the probability of a new Japanese attack on
Hawaii and of a Japanese move to secure a base in the Aleutian Islands. Besides making raids on shipping to the east of Hawaii, the Japanese might also stage air attacks against exposed military objectives (especially the aircraft factories) on the Pacific coast and against the Panama Canal. A forecast by General Headquarters along these same general lines emphasized the peril to the Canal and the necessity of reinforcing Army airpower in the Panama area to permit effective reconnaissance of Pacific waters.5

Beyond these rather pessimistic analyses of the real possibilities of the war situation, Army estimates and plans of early and mid-December 1941 were influenced by a series of false alarms of impending enemy attacks and by a strong suspicion that the Axis Powers were acting in accordance with a closely coordinated plan of operations. Typical of the former was the report, telephoned personally by General Marshall to Fourth Army Headquarters on 12 December, that a Japanese force including an aircraft carrier had been sighted off the California coast north of San Francisco and that it might at-tack at any moment.6 The President had voiced his belief in Axis cooperation in an address to the American people on 9 December. After stating that Germany had incited Japan to attack the United States, he continued: "We also know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan."7

The European and Asiatic Axis partners in fact did not coordinate their military operations either before or after Pearl Harbor. Indeed, the Japanese attack came as a complete and somewhat unpleasant surprise to Hitler who, far from inciting Japan to war on the United States, was still hoping to keep the latter out of full participation in the conflict. Since July the Nazis had been egging on the Japanese to attack Siberia instead of southeast Asia. Nor did the Tripartite Pact require Germany to declare war on the United States after the Pearl Harbor attack. Japan was the obvious aggressor, and therefore the pact did not apply. Hitler decided to declare war (and Mussolini automatically followed suit) primarily because he feared that if Germany did
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not Japan might consider its Axis alliance a dead letter. On the same day that they declared war, the Germans announced the terms of a new Axis pact, which stated that the three partners would conduct the war "in common and jointly" and that none would make a separate peace or armistice without the others' consent. Beyond this, the only known coordination of German and Japanese operational plans was an agreement on a demarcation line through the Indian Ocean to divide their spheres of submarine activity. The lack of Axis military coordination seemed "almost incomprehensible" to Germany's Washington military attaché when he learned of it on his return to Berlin in May 1942; and, amidst the stress of December 1941, American officialdom was frankly and properly incredulous that such could be the case.8

Looking at the situation with the knowledge available as of 12 December 1941, the War Plans Division recommended the following program of Army action during the immediate future:

1. Take all possible steps short of jeopardizing the security of Continental U.S. and the Panama Canal to reinforce the defenses of Oahu.
2. Take immediate steps to establish in Northeast Brazil sufficient forces to deny this area to Axis forces.
3. Take all practical measures to increase the security of the Panama Canal.

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4. Provide sufficient properly equipped forces for Defense Commands to insure the security of important areas and facilities on the coasts of the Continental US
5. Provide necessary reinforcements for Alaska and our Atlantic bases in the Western Hemisphere.
6. For the accomplishment of the above, utilize any equipment or supplies now available or being produced in the US for whatever purpose, curtailing aid to our associates as necessary.
7. Immediately initiate all-out effort to accomplish the overall production program now contemplated for the ultimate defeat of our enemies.9

Three days later General Headquarters drafted a similar but somewhat more specific "basic strategical plan," recommending three preparatory stages before the Army launched any large overseas offensives. During stage one,
the Army's major task would be to secure the nation's Pacific and Atlantic defenses—along the line Alaska-Hawaii-Ecuador in the Pacific and the line Newfoundland-Bermuda-Brazil in the Atlantic. The Pacific defense line would require (in order of priority) reinforcement of Hawaii, the Panama Canal defenses, and Alaska and establishment of "a secure southern flank in the general area of Guayaquil, Ecuador." First priority along the Atlantic front would go to reinforcement of Caribbean defenses and to establishment of American forces in Brazil. Following these moves the Army would reinforce Newfoundland, Bermuda, Greenland, and Iceland in that order. During the second stage, the Army would concentrate on building a highly mobile reserve (primarily of aircraft and of airborne troops) in the continental United States, capable of being moved rapidly to any threatened point along the defensive perimeter established during stage one. During the third stage the Army and Navy, having established a secure defensive position, would prepare the large land, sea, and air forces required for major offensive operations.10

In revising its current estimate of the situation on 18 December, the War Plans Division incorporated certain general observations on strategy contributed by General Embick two days earlier, and summarized the overseas reinforcement measures then under way. The planners' analysis of the situation, including the potentialities of enemy action in the Atlantic and Pacific, remained unchanged. Though reporting and recommending continuation of the effort to reinforce the Philippines, the revised estimate otherwise urged immediate action only within the defensive perimeter previously outlined. It accepted General Embick's conclusion:

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The entire national life of each of our enemies has been organized for years in preparation for the present war. We and our allies are still in the early stages of such preparation. In consequence for each it is essential that we avoid any and all commitments that will dissipate our present limited resources without assurance of adequate return, that we accept as the first essential the security of the home citadel, and that we proceed at maximum speed to the development of the war machine which the potential of the nation permits.11
The Army was not in fact free to adopt and follow any such orderly course of defensive and then offensive preparation as that advocated by the War Plans and General Headquarters staffs, though in succeeding months it did deploy forces in the Western Hemisphere to the approximate limits proposed in the mid-December recommendations.12 The President and his principal War Department advisers—the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff had necessarily to look at the situation from a broader point of view than that of the Army planners. They had to consider political as well as strictly military factors in determining the course of Army action. They had also to weigh Army views against those of the Navy and against those of the nations associated with the United States in fighting the Axis. Possibly the most important factor in modifying the immediate outlook after Pearl Harbor was a growing realization that the Japanese attack was not part and parcel of a coordinated plan of the Axis nations to loose all their fury in the direction of the United States. During December it became increasingly evident that the United States could secure its position with a lesser defensive deployment than earlier supposed, and begin at once to consider military operations overseas that would prepare for the larger offensives to come.

Planning for the Offensive

It appeared for a few days in mid-December that the first offensive operation of United States forces might develop in the West Indies against Vichy-controlled Martinique and the French naval vessels harbored there. Since June 1940 it had been American policy to maintain the status quo of France's New World possessions so long as they were not used in any way to assist Axis operations in the Atlantic. On 10 December the War Plans Division received a report from the Navy that the French aircraft carrier Bearn might be getting ready to leave Martinique. Army authorities (Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and General Gerow) decided this must not happen. The

Bearn was the only aircraft carrier possibly available to the European Axis Powers for operations in the Atlantic, neither the German nor Italian Navy
possessing any. Even though it was not in fighting trim after eighteen months' internment and Martinique reportedly had only ten planes in condition to fly, Mr. Stimson told Secretary of State Hull that he would consider the Bearn's escape a catastrophe. Mr. Hull apparently agreed, for he promised to question Vichy at once on its intentions, and without waiting for an answer he told the Army and Navy to go ahead and capture or sink any French naval vessel that tried to leave Martinique. The Navy of course was to take the lead, but the Army Caribbean commander was ordered to support whatever action the Navy took.\textsuperscript{13}

All of this happened on 10 December. On the following day Ambassador Leahy sought assurances from Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan not only about Martinique and its naval vessels but also about the French Fleet generally, French Africa, and continued French neutrality in accordance with the 1940 armistice terms. Vichy promised not to alter its policy on any of these points. Three days later, after delivering President Roosevelt's acknowledgment of these assurances, Ambassador Leahy requested that Vichy disarm the French possessions in the New World and permit American officers to supervise their disarmament. He also offered American protection to the disarmed colonies. The French Government turned down these requests, thereby leaving the French possessions in \textit{status quo}, but it did authorize their governor, Admiral Robert, to renew in writing the informal agreement of November 1940 to maintain the \textit{status quo}. On 17 December Admiral Robert signed a confirmation of the earlier Robert-Greenslade agreement and delivered it to Rear Adm. Frederick J. Horne of the United States Navy.\textsuperscript{14}

Pending the signature of Robert-Horne agreement, the Navy and Army had closely patrolled Martinique with ships and planes. The Washington planners reviewed the existing joint plan for the occupation of Martinique and Guadeloupe and proposed that the Army forces for that purpose be strengthened by additional planes and by airborne troops. The idea behind the revised plan was to "use a strong force, no bluff, and hit them with everything at once" if Admiral Robert rejected a surrender ultimatum-for which a one-hour time limit was suggested. The commander of the Caribbean Defense Command would have much preferred this solution to the problem.
G-2 was as suspicious of Admiral Robert after the new agreement as before and urged that the French West Indies at least be kept under the closest scrutiny. On the other hand, the Department of State and the Navy accepted the assurances of Vichy and the written pledge of Admiral Robert in good faith, though the Army and Navy continued their sea and air patrol of Martinique.15

On 24 December, one week after the conclusion of the Robert-Horne agreement, a small incident occurred that had serious implications and repercussions. The Free French seized the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, situated off Newfoundland's southern coast. This action not only violated the general status quo understanding with Vichy so recently reaffirmed, but also it violated pledges given by General Charles de Gaulle and by the British Government that no such move would be made without American consent. Secretary of State Hull took great umbrage at this incident, but neither President Roosevelt nor Prime Minister Churchill would back up Department of State demands that the Free French be evicted and the status quo restored. American public opinion, starved for "good" war news, had greeted this small and bloodless action with enthusiasm. The French admiral who made the seizure refused to leave, and the President felt that the United States could not "afford to send an expedition to bomb him out.16 Unquestionably, this affair had an adverse effect on the chances of securing French connivance in an unopposed Anglo-American entry into North Africa; it also helped to make General de Gaulle persona non grata to the American Department of State for the remainder of the war. Of equal significance, from Secretary Hull's viewpoint, was the fact that the seizure violated both American policy and the Havana agreements of 1940. The Department of State had consistently maintained that if and when protective occupation of European possessions became necessary, it must be undertaken by forces drawn from the American republics and not by Old World belligerent forces. Any such action also required the approval of the other American nations. If Mr. Hull on the one hand seemed to magnify the incident out of all proportion to its true dimensions, the President and Prime Minister on the other showed no real understanding of the underlying
principles at stake or of the practical consequences of General de Gaulle's highhanded action. 17

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Before the Martinique question was resolved, President Roosevelt had asked the service chiefs for their recommendation with respect to an immediate protective occupation of the Azores, either invited or uninvited. General Marshall and Admiral Stark advised him that the protection of Atlantic shipping required keeping the Azores out of German hands, and that this was still considered an American and not a British responsibility. At the urging of the War Plans Division, the service chiefs made no differentiation between the forces needed for a peaceful operation and a hostile one, holding that any force dispatched ought to be prepared for the worst. The initial combat landing force would have to number twenty-seven thousand men, and afterward it would need to be replaced by a holding force of thirty-two thousand. Since this operation would place a severe drain on available merchant shipping and on the Atlantic Fleet, the President was further advised that the Azores project could be undertaken only if all United States forces were withdrawn from Iceland, and then only with the understanding that convoys and the other Atlantic garrisons would have to get along with considerably less naval protection while the Azores operation was in progress.18

The Navy, in particular, was reluctant to embark on a new Atlantic operation such as an Azores expedition, since its great concern centered on redressing its position in the Pacific and especially on securing the Hawaiian Islands against a new Japanese attack. General Marshall subscribed to the Navy's statement on this point:

Unless every possible effort is made, and every suitable available resource of weapons and shipping is devoted to the restoration of the safety of the Hawaiian Islands, the United States may suddenly face a major disaster through the loss of those Islands to Japan. Not only would this be a terrible political blow, but we would at once lose our power of taking an offensive against Japan, without which the war may at best become a stalemate.19
Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations on 11 December had urged that the Army put all of its available resources into the reinforcement of Hawaii, to the virtual exclusion of other overseas reinforcement. Admiral Stark, insisting that the islands were "in terrible danger of early capture by Japan," asked the Army to rush upwards of one hundred thousand equipped men with appropriate air support to Hawaii, both to reinforce Oahu and to permit the strong garrisoning of three of the other major islands. In response General Marshall, though acknowledging the strategic importance of Oahu, insisted that the Panama Canal and the Pacific coast must have a higher priority in reinforcement; he also pointed out that even if the military equipment and shipping were available for a Hawaiian reinforcement as large as that proposed by Admiral Stark, the Navy was in no position to guarantee their safe passage to the islands. Oahu nevertheless did obtain large Army ground and air reinforcements during December and January.20

On the same day that the Marshall-Stark memorandum stressing the vital importance of Hawaiian reinforcement went to the President — 14 December — Mr. Roosevelt, with the support of Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, decided to attempt reinforcement of the Philippines. General Marshall gave the task of seeking ways and means of carrying out this decision to Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had just reported for duty in Washington. In figuring ways and means General Eisenhower worked closely with Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, the chief of G-4, and within the week their thought and energy helped to set in motion a line of military action of world-wide rather than Western Hemisphere dimensions.21

A convoy of Philippine-bound reinforcements sailing westward from Hawaii at the moment of the Japanese attack had already been diverted to Australia in the hope that it or some of its contents might be able to proceed from thence to the Philippines. On 17 December General Marshall approved
General Eisenhower's recommendation that an American military base be established in Australia as a position from which the Philippines might be supported. The rapidity of the Japanese advance was to block most of the planned reinforcement of the Philippines even from Australia, but the base established there soon became the focal point of American efforts to contain the southward Japanese advance. It was assumed at the outset that Australia would be primarily an air base, but in December 1941 there was no transpacific air route over which to send Army bombardment planes to Australia, though a new route out of Japanese reach was in the making.

In consequence, the air route via northeastern Brazil and across the South Atlantic and Africa suddenly acquired vital importance. Developed during the preceding six months as an air ferrying and supply route to the Middle East, until February 1942 it was the only air route and the only quick supply route to the Far East. It therefore became urgently necessary to keep Brazilian and African airfields out of German reach. In Brazil, the Army had to be content for the moment with stationing small Marine detachments at three key airfields. If feasible, the best way to protect this new life line to the Middle and Far East would have been to block German penetration into Africa by getting there first. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, after discussing the South Atlantic situation with his chief on 17 December, in writing urged:

The Northeastern shoulder of South America and the Western bulge of Africa are absolutely essential as take-off and landing points if we are to get aircraft to the Middle East, Russia and the Far East. There is increasing evidence of German design against Spanish Morocco and of collaboration with the French in Morocco and Algeria. Any German penetration of the West Coast of Africa would be a grave threat to our ability to accelerate the termination of the war . . . . I respectfully recommend that the protection of the Western bulge of Africa and this essential air route be moved up to the highest priority classification.
General Arnold promptly indorsed Mr. Lovett's recommendation. Mr. Stimson was persuaded that the saving of western Africa was second in importance only to "the primary question of saving the British Isles and winning the Battle of the Atlantic".

Thus by 18 December, the day the Army received British proposals for an agenda to guide the Anglo-American (ARCADIA) conference soon to begin, Army authorities were already taking a broader view of the war situation across the Atlantic as well as across the Pacific. They were beginning to think in terms of a limited projection of American military power across both oceans in the immediate future.

In preparation for the ARCADIA meetings, the Army and the Navy had to reassess the war situation, redefine their strategic objectives, and decide on both the immediate and the long-range courses of action most likely to achieve those objectives. The war outlook remained gloomy enough, though not so grim as it had appeared in American eyes during the first week after 7 December. Japan's overwhelming naval and air superiority in the Far East made it seem probable that the Japanese could capture Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, cut off Chinese communications with India, and gravely threaten Australia and New Zealand and their communications with the United States. General Marshall and Admiral Stark believed that even as the Japanese swept southward they had the means to make continued raids on the Hawaiian Islands a probability, and devastating raids on Alaska, the Pacific coast, and

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the Panama Canal distinct possibilities. In the Atlantic area, German and Italian forces had been routed in eastern Libya after a hard battle begun in mid-November, and were still falling back toward Tripoli. The Germans were also reported to be withdrawing ground and air forces from the Eastern Front, where Soviet arms had finally checked the German advance. Neither of these setbacks, in the view of the Army planners, had materially weakened Germany's position; rather, they held that the Germans possessed
such powerful land and air forces -that for the time being their position in Europe was secure against any major attack. Germany's future course of action, the planners believed, might be either to renew the advance toward the East (both in the Soviet Union and in the Mediterranean area) in order to join hands with Japan, or to stabilize in the East and undertake the invasion of Great Britain. Whichever course the Germans chose, they could be expected "to occupy the Iberian Peninsula and the West Coast of Africa and continue operations in the Atlantic in order to interrupt British and American air and sea communications with the Middle and Far East." General Marshall and Admiral Stark agreed on the likelihood of a German advance into French North and West Africa and, coupled with this, an intensified campaign by Axis submarine and surface raiders against Atlantic shipping. "We can expect," they advised, "the frequent appearance of submarines on the coasts of North and South America"-a forecast soon to be validated . But there was also a real danger in overestimating enemy capabilities. In urging Secretary of War Stimson to advocate offensive action wherever possible, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy observed:

The initiative Germany gained in Western Europe forced Great Britain on the defensive, which, until the recent Libyan campaign has been the theme of British strategy since that time. The naval blow dealt the United States by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor has produced a somewhat similar view by the naval and military authorities of the United States. Japan, Germany, and Italy, each operating on interior lines, are rapidly encircling the Western Hemisphere, and unless immediate offensive action is undertaken by the United States the war will eventually result in a total defense of this hemisphere.26

General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their recommendations to the President carefully distinguished between what it was essential and what it was desirable to do in the immediate future. The United Kingdom and Iceland had to be held at all costs, and the maintenance of Anglo-American sea communications in the North Atlantic was essential to a continuance of the war effort. In the Pacific, they thought it essential to hold Hawaii and con-
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Continue the operation of a strong fleet from there, since in their opinion the Hawaiian Islands constituted the only position from which the United States could eventually launch offensive operations against Japan. In Asia, Great Britain had to keep control of India in order to prevent the juncture of Axis forces. If possible, the Soviet Union had to be kept in the war since "Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in the field." These were the essentials. The desirables included holding or gaining control of all other strategic areas threatened by the Axis Powers. For example: "The Atlantic Islands (Azores, Cape Verde, etc.) should not pass into enemy control. The Middle East and French and Italian North Africa, if firmly in the hands of the Associated Powers, would constitute a position from which the United States and the United Kingdom could employ offensive action against Italy, Spain, and France, and thus indirectly against Germany." 27

The basic difficulty of the United States in choosing an immediate course of action, as the planners saw it, was that the Army could not "at this moment employ any large forces outside the Western Hemisphere because of shortages in equipment, ammunition, and shipping." 28 Because of the first two shortages, the Army still had only one division in the United States ready for immediate active service overseas. While the Army could complete the relief of British troops in Iceland, or dispatch an expeditionary force to the Natal area, or the Azores, or the Cape Verdes, or reinforce the Philippines or Dutch East Indies, because of the shipping shortage it could not execute "more than one, or at most two, of these operations simultaneously." 29 From this point of view the Army planners, though acknowledging the high desirability of establishing American control in French West Africa, could not see how it could be done in the near future. If the Germans wished, the War Plans Division believed, they could during the winter of 1941-42 put as many as fifty divisions with air support into African operations and gain control of the entire coast from Tripoli to Dakar. Current plans for an American occupation of Dakar and the Cape Verde Islands called for a total force of 171,000 men, and the planners held that it would be impossible to prepare a force of that magnitude for movement overseas before the summer of 1942. 30

On 21 December, the eve of the ARCADIA Conference, President Roosevelt met with his principal Army and Navy advisers to receive their
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of the war situation and to discuss the recommended courses of action. The President and his advisers tentatively decided to complete the relief of British Army forces in Iceland and to send at least two divisions to Northern Ireland in order to release British troops for the defense of England and Scotland. In the southern Atlantic, the Dakar-Cape Verdes project was to be given first priority in Army planning, the Azores project was to be "subordinated," and the possibility of landing in North Africa was "to be studied." No further ship transfers from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet were to be made. In the Pacific, this meeting confirmed the establishment of an American base in Australia and the necessity for securing communication with it across the Pacific.31

The ARCADIA Decisions

The Anglo-American conference began with a meeting between the President, the Prime Minister, and their political advisers on the evening of 22 December and continued through the final White House conference on 14 January 1942.32 At their initial meeting, the President and the Prime Minister decided to push two projects that were to dominate the discussion at the ARCADIA staff conferences. One involved sending four partially trained and equipped American divisions to Northern Ireland, where they would relieve three fully trained British divisions for service elsewhere. The other project was for an Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa (Morocco and Algeria), to be undertaken with French acquiescence as soon as the British Libyan offensive approached French Tunisia. The President's enthusiasm for these two operations reflected his desire to have the American people understand their full commitment in the Atlantic war at a moment when American attention was focused on the Pacific. The first increment of American troops began to move to Northern Ireland in January 1942, and in the same month additional United States Army replacements were sent for the relief of the marines and British troops in Iceland. The
Iceland relief was completed by midsummer, but the Ireland movement never reached the dimensions contemplated. For various reasons, the North Africa scheme (GYMNAST) proved completely abortive for the time being, despite recognition that it was the project "of the first strategical importance in the

Atlantic area." The anticipated German drive through Spain into northwestern Africa never materialized; instead the Germans used such planes and arms as they could divert from the Eastern Front to reinforce Rommel's Africa Korps, thereby staying the British offensive and then (late January 1942) driving the British back toward Egypt. The British also suffered disastrous naval losses in the Mediterranean during December 1941. Whatever disposition French (and possibly Spanish) authorities may have had to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain vanished, and GYMNST had to be shelved.

Anglo-American decisions on other projects included an acceptance by the United States of its ABC-1 commitment to relieve British troops protecting the Dutch West Indian islands of Curacao and Aruba, vital for the war effort because of their large oil refineries. American troops relieved the British in February 1942. The British assumed responsibility for occupying the Azores as well as the Canaries, if either operation became necessary, while the United States accepted responsibility for occupying the Cape Verde Islands off French West Africa and on the flank of the vitally important South Atlantic air route. The Dakar project (for a large-scale landing against opposition) also remained a possibility for United States forces, but since it was assumed that it would involve much larger forces than GYMNST it was now considered impossible to launch the operation before the autumn of 1942. Irrespective of other projected operations in the Atlantic area, the United States Army still wanted to put a sizable protective force into northeastern Brazil, and the conferees agreed this plan should be kept alive as a United States responsibility. The rapid Japanese advance into Malaysia during and immediately after the ARCADIA meetings made the initial plans for the defense of that area relatively meaningless and helped
also to frustrate an American design to get the Soviet Union into the Far Eastern war and to use Siberian airfields to bomb Japan. Indeed, except for the extensive American reinforcement of the Hawaii-Australia line of communication and the large build-up of the new United States base in Australia, the actual deployment of the United States Army forces during most of 1942 corresponded more closely with the perimeter defense concept postulated by the War Plans Division and General Headquarters in mid-December than with the more ambitious offensive ideas advanced during the ARCADIA meetings.

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This first great Anglo-American conference of the war nevertheless had a profound and lasting significance beyond its immediate military decisions. In at least three directions the ARCADIA meetings made a notable contribution to the ultimate victory of the United States and its associates in the war. In the first place, they confirmed the basic strategy outlined in the ABC-1 agreement of early 1941. Germany was recognized as the predominant member of the Axis triumvirate, and the Atlantic and European area as the principal war theater. Therefore, despite Japan's rampage in the western Pacific, it was agreed "that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany." Secondly, the conference approved the establishment of a combined Anglo-American staff organization in Washington to integrate strategic planning of the two nations. This move had the almost equally significant but somewhat unintentional result of establishing the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army, Army Air, and Navy). An even more significant step was the creation of the first unified theater command. Though the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command, organized in Malaysia under British General Wavell, proved short-lived, it set the precedent for the unified commands in the Mediterranean and western Europe that directed Anglo-American forces to victory. Finally, the President and the Prime Minister took the lead in drafting the United Nations Declaration, signed on New Year's Day 1942 by the representatives of twenty-six nations fighting the Axis and pledging their mutual cooperation, the full employment of their resources in the war, and
their agreement not to make a separate peace or armistice. Collectively, these decisions and actions meant that the United States, Great Britain, and the rest of the newly christened United Nations were henceforth not going to fight the Axis aggressors alone and defensively, but together and offensively in every theater of the war.

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Endnotes

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Endnotes for Chapter VII

1 Notes on Conf in OCS, 8 Dec 41, OCS Conf Binder 29; Stimson Diary, entry of 9 Dec 41.


3 Ltrs, SW to President, 25 Apr and 11 Sep 42, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

4 Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4622-37.

5 Notes on Conf in ODCS, 9 Dec 41, OCS Conf Binder 29; Memo, G-2 GHQ for CG FF, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4544-28; Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4622-37.

6 Memo, Gen Marshall for WPD, 12 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, Book A, Tab C.

7 *FDR Public Papers and Addresses*, 1941, p. 529.


9 Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, Sec. IV, WPD 4622-37. An eighth paragraph called for a restudy of the naval building program.

10 Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 15 Dec 41, GHQ 381, Sec. 2. General McNair apparently never forwarded this memorandum to General Marshall.


12 The story of this deployment is treated in detail in Conn, Engelman, and
Fairchild, Guarding the United States.

13 Notes on Conf in OCS, 10 Dec 41, OCS Conf Binder 29; Stimson Diary, entry of 10 Dec 41; Note for Record, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4622-30; Entries of 10 Dec 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary. See Chapters II and IV, above, for earlier plans and action.


15 Annex, Sec. VII, Nov 41 (but revised and extended after 7 Dec 41), to WD Strategic Estimate, Oct 41, WPD 4510 Theater Studies; Entries of 12 and 13 Dec 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Pets Ltr, Gen Andrews, CG CDC, to Gen Marshall, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4452-16; Memo, G-2 for WPD, 19 Dec 41, and other papers, WPD 4337-9.

16 Memo for Record, President Roosevelt, 1 Jan 42, *FDR Personal Letters*, II, 1268.


18 Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, Book 1; Memo, CofS for CNO, 14 Dec 41, WPD 4422-30.

19 Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, Book 1.

20 Memo, CNO for CofS, 11 Dec 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 4, Tab F; Memo, CofS for CNO, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4544-29; Tab B to Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Dec 41, WPD 4622-37; two WPD Memos for Record, 9 Jan 42, WPD 4622-39. For details of the reinforcement of Hawaii, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. V.


22 These detachments were dispatched from Quantico, Virginia, on 15 December and arrived at their Brazilian stations on 19 and 20 December 1941. For further details, see Chapter XII, below.

23 Memo, ASW for Air for SW, 18 Dec 41; Memo, DCofS for Air for SW, 20 Dec 41. Both in SW file, War Plans. Arnold was promoted to lieutenant general on 15 December 1941.

24 Stimson Diary, entry of 19 Dec 41.


29 WPD study, 21 Dec 41, title: Immediate Mil Measures, OPD Exec 4, Book 2.

30 WPD Comments, 21 Dec 41, on Memo, SW for President, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4402-136; WPD study, 21 Dec 41, title: Immediate Mil Measures, OPD Exec 4, Book 2.

31 Paper, written by SW Stimson, title: Memo of Decisions at the White House, Sunday, 21 Dec 41, WDCSA 381 (12-21-41) . There is reason to suspect that Mr. Stimson's memorandum is not a complete record of the discussion and decisions at the meeting, but there is no other contemporary record in Army files. See also Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 275.
32 On the ARCADIA Conference, see Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning*, 1941-42, Ch. V, and Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Ch. XX.

33 ABC-4/6, 13 Jan 42, title: Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater-For First Half 1942.

34 ABC-4/6, 13 Jan 42.


CHAPTER VIII

General Military Relations With Latin America

The United States, during the decade 1929-39, laid the foundation for closer military relations with the Latin American nations by pursuing what has been so aptly termed the "Good Neighbor" policy. The essence of this policy was United States support by word and action for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere nations. During the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, the United States proceeded to abolish both the form and substance of protectorates in the Caribbean area. When in the mid-1930's an upsurge of totalitarianism and aggression in the Old World foreshadowed the possibility of another general war, the United States Congress with the President's acquiescence tried to insulate the nation from involvement in such a conflict by passing neutrality acts in 1935 and 1937. In this same period President Roosevelt took the initiative in fashioning a front of hemispheric neutrality toward Old World wars by calling and attending in person the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, which met in Buenos Aires in December 1936.

The Buenos Aires conference adopted principles of far-reaching significance. The United States and the other American republics foreswore individual intervention in each other's internal or external affairs of any sort and for whatever reason. The conference also approved a Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, which stated that "every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every" American republic and "justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation." ¹ Two years later the Declaration of Lima reaffirmed the intention of the American republics to support each other in case of any non-American attack on any one of them and provided specifically, when an emergency arose, for assembling their foreign ministers to decide on policies and plans for common action. Such meetings took place at Panama in October 1939, following the outbreak of war in Europe; at Havana in July 1940, following the defeat of France; and at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942,
after Japan's attack plunged the United States into the war. Despite the stresses of the international situation and its own growing military preponderance, the United States by means of these conferences managed to maintain with rather remarkable fidelity the principles of the Good Neighbor policy in its arrangements with the Latin American nations for hemisphere defense.

The Good Neighbor policy evolved during a period in which the United States Army had the slenderest of associations with its Latin American counterparts. At the beginning of 1938 the Army had only six military attaches assigned among the twenty Latin American republics. Three represented the Army in Mexico, Cuba, and Brazil; the other three were accredited to two or more countries. Lt. Col. Joseph B. Pate, stationed in Panama, was also expected to represent the Army in Venezuela, Colombia, and the five republics of Central America. No military attaches were accredited to Peru, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. In addition to the attaches, the Army had two military missions serving in Latin America—a four-man group in Brazil and a one-man mission in Guatemala. The very limited Army representation in Latin America reflected two policies: first, a political policy of avoiding anything that might be construed as an intrusion in Latin American military affairs, carried out even to the extent of discouraging private munitions sales by American manufacturers; and second, until late 1938, a military policy of limiting the mission of the armed forces to the defense of the continental United States and its outlying territories.

Alarmed by the increasing volume of German Nazi and Italian Fascist activity in Latin America, the Department of State, rather than the armed services, took the initiative in convening an informal interdepartmental conference on 10 January 1938 to discuss ways and means of providing greater military assistance to the other American republics. After this meeting, the Department of State proposed such limited measures of cooperation as training additional Latin American students in United States
service schools; more frequent visits of naval vessels and demonstration flights of service aircraft in Latin America; visits by high-ranking Latin American officers to the United States; and providing Army and Navy publications to military libraries in Latin America. A month later the Department of State added to this list a recommendation that additional qualified military and naval attaches be appointed to the Latin American capitals, including air attaches at certain key points. To buttress these proposals, the Department of State transmitted

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a review of current Nazi and Fascist activity, which noted that practically everywhere in Latin America the German and Italian "colonies" had been organized and brought under party control. Their activity was being backed up by the German and Italian Governments with free international news services, subsidies for Latin American newspapers, underwriting of arm sales, provision of military missions, and, in the economic sphere, an "aggressive commercial policy founded on bilateral balancing, subsidization, and currency depreciation." 4

The Department of State's proposals led the War Department to make a serious study of methods by which the military relations of the United States with Latin America could be expanded and improved. As a result, the Military Intelligence Division in April 1938 recommended a broader range of activities than the Department of State had suggested, and the Chief of Staff approved these recommendations on 20 May. The War Department, though handicapped by a shortage of qualified officers, was immediately ready to appoint three more military attaches. It was also prepared to act on the other proposals made by the Department of State-to accept a maximum of fifty Latin American students at Army service schools, to arrange for Army training flights from Panama to Central and South American countries, and to supply unclassified technical publications if funds could be obtained to pay for them. In addition, the Army advocated the establishment of additional military missions and advanced two proposals that were to be of outstanding importance in the years to come: the backing of American-
owned commercial aviation interests in Latin America, and the active promotion of American munitions sales.\(^\text{5}\)

While the State, War, and Navy Departments were formulating plans for closer military collaboration, a new vehicle for supervising and coordinating the execution of a Latin American program evolved, the Standing Liaison Committee. Established with the President's approval in April 1938, it consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Though originally intended to provide a means for coordinating all diplomatic-military problems between the Department of State and the services, from its first recorded meeting on 20 June 1938 it concerned itself principally with Latin American military problems.\(^\text{6}\)

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Despite this rather auspicious beginning, the Army's plans for closer military collaboration with Latin America did not get very far in terms of action until after Hitler's armies swarmed into France in May 1940. Brazil was the important exception. An exchange of visits between General Marshall and the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army in the early summer of 1939 established a plane of intimacy between the armies of the two nations and started them on the road toward a full wartime collaboration.\(^\text{7}\) Not much was accomplished in other directions. Although there was much talk on the subject, the Department of State continued to reject any backing of American aviation interests in Latin America for military purposes until May 1940.\(^\text{8}\) Until after the war in Europe began in September 1939, the Army likewise made no progress in finding ways and means to supply the Latin Americans with munitions.\(^\text{9}\) The Army did succeed between 1938 and June 1940 in doubling the number of its military attachés in Latin America, though the twelve officers then assigned to this duty were hardly adequate in number or sufficiently high in rank to give the Army the liaison with Latin American armies that it needed when the crisis in hemisphere defense arrived in May 1940.\(^\text{10}\) Then the United States had to move fast to secure assurances of military collaboration from the Latin American nations, since it looked as if plans for hemisphere defense might soon have to be translated
into practice.

**The Staff Conversations and Agreements of 1940**

President Roosevelt, who for some time had been concerned over the vulnerability of the island of Fernando de Noronha off the Brazilian coast, on 30 April 1940 directed Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, to arrange for conversations with Brazilian authorities to insure the security of the island against a transoceanic attack. After consultation, Admiral Stark and General Marshall on 7 May sent Under Secretary of State Welles an outline for conversations, on the assumption that diplomatic representatives would do the actual conferring. Three days later German forces moved against France, and their precipitous advance created a new and altogether ominous outlook by 15 May. On 16 May, the President directed his military advisers to prepare plans at once for developing closer military relations with Latin America. Thus the proposal for conversations with Brazil broadened into a plan for conversations with most of the Latin American nations.

On the continued assumption that Department of State representatives would conduct the preliminary conversations, General Marshall directed his planners to draft suggestions for them. He specified that all nations approached were to be asked how, and how extensively, they could cooperate in hemisphere defense. The South American nations, in particular, were to be asked what assistance they could offer to actual operations by United States forces. Army and Navy planners collaborated on 17 May in preparing suggestions, and the Chief of Staff was able to present their proposals to the Department of State on the following day. In them, the military planners suggested that each nation approached should be asked to reaffirm its adherence to the Declaration of Lima and to indicate whether or not it would be willing to accept aid from, and extend aid to, other American republics (including the United States) in the event that its security or the
security of other American nations was threatened by attack or intervention from overseas. Nations that expressed a willingness to extend such aid were then to be asked to agree to make available their existing bases for land, air, and naval forces, and also the essential communications facilities that would make that aid effective. The Department of State was also asked to emphasize in the conversations the strategic and critical importance of the Brazilian bulge in the defense of the Americas. Each nation indicating a willingness to collaborate with United States forces in such military operations as the emergency might require was then to be asked to authorize further military staff conversations between its designated representatives and officers of the United States Army and Navy.

President Roosevelt approved these proposals on 23 May, and the procedure they outlined was in general that followed between June and October 1940. The only significant change came on the same day, when it was decided that both preliminary and subsequent conversations should be conducted by Army and Navy staff officers. Accordingly, the Department of State instructed its representatives to seek the approval of the governments concerned to secret and informal discussions at their capitals between United States and Latin American officers, to deal with the currently critical international situation and common measures to combat it.

All of the countries approached (Bolivia, Paraguay, and Panama being omitted) approved the Department of State’s proposal, although with some reservations; Mexico, for example, expressed its preference for discussing military matters in Washington, and Army and Navy representatives participated in a preliminary conference with the Mexican ambassador there on 11 June that led to more formal military staff conferences in July. The Army and Navy prepared instructions for their designated representatives—officers selected principally from their War Plans Divisions—on 29 May, and these officers departed in early June. They were instructed to propound approximately the same questions suggested to the Department of State on 18 May. In effect, they sought fulfillment of one item in the new RAINBOW
4 war plan, completed and approved at this same time, which read:

With respect to the Latin American Republics, universal assurance should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out our operations for Hemisphere Defense or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases.\textsuperscript{16}

The first round of United States-Latin American military staff discussions took place in sixteen of the twenty Latin American capitals between 9 and 24 June, each under the auspices of the local senior diplomatic representative of the United States.\textsuperscript{17} All of the nations approached, except Argentina, indicated their general willingness to cooperate with the United States in military measures for hemisphere defense and to engage in further and more formal staff conversations. The principal and nearly universal qualification to this Latin American pledge of support was an acknowledgment of inability to cope with any serious external attack because of a general lack of modern armaments. Therefore, they all wanted arms, in greater or lesser quantities, from the United States, and none could afford to pay for them.\textsuperscript{18} All of the nations approached (again, except Argentina) agreed that the danger to the Western Hemisphere was very real, although each tended to anticipate an attack in the direction of its own territory. The period of the discussions was the period of the French collapse and armistice and of general agreement in

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Washington that the immediate future was dark indeed. Also, in the midst of these conversations the United States issued the call for the Havana Conference of Foreign Ministers. On 10 July, therefore, it was decided to postpone any further military staff conversations until the results of the Havana meeting became known, and the Latin American nations were so informed.\textsuperscript{19}

There were a number of developments between the June staff discussions and the more formal staff conversations that began in August that helped to define the framework for military collaboration with Latin America. In late
June the President authorized the Army to make arrangements with Pan American Airways to develop airway facilities in the Latin American nations that would permit deployment in an emergency of American airpower toward the South American continent. At the Havana Conference, which assembled on 21 July, the American nations agreed on procedures for the temporary occupation, if necessary, of European possessions in the New World, including a provision that sanctioned emergency action by United States forces acting alone. Also, the United States announced its intention of bolstering sagging Latin American economies by large-scale loans. Soon after the Havana meeting, the Destroyer-Base Agreement with Great Britain provided the means for introducing United States forces into a chain of defensive positions along the Atlantic front. Furthermore, by the end of summer the chances of Britain's survival appeared much brighter than they had in June, and therefore the threat of an early German attack across the Atlantic seemed to have faded.

Between the two rounds of staff conversations, the War Department adopted a basic policy toward Latin America that it consistently followed until after the entry of the United States into the war. On 8 July the Military Intelligence Division, in presenting proposals for various measures of military cooperation, asked for a decision on the basic objective of the United States in Latin America. Specifically, it asked:

Do we wish to embark seriously upon a program of raising the military efficiency of Latin American forces to a point where they would be of material aid to us as allies in hemisphere defense? Or, alternatively, shall we limit our efforts to obtaining the indirect results which would follow a better mutual understanding . . . ?

For a variety of reasons G-2 urged the second course. It believed the crucial argument in its favor was the time factor: the critical period in hemisphere defense would be the succeeding twelve months, and within that time the

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United States, because of its own acute shortage of modern equipment, could do very little to improve the strength of the Latin American armed forces G-
2's recommendation, concurred in by the other staff divisions and approved by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War on 26 July, resulted in a definition of the Army's basic Latin American objective in the following terms:

Objective—better mutual understanding; impressing Latin American officers with our military preparedness and our determination to uphold the Monroe Doctrine; affording selected officers of our Army opportunity of studying Latin America. In attaining our objective, we should concentrate on those countries of the most immediate military importance to us. Our objective does not comprise expectations on our part of being able to use Latin American forces as effective allies in war.23

A few days later President Roosevelt approved a Latin American arms policy in consonance with this basic objective: to supply the principal nations with enough arms to ward off an external attack until United States forces could arrive.24 The 1940 staff conversations and agreements that followed were intended primarily to insure that Latin American land, air, and sea base facilities would be available to United States forces when they did arrive.

The Army and Navy officers chosen to conduct the new round of staff conversations received instructions authorizing them to make detailed inquiries of each of the Latin American states approached about their military readiness to deal with external attacks and internal disorders. Their objective was the conclusion of military staff agreements that would provide for the continued exchange of military information and for the coordination of hemisphere defense measures—particularly for the dispatch on request of United States forces to any nation in danger of external attack. As an integral part of the staff agreement, the conferees were authorized to pledge:

The United States will employ its armed forces to assist any republic to defeat attacks on it by the armed forces of a non-American state or by fifth column groups supported by a non-American state, when requested to do so by the recognized government of the republic concerned . . . .

The United States will assist American republics to acquire armaments, to train their personnel, and to provide the assistance of such advisers as may be desired and available. In the supply of armaments, the United States will assist to the extent that its resources, present programs, and legal restrictions permit, either by releasing material from its
existing stocks, or by making available the necessary manufacturing capacity in
government or commercial plants.25

The staff agreements made were to be subject to the subsequent political
approval of the governments concerned.

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Between mid-August and the end of October 1940, Army and Navy officers
engaged in military staff conversations with all of the American republics
save Mexico and Panama.26 In return for the pledges of United States
assistance, they sought assurances regarding all or most of the following
points, that reach nation would be ready

1. To call upon the United States for armed assistance in the event of an actual or
threatened attack.

2. To report to the United States, by the fastest means available, the origin, apparent
objective, and initial progress of any non-American attack.

3. To explain, by broadcast, to the rest of the world, and particularly to the other
American republics, the reason for its action in the event they requested the armed
assistance of the United States.

4. To ask for the aid of the other republics [as] if the proceedings of the Havana
Conference had been ratified and a general Pan American agreement were in existence.

5. To permit the transit of United States forces going to the aid of a neighbor, making
available its railways, seaports, airports, and other facilities.

6. To effect the most appropriate and efficient distribution of its own forces to defend
vital installations within its territory.

7. In the event of attack and pending the arrival of United States forces to assist:

   a. To take such steps as were necessary to maintain internal order and to
insure that the existing government remained in office and continued to exercise authority.

b. To continue to defend and prevent damage to transport and signal communications systems.

c. To defeat, delay, or interfere with enemy operations so far as remaining available means permit.

8. To develop and maintain an effective and complete interchange of intelligence relating to continental security.

9. To develop and maintain an adequate and efficient secret service in order to keep under surveillance the activities and movements of all aliens and their sympathizers, and to control subversive groups.

10. To eliminate anti-United States propaganda in time of emergency.

11. To furnish such air photographs or to permit the taking of such air photographs as might be needed in connection with plans for specific operations, after being informed of the nature and intended use of such photographs.

12. To permit such medical, engineering, and signal surveys of conditions and facilities as the United States might wish to make.27

The staff conversations resulted in the conclusion of military staff agreements between the United States and each nation approached, except Argentina. All of the agreements contained pledges of United States assistance in a form more or less similar to that included in the conferees' instructions, and all of them contained assurances that approximated in most particulars those sought by the United States, though in some instances in guarded and qualified terms. Despite such qualifications, the War and Navy Departments approved all of the agreements. Before the end of 1940 the Department of
State also gave its formal political approval to all of them except that with Brazil, which was approved in revised form in April 1941. The Latin American governments were slower in giving formal political approval to the staff agreements, only three of them doing so before the end of 1940. Irrespective of formal approvals, the staff agreements were generally honored after 1940 by all of the nations concerned. In December 1940 the Army assured the Department of State that it believed the staff agreements had established "a satisfactory bilateral basis for the cooperation of the respective army forces . . . in every case," and it had no real reason to change that opinion during the following year.

The War Department, though generally satisfied with the 1940 staff conversations and agreements, believed further conversations necessary or at least desirable in several instances. Brazil's central importance in plans for hemisphere defense resulted in the continuation of military conversations in one form or another throughout 1941. Mexico's contiguity likewise called for frequent consultations from February 1941 onward. Army attempts to reopen military conversations with other nations were less successful before the entry of the United States into the war, principally because the Army found itself virtually unable to do anything about furnishing them with arms. This circumstance led the American ambassadors in several nations to recommend against further military conversations until the United States was in a position to offer concrete help toward local external and internal defense. Since in most instances the Army's chief concern was to maintain the interest in defense problems that had already been engendered, it did not press a general renewal of conversations until after Pearl Harbor.

Only Argentina among the American republics rebuffed United States overtures of military cooperation during 1940 and 1941. Argentina, as the most powerful of the Spanish-speaking South American countries, had long aspired to leadership among them. In years past it had contested leadership in the Pan-American movement, and now it resisted the efforts of the United States...
States to weld a common front of New World solidarity. Geographic, economic, and cultural factors, rather than pro-Axis sympathies, governed Argentine attitudes during the war. Argentina's economic and cultural ties were with Europe, and if Germany won they would still have to be with Europe. Furthermore, the Argentineans believed that they must dominate the defenses of the La Plata region. When United States Army and Navy officers conferred separately with Paraguay and Uruguay during 1940, and particularly when the United States showed an interest in the construction of naval and air bases in Uruguay, Argentina objected. It countered with efforts to construct a bloc of South American states (including Chile, Peru, and Brazil) that would work for its own common defense, but that would also resist United States leadership in hemisphere defense and maintain neutrality toward the war. Argentine policy and plans thus conflicted rather sharply with United States plans for close military collaboration with Brazil and for the military support, if necessary, of the other nations concerned, especially Uruguay.30

Since Army plans for hemisphere defense never contemplated major operations below the Brazilian bulge, Argentina's recalcitrance was of more immediate concern to the Navy, which wanted the cooperation of the Argentine Navy in patrolling the South Atlantic. Only a Navy spokesman visited Buenos Aires in June 1940 during the preliminary round of conversations, and he found the Argentineans very reluctant to agree to any common defense measures. Representatives of both the Army and the Navy went to Buenos Aires in September and October, and although the conversations were friendly enough they discovered that their Argentine counterparts were unwilling to commit their country to anything unless and until the United States and Argentina made a political agreement delineating their respective roles in hemisphere defense and prescribing the economic and military advantages that would be forthcoming for Argentina in return for its cooperation From November 1940 onward the War Department favored a renewal of military conversations at Buenos Aires, but it deferred to the Navy's judgment because of the latter's primary interest. In July 1941 Argentina finally decided to send a staff mission to Washington; but it did not arrive until after Pearl Harbor, and then it accomplished nothing because Argentina refused to break with the Axis Powers or check Axis activity within its borders. Although Argentina's refusal of military collaboration had little effect on Army defense plans during the prewar period, its opposition
on a broader

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front had been a serious matter that was only to be resolved with reasonable success at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942.\(^{31}\)

In considering the question of reopening military conversations with Argentina during the summer of 1941, the War Plans Division laid down five basic principles that were equally applicable in negotiations with other American republics:

1. That we are determined to oppose the extension to this hemisphere of Axis political, economic or military influence, and that we are determined to defend this hemisphere against all external aggression.
2. That we will conduct this defense with or without the help of the Argentine Government.
3. That we should very much like Argentine cooperation.
4. That we have no territorial ambitions toward any foreign government.
5. That if the Argentine Government desires to extend military cooperation, we have certain definite proposals to make, which, in view of the history of recent Axis operations, should be made operative at once and not made contingent upon decisions of deliberative bodies called together after Axis aggression becomes a fact.\(^{32}\)

The major purpose of the staff conversations and agreements with Latin America had been to achieve point five, and in negotiations toward this end the Army and Navy managed before Pearl Harbor to keep within the bounds of prewar political policy. This was the key to the success of their negotiations. But the United States had also to be prepared to act, and its war plans during 1940 and 1941 provided for the dispatch of sizable expeditionary forces to either or both coasts of South America, if necessary to protect it against major external attack.\(^{33}\) Though plans for expeditionary forces were not discussed in the staff conversations, the Latin American republics undoubtedly were aware of American intentions and understood
that the staff agreements of 1940 were designed primarily to facilitate the execution of American military plans. For its part, the War Department believed that the staff agreements did assure Latin American military cooperation should a real emergency arise.

Other Measures To Improve Military Relations

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1940, the War Department prepared to carry out some of the other measures that had been proposed more than two years earlier for improving military relations with Latin America-increasing the number of Army officers stationed in Latin America, inviting high-ranking Latin American officers to visit the United States, and arranging for more Latin American officers to attend Army service schools. Since these measures would cost money that the War Department could not pay out of its regular appropriation, President Roosevelt, at the Army's initiative, on 22 June approved the allocation from his recently voted Emergency Fund of $500,000 to the War Department and $300,000 to the Navy Department for use at the departments' discretion in improving military contacts with Latin America. The War Department earmarked four fifths of its allocation for new military missions to Latin America and visits by Latin American officers to the United States and allotted the remainder to confidential military intelligence activities.

Since 1938 the number of military missions in Latin America had grown from two to seven, and in July 1940 a total of twenty-four officers were assigned to them. The Army's new goal was to establish military missions in most if not all of the Latin American nations and to enlarge the missions already established. Because many nations could not afford to pay for such missions, G-2 wanted them all paid for by the United States and not by the receiving nations. This seemingly minor question of payment was in reality a thorny problem. Wide differences in pay scales and in living costs between the United States and Latin America, as well as among the Latin American
countries themselves, made it very difficult in practice to send officers to them. The Joint Board finally approved a policy for United States military mission members under which they were to receive normal pay and allowances for their grades from both the recipient nation and the United States. Because of lower Latin American pay scales, this meant in effect that the United States Army thereafter bore the bulk of the expense for maintaining military missions, though not all of it as G-2 had recommended. Nor was G-2 able to carry out in full its plan for doubling the number of officers on military missions in Latin America. At the beginning of December 1941 the number of Army missions had increased to twelve, but only thirty-two officers were assigned to them. A more significant increase occurred in the number of military attaches assigned to Latin American posts. Their number nearly trebled between June 1940 and December 1941, and by then the Army was represented by attaches or missions in all of the Latin American capitals.

The circumstances of mid-1940 led the Military Intelligence Division to believe that one of the most fruitful moves toward a better military understanding with the Latin American nations would be to invite groups of their senior officers to visit the United States so that they could see the extent of its military preparations. This proposal took shape in General Marshall's invitation to the chief of staff or ranking Army commander of each of the Latin American countries to visit the United States as his guest. In response, two groups of about twenty officers each came to the United States for two-week tours in October 1940. After visiting military establishments they were entertained by General Marshall and his staff in Washington. More than half of the ranking military commanders of Latin America came to the United States on these visits, which provided an unprecedented opportunity for establishing a personal acquaintance between United States and Latin American military leaders. The Brazilian Chief of Staff, who had exchanged visits with General Marshall the year before, availed himself of this opportunity to discuss and conclude the Brazilian-
American staff agreement of 29 October 1940, but the other visitors generally refrained during their visits from trying to discuss hemisphere defense plans or their own defense needs. Subsequent reports from Latin America attested the value of this sort of an approach to mutual understanding in military relations.37

In July 1940 the Military Intelligence Division renewed its earlier proposal to increase the number of Latin American junior officers in attendance at United States Army service schools. Twenty-nine officers from eight countries were in attendance at their own governments' expense in the summer of 1940, a number that declined to eighteen by the time G-2 prepared a new student training plan in December. In its July proposal G-2 had frankly recognized the difficulties in receiving students when it advised:

> Language presents a great barrier. Our ways are not their ways. A Latin American officer in an American training camp would find none of the pleasures of life that he would enjoy in his own or in a European garrison town .... Unless foreign officers are selected who can overcome these disadvantages, the net result is likely to be actually detrimental to mutual understanding. 38

Although G-3 believed that a good many more Latin American students could be accommodated, G-2 recommended seventy-five as the maximum number that should be invited at any one time. It was finally decided to invite groups of forty or fifty officers for six months' training with the ground arms and, after 1 January 1941, to have the United States Army pay the traveling and training expenses of all the student officers. The newly invited officers were to spend three months in schools and then three months with troop units of the school's arm. Two groups came to the United States during 1941. The Department of State was well pleased with the results of the training program. In response to its urging, invitations went out in the spring of 1942 to all of the American republics to send students for a third training program,' to be inaugurated about 1 June 1942.39
Collectively, these several measures helped to promote closer inter-American military relations. What probably most impressed Latin American military men, and influenced them most in favor of cooperation in hemisphere defense, was the rapid growth and modernization of the armed forces of the United States during late 1940 and 1941, coupled with the repeatedly expressed intention of the United States Government to defend the Western Hemisphere against any external aggression. By the beginning of 1941 America's strength and determination were overcoming the effect of Hitler's smashing victories of 1939 and 1940.

Planning for the Support of Friendly Governments

On 7 January 1941, after returning from a South American trip, President William S. Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System reported to President Roosevelt, "Latin Americans on the whole now have a friendly feeling toward the United States," and, "our Good Neighbor Policy has, in the main, destroyed the specters of `Yankee Imperialism' and `Dollar Diplomacy.'" But Mr. Paley also observed that there were inherent dangers in the Latin American situation that had to be taken into account. He reported that everywhere in Latin America the Nazis were well organized and well financed and they posed a threat that the Latin Americans themselves were inclined to minimize. In addition, the loss of normal European markets had subjected most Latin American countries to serious economic strain, and economic distress was a major factor in the political instability of many of them, especially of those in Central and northern South America. Although pro-Axis sentiment was not strong enough anywhere to command wide popular support, the economic and political instability of a number of these nations appeared to threaten Nazi-inspired revolutions that might lead to the installation of governments unfriendly to the United States. As Mr. Paley put it, "it is the judgment of some well qualified observers that a well planned revolution backed by not very many well aimed guns and a few airplanes can succeed in some of the weaker Latin American countries, countries
which, unfortunately from our standpoint, are near the Canal Zone."\[41]

In July 1940 the foreign ministers at Havana had agreed that if the peace of any Latin American state were menaced by Axis activities, the American republics should immediately consult among themselves to determine how to deal with the situation, provided the interested state requested consultation. In the subsequent staff agreements, the United States had pledged that, when asked for, its armed forces would come to the aid of any recognized government threatened by an external attack or an internal fifth-column movement supported by a non-American state. Because of the military weakness of Latin America, the United States had assumed that it would have to use its own forces to deal with any imminent threat or actuality of a major external attack and that the Latin American states would cooperate (as provided for in the staff agreements) by opening to these forces their land, air, and naval bases. For this purpose American war plans during late 1940 and 1941 earmarked the Army's best-trained division for emergency use in Brazil or elsewhere in the southern Atlantic area and provided, in the general strategic reserve, for one reinforced division to be sent to the west coast of South America and for a three-division corps to be available for dispatch to eastern South America, as needed to protect those areas from overseas attack.\[42] In January 1941 the Army and Navy began to plan for the other phase of the pledge of armed support—military assistance to help avert internal Axis-inspired revolutionary movements.

The Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, Lt. Gen. Daniel Van Voorhis, first suggested plans of the latter sort in August 1940. Pointing out how much easier it would be to help maintain a friendly government in power than to oust a pro-Axis government once it were established, General Van Voorhis expressed the opinion that a few hundred infantrymen and a battery of pack howitzers transported by air from the Canal Zone could probably handle the first of these situations in nearby countries at least until additional forces could be dispatched from the continental United States.
Chapter VIII: General Military Relations With Latin America

The drafting of such plans seems to have been precipitated by Nazi activity in Colombia rather than the Panama commander's earlier proposal. On 15 January 1941, the Chief of Staff, at the urging of the War Plans Division, asked the joint Board to develop a plan for the effective support of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and the five Central American republics, providing for the stationing on forty-eight hours' notice in seaports and strategic interior points of United States forces dispatched from the Canal Zone and for their reinforcement, if necessary, by an Army expeditionary force from the United States.\(^{43}\)

The Joint Board's plan, approved by President Roosevelt on 29 April 1941, acknowledged the protection of the Panama Canal as its primary purpose, but it also emphasized the importance of preventing any Nazi success of a sort that would be bound to influence the whole of Latin America. The joint plan assumed that the assistance of United States forces would be requested by a recognized government while it was still in control of the situation, that the forces would not encounter organized opposition on their arrival, and that not more than one such operation would have to be undertaken at a time among the eight republics for which detailed plans were to be drafted. On 20 May the War Department instructed General Van Voorhis, in his capacity of Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, to draft separate Army plans for each country in collaboration with the Commandant, 15th Naval District, who would prepare the corresponding Navy plans. Any operation undertaken jointly was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation, and no operations were to commence until expressly ordered by the War and Navy Departments.\(^{44}\)

The initial plans of the Washington authorities and of the Caribbean commander contemplated transporting an airborne infantry battalion preceded by a platoon of parachute troops from the Canal Zone to the capital of the country concerned, while naval forces from the Canal Zone, including a small Marine contingent, were to enter strategic seaports. In May the War
Department decided that the plans needed a full parachute battalion. General Van Voorhis activated the 550th Infantry Airborne Battalion on 1 July 1941, filling it with volunteers from combat units already in Panama. In August the 501st Parachute Battalion arrived in the Canal Zone from Fort Benning, Georgia. Both battalions participated in a mock operation at the Rio Hato airfield on 12 September 1941, in the presence of General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces. Two weeks later the airborne units were put under the Caribbean Air Force to facilitate their training and readiness.45

The principal difficulty that General Van Voorhis encountered in preparing his plans was the lack of adequate air transport on hand or in prospect to carry all of the airborne and parachute troops in a single movement. Even if the War Department had been able to furnish him with enough planes, none of the landing fields in the capitals of the various countries could have handled the number of planes required to transport all of the Army's troops together. In their final form, each of the seven plans approved by the War Department proposed the initial movement of about three hundred troops by air and of about the same number by sea. Air transports would then shuttle troops and supplies into the capital and other strategic points as rapidly as possible after the first landing. Until more transport planes could be furnished to the 20th Transport Squadron in Panama, most of the troops in the initial movement would have to be transported in heavy and medium bombers, and General Van Voorhis reluctantly allocated half of his B-17 and B-18 strength for this purpose. The execution of any of these plans would temporarily have cut heavily into the air protection of the Canal and would have virtually stripped it of its scanty local naval protection.46

Each plan contained a draft letter of instructions to the Commanding Officer of Troops stating that he was to act directly under the authority of the president of the country concerned and on his own responsibility rather than under the auspices of local American diplomatic and military representatives. Immediately upon arrival, he was to call upon the president and
thereafter comply with all reasonable requests made by him for support. The commander was also to ask the president to proclaim the fact that United States troops were present at his request, that they were only taking actions that were directed by him, and that all citizens should therefore comply with orders received from United States military and naval personnel.47

During the preparation of the plans, the Caribbean commander sent officers into the various countries to collect information and establish liaison with United States diplomatic representatives and military attaches. General Van Voorhis had discretionary authority to inform them of as much of the details of his planning as he thought desirable. Under his supervision the attaches prepared auxiliary plans for billeting United States forces and providing them with hospital facilities, local supplies, ground transportation, and other types of assistance. In October 1941 the Caribbean commander assembled all of the attaches in the Canal Zone to acquaint them with the details of his planning. More or less unanimously they criticized the plans that had been drafted as unrealistic, principally because of the assumption that no opposition would be encountered when the first troops landed. The Army planners in Washington recognized that the plans envisaged United States support only in anticipation of hostilities, rather than action after hostilities had commenced. They acknowledged that plans of a much wider scope would be required in the latter case, but no such plans (other than the provision for expeditionary forces in general war plans) were ever drafted.48

In the summer of 1941 the possibility arose that a plan of the sort being developed by General Van Voorhis might have to be put into effect. An undeclared war broke out between Peru and Ecuador on 23 July over a century-old boundary dispute that had created a growing tension during the preceding months. The proffered mediation of the United States, Argentina, and Brazil had failed to avert hostilities. Because of Ecuador's military weakness and precarious stability, the War Department was most concerned over the situation there. It directed the Caribbean commander to give priority to Ecuador in his planning for the support of friendly governments, and the Ecuador plan, transmitted to Washington on 26 August, was the first to be completed by him.49 Since further Department of State and G-2 investiga-
tions indicated there was no real evidence of Axis exploitation of the Ecuador-Peru conflict, there was never any serious danger that the plan would have to be invoked. Instead, the War and State Departments arranged to send small teams of Army observers to both Ecuador and Peru, not only to observe but also to help persuade the forces of each country to stop fighting. Only desultory armed action occurred after August, and as a result of measures taken during the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers the two countries negotiated an agreement on 29 January 1942 that put a temporary end to the dispute—the only significant armed clash among the American nations themselves during the period of World War II.50

The Organization of Military Relationships, 1941-42

In August 1941 the Navy War Plans Division proposed a new plan for handling military matters with Latin American nations in a more or less uniform manner. The Navy planners pointed out that the principal fault of the existing staff agreements was that they provided for using Latin American base facilities and for collaboration in operations only when a Latin American state specifically asked for the assistance of United States forces. What the United States needed was assurance that such facilities would become available to its forces automatically in case of a non-American attack on the Western Hemisphere. With the increasing likelihood that the United States might become an active belligerent in the war, it also needed revised agreements to govern the situation that would exist should that happen and the particular Latin American state concerned either remain a neutral or likewise become a belligerent. To coordinate joint United States-Latin American operations that might occur in the latter situation, the Navy advocated the general establishment of joint Army and Navy missions in Latin America and urged their establishment immediately so that there would be an easy transition to their wartime task of coordinating all aspects of military collaboration.51

The Navy planners held that general Latin American adherence to the Declaration of Uruguay was the best practical solution in case the United States declared war and the other American republics failed to do so and also
failed to ask for its protection against non-American aggression. On 19 June

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1941 Uruguay had reaffirmed a declaration originally made during World War I, stating:

That no American country, which in defense of its own rights, should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents, will be treated as a belligerent; and that existing decrees which may be in contravention to this resolution shall be null and of no effect.52

By way of clarification, Uruguay in 1917 had assured the United States that "all ships of the American Navy, of any kind whatsoever, may now and henceforth visit the ports of Uruguay, for any purpose whatsoever, where they will be received as friend, and not as belligerent, and without restrictions." 53

After Uruguay's reiteration of these principles in June 1941, several other Latin American nations followed suit, and none expressed opposition to them. Universal and unqualified acceptance of these principles would have opened Latin American base facilities to Navy craft of all sorts if an Old World power attacked the United States. But it would not similarly open Latin American bases to Army air and ground forces, and the immediate application of airpower had now become crucial to effective hemisphere defense. The Army needed revised staff agreements to cover not only the projection of airpower in an emergency but also the provision in advance of prepared airfields stocked with gasoline, bombs, and machine gun ammunition. It therefore rejected the Declaration of Uruguay as an alternative to the renegotiation of existing agreements.54

The Army planners also contended that a uniform method of representation and military negotiation was not applicable to Latin America, though they agreed that joint Army-Navy missions to certain countries might be desirable. They insisted that in any new staff agreements there should be provision for United States security forces to guard the air and naval bases
being constructed with United States funds. Army and Navy planning officers collaborated in producing a revised draft of the Navy's original proposals that took these objections into account and completed it just before Pearl Harbor. When Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, the head of the Navy War Plans Division, rejected this draft and insisted on a new one calling for the establishment of joint Army and Navy missions in all or most of the Latin American countries, General Gerow, in turn rejected that. By this time

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the United States was in the war, and both the Army and the Navy turned to Department of State channels as the quickest way to secure permission from individual nations for the entry of United States forces and the rapid development of new base facilities.55

Three days after the United States entered the war, Secretary of State Hull asked for a new foreign ministers meeting to be assembled in Rio de Janeiro during January. Under Secretary of State Welles prepared to represent the United States at the conference, scheduled to convene on 15 January, and the Department of State on 27 December provided the Army with a copy of its proposed agenda. General Marshall and Admiral Stark used the Standing Liaison Committee meeting of 3 January as the means to inform Mr. Welles about the objectives the War and Navy Departments wished the Department of State to seek at Rio. The Chief of Staff's statement called for:

\( a. \) Declaration of war by all the American Republics upon all members of the Axis.
\( b. \) Failing this, the severance of diplomatic relations with all of the Axis Powers.
\( c. \) Agreement to permit the movement of United States air power into or across the territory of each of the American Republics, advance notice to be given where practicable, but this not to be an imperative requirement.
\( d. \) Agreement by each of the American Republics which has not already so agreed to permit the entrance into or across their territory and the stationing therein of the essential base, maintenance, communications and weather detachments, together with their own equipment and local
security elements essential for the logistical support of our operating aircraft.

e. Agreement by each of the American Republics to grant to such United States forces as enter or cross its territory in accordance with agreements referred to above, and in the course of operations in the defense of this hemisphere, the use of all facilities which such forces may require . . .

On the first two points, the Navy position was identical with that of the Army. In its list of particulars the Navy asked for definite assurances from the Latin Americans of their naval collaboration in protecting their own waters and of the unrestricted use of their port facilities for United States naval operations; it asked also for definite commitments from them "to enter into military agreements to effectuate the necessary mutual defense arrangements," joint operating plans being more or less essential from the Navy's point of view though not from the Army's. Mr. Welles promised to do what he could to attain Army and Navy objectives, aside from attempting to persuade all of the Latin American nations to join in the war as belligerents, which he termed impossible; his objective, he indicated, was a universal severance of diplomatic relations.

The Department of State's own plan for action along military lines at Rio proposed, first, the invocation of the declaration adopted at the Havana conference of July 1940, entitled Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas; second, the establishment of an inter-American defense board to consist of military and naval representatives from each of the American republics and to meet in Washington "for the purpose of defining and coordinating essential defensive and protective measures"; and, third, the establishment of "regional" defense boards, similar to the existing joint defense board of the United States and Canada and the projected joint defense commission of the United States and Mexico. The War and Navy Departments objected very strenuously to the creation of an inter-American defense board of the sort proposed by the Department of State, and Secretaries Stimson and Knox, after a Cabinet meeting on 2
January, thought they had secured President Roosevelt's concurrence with their effort to kill the proposal; but before Mr. Welles left for Rio he managed to persuade the President that it should be restored to the agenda. The War Department was also generally opposed to the creation of additional defense commissions. Instead, the Army wanted to invoke the staff agreements of 1940 and revise and extend them as necessary in bilateral negotiations.  

"Bi-lateral agreements," General Marshall and his advisers held, "are the best means of obtaining such cooperation as is not yet in effect. Bilateral agreements which already exist are reasonably satisfactory if arrangements are made to put them into effect without delay when the need arises."  

Although opposing the Department of State's proposal for an inter-American defense board, the Army and the Navy recognized the need for some sort of high-level coordination in Western Hemisphere military affairs. Representatives of the services and of the other government agencies most interested in Latin America met on the first day of the new year "to discuss and decide on a proposal that the President appoint either an Army or a Navy officer of high rank and great prestige as an expert consultant on military matters to whom the representatives of the other American Republics would be invited to go to discuss measures of military cooperation which their respective governments could take against the Axis." The conferees decided to recommend to the President that either Admiral William H. Standley or Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy be appointed to this position. It was assumed that the expert consultant might serve as an executive chairman to an inter-American board somewhat similar to the one proposed by the Department of State, but Secretary Stimson's adamant opposition to any board led the Chief of Staff and his planners to propose, on 6 January, the appointment of both General McCoy and Admiral Standley as expert military consultants, "for the purpose of conferring bi-laterally, with the representatives of such of the American republics as may choose to do so, on
matters of mutual concern in the defense of this Hemisphere." 61 This proposal fell by the wayside when Mr. Welles succeeded in regaining the President's support for the inter-American defense board plan.

General Marshall continued to be greatly concerned over the unsatisfactory character of the Army's Latin American relationships. After discussion with his principal subordinates and also with the President, he tentatively decided on 15 January to create a new War Department agency, to be independent of both the War Plans Division and of G-2, that could "act positively in leading South America toward an adoption of and adherence to pertinent policies of the United States War Department."62 The Chief of Staff selected his Latin American planning expert, General Ridgway, to head the new agency. Apparently, General Marshall intended the proposed organization to act both as a super-military intelligence organization for Latin America, for the better coordination and direction of intelligence activities in the field, and as an agency in Washington that would give the War Department a more powerful voice with the President and among the various government bureaus concerned with Latin America in the determination of Latin American military policy. General Ridgway's own arguments appear to have persuaded the Chief of Staff of the futility of this scheme. Any agency such as that proposed would be foredoomed to failure, General Ridgway contended, even if it began operations with a clear directive from the President, since it would necessarily have to encroach upon the functions of existing agencies and would therefore arouse their resentment and opposition. It seemed to General Ridgway that in essence General Marshall was proposing "to remedy an unsatisfactory and ineffective execution of assigned functions" by existing agencies through the creation of a new agency. Instead, he urged:

(1) A reorientation of the collective mind of the State Department, to compel acceptance of the fact that military factors are now primary and all others ancillary.
(2) A reorganization of G-2 functions and methods to bring about the highest possible degree of efficiency.
(3) Broadening of the functions of the War Plans Division to provide for the necessary preparation and presentation of the military factors, affecting our military policies, and an
increase in the authority of the Division to insure that its recommendations receive the fullest consideration, and whenever necessary by the President, in order to guarantee that no decisions of political nature contrary to these recommendations are made without reference to the President himself. 63

These objectives were achieved in part through the reorganization of the War Department in March 1942 and through the new joint Chiefs of Staff organization, which gave the services a stronger voice in determining military policy. The development of the war situation and of American planning for offensive overseas operations from January 1942 onward also tended increasingly to divert the Army's attention from Latin American military problems to more pressing matters, and the proposal to create a central War Department agency for coordinating Latin American military affairs was not to be revived and put into effect until the last year of the war. 64

In the weeks immediately following Pearl Harbor, when extensive military operations in Latin America loomed as a distinct possibility, 65 it appeared that the Army might become more intimately involved in the work of several wartime agencies concerned with Latin American affairs. The most important of these was the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller. This organization had been established by the President in August 1940, and the G-2 Division had maintained informal liaison with it since the beginning of 1941. Its most important activity until the summer of 1941 was to combat German, Italian, and Japanese commercial and propaganda efforts in Latin America, and it was primarily responsible for compiling the so-called "blacklist" of Axis-controlled commission houses and agencies and in persuading American firms not to trade with them. 66 This function passed to the Department of State in July 1941, but at the same time an Executive order broadened the scope of the coordinator's responsibilities so that thereafter it included most aspects of Latin American relationships not directly under the control of the State, War, or Navy Departments. 67

In early November 1941 Mr. Rockefeller's organization was proposing to undertake a $100,000,000 public works program in Latin America, which would include construction of housing, hospitals, sanitation and water supply systems, and transportation and communication facilities. So far as
possible it wanted to center these construction activities at "strategic and focal points" so that they could be used by American military forces in an emergency. Mr. Rockefeller asked the Army to list the places where it thought facilities of this sort might be needed. General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces both expressed a desire that the work be concentrated in northeastern Brazil. Though G-2 delivered these requests to the Office of the Coordinator, the War Plans Division confessed that it could not see "how any appreciable part of the development program within a particular country could be concentrated at the relatively few points in which the War Department has a definite potential interest without arousing suspicions that it is being done for military reasons."

After the United States entered the war, Mr. Rockefeller revived this public works project in the more modest form in which it was eventually to be carried out during the war. On 8 January he conferred with General Marshall and his subordinates about his plans for spending $25,000,000 for sanitation and housing projects and again suggested that the War Department designate the strategic areas in which it wished such work undertaken. He also asked for and secured the services of Col. (later Maj. Gen.) George C. Dunham of the Medical Corps to head the project. Colonel Dunham was an expert on tropical medicine and had directed the Army medical survey of Brazil during late 1941 in connection with the work of the United States-Brazilian Joint Planning Group. In February 1942 President Roosevelt provided money for the project from his Emergency Fund, and at the end of March the Office of the Coordinator established a separate corporation, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (directed by General Dunham throughout the war), to undertake sanitation and public health measures in Latin America.

In the economic field, the Office of the Coordinator and the Board of Economic Warfare joined hands during the winter of 1941-42 to bolster the economies of the Latin American countries as well as to insure that the Axis Powers did not get any vital raw materials from them. An Army officer
headed the American Hemisphere Division of the Board of Economic Warfare, which directed the work, and the War Department had a hand in the

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formulation of policy through Secretary Stimson's membership on the board. Of more direct concern to the Army was the gathering and dissemination of information in and about Latin America, over which the Office of the Coordinator had more or less exclusive jurisdiction. The Army undoubtedly would have come into conflict with Mr. Rockefeller's office in this field if it had carried out the January 1942 proposal for establishing a high-level agency for the purpose of influencing United States and Latin American opinion. The War Department's good relations with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs indicate its general satisfaction after early 1942 with the way nonmilitary matters were being handled with Latin America. In any event, as soon as it became clear that no large-scale Army expeditionary forces would have to help defend the territory of the Latin American nations against overseas attack, the various activities of the United States in the fields of public health, economic defense, and propaganda lost much of the immediate military significance they had seemed to have in the first weeks of direct American participation in the war.

The Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers, held between 15 and 28 January 1942, achieved solidarity of action toward the war marred only by the subsequent failure of Argentina and Chile to act on the recommendation to break diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers. Among the measures adopted at Rio was the Department of State's proposal for the establishment of an inter-American defense board. The objections the Army had initially raised to this proposal were numerous: it would be too large and unwieldy a body for effective action; Latin American military matters required immediate action, and the establishment of the board would be a time-consuming affair; it would not be possible to discuss secret plans before so large a body; the board's membership would lack authority to carry out its adopted measures; and the board would absorb the time of high-caliber men sorely needed for more pressing duties. Perhaps most of all, the
War Department feared that the Latin Americans would try to use the board as a means for pressing their claims for United States munitions. Both before and after the Rio meeting, Under Secretary of State Welles assured the War and Navy Departments that the proposed board would not have any executive functions or responsibilities in hemisphere defense and that its work need not interfere with the continued bilateral arrangement of military matters

The Army and Navy selected General Embick and Vice Adm. Alfred W. Johnson as their delegates on the Inter-American Defense Board, and General Embick served as its chairman through 1942 and 1943. The Army also provided the board with a secretariat of about twenty officers and with a coordinator, Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship, who had been Governor of Puerto Rico following his retirement from the Army in 1933. During the war most of the Latin American countries were represented on the board by their military, naval, and air attaches in Washington. The board held plenary sessions about twice a month, and by December 1943 it had adopted thirteen resolutions embodying recommendations and suggestions for improving the defenses of the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and General Marshall spoke at the Inter-American Defense Board's first meeting on 30 March 1942, and their addresses combined warm words of welcome with admonitions that the United States could not hope to supply arms beyond its existing
commitments to the Latin American nations for some time to come.\textsuperscript{79} Thereafter during 1942 and 1943, the policy of the Army and Navy was to avoid the deliberation by the board of any topic that could be satisfactorily adjusted through bilateral negotiations. In consequence the work of the board was limited to military matters of only peripheral significance in the conduct of the war. Nevertheless, General Embick was in agreement with Mr. Welles that the board served a useful purpose as a symbol of hemisphere solidarity in the prosecution of the war, and continuance of the board through the war provided the

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American nations with a vehicle for maintaining a close military association in the postwar years.\textsuperscript{80}

\textit{Military Assistance to Latin America in 1942}

The Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1942 provided the impetus for certain concrete measures of military aid to the Latin American nations. After 7 December 1941 their pleas for modern arms and ammunition had poured into Washington, typical among them being Venezuela's request for sixteen 37-mm. antiaircraft guns and sixteen .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns for the defense of its oil installations. The Army could only answer this and similar requests by pointing out that the shortage of antiaircraft guns and ammunition was so critical that none could be sent to the Latin American nations.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, it recognized that certain vital installations along the coasts of South America-such as the oil refineries of Venezuela and at Talara, Peru, and the copper refining plants along the Chilean coast-were highly vulnerable to surface and air attack. When General Miles, the chief of G-2, began an inspection trip on 17 December to Panama and around South America, one of his missions was to survey these installations and recommend how they could best be protected. The War Department at this time did not believe that military necessity required it to put any of its own combat forces and equipment in any South American country except Brazil, but it was interested in having the countries
do everything within their power to guard installations vital to the war effort. Later, in consequence of promises made by the United States Government during the Rio conference, the Army was called upon to provide limited quantities of equipment and other assistance to protect key points along the South American coasts.

While the crucial question of a universal severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers was still in the balance at Rio, President Roosevelt on 19 January telephoned General Marshall and asked him what munitions could be made immediately available to the South American nations, particularly to Brazil, to reassure them of the determination of the United States to guard the Americas against external attack. General Marshall obtained a list of one hundred fifty coast artillery guns and mortars of varying calibers, all of which were then emplaced in coast defense positions around the continental United States. Since the United States had airpower and more modern coast defense guns available, these guns could be spared for installation around the coast of South America. The Army was prepared to sell them at a scrap value of $20.00 a ton. The Army planners estimated that it would take from two to eight months to dismantle, ship, and install the guns and believed that once emplaced they would furnish highly effective protection against attack by hostile surface vessels. The Chief of Staff informed the President that Brazil had already indicated that it did not want any of these guns, nor did Mexico or Peru, to whom they had also been offered. Mr. Roosevelt's offer of the same material to Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela likewise failed to elicit any interest. What the South American nations wanted was modern equipment such as combat aircraft and antiaircraft guns.

Further overtures by the President and the Department of State led to the Army's allocation on 21 and 22 January of a substantial amount of ground munitions to Brazil and Chile and of fifty advanced trainer airplanes, equipped for reconnaissance and bombardment activity, to be divided among
all of the South American coastal nations except Argentina. The planes began to move southward during February. Those going to the Caribbean area and to the west coast of South America were flown by American crews and provided with a three months' bomb supply. After further discussion between the President, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall, and in accordance with recommendations made by General Miles, the War Department on 26 January authorized Under Secretary of State Welles to offer some direct coast artillery assistance to Chile. This proposal broadened within the next few days into a plan for placing United States coast artillery batteries at key points in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela.

The coast artillery project called for the dispatch of the 56th Coast Artillery Regiment, commanded by Col. William Sackville, to four key ports in Chile, one in Peru, and two in Venezuela, to protect them against shelling by submarines or surface raiders. The 56th was a 155-mm. mobile gun regiment of six batteries, currently in the process of deactivation but reassembled for this mission. General Miles recommended that its batteries be reinforced by antiaircraft guns, but none could be spared for the purpose. By 4 February, when the Department of State officially informed the governments that they could have the assistance of the 56th if they wanted it, the project called for sending the regimental headquarters and four batteries to Chile (16 guns, accompanied by 62 officers and 1,267 enlisted men). The batteries were to be located in northern Chile at Tocopilla, Barquitos Island, San Antonio, and Antofagasta, each of which had waterfront facilities essential to the production and export of copper and nitrates. Antofagasta was also an outlet for Bolivian tin. In Peru the battery offered was to be put at Talara, which had a large and exposed oil refinery—the only one producing aviation gasoline in western South America and the source of fuel oil for the Chilean copper industry. The battery for Venezuela was to be split between the oil ports of Las Piedras and Puerto de la Cruz. When sent, the batteries actually went to the locations selected by the Army, although the United States formally recognized that the choice of locations rested with the governments concerned. In each case the original intent was to have United States troops get the batteries ready for operations as soon as possible, but to remain with
their guns only long enough to train local forces to operate them—a period estimated at four months—and then to turn over the guns to Chile, Peru, and Venezuela under lend-lease. On 4 February Colonel Sackville reported to General Headquarters in order to prepare detailed plans for the operation; the movement was scheduled to begin about 15 February.87

Chile, though accepting the offer of aid in principle, hesitated about accepting it in full. After agreeing before Pearl Harbor to the use of its ports by operating units of the United States Navy, the Chilean Government became more and more reluctant to cooperate openly in hemisphere defense measures. On 21 January it informed the United States that it would not dare break diplomatic relations with the Axis unless it were promised immediate delivery of thirty-six combat airplanes and sixty-three antiaircraft guns.88

The material was not forthcoming, and Chile did not break relations with the Axis until a year later, on 20 January 1943. As for the coast artillery batteries, Chilean objections led to scaling down personnel to two officers and twenty-five men for each battery and elimination of the regimental headquarters from the movement. The force actually sent thus had less than one tenth the strength of that originally proposed. The reduced contingent, under Colonel Sackville's command, sailed from San Francisco on 19 February 1942 and reached its Chilean positions in late March. A month later its guns were ready to fire, though the Army reminded the Department of State that these skeleton United States batteries could not be expected to function very efficiently. The training of Chilean coast artillery units progressed slowly, and it was not until April 1943 that the United States cadre was withdrawn and the guns turned over to Chile.89

A full contingent of 13 officers and 278 enlisted men accompanied the coast artillery battery that arrived at Talara, Peru, on 8 March 1942. Before the Peruvian Government received the offer of the battery, it had agreed to permit United States air operations from the vicinity of Talara in connection with the Pacific patrol instituted after Pearl Harbor as a part of the air
defense system of the Panama Canal.\textsuperscript{90} Peru accepted the coast artillery proposal with enthusiasm, and the excellent cooperation of Peruvian forces permitted the battery to complete its training mission on schedule. It turned over its guns and other equipment to the Peruvians in August 1942, and at the same time most of its personnel was absorbed into two antiaircraft batteries organized to protect the new American air base then being established near Talara.\textsuperscript{91}

In a defense agreement signed by a representative of the Caribbean Defense Command and Venezuelan military authorities on 15 January 1942, the United States Army promised to furnish three batteries of 155-mm. guns to protect oil installations along the Venezuelan coast and to provide officers to instruct Venezuelan Army forces in the operation of the guns. When Venezuela in early February received the offer of one battery of 155-mm. guns fully manned by United States troops, it hesitated to accept, but after a German submarine shelled the offshore island of Aruba on 16 February it agreed to the terms on which the battery of the 56th Coast Artillery Regiment had been offered. Known as the VELLUM Force, the troops of the battery sailed from New Orleans on 26 February, landed first in Trinidad, and reached Puerto de la Cruz in Venezuela on 13 March. Because of the delay in the shipment of its guns and equipment and in the construction of suitable barracks, the coast artillery installations at Puerto de la Cruz and at Las Piedras four hundred fifty miles westward did not become operational until the end of May 1942. The training of Venezuelan replacements began in July but proceeded so slowly that United States troops could not be withdrawn until March 1943.\textsuperscript{92}

The South American coast artillery project, when first proposed in late January 1942, was looked upon as a defense measure of some value, but before any of the guns had been installed the Army shifted to the view that the 56th Coast Artillery was to be engaged in much more of a political than military mission. As early as 10 February General Marshall expressed a
strong desire to turn over the guns to local forces and get the men back to the United States just as soon as possible. By late February the Army was saying with emphasis that, except in northeastern Brazil, the protection of vulnerable installations in the Latin American nations was their responsibility and not that of United States ground and air forces. With this position the Latin American countries generally agreed, although they wanted large quantities of equipment for their protective forces, equipment that the United States could not supply. The effectiveness of the twenty-four 155-mm. guns actually installed was never tested. The commander of the battery at Talara, Peru, the most favorably situated of all the batteries, believed that for a really effective defense the Talara area needed four more 155-mm. guns, two batteries of large-caliber seacoast guns, a submarine mine battery, an underwater listening loop, at least one battery of 3-inch antiaircraft guns, a field artillery battalion, a regiment of infantry, and defensive aircraft, plus, of course, the necessary signal and other service troops to make these combat units effective in action. Protection of this dimension to the fourteen points along the northern and western coasts of South America listed by General Miles on 27 January as essential to the United States war effort would have absorbed a large portion of the United States Army and was impossible if the United States intended to win the war.

Placing United States Army forces on the territory of the Latin American nations raised the issue of command. In January 1942 both General Miles and General Andrews, the Caribbean commander, suggested that when small forces with nothing more than a local mission were stationed on foreign soil it would be a good idea to put them under command of the military authorities of the country concerned. Such a move, they believed, would go far toward forestalling local criticism about United States infringements on sovereignty. The War Department recognized the merit of this suggestion but did not want to accept it as customary practice. Instead, the approved policy specified that command arrangements should be made separately in accordance with the circumstances of each individual case, and in no case
without advance authorization from the War Department. In practice, the Army agreed to put the small servicing and weather detachments stationed at various Latin American airfields under nominal local command, and it accepted Chilean command of the coast artillery contingent sent to that country. The Peruvian and Venezuelan coast artillery batteries were placed under the command of the local United States military attaches, on the theory that these detachments were engaged in a training rather than a tactical mission. The Army ground and air forces sent to the new bases established as part of the Panama Canal defense system remained under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, although it was agreed that if ground forces of those bases were detached for local missions they would operate under local command.

The token assistance given by a coast artillery regiment and the very small quantities of munitions that could be furnished immediately under lend-lease were no real measure of the protection that the United States provided for the Latin American nations after Pearl Harbor. It stood ready to render military assistance on request to any friendly government threatened by an internal and Axis-inspired revolutionary movement. Its intelligence agents, civilian and military, cooperated closely with the Latin American governments in rooting out Axis agents and in curbing activities that were considered inimical to the defense and war efforts. To help guard Latin America against external attack, the United States Navy operated small but active task forces off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America. The Army had sizable ground and air garrisons in Panama and Puerto Rico and smaller forces at the newer bases that could have been employed to fend off a transoceanic invader. Above all, the United States was fully committed to using as much of its general military strength as might be necessary to protect the New World against a major external attack. That was the fundamental premise in all of the war plans drafted before Pearl Harbor, and it remained the basic consideration thereafter in planning for the offensive.
Endnotes for Chapter VIII

1 U.S. Dept of State, Peace and War, p. 353.


3 Ltrs, Secy State to SW, 12 Feb and 12 Mar 38,.AG 336 (2-12-38).

4 Résumé of Dept of State memo on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activity in the Amer Republics, 1 Mar 38, SLC Min, Vol. 1. Item 2.

5 Memo, G-2 for CoS, 18 Apr 38, approved by CoS on 20 May 38 and forwarded as Incl to Ltr, SW to Secy State, 20 May 38, AG 336 (2-12-38).

6 On its origin and functioning, see SLC Min, Vol. 1, Items 4-6, 23.

7 See Chs. XI and XII, below.

8 See Ch. X, below.

9 See Ch. IX, below.

10 For example, a major served as military attaché in Argentina, and a second lieutenant held a roving commission among Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

11 Memo, President Roosevelt for CNO, 30 Apr 40, WPD 4224-86; Memo, CoS and CNO for Under Secy State, 7 May 40, WPD 4224-116.

12 Memo of Conf in OCS, 17 May 40; Memo, WPD for CoS, 18 May 40; Memo, CoS for Under Secy State, 18 May 40. All in WPD 4115-14.

13 Telg, Dept of State to Lat Amer Reps, 23 May 40, quoted in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 615-16.

14 See Ch. XIII, below.
15 Drafts of both Army and Navy instructions, WPD 4115-16.

16 Sec. VII, par. 2, Jt A&N Basic War Plan RAINBOW 4, presented to the JB on 31 May and approved by it on 7 June, JB 325, ser 642-4.

17 The Army and Navy officers sent to Latin America in June 1940 were generally referred to at the time as engaged in "liaison missions," and the second round of conferences, which began in August, were referred to as "staff conversations." The American officers reported directly to the War and Navy Departments, and copies of the Army reports are in WPD 4115-24, WPD 4115-25, WPD 4115-26, and WPD 4115-28, except for those of the conversations with Brazil and Argentina, The record of the Brazilian discussions, which are dealt with separately in Chapter XI, below, are in WPD 4224-101. On Argentina, see pp. 181-83, below.

18 Memo Lt Col Arthur R. Harris (G-2) for WPD, 28 Jun 40, WPD 4115-28.

19 Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Jul 40, and atchd papers, WPD 4115-27.

20 See Ch. X, below.

21 For these developments, see Ch. II, above.

22 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 8 Jul 40, AG 380 (5-24-40).

23 Ibid. Italics in original.

24 See Ch. IX, below.

25 WPD Memo No. 1, 2 Aug 40, sub: Instructions for WD Ln Offs, WPD 4113-29.

26 Staff conversations and an informal staff agreement had already been concluded with Mexico. See Ch. XIII, below. Panama had no Army, and the Department of State agreed to the Army's plan of having all military arrangements with Panama conducted by the commanding general of the
Panama Canal Department. Memo, Lt Col Walton H. Walker, WPD, for Lt Col H. H. Brooks, OSW, 26 Nov 40, OPD Misc 48, Staff Conv.

27 From "Summary of Staff Conversations With American Republics, August-October 1940," quoted in Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, Bi-lateral Staff Conversations With Latin American Republics (early draft copy), pp 5-7. All studies and unpublished Army historical monographs, unless otherwise indicated, are in the OCMH files.

28 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 28 Dec 40, WPD 4115-44. An inclosure to this letter summarized the history and current status of the military conversations and agreements with each of the Latin American republics.

29 Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Dec 40, WPD 4115-43; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 28 Dec 40, WPD 4115-44. For examples on the problem of whether or not it would be wise to renew conversations with Chile and Venezuela, see papers in WPD 4228 and WPD 4361.

30 Various papers in WPD 4374, especially reports of 15 Jan and 26 Nov 41; 5LC Min, Vol. II, Items 28 and 29, 7 and 10 Jun 41; Linger and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 154-56.

31 Memo, Capt William O. Spears, USN, for CNO, 17 Jul 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDR; Memo, Lt Col Robert L. Christian for ACofS WPD, 28 Oct 40, and other papers, WPD 4374-1; various papers, dated 12 Jul-21 Dec 41, WPD 4374-8, WPD 4374-14, and WPD 4374-20.

32 Memo, Col Ridgway for ACofS WPD, 10 Jul 41, WPD 4374-8.

33 See p. 187, below, and also Chs. I, II, and IV, above.

34 Ltr, Under Secy State to President, 21 Jun 40; Ltr, Under Secy State to CofS, 24 Jun 40. Both in AG 380 (5-24-40). Notations on the copy of the former in OCS 20357-12 show that it was drafted and circulated by the Office of the Chief of Staff.

35 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 1 Aug 40, AG 380 (5-24-40).
36 Memo, G-2 for WPD, 1 Jul 40, WPD 4115-23; Memo, G-2 for CofS, 8 Jul 40; Memo JB for SW, 14 Nov 40 (ref JB 354, set 654, 13 Nov 40); Ltr, SW and SN to President, 29 Nov 40. Last three in AG 380 (5-24-40). Memo, JPC for JB, 5 Dec 41, WPD 4115-66.

37 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 8 Jul 40, AG 380 (5-24-40); various memos, WPD 4115-37; lists of the two visiting groups, WPD 4115-44; Notes on SLC mtg, 8 Nov 40, SLC Min. Vol. I, Item 63. A report of 9 October 1941, in WPD 4385-15, is typical of the testimony on the value of these visits.

38 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 8 Jul 40, AG 380 (5-24-40).

39 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 4 Dec 40, AG 380 (5-24-40); Ltr, Under Secy State to CofS, 21 Mar 42, and other papers, WDCSA 336 '13-21-42). Aside from this general training program for Latin American officers, during the war the Army gave special training to ground officers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and to the air squadrons of Brazil and Mexico that subsequently served in Italy and the Philippines, respectively. After 1942 the Army also conducted an extensive training program in Panama for Latin American officers and enlisted specialists.

40 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 1 Nov 40, WPD 3807-64; Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Jan 41, WPD 4115-47.

41 Memo, Paley for President, 7 Jan 41; Ltr, Under Secy State to President, 17 Mar 41. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. In the latter, Mr. Welles described Mr. Paley's observations as "exceedingly sound." On the general situation in Latin America at this time, see Memo, G-2 for WPD, 20 Dec 40, sub: Estimated Stability of American Republics and Their Respective Attitudes Towards Hemisphere Defense, WPD 4244-26.


43 Statement of Gen Van Voorhis to Lt Col Norman R. and Mai Mathewson, 14 Aug 40, WPD 4379-2; Memo, Col Ridgway for Actg ACofS WPD, 21
Aug 40, WPD 4115-33; Memo, Col McNarney for ACoS WPD, 31 Dec 40, WPD 4379-2; Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Jan 41, and other papers, AG 380 (1-13-41).

44 JB 325, set 676, 15 Mar 41, and other papers, AG 380 (1-13-41); Ltr, TAG to CG CDC, 20 May 41, AG 380 (5-8-41); Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, War Plans and Defense, Caribbean Defense Command, Annex 3.

45 Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, G Feb 41, AG 380 (1-13-41); Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 May 41, WPD 3558-18; U.S. Air Force Hist Study 42, Air Def of the Panama Canal, 1 January 1939-7 December 1941, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama, pp. 189-90.

46 On the problem of air transportation, see various papers, dated March-August 1941, WPD 4413, WPD 4452-8, and AG 380 (1-13-41). Copies of each of the seven plans prepared are in OPD Misc 25-31. Because of Colombia's size and geographical complexity, two separate plans were drafted (but apparently never formally approved) to cover possible operations in that country. Memos, Maj Edward H. McDaniel for Gen Gerow, WPD, 18 Sep and 7 Oct 41, WPD 4413-4 and WPD 4413-7, contain briefs of the Ecuador and Guatemala plans, which were typical.

47 Hist Sec, CDC, War Plans and Defense, CDC, Annex 3, pp. 10-11.

48 Lt, CG CDC to TAG, 20 Sep 41, and inds, AG 380 (1-13-41); Memo, WPD for G-2, 29 Nov 41, WPD 4413-10.

49 Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow and Col Bundy, WPD, 28 Jul 41, WPD 4225-15; Notes on War Council mtg, 28 Jul 41, SW Conf Binder 1; Ltr, TAG to CG CDC, 2 Aug 41, AG 380 (1113-41); Ltr and Ind, CG CDC to TAG, 26 Aug 41, WPD 4113-4.

50 Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow, WPD, 12 Aug 41, WPD 4115-53; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 13 Oct 41, OCS 15484-54; Memo, G-2 for WPD, 12 Feb 42, WPD 4115-53.
51 Navy WPD study, in form of Memo, JPC to JB, transmitted to Army WPD in late Aug 41, OPD Misc 49.

52 Tab A, Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Sep 41, WPD 4346-7.

53 Ibid.

54 Navy draft cited in footnote 51, above; Memo, Jt Policy and Plans Sec for Lat Amer Sec WPD, 9 Sep 41, OPD Misc 49; Memo, G-2 for WPD, 16 Sep 41, WPD 4374-11; Memo for File, 27 Nov 41, and other papers, WPD 4346-7. See also Ch. X, below.

55 Various papers, dated 19 Nov-13 Dec 41, WPD 4115-66, WPD 4115-67, and WPD 4115-70; the final Navy draft of this proposed joint paper, dated 5 Dec 41, is in WPD 4115-66.

56 Notes prepared by the CofS to be used at the SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 44.

57 Dept of State notes on SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 42.

58 Various papers, dated 27 Dec 41-9 Jan 42, WPD 4115-74; Notes on SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Items 42 and 44.

59 Notes prepared by the CofS to be used at the SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 44.

60 Memo, CofS for SW, 3 Jan 42, WPD 4115-74.

61 Draft Ltr, SW to President, 6 Jan 42, WPD 4115-74.


63 Memo, Gen Ridgway for CofS, 16 Jan 42, WPD 4115-84.

64 See Cline, *Washington Command Port*, Ch. VI, and also pp. 318-19, on
the establishment and work of the Pan-American Group, OPD.

65 See Ch. VII, above, and Ch. XI, below.

66 Memo Lt Col Omar N. Bradley for Col Orlando Ward, OCS, 22 Jan 41, OCS Conf Binder 8; Memo, Col Ridgway for ACofS WPD, 19 Apr 41, WPD 4487.


68 Memo, G-2 for WPD, 13 Nov 41; Memo, DCoS GHQ for WPD, 17 Nov 41; Memo, CofAAF for WPD, 17 Nov 41. All in WPD 4115-63.

69 Memo, WPD for G-2, 24 Nov 41, WPD 4115-63.

70 Various papers, dated 8-31 Jan 42, WPD 4115-82 and WPD 4115-83. See also, Ch. XI, below.

71 *History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*, Chs. X and XIX.

72 Established as the Economic Defense Board in July 1941 and redesignated the Board of Economic Warfare on 17 December 1941.

73 Two articles by David H. Popper, in *Foreign Policy Reports* 15 April and 15 May 1942, provide an excellent summary of the accomplishments of the Rio conference and of the position of Latin America toward the war in the spring of 1942.

74 WPD Memo for Record, 27 Dec 41; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 2 Jan 42 and other papers. All in WPD 4115-74.

75 Remarks of Mr. Welles at SLC mtgs, 3 Jan and 10 Feb 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Items 42 and 46.

76 Ltr, Secy State to SW, 26 Nov 43, OPD 334.8 Inter-Amer Def Bd.
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77 General Embick and Admiral Johnson at the time of their appointment were serving in a similar capacity on the joint United States-Mexican Defense Commission, and General Embick was also senior Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States.

78 On the board's initial organization, see various papers, dated 5 Feb-28 Mar 42, WPD 4115-74 and OPD 334.8 Inter-Amer Def Bd. The Inter-American Defense Board (Washington: 1943 ), a forty-one page pamphlet, describes the organization and work of the board up to December 1943.

79 Stimson Diary, entry of 30 Mar 42. The addresses are printed in The Inter-American Defense Board, pp. 24-29.

80 On the wartime policy toward the board, see Memos, OPD for DCofS, 23 and 24 Feb 43, and Notes on SLC mtg, 24 Feb 43. All in SLC Min, Vol. IV. Memo, OPD for Chairman, Inter-Amer Def Bd, 4 Mar 43; Ltr, SN to Secy State, 13 Mar 43; Memo, Navy Dept for Adm Johnson, 13 Mar 43. Last three in OPD 334.8 Inter-Amer Def Bd.

81 Memo, WPD for Ln Off Dept of State, 18 Dec 41, and other papers, WPD 4244-44.

82 Memo, WPD for Gen Miles, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4115-68; Memo, SGS for TAG, 17 Dec 41, OCS 20020-181 (Gen Miles's formal instructions).

83 Memo for Record of Gen Marshall, 19 Jan 42, WPD 4224-217; Memo, CofS for President, 20 Jan 42; Memo, President for CofS, 21 Jan 42. Last two in WPD 4244-45. Memo, Gen Ridgway for Mr. Laurence Duggan, Dept of State, 21 Jan 42, WPD 4228-28.

84 On the allocations to Brazil, see Chapter XII, below; on the trainer airplanes, see Notes on Tel Conv, Gen Ridgway with Mr. Duggan, 21 Jan 42, WPD 4228-28; Notes on White House Conf, 28 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42) ; Memo, CofAAF for President, 29 Jan 42, and other papers, JAB 6-9 (OPD Misc 37).

85 Notes of SW after Cabinet mtg, 23 Jan 42, WPD 4115-87; Memo, Lt Col
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Henry A. Barber, Jr., for Gen Gerow, WPD, 26 Jan 42, WPD 4115-88; Draft of Rad, Dept of State to Amer delegation, Rio, 26 Jan 42, and annotations thereon, WPD 4228-30; Notes on White House Conf, 28 Jan 42, WDCSA 334, Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42).

86 Designation changed to 58th Coast Artillery in November 1942.

87 Memos, G-2 for WPD, 27 and 28 Jan 42, WPD 4655-1; Notes on White House Conf, 28 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs & Conf (1-28-42 ); various papers, dated 30 Jan-5 Feb 42, WPD 4655-3 and WPD 4655-4; Notes on GHQ Staff Conf, 3, 4, and 6 Feb 42, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Binder 2.

88 Notes on Conf of War and Navy Dept officials with Secy State Hull, 21 Jan 42, WPD 4228-37.

89 Various papers, dated 8 Feb-18 Mar 42, WPD 4655-4; Notes on SLC mtg, 27 Apr 42, OPD 334.8 (3-6-42); Ltr, SW to Secy State, 13 May 42, WDCSA 381 War Plans; Historical Division, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, Chile: Missions and Defense Measures, 1939-1946, pp. 27-31. With respect to both Chile and Peru, the United States Army ran into the minor complication that in those countries coast artillery defense was then under the jurisdiction of their navies and not of their armies.

90 Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, treats the air defense system of the Panama Canal, including a brief account of the development of new Army air bases in Central America, at Salinas and on the Galapagos Islands in Ecuador, and at Talara in Peru.

91 The 723d and 727th Batteries CA (AA), activated 14 August 1942. The arrangements for sending coast artillery to Peru can be followed in WPD 4655-4. See Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, United States Missions and Bases in Peru and the Caribbean Defense Command, pp. 3 5f, for further details.

92 The terms governing dispatch of the battery to Venezuela are set forth in Memo, WPD for Dept of State, 7 Feb 42, WPD 4655-4; and their acceptance, Memo, Dept of State for WPD, 17 Feb 42, WPD 4361-18. There is a good
account of the difficulties encountered by the VELLUM Force in Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, Military Collaboration, C.D.C.-Venezuela During World War II, Ch. VI. Chapter VII of the same monograph describes the installation and operation, between the autumn of 1942 and February 1944, of United States Army batteries on Patos Island, belonging to Venezuela and located adjacent to Trinidad.


94 For example, Memo, Col Barber, WPD, for Ln Office, Dept of State, 21 Feb 42, WPD 4383-14, concluding: "Attention is invited to the fact that in the last analysis, it is necessary for each country to protect adequately its own vital facilities and its own sources of strategic supplies."

95 Historical Section, Caribbean Defense Command, MS, Procurement, Occupation, and Use of Peruvian Bases, p. 32.

96 Report by G-3 GHQ, 7 Jan 42, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Binder 2; Pers Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen McNair, CofS GHQ, 15 Jan 42, WPD 4452-19; Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Feb 42, and other papers, WPD 4655.

97 For the servicing detachments, the staff agreement of 15 January 1942 with Venezuela was a typical arrangement; see Hist Sec, CDC Military Collaboration, C.D.C.-Venezuela During World War II, p. 26. For Chile, Memo, WPD for G-2, 19 Feb 42, WPD 465 5-4.

98 Article XIV of the informal agreement of 24 January 1942 governing the occupation of the base at Salinas, Ecuador, copy in WPD 4225-28. The Salinas agreement served as a model for later arrangements.

99 This topic has not been treated for security reasons.

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CHAPTER IX

The Supply of Arms to Latin America

The supply of arms posed some of the thorniest problems in American military relations with the Latin American nations during the whole World War II period. It will be recalled that the Army had suggested in May 1938 that relations might be substantially improved if the United States encouraged the private sales of munitions to these countries. The Department of State rejected the suggestion. Instead, it continued its more or less official disapproval of foreign munitions sales, illustrated by current instructions that required American military attaches in Latin America to avoid, whenever possible, the discussion of arms purchases from United States firms. This remained American policy until after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939.

Until then, also, the factor of price was an even more important barrier to American sales of arms in Latin America than American policy. The Latin Americans could purchase most munitions more cheaply, and on easier terms, from European than from American producers. In consequence, except for military airplanes and airplane parts, American arms sales to most of the Latin American countries from 1935 onward were negligible. They averaged about $10,000,000 a year for the period 1936-39, measured in terms of the dollar value of export licenses issued, and about 85 percent of the total consisted of military aircraft and aircraft spare parts. Sales reached their peak in 1938, due principally to relatively large aircraft purchases by the Argentine Government. Thereafter they declined.

Germany and Italy were the principal purveyors of munitions to Latin America on the eve of World War II. The Nazi technique of barter economy, by which Germany purchased raw materials with blocked marks that could only be expended on German goods, naturally helped the Germans to capture the market, and the Department of State believed that both the German and the Italian Governments were granting either direct or indirect subsidies to munitions sales in Latin America. The sales of munitions by Germany and Italy, coupled with their large share in the training of Latin American armies and in the schooling of Latin American officers abroad, exerted an important influence in Latin American military circles, especially among high-ranking officers. This in turn had a more far-reaching significance for the interest of the United States in continental security, because in most Latin American nations the military had a large influence in the formulation and direction of national policy.

In November 1938 President Roosevelt indicated to Under Secretary of State Welles that to offset Nazi and Fascist influence of this sort he would like to have legislation adopted that would permit the War and Navy Departments to sell at cost some of their surplus military material to the Latin American republics. This suggestion ran into complications. The Army had some military surplus that could have been supplied to Latin American countries, but until the outbreak of war in Europe legal barriers were generally believed to forbid such sales. After September 1939, when these barriers were removed by reinterpretation of old legislation and enactment of new, the United States was itself engaged in a rearmament program that absorbed some of the existing surplus and most of the remainder was to be made available after May 1940 to nations who were fighting the Axis overseas. During this second period, too, the nation's own rearmament program barred any serious thought of manufacturing new military equipment for the Latin
Law, Policy, and Procedure

The Army had considered the legal problem of public sales in making its initial proposal for a re-examination of arms policy in May 1938. While an act of 5 June 1920 authorized the Secretary of War to dispose of surplus war material to foreign governments, the War Department at the time considered itself bound by a subsequent Presidential letter of 23 April 1923 that prohibited such sales. Although an interpretation in 1931 held that exceptions to this prohibition could be made with specific Presidential approval in each instance, in 1938 it was generally believed that the proposal to sell surplus military stocks to Latin America called not only for a change in policy but for new legislation as well. Prompted by President Roosevelt, Congress in January 1939 prepared the draft of a joint resolution designed to authorize limited sales of military equipment to Latin America. Known as the Pittman Resolution and first introduced in March 1939, it was not finally adopted until 15 June 1940. In its final form, the Pittman Resolution stated, "the President may, in his discretion, authorize the Secretary of War to manufacture in factories and arsenals under his jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, coast-defense and antiaircraft materiel, including ammunition therefor," and to sell these types of munitions to American republics, subject to a number of provisos, including a pledge by recipients not to dispose of such material subsequently to a non-American government. While this resolution when introduced was interpreted to cover the disposal of surplus material, its limitation to coast artillery and antiaircraft guns led the Army to seek a different solution.

The Army realized it would have to find some new solution when Brazil asked for large quantities of American arms in the summer of 1939. The outbreak of war in Europe prompted President Roosevelt to act. On 4 September 1939 he told Under Secretary Welles that "since under existing legislation we cannot give or sell any old arms to Brazil, it might be possible to get around that difficulty by having the War Department under existing law sell suitable old guns to some American citizen under an arrangement which would provide that he in turn dispose of them to the Brazilian Government"—a suggestion that foreshadowed the method used in the transfer of large surpluses to Great Britain in 1940. The Army's Judge Advocate General thereupon advised that his office had on several recent occasions held that the act of 5 June 1920 authorized the Secretary of War, with Presidential approval, to dispose of surplus military equipment, for which there was no domestic market, to foreign purchasers, including foreign governments. Therefore he held that there was no need to resort to the stratagem suggested by the President.

Having cleared the hurdle of law with respect to surplus material, the Army still had to cope with the problem of policy. When Chile submitted a request for arms in the fall of 1939, General Marshall stated his own doubts about "the propriety of supplying them with small arms, in view of our declared policy not to sell [government-owned] small arms to foreign nations." General Marshall also expressed his understanding that it was "not the policy of the State Department at the present time to consider selling rifles, automatic rifles and machine guns to Western Hemisphere Republics. Up to now, the policy has
been confined to Coast Defense and Antiaircraft weapons — if it at all." Mr. Welles agreed to lay the matter of selling small arms and other types of offensive weapons before the President in order to secure a policy decision.

A change in policy seems to have been effected by accident rather than by design. In early December-1939, President Roosevelt received the President of Haiti at the White House, and during their conversations the American President promised to furnish Haiti with some rifles and machine guns out of Army stocks. Apparently the President made this commitment without consulting either the State or War Department. Though Haiti at the time did not get the arms requested—principally because it had no money to pay for them—the President's approval of the idea in this instance seems to have stilled any further objections on the ground of principle to the release of small arms and other weapons capable of offensive use.

The Chilean request for arms presented in the fall of 1939 illustrated the practical difficulties of putting the new policy into effect. Chile first approached G-2 with a request for information about the best means of obtaining a large quantity of war material, particularly antiaircraft guns, howitzers, and infantry mortars, from private American firms. The information was freely given, along with permission to use Army designs if orders were placed, but evidently the Chileans discovered that the problem of cost was insurmountable. The next step was a Chilean request to the Department of State for assistance in obtaining government-owned Army and Navy munitions. Chile wanted to purchase two cruisers and two destroyers for its Navy and antiaircraft and other artillery pieces for its Army. The Chilean Army was described by the Department of State as being in "deplorable" circumstances, and Mr. Welles urged the Army and Navy to consider what might be done on Chile's behalf. For the Navy, Admiral Stark stated that while it might be possible to release some old destroyers to Chile, he was opposed to the idea. These vessels, he contended, could be most usefully employed in hemisphere defense by the United States Navy itself. In the meantime, General Marshall had directed the Chief of Ordnance to survey his stocks and decide what might be offered to Chile. The resulting list, submitted to the Department of State in mid-December for transmission to the Chileans, included one hundred thousand Enfield rifles, one hundred old 75-mm. guns, and some obsolete mortars and mountain guns, with ammunition for the last-named only. Although cost was one reason for the Chilean's reluctance to consider the purchase of any items on this Army list of surplus, a more important factor was their intimation to the Department of State that what they really wanted was modern equipment, especially antiaircraft and field artillery guns. General Marshall had to explain that the Army was not prepared to part with any of its modern equipment or to promise any deliveries from future production for a long time to come. All that it could do was to add some 8-inch howitzers to the original list. The Chileans decided that none of the material offered was sufficiently attractive in type or price to justify purchase.

Thus, the shift in United States policy that permitted the sale of surplus government arms to Latin American republics actually had little effect in practice before the summer of 1940. The only significant sales under the revised policy were made to Brazil. The Latin Americans wanted modern and not obsolete arms, and at a price they could afford. Because of its own rearmament program the United States Army held that it could not spare modern arms at any price.

The critical situation that confronted the United States in May and June 1940 called forth a new definition
of American policy toward the supply of arms to Latin America. The Army liaison officers who were hurriedly dispatched to the Latin American states in June 1940 were authorized to ask

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what aid from the United States these states needed for self-defense and for their contribution to hemisphere defense. The Latin Americans responded by emphasizing their dire need for all sorts of war material, which they insisted must be furnished to them at a cost they could afford to pay. The Minister of National Defense of one of the smaller but strategically located republics summed up the situation when he said: "We are naked and need help." 22

The United States clearly recognized the military impotence of most of the Latin American states and their need for additional armaments, but after June 1940 its own rapid military expansion to meet the Axis threat and the large-scale transfer of military equipment to Great Britain all but eliminated any "surplus" even of obsolete material. General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented this problem to President Roosevelt on 24 June as one of the many "Decisions as to National Action" that had to be made:

The facts are-At the present there are practically no excess facilities available in this country for the manufacture of heavy weapons and ships other than small or medium sized noncombatant craft. The Army has a few rifles and machine guns that possibly might be released, but there would be no ammunition available for these weapons earlier than March, 1941.

It is recommended that-Should it be found possible for Latin American countries to procure material in the United States, credits be provided for the purpose.23

The President approved this recommendation on 24 June, and in accordance with his decision the approved policy statement read: "It is decided that by providing small amounts of munitions at intervals, the urgent requirements of the Latin American countries requesting munitions may be met. Credits will be provided for the purchase of munitions." 24

Early in July Colonel Ridgway of the War Plans Division prepared a summary of the Latin American arms situation for General Marshall. Colonel. Ridgway noted that the act of 1920 permitted the sale of surplus items and that the Army could price them within reach of Latin American means. But the Army's surplus stocks still available in July 1940 consisted of items that the Latin Americans had indicated they did not want regardless of price. Colonel Ridgway pointed out that the Pittman Resolution, recently passed, permitted the sale of coast defense and antiaircraft guns but required that sales be made at no expense to the United States. Even if the United States

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could afford to spare any new coast defense and antiaircraft guns, the Latin American states could not afford to pay for them. What they wanted, furthermore, was a full array of military and naval equipment. Brazil's request, submitted on 12 June 1940, was illustrative: it included a great variety of items that the United States was not legally authorized to sell; the total cost off the items was roughly calculated at $180,000,000; Brazil wanted 50 percent deliveries as soon as possible, the balance within five years, and an extension of credit that would permit payment over a ten-year period. In order to decide how, and how far, the Brazilian request should and could be met, as well as how to deal with the many other Latin
American requests that had already been submitted formally or informally, Colonel Ridgway presented to
the Chief of Staff a statement of policy and recommended that it be discussed by the Standing Liaison
Committee and the results submitted to the President for his decision.25

In slightly modified form, President Roosevelt approved the statement on 1 August 1940. It provided:

a. For arming the countries named to the extent indicated, as determined in each case by our estimate of their requirements:

(1) (a) Brazil-To insure her ability to defend herself against a major [Axis] attack from neighboring states,
or from overseas, and against internal disorder, until U. S. armed aid can arrive in sufficient force to insure
success.

   (b) Mexico-To insure her ability to defend herself against any probable attack from
   overseas, and against internal disorder, until U.S. armed aid can arrive in sufficient force to
   insure success.

(2) Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela-To insure their ability to meet and repel any probable minor attack
from overseas and to insure their internal stability.

(3) Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic-To insure internal stability.

(4) Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru-To be determined after requirements for the
other republics have been computed and plans to supply them have been approved.

b. For providing these arms on financial terms these Republics can meet.

c. For assistance in the matter of military, naval, and industrial personnel.

d. For adjusting the economic relations between the United States and Latin American states to insure the latter's political
cooperation. Financial arrangements to accomplish this adjustment should be made on the basis of accepting the loss as a
proper charge against our National defense.26

Admiral Stark, in indicating his agreement with this statement of policy, had remarked: "This is just
common sense." 27

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Common sense it may have been, but problems of ways and means prevented any effective fulfillment of
the new policy before Pearl Harbor. The mounting pressure of America's own program of military
expansion and rearmament and successive and huge calls for aid from nations actively fighting the Axis
Powers were to make it virtually impossible to send even token shipments of modern arms to the Latin
American nations. Furthermore, Mr. Stimson, the new Secretary of War, had assumed office with the
conviction that "Hitler's so-called fifth-column movements in South America" were merely "attempts to
frighten us from sending help where it will be most effective."28 During the prewar period he more or less
consistently opposed sending modern military equipment to the Latin American nations, on the ground
that American security required that first call on it should be given to meet the more urgent demands of the
home front and fighting fronts abroad. While the problem of arms supply was to loom very large in military relationships with Latin America between the summer of 1940 and December 1941, its record is a story of good intentions, extensive planning, and refinement of policy by Army staff officers, but of almost no performance on the part of the United States; on the part of the Latin Americans it is a story of exaggerated and frustrated hopes and of understandable irritation.

Aside from the scarcity of weapons, there was another fundamental reason for misunderstanding in Latin American arms negotiations during the prewar period. Customarily, there was a very wide divergence between the estimates submitted by the Latin American nations of what they considered their essential needs to be and the Army’s estimates of what the United States ought to supply to them when it could. The approved war plans of the Army and Navy envisaged that the principal defense against any Axis assault in strength on any point in the hemisphere would have to be provided by United States forces. The most that the United States Army could plan to do, considering its own and other more pressing needs, was to furnish Latin American nations with enough arms to maintain their internal security and fend off external attacks until United States forces could arrive. This limited defensive role was far from palatable to the Latin Americans. Naturally enough, the larger nations wanted to take a more active hand in any large-scale hemisphere defense operations that might develop. For this purpose, they wanted modern, balanced forces, equipped for offensive as well as purely defensive operations. In consequence, there was usually a very great difference between the types of material they requested and the types the United States planned to make available to them.

In the fall of 1940 the Army anticipated that the Export-Import Bank would provide the credits to enable Latin American nations to purchase arms from the United States. The credits would come from the $500,000,000 that Congress on 26 September authorized the bank to lend to Latin American republics. Actually, before the “processing” had been completed on any of their applications, the Latin American states were included within the lend-lease framework, and almost all of their “credits” were therefore provided out of lend-lease appropriations.

The procedure for processing Latin American arms requisitions through the State, War, and Navy Departments and their interdepartmental committees proved to be a much more complicated matter than the arrangement of credits. It also underwent rather frequent change and refinement. The basic features of the system were settled for the Army in a joint memorandum approved by the Secretaries of War and State in March 1940. Requests were to be received only from officially accredited Latin American government representatives, not from private brokers. They were to submit their requests first to the Department of State, which would transmit them to the War Department only after the Department of State had determined that the request conformed to current foreign policy. With Department of State consent, foreign representatives might confer informally with War Department representatives in the early stages of a negotiation, but the War Department could not commit the United States to filling a request without full Department of State cognizance and approval. After Department of State approval, the War Department would handle the actual negotiation, with the final agreement again subject to Department of State review.

General Marshall in November 1940 proposed the establishment of a joint Army-Navy board to supervise
the processing of Latin American arms requests. At first the Navy objected to the creation of such a board. Navy planning officers felt that there were already too many special emergency boards and committees; they also felt that a board such as the Army had proposed would get nowhere unless it were tied into the priorities system of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and the work of the

Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Conferences ironed out the objections raised by the Navy, and a charter for the new organization, known as the joint Advisory Board on American Republics, was formally approved in mid-December. It was to consist of three Army members (representing the War Plans and Supply Divisions of the General Staff, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board) and two Navy members (representing the Navy's War Plans Division and Fleet Maintenance Division). The board's duties were to handle all Latin American munitions requests transmitted by the Department of State and to draft a detailed program for future arms aid to Latin America.\(^{32}\)

The establishment of the joint Advisory Board was accompanied by a new refinement in policy, based on the premise that "Hemisphere solidarity demands that the United States take all reasonable measures to meet the needs of our sister republics." But the War Plans Division also observed that the Army's own current procurement program called for the provision of critical items for a force of 1,400,000 men at the earliest practicable date. The United States was furthermore, as of mid-November 1940, splitting its munitions production with the British on practically a 50-50 basis. Under the circumstances, there seemed scant likelihood of any "free capacity" to meet Latin American needs for many months to come. Nevertheless, the Army believed that it should prepare to do whatever it could by adopting a precise definition of policy and by obtaining new legislation from Congress to authorize sales of types of munitions to Latin America not covered by the Pittman Resolution.\(^{33}\) The policy proposed was approved by Secretary of War Stimson on 2 December 1940. On releases, it provided for a rather involved formula:

\[\text{a. As soon as the quantities of any item of equipment or munitions required for the 1,418,097 troop basis are on hand, not to exceed 5\% of the productive capacity of the United States in critical items and 50\% in essential items may be allocated to other American Republics.}\]

\[\text{b. As soon as the quantities of any critical item of equipment or munitions required for two million men are at hand, not to exceed 50\% of the productive capacity of the United States, after British commitments have been met, may be allocated to other Amer-}\]

In effect, the formula meant that there would be no deliveries of standard critical or essential items at least until January 1942. The approved policy statement also contained the following terms, which remained basically applicable to all orders thereafter:

\[\text{c. Substitute items of equipment may be released for sale to other American Republics whenever standard items are available for their replacement.}\]
d. Standard, or substitute standard, equipment only will be authorized for manufacture in the United States, except in the case of prior commitments.

e. No equipment will be sold to other American Republics unless complete units (including ammunition, if needed) are available.

f. The War Department will oppose the loan of US funds to other American Republics for the creation of munitions productive capacity outside the United States.35

Early in January the War Plans Division submitted to General Marshall a draft of proposed legislation to legalize the release of all types of new war material to other American republics. But the more far-reaching lend-lease bill was already in preparation, and in February it was decided to include Latin America in the lend-lease program. The Lend-Lease Act, approved on 11 March 1941, permitted the release of any type of weapon, and its passage ended the legal limitations on arms supply to the Latin American nations.36

The Latin American Arms Program of 1941

The Joint Advisory Board at its first meeting on 8 January 1941 decided that its Army and Navy members should first prepare separate service programs and then combine these programs in the final stage of planning.37 As the Army members set about their work Colonel Ridgway, in an informal letter, described the situation they faced. In the request of one Latin American country, he noted

. . . the list of things . . . in its first priority includes the most modern field and AA artillery and aviation. These are just the things in which our tremendously expanded forces are most deficient ....

Added to this is the tremendously urgent demand from the British which the President insists we meet. It is practically certain that some items, if promptly ordered, can be procured in the next few months. Primary training planes, commercial automotive equipment

of various kinds, and miscellaneous items of army equipment, other than arms and ammunition, are included in this class.

. . . the transformation of our industry from the production of peace-time products to munitions of war on the scale now required is a task of tremendous magnitude and difficulty. I doubt if our neighbors to the South have any appreciation of the scope of our effort. But regardless of that, what they should have is an appreciation of our sincerity in attempting to meet their demands. Of that sincerity there can be no doubt. I have seen it here on every hand.

The War and Navy Departments are now working on a program for each of the American Republics which have requested munitions. That program, when completed, will show the estimated dates by which each item will begin to become available, the period over which procurement will extend, the unit cost and total estimated value. These programs require much time to work up. The data on which they are based must come from every branch of industry in our country. Any attempt at hasty predictions as to the estimated delivery schedules is not only valueless but actually dangerous in the possible political reactions such predictions might produce.38

Pending the completion of a consolidated program for all of the Latin American nations, the Army planners made no attempt to consider requests already submitted by particular states, since the total amount that could be made available was dependent on the combined requests of all. In the interim, they sought to obtain lists from each country of what it wanted. The official or informal requests received before the joint Advisory Board’s report was completed totaled about a billion dollars for Army material.
and another quarter billion for Navy material. The board concluded that these requests would have to be scaled down by excluding all but the most urgent requirements for hemisphere defense.\textsuperscript{39}

In drafting the Latin American arms program, the members of the joint Advisory Board had to take into consideration a variety of factors. The basic consideration was the contribution that each nation could be expected to make toward hemisphere defense, particularly toward the security of the Panama Canal. The existing military strength of each nation had also to be weighed, and every individual allotment had to be calculated in the light of the existing rivalries between each state and its neighbors. Nor could the United States expect that the supply of arms would serve to purchase the good will of the Latin Americans. It was far more likely that the allocations to any particular state would arouse the envy and distrust of its neighbors. Therefore, the planners believed that any credits extended to finance arms supply, whether under lend-lease or otherwise, should be considered as loans to be repaid-if not in cash, then in definite assurances of close collaboration with United States forces, and in guarantees that the United States could use Latin American airfields, naval bases, and other facilities if and when necessary. At the beginning of March 1941, when the joint Advisory Board completed its report, there appeared to be no immediate danger of external aggression to Latin America "as long as the British-American combination controls the South Atlantic." On the other hand, the board did consider the possibility of Nazi-inspired internal uprisings a serious and constant menace, "if for no other reason than to obstruct our material aid to the British" by diverting American forces to the southward.\textsuperscript{40}

In its report of 3 March 1941 the joint Advisory Board recommended a gross allocation of $400,000,000 for Army and Navy material, to be supplied to the Latin American nations within a three-year period or longer, three fourths of which was to be spent on Army material. Initially, individual allotments were recommended for each of the Latin American states except Mexico, Argentina, and Panama. Subsequently, allotments were also calculated for Mexico and Argentina, and the Army total of specific allotments came to $286,000,000, which left an additional $14,000,000 as a general reserve. The board also decided that only $70,000,000 worth of Army supplies could be made available during the 1941 and 1942 fiscal years, leaving $230,000,000 to be furnished during fiscal 1943 "and later years." In effect, this very important qualification meant that only a modicum of military supplies could be released to the Latin American republics before the summer of 1942 under the best of circumstances. In presenting its report, the joint Advisory Board included the following recommendations:

5. \textit{a.} That plans for hemisphere defense be considered principally the responsibility of the United States, and that as far as possible, all plans and agreements made with the American republics be an extension of our own plans.

\textit{b.} That all armaments furnished to the American republics be in accordance with our own plans and estimates of their needs for hemisphere defense, and that these armaments be procured through the established agencies of the Army and Navy, in order to obtain the following advantages:

(1) To avoid interference with the procurement plans of the British, Chinese, Greek, or other foreign programs.
(2) To insure that American republics will be equipped with our own standard
material.
(3) To permit control over the deliveries without interfering with our own Army and Navy programs.

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The board also recommended a procedure to be followed in processing future arms requests and maintenance of the system of priorities among nations approved in the summer of 1940 and reaffirmed in January 1941.41

The adoption of the new program for Latin American arms supply raised the question of how the recipients should be informed of what was in store for them—a particularly important matter because it was essential to good hemisphere relations that the Latin Americans should not entertain any false hopes of substantial deliveries in the immediate future. The War Department favored the issuance of a frank public statement by the Department of State that would curb such expectations:

The United States is making a great national effort to equip its tremendously expanding armed forces. In addition, it must supply large quantities of munitions to the British.

As long as British resistance continues, there will be no major menace to this hemisphere. If British resistance collapses, we will all be in danger.

The national safety of all countries of this hemisphere demands that the British be supplied as fully and as rapidly as possible. The United States is doing this even to the extent of delaying the equipping of its own troops, but it is doing so in the common defense of all the Americas.

Subject to agreement upon details, the American republics can be assured that they may begin procuring their armaments in the United States as soon as our production will meet these vital prior requirements. Their armies could thus commence to receive arms only a short time after the armies of the United States have received theirs.

In forwarding this draft, the Secretary of War observed that the Latin Americas "not unnaturally . . . conceive of us as a huge arsenal well-stocked with all kinds of weapons, and when we tell them of our real condition they don't believe us. Being non-industrial nations, they have no conception of the time necessary for the manufacture of munitions. The consequent result is that they doubt our sincerity." The Department of State decided not to issue the statement. The Army believed that if it had been issued a good deal of mis-

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understanding in Latin American military relations might have been avoided during the succeeding months.42

In order to include the Latin American nations under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, as previously planned, the President had to certify that their defense was vital to the defense of the United States. The Department of State prepared a joint State, War, and Navy Department letter to the President requesting
that he take this step, and he gave his official approval on 23 April 1941. The War Department had already agreed that the Department of State should be charged with the responsibility of formally notifying the Latin Americans that they had been included within the lend-lease framework and of the allocations made to each of them under the new arms program. In late April Under Secretary of State Welles received the diplomatic representatives of the Latin American states and went through the ceremony of making these announcements. At the same time he described the procedure they were to follow in submitting their requests for arms under the new program.

Two other essentials to carrying out the Latin American arms program caused a good deal of difficulty during 1941. First, each of the Latin American nations had to submit an official list of its requirements, and the War and State Departments discovered that it took a good deal of time and effort to round up all of the lists. Second, each nation had to designate an official representative or purchasing body to carry through negotiations after its list was presented, and a number of the states were slow in doing so.

It required two months' time and numerous conferences between the many agencies involved before a revised procedure for handling Latin American arms requests under lend-lease was finally worked out by the Division of Defense Aid Reports, Office for Emergency Management. The procedure, as finally evolved, called for the following steps: (1) through its diplomatic representative, a Latin American nation informed the Liaison Office of the Department of State that it desired lend-lease aid and that it had an officially accredited military representative to conduct detailed negotiations; (2) the Liaison Office transmitted this information to the Division of Defense Aid Reports, which in turn informed the proper officers of the War and Navy Departments; (3) the diplomatic representative visited the Division of Defense Aid Reports, which explained to him all of the details of the lend-lease procedure; (4) the military representative then arranged with the Division of Defense Aid Reports to visit the War and Navy Departments, taking with him a precise list of the material his country wanted; (5) War and Navy officers helped him to rearrange his list on a priority basis and in accordance with the allocation of lend-lease funds to be made available, and to prepare separate requisitions for each item on the revised list; (6) the military representative presented approved requisitions to the Office of Defense Aid Reports for transmission to the proper procuring agency; (7) after formal approval and allocation of funds to cover requisitions, the requests became commitments of the United States, subject to the priority of its own national defense orders; (8) when the material called for on a requisition was ready, a transfer order was issued authorizing its delivery—until then, the material remained United States property. While these steps were being taken, the diplomatic representative of the Latin American nation was to negotiate a basic lend-lease agreement with the Department of State. During its negotiation, the Department of State was to consult with the Division of Defense Aid Reports but not with the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments. No material could be transferred until this basic agreement was concluded.

The War Department was dissatisfied with one aspect of the lend-lease procedure—the Department of State's negotiation of basic lend-lease agreements without consultation with the military services.
Although the Army admitted that it had but slight interest in the financial provisions of these agreements, it believed that the War and Navy Departments had a fundamental interest in them because of their bargaining value and held, therefore, that none should be signed until approved by the War and Navy Departments. Although the various War Department agencies concerned were agreed on this point, there seems to have been a general reluctance to press the matter with the Department of State. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy finally presented the War Department's views to the Department of State by letter, suggesting that "certain military and naval advantages of a limited character might be introduced into the negotiations," and that the War and Navy Departments should at least be informed about the course of lend-lease negotiations so that the services might present bargaining points for consideration. Mr. Welles replied that the proper body to discuss this topic was the Standing Liaison Committee. Since the Department of State's strong objection to any intrusion by the Army or Navy into the negotiation of basic lend-lease agreements was well known, the Army's spokesmen hesitated to ask General Marshall to press the question. In consequence, nothing more was done toward securing a voice in the negotiation of lend-lease agreements until the eve of Pearl Harbor.

G-2 suggested in September 1941 that it would be a good idea to have military attaches and members of military missions in Latin America play a more active role in lend-lease arms negotiations. They naturally were expected to provide technical advice in the initial drafting of Latin American arms requests before their transmission to Washington, but G-2 also proposed that the attaches and mission members should themselves come to Washington to lend assistance during the processing of arms requests. The War Plans Division rejected this suggestion. While acknowledging that the attaches could offer valuable technical advice, the Plans Division pointed out that they lacked the broader knowledge of strategic considerations and over-all requirements that were the main factors in determining action on Latin American requests. Furthermore, since little material aid was going to be available for the Latin Americans for some time to come, the failure in any particular negotiation to secure the promise of "fairly speedy delivery of a large part of the munitions requested might cause [the attaches] a considerable loss of prestige."  

The second lend-lease appropriation act, approved on 28 October 1941, authorized the expenditure of $150,000,000 for Latin American munitions, two thirds of which was to be spent on Army material. This act also required that the $100,000,000 for Army material be obligated by approved action on specific requisitions before 28 February 1942. In presenting the Latin American program during hearings on the act, Army spokesmen had stated that the appropriation would be spent approximately as follows:

- Ordnance and ordnance stores: $45,000,000
- Aircraft and aeronautical material: 29,775,000
- Tanks and other vehicles: 15,000,000
- Miscellaneous military equipment: 10,225,000

Likewise, the Congressional subcommittee had been told the approximate sums that would be spent for each country; for example, for Brazil $25,000,000, for Argentina $15,000,000, and Mexico $10,000,000. In order to carry out the authorized expenditure for Latin American arms within the time limit set, the Army believed it essential to secure revised requisitions from all the Latin American states...
that would conform to the limitations by category and breakdown by countries that had been presented informally to Congress. It therefore asked the Department of State to pass this information on to the Latin Americans so that they could submit revised lists. In making this request, the Army also "earnestly recommended" that "the State Department make it clear that the utilization of the funds in question for the categories listed is entirely contingent upon our resources, available production, and other commitments, and that the allocation of funds is not an indication that munitions in the amounts specified will be available for early release." 52 Although the Department of State was more than willing to tell the Latin Americans just what was planned for them, the Navy objected, especially to informing them of the breakdown of funds by categories. The net result of this disagreement was the delay of any Department of State announcement to the Latin Americans until the eve of Pearl Harbor.53 The formal entry of the United States into the war then made it necessary to recast both the program and the policy for Latin American arms supply.

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Airplanes for Latin America

The Latin American nations, especially the larger ones, were particularly interested in acquiring military aircraft from the United States. In general, Latin American military aviation in 1941 was in a rudimentary stage of development. Several countries had fewer qualified pilots than serviceable planes. Because some countries had been able to afford foreign airplane purchases during the preceding decade and others had not, the existing air strengths among the South American countries were more badly out of balance than their relative strengths in ground forces. Above all, the Latin American countries lacked pilots who were qualified to fly the modern combat aircraft, or even the basic and advanced training planes, that they wished to secure in large numbers. 54

Because American aircraft production was being shared so extensively with the British, the question of aircraft supply to Latin America was placed within the jurisdiction of the joint Aircraft Committee (composed of representatives of the Army, the Navy, and the British Purchasing Commission), rather than solely under that of the joint Advisory Board on American Republics. Although the board formulated a Latin American aircraft program to supplement the over-all supply program drafted in March 1941, the aircraft program required the approval of the joint Aircraft Committee and was not accepted in its final form until March 1942.55

Latin American requests for the purchase of military aircraft had begun to multiply by the fall of 1940. Argentina was attempting the direct purchase from private manufacturers of 300 to 400 Army-type planes, and by December the War Department had received requests from other American nations for a total of about 1,000 military aircraft—approximately 700 tactical planes and 300 trainers. 56 Because British needs and the rapidly expanding Army Air Corps were absorbing the entire output of Army-type planes, it was not possible to meet Latin American requests except by diverting airplanes already allocated to the United States Army or to the British. While the Department of State and certain War Department officials would have liked to divert a few planes from current production in order to make token deliveries

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to Latin America, neither the Air Corps nor the British showed any desire to share their allocations before the fall of 1941.

Colonel Ridgway drafted the initial joint Advisory Board study on Latin American aircraft supply in April 1941. By then, requests for about 2,000 planes had been received. His study proposed that about $87,500,000 of the total of $300,000,000 tentatively recommended for Army material supply in the March 1941 program be spent over a five-year period for the purchase of 1,471 planes (1,080 trainer and 391 tactical) for the Latin American countries. Allocations were suggested for each country on the bases of its existing air strength, the role that the United States expected it to play in hemisphere defense, and its ability to support and employ an air force effectively. 57

Two months later Colonel Ridgway's study provided a basis for formal action by the joint Aircraft Committee, begun after a conference of its members with State, War, and Navy Department and Office of Production Management representatives on 17 June. While accepting his estimates as a point of departure, the joint Aircraft Committee decided that no specific allocations should be made to any one country until all of the Latin American nations had submitted their requests. The Department of State was asked to obtain a list of requirements from each Latin American country by 15 August, but it was unable to do so, and two months later the lists from several nations were still not available. In effect, the delay of some nations in submitting their requests held up the negotiation of all Latin American airplane contracts. The Department of State and Joint Advisory Board therefore asked the joint Aircraft Committee to go ahead and authorize preliminary action on actual requests received, as well as on the revised over-all Latin American aircraft program upon which the joint Advisory Board had been working. This "Aircraft Program for American Republics" was submitted to the joint Aircraft Committee on 30 October 1941. Soon thereafter, it approved a list of types of planes to be supplied Latin American nations and scheduled delivery dates when each type was expected to become available for shipment to them. Initial shipments of the various trainer types were scheduled between February and August 1942, and tactical types were to be available from August 1942 onward. Earlier token deliveries were to be made if possible. 58

The Joint Aircraft Committee did not give its final approval to the Latin American airplane program until 7 March 1942. The subcommittee that drafted the report upon which this action was based attributed the long delay in completing the program to the failure of individual Latin American nations to take the necessary steps to qualify for airplane deliveries under lend-lease or, when so qualified, to their failure to submit the proper requisitions or to conform with the prescribed lend-lease procedure. The net effect of those delays had been to postpone even the production scheduling of most Latin American airplane orders. The report therefore laid down a new policy: no further attempt should be made to obtain a precise estimate of airplane requirements from each Latin American nation, nor should there be a separate production schedule to meet Latin American requirements. Instead, military aircraft for Latin America would in the future be "provided from current production under Air Corps, Navy, or Defense aid contracts, subject to the scheduling of delivery by the Munitions Assignment Board." To cover past and future requests, the joint Aircraft Committee adopted a program chat specified the total number of each type of plane that might be supplied and the maximum quantity of each type that might be delivered per month. No attempt was made to allocate the over-all totals among the countries. The approved totals provided for the ultimate delivery of a maximum of 550 training and 240 tactical planes, or a little more than half the totals proposed in April 1941.59

By March 1942, when this joint Aircraft Committee report was approved, six transport planes and about
one hundred training planes had actually been delivered or were en route to Latin America. Because of special circumstances, Brazil received some tactical planes in March and April 1942 and more at the end of the year. After the slow beginning in deliveries, the Latin American countries actually received during and immediately after the war more than two thousand airplanes of Army types, a total substantially larger than that planned for them in 1941 and 1942. More than 60 percent of the planes went to Brazil and Mexico, both of which became active participants in the fighting overseas. Less than 20 percent of the total was of tactical types. Deliveries of tactical planes, originally planned for sixteen nations, were actually made only to Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. The allocation of nontactical types among thirteen other countries did not differ

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very much from what had been planned for them in 1941. The value of Army deliveries of aircraft and air accessories to Latin America reached a total of nearly $128,000,000 by mid-1945, or half again as much as originally proposed in 1941.

Special Problems During 1941

Between the adoption of the March 1941 plan for arms supply to Latin America and the advent of hostilities in December, the War Department had to deal with a number of special problems that involved both old and new questions of policy. The first of these related to the policy, approved by the Secretary of War on 2 December 1940, that "The War Department will oppose the loan of United States funds to other American Republics for the creation of munitions productive capacity outside the United States." In March 1941 the Navy Department tried to obtain some machine tools for shipment to Brazilian Navy yards, where it planned to repair its own naval vessels. War Department policy prohibited any export of machine tools to Latin America. Under Secretary of State Welles, previously uninformed of the War Department's position, announced his strong opposition to the policy when the matter came to his attention. The War Department, while expressing sympathy for this particular Brazilian request, nevertheless urged that no machine tools be exported to Latin America for any purpose whatsoever. The domestic shortage was too critical to permit such a diversion. The State and Navy Departments remained unconvincing, and the question was referred to the joint Advisory Board for reconsideration. The Board recommended that, in the interest of establishing a general policy acceptable to all three departments, the Latin Americans should be permitted to purchase machine tools and machinery for creating munitions productive capacity "when, but only when, in the discretion of the State, War, and Navy Departments, the export of these purchases will definitely best serve the national interests and where there is no more urgent need for the machinery for our own defense needs or those of other nations resisting aggression." This formula was approved, and it allowed the machine tools in question to go to the Brazilian Navy.

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The outbreak of hostilities between Peru and Ecuador in July 1941 led the War Department to state explicitly a policy implied in the Neutrality Act of 1939. Since armed intervention by the United States on behalf of either contestant was contrary to American foreign policy, it followed that it would be contrary to policy to furnish weapons of any description to either side for the duration of hostilities. The War Department adhered to this policy. While it did not prevent negotiations with the two countries for future
delivery of arms for hemisphere defense purposes, the War Department made it clear that "present policy precludes the furnishing of combat weapons of any description to Ecuador or Peru pending settlement of their boundary dispute." 64

A significant development in policy on Latin American arms supply was inspired by an address of Acting Secretary of State Welles on 22 July 1941. Mr. Welles advocated the abolition of offensive armaments as one of the necessary steps toward restoring postwar law and order. A few days later, Colonel Ridgway suggested that it would be a good idea to apply this policy to the Latin American arms supply program immediately, and specifically to bar any shipment to the Latin American nations of heavy bombardment aircraft, chemical warfare toxic agents, medium and heavy tanks, and seacoast and field artillery above 6-inch caliber.65 This suggestion became the basis for a formal policy decision by the Chief of Staff in mid-October that added medium bombardment aircraft and aircraft bombs heavier than three hundred pounds to Colonel Ridgway's list of munitions to be withheld. While this was a somewhat academic decision at the time since munitions of these types were not then available for Latin American supply, it provided an important limitation on future deliveries. General Marshall stated, as one reason for the adoption of the policy, that "it would be extremely dangerous to the United States and to neighboring American republics" if these types of equipment "should come under control of subversive or Axis elements." 66 The Department of State took the position that a limitation-on-arms policy of this sort was a matter for Army and Navy decision and therefore expressed no objection. The Navy not only concurred in the War Department's policy but also took parallel action by announcing its intention to withhold combat vessels of all types (except patrol vessels), motor torpedo boats, patrol bombers

(except from certain of the larger maritime powers), and such other offensive-type weapons as policy dictated in particular instances.67

One of the special problems of policy in which the Army had only a limited interest was that of arms supply to Argentina. From the summer of 1940 onward Argentina had exhibited great reluctance to cooperate with the United States in hemisphere defense measures.68 Nevertheless, the military services continued to hope for an improvement in Argentina's attitude throughout 1941. The Army's portion of the Latin American arms program provided a substantial allotment for Argentina, second only to that for Brazil and about one sixth of the total; and the Army planned to earmark for Argentina one fourth of the funds appropriated in October 1941 for Army lend-lease to Latin America. In the summer of 1941 the United States definitely promised to deliver as soon as possible a considerable quantity of raw materials and finished manufactures that Argentina needed for her military expansion.69 After war broke in December, an Argentine mission arrived in Washington to carry on staff conversations and negotiate for arms. These plans and approaches were nullified by the opposition of the Argentine Government to United States objectives both before and during the Rio conference of January 1942 and by its subsequent insistence on maintaining a strict neutrality, which hardened the State and War Departments against granting any lend-lease aid to Argentina. In February the Department of State announced that it would make a clear-cut statement of the American position along the following lines:

While the United States does not desire to influence Argentina in her international relations, we must adopt a realistic policy in determining priorities for delivery of lend lease equipment. Obviously the United States must favor those countries which have declared war or broken relations with the Axis. The same treatment cannot be given a nation still on friendly terms with our enemies.70
The War Department in the meantime had adopted the policy of according a courteous hearing to Argentine arms requests, but of avoiding any action that would lead to their fulfillment. Argentina was the only American nation that did not receive any arms from the United States Government during World War II.

Two days before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the War Department moved to reopen the question of participation by the Army in the Department of State's negotiation of basic lend-lease agreements, which the military planners still believed should provide bargaining opportunities to secure military advantages. A lend-lease administrative reorganization of October provided a legitimate means by which the War Department could insist on its objectives being considered during these negotiations. An Executive order of 29 October 1941 had directed that master lend-lease agreements should henceforth be negotiated by the Department of State in consultation with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Economic Defense Board. As a member of the Economic Defense Board, of which Vice President Henry A. Wallace was chairman, the Secretary of War presented the Vice President with a list of specific military advantages (mostly concerned with flight privileges and aerial photography) that the War Department wanted introduced into pending lend-lease negotiations. The Vice President passed Mr. Stimson's letter on to Secretary of State Hull, but almost immediately the War Department asked that its request be withdrawn since the outbreak of war completely changed the situation and permitted the Army to obtain the military advantages it desired by direct negotiation. The Secretary of State's reply to the Vice President concluded by observing: "It is now the view of the War Department, in which I concur, that it is neither desirable nor feasible to relate the conclusion of the master lend-lease agreements with the attainment of the objectives desired by the War Department." This was not a complete statement of the War Department's position. The War Department had withdrawn its request because it could get what it wanted more rapidly through direct negotiation, but it still believed that military advantages could legitimately be sought in political negotiations conducted by the Department of State or in any other project sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. When the War Department learned in January 1942 that the Department of Agriculture was planning to spend a half billion dollars for surplus Latin American commodities, the War Plans Division promptly drafted another letter for the Secretary of War's signature requesting Vice President Wallace to consider the promotion of specific military advantages in any negotiation that occurred in consequence of the Department of Agriculture's project. The Vice President's response was evasive. While acknowledging "our failure to supply the Republics of Latin America with the necessary munitions of war under lend-lease is probably . . . an important reason for their reluctance to cooperate with us," he did not commit himself to the support of any specific War Department proposals.

Arms Supply After Pearl Harbor

Pearl Harbor naturally upset the plans and schedules for Latin American arms supply. In an informal memorandum to Mr. Orme Wilson of the Department of State, in connection with a Cuban arms request, Colonel Ridgway frankly stated: "The great demands for military equipment resulting from Japan's attacks
have made it practically impossible to find anything for immediate or even reasonably prompt delivery to Latin American republics." 74 When this statement was called to Under Secretary of State Welles's attention, he decided to put the question before President Roosevelt for decision. Although acknowledging the paramount needs of United States forces, he stated:

I nevertheless believe that a failure by the United States to agree to furnish limited quantities of military materiel to the American republics . . . would have an exceedingly unfortunate effect and would be seized upon by our enemies to create an atmosphere of doubt and fear which would hardly be conducive to the success of the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in January or to the continuing cooperation of the other American republics with this Government in our war effort . . . I feel strongly that the amounts of material necessary, even though reduced from the original schedules, to maintain the confidence of the American countries in the United States ability to deliver are very modest compared with our total war output.

Mr. Hopkins referred Mr. Welles's plea to General Burns, who consulted Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore and Colonel Ridgway in preparing a response for the President's signature. In effect, the Army answered Mr. Welles's letter. The President's letter stated that many items of raw and semi-finished materials could be furnished the Latin Americans immediately without interfering with other essential requirements; inevitably there would be a delay in providing them with military material, "but this type of aid should, however, begin as soon as possible." Colonel Ridgway noted that the President's "decision" hardly solved the dilemma of Latin American arms supply, since almost all of the Army lend-lease material that they had requested consisted of finished munitions and not "raw materials and semifinished materials." 75

Despite the discouraging outlook for any early deliveries, the Army went ahead with the preparation of a new Latin American arms program consistent with the division of funds by categories and countries as proposed in October 1941. The objective was at least to obligate the expenditure of the $100,000,000 for Army material provided by the second lend-lease appropriation act, with actual procurement to occur as soon as feasible.76 The War Plans Division summarized the Army's objective in the following words: "file are acutely aware of the needs of the American republics, are highly sympathetic with their requests, and will supply these requests at the earliest possible moment that our resources will permit." 77

In fact, there was not a great deal that the United States could do about supplying the Latin American nations with modern military equipment during the first year of its active participation in the war. After Pearl Harbor the Latin American republics redoubled their pleas for such items as antiaircraft guns and combat aircraft to protect their coasts against attack, but in view of its own critical shortages the United States could not furnish them with any modern equipment of that sort. The Latin Americans did not want the coast defense guns the United States could offer. To ease South American fears Under Secretary of State Welles, as already noted, was authorized during the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers to offer the coastal countries some advanced training planes equipped for reconnaissance and bombardment duty, and the United States also agreed to expedite deliveries on various items of ground equipment for the Brazilian and Chilean Armies.78 In February and March 1942 Brazil obtained some further pledges of early deliveries.79 Generally speaking, during the period of real danger in 1942 the other Latin American countries had to rely on the military means they already had and on the assistance of United States forces in an emergency.

Nevertheless, the United States continued to plan for future deliveries. Between August 1941 and March
1943 the Department of State negotiated basic lend-lease agreements with eighteen of the Latin American countries, granting credits totaling more than $425,000,000, all but $100,000,000 of which was to be spent on Army-type munitions. The agreements also contained clauses stating in effect that the United States proposed to begin deliveries immediately and to continue them as expeditiously as practicable during the ensuing twelve months. In most instances it proved to be impossible to make any substantial deliveries within twelve months for reasons generally well understood by Latin American representatives in Washington though not by their governments back home. In any event the Latin American countries assumed that the United States had committed itself to delivering military material to the amount of the credit granted as soon as it could, whatever the war outlook when deliveries became possible. The agreements provided for a partial repayment of the cost of materials actually delivered.

The United States did not attempt during the war to make any arrangements for receiving reciprocal aid from the Latin American nations. Their governments did not have the means to finance such aid, and many of the localities in which the armed forces of the United States operated did not have the resources for local supply anyway. These reasons, plus the consideration "that the American Republics had given . . . the United States so many strategic military and naval advantages of incalculable value," convinced Department of State and lend-lease representatives "that it would be impolite, unwise, and improper to expect or ask for an additional contribution" from the Latin American countries in the form of reverse lend-lease.

In making deliveries of munitions to the Latin American countries after January 1942, the United States adhered to the policy adopted in late 1941 of not supplying them with heavy, offensive-type weapons and chemical warfare toxic agents. Again Brazil was an exception, because of its character as a fighting ally and the preparations under way for sending a Brazilian expeditionary force overseas. No other Latin American nation received any chemical agents of the proscribed variety, any medium or heavy bombardment airplanes, any bombs above 100 pounds' weight, any medium or heavy tanks, or any heavy artillery except the 155-mm. guns turned over by the 56th Coast Artillery Regiment to Peru, Venezuela, and Chile in 1942 and 1943.

From the beginning it had been United States policy to grant lend-lease aid to the Latin American nations only in the form of military equipment and services, and these only for purposes of hemisphere defense. The sole departures from this policy were made in the case of the two that waged war on the Axis overseas-Brazil and Mexico. Early in 1943 President Roosevelt authorized the Army to help train and equip Brazilian ground and air units for overseas service; subsequently, the President approved similar aid for a Mexican aviation squadron. The extensive and wholehearted co-operation of Brazil and Mexico with United States military and naval operations in the Western Hemisphere likewise qualified them for special consideration in lend-lease aid. Allocations to Brazil and Mexico accounted for more than 70 percent of the $125,000,000
worth of military equipment that the United States Army assigned to Latin American nations before June 1943. Compared with 1941 plans, this total represented for Latin America as a whole about two thirds of the projected supply of military aircraft and air accessories, but less than one third of the planned supply of ground arms. The Latin American nations other than Brazil and Mexico had been assigned only about one fourth of the arms that the 1941 program and the basic lend-lease agreements had specified they might receive.  

Although war production in the United States finally reached a level in the spring of 1943 that permitted regular deliveries of arms to Latin America, by that time the fundamental change in the strategic outlook raised the question of whether or not it was desirable to continue to supply these nations with arms as originally planned. The containment of Japanese expansion in the Pacific followed by the successful invasion of North Africa had all but ended the possibility of a major attack on the Western Hemisphere. War and State Department spokesmen agreed in June 1943 that there was very little reason to keep up the supply of arms to Latin America for the purpose of hemisphere defense. As foreseen in 1941, the allocations to some states were beginning to arouse the jealousy and distrust of others. At the request of Under Secretary of State Welles, the Army's Operations Division drafted a revised statement of policy to govern the supply of lend-lease material to Latin America, and the Navy and State Departments approved this statement on 6 August 1943. The revised policy, adhered to by the United States with only minor exceptions during the last two years of the war, called for the continued military equipment of the Latin American countries for the following wartime purposes:

(1) The continued development and preparation of such Latin American ground, naval, and air forces with their supporting establishments and installations as may be required for joint employment with forces of the United Nations in anti-submarine and other military operations in defense of our common interests.

(2) The training and equipping of such Latin American forces as may be employed in conjunction with forces of the United Nations in offensive operations overseas.

(3) The repair and maintenance, insofar as may be practicable, of existing equipment and that to be furnished in the future.

(4) The furnishing of munitions and equipment of type and in the quantities best designed to maintain internal stability in those countries whose governments continue to support the United States.  

In September, again at the Department of State's urging, the Army and Navy revived the joint Advisory Board on American Republics and gave it the task of spelling out the new Latin American arms policy in greater detail. Its handiwork became the basis for formal action by the joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of 1943. In brief, the Army's policy during 1944 was to reduce lend-lease aid to Latin America to the greatest possible extent, except to those nations contributing directly to the war effort.

Various considerations nevertheless continued to make small allotments of military equipment to most of the Latin American nations necessary during the last two years of war, and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in particular required large quantities of American material and assistance. Thus, the ultimate dollar value of Army aid to Latin American under lend-lease during the war reached a total of about $324,000,000-somewhat more than that contemplated in the 1941 program and almost exactly the amount specified in the basic lend-lease agreements of 1941-43. About 71 percent of this total represented military
aid to Brazil. The final tabulation of all lend-lease aid granted to the American republics during and after the war amounted to about $500,000,000, and by 1948 they had repaid the United States nearly $70,000,000.

It would be both improper and impossible to use a financial accounting of lend-lease aid as a measure of the true worth of inter-American solidarity during World War II. Many other items would have to be considered on both sides of the ledger. Sixteen of the Latin American nations sanctioned the development in their territory of air and naval bases that were available to United States forces for regular or emergency use during the war. All of Latin America joined in rendering economic aid of incalculable value to the war effort of the United Nations. The United States helped Latin America in many ways other than the supply of military and naval equipment and services. Nevertheless, although aid of the latter sort amounted to only 1 percent of the total expenditures of the United States Government under the lend-lease program, it went a long way toward assuring the military collaboration of the American nations during and after the war.

Endnotes

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Endnotes for Chapter IX

1 See Ch. VIII, above; G-2 study, title; The Existing International Situation, forwarded with Memo, G-2 for WPD, 31 Aug 37, WPD 3748-9; Memo, Chief Lat Amer Sec G-2 for Chief Intelligence Br G-2, 13 May 38; Min, Jt Secretariat mtg, 15 Jun 38. Last two in SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 9 and 10.

2 Statements are based on statistics compiled from Documents on American Foreign Relations, January 1938 June 1939, S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds. (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1939), pp. 576-80; and Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940, II, 838-43.

3 Résumé of Dept of State memo on Italian Fascist and German Nazi activity in the Amer republics, 1 Mar 38, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 2.


5 General Marshall made a frank and succinct statement of the Army's position to the Department of State in February 1940, in which he said the War Department doubted "whether, in the event of passage of the legislation now pending before Congress . . ., any orders [for new equipment] for the other American Republics can be filled in less than two years." Memo of Conv, 21 Feb 40, WPD 4228.


7 Public Resolution No. 83, 76th Congress.

8 The Judge Advocate General, as early as 5 April 1939, interpreted the proposed resolution as excluding the sale of any other military equipment such as rifles and pistols. SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 35.

9 On the circumstances of this Brazilian request, see Ch. XI, below.

10 Ltr, Under Secy State to CofS, 5 Sep 39, WPD 4224-17; Memo, JAG for CofS, 6 Sep 39, WPD 4224-18. In the latter memo, The Judge Advocate General expressed the opinion that the procedure suggested by President
Roosevelt was itself illegal.


12 Memo, CofS for WPD, 21 Nov 39, WPD 4228. Italics in original. This statement reflected the discussion of the subject with Under Secretary of State Welies at the SLC meetings on 6 and 20 November 1939. SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 41 and 45.

13 Notes on SLC mtgs, 20 Nov and 7 Dec 39, SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 45 and 47. Judging from the reported remarks of Mr. Welles at these two meetings, the Under Secretary seems himself to have shifted ground between these two dates from opposition to cautious advocacy of the Chilean requests for offensive-type arms.

14 For the Haitian transaction, see undated memo (about 1 Feb 40), title: Status of Negotiations on Sale of Armament to the Amer Republics, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 49. Also, various papers in WPD 4235.

15 Undated Memo (about 1 Feb 40), title: Status of Negotiations . . ., and Notes on SLC mtgs, 6 and 20 Nov and 7 Dec 39, SLC Min, Vol. I, Items 41, 45, 47, and 49.

16 Memo, WPD for G-4, 27 Feb 40, WPD 4244-3.


18 Dept of State Memo of Conv, 19 Feb 40, AG 400.3295 (1-4-40); Notes on Conv, 21 Feb 40, WPD 4228; SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 50.


20 On the supply of arms to Brazil, see Chs. XI and XII, below.

21 Par. 2c, Instructions for Ln Offs, 29 May 40, WPD 4115-16.


23 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 22 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. See Ch. II, above.

24 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. The President's approval and decision are recorded in Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Strong, ACofS WPD, 24 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

25 Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10.


27 WPD Note for Record, 27 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10.


29 For example, in a discussion with Secretary Hull about allocating some airplanes to the Latin American nations, Mr. Stimson said, "Latin America ought to be ruled out altogether," because "there was no war in this Hemisphere at present and the urgent front, in view of the small supply of our planes, should be considered to be only where the war was raging and where planes were really actually now needed." Stimson Diary, entry of 23 Dec 40.


32 Notes on SLC mtg, 8 Nov 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 63; Memos, 20, 22, and 26 Nov 40, JAB 2-2 (OPD Misc 33); Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Dec 40, JAB 1-2 (OPD Misc 32); Jt A&N Memo, n.d., sub: Appointment of Bd . . ., approved by SW on 17 Dec and SN on 23 Dec 40; Memo, WPD for TAG,
31 Dec 40. Last two in WPD 4244-18. The board's system for handling requests for Army material is set forth in a paper entitled Procedure for Handling Requests for Armaments, 26 Dec 40. This paper was drafted by Colonel Ridgway, WPD member and the board's chief architect and moving spirit, and is in JAB 2-6 (OPD Misc 33).

33 Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 Nov 40, WPD 4244-19.

34 Memo, WPD for G-2, G-3, G-4, and A&NMB, 5 Dec 40, WPD 4244-19. Critical items were military supplies of a noncommercial character; essential items, those of common military and civilian use.

35 Ibid.


37 Min, JAB mtg, 8 Jan 41, JAB 3 (OPD Misc 34).

38 Ltr, Col Ridgway to Mr. Selden Chapin, 15 Jan 41, WPD 4346-6. While this was ostensibly a "personal" letter, Colonel Ridgway showed it to Mr. Orme Wilson, Mr. Chapin's successor as Liaison Officer of the Department of State, before sending it. Mr. Wilson approved it as a proper expression of the Latin American arms problems.

39 Memo, WPD for G-2, 9 Dec 40, WPD 4244-21; Report of JAB to SW and SN, 3 Mar 41, JAB 5-2; Memo for WPD use only, 23 Sep 41, JAB 5-21. Last two in OPD Misc 36.

40 Memo (and attachments), A&NMB for JAB, 19 Feb 41, OPD Misc 47, Munitions for South Amer Countries; Report of JAB, 3 Mar 41, JAB 5-2 (OPD Misc 36).

41 Report of JAB, 3 Mar 41 and attached preliminary tabulation of allotments, JAB 5-2. The revised tabulation (including Argentina and Mexico) is attached to a memorandum by Colonel Ridgway, WPD, 24 July
1941, JAB 5-16. Panama was never included in the Latin American arms program. The above paragraph is also based on Report of JAB to SW and SN, 14 July 1941, JAB 5-16; and Memo for WPD use only, 23 September 1941, JAB 5-21. General Marshall approved the initial report on 3'March 1941, and subsequently the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State gave it their official approval. Report of JAB to SW and SN, 16 Apr 41, JAB 5-10. All in OPD Misc 36.

When the calculations that led to the Victory Program of September 1941 were begun in July, the JAB report of 3 March 1941 and its refinements, together with a related study on Latin American airplane requirements (11 April 1941, OPD Misc 47) provided a completed estimate of future Latin American procurement requirements that was fitted without change into the over-all long-range United States procurement program. Memo, Plans Sec for Lat Amer Sec WPD, 24 Jul 41; Memo (with inds), Lat Amer Sec WPD for Plans Sec, 31 Jul 41. Both in JAB 5-18 (OPD Misc 36).

42 The statement was drafted by Colonel Ridgway, who secured advance approval of minor Department of State officials before it was forwarded in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. Secretary of State Hull held up issuance pending further discussion of which there is no record. The papers were still in suspense in November 1941 when Colonel Ridgway asked his colleagues whether the matter ought to be revived. They unanimously agreed that the time had long since passed when such a statement would have had a salutary effect. Memo, Col Ridgway for Chief WPD, 2 Apr 41, JAB 5-7 (OPD Misc 36); Ltr, SW to Secy State, 7 Apr 41, WPD 4244-33; Ltr, Secy State to SW, 11 Apr 41; WD pencil memos, 13 Nov 41. Last two in JAB 5-7 (OPD Misc 36).

43 Report of JAB, 16 Apr 41, JAB 5-10 (OPD Misc 36); Ltr, Secy War, Navy, and State to President, 22 Apr 41, WPD 4244-37; Ltr, Secy State to SW, 6 May 41, JAB 5-10 (OPD Misc 36).

44 The Department of State at first thought the War and Navy Departments ought to make the announcements, but, at War Department urging, the Department of State accepted the responsibility. Colonel Ridgway noted that an announcement of allocations by the War or Navy Department would have led to "prolonged discussion of each item involved, organization of the armed forces, and discussion of detailed plans for mutual military and naval
cooperation which is not desirable at this time." Since the Department of State was not qualified to talk about such technical matters, Latin American representatives could not very well raise them if the Department of State did the announcing. Memo, Col Ridgway for Capt Spears (Navy), 1 Apr 41; Col Ridg-way's Memo for Record, 1 Apr 41. Both in JAB 5-6 (OPD Misc 36). Memo, Mr. Wilson (Dept of State Ln Off) for Col Ridgway, 5 May 41, JAB 5-12 (OPD Misc 36); Notes on SLC mtg, 5 May 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 23.

45 As of April 1941, despite the fact that almost all the Latin American countries had raised the question of arms supply informally, only five had designated representatives officially authorized to discuss such matters. Memo, Col Ridgway for Mr. Wilson, 11 Apr 41, WPD 4115-44. By mid-July only half the countries had submitted their armaments lists. Report of JAB, 14 Jul 41, JAB 5-16 (OPD Misc 36).

46 Ltr, Gen Burns, Exec Off Div of Def Aid Reports, to Under Secy State Welles, 2 Jul 41, with inclosure describing the procedure as above, JAB 2-6 (OPD Misc 33). See also, Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Ch. III.

47 Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow, WPD, 1 Aug 41, WPD 4224-174; Memo for Record, Col Ridgway, 6 Aug 41, JAB 5-10 (OPD Misc 36).

48 Ltr, ASW McCloy to Mr. Welles, 5 Sep 41; Ltr, Mr. Welles to ASW McCloy, 22 Sep 41; Memos for Record, 25 Sep and 20 Nov 41. All in JAB 5-10 (OPD Misc 36).

49 Memo, WPD for G-2, 10 Sep 41, WPD 4115-56.

50 The first lend-lease appropriation act of March did not carry any funds for Latin America.

51 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State (through Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator), 31 Oct 41, WPD 4244-41.

52 Ibid.
53 Memo Def Aid Dir for WPD, 13 Nov 41, WPD 4244-41; Dept of State Memo of Conv, 13 Nov 41, WPD 4244-42; Draft Memo (not used), WPD for Def Aid Dir, 27 Nov 41; Memo, Col Barber for Col Ridgway, WPD, 28 Nov 41. Last two in WPD 4244-41.


55 Memo, WPD for G-2 26 Dec 40, WPD 4406; Ltr, SW to Gen Arnold, 30 Jan 41, JAB 4 (OPD Misc 35); Notes on SLC mtg, 10 Jun 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 29; Report of JAC, approved 7 Mar 42, JAB 6-15 (OPD Misc 37).

56 Memo, WPD for G-2, 8 Oct 40, WPD 4374; WPD Interoffice Memo, 10 Dec 40, WPD 4406; Memo, WPD for CofAC, 30 Dec 40, WPD 4406-1.

57 Study of Col Ridgway, 11 Apr 41, OPD Misc 47. Note how this study reversed the proportion of tactical and trainer planes that had been requested by the Latin Americans.

58 Ltr, Actg Secy State to SW, 2 Aug 41, and subsequent correspondence in JAB 5-16 (OPD Misc 36); Memo, Dept of State for JAC, 20 Oct 41, and other correspondence in JAB 6-3 (OPD Misc 37); Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Nov 41, OPD Misc 15.

59 Memo, JAC Subcommittee for JAC, 28 Feb 42, and accompanying table, JAB 6-15 (OPD Misc 37).

60 See Ch. XII, below.

61 This information has been derived from tables in Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II, issued by the Office, Chief of Finance, War Department (Washington: 31 December 1946). The tables record deliveries through 30 June 1946, but most of them were made before September 1945.
62 Army Service Forces International Division, MS, Lend-Lease, II, 1296, Table X.

63 Notes on SLC mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 13; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 8 Apr 41; Ltr, Secy State to SW, 16 Apr 41. Last two in WPD 4224-139. Memo, JAB for SW and SN, 2 May 41, containing the new statement of policy quoted above, JAB 8 (OPD Misc 39); Notes on SLC mtg, 5 May 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 23; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 12 May 41, WPD 4224-139.

64 Memo, WPD for Def Aid Dir, 25 Nov 41, WPD 4225-21. The initial statement of policy was made in Memo, WPD for CofS, 26 Jul 41, WPD 4115-53.

65 Memo, written by Col Ridgway, no addressee, 25 Jul 41, WPD 4244-36.


67 Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Oct 41, WPD 4244-37; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 14 Oct 41; Ltr, Under Secy State to SW, 12 Nov 41; Ltr, SW to SN, 29 Nov 41; Ltr, Actg SN to SW, 10 Dec 41. Last four in AG 400.3295 (9-30-41).

68 See Ch. VIII, above.

69 Ltr CofS to Under Secy State, 2 Jul 41; Ltr, CofS to CG PCD, 2 Jul 41. Both in AG 400.3299 (7-2-41).

70 Notes on SLC mtg, 10 Feb 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 46.

71 WPD Notes on Conf, 5 Jan 42, WPD 4374-23; exchanges between Col Ridgway and Argentine Minister, 6 and 8 Jan 42, JAB 5-29 (OPD Misc 36).

72 Ltr, Secy State to Vice President, 13 Dec 41, WPD 4115-62. The other papers on this subject are to be found in this WPD file and in AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 1.

73 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Jan 42; Ltr, SW to Vice President Wallace, 6
Jan 42; Ltr, Vice President Wallace to SW, 16 Jan 42. All in WPD 4115-76.

74 Memo, Col Ridgway, WPD, for Ln Office, Dept of State, 14 Dec 41, WPD 4358-14.

75 Ltr, Under Secy State Welles to President, 24 Dec 41; Ltr, President to Mr. Welles, 6 Jan 42, and accompanying papers and memos. All in JAB 5-28 (OPD Misc 36).

76 The progress and objectives of the new program are described in WPD interoffice memos of 12 and 15 Dec 41. Both in OPD Misc 15.

77 Memo, WPD for G-2, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4115-68.

78 See Ch. VIII, above.

79 See Ch. XII, below.

80 ASF Int Div, Lend-Lease, II, 1231ff.

81 For example, the coast artillery battery sent to Venezuela (discussed in the preceding chapter) found it to be virtually impossible to buy many supplies locally. Most of the things the battery wanted were items that Venezuela itself had to import, and the Venezuelans naturally could not see why they should have to supply imported articles to the United States garrison. His Sec, CDC, Military Collaboration, C.D.C.-Venezuela During World War II, pp. 71-73.

82 Army Services Forces International Division, MS, History of Reciprocal Aid, 9 May 1941-31 December 1945 (revised), pp. 56-57, quoting minutes of meeting between Department of State and Foreign Economic Administration representatives, 16 September 1943.

83 Statements based on various tables in Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II.

84 See Chs. XII and XIII, below.
85 Statements based on table in Memo, OPD for DCoS, 8 Jun 43, SLC Min, Vol. IV.

86 Statement of Policy Regarding Future Supply of Lend Lease Materials to Lat Amer as Agreed upon by the State, War, and Navy Depts, 6 Aug 43, copy in G-4 400.3295, Vol. I. For background, see: Memo Chief Lat Amer Theater OPD for ACofS OPD, 6 Aug 43, and attachments, OPD 400.3295 (6 Aug 43); Memo, OPD for DCoS, 8 Jun 43; Notes on SLC mtg, 14 Jun 43 (recording remarks of Mr. Welles and General McNarney). Last two in SLC Min, Vol. IV. For a comprehensive review of the problems of Army supply to Latin America toward the end of the war, see: Report of seminar held at Army Industrial College, 21 Dec 44, ASF Int Div 337 Conf, Vol. V.

87 Various papers, G-4 400.3295, Vols. I and IV.

88 OPD Note for Record, 25 Mar 44, and OPD Memo for Record, 11 Sep 44, both contain statements almost identical in language with that made in the text above. Both in OPD 400.3295, Case 28.

89 Carrel I. Tod and Anne P. Croft, under direction of Theodore E. Whiting, Lend-Lease section of Statistics, a volume to be published in series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Table LL-7.


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CHAPTER X

Air Defense Preparations in Latin America

As one important means of improving New World military ties, the Army had recommended in May 1938 that the United States Government take a more active hand in backing commercial aviation interests of the United States in Latin America. Following President Roosevelt's enunciation of the policy of hemisphere defense in November 1938, with its emphasis on air defense the military planners recognized that the Army must take a broader interest in Latin American air development. Thereafter during the prewar period, Army plans and preparations for air defense centered around the attainment of three major objectives in the Latin American area: elimination of commercial airlines owned, controlled, or manned by Axis nationals, and their replacement by United States or locally controlled companies; development of airfields and airway facilities of a nature that would permit the projection of American military airpower into strategic areas; and other preparations that would permit air operations to begin at once in the event of an actual or imminently threatened hostile air attack.

The American-controlled Pan American Airways system had achieved a dominant role in Latin American commercial aviation by 1938, largely without any official backing from the United States Government except that granted through substantial mail subsidies. Pan American operated all of the lines in the West Indian and Central American regions, and it had an international service that circled the South American continent. In South America its position was being vigorously and increasingly challenged, especially by airlines subsidized by the German and Italian Governments. The physical geography of Latin America, together with the meager development of other forms of transportation, made commercial aviation far more important there than in the United States or other parts of the Western World. Because of this dependence on aviation, Latin American governments and peoples were peculiarly susceptible to the influence that foreign aviation interests might
exercise. The stage was set for a struggle for control that was to be waged during the prewar period ostensibly by private commercial interests, but in reality by the United States Government and the aggressor nations of the Old World.³

The Control of Civil Aviation

The Army in June 1938 had again urged that it was "highly important that the United States Government . . . give close attention to the non-American aviation developments in Latin America, and that every reasonable effort be made to assist United States commercial aviation (or local or Latin American owned) interests when disadvantageous situations arise." Specifically, the Army proposed that the United States Government help American aviation interests by building airfields and improving their facilities, by establishing meteorological and weather stations, and by training Latin-American nationals in American civilian aviation schools.⁴

While Pan American had already shown its willingness to allow it facilities to be used by American military planes, as for example in the good-will flight of Flying Fortresses to Buenos Aires in February 1938, they were not adequate for normal military operations. Pan American airfields were not equipped for night flying and were too small for the larger types of military planes. If the United States wished to help local national airlines as a means of offsetting foreign competition, it would have to grant them direct or indirect subsidies.

The Department of State at this time was loath to agree to "any sort of policy which could be interpreted as evidence of a military interest of this Government in civil aviation in Latin America," although it admitted that some greater degree of support for American aviation might be desirable.⁵

The creation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in July 1938, with powers to coordinate and administer all aviation policies, furnished both a vehicle for exploring what could and should be done with respect to Latin American aviation and an excuse for postponing the whole problem until the new
authority was prepared to tackle it. The War Department's suggestions were effectively side-tracked until the following spring.6

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President Roosevelt took the initiative in reopening the question of Latin American aviation in March 1939 by instructing Secretary of Commerce Hopkins to inform the Civil Aeronautics Authority of the "President's interest in the formulation of a broad plan for the expansion of aeronautics in the Western Hemisphere." 7 The Authority thereupon drafted a tentative plan, dated 29 March 1939, which had as its central feature the creation of a holding corporation in the United States, with subsidiaries in each of the Latin American countries, that would finance the purchase of all foreign-owned local airlines in each country and ultimately nationalize them. The United States Government, either directly or indirectly, would furnish the estimated capital of $25,000,000 necessary to accomplish this purpose.8 An interdepartmental discussion of the plan led to the creation of a special committee, with Mr. G. Grant Mason of the Civil Aeronautics Authority as chairman and with representatives from the War, Navy, and State Departments, to consider and revise these proposals. The revised plan was approved by all interested agencies between May and July 1939 and by President Roosevelt on 10 August. 9

The War Plans Division made an exhaustive study of the original Civil Aeronautics Authority plan and, though heartily agreeing with its primary objective of supporting American aviation interests and eliminating German and Italian, judged it faulty in many particulars and impracticable of achievement. The planners' main objections were that the plan did not provide for the "control of secure and suitable bases, the essential need for air operations in South America," and that it would not eliminate German and Italian international airlines, only the local services.10 The plan as revised dropped the idea of a holding corporation and in fact amounted to little more than an enumeration of objectives similar to those proposed by the Army in June 1938. After the President's approval of these objectives in August 1939, the Department of State took the lead in calling several
meetings of the interdepartmental committee established in the spring. The conferees agreed at meetings on 1 and 5 September 1939 that the United States should actively promote the ownership of all feeder airlines in Latin America either by American or by bona fide locally owned companies. They also agreed that the Department of State should take the initiative through diplomatic chan-

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nels to work toward this goal. Very little more was actually done before the critical events of May 1940 stimulated specific and immediate action.\textsuperscript{11}

During 1939 the Army was immediately concerned over the airline situation in Colombia, where the local SCADTA feeder system was largely manned and ostensibly controlled by Germans.\textsuperscript{12} Actually, Pan American had purchased an 84 percent interest in SCADTA as early as 1931 but kept its connection secret from the Colombian and the United States Governments until January 1939. Even when Pan American's control became known, the American company was reluctant to liquidate the German operation of the system. Both the Army and the Department of State considered continued German operation highly inimical to the national interest of the United States because of Colombia's proximity to the Panama Canal. This was one problem tackled by a subcommittee of the interdepartmental air committee in the fall of 1939, and with eventual success. Pan American publicly acknowledged its ownership and started to purge SCADTA of its German personnel in November 1939. In June 1940 Pan American, in collaboration with Department of State and Colombian authorities, was able to eliminate most of the German influence and establish a new company, AVIANCA, jointly owned by Pan American and the Colombian Government. In the meantime, German pilots and other workers who were released from SCADTA set up another airline, ARCO, which was bought out by AVIANCA in 1941 after the War and State Departments had promised to repay Pan American for the expense that it had incurred in "de-Germanizing" the Colombian airlines.\textsuperscript{13}
Pan American held a two-thirds interest in AVIANCA after June 1940, although the arrangement made between the Colombian and United States Governments called for eventual nationalization of the line through majority stock ownership by the Colombian Government or Colombian citizens. The promise to reimburse AVIANCA led to an involved negotiation between the War Department and Pan American. The Army wanted some further assurances before it paid off this obligation, including the dismissal of all German employees (some of whom were employed in office work as late as December 1941), an agreement that AVIANCA's airport facilities would be available for military use if necessary, and a pledge by the Colombian Government to AVIANCA that it would not charter any new airline that would pose further complications. The Army was concerned on this latter score because many of the dismissed German pilots and other employees were still in Colombia at the end of 1941; both Colombia and the United States had wanted to ship them back to Germany, but the British had strenuously objected since they had more than enough German pilots to deal with already. In the spring of 1942 the Germans were interned either in Colombia or in the United States. After Pearl Harbor Colombia agreed to permit Pan American to retain majority ownership of AVIANCA until 1944, thereby giving the United States a more effective control over the Colombian air situation. Colombia was also prepared in 1942 to permit American military planes to use its airports in essential hemisphere defense operations. Thus assured, in August 1942 the United States agreed to pay Pan American from Army funds a sum of nearly $1,000,000 for the de-Germanization of Colombian airlines carried out during 1940 and 1941.14

A different method of eliminating German aviation in Latin America was used in neighboring Ecuador. Though the German-owned local line in Ecuador, SEDTA, operated with only two obsolete transports as its "fleet," it provided an indispensable service to Ecuador's economy. When SEDTA in May 1940 applied for a permit to establish a service from the mainland to the Galapagos Islands, in which the United States had already indicated its strategic interest, the American government was moved to action. President
Roosevelt in June authorized the loan of funds to Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), Pan American's associate, to enable it to establish a competing line. Panagra inaugurated its service in December 1940, with equipment and service superior to that provided by the German line. Nevertheless, SEDTA managed to operate a reduced service until Ecuador requisitioned its planes and property in September 1941. The Army contributed to the desired end not only by backing the Panagra line but also by establishing an Ecuadoran Air Mission and allocating enough money to it to permit the mission to help in the improvement of Ecuadoran airfield facilities.15

The ousting of German aviation from Colombia and Ecuador was a noteworthy gain for the security of the Panama Canal, but only a halting step toward the broader goal of eliminating all Axis influence in Latin American aviation. To achieve this goal required the formulation and execution of a much more systematic aviation policy and program for Latin America than that followed by the United States to the beginning of 1941. President Roosevelt was dissatisfied with what had been accomplished during 1940, and it was probably at his instigation that Mr. Rockefeller, the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, proposed expansion of the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board so that it could, under the supervision of a new interdepartmental committee, carry out an effective de-Germanization program designed to supplant all Axis-controlled airlines by American or locally controlled companies.16 The War Department promptly indorsed Mr. Rockefeller's proposal, and the Chief of Staff in doing so stated:

The matter is one of vital importance to national defense. We all agree that German controlled airlines in South America provide Germany with the means for spreading Nazi propaganda, for communication with German agents and sympathizers in South America, and for familiarizing German military personnel with South American terrain. They also provide bases which would be of great strategic value to an invader. Consequently, these airlines constitute a definite threat to the security of the United States in the event of war
While Mr. Rockefeller's proposal was still under consideration, the President directed the Postmaster General to consult with representatives of all interested government agencies in the formulation of a general policy toward commercial aviation. At a meeting on 19 February the conferees decided that the Army and Navy should study the question and make recommendations. The Army's representative thereupon drafted a recommendation on general aviation policy and obtained Navy and State Department concurrences. This policy statement, which the President approved in early March, became the basis for effective action in eliminating Axis influence from Latin American commercial aviation. With respect to Latin America, the new policy pro-

vided that: (1) the United States Government would oppose the establishment of any new services by United States airlines south of Mexico City that would be in competition with Pan American; (2) until European-controlled airlines in Latin America were eliminated, no action should be taken to lessen the strength and effectiveness of the Pan American Airways system as an instrument in accomplishing their elimination; and (3), while the needs of the armed services must have priority on airplane equipment and personnel during the emergency, subject to this qualification all government agencies should lend all possible assistance to the Department of State "in the elimination of European controlled airlines in the Western Hemisphere south of the United States, and in replacing them by United States controlled airlines." 18

After approval of the new policy, the Department of State took the lead in arranging for allocation from emergency funds of money to finance the nationalization of airlines in central and southern South America and in trying to obtain assurances from the Army that planes for the airlines would be forthcoming. It also formulated a new plan that called for the application of the Colombian precedent to the rest of South America—that is, the establishment of new companies jointly controlled by American and local-
national ownership. The Bureau of the Budget, with the President's approval, allocated $8,000,000 in April to pay for de-Germanization measures. Instead of enlarging the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to administer these measures, as Mr. Rockefeller had proposed (and as the new statement of aviation policy had also recommended), the American Republics Aviation Division was set up in the Defense Supplies Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The division became responsible both for disbursement of funds and for provision of airplanes and technicians to American and locally owned Latin American airlines.19

Because of the shortage of transport planes, the Army in the spring of 1941 was attempting to secure the curtailment of airlines in the United States and to obtain their planes for Army use. Despite the shortage the Army promised in April to release five planes to equip a new Panagra subsidiary in Bolivia and soon thereafter committed itself to furnishing four more planes to permit de-Germanization of the VASP line in Brazil.20 It also promised to furnish pilots for the Bolivian operation by releasing Reserve officers then on active duty with the Air Corps and to continue its practice of allowing graduates of the Air Corps Advanced Flying School to volunteer for service as pilots with Pan American and its subsidiaries. 21 In June the Army decided to purchase for Army Air Corps use all German planes from discontinued lines in order to eliminate any possibility of their future employment in Latin America. Negotiations toward this end were still in progress on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Thereafter, the almost solid front of the Americas made possible the application of more direct methods of putting an end to all German aviation activity.22

The United States Government during 1940 and 1941 backed the Pan American Airways system as the vehicle for obtaining air control in Latin America for reasons of military necessity rather than of choice. In November 1940 General Marshall and Admiral Stark told Under Secretary of State Welles that they regarded active support of Pan American as essential to the
national defense, and it was on this basis only that Mr. Welles agreed "to
back Pan American to the limit." Of necessity, too, backing Pan
American meant the strengthening of its monopoly in the Latin American
field.

The problem of American airline competition amidst defense preparations
had come to the fore in Central America in the fall of 1940. A local British-
owned airline, TACA, had applied for permission to extend its service to the
commercial landing field in the Panama Canal Zone. Behind this application
was a broader scheme of American Export Airlines, which contracted in
October 1940 to purchase TACA, and which planned to connect its local
airlines with the continental United States as well as to extend them
throughout the Caribbean area. Pan American met this challenge by fighting
the TACA-American Export project before the Civil Aeronautics Board and
by establishing feeder lines in Central America that duplicated TACA's
services. This fight between competing American airlines in a sensitive
hemisphere defense zone presented both soldiers and diplomats with a
complicated situation requiring difficult policy decisions.

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The military services and the Department of State had at first opposed
TACA's request to enter the Canal Zone, since the entry of foreign-owned
airlines into the Zone was contrary to existing policy. In June 1940 General
Van Voorhis, commander of the Panama Canal Department, urged
reconsideration. He stated that the owner of TACA was strongly pro-ally
and pro-American and that most of the airline's employees were Americans.
Even more to the point was TACA's control of a network of landing fields-
115 of them in actual service-throughout the five Central American
republics, many of which were equipped with radio facilities. In view of
these facts, TACA held a position in which it could render invaluable
assistance in surveillance and in aiding Army air operations. To win TACA's
support by granting it the right of entry into the Canal Zone made excellent
common sense to General Van Voorhis.
When the American Export Company proposed to buy TACA, the State, War, and Navy Departments all approved the move, and they decided also to approve TACA's entry into the Canal Zone as soon as the company had been Americanized. Among other reasons, the War Department specifically approved American Export's proposed purchase of TACA because it promised to lead to competition between two large American companies in Latin American commercial aviation. In late December 1940 the Army gave an American Export representative cautious assurances that the Pan American contract signed the preceding month did not commit the War Department to back Pan American exclusively in other directions. The evident blessing being bestowed by agencies of the United States Government on TACA induced Pan American to redouble its efforts to eliminate its Central American competitor altogether. Pan American succeeded in ousting TACA from Guatemala and so handicapped its position elsewhere that it appeared to the Army that American Export might lose interest in its acquisition. The Army and the Navy continued throughout 1941 to advocate the purchase of TACA by American Export, or its Americanization by other means. But after the enunciation of a Latin American air policy in March 1941, with its caveat against backing any new American competition with Pan American south of Mexico City until Axis-controlled lines had been eliminated in South America, the military services felt obliged to oppose American Export's application for a through route between New Orleans and the Canal Zone. The establishment of such a trunk line was as basic to the American Export interest as it was antipathetic to that of Pan American Airways, for it would have linked up with Panagra, which was showing increasing irritation over its family connection with Pan American. American Export's application to acquire TACA was finally disapproved by the Civil Aeronautics Board on 4 December 1941, though not on the ground of its threat of competition with Pan American Airways. Nevertheless, prompted by continued urgings from the War Department, the board on 24 December approved TACA's entry into the Canal Zone. This action,
together with the Army's more or less open partiality toward TACA, assured that airline's continued cooperation with the military authorities in Panama during the war. The position of the services and of the Department of State toward the American Export-Pan American contest had also indicated rather clearly that they would have preferred to foster competition among American airline companies in Latin America if the exigencies of the prewar situation had permitted such action.

Axis-controlled aviation at the beginning of 1941 had centered in Brazil, from which it radiated southward and westward to the Pacific coast. The German CONDOR line, serving the Brazilian coast and the interior of southern South America, was old and well-established. Transatlantic flying in 1941 was limited to a weekly service provided by the Italian LATI line, which operated from Europe via the Cape Verdes to Natal and Rio de Janeiro-a service patronized largely by Axis agents. From Natal southward along the Brazilian coast, LATI and the Vichy-dominated Air France company controlled airfield facilities that menaced American hemisphere defense projects in Brazil and posed an acute menace to British shipping and the maintenance of the British patrol against Axis shipping in the South Atlantic. In the spring of 1941 both CONDOR and LATI were under strong suspicion of performing more or less regular reconnaissance off the coast to spot British naval vessels and guide Axis ships through the British blockade. LATI's suddenly increased activity on the transatlantic route in June and July coincided with a heightened German submarine campaign against British shipping in the southern Atlantic and there was good reason to believe that Axis submarines were being guided by LATI's planes. During the last week of June 1941, six Axis merchant vessels carrying strategic war materials left Brazil to run the British blockade, again coincident with LATI's increased amount of flying across the ocean. The United States Army believed that this direct menace to the British war effort must be stopped.29
To deal with this situation, the United States put CONDOR and LATI on its 17 July 1941 blacklist of Latin American firms with which American companies were forbidden to trade. Since the Germans had a supply of new planes and spare parts, which had been run through the British blockade in the spring of 1941, this move had little immediate effect. At the urging of the United States the Brazilian Government in October began to move toward taking over CONDOR and LATI, but it was reluctant to suspend their operations until the United States was prepared to furnish substitute services. When the Army’s Ferrying Command operations by way of the South Atlantic were inaugurated in November, the continued operation by hostile airlines of airport ground facilities, including radio transmitters and meteorological services, became intolerable.30

With Brazilian cooperation, both LATI and CONDOR were forced out of business in December 1941. The Ferrying Command agreed in January 1942 to purchase the seven LATI planes as soon as the Brazilian Government requisitioned them. Brazilian interests with government backing reorganized CONDOR, and the new company was permitted to resume operations in April. At the end of 1942 German and Italian equipment was still in use on a number of local airlines in southern South America, but all vestiges of Axis control had disappeared.31

In retrospect, while the de-Germanization program had been slow in getting under way, it had achieved the desired results by the time that the United States openly entered the war. Axis aviation had been virtually eliminated and supplanted by American or locally owned services. While the small number (about forty) and obsolete character of the German transport planes and their comparatively rudimentary ground facilities had never constituted a really serious menace, indirectly German aviation interests had been able to exert an influence out of all proportion to their size in planes and personnel through propaganda and the maintenance of communications with axis diplomats and agents. Conceivably, too, the extensive German control of airfield installations could have been used to facilitate a German air invasion. In 1941 Axis-dominated commercial aviation was one of Ger-
many's strongest weapons in Latin America to combat American hemisphere defense plans and measures, and its elimination marked a huge forward stride in safeguarding the hemisphere against possible Axis attack.

The Airport Development Program

The Pan American Airways organization made its principal contribution to hemisphere defense preparations by developing airfields in the Latin American nations for United States Army and Navy use. This work began in the autumn of 1940, under what became known as the Airport Development Program, but it had its origins in the military planning of 1939, specifically in the plan to establish a major United States air base in Puerto Rico. Air traffic to and from this base would normally have to make use of intermediate airfields between the United States and Puerto Rico. Existing Pan American facilities at Camaguey, Cuba, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti, could be used, but they would have to be substantially improved. The Army also wanted to station small detachments of mechanics and communications specialists at each of the fields. By September 1939 the Air Corps and General Staff had agreed upon the facilities and services needed and on the necessity of providing them as soon as possible. At the outset, the Department of State refused to consider the lease or operation of such facilities by the Army, and on 6 November 1939 a Department of State spokesman also expressed opposition "to the installation and operation of these facilities by any United States Government agency." Instead he suggested that a private American company such as Pan American Airways might undertake the necessary work and operations under contract. When the Army brought the subject up again in January 1940, the Department of State agreed that it might be willing to go ahead and make suitable arrangements for the facilities desired either directly with the Cuban and Haitian Governments or with a private company. Further prodding by the War Department failed to obtain any action until May 1940. The agitation of the question during the preceding year had nevertheless narrowed down the probable choice of means to that of selecting a private company to do the work.

The immediate need for the Puerto Rican air route merged during the fall
and winter of 1939-40 with the more far-reaching plan for development of alternate air routes to the Brazilian bulge. This plan envisaged establishment of the principal air route to Brazil via Puerto Rico, Martinique, Trinidad, and Dutch Guiana, with a secondary route from Texas via Panama and the Colombian and Venezuelan coasts. General Emmons, Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, who led a flight of bombers to the Natal area in November 1939, reported that it was well suited to intensive development for Air Corps operations. By using existing airfields the Army could fly medium and heavy bombers to Natal, but not shorter-range planes. To permit the movement of all types of Army aircraft to the Brazilian bulge, General Emmons held that it was essential to develop a chain of airfields with necessary supporting facilities for land planes along both routes. While this project would require new facilities of many sorts, the existing terminals and organization of the Pan American Airways system provided an essential basis for further development. In a separate report, Lt. Col. Robert Olds, who accompanied General Emmons on the Brazilian flight, stressed the advantages of using the Pan American system:

The economic and military value of the Panagra-Pan American Airways System to the United States in its broad concept of hemispherical defense cannot be overestimated. The concentration . . . of Air Force units from North America into South America will depend solely under existing circumstances upon the full utilization of Pan American facilities . . . . Whether in the form of a government subsidy or in the form of direct installations on a rental basis, it is mandatory that certain existing facilities of the Pan American System be augmented along the east coast of South America to insure the rapid concentration of American Air Forces in the defense of the critical Natal area.

The final selection of Pan American Airways as the instrument for carrying out a program of airfield construction in Latin America was made only after a new exploration of alternative methods of doing the work. At an interdepartmental conference on 15 May 1940, called specifically to consider the immediate problem of developing an air route to Puerto Rico, the conferees agreed that the method selected for this work should be one that would be generally applicable to the larger Latin American airfield
program. The solution tentatively decided upon was the establishment of a new government-subsidized corporation that would construct airfields and provide necessary technical facilities for their military use; then, after construction had been completed, the Army would make a supplemental contract with Pan American to provide for fuel and for the servicing of planes. The execution of the plan would require new legislation since the judge Advocate General held that the Army could not legally loan its equipment to a corporation of the sort proposed.  

Further study of the problem during the following week produced four alternative schemes for consideration. Listed in their order of desirability, they were: (1) the creation of a new United States Government agency, to operate under direct supervision of the Civil Aeronautics Authority; (2) a contract with Pan American Airways to do all the work; (3) the establishment of a new private corporation, as tentatively recommended the preceding week; and (4) contracts with the national governments concerned. While the planners would have preferred the first alternative, they pointed out that that solution would also require new legislation expanding the powers of the Civil Aeronautics Authority and permission of each nation concerned as well. In view of the absolute necessity under the new strategic situation of providing facilities as soon as possible, they therefore recommended adoption of the Pan American Airways scheme. In early June the Department of State agreed to present the question to the President for decision and did so by a letter dated 10 June. Sometime between then and 1 July, the President authorized the Army to go ahead with the Pan American project and to finance it with money from his recently voted Emergency Fund.

In the meantime, the joint Planning Committee had reviewed the whole problem of Latin American air facilities required for the execution of hemisphere defense plans, and on 24 June it submitted a report that became the primary guide for defining the scope and objectives of the subsequent Pan American contract. The report specified the airfields to be developed,
and it stated that the fields were to be located along the coast rather than inland in order to facilitate their supply and the movement of land forces and equipment for their protection and also to permit Navy planes to use them. At the major fields, the runways should be able to accommodate all types of Army planes; adjacent facilities were to be provided for the operation of large Navy patrol planes. In addition, each major field should have auxiliary communications, meteorological, servicing, and storage facilities.38

Four months of intricate negotiations preceded the signing of the contracts of 2 November 1940 with Pan American Airways. The effort to keep the project a secret was a partial failure almost from the beginning. On 10 July 1940 the Washington Post reported that the President had authorized the expenditure of emergency funds for a Latin American airport program to be carried out by Pan American Airways. "The plan," continued this Post report, "is to have the airline do what the Government itself cannot accomplish without endless red tape and time-consuming diplomatic negotiation,

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by establishing a series of ultra-modern airports equipped with service, maintenance, and repair facilities." To conceal its official hand the Army called upon a retired officer, Col. John H. Jouett, president of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, to serve as contract coordinator in negotiations with Pan American and its legal representatives. In late September ill health forced Colonel Jouett to withdraw from this position, but by then the Pan American contracts were practically in final form.39

Pan American Airways at the outset accepted responsibility for the Latin American airport construction program with some reluctance. It had neither the organization nor the experience to undertake a large-scale construction program, and it also foresaw the possibility of unfavorable repercussions in Latin America if it became identified with a government-subsidized project undertaken for military purposes. On the other hand the introduction on 4 July of new stratoliner land planes on Pan American's international services
to Latin America gave the company an interest in airfield improvements for purely commercial reasons. After Pan American had made a preliminary study of the feasibility and cost of the project, Army and Navy representatives on 19 July gave its officials a "go ahead" signal to proceed with arrangements for undertaking the work. When Pan American's president, Mr. Juan Trippe, requested the immediate assignment of Army and Navy inspectors to supervise these arrangements, he was told that the War Department "had complete confidence in the ability of Pan Air to decide questions as to construction, etc.," and that there would be no military supervision until after construction commenced.40

By early September the Army, the Navy, and Pan American had agreed upon plans and contractual arrangements that were mutually satisfactory. General Marshall thereupon recommended the provision of $12,000,000 to finance the airfield project and backed his recommendation with the opinion that "the immediate conclusion of the PAA contract is now more essential to our national defense than any other single matter." 41 On 13 September President Roosevelt approved the allocation of $12,000,000 from the Emergency Fund voted by Congress the preceding June. Legal and financial details continued to delay official consummation of the Pan American contract for some weeks thereafter, although the Army assumed that the airline was going

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ahead with preliminary surveys and was securing the requisite approvals from Latin American governments. On 24 October the Department of State gave its official approval to the Pan American project, and in doing so explained:

It is the opinion of the State Department that to handle this matter on the basis of negotiating treaties with the various countries concerned would be either impracticable of complete accomplishment, or would involve delays of such duration as might be fatal to adequate preparations to meet the present critical international situation. For that reason, the project for the development of this work by the Pan American Company under the direction of the War and Navy Departments appears to the Department of State the most
practicable method of achieving the desired results.  

To do the airfield construction work in Latin America, Pan American Airways set up a new company, the Pan American Airports Corporation, which engaged solely in undertaking the construction program prescribed and paid for by the United States Government. The War Department contracted directly with the Pan American Airports Corporation for the construction. Pan American Airways, Inc., the parent company, simultaneously executed a separate contract with its new subsidiary to cover supervision of the latter's work. The parent company and its operating subsidiaries also conducted all negotiations with Latin American governments for the necessary leases and work permits. Pan American signed the contracts for the airfield work on 2 November, and the next day Secretary of War Stimson added his signature to the War Department contract with the Pan American Airports Corporation.

During the negotiation of the Pan American contract the War Plans Division exercised staff control over the course of the transaction. With the signature of the contract, control passed to the G-4 Division of the War Department General Staff, which supervised its execution until February 1942, when the Army Air Forces assumed control. The contract provided for the appointment of an Army deputy contracting officer to maintain liaison with Pan American and exercise general supervision over the airfield project. The post was filled by an officer detailed from the New York offices of the Corps of Engineers, who submitted monthly progress reports to the War Department. During 1941 the Army also sent a few officers into the field to inspect progress of the work and report any deficiencies or particular problems. Nevertheless, Pan American was given a generally free hand to carry out the program until after the entry of the United States into war.

The Pan American contract called for a payment of $12,000,000 for the construction or improvement before 30 June 1942 of facilities at twenty-five locations and for maintenance of these facilities and supply of fuel during the construction period. Several site changes were subsequently made for
political reasons. The War Department planned originally to have Pan American build airfields in Trinidad and British Guiana. Pan American actually did some work on a seaplane base in Trinidad, but all work on the landing fields in the British bases was done by the Corps of Engineers after Pan American had made some preliminary surveys. A major base had also been planned for Martinique, but the continued adhesion of Martinique to the Vichy regime made this project impracticable. Alternative bases were eventually provided by the Army at Antigua and St. Lucia. The Army also assumed responsibility for constructing the airfield at David, Panama. Thus, under the original contract, Pan American actually built new airfields or improved existing ones at twenty-one sites: on the principal West Indies-Brazil route, on airfields in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Dutch Guiana, and at eight Brazilian sites; and along the secondary Texas-Panama-northern South American route, at three locations in Mexico, one each in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Colombia, and three in Venezuela. By the end of February 1941 construction was in progress at five of these fields. On the eve of Pearl Harbor the field construction program was estimated to be only 38 percent complete, with only five landing fields and two seaplane bases reported as much as 80 percent finished. Nevertheless many of the fields were then in usable condition and were being used by the Army and the Navy, and the progress report for November 1941 forecast that all work under the original program would be completed by 30 April 1942, two months before the date specified in the contract.

On several occasions during 1941 the War Department expressed dissatisfaction with the seemingly slow progress of the Airport Development Program. The War Plans and G-4 Divisions of the General Staff both made known their impatience to the Engineers in March 1941. In response, the deputy contracting officer cited the "necessary slowness in negotiating with the various governments in Latin America" and the difficulties that Pan American had met in placing orders for construction equipment and materials. Another and perhaps more important reason lay in the difficulty in
getting competent engineer supervisors and civilian labor and keeping them working efficiently at field locations. For example, at the Dutch Guiana base of Paramaribo, where separate landplane and seaplane facilities were being provided, the work encountered unusual supervisory difficulties and was also plagued by heavy rains and other adverse effects of the tropical environment. Although construction at Paramaribo began in February 1941, with an initial forecast of completion by 30 August 1941, the landplane base was only 12 percent complete by that date. Initially, considerable time was consumed in assembling equipment and training native employees in its efficient use.\(^{47}\) Thereafter, a long delay ensued because of drainage problems that the engineer in charge of construction was apparently not competent to solve. Meanwhile, the rainy season set in, making continuous work difficult. Engineering problems and the weather appear to have overwhelmed the supervising engineer, who more and more frequently "was seen in town, rather than at the field, and usually intoxicated . . . . At the same time he appears to have had more and more trouble with his labor, including a short strike, largely because he left others in charge."\(^{48}\) Such supervisory difficulties were not unique in tropical environments. The work at Guatemala City was at first very poorly organized and managed. "This condition," reported the deputy contracting officer, "was corrected early in June by the dismissal of the engineer-in-charge of that job and the substitution of a construction superintendent who has proved to be very efficient and well qualified."\(^{49}\) In September 1941 the War Department registered a formal complaint with Pan American about the unsatisfactory progress of the airport program; while acknowledging the many difficulties the airline had encountered, it nevertheless urged the necessity of speeding work at all fields.\(^{50}\)

In Brazil, where the construction program was carried out under the supervision of Pan American's local subsidiary, Panair do Brazil, work was particularly slow in getting under way despite the strategic importance of Brazil in hemisphere defense plans and the high priority accorded to Brazilian construction in the original airways plan.\(^{51}\) Pan American failed to complete more than 40 percent of the construction work on any of the Brazilian land fields before the entrance of the United States into the war, although several of the fields had usable runways. When the Air Forces proposed in the fall of 1941 to arrange with Pan American for the
construction of additional facilities in Brazil, the War Plans Division expressed opposition not only because of the reluctance of Brazil to cooperate more wholeheartedly in

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defense plans but also because "Pan American's performance under the contract has been so slow and of such a nature that additional construction at sites now included under the Pan American contract should be undertaken through Pan American only if no other solution is possible." 52

When the Air Forces renewed its recommendation for an expansion of Latin American airport facilities after the United States entered the war, the G-4 Division urged that much closer supervision of the current Airport Development Program be carried out than had theretofore been customary and that "any new work not included in the original contract or its pending modification be undertaken by some means other than further modification of the existing contract with Pan American Airports Corporation." 53 But after the transfer of supervisory control to the Chief of the Army Air Forces on 4 February 1942, the Chief of Engineers notified him "that it had been determined under existing diplomatic arrangements with South America that the only feasible method to prosecute this work was through Pan American." 54 After February 1942 the Army Engineers maintained much closer supervision over Pan American's contract work, and the Department of State in March 1942 facilitated supervision by formally notifying the governments concerned of the interest of the United States Government in the airport construction program.55

The expansion of the original Pan American contract began in May 1941 with a War Department authorization to Pan American to construct an airfield near Cayenne, French Guiana. Pan American wanted this field for commercial reasons and the Army wanted it because of the 440-mile gap between Zandery Field in Dutch Guiana and the first Brazilian field at Amapá — a gap notable for its bad flying weather. Local French authorities, though loyal to Vichy, also wanted the airfield built, and for several months
during 1941 they successfully cooperated with Pan American to conceal its identity as the constructor and prospective user of the Cayenne airfield. Nazi pressure through the Vichy Government finally led to the removal of the local French governor who had pushed the project, and work on the Cayenne airfield was suspended in August 1941.\textsuperscript{56}

Primarily for political reasons, the Army agreed during 1941 to add a limited airport program for Paraguay and Bolivia to the Pan American contract. The War Plans Division consistently opposed any military airfield pro-

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gram for southern South America as being unnecessary under current war plans or under any likely development of the strategic situation. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff yielded to Department of State requests that this work be undertaken, partly because the Air Corps favored it and partly because he himself believed that airfield development in Paraguay and Bolivia was preferable to the alternative of supplying them with Army munitions. In May President Roosevelt approved the expenditure of an additional $2,000,000 of emergency funds for airfields in Paraguay and Bolivia, and two months later G-4 was authorized to contract with Pan American for work on two fields in each country.\textsuperscript{57} A Department of State proposal that the Army lend similar backing to an airport development scheme in Uruguay met with a different response. Current military plans and the existing war situation did not envisage any possible Army air operations as far south as Uruguay. Although the Air Forces looked upon the Uruguayan project with some favor, the General Staff successfully opposed an extension of the Pan American contract to include it, and the staff also opposed the expenditure of War Department lend-lease funds to do the work by other means.\textsuperscript{58}

The basic Pan American contract of 2 November 1940 was revised a year later to include the Paraguayan and Bolivian airfield work and to provide additional funds for speeding construction at the sites originally chosen, for new facilities at these airfields, and for other purposes. This revision
increased the allotment of emergency funds for the Airport Development Program before Pearl Harbor from $12,000,000 to $19,000,000. Soon after the United States entered the war, the Army Air Forces proposed a further expansion of the airfield program, primarily to increase the capacity of the South Atlantic airway via Brazil. For some weeks the War Plans Division and General Headquarters opposed any major expansion of Brazilian airfield facilities unless assurances were obtained that this airway could be properly defended. The improvement in the war outlook and in Brazilian-American relations overcame these objections, and the Air Forces after assuming supervisory control over the airfield program in February 1942 proceeded to expand it in Brazil and elsewhere. By the end of June 1942 a total of about $33,000,000 had been allotted to Pan American contract work on airfields in Latin America.

Thereafter during the wartime years the United States Army continued to depend primarily on Pan American Airways for the development and maintenance of airfields in the Latin American nations in which the airline had undertaken construction work for military purposes before Pearl Harbor. By midsummer of 1944, when the airfield construction program was virtually complete, Pan American had built new airfields or improved existing facilities at forty different locations, including the development of sixteen landplane and five seaplane bases in Brazil and of eight landplane bases in Mexico. The construction costs of airfields included in the Airport Development Program amounted eventually to more than $90,000,000, and by the summer of 1945 the Army had also paid Pan American more than $10,000,000 for maintenance of the airfields. Considerably more than half of this money was expended on airfield construction and maintenance work in Brazil, primarily to provide facilities for the tremendous volume of air traffic that flowed to and from the fighting fronts of the Old World.

The Latin American airfield program was only one segment of the worldwide services rendered by Pan American Airways to the military prosecution of the war. During 1942 Pan American devoted more than 60
percent of its greatly expanded facilities to the performance of services for the United States Army and Navy, and it was paid a total of about $59,000,000 for its services during that year. After 1941 the War Department never questioned the fact that by means of the Pan American contracts the United States Army and Navy had obtained a military airways system in Latin America more readily and more cheaply than could have been provided in any other manner. The airfields built by Pan American were sufficiently ready at the end of 1941 to permit the immediate reinforcement of the Panama Canal defenses and in 1942 to cope with the submarine menace in the Caribbean and South Atlantic; and they helped to provide the United Nations with their most vital airway link during 1942 and 1943.

Beyond its immediate worth to the war effort, the Airport Development Program provided facilities of permanent value to hemisphere relations and defense. General Marshall had emphasized this point in informal remarks at a meeting in April 1941: "Airfields throughout South America are an asset to us for military use and for future trade relations. Anything we can do now toward providing airfields is an enduring thing and not a venture .... A great deal of money had better be concentrated to develop airfields all over the place. That is something that will help us in the long run . . . . It makes the best kind of common sense." Though in practice the Army confined itself to sponsoring the development of airfields actually needed for defense and for the prosecution of the war, its association with Pan American produced many airfield facilities that were an important contribution to the peacetime ties and relationships among the American nations.

Preparing for Air Operations

To make full use of the airfields and airways being developed by Pan American in Latin America, the Army needed certain privileges and services that it was only partially successful in obtaining before the United States
entered the war. It needed the greatest possible freedom to move its planes over the territory of the Latin American nations and to land planes within their territory. It needed communications and meteorological services to guide the planes, and at airfields it needed trained mechanics to service them and supplies of aviation gasoline to fuel them. A War Plans Division study of September 1941 explained:

The use of air power in counter-air-force action is the only manner in which the requirement for speed and mobility can be met over the great distances involved in the defense of this Hemisphere. But modern aircraft require prepared airdromes from which to operate and base facilities to include, at the very least, the spotting of, in advance, gasoline, oil, machine gun ammunition, and bombs .... Runways and material are required before the need for them actually exists, for when airborne aggression strikes, there will then not be time to provide these necessities.66

The advance spotting of bombs and ammunition at airfields would have required a military guard, and that in turn would have given the airfields the character of military bases. Except in Panama, the Army was to find that it could not establish new military bases anywhere in the territory of the Latin American nations until after Pearl Harbor.

An early 1941 proposal to store bombs at two Venezuelan airports illustrates the political difficulties besetting advance preparations for air defense. The United States Navy suddenly became concerned over the safety of the oil installations on the islands of Aruba and Curacao and asked the Army to store airplane bombs at nearby Venezuelan airfields from which Army bombers could attack hostile vessels in the area. The Army considered the Venezuelan airfields too far from Panama and Puerto Rico to permit bomb-loaded flights to them in an emergency. The Chief of the Air Corps started a shipment of bombs for this purpose to Panama even before the Army took up with the Department of State the problem of securing Venezuelan consent to storing the bombs at the La Guaira and Maracaibo airfields. Under Secretary of State Welles was informed that the Army wanted to store three
hundred heavy bombs, to be guarded by a company of troops, at each field. It would also need to construct storage igloos for the bombs, establish new radio facilities with the necessary operating personnel, and station liaison officers at each field to maintain contact with Venezuelan military authorities. 67

Though at first Mr. Welles did not anticipate any great difficulty about making some such arrangement, he soon learned that the Venezuelans were opposed to the stationing of any United States Army units, however small, on Venezuelan soil. On the other hand, they were willing to permit two Army noncommissioned officers to be attached to the United States Naval Mission so that one of them could supervise the employment of Venezuelan civilians to guard the bombs at each airfield. The Venezuelans also wanted the bombs stored at airfields other than those proposed by the United States Army and from which Army medium and heavy bombers could not operate. The Army, though insisting it must use the airfields it had designated, accepted the noncommissioned officer proposal; then it discovered that the Navy no longer wished to have bombs for Army aircraft stored in Venezuela. 68 The Army's chief Latin American planner wanted to persist in getting final Venezuelan approval of the project anyway, on the ground that "having secured such permission from one American Republic, it will probably be easier to secure similar privileges from others." 69 Nevertheless, nothing more was done, and the Army failed to obtain a comparable privilege elsewhere until after the United States entered the war.

The Army's air commander in the Panama Canal Zone informally suggested in March 1941 that it would be a good idea to station small Army detachments of servicing and communications specialists at each of the airfields being developed by Pan American Airways. 70 His suggestion led to an official inquiry from the War Department to the Caribbean commander for recommendations. In response General Van Voorhis stated, "United States military servicing, communications and weather detachments are considered essential at certain airdromes in Central and South America where United
States troops, under present plans, will not be stationed." They were needed not only for these specific duties but also to guard planes in transit against sabotage and to help insure the secrecy of air movements. He asked that fifteen-man detachments be placed at each of the Pan American airports in Mexico, Central America, the West Indian republics, and northern South America and that they be controlled from a small headquarters to be located in the Canal Zone under the commander of the Caribbean Air Force.71

During the summer and autumn of 1941, War and State Department officials discussed the possibility of stationing Army detachments at airports but actually did nothing about it. In October the Caribbean Defense Command renewed its earlier recommendation. It asked particularly for detachments at airfields in the Central American and West Indian republics, and it wanted the detachments to be in uniform and armed. For the moment, the War Plans Division decided that the potential disadvantages of the scheme outweighed its prospective advantages—the detachments would be difficult to control, and their presence in uniform might encourage anti-American outbursts. Since the Army Air Forces did not officially indorse the detachment plan until a few days before Pearl Harbor, it was not acted upon before the United States entered the war.72 Until then, the Army normally depended on Pan American Airways to provide weather, communications, and mechanical services, as well as fuel, at its airports.73

The Army needed to secure greater freedom for its planes to fly over and land on the territory of the Latin American nations than it had under procedures in effect before 1941. The transfer of a heavy bomber squadron from Panama to Trinidad in the spring of 1941 illuminated the difficulties arising under current procedures for flight arrangements. The planes had to be disarmed and their armament shipped by sea, and Colombia and Venezuela had to be approached through diplomatic channels for permission to fly over their territory and land at their airfields en route.74 Instead of special arrangements for each movement, the Army wanted flight agreements that would permit its planes to move at will within the Caribbean area. The Army Air Forces recommended in the fall of 1941 that the Department of State nego-
tiate uniform agreements with each of the Caribbean and northern South American nations on the following terms:

(1) No restrictions as to type and number of airplanes, frequency of flights, personnel or material carried.

(2) No restrictions as to length of time the flight may remain in the country concerned.

(3) Official notification by direct communication between the Chief of the Army Air Forces or the Commanding General of the Caribbean Air Force, and one predetermined military agency of the countries concerned.

(4) Permission granted to be applicable to all flights of United States service aircraft across and to the country concerned.\textsuperscript{75}

The flight agreement with Mexico negotiated in April 1941 had been a step in this direction.\textsuperscript{76} Informally, Colombia during the summer of 1941 agreed to freer flight privileges than those accorded by the Mexican agreement, and Venezuela did likewise on the eve of Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{77} The Central American and West Indian nations generally imposed no restrictions on Army aircraft in transit between the United States and its Caribbean bases. Nevertheless, before December 1941 neither they nor any of the other Latin American nation would agree to allow United States Army planes to fly at will over their territory and land thereon as necessary, subject only to advance notification through military channels for technical reasons. Without such freedom, the Caribbean Air Force could not carry out its mission in time of war.

In order to prepare air navigation charts of the terrain along the developing system of military airways in Latin America, the Army also needed to obtain permission for Army Air Corps photographic teams to operate from Latin American airports. Many of the Latin American nations had granted this
privilege in principle in the staff agreements of 1940, but little had been done about it. Two days before the Pearl Harbor attack the Army sought permission for its air forces to photograph fifty-mile wide strips along the airways through Mexico, Central America, and the northern and western coasts of South America.78

With the advent of war, the War Plans Division decided that the quickest and most appropriate way to obtain the various air privileges that it had previously sought would be to invoke the staff agreements of 1940. On 11 December it asked the Department of State to do so, "but only to the extent of granting permission to use their airports, seaports and related facilities, in- including communications of all kinds; to take necessary air photographs; and to send to certain key airports small Air Corps servicing, communications and weather detachments." At the moment of this request, the Army had no desire to put armed forces other than these small detachments into any of the Latin American republics except Brazil.79 The Department of State immediately asked Ecuador and the five Central American and three West Indian republics to accede to the Army's wishes, and more cautious requests went out to Colombia and Venezuela.80 The Army at the same time asked for Mexican consent to station airway detachments at three airports.81 Apparently without consulting the War Plans Division, the Army Air Forces a few days later asked the Department of State to negotiate new flight agreements that would permit Army aircraft to move at will in the Latin American area." 82

The diplomatic approaches that followed these Army requests resulted, without the formality of new written agreements, in the granting of virtually unrestricted flying and photographic privileges for United States military planes by Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru and by the Central American and West Indian republics. A new staff agreement with Venezuela, signed by a representative of the Caribbean Defense Command on 15 January 1942, provided for relatively free flying privileges but not for photographic work
by United States Army planes Mexico announced its willingness to allow American planes to reconnoiter its territory in December 1941, and the formal establishment of the joint United States-Mexican Defense Commission the following month provided a channel for obtaining necessary flying and photographic privileges for Army aircraft during the war. Brazil agreed during the spring of 1942 to let the Army map both its coast and its interior, and also to allow Army planes to use the air corridor through northeastern Brazil without restriction.83

The Army's formal request to station servicing detachments at the Pan American airports had a more complex aftermath. Mexico accepted unarmed detachments dressed in civilian clothes and ostensibly working as Pan American employees. Venezuela agreed to the same arrangement for detachments at four airfields, but because of the Army's reluctance to allow any of its troops to be stationed anywhere unarmed and in civilian clothing unless absolutely necessary, a detachment was eventually sent only to the strategically located Maracaibo airfield.84 Colombia likewise approved the dispatch of detachments, but under restrictions that persuaded the Caribbean commander to withhold action until an emergency required that they be sent.85 The West Indian republics readily agreed to receive servicing personnel at their airfields, and at the end of February 1942 Brazil approved the stationing of much larger numbers of Air Corps specialists than the detachment plan had ever visualized.86 In Central America and on the west coast of South America a different situation developed from that foreseen when the War Plans Division submitted its request for detachments to the Department of State on 11 December. Almost immediately afterward the War Department decided to establish a long-range air reconnaissance by Army planes of the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. This required the establishment of regular military bases in Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru.87 The emergency air base in Costa Rica received a small military guard as well as a servicing detachment. Apparently the landing field at
Managua, Nicaragua, was the only location at which the Army carried out its original detachment plan without change.

These various arrangements made after Pearl Harbor gave Army aircraft the mobility in air operations that the military airways system projected in 1939 and 1940 had been designed to provide. In the western Caribbean area, most of the Pan American airports served as useful wartime links between the United States and the military air bases that guarded the Panama Canal and its approaches. In the eastern Caribbean, they provided steppingstones to the major military airfields in Puerto Rico and the British bases. Beyond British Guiana, the Pan American airfields became the stations of the Army's South Atlantic airway to the Old World. The War Department's prewar alliance with Pan American Airways passed the tests of wartime circumstances, and in so doing it provided a convenient and workable basis for military collaboration between the United States and its neighbors to the south.

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Endnotes
Endnotes for Chapter X

1 Ind to Ltr, SW to Secy State, 20 May 38, AG 336 (2-12-38). See Ch. VIII, above.

2 See Ch. I, above.


6 Notes on SLC mtg, 11 Jul 38, Item 17; Notes on Jt Secretariat mfg, 26 Sep 38, Item 18. Both in SLC Min, Vol. I

7 Ind to Ltr, Chairman CAA to SW, 21 May 40, WPD 4113-14.

8 A copy of the CAA plan is in AG 580 (3-27-39).

9 Memo, ASW Johnson for Maj Gen Malin Craig, 27 Mar 39, and subsequent exchanges, AG 580 (3-27-39); Memo, WPD for CofS, 23 May 39, WPD 4113-6, summarizes the revised plan; Incj, title: Chronology of Events Relating to Adoption of the Plan for Aeronautical Improvement in the Western Hemisphere, to Ltr, Chairman CAA to SW, 21 May 40, WPD 4113-14.

10 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Apr 39, WPD 4113-1.
11 Memo, WPD for CofS, 23 May 39, WPD 4113-6; Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Aug 39; Memos, Col Handy for ACofS WPD, 2 and 5 Sep 39. Last two in WPD 4113-8. Incl to Ltr, Chairman CAA to SW, 21 May 40, WPD 4113-14.

12 For authoritative accounts of the nature and extent of foreign-controlled airline operations in Latin America before 1942, see Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, and Lissitzyn, *International Air Transport*, pp. 334-47. Latin American commercial airlines were customarily known by abbreviations of their lengthy official names and are so referred to in this text. For a list of abbreviations and full names of aviation companies operating in Latin America before 1942, see Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, p. xxiii and listing inside its back cover.

13 Army records contain a good deal of information on this subject, supplementing the various published accounts. On the situation in the fall of 1939, see especially: WPD Memo for Record, 24 Oct 39, WPD 4113-9; and Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, 22 Nov 39, WPD 4113-8. The best overall summaries are the memorandums composed by Col. Clayton L. Bissell (1 Apr 42) and Maj. J. D. Gillett (5 Apr 42) of OPD, in WPD 4257. See also: Lissitzyn, *International Air Transport*, pp. 331-32; Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, pp. 72-73; Josephson, *Empire of the Air*, pp. 157-59; and Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 274-75.

14 Memos of Col Bissell and Maj Gillett, cited in footnote 13, above; various papers in WPD 4257 and AG 580.81 (1-17-41). The final settlement called for the payment of $922,666.00, compared with the bill for $1,217,872.54 submitted by Pan American in 1941.


16 Remarks of Under Secy State Welles at SLC mtg, 3 Jan 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 1; Ltr, Mr. Rockefeller to Gen Marshall, 29 Jan 41, WPD 4257. The Civil Aeronautics Board had absorbed the work of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in June 1940.
17 Ltr, CofS to Mr. Rockefeller, 1 Feb 41, OCS 9136-61.

18 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 Feb 41; Ltr, SW to Postmaster General, 3 Mar 41. Both in WPD 4442.

19 Memo, Dept of State for WPD, 2 Apr 41, and Incl, WPD 4257; Memo, Dept of State for WPD, 10 May 41, WPD 4113-33; Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, p. 71.

20 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 7 Apr 41, and subsequent exchanges, AG 580 (4-7-41).

21 Ltr, SW to Vice President, Panagra, 4 Jun 41, WPD 4113-33. General Marshall had approved this practice in November 1940. Notes on Conf in OCS, 15 and 23 Nov 40, OCS Conf Binder, OPD files.

22 WPD Note for Record, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4113-106; Memo, CofAAF for Def Supplies Corp, 10 Nov 41, WPD 4113-135.


25 WPD interoffice memo, 1 Aug 40, AG 580.81 (11-1-40). This file and WPD 1162-G8 contain background information in the TACA application. See also Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Dec 40, WPD 4113-47.

26 Notes on SLC mtg, 23 Nov 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 65; Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Dec 40; Memo, Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 31 Dec 40. Last two in WPD 4113-47.

27 Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Mar 41, and Incl, WPD 4113-60; Memo,
CofAAF for CofS, 7 Oct 41; Ltr, SW to Chairman CAB, 4 Nov 41. Last two in OCS 18733-131. Ltr, SN to Chairman CAB, 5 Nov 41, WPD 4113-47.

28 Ltr, SW to Chairman CAB, 13 Dec 41, OCS 18733-136; Burden, *Struggle for Airways*, pp. 146-47.


30 Various exchanges, dated October-December 1941, WPD 4113-132 and WPD 578-127.

31 Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4113-137; various papers, dated January-February 1942, WPD 4113-149; Burden, *Struggle far Airways*, p. 76, and folding map inside back cover.

32 See Ch. 1, above.


37 Report of subcommittee on Caribbean Airways, n.d., WPD 4113-13, copy furnished by memo to WPD on 23 May 40, WPD 4185-5; Memos, Mai Bissell for ACoF S WPD, 4 and 18 Jun 40, WPD 4113-16 and WPD 4113-19; Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Jul 40, WPD 4113-22.

38 Memo, JPC for CofS and CNO, 24 Jan 40, WPD 4113-23.


41 Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Sep 40, AG 580.82 (8-27-40) Bulky Package.

42 Ltr, Under Secy State to SW, 24 Oct 40, WPD 4113-37. Memo, SGS for CofS, 18 Sep 40, OCS Conf Binder 3, records President Roosevelt's approval; various papers in AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 1 and Bulky Package, record the arrangement of other details during September and October.

43 OCS interoffice memo, 4 Nov 40, AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec 1. This file also contains copies of the original Pan American contracts. The most convenient summary of these contracts and the many supplementary contracts subsequently negotiated with Pan American is in the Pratt Report, Sec. III and Incls 3 and 4.

44 On 7 September General Marshall had pointed out that "in the Caribbean theater the Pan American contract is a primary essential to the matter of the British bases." Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Sep 40, AG 580.82 (8-27-40) Bulky Package.

45 The 1941 progress reports are in AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 2.

46 Memo, WPD for G-2, 6 Mar 41, WPD 4113-33; Ltr, TAG to CofEngrs, 12 Mar 41; 5th Ind on Progress Report of Dec 40, Deputy Contracting Off to Div Engrs North Atlantic Div, 31 Mar 41. Last two in AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 2.
47 Progress Report, 30 Apr 41, AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 2.


49 Progress Report, 31 Jul 41, AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 2.

50 Lt r, to President of PAA, 19 Sep 41, WPD 4113-33.

51 Ltr, Deputy Contracting Off to CofEngrs, 29 Nov 41, AG 580.82 (8-27-40), Sec. 1.

52 Memo, Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 8 Nov 41, WPD 4113-33.

53 Memo, G-4 for WPD, 18 Dec 41, G-4/32126, Sec. III.

54 Pratt Report, p. 60.

55 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 16 Nov 45, OPD 580.82, Sec. III-A.

56 Memo, Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 19 Dec 40, WPD 4113-49; various papers, dated February-August 1941, WPD 4113-56.

57 Notes on SLC mtgs, 23 Jan and 4 Feb 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Items 4 and 5; Memo SGS for CofS, 2 May 41, OCS Conf Binder 15; various papers, dated February-July 1941, WPD 4385-4.

58 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 30 Sep 41, and subsequent correspondence, WPD 4346-7.

59 Ltr, SW to SN, 12 Jul 41, WPD 4113-55; Ltr, TAG to CofAAF, 21 Nov 40, WPD 4113-33.

60 Various papers, dated 16 Dec 41-16 Jan 42, WPD 4113-33; Notes on GHQ staff conf, 7 Jan 42 GHQ 337 Staff Conf s Binder 2.

61 Financial Report on Airport Development Program as of 30 June 1942, OPD 580.81 PAA.
62 Pratt Report, p. 76.


64 A careful postwar investigation of the Airport Development Program produced the opinion "that under the circumstances and the many, many difficulties faced, a splendid job was done, and that it would have been most difficult to have done a much better one." Pratt Report, p. 92.


66 Memo, Chief jt Policy and Plans Sec for Chief Lat Amer Sec WPD, 9 Sep 41, OPD Misc 49.

67 SGS Memo for Record, 17 Jan 41, OCS Conf Binder 8; Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 18 Jan 41, WPD 4361-2.

68 Notes on SLC mtgs, 23 Jan and 15 Feb 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Items 4 and 6; various papers, dated 22 Jan-12 Feb 41, WPD 4361-2; Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Feb 41, OCS Conf Binder 10.

69 Note for Record, Col Ridgway, WPD, 25 Feb 41, WPD 4361-2.

70 Pets Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 12 Mar 41, AG 320.2 (1-8-41).

71 Ltr, CG CDC to TAG, 31 May 41, AG 580 (4-15-41).

72 Rad, CG, CDC to TAG; 17 Oct 41, AG 580 (4-15-41); Memo, WPD for CofAAF, 28 Oct 41, and accompanying notations; Memo, CofAAF for WPD, 2 Dec 41. Last two in WPD 4113-77.

73 On occasion during the latter part of 1941 Mexico and the Caribbean republics permitted Army mechanics in civilian clothes to be stationed temporarily at Pan American airports to service large flights of planes. See Chapter XIII, below, for the Mexican approval of this arrangement.
74 Ltr, CG CDC to TAG, 1 May 41, OCS 9136-74.

75 Memo, CofAAF for WPD, 27 Sep 41, WPD 4113-102.

76 See Ch. XIII, below.

77 Report of 14 Jul 41, and other papers, WPD 4379-11; Memo, Venezuelan Foreign Minister to Amer Ambassador, 6 Dec 41, WPD 4361-21.

78 Ltr, SW to Chairman Economic Defense Board, 5 Dec 41, and Incls describing privileges desired, WPD 4115-62.

79 Memo, WPD for Dept of State, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4113-136.

80 Memo, Dept of State for WPD, 22 Dec 41, inclosing copies of messages sent on 13 December 1941 by Department of State to embassies and legations, WPD 4115-73.

81 Ltr, Gen Embick to Col Cristobal Guzman Cardenas, 13 Dec 41, WPD 4484-1.

82 Memo, CofAAF for SW, 18 Dec 41; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 19 Dec 41. Both in OCS 9136-89.

83 Memo, WPD for GHQ, 3 Jan 42, WPD 4115-78, contains a summary of photographic privileges granted. Dept of State Memo, 8 Jan 42, OPD Misc 10, Lat Amer Flying-General, contains a summary of flight privileges granted. On Colombia, Memo, Col Barber for Gen Gerow, WPD, 16 Jan 42, WPD 4379-23. On Venezuela, Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4361-15. On Brazil and Mexico, see Chapters XII and XIII, below.

84 The detachment went to Maracaibo in June 1942 and remained for about one year. See Hist Sec, CDC, Military Collaboration, C.D.C.-Venezuela During World War II, pp. 47-49.

85 Small weather and communications detachments were sent to two Colombian airfields during 1943. See Historical Section, Caribbean Defense
Command, MS, Cooperation and Collaboration of the Republic of Colombia with the United States in the Second World War, p. 49.

86 See Ch. XII, below.

87 The development of American military bases under the Caribbean Defense Command is treated in Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States.

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CHAPTER XI

Military Relations With Brazil Before Pearl Harbor

The progress of navigation by air in the decade preceding World War II radically altered the framework of planning for the defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Commercial airways bridged the 1,800 mile ocean span between Africa and Brazil and pointed out the Brazilian bulge as the air approach that an Old World aggressor would find most practicable. The adoption of a new policy of hemisphere defense in November 1938 necessarily focused the attention of American military planners on Brazil. A hostile military lodgment in Northeast Brazil would have immediately threatened the meager existing Caribbean defenses of the United States to the north and, to the south, the most populous and highly developed region of South America. In 1939 protection of the Brazilian bulge against Axis aggression became the keystone of American military plans for defending the hemisphere's Atlantic front. The Army was well aware that the successful execution of plans and measures to this end would require the friendly cooperation and collaboration of Brazil, and its staff discussions with Brazilian military authorities, which began in June 1939, eventually led to a full military partnership during World War II between the United States and Brazil.

Fortunately, a tradition of friendship existed between the United States of America and the United States of Brazil. Their relations had been particularly cordial in the preceding half century, during which their economies had become increasingly interdependent. Only Brazil among the South American nations became an active belligerent in World War I. Brazilians had enthusiastically espoused the Pan-American concept from its beginnings and had worked in complete harmony with the United States in establishing the political framework of inter-American solidarity climax at 1938 by the Declaration of Lima. 2
Brazil has nearly half the area and about half the population of the South American continent, and great natural resources make it one of the potentially strong powers of the world. But in 1939 Brazil's military strength was no match for its size and natural wealth. The Brazilian Navy was so antiquated that both American and Brazilian experts considered it of little worth for action against modern naval vessels. The Army, which had an active strength of about sixty-six thousand in 1939, lacked modern combat equipment. The Air Force, which was to be organized as an independent service in January 1941, had no modern combat planes and was far weaker than those of Argentina and Peru. Brazil's military policy called for the concentration of its Army in the populous southeastern part of the country, adjacent to the Argentine and Uruguayan borders and to the large Italian, German, and Japanese minorities in the southern states. These foreign elements—especially the Germans and Japanese—had been only partially integrated into Brazil's population, and during the 1930's the Nazi and Fascist regimes in Europe had fostered movements among the German and Italian minorities that threatened the security of the Brazilian Government.

In consequence of Brazilian military concentration in the south, the 2,500 mile coast line north of Rio de Janeiro was virtually defenseless in 1939. It had no installations whatsoever for coastal defense, no defenses against air attack, and almost no ground troops to fend off an invader. Nor did it have any means of land communication—road or railway—with central and southern Brazil that would have permitted rapid deployment of Brazilian forces toward the northeast to resist an external attack. While a surface attack on Northeast Brazil was fairly unthinkable as long as friendly naval powers Great Britain, France, and the United States-controlled the Atlantic, the development of airpower and of the airway across the South Atlantic made an air attack feasible. Combined with a fifth-column movement among the foreign minorities in the south, such an attack could conceivably have brought a quick overthrow of the administration of President Getulio Vargas and produced a situation gravely inimical to the national interests of the United States and of the other American nations. Analyzing the situation in March 1939, an Army War College group concluded that only the United States could provide forces that would be adequate to protect the Brazilian bulge.
Brazilian civilian and military authorities readily acknowledged the defenselessness of Northeast Brazil. The Minister of War, General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Pedro de Goes Monteiro, naturally wanted to mend the situation by building up the strength of the Brazilian Army. The Brazilian Army's objective, from 1939 onward, was to improve and increase its ground forces so that it could provide an adequate defense of the Brazilian bulge without American ground assistance. But Brazil's meager industrial development and lack of accessible industrial raw materials (notably iron and coal) made it almost wholly dependent on foreign armament supplies. Therefore, the Army's objective could be attained only by securing large quantities of arms from abroad—either by obtaining deliveries on a big munitions order placed with the German Krupp works in 1938 or by securing an equivalent arms supply from the United States. Throughout the pre-Pearl Harbor period the Brazilians realized that they had no real chance of adequately modernizing their naval and air arms, and they were therefore more willing to accept United States air and naval support than ground support in the defense of Northeast Brazil. Between 1939 and 1942 the fundamental issue in Brazilian-American defense planning was the method of conducting a ground defense of the Brazilian bulge against the threat of external attack. The changed military situation of 1942 finally permitted a resolution of this issue in accordance with Brazilian desires.

The United States and Brazilian Armies had maintained relations before 1939 through military attaches in Washington and Rio de Janeiro, and also through a four-man United States Military Mission that since 1934 had helped advise and instruct the Brazilian Army in coast defense, ordnance, and chemical warfare matters. A thirteen-man United States Navy mission served the Brazilian Navy in a similar capacity. The United States and Brazilian Armies had maintained relations before 1939 through military attaches in Washington and Rio de Janeiro, and also through a four-man United States Military Mission that since 1934 had helped advise and instruct the Brazilian Army in coast defense, ordnance, and chemical warfare matters. A thirteen-man United States Navy mission served the Brazilian Navy in a similar capacity. 4 A more intimate relationship followed the visit of Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha to the United States in February 1939, during which the Department of State had arranged for him to discuss military matters with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. 5 As a result an official invitation was issued to the Chief of Staff designate, General Marshall, to visit Brazil. General
Marshall, accompanied by War Plans and Air officers, arrived in Rio de Janeiro on 24 May 1939. There he established a personal relationship with the Brazilian Chief of Staff. In mid June General Goes Monteiro accompanied General Marshall to the United States on a return visit. This exchange of visits laid the groundwork for subsequent Brazilian-American military collaboration.  

The Problem of Arms Supply

General Goes Monteiro, in his talks with American staff officers during June and July 1939, took the position that Brazil must continue the concentration of its existing military strength in the south and depend on American military aid for the defense of Northeast Brazil. For this purpose he proposed the installation of coast defense and antiaircraft guns and construction of air and naval bases, and suggested that the base sites be selected jointly by American and Brazilian staff officers. These proposals hinged on the ability and willingness of the United States to supply Brazil with large quantities of arms and other war material and to grant technical and financial assistance in the construction of the proposed air and naval bases. General Goes Monteiro informally submitted a list of the ordnance and air equipment Brazil wanted. The "first priority" items on this list included 156 heavy artillery pieces, 196 antiaircraft guns, 102 combat aircraft, 41 tanks, 252 armored cars, and 722 automatic weapons of various types. The total requirements of Brazil would be about thrice these amounts. The Brazilians hoped to pay for munitions principally by a direct exchange of raw materials. While the armaments request included air and naval items, the apparent implication of the Brazilian proposals was that if Brazil and the United States became jointly involved in a war, American naval and air forces could use the new Brazilian bases, while ground defense would be supplied by newly organized units of the Brazilian Army equipped with American arms. President Vargas approved these proposals upon General Goes Monteiro's return to Rio de Janeiro in August.
In summarizing the Rio conversations for General Marshall, Major Ridgway of the War Plans Division concluded that the crucial factor in carrying out General Goes Monteiro's plan for defending Northeast Brazil would be the supply of munitions. If the United States could furnish them (though not necessarily in the large quantities requested), "the remaining steps will be relatively easy of accomplishment," Major Ridgway noted. The difficulty was that legal restrictions prevented the United States Army from providing from its own stocks or arsenals the type of military material that Brazil wanted, and Brazil certainly could not expect any American private manufacturer to negotiate the type of barter deal that it had made with the German Krupp works. Major Ridgway could only urge that the arms supply question be considered, that the United States provide such technical assistance and training to Brazilian Army officers as might be practicable, and that, in the meantime, American plans for formation of a joint Army-Navy expeditionary force to be employed in defense of the Brazilian bulge in an emergency be developed with a minimum of delay.

The day before Germany invaded Poland, President Roosevelt and the Department of State became alarmed by reports that the Germans intended to seize the island of Fernando de Noronha, lying about 215 miles off the Brazilian coast, and turn it into a submarine base. Brazilian authorities assured the United States that they had previously taken adequate measures to insure the security of Fernando de Noronha, but they again asked that the United States hasten to supply them with munitions, especially coast defense guns. Their request now received President Roosevelt's personal attention and backing.

After the outbreak of the European war, the Brazilian Army was doubly anxious to get American arms, since it appeared probable that there would be great difficulty in securing deliveries on the Krupp order. General Marshall in October explained to General Goes Monteiro the existing difficulties that prevented the United States Army from readily providing all the types of
equipment Brazil wanted, but he did offer to sell some surplus coast artillery weapons to Brazil at nominal prices.\textsuperscript{11} In mid-November the Secretary of War and President Roosevelt approved the terms on which surplus material could be offered.\textsuperscript{12}

During the summer conversations, arrangements had been made for a goodwill visit of American Flying Fortresses to Brazil. This flight, when undertaken in November under the leadership of General Headquarters Air Force commander General Emmons, provided the means not only for publicizing Brazilian-American friendship but also for furthering military collaboration. As previously mentioned, General Emmons and his party used this opportunity to conduct a careful survey of the west and east coast air routes to the Brazilian bulge, and of the Natal area on the bulge as the prospective major air base site.\textsuperscript{13} General Marshall had arranged for Major Ridgway to accompany the flight, and he, together with Col. Allen Kimberly, Chief of the United States Military Mission, discussed problems of strategy and arms supply with General Goes Monteiro. They offered the Brazilian Chief of Staff the surplus coast artillery weapons that the President had approved for sale and also gave him a list of strategic raw materials that the United States wished to acquire. The Department of State had vetoed the Brazilian proposal that the United States follow Germany's example of bartering military equipment for raw materials directly; instead, the American plan was to purchase in both directions on a cash basis—the exchanges to parallel each other insofar as possible.\textsuperscript{14} The Brazilians agreed to this procedure and arranged for three of their artillery officers to return with General Emmons to inspect the material offered.\textsuperscript{15}

The surplus coast defense equipment offered to Brazil in November 1939 consisted of 6-inch mobile guns, 7-inch railway guns, and 12-inch guns, and gun tubes, of various models. None of the material was in an immediately usable condition, but apparently neither Americans nor Brazilians foresaw the difficulties that lay ahead in getting the weapons ready for actual use. At
the time, coast defense guns appear to have been considered an interim contribution that the United States Army could make immediately to Brazil's defenses, pending arrangements to supply field equipment. Between January and May 1940, Brazil purchased for cash ninety-nine of the 6-inch guns, eighteen of the 7-inch guns and gun tubes with 2,300 empty projectiles for them, and twenty-six 12-inch gun tubes, at a total cost of more than $100,000. All of the guns and gun tubes required extensive overhauling and additional parts, and there was no currently available ammunition supply for any of them—indeed, the drawings for the ammunition could not even be located. At General Marshall's urging, the War Department from the spring of 1940 onward seems to have done all that it could to expedite work on this equipment. In November 1940 the Chief of Staff arranged to attach Lt. Col. Morgan L. Brett, a retired ordnance expert, to the Brazilian Purchasing Com-

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mission in Washington in order to forward this work. Actually, only the reconditioned 6-inch guns reached Brazil before the end of 1941 (only nine of them before February 1941). The procurement of the 6-inch guns added nothing to the defenses of Brazil, since the Brazilians were not able to get any ammunition for them in the United States or to manufacture it themselves. In February 1942 the Brazilians were still trying to get better priorities in the United States in order to make some of the 6-inch and 7-inch guns usable.16

The United States was actually considerably more successful in getting German arms rather than American arms into Brazil during 1940 and 1941. Deliveries on the order that Brazil had placed with the Krupp works in 1938 had just started to arrive when the war in Europe began. Between September 1939 and June 1940, the British permitted two shipments of German arms to reach Brazil via Italy. When Italy entered the war, the British clamped down on further German arms shipments. Nevertheless, the Germans in June 1940 were promising the Brazilians September deliveries, and in fact they continued to turn over title to armaments produced under the Krupp contract to a large Brazilian Army purchasing commission that remained in Essen, Germany, until December 1941.
The British in November 1940 seized a Brazilian vessel, the *Siquiera Campos*, that was attempting to carry some of these arms from Lisbon to Brazil. The Brazilians immediately requested that the United States intercede with the British to get the arms released. Primarily at General Marshall's urging, the United States persuaded the British to release the ship, but the episode stirred anti-British sentiment in Brazil, especially among the higher officers of the Brazilian Army. Finally, in the summer of 1941, the British permitted an American vessel to pick up a load of German arms (mostly missing parts for equipment already delivered) at Lisbon and carry it to New York for transshipment to Brazil. Again, the intervention of General Marshall in securing this permission was perhaps decisive. Throughout, the United States Army seems to have done all it could to help the Brazilian Army secure delivery on their German armament order. By November 1941 Brazil had actually obtained about two hundred guns of various types from Germany, many of them not usable because of missing parts. While these guns represented only a fraction of the original order, they were far more than the United States was able to supply Brazil during the prewar period.¹⁷

The failure of the United States, for whatever good reasons, to make effective delivery of the coast defense equipment purchased by the Brazilians in early 1940, together with the Brazilian Army's failure to get more than a fraction of the arms ordered from Germany before the war, introduced a factor of irritation in Brazilian-American military relations that made it increasingly difficult to plan for the defense of the Brazilian bulge. Knowing that they could not obtain more than a small part of their German armaments order, the Brazilians realized that they must get large quantities of arms in the United States if they were to achieve their defense objective—responsibility for ground defensive measures in any joint United States-Brazilian operations that might have to be undertaken. On the other hand, until 1942 the United States found it utterly impracticable, in view of its own and other nations' more urgent requirements for munitions, to make more
than small token shipments of modern military equipment to Brazil.\textsuperscript{18} The arms supply problem made the planning and execution of Army defense measures in Brazil far more complicated than the friendly preliminary staff conversations of 1939 and the general prewar cordiality in Brazilian-American relations had seemed to augur.

\textit{War Plans and Staff Agreements, 1940}

The war plans of the United States had recognized the vital importance of the Brazilian bulge in hemisphere defense long before Hitler loosed his onslaught against western Europe in the spring of 1940. The basic joint RAINBOW 1 plan, approved in August 1939, placed the defense of Brazil at the top of the list of specific tasks to be undertaken by United States forces.\textsuperscript{19} General Emmons' survey in November 1939 reinforced the conviction that "the Natal area is of critical and utmost importance in the defense of the continental United States and the Panama Canal against a possible coalition of European nations." \textsuperscript{20} The Army's Air Board in 1939 used the prospective task of evicting a hostile air force from the Brazilian bulge as the yardstick for determining the strength required by the Army's air arm in hemisphere defense.\textsuperscript{21} During the fall and winter of 1939-40, the Army and Navy planners worked on detailed RAINBOW 1 plans for dispatching an expeditionary force to Brazil, although the services did nothing more than plan until Hitler opened his western European offensive.

Just before the German attack on France, President Roosevelt again expressed concern about the security of Fernando de Noronha and suggested the immediate renewal of conversations with Brazil "to make definitely certain that this Island will not be used by any European nations in case the European war spreads." \textsuperscript{22} Fernando de Noronha had a usable airfield and would have been a logical steppingstone in any German or Italian air approach to the Natal area. In response to the President's message, the Army and Navy proposed that the Department of State open conversations with the
Brazilians to determine if they were prepared to act on the basis of the views expressed by Foreign Minister Aranha and General Goes Monteiro in 1939. Immediately after the German attack began, General Goes Monteiro sent a message to General Marshall indicating his feeling "that closest collaboration between the United States and Brazil is vitally necessary as there is now a real and imminent danger confronting both countries." The way toward intimate military collaboration with Brazil appeared clear.

When the Germans smashed through the front of the western European Allies within a week, the United States Government feared that it might have to take drastic action to protect the vital and vulnerable Brazilian bulge. While the President's proposal for conversations with Brazil broadened into preparations for conducting military staff conversations with the American republics generally, United States authorities realized that any sort of conversations would take time and that it was essential for the United States to be prepared to take emergency action to deal with either an external attack or an internal Nazi-inspired revolutionary movement in South America. At the President's direction, over one weekend (25-27 May) the armed services hatched the impracticable POT OF GOLD plan for rushing a 100,000-man force to Brazil. The Department of State agreed to send consular representatives to the Natal area to obtain a variety of current information needed for planning the movement of American troops to the bulge. A Nazi plot uncovered in Uruguay during the last week in May helped to confirm American fears and sufficiently alarmed the Brazilians themselves so that they sent five thousand rifles to the Uruguayan Army.

By mid June Army detailed planning, based on the new joint RAINBOW 4 plan, projected a Northeastern Brazil theater as a prospective major area of operations in the event that Great Britain followed France in defeat. In July both the Army and Navy planning staffs believed that a highly probable development of the war, if Great Britain were defeated, would be a German
drive through Africa and across the South Atlantic to Brazil. They feared this drive would be preceded or accompanied by Axis-inspired Latin-American revolutionary movements, and they felt the prospect constituted the most serious military threat to the Western Hemisphere. 29

When it appeared in the fall of 1940 that Great Britain could hold out at least until the following spring, the sense of urgency in planning for operations in Northeast Brazil subsided. Nevertheless, the Army considered it "well recognized" that a German penetration of North and West Africa and occupation of Dakar would make it "imperative for the United States to anticipate such action by the preventive occupation of the air fields and ports in northeastern Brazil." 30 It was to facilitate an operation of this sort that the Army in November 1940 contracted with Pan American Airways for the improvement of and new construction of airfields between the United States and eastern South America, so that all types of combat aircraft could be deployed under their own power to the Brazilian bulge. 31

All of these emergency plans required advance arrangements for "closest collaboration," as urged by the Brazilian Chief of Staff the preceding May. To make the arrangements the Army chose Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, an Engineer officer who had previously served with the Military Mission in Rio de Janeiro. Unlike the other officers dispatched from Washington at the beginning of June 1940 to conduct staff discussions in Latin America, Colonel Miller was to remain in the Brazilian capital, where he would serve as Chief of the Military Mission. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and General Goes Monteiro both had requested his appointment to this position, and it was also planned to raise Colonel Miller to general officer rank to lend prestige to his mission and to emphasize American concern for the security of Brazil.

Arriving in Rio de Janeiro during the final week of the French debacle, Colonel Miller found the Brazilians thoroughly alarmed over the turn of
events in Europe and dubious of the ability of the United States to protect them or to help them to protect themselves against future Nazi aggression. The Brazilian Army immediately presented Colonel Miller with a list of the armaments it wanted—a long list of material estimated to cost about $180,000,000. At first, the Brazilians insisted that the problem of arms supply must be settled before any staff discussion of mutual defense plans began, but presently they agreed that the two problems might be considered together.32

Analyzing the situation the day after his first discussion with Brazilian staff officers on the preparation of mutual defense plans, Colonel Miller reported to Ambassador Caffery:

The present turn of events of the war in Europe is having a profound influence upon all the authorities here in the Brazilian army, navy, and civil government. Although they do not trust Germany, they do have great admiration of the fighting machine of that country. They have no love for the English. They do not wish to arouse the antagonism of Germany, because they know that Brazil is not prepared and they believe that Germany is the only country that will furnish them with arms at reasonable terms. They strongly doubt that the United States will be able to assist them with material. The fate of neutral countries in Europe has raised doubts of the ability of the United States to protect there from aggression, especially in the case of a coalition of powers acting against us. All of these considerations tend to strengthen the pro-Nazi element in Brazil, and as Germany consolidates her gains in Europe the situation here in Brazil will grow worse unless immediate action is taken by our Government to combat it effectively.33

A few days earlier, Foreign Minister Aranha in a conversation with Ambassador Caffery had "made it forcibly clear . . . that if the United States cannot find means to assist Brazil in acquiring armament, necessarily the Brazilian military authorities will turn toward Germany and acquire armaments there . . . at the end of the war." 34 Until the United States indicated what action it could take on the armament list submitted by the Brazilians, then, there was scant prospect of reaching any agreement on mutual defense plans.

Brazil's armaments request became the vehicle for determining a Latin American arms supply policy. In presenting the problem for decision, Colonel
Ridgway virtually reiterated the statement he had made a year previously: "Upon our willingness to supply, or definitely to promise to supply, this armament in the near future, appears to depend our future relations with Brazil." 35 After President Roosevelt approved a new Latin American arms policy on 1 August, the Department of State informed the Brazilians through Ambassador Caffery that their Army could "procure some of its equipment in the United States within the next few months" and all of it "within an estimated maximum period of three years." The Brazilians from President Vargas on down expressed their great pleasure on receiving the news.36 Seemingly, the way was now open for negotiation and execution of an agreement with Brazil on mutual hemisphere defense plans and preparations. Actually, grounds for a continued misunderstanding between the Brazilian and United States Armies remained. What the Brazilians wanted most was modern combat equipment. The Army had informed the Department of State that only automotive equipment and some noncombat aviation material (training planes) could be made available to Brazil in the near future. Apparently this point was not made clear to the Brazilians in August 1940.37 The Brazilians also seem to have been led to anticipate that they could get actual deliveries of some equipment "within the next few months," whereas the Army had meant that it would assist the Brazilians in placing orders for this equipment in the near future, but that it would be many months before the equipment could actually be delivered in Brazil. Finally, in the autumn of 1940 the United States Army began its own rapid expansion, and the United States Government veered toward a policy of all-out aid to Great Britain. With American industrial mobilization for war just getting under way, prospects of delivering any significant amounts of modern military equipment to Brazil were to become increasingly slim.

The War Department in August authorized Colonel Miller to begin formal staff conversations with Brazilian Army representatives in order to work out a definite plan for military collaboration. The United States goal was a plan that would provide adequate means of insuring "the maintenance in Brazil of a Government, both determined and able, to preserve its territorial integrity and freedom from European control, and to cooperate fully with the United
States in hemisphere defense." Colonel Miller's instructions, similar in context to those issued other Army officers sent out from Washington for the second round of staff conversations, emphasized the paramount concern of the Army for the security of the Brazilian bulge. Although Colonel Miller carried on informal conversations with the Brazilian staff during August and September, General Goes Monteiro presently indicated his preference for concluding the conversations in Washington. The Brazilian Chief of Staff, who was joining other Latin American military chiefs in a visit to the United States in October, wished to negotiate a staff agreement directly with General Marshall and his advisers. Through Colonel Miller, General Goes Monteiro transmitted to Washington a draft of the type of agreement Brazil wished.

In Washington General Goes Monteiro conferred first with General Marshall and afterward with his staff subordinates. He left with the latter a new draft for a staff agreement, dated 29 October 1940, that with some modifications was eventually accepted by both governments. The agreement in its final form contained a mutual pledge of armed assistance under two hypotheses: by Brazil, to any American nation (except Canada) attacked by any non-American power; by the United States, to Brazil if it were attacked by any non-American state. Brazilian aid under the first hypothesis would include the use of its air and naval bases and the supply of strategic raw materials, and Brazil pledged itself to prepare for rendering such aid by building up its defenses as rapidly as possible. Brazil also agreed to take the proper steps to suppress alien subversive activity within its borders. The United States promised to supply Brazil with arms and with material to develop its war industries and railway system to the degree that American resources, current programs, and legal restrictions permitted; in principle, the United States agreed to accept raw materials in payment for the armaments and other material furnished Brazil. The United States also promised "to bring up its armed forces to join Brazilian forces" in the defense of Brazil, in the event of an external attack before Brazil had completed its defense preparations. Although the staff agreement made no specific mention of Northeast Brazil,
General Marshall subsequently recalled that he had had to fend off General Goes Monteiro's request for a definite pledge that the United States would employ its armed forces to guarantee the integrity of the bulge.

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Also, the Brazilian Chief of Staff told American staff officers with whom he conferred that he thought Brazil would not object to an American aerial photographic survey of strategic points along the Brazilian coast, or to a survey "on the ground" by United States Army medical officers. Underlying the Brazilian Army's proposals and United States Army's acceptance of them was the understanding that the United States would render substantial material assistance in strengthening Brazilian defenses and defense forces.42

United States Navy staff conversations paralleled those of the Army during September and October 1940. The Navy reached a satisfactory agreement with its Brazilian counterpart, the Brazilian Navy promising "to interpose no objections to advance discreet operations of United States Naval Forces in the Natal area and outlying Islands, both ashore and afloat." These operations could be carried on in advance of any actual attack from abroad against this area.43

The Army and Navy staff agreements with Brazil negotiated in the autumn of 1940 provided the base for the subsequent military cooperation of the United States with Brazil during World War II. General Goes Monteiro on his return to the Brazilian capital gave President Vargas a favorable report on his reception in the United States, on the progress of American defense preparations, and on the prospect for close cooperation with the United States in hemisphere defense measures. General Marshall's intervention during November on behalf of Brazil in the Siquiera Campos affair provided an additional impetus to the spirit of friendship that had characterized the staff conversations.44 But troubled waters lay ahead. Nearly two years were to elapse before Brazil and the United States achieved the close plane of military collaboration forecast by the staff agreements of 1940.
When Ambassador Caffery in August 1940 officially informed the Brazilian Government that it could expect in time to receive substantial quantities of armaments from the United States, he suggested that Brazil send a ranking officer to the United States to negotiate for the material. In September Brazil chose General Amato Soares Bittencourt, First Sub-Chief of the General Staff, to carry out this mission. After the tentative approval by both govern-
ments of a military staff agreement, General Amaro's mission was broadened to include the detailed negotiations that would be required to put the agreement into effect. His credentials, delivered to General Marshall in mid-December, stated that as soon as an understanding on the question of arms supply had been reached, he would become "Head of the Brazilian Military Committee" in the United States and the main channel for all military communications between the two governments.45

General Amato opened his formal conversations with American authorities on 8 January 1941. He first talked with Under Secretary of State Welles, who assured him that the Department of State would arrange for credits to finance the purchase of as much war material as the Army could release to Brazil—either surplus from its own stocks or new equipment to be ordered from private manufacturers. On the same day, General Amato discussed his problems with General Marshall and his staff assistants. The Chief of Staff explained frankly that, while the Army would do all it could to help Brazil obtain modern armaments as soon as possible, there was very little that could be done in the immediate future. The rapidly expanding United States Army and the fighting forces of the democracies abroad had to have first claim on American munitions production. General Marshall promised only that Brazil's requests would be given preference over those of the other Latin American nations.46

The list of armaments presented by General Amaro was identical with that
delivered to Colonel Miller the preceding June, except that Brazil now added to it the items that had been ordered from Germany but never delivered. War Department officers calculated that the expanded Brazilian requests would cost about $250,000,000, and they noted that Brazil wanted some items "in quantities in excess of the total amount available to United States forces and in at least one item, 37-mm. AP [armor-piercing] shell, in a quantity 50 percent greater than the combined total of United States and British requirements." Obviously, they concluded, the Brazilian request would have to be reduced. General Amaro himself made a preliminary reduction by submitting a "first priority" listing, but this still amounted to nearly one half of the total. United States officers then worked out a tentative schedule specifying when the Brazilians could expect the items on the

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priority list to become available. They divided it into three groups: (1) material that could be made available at once out of Army stocks—a few controlled mines and Waco primary training planes; (2) material that could be obtained in the near future if orders for it were placed immediately—other types of primary trainers and various items of military automotive equipment; and (3) material on which no deliveries could be made before November 1941 at the earliest—the great bulk of the items asked for, and all of the combat items. The three lists were communicated to General Amaro on 15 January 1941, and on the next day he replied that Brazil now had a clear picture of what it could expect from the United States in the way of arms supply.

Toward the end of January the Army proposed that a credit of $12,000,000 be made available to Brazil immediately to permit the procurement of the material in the first two groupings, as well as to finance the remaining expense for modernizing and making usable the coast defense guns sold to Brazil in 1940. Working from the Brazilian first priority list, the Army also calculated an over-all schedule that would provide Brazil with arms valued at $80,000,000 within the ensuing two and a half years. This schedule in turn became the yardstick for calculating the arms allotments for all of the other Latin American nations. On 7 February the Army recommended that the
Department of State arrange for credits for all items on the new schedule, so that Brazil could at least place orders for these items with American manufacturers. The Department of State wanted to postpone the question of credits until the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, but was finally persuaded in March to arrange with the Export-Import Bank for the $12,000,000 credit initially recommended by the Army.49

The American-Brazilian arms negotiation during January and February 1941 had in effect cleared the air by letting the United States Army know what Brazil wanted most and by letting the Brazilian Army know what the real chances of procurement were. But it had not produced a promise of early delivery of any modern combat equipment to Brazil, and therefore held no promise that Brazil could prepare its Army for joint defensive operations with American forces in Northeast Brazil.

In December 1940 the Army had wanted to hasten the preparations for operations on the Brazilian bulge. The current joint war plan (RAINBOW 4) called for the movement of a reinforced triangular division to Brazil immediately after a war emergency required putting the plan into full effect. Indeed, this movement to Brazil was to precede any other deployment or reinforcement of Army forces in the Atlantic and Caribbean areas.50 Extensive advance preparations would, of course, be needed to receive this force. Work on the Brazilian airfields to be constructed or improved by Pan American was about to begin. But in addition to the work contracted for, the fields needed bomb and gasoline storage and other service facilities, and quarters for technicians and troop guards. The Navy also needed many new facilities at ports around the Brazilian bulge for its projected South Atlantic operations. The War Plans Division thought that what the Army ought to do in advance of any RAINBOW 4 situation, if it could, was to put small American troop units near the major airfields in order to insure against sudden and surprise seizure of them by Axis air forces. The United States should then finance further military improvements in the area to prepare it for large-scale troop occupation if necessary, and also should draft joint war
plans with Brazil to govern the conduct of such military operations in Northeast Brazil as might develop. Solely from the military point of view, the Army would have much preferred that the United States lease bases in Brazil, since leased bases could have been occupied at will by United States forces. On the other hand, War Plans recognized the high improbability of Brazil agreeing to any such lease arrangement.51

During the October conversations, General Goes Monteiro and Colonel Ridgway had discussed the possibility of sending some modern equipment and a small body of American troops to the Brazilian bulge. Initially, the American troops would teach Brazilian soldiers how to use the material, but afterward the Americans might be permitted to remain to help guard the airfields. In meetings on 3 January 1941, General Marshall discussed this proposal first with his staff and then with Admiral Stark and Under Secretary of State Welles. By that time the proposal involved placing one company of American soldiers at each of five airfield sites. Both Mr. Welles and Admiral Stark approved the idea, and suggested that the Army take the matter up directly with General Amato.52 Late in January, having made some progress on the arms supply question, Colonels Ridgway and Miller (the latter having been summoned to Washington to participate in the conferences with General Amaro) broached the subject. General Amato doubted that Brazil would allow American troops to be stationed at five different locations for any purpose. As an alternative, he suggested that a troop training center be set up in the vicinity of Natal or Recife and that the United States "send there small groups and the necessary material to instruct Brazilian personnel in the use of bombardment and fighter aircraft, antiaircraft artillery and coast defense material (155-mm. gun), communications, and organization of base facilities." General Amaro's plan contemplated that after the training period the material would be turned over to the Brazilian Army and the American personnel would be returned to the United States.53 Acting on General Amaro's suggestion, the Army worked out a plan for sending a total force of nearly fourteen hundred officers and enlisted men, equipped with forty-six airplanes and a substantial number of antiaircraft and coast defense guns.
General Amaro, when shown this plan, urged a reduction in the number of personnel and insisted that the training center must be under Brazilian command. Since he also indicated rather clearly that he wanted a more definite commitment on arms supply before urging his government to accept any training center proposal, nothing further came of the project.  

Before Colonel Miller returned to Rio de Janeiro, he left his impressions for War Department guidance. He insisted that the great majority of the Brazilians were "pro-American, pro-British, and anti-Axis." Nevertheless, they were highly nationalistic, jealous of their sovereignty, and opposed to any measure that could be interpreted as an infringement on Brazilian sovereignty. The Brazilians wanted to participate in hemisphere defense measures, not merely to acquiesce in them. The United States ought therefore to furnish Brazil with what arms it could, and it ought also to assist rather than hinder the development of a Brazilian armaments industry. While the United States, with Brazilian approval, might properly help prepare air and naval bases in Northeast Brazil, this should be done "with the understanding that such bases are Brazilian and will be defended by Brazilian forces until such time as the Brazilian Government requests their defense by our forces." Colonel Miller cautioned against any attempt by the United States to lease bases in Brazil or to place American armed forces in Brazilian bases before "the realization by the Brazilians that an armed attack against them is imminent." All of this was sound advice, but it did not solve the problem that worried the United States Army most-how to insure that Brazil would call on the United States for armed assistance in time to ward off an actual attack. The presence of only token American forces in Northeast Brazil would probably discourage any Axis attack, whereas to evict even a token Axis force would be a large undertaking.

Military negotiations with Brazil were at a virtual standstill for three months after the January and February conferences. General Amato remained in charge of Brazilian military purchasing activities in Washington, but after February defense negotiations were conducted through Ambassador Caffery.
and Colonel Miller in Rio de Janeiro. Internal differences of opinion among Brazilian civilian and military officials seem to have been primarily responsible for the failure of Brazil to take immediate advantage of the $12,000,000 credit for military material extended in early March.

With respect to plans and projects for joint defense operations, the Brazilian Army at the beginning of March informed Colonel Miller of a new scheme for strengthening Northeast Brazil. It proposed to station permanently three of its five existing infantry divisions in Northeast Brazil and to organize three new antiaircraft battalions to reinforce the three divisions. It asked that the United States send modern equipment for the units by September 1941 and also that the United States supply the equipment for new Brazilian infantry divisions to be recruited to guard the vital southern part of the country. The War Plans Division in Washington expressed some concern over this projected redistribution of the Brazilian Army and termed it "impracticable" to supply the quantity of equipment that Brazil wanted. In April Brazil abandoned this scheme and proposed, instead, to schedule maneuvers for three divisions plus supporting naval and air forces in Northeast Brazil during August and September. This proposal prompted the American planners to suggest that American forces be sent to participate in the maneuvers. They proposed an American force, consisting of a composite air group, antiaircraft, signal, and engineer battalions, and some medical troops, to operate during the maneuvers under Brazilian command. After Mr. Welles approved the proposal, General Marshall asked Brig. Gen. Lehman W. Miller to sound out the Brazilians.

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The Security Force Plan, June 1941

At this point, the Army's concern for the security of the Brazilian bulge flared anew. Secret Nazi negotiations with Vichy's Admiral Darlan, climaxed on 15 May by a public announcement that Darlan had reached an agreement with Hitler, created a state of genuine alarm in Washington. German occupation of Dakar seemed imminent. On the morning of 16 May the chiefs
of the War Plans and Military Intelligence Divisions, after conferring with each other, urged General Marshall to take immediate action on Brazil. With Department of State approval, the Chief of Staff sent Colonel Ridgway to Rio de Janeiro that afternoon, with the mission of securing immediate Brazilian agreement to joint staff planning in Brazil and to dispatching United States Army forces to Northeast Brazil at the earliest possible moment.59 In conferences on 20 and 22 May, with Ambassador Caffery present, Colonel Ridgway conveyed his messages and the sense of urgency behind them, but he did not get any specific answer on either point. Foreign Minister Aranha advised that only a strong personal appeal to President Vargas would be likely to secure Brazil's approval of these measures. By such an appeal, Brazilian consent was obtained on 31 May to sending an American Army joint staff planning group to Brazil, but the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador, and General Miller all advised Colonel Ridgway that President Vargas would not be likely to approve the stationing of American troops in Northeast Brazil unless President Roosevelt personally requested it. The Brazilians, Colonel Ridgway reported, were looking to Mr. Roosevelt for strong leadership—as also were the American Secretaries of War and Navy at this time.60

In the meantime, the Army and Navy planning staffs in Washington were preparing for what appeared to be an imminent threat of American involvement in the war. On 22 May the Joint Plans and Projects Section of the Army's War Plans Division proposed the American garrisoning of naval and air bases in Northeast Brazil as the most immediately practicable move to counter the German threat. On the same day, President Roosevelt gave the Army and Navy a directive to prepare for the occupation of the Azores within thirty days. As between the Azores and Northeast Brazil projects, the Army planners unanimously favored the latter. The most telling argu-

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success. In cooperation with the Brazilian Army, small American forces could hold Northeast Brazil against a strong Axis attack—and an Axis force from Africa could not bypass the Brazilian bulge and attack any other South American position. With the Brazilian flank secure, the United States could prepare the great bulk of its forces for operations that might have to be undertaken in the decisive European theater.\textsuperscript{61}

After Colonel Ridgway's return to Washington, General Marshall directed him to draft a memorandum for Under Secretary of State Welles recommending immediate action to get troops into Brazil. On his own initiative Colonel Ridgway broadened the scope of his recommendations. In order, as he put it, "to avoid the fault line of cleavage which divides Portuguese speaking from Spanish speaking Latin America," he recommended that simultaneous requests be made to Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela for permission to garrison bases within their territory, and also for unrestricted transit privileges for armed American aircraft. Other War Plans officers not only approved Colonel Ridgway's proposals but also thought them so urgent and important that they ought to go direct from the Chief of Staff or Secretary of War to the President. For this reason Colonel Ridgway's draft was converted into a joint Planning Committee paper that, after joint Board approval, would go directly to President Roosevelt. This maneuver backfired. The chief Navy planner held that the Navy had no immediate interest in the use of Colombian, Venezuelan, or Ecuadoran ports, and preferred to negotiate separately with Mexico. The Navy, furthermore, had already obtained Brazil's approval for the use of the ports of Recife and Belem by surface vessels of the Atlantic patrol force. To the Army planners it seemed, "the Navy, having secured from Brazil permission for immediate use of its northeast harbors for such preparations as it may desire, does not see the urgency of the action we propose."\textsuperscript{62} From this point onward, the Army, in planning for Brazilian operations, had to cope with Navy as well as Department of State and Brazilian objections.

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The immediate consequence was that the recommendations on Brazil jointly
approved in early June were considerably milder than those desired by the Army. Even so, they stated forthrightly:

\[ a. \] That the present military situation is such as to warrant securing immediately the consent of the Government of Brazil to the movement of United States Army and Navy security forces to Northeast Brazil.

\[ b. \] That this permission should be secured now without waiting for an actual attack by a non-American power and a request for armed aid which, under existing staff agreements, are the conditions precedent to the entrance of United States armed forces into Brazil.

\[ c. \] That permission be obtained concurrently for the transit of United States military armed aircraft across the territory and territorial waters of Colombia and Venezuela; and for the use of their airports, sea ports, and other facilities as may be necessary incident to such movement.

The Joint Board approved the recommendations on 7 June and formally transmitted them to the President six, days later. A copy of the recommendations also went to Mr. Welles, who gave them his qualified approval at the Standing Liaison Committee meeting on 10 June. He thought Army troops could be introduced into Brazil "on a basis of participation in maneuvers." On 17 June General Marshall informed the Under Secretary that the Army wished to send a balanced force consisting of "aviation, antiaircraft artillery, infantry, field artillery, and service elements totaling approximately 9,300 troops and 43 planes," and that the Army and Navy were prepared to move this force on twenty days' notice.

The War Plans Division in the meantime had continued to urge a movement of Army troops to Brazil as the one above all others under consideration that would place an "effective bar to Axis penetration without (risking Army) involvement in major operations," that would provide the Latin Americans with an absolute assurance that the United States intended to implement real hemisphere defense, and that would also "serve as definite support to friendly South American governments now faced with very dangerous Axis political and subversive activities." On the morning of 19 June three days before the German attack on the Soviet Union-Secretary Stimson drafted a letter to the President stating, "recent news from North Africa makes it very clear that we must act immediately to save the situation in
Brazil." When Mr. Stimson talked with General Marshall about the matter, they decided it ought to be presented to the President in person at once. They did so the same morning, and President Roosevelt promised he would direct the Department of State to find ways and means of getting American troops into Brazil in the very near future. The President said that he thought the best way would be to get Brazil to offer the United States a limited lease on an Army air base site in the Natal region, and he proposed to talk with Mr. Welles along this line. Since General Marshall knew that the Department of State was as strongly opposed as the Latin Americans themselves were to the lease by the United States of military bases in other American nations, he had good reason for doubting the results of the President's directive to the Department of State.

The German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June unquestionably had much to do with postponing the movement of American troops to Brazil. Nevertheless, though this attack ended the immediate threat of German penetration into West Africa, the Army still wanted to put a security force on the Brazilian bulge as soon as possible. Secretary Stimson considered that the new strategic situation provided the United States with a golden opportunity for securing "the protection of one hemisphere in the South Atlantic" as well as for strengthening the Anglo-American position in the North Atlantic. In early July Mr. Stimson wanted the President to announce the impending movement of Army troops to Brazil along with his public disclosure of the arrival of American forces in Iceland. General Gerow hoped to get the Army excused from participation in the Iceland occupation and to earmark the troops being prepared for that purpose as expeditionary forces for Brazil and other southern Atlantic danger points. General Miller in Rio was instructed "to take every practicable measure to obtain the desired consent of the Brazilian Government" to the movement of the 9,300-man security force to the Natal area, ostensibly for participation in the Brazilian Army maneuvers scheduled for August and September 1941. Before this instruction reached him, General Miller reported that the Brazilian Chief of Staff had expressed an opinion that some sort of American
participation in the maneuvers might be arranged, but he also stated that Foreign Minister Aranha and Ambassador Caffery were opposed to the idea. This report led General Marshall once again to urge Mr. Welles to renewed efforts to attain the Army's objective, "upon which," the Chief of Staff noted, "you, Admiral Stark and I are all agreed, and which has the President's approval." The Under Secretary responded that President Roosevelt had addressed a personal and confidential message to President Vargas, that a reply to it was anticipated in the near future, and therefore that he thought it undesirable to take any new step to secure Brazilian consent to American participation in the maneuvers. Actually, the plan for immediately putting troops into Brazil had already been sidetracked, presumably because the changed strategic outlook had, from the nonmilitary point of view, reduced its urgency.

The scheme suggested in April of having a United States Army force participate in Brazilian maneuvers had contemplated sending auxiliary troops only, not infantry; the June plan, in contrast, proposed a balanced composite force built around an infantry regiment. Though Brazilian Army leaders had been cautiously receptive (though not enthusiastic) toward the first idea, they wanted no part of the second. After receiving General Marshall's memorandum of 17 June on the subject, Under Secretary Welles promptly informed Ambassador Caffery of the new security force proposal. When the Ambassador mentioned it informally to Foreign Minister Aranha, the latter "literally threw up his hands in consternation." Because of this reaction Mr. Caffery instructed General Miller not to engage in any discussion of the project with Brazilian military authorities, and General Miller himself characterized the June plan as "a wolf in sheep's clothing which seemed very dangerous and capable of producing a very unfavorable reaction in Brazil." In a subsequent conversation with Ambassador Caffery, Mr. Aranha echoed the sentiment of Chief of Staff Goes Monteiro that under existing circumstances no Brazilian government could survive the approval of a proposition such as that advanced by the United States Army in June. The
Brazilians avoided a direct refusal by abandoning their planned maneuvers.\textsuperscript{74}

President Roosevelt never did issue a clear directive to the Department of State to find ways and means of getting Army troops into Brazil, either during June or at any time before 7 December 1941. The personal message that Mr. Roosevelt finally sent to President Vargas on 10 July did not even mention the possible movement of Army troops to Brazil. Instead, it embodied Ambassador Caffery's suggestion that Brazil be asked to agree to the use of token Brazilian forces to help guard Dutch Guiana and the Azores, and President Vargas gave his consent to this proposal.\textsuperscript{75} But this approach, designed to lead to an exchange of Brazilian and American defense forces, accomplished nothing. A subsequent proposal to put a contingent of Brazilian troops into Puerto Rico likewise came to naught, since for technical reasons neither the Brazilian nor the American Army regarded it with any enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{76} In effect, then, the Army failed to persuade President Roosevelt to make the strong personal appeal to President Vargas that the situation had seemed to warrant from the military point of view.

As soon as it began to appear that the security force plan was being stalemated, Colonel Ridgway suggested a new scheme: first, the Navy would obtain Brazilian permission to base patrol planes at Natal; then, with Brazil's consent, the Navy would request the assistance of Army long-range reconnaissance planes of the B-17 type; upon the arrival of the B-17's, the Navy would provide a Marine Corps detachment to guard the Army planes; and, finally (again, with Brazilian consent), Army security detachments would replace the Marine Corps guards. The Navy promptly approved the plan, and until 1942 supported it as the best way to get Army troops into Brazil.\textsuperscript{77} For nearly two months after this exchange, the Army held its own troop movement plan in abeyance, awaiting the outcome of Department of State and Navy negotiations.

\textit{Joint Staff and General Headquarters Planning}
The Army had better success in getting action on the other major objective of Colonel Ridgway's hurried mission to Brazil in May 1941—the joint staff planning project for combined Brazilian-American ground and air operations that might have to be undertaken in Northeast Brazil. The Brazilian Chief of Staff had suggested such planning in October 1940, and on 31 May 1941 he tentatively agreed that it should begin in Brazil in the immediate future, though he requested a formal written proposal to govern its scope and conduct. The War Plans Division drafted and secured the Department of State's approval of the proposal before 11 June, but it was delayed in transmission and did not reach the Brazilian capital until the last day of the month. In slightly revised form, the draft became the Brazilian-American Joint Planning Agreement, signed on 24 July 1941. This agreement was based on the existing joint Staff Agreement of 29 October 1940. It provided for a joint planning group of six Brazilian and five United States staff officers that was to survey the military requirements of Northeast Brazil and plan the contribution each nation should make to the defense of the area. The group's planning was to be subject to certain limitations, among them the following:

(1) In case of a positive threat against any part of Brazilian territory, and when she considers it appropriate, Brazil will be able to request the assistance of forces of the United States, at the points and for the time determined in advance by Brazil.

(2) The air and naval bases in the territory of Brazil will be commanded and maintained by Brazilian forces and only on request of its government may they be occupied also by United States forces, as an element of reinforcement.

The United States Army hoped that an early Brazilian request for assistance from American forces would come out of the joint planning work.

The Army selected an Infantry officer, Col. Dennis E. McCunniff, to head
the United States section of the joint Planning Group, and gave Colonel McCunniff and his colleagues a dual mission. They were to participate with Brazilian officers in joint planning, and independently they were to "engage in planning for the execution of so much of Rainbow No. 4 as applies to the Northeast Brazil Theater."  

The Army's RAINBOW 4 theater plan, drafted the preceding summer, provided for the movement, if necessary, of more than sixty thousand United States troops to the Brazilian bulge. The United States planners before their departure spent three days at General Headquarters in early July studying the plan and other data on Brazil.  

In effect, the United States Army in the summer of 1941 was planning alternative courses of action in Brazil. If the war outlook in the Atlantic remained relatively favorable, the Army wanted to put a 9,300-man security force into Northeast Brazil as a reinforcement for Brazilian forces; if the situation worsened,

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either because of the collapse of Great Britain or in the event of a German occupation of West Africa, the Army planners considered that it would be necessary to send a much larger American force to Brazil.

Before the arrival of the United States members of the joint Planning Group in Rio on 16 July, Ambassador Caffery had been rather strongly critical of the delay in getting joint planning under way, and particularly of the formal way in which the Americans had approached it. Since early May the Ambassador had also been protesting the failure of the United States Army to live up to its "commitments" to supply the Brazilians with arms. General Marshall told Mr. Welles that Mr. Caffery's "misapprehensions" ought to be corrected "for the common good."  

On the other hand, neither Mr. Caffery nor the Department of State appears to have been informed about the RAINBOW 4 aspects of the Army's Brazil plans. Though not exactly working at cross purposes, the War and State Departments were certainly not working in close coordination between June and December 1941 in furthering the Army's plans for operations in Brazil.

After preliminary conferences in the Brazilian capital, eight of the eleven
members of the joint Planning Group participated in a month's reconnaissance of the Brazilian bulge and the island of Fernando de Noronha. The United States members then prepared a Northeast Brazil defense plan, which proposed Natal and Recife at the eastern tip of the bulge and Belem at the mouth of the Amazon as the sites for major air bases and supply installations. The Brazilians accepted this plan in principle, though they contended that Brazil could furnish all the ground troops necessary to implement it. There was full agreement on the need for additional air base and communications facilities, and the Brazilians proposed that a permanent United States-Brazilian Army board be established at once "to study and prescribe the construction recommended and material required to implement the proposed plan." With this much accomplished, the United States members departed for home on 5 October. 83

During the period of joint planning the Brazilians allowed United States Army officers to make a separate medical survey of Northeast Brazil, but they would not let United States Army planes map the area, though they promised to do so themselves and make the results available to the United States. 84 While the Brazilian Army was perfectly willing to share its information freely with the United States Army and to let American officers in civilian clothes reconnoiter Brazilian territory, the Brazilians were still opposed to any overt United States Army activity. 85

Although this attempt at joint planning was a failure as a device for getting United States Army forces into Brazil in 1941, it provided much valuable information for the correction and elaboration of earlier United States Army war plans, it prepared the way for the military improvement of Brazilian air bases undertaken in the spring of 1942, and it induced the Brazilian Army to take a definite stand in respect to the movement of American forces to Brazil. By October 1941 it was clear that the Brazilians were prepared to accept virtually unlimited naval assistance from the United States, and to accept air assistance if a serious external threat loomed before the end of
1942. They were not prepared to allow United States Army ground combat forces in Brazil, either in 1941 or later. Instead, they insisted that if United States equipment were forthcoming they could supply adequate ground defense forces, and in fact they were already rapidly increasing their own ground garrisons in northern and eastern Brazil. In view of the inability of the United States to equip these forces, the American members of the joint Planning Group still doubted that Brazilian ground troops would be able to protect the vital air installations in Northeast Brazil against an attack by a major power. They noted that the current staff agreement did not provide any assurance that Brazil would ask for American assistance in time, should a real emergency arise, and they adopted the Army's consistent view that the situation called for the presence of United States ground and air forces in advance of any such emergency. Therefore, they recommended the negotiation of a new Brazilian-American military agreement that would provide for the lease of land and sea bases at nine locations in Northeast Brazil. They also recommended the further improvement of eight airfields for military use and the preparation of detailed plans for the occupation of these bases by United States forces. 

The War Plans Division in Washington believed that there was no possibility of obtaining United States Government approval—let alone Brazilian assent—to the first recommendation made by the joint planners, but the Army could get to work on the other two. The Army Air Forces proceeded to draft new plans for airfield improvement. General Headquarters was given the task of drawing up a detailed operations plan, with the assistance of Colonel McCunniff and the other joint planners, who were temporarily assigned to General Headquarters to work on it. 

The original Northeast Brazil theater plan shown to Colonel McCunniff and his colleagues in early July 1941 had been drafted in 1940. Revised operations plans for Brazil, begun in the War Plans Division in July 1941 and in General Headquarters a month later, were based not on RAINBOW 4 but on RAINBOW 5, the basic apprehension being the seeming imminence
of a German move toward the South Atlantic rather than the collapse of Great Britain. Between 10 October and early December, General Headquarters virtually completed a new and much more detailed operations plan for Northeast Brazil, also based on RAINBOW 5. It called for a total deployment to Brazil of more than 64,000 ground and air troops, including two divisions. These forces were to be concentrated, as recommended by the joint planners, in the vicinities of Natal, Recife, and Belem. This was the plan the Army wanted to follow in part after the outbreak of war.  

Colonel McCunniff's report on the joint planning effort in Brazil noted, "it was apparent from the first meeting that the major objective in so far as the Brazilian group was concerned was to secure arms and equipment from the United States." The United States Army sincerely wanted to supply arms to Brazil, but, as earlier, it could not see how an adequate supply of arms could be arranged in time to enable the Brazilians to assume the ground and air defense of Northeast Brazil. The basic arms supply program for Latin America that the War and Navy Departments had approved in March 1941 allocated munitions valued at $100,000,000 to Brazil, four fifths of which was to be used for ground and air equipment, but most of these munitions were not to be delivered until after 1 July 1942. In April 1941 the Army planned the eventual delivery of 230 military aircraft to Brazil, and in the same month President Roosevelt extended the coverage of the Lend-

Munitions for Brazil in 1941

Pending conclusion of a lend-lease agreement with Brazil and at the Army's insistence, the United States had, as already noted, made a $12,000,000 credit available to the Brazilians for military purchases. Brazil never used this credit, the Brazilian Minister of Finance preferring to wait until his country could take advantage of the more liberal terms embodied in the lend-lease agreement signed on 1 October 1941. The agreement, following exactly the terms of the March 1941 program, promised the delivery of $16,000,000
worth of Army and Navy material to Brazil by September 1942, and the remainder ($84,000,000 worth) sometime thereafter. By the end of November, Brazil had submitted lend-lease requisitions calling for an expenditure of $35,000,000 for ground equipment, or nearly one half of the $74,000,000 then allocated for the Brazilian Army. In contrast with this extensive planning, the actual deliveries of modern military equipment to Brazil before Pearl Harbor consisted of only a few searchlights and a token shipment of automotive equipment and light tanks.

When the United States Army suddenly decided in May 1941 that, if possible, it ought to put some American troops into Brazil at once, it had also arranged to divert from its own forces to those of Brazil a million-dollar token shipment of 167 trucks, 10 scout cars, and 10 light tanks, together with a small quantity of ammunition for the guns on the scout cars and tanks. Brazil wanted this material for its newly established Armored Force only it wanted 90 light and medium tanks immediately instead of the 10 light tanks offered. The Army planned to get the proffered material aboard ship by the end of July so that some of it could appear in the Brazilian Independence Day parade on 7 September. After some delay, Brazil accepted most of the material and paid for it in cash. It reached Brazil in time to appear in the parade, and, according to General Miller, its appearance "produced a very favorable reaction in Brazilian Army circles." This token shipment nevertheless represented only a small fraction of what the Brazilian Army currently believed it needed, and, as Foreign Minister Aranha pointed out to Ambassador Caffery, it was not suitable equipment for defending the Natal region.

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Efforts of the United States during 1941 to provide some modern military aircraft for Brazil did more harm than good. Though the Brazilians had about two hundred military planes, they had very few tactical aircraft, and no modern ones. In the midst of the May crisis, General Marshall announced in a Standing Liaison Committee meeting that the Army was then trying to obtain the immediate release of twenty modern light bombers (A-20's) to Brazil from British allocations-British representatives in Washington having
intimated that this could be done. General Arnold thereupon personally informed General Miller at Rio that twelve of the planes could probably be released to the Brazilians immediately, if they wanted them. The Brazilians wanted them very much, even though they had no pilots qualified to fly A-20's. When British authorities in London refused to release the planes to Brazil, the reaction in Rio de Janeiro was most unfavorable. General Miller urged that some substitute offer be made at once. As substitutes, he suggested transport planes for the air-mail service operated by the Brazilian Air Force and assignment to the United States Air Mission of a few B-18's medium bombers of a slow and obsolete type—that would permit a transitional type of training for Brazilian pilots to prepare them to operate more modern aircraft.

Between August 1941 and January 1942 the United States Army worked out a solution to the problem of providing military planes to Brazil. No modern combat aircraft were to be made available to Brazil before the autumn of 1942, but it did not appear that Brazil could train pilots to fly them before then in any event. What the Brazilian Air Force needed was modern training equipment—primary trainers first and basic trainers thereafter—to qualify its pilots for the operation of high-speed aircraft. In the fall of 1941 the Brazilians planned a pilot training program to begin in February 1942. To provide airplanes for the program, the United States agreed to release sixty primary trainers to Brazil, fifteen of them in November 1941 and the balance in monthly increments, and fifty basic trainers at a rate of ten a month from February through June 1942. The United States also planned to furnish the Brazilian Air Force with some transport planes during 1942. As an interim measure, General Miller proposed and the Army Air Forces in October 1941 approved the assignment to the United States Air Mission before the end of 1941 of a few B-18's and P-36's for use in instructing Brazilian Air Force pilots. Despite all this planning, the only United States military aircraft made available for Brazilian use before Pearl Harbor were the three primary trainers previously assigned to the Air Mission for instructional purposes.
If the United States had been able to supply the Brazilian Army and Air Force with a substantial amount of modern combat material in 1941, the Brazilians might have been willing to receive small United States Army forces in Northeast Brazil to help guard its vital airfields and to service the military air traffic that in June 1941 began to flow from the United States to Africa via Brazil. This the United States could not do, as pointed out by General Marshall on 24 October in a letter to Mr. Welles:

We do not have and for a considerable period of time we will not have, munitions to supply to Brazil of the type Brazil desires. The latter types are being and will continue to be supplied in proportion as our acute shortages are relieved, and on a priority higher than that accorded to any other Government not actually engaged in fighting the Axis. The requirements of our own forces, of the British, and of other Governments actually engaged in resisting aggression, take precedence over the needs of Brazil. These decisions have been reached by superior agencies of our Government in the light of our own national interests and the world situation. The War Department contemplates no change. 98

Under these circumstances, about all the United States Army had been able to do before Pearl Harbor was to prepare the way for supplying arms to Brazil in quantity by late 1942 and 1943.

The Army's Quest for Action

Brazil's failure to obtain any appreciable quantity of American munitions in 1941, and Brazilian opposition to the entry of United States Army forces into the Natal area, should not obscure the many ways in which the United States and Brazil did cooperate in hemisphere defense measures before Pearl Harbor. First and foremost, Brazil had approved the construction of eight military air bases, financed by the United States Government, in the Northeast. 99 Then, beginning in June 1941, it permitted transport planes to be ferried via Brazil to the British forces in Africa and the Middle East. Five months later, the Army Air Forces' Ferrying Command inaugurated its own South Atlantic air transport service by way of Brazil to Cairo. 100 In the autumn of 1941, as Ambassador Caffery subsequently observed, Brazil freely permitted United States noncombat aircraft to visit Brazil, to fly over Brazilian territory, and to use Brazilian airfields while in transit to Africa and
elsewhere. Beginning in June 1941 also, surface vessels of the Navy's South Atlantic patrol force began to use the ports of Recife and Bahia as operating bases. During the summer and autumn of 1941, as noted above, Brazil reversed its traditional military policy of keeping almost all of its armed forces in the south and began to build up garrisons in the Northeast to protect the vital air and naval installations taking shape there. Positive actions of a nonmilitary character included the suppression of German, Italian, and Japanese language newspapers and control of exports to insure that strategic materials went to the United States instead of to the Axis Powers. The Army's Brazilian experts appreciated the extent of Brazil's cooperation and recognized that Brazilian military as well as civilian sentiment was overwhelmingly pro-United States and anti-Axis, but they also believed that Northeast Brazil needed much stronger military protection than it had in the autumn of 1941.

The Army planners in Washington wished that the military negotiations with Brazil could be put on a higher plane than a mere bargaining for concessions. They wanted the United States Government "to demonstrate that the measures of cooperation asked of Brazil [were] not to be regarded as concessions made to us but rather as contributions to hemisphere defense, and . . . to convince the Brazilian people of the existence of an actual menace to their future independence and of the necessity of their making frequent contributions to hemisphere defense." The difficulty was that the Brazilians simply did not appreciate the design of the hemisphere defense measures that the United States wanted to execute, nor the reasons for it. The Brazilian members of the joint Planning Group frankly told the United States members that the defense of Northeast Brazil appeared to be much more vital to the United States than to Brazil. As Mr. Caffery pointed out later, many Americans in the fall of 1941 "were blind to the imminent danger with which the United States was so acutely threatened," and "failed to appreciate that the President's tenet that material assistance to the peoples and nations fighting the Axis constituted, in fact, a defense of the United States." This being the case, he continued, "it should readily be appreciated
that the Brazilians, for their part, had precious little interest in implementing aid to Britain, much less succor to Red Russia." 106

In order to persuade President Roosevelt to take a more forthright line of action toward Brazil, the Army planners in late August 1941 drafted a strong letter to be sent by Secretary of War Stimson to Secretary of State Hull. After reciting in some detail the Army's fruitless efforts to get its forces into Brazil, this letter concluded:

The time has arrived when this Government in the most formal manner should bring to the attention of the Brazilian Government the high importance to Brazil, to the United States, and to this entire Hemisphere, of preventing any Axis infiltration into or control of the northeast portion of Brazil and to insist that Brazil comply with the request of this Government for the entry of our security forces into her strategic northeast for the period of the emergency, a request that we deem imperative to make in the interests of our joint safety.

I judge this matter to be among the most important questions of foreign policy now confronting this nation, and as such, one which you, Secretary Knox and I should present jointly to the President as soon as his convenience will permit. 107

Mr. Stimson signed this letter on 30 August and directed that a copy be sent to Secretary of the Navy Knox so that the War and Navy Departments would be in agreement before the matter was presented to Mr. Hull and then to the President. On 31 August General Gerow, the Chief of the War Plans Division, flew to Hyde Park where he discussed the Brazilian situation with President Roosevelt. Three days later Mr. Knox assured the War Department that he would give it "every possible assistance in this matter." 108

The Chief of Naval Operations reacted very differently to the War Department's proposal when General Marshall consulted him about it. Admiral Stark observed that the proposed action might hamper the Navy's current effort to expand its Brazilian operations to include the operation of patrol planes based on Brazilian ports. As an alternative, Admiral Stark
proposed that, as soon as Brazil agreed to the operation of Navy patrol planes, the Navy would ask for the protection of these same ports by Army pursuit planes, and after that for the privilege of putting Marine Corps detachments in to protect these planes, a proposal very similar to the one discussed by the Army and Navy planners during July. Admiral Stark also suggested that the

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Army use the good offices of Rear Adm. A. T. Beauregard, naval attaché at Rio, to advance its plans. Over the objections of the Army planners, General Marshall and Secretary Stimson decided that they ought not to go ahead with the Army's Brazil proposal without Admiral Stark's concurrence. The Chief of Staff sent Admiral Stark a copy of the proposed Secretary of War Secretary of State letter for transmission to Admiral Beauregard and suspended action on the original.

Not only was the Navy somewhat less than enthusiastic over the Army's security force plan for Brazil but also it apparently feared that the execution of the Army's plan might interfere with the Navy's own plans for South Atlantic operations. There certainly was little coordination between the Army and the Navy in connection with planning for Brazil in the fall of 1941. When General Headquarters set to work in October on a detailed operations plan for Brazil, it had no information on current Navy plans for the area, nor did the naval liaison officer assigned to General Headquarters know anything about them. In the outline of information presently obtained by General Headquarters, the Navy indicated that in the event of a German move into Africa a major United States naval base would have to be established at Natal or at Maceio. At the end of October the Navy Department insisted that Natal must become "a Naval Base and Naval Command." Admiral Beauregard in his discussions with Ambassador Caffery seems to have accepted the latter's opinion "that if any necessity exists for our Army moving in anywhere in Brazil or any garrisons established, it can only be done by diplomatic means and not between the Armies as the Brazilian Army is dead set against our coming in." At the end of November Admiral Stark again asked "that the Army postpone further
requests to base troops or planes in Brazil until the Navy is fully established there." 114

In the meantime, the Army planners viewed the Brazilian situation with growing concern. The War Plans Division estimate of 19 September, compiled in connection with the Victory Program planning, of what the Army could do with its existing means to meet the Axis challenge, put the Brazil operation first and stated that if Germany moved into West Africa and its adjacent islands, United States Army forces would have to be sent to the Natal area.115 The October War Department Strategic Estimate accorded the same top priority to a Brazilian operation in its listing of the eleven most "profitable lines of action" then open to the United States.116 The Victory Program estimate itself called for a task force of 86,646 United States ground troops for Brazil.117 Colonel Ridgway summarized the Army planners' point of view when he stated:

Brazil is the most vital point in our outpost system for our future security against the long range plans for aggression of the Axis. By acceding to the Brazilian Government argument that there is no immediate threat to Brazil, we overlook the rapidity with which our military situation can deteriorate. The sudden collapse of Russia, the eviction of Britain from the Middle East, the eruption of Axis forces down the northwest African coast and the possible concurrent reversal of Latin American opinion from pro-Ally to pro-Axis (hastened by the impact of German subversive efforts on the South American continent) might prove that we had cut our time factor too fine. The objective of the War and Navy Departments therefore continues to be the placing of adequate United States security forces in northeast Brazil at the earliest practicable date. The obstacle of Brazilian sensitiveness to this relinquishment of sovereignty is well understood, but efforts must be intensified to surmount it.118

On 10 November General Gerow advised the Chief of Staff: "I believe the need for placing our armed security forces in Brazil is greater now than it was last summer." He and General Arnold of the Air Forces therefore recommended the dispatch of the long-suspended letter to Mr. Hull.119
General Marshall had already sent a modified version of the letter to Mr. Welles, and he still preferred to let the Navy continue to take the lead in Brazil. When the Chief of Staff learned on 12 November that Brazil had agreed to open its ports to Navy patrol planes, he told Mr. Welles that it was very important to get a few Army planes, guarded by Marine detachments, to Natal and Maceio as quickly as possible. Once they were there, their number could be gradually increased. Mr. Welles thought that United States armed guards "could be gotten in there in some guise, possibly as technical assistants"-a scheme that was to be put into practice a few weeks later after the United States went to war.

General Marshall had good reason to act on the Brazil problem with more caution than his planners counseled during the fall of 1941. The Army's own representative at Rio, General Miller, believed that the Navy approach was the best. He urged that "the occupation of Brazilian territory by United States armed forces . . . be delayed as much as the military situation will permit and until the people of Brazil have been awakened to the danger confronting them." General Marshall must also have been impressed by President Roosevelt's reluctance to give any firm backing to the Army's security force plan for Brazil. Early in November the Chief of Staff learned both from the War Plans Division in Washington and from General Miller in Rio that the President had never formally requested that Brazil allow United States Army forces to enter its territory. Ambassador Caffery pointedly told General Miller that "the President is not supporting the Army's stand in this matter."

Both the President and the Chief of Staff knew that President Vargas and Foreign Minister Aranha had been trying since August to mold Brazilian opinion in favor of more open collaboration with the United States. The Brazilian Government in working toward this end had to take into account the determined opposition of Brazilian Army leaders to the entry of American ground forces. It also had to recognize the ease with which pro-Nazi elements could fan popular sentiment against any American move that
could be interpreted as imperialistic or an infringement on Brazilian sovereignty. Therefore, the Brazilian President and his Foreign Minister had to move slowly, but by early November they were openly announcing their intention of supporting the United States should it be drawn into the war. Ambassador Caffery was told that Brazil would immediately ask for United States Army assistance if German forces moved into Portugal or northwestern Africa.125

The outlook for closer Brazilian-American cooperation and for the achievement of the United States Army's objectives in Brazil momentarily worsened during November, partly because pro-Nazi elements became bolder as the German armies approached Moscow, partly because General Miller, through no fault of his own, had become persona non grata to the Brazilian Chief of

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Staff. President Vargas was sufficiently worried to request that the United States Navy postpone its plan for operating patrol planes from Brazilian ports.126 On 27 November Brazil finally granted a clearance for operation of the planes, and on 11 December the first naval patrol squadron reached Brazilian ports.127 The operation that General Marshall in Washington and General Miller in Rio had looked upon as the opening wedge for gaining Brazilian consent to the entry of United States Army air and ground forces thus began after the United States was fully in the war, and under circumstances that gave the Brazilian bulge a new and unforeseen significance.

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Endnotes
Endnotes for Chapter XI

1 Incl 3 to Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 Feb 39, par. e, Strategic Factors, WPD 4115-3. The term "Northeast Brazil," as used in this volume, refers to the Brazilian coastal area between Recife and the Guiana border.

2 Lawrence F. Hill, ed., Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), contains a good brief description of Brazil and Brazilian-American relations.

3 This analysis of Brazil's military position is based principally on: G-2 Memo, 16 Jan 39, title: Notes on Coast Artillery Defs of the Coast of Brazil; and Memo, G-2 for WPD, 25 Jan 39, sub: Def Policy of Brazil. Both in WPD 4115-3. Also AWC report, 29 Mar 39, sub: Special Study, Brazil, copy in WPD 4115-7.

4 AWC report, 29 Mar 39, p. 47.


7 Memos of Convs held in Rio, 12, 14, and 15 Jun 39, WPD 4224-7, WPD 4224-9, WPD 4224-10; Ltr, Gen Goes Monteiro to Gen Marshall, 8 Aug 39, WPD 4224-13.


9 Ibid.

10 Telg, Under Secy State Welles to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, 31 Aug 39; Telg, Caffery to Welles, 1 Sep 39; Ltr, Welles to President Roosevelt, 6
Sep 39. All in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Telg, Caffery to Dept of State, 4 Sep 39; Ltr, Wells to Gen Marshall, 5 Sep 39. Last two in WPD 4224-17:


12 Papers in WPD 4224-45. See also Ch. IX, above.


14 Memos for Record, Col Kimberly, 18 and 22 Nov 38, WPD 4224-67; Notes on SLC mtg, 6 Nov 39, SLC Min, Vol. I, item 41.


16 Because of the extended delay in carrying out this sale, the Army records on it are particularly voluminous. For terms, see Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 22 Apr 40, and pen annotations on WPD copy, WPD 4244. There is a full summary of the negotiations down to October 1940 in the report of Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller to Ambassador Caffery, dated 10 October 1940, WPD 4224-104. Thereafter, see: Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Feb 41, WPD 4224-124; Memo for Record, Col Brett, 16 Jun 41, WPD 4224-160; and Min, first mtg of WD Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground), 12 Feb 42, OCS 21210-32.

17 This paragraph and the preceding one are based principally on: Notes on SLC mtg, 23 Nov 40; Memo, CofS for SW, 26 Nov 40. Both in SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 65. Memo, E. A. R. for SW, 29 Nov 40, stating the British position, SW file, Brazil-Brazilian Vessel; Ltr, Gen Goes Monteiro to Gen Marshall, 30 Nov 40; Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Goes Monteiro, 14 Dec 40; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 15 Jan 41. Last three in AG 386.3 Brazil (11-30-40). Ltr, Under Secy State to CofS, 10 Jun 41; Ltr, CofS to SW and Under Secy State, 11 Jun 41. Last two in AG 380 (1-13-41). Memo, Col Brett for Col Ridgway, 27 Nov 41, WPD 4224-200.
18 On the general problem of Latin American arms supply in 1940 and 1941, see Chapter IX, above.

19 JB 325, ser 642-1. See Ch. I, above.


21 See Ch. I, above.

22 Memo, President Roosevelt for CNO, 30 Apr 40, copy in WPD 4224-86, printed in *FDR Personal Letters*, II, 1016.

23 Memo, CofS and CNO for Mr. Welles, 7 May 40, WPD 4224-116.


25 See Ch. II, above.

26 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 40; Memo, WPD for Dept of State, 27 May 40. Both in WPD 4115-17.

27 *Hull, Memoirs*, I 820-21; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 611-14; Ltr, Adm Pickens to Adm Stark, Rio de Janeiro, 26 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


29 The Army WPD view is indicated (among other places) in Memo of Conv with Mexican military representatives, 19 Jul 40, WPD 4338; the Navy WPD view in Memo for CNO, 11 Jul 40, copy in WPD 4115-29.


31 See Ch. X, above.
32 Memo, CofS for SW, 1 Jun 40, WPD 4115-16; Ltr, Col Miller to Gen Marshall, 17 Jun 40, WPD 4224-102; Memo, Col Miller for Ambassador Caffery, 17 Jun 40, WPD 4224-101; Memo and Incls, WPD for CofS, 16 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10.


34 Incl 3 to Memo, WPD for CofS, 16 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10.

35 Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10. See Ch. IX, above.


37 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 27 Jul 40; Memo for File, Actg ACofS WPD, G Nov 40. Both in WPD 4224-104. The latter memorandum records a conversation with Ambassador Caffery, then in Washington, during which the War Plans chief stated that General Marshall's July memorandum had not promised the early delivery of any combat equipment and also that the 'major part' of the arms that the United States planned to provide for Brazil could not become available until late 1942 or 1943.

38 Memo, WPD for CofS, 16 Jul 40, WPD 4244-10.


40 Memo, Gen Goes Monteiro for Col Miller, 21 Sep 40; Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Strong, WPD, 9 Oct 40. Both in WPD 4224-101.

41 A copy of this agreement in its final form is in WPD 4115-44. The Brazilian Army approved it by Ltr, Gen Goes Monteiro to Gen Miller, 7 Apr 41, cited in WPD 4115-44; the United States Army, by Ltr, SW to Secy State, 26 Apr 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

42 Memo, Col Ridgway for ACofS WPD, 30 Oct 40; Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 30 Oct 40. Both in WPD 4224-101. Summary of Staff Conv with Amer Reps, Aug-Oct 40, Sec. 4, WPD 4115-44; remarks of Gen Marshall at
SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 42.

43 Ltr, Actg SN to Secy State, 14 Nov 40, OPD Misc 61.

44 Ltr, Gen Goes Monteiro to Gen Marshall, 30 Nov 40, and other papers, AG 386.3 Brazil (11-30-40).

45 Memo, Gen Goes Monteiro for Col Miller, 21 Sep 40 WPD 4224-101; Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Nov 40, and other papers in WPD 4224-104; Ltr, Gen Dutra to Gen Marshall, 20 Nov 40, and other papers, AG 335.11 Brazil (11-18-40).


48 Memo for Record, Col Ridgway, 10 Jan 41, WPD 4113-30; Memo, Col Ridgway for Brig Gen Lehman W. Miller, 5 May 41, WPD 4224-143.

49 Memos, CofS for Under Secy State, 25 Jan and 7 Feb 41, AG 380 (5-18-40); Sec. 2; Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Mar 41, WPD 4224-131; Notes on SLC mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 13. See also Ch. IX, above.

50 Memo, Col McNarney for Gen Gerow, WPD, 19 Dec 40, OPD Exec 4, Item 5.

51 Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Dec 40, WPD 4224-106. About this time, military observer Hanson Baldwin was urging the lease of a large air base site at Natal, to be "under the complete sovereignty and military control of the United States." He argued that the base was of such vital importance to hemisphere defense that the United States ought to be prepared to offer Brazil $100,000,000 for it. Baldwin, United We Stand, pp. 108, 217.

52 Notes on Conf in OCS, 3 Jan 41, OCS Conf Binder 8; Notes on SLC mtg, 3 Jan 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 1; Note for Record on Memo, SGS for
53 Memo, Col Ridgway for ACofS WPD, 29 Jan 41, WPD 4224-116.


55 Memo, Col Miller for Col Ridgway, 13 Feb 41, WPD 4224-122.

56 Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Mar 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

57 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Apr 41, WPD 4224-141; Memo, WPD for DCofS Arnold, 5 May 41, OPD Exec 13; Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Miller, 6 May 41, WPD 4224-150.

58 See Ch. V, above.


60 Notes on Cons in Rio, 20 and 22 May 41, WPD 4224-155; Draft of JB 325, set 695, -- May 41 (Ind 2 to Memo, WPD for CofS, 2 Jun 41), WPD 4516; Memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Jul 41, WPD 4516-6; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 364-76. See Ch. V, above.


62 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Jun 41, and other papers, WPD 4516. The Army had learned on 21 April that Brazil had approved the use of its harbors by the United States Navy. SLC Min, Vol. 17, Item 20.

63 JB 325, ser 695, 4 Jun 41, copy in AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2; Ltr, SW and SN to President, 13 Jun 41, and other papers, WPD 4516.
64 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 5 Jun 41, WPD 4516; Memo, WPD for CofS, 9 Jun 41, OPD 334.8 Ln Com; Notes on SLC mtg, 10 Jun 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 29.

65 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 17 Jun 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2. See also Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, pp. 518-19, 600-605, on American-Brazilian negotiations during the summer and autumn of 1941.


67 Ltr (not used), SW for President, 19 Jun 41, Stimson Diary.

68 Stimson Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Memo, Gen Marshall for WPD, 21 Jun 41, WPD 4516.

69 Memo, SW for President, 23 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


71 Gerow Diary, entry of 26 Jun 41.

72 Memo, WPD for Gen Miller, 23 Jun 41, WPD 4224-164; Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Jul 41; Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 14 Jul 41. Last two in WPD 4113-109. Ltr, Mr. Welles to Gen Marshall, 15-1 41, WPD 4516.


75 Notes on SLC mtg, 18 Aug 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 33; Incl 1 to Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Nov 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

76 Gerow Diary, entry of 31 Aug 41; Memo (not used), WPD for CofS,--Sep 41; Memo, M. B. R. [Ridgway] for Col Crawford, WPD, 20 Sep 41.
Last two in WPD 4516-20. Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow, WPD, 30 Sep 41, WPD 4516-27. A principal difficulty was the wide differential in soldier pay, an American infantry regiment at this time being paid approximately $900,000 more annually than a comparable Brazilian regiment.

77 Memo, WPD for Dir Navy WPD, 3 Jul 41, and notations thereon of 9 Jul 41, WPD 4224167; Memo, Adm Stark for Gen Marshall, 2 Sep 41, WPD 4516-20; Notes on SLC mtg, 12 Nov 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 36.

78 Memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Jul 41, WPD 4516-6; Tab A to Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Nov 41, AG380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.


80 Instructions to U.S. Army Reps-Brazil-U.S. Planning Group, 2 Jul 41, WPD 4516-7.

81 Ind 2 to Instructions cited in footnote 80, above; Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 15 Sep 41, WPD 3209-14.

82 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 21 Jul 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

83 Ltr, Col McCunniff to WPD, 15 Oct 41, WPD 4113-33. This letter is the formal report on the work of the joint Planning Group. Its activities were also reported in General Miller's Report of Status of Hemisphere Defense Projects, 8 Aug 41, WPD 4516-26, and his Memo for WPD, 14 Oct 41, sub: Military Cooperation of Brazil in Hemisphere Defense, WPD 4224-186. See Chapter XII, below, for an account of the joint United States-Brazilian Army board established in December 1941.

84 On the medical survey, see WPD 4378; on aerial mapping, see the reports of General Miller cited in footnote 83, above.

86 Ltr, Col McCunniff to WPD, 15 Oct 41, WPD 4113-33.

87 Memo, Col Ridgway, WPD, 18 Oct 41, and atchd comments of Gen Gerow and Cols Gerow and Handy, WPD 4113-33; entry of 10 Oct 41 GHQ 314.81 Diary.


89 Ltr, Col McCunniff to WPD, 15 Oct 41, WPD 4113-33.


91 Study by Col Ridgway, 11 Apr 41, OPD Misc 47. See Ch. IX, above.

92 Memo, Gen Miller for WPD, 14 Oct 41, WPD 4224-186; Memo, Gen Miller for G-2, 30 Oct 41, WPD 4516-35.

93 Memo, Col Brett for Col Ridgway, 27 Nov 41, WPD 4224-200.

94 Ltr, Gen Miller to Col Barber, WPD, 12 Sep 41, WPD 4224-176.

95 Information about the token shipment has been drawn from various papers in WPD 4224153, WPD 4244-35, WPD 4516-18, OCS 6526-36, and SLC Min, Vol. II.

96 Notes on SLC mtgs, 21 May, 10 Jun, and 1 Jul 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Items 26, 29, and 30; various papers, dated 26 May-2 Jul 41, WPD 4406-9.

97 Various papers, dated 18 Aug 41-24 Jan 42, WPD 4406-9, WPD 4406-18, WPD 440620, WPD 4406-26, WPD 4406-30, WPD 4406-33, WPD 4406-37, SLC Min, Vol. II; Memo, AAF for WPD, 4 Feb 42, JAB 6-7 (OPD
98 Ltr, CofS to Under Secy State, 24 Oct 41, WPD 4516-20.

99 See Ch. X, above.

100 Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 319-27. For further details, see manuscript history by Capt. Dulany Terrett and others, The Official History of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command (hereafter cited as Hist of So Atlantic Div, ATC), Ch. II, pp. 92ff.

101 Memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Aug 42, commenting on undated report handed by Mr. Caffery to General Marshall, OPD 336 Brazil.

102 Memo Adm Stark for Gen Marshall, 2 Sep 41, WPD 4516-20; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 377-78.

103 Memo, Gen Miller for WPD, 14 Oct 41, WPD 4224-186; Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Marshall (through Gen Gerow), 9 Oct 41, WPD 4224-188.

104 Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Marshall (through Gen Gerow), 9 Oct 41, WPD 4224-188.

105 Ltr, Col McCunniff to WPD, 15 Oct 41, WPD 4113-33.


107 Draft of Ltr, SW to Secy State, 30 Aug 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2. Actually, as noted above, the President had not requested Brazil to permit the entry of Army security forces, though it was the War Department's understanding at this time that such a request had been made in early July.

108 Notes on draft ltr cited in footnote 107, above; Gerow Diary, entry of 31 Aug 41; Memo, Aide to the SW for CofS, 3 Sep 41, WPD 4516-20.

110 Memo, Col Barber for Gen Gerow, WPD, 3 Sep 41, WPD 4516-20; Ltr, CofS to CNO, 8 Sep 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

111 Entry of 16 Oct 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Bind 1; Memo, Capt C. M. Yates, USN, for DCoFS GHQ, 21 Oct 41, GHQ 381 RAINBOW 5.

112 Memo, Capt Spears, USN, for Col Ridgway, WPD, 31 Oct 41, WPD 4516-28.

113 Ltr, Adm Beauregard to Adm Stark, 12 Nov 41, WPD 4224-186.


115 Tab D to Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Sep 41, WPD 4494-12.


117 Tab A to Estimate Army Requirements, Sep 41, WPD 4494-21.

118 Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Marshall (through Gen Gerow), 9 Oct 41, WPD 4224-188, summarizing Colonel Ridgway's remarks at a meeting with Col Donovan and members of his organization on 8 October. As suggested in the text above, it is by no means clear that this was the Navy Department's "objective" at this time.

119 Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Nov 41, WPD 4516-20. The memorandum was drafted by Colonel Bundy, Chief of WPD's Plans Group.

120 Ltr, CofS to Under Secy State, 24 Oct 41, WPD 4516-20.

121 Notes on SLC mtg, 12 Nov 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 36. See Ch. XII, below.

122 Remarks of Gen Miller at SLC mtg, 1 Oct 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 34. General Miller was then in Washington.
123 Memo, Gen Miller for WPD, 14 Oct 41, WPD 4224-186.

124 Memo, Gen Miller for G-2, 30 Oct 41, WPD 4516; Incl 1 to Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Nov 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.


126 Telg, Ambassador Caffery to Dept of State, 21 Nov 41, WPD 4516-32; Dept of State Memo, Mr. Duggan for Mr. Welles, 25 Nov 41, WPD 4406-30.

When the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into war on 7 December 1941, the introduction of security forces into Northeast Brazil seemed to the United States Army more important than ever. The object of its grave concern was not the position of the Brazilian Government toward the war, but the new air bases in northern Brazil, which were virtually undefended.

President Vargas at once pledged that Brazil would associate itself with the war effort of the United States, though he cautioned that this did not mean that Brazil had any immediate intention of declaring war on or even of breaking diplomatic relations with Japan.1 After the exchange of war declarations between the United States, Germany, and Italy on 11 December, Brazil began to curb German, Italian, and Japanese activities by such measures as freezing credits, closing Axis news agencies, and suspending the German controlled CONDOR airline. These measures did little to protect Northeast Brazil. The Brazilian ground and air forces then stationed in the Northeast were not prepared in terms of either equipment or training to deal with an attack by modern combat forces, and the United States Navy patrol forces based there were neither adequate nor suitable for defense of land air bases. To the United States Army, it appeared that only American ground and air forces could be depended upon to protect the string of vital airfields extending from the Guianas to Natal against sabotage or external attack.

The Army had planned the airfields in 1940 solely as a hemisphere defense measure. Then, as construction progressed and the fields became partially usable in the latter half of 1941, they began to serve a new purpose—they became essential links in the South Atlantic airway, over which airplanes were being ferried and high-priority materials transported to British forces in Africa and the Middle East. When Japan's attack cut the transpacific air routes and the North Atlantic route virtually closed down for the winter,
the South Atlantic route suddenly became the sole remaining airway from the United States to the fighting forces in the Old World. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the United States Army began to plan the flight of heavy bombers by way of the South Atlantic to the beleaguered American forces in the Philippines. When the United States and Great Britain got together at the ARCADIA Conference to plan their conduct of the war, guarding the South Atlantic airway was one of their most pressing concerns, the Anglo-American agreement of 31 December on grand strategy designating it as the most-important of the air routes between the hemispheres. Beyond this attention focused on the airway as a critically important ferrying and supply route, the United States Army for several months after Pearl Harbor continued to view the defenselessness of airfields in Northeast Brazil as a menace to hemisphere security that could easily be corrected by stationing United States security forces there with Brazil's consent. Without such protection it looked to the Army as if the Brazilian airfields invited a German air advance across the South Atlantic from Africa, aimed toward the Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal.

Emergency Airfield and Airway Security Measures

To meet the threat to Northeast Brazil and its vital airway the Army's War Plans Division proposed to send a reinforced infantry regiment to the Natal area at once, using for this purpose the troopships then earmarked for an Azores expedition. The first regiment was to be followed by at least the rest of a reinforced division as soon as additional sea transportation could be found. Army defensive air units were likewise to be sent to Brazil as soon as possible. While the proposal was being drafted and circulated for concurrences, General Marshall and Admiral Stark agreed that three companies of marines should be flown to Brazil, to guard the airfields at Belém, Natal, and Recife, as soon as the Brazilian Government gave its consent. Under Secretary Welles promised that a request along these lines would be presented to President Vargas personally. When the Navy's chief planner refused to concur in the plan for sending Army forces to Brazil, General Gerow, with General Marshall's approval, presented the matter to
Secretary of War Stimson for decision and action. Mr. Stimson during telephone conversations with Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles agreed to suspend the Army's plan pending Brazil's approval of the Marine operation, but only when Mr. Welles 

expressed confidence that the Brazilian Government could be prevailed upon to allow Army forces to be stationed in Brazil shortly after the arrival of the marines.  

Brazil quickly agreed to receive three fifty-man Marine companies. General Marshall then directed his war planners on his as well as Admiral Stark's behalf to go ahead and arrange the details of the operation with the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Department of State. What Brazil had consented to was to admit marines under the guise of technicians for servicing aircraft. The real purpose in sending them was to get fully equipped "fighting men" to Brazil to guard the airfields. The instructions to the company commanders—actually drafted by Colonel Ridgway of the War Plans Division—emphasized this primary mission, but they also contained an eminently proper admonition: 

It cannot be too forcefully impressed upon you and your men that you are there in the sovereign territory of Brazil under very unusual circumstances by authority of the President of Brazil, as an evidence of Brazilian determination to cooperate fully with us in Hemisphere Defense, and that you and your men are there as friendly associates of Brazilian military and naval forces, as well as civil authorities and the people themselves. 

Acting under these instructions, the 17th, 18th, and 19th Marine Provisional Companies departed from Quantico by air in the early morning hours of 15 December.  

The marines reached Trinidad two days later. There, they were briefly halted while the Army and the Department of State straightened out a new tangle. The Brazilian Government now said that it did not want the marines to land in uniform or bearing arms. President Vargas finally agreed that the marines
could land in uniform, but he asked that their arms be left crated or at least hidden out of sight. The Marine companies then proceeded to their destinations, the Belém company arriving on 19 December and the Natal and Recife companies on the following day. When the Natal and Recife contingents arrived, they discovered that the local Brazilian authorities had not been fully informed about the terms that the Brazilian President had approved, and both detachments were put on Navy ships until suitable arrangements could be made for their disposition ashore. The reception of the marines did little to reassure the Army in its concern for the security of the airfields.  

After the outbreak of war, the Army hurriedly instituted several other measures to improve the safety of the airway through Brazil. On 7 December it asked Pan American Airways to put the radio stations of its Brazilian subsidiary on a 24-hour schedule. The Army Air Forces sent its own control officers to Brazilian airports, 1st Lt. Marshall V. Jamison arriving at the key Natal base for duty on 19 December. During December the Brazilian Government approved the movement of three Army transport planes a week in each direction without special diplomatic arrangement, and this consent covered all Army air movements through Brazil until the following March.

The Army was gravely concerned about the continued operation of the radio transmitters owned by the CONDOR and LATI airlines, and about other radio stations that might broadcast unauthorized information concerning military air traffic through Brazil. At the Army's urging, the Department of State persuaded the Brazilians to issue an order on 13 December prohibiting any coded messages about aircraft movements from being sent. In practice Pan American broadcasts concerning United States military aircraft were excepted from the operation of this regulation. Since the Army believed that only the closing of the CONDOR and LATI stations would satisfy its interest, General Arnold on 19 December offered to send two B-18's and ten P-36's from the Caribbean Defense Command to Northeast Brazil for the instruction of Brazilian Air Force pilots as soon as the offending radio stations were silenced.
stations were closed down. With considerable difficulty the Army finally secured the discontinuance of broadcasts that it considered dangerous to Brazilian air operations, and the B-18's and P-36's were eventually sent to Brazil in March 1942, though on terms other than those proposed in December by the Chief of the Army Air Forces.\textsuperscript{10}

\section*{Brazil Theater Planning}

Before and during the ARCADIA Conference, Army opinion was unanimous that the principal Brazilian air bases must be defended by American combat forces just as soon as possible. In mid-December this project had a priority immediately below that of reinforcing the continental United States, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{11} The Army Air Forces was about to launch its Project X -- the planned movement of eighty heavy bombers to the Far East, initiated by orders of 19 December.\textsuperscript{12} With this movement in prospect, Secretary Stimson termed the protection of the airway "a very emergent problem," and the War Plans Division held that the "occupation of Natal by American forces in considerable strength affords the only reasonable assurance that we can maintain communications in the South Atlantic and a base from which long-range airplanes can fly to Africa and thence to the Middle East and the Far East."\textsuperscript{13} General Marshall believed that at the very minimum the Army ought to place a reinforced and specially equipped 1,200-man infantry battalion, supported by seven or eight combat airplanes, at each of the three key air bases in Brazil.\textsuperscript{14}

The United States Army thought it might have to do much more if German forces moved into Spain and Africa, and this appeared a likely development as the ARCADIA meetings began. In their joint estimate of 20 December General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed the belief that "Germany's failure to achieve full success in Russia may strongly influence her to invade Spain, Portugal and French North and West Africa for the purpose of restoring the balance."\textsuperscript{15} Two days later, at the initial meeting between the President, the Prime Minister, and their political advisers, "there was general
agreement that if Hitler was held in Russia he must try something else, and
that the most probable line was Spain and Portugal en route to North Africa."

16 The Army therefore had good reason to believe that it might be called
upon to send an expeditionary force to Northeast Brazil in the very near
future.

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Despite their apprehensions, General Marshall and the Army planners did not
want to move either a small or a large force to the Brazilian bulge without
Brazil's full consent and cooperation. The Army had hoped that the arrival of
the Marine companies would provide the opening wedge to overcome the
continued opposition of the Brazilian Army and Air Force to the entry of
American combat forces.17 On 20 December Under Secretary of State
Welles assured General Marshall that Brazilian military as well as civilian
sentiment toward collaboration in defense was "rapidly improving," and that
"he thought Brazilian agreement to the rapid reinforcement we think
necessary might be secured within ten days." 18 The War Plans Division
thereupon advised the Chief of Staff:

If the ten-day estimate is even approximately accurate, we can afford to wait, but no
longer. Every week now adds to the peril and difficulty of sea-borne troop movements to
that area. Axis submarines in numbers are now reported between Natal and the African
coast. Known Axis capabilities, possible Brazilian internal reactions, and unpredictable
surprise moves, combine to create a growing peril. We now fight facing westward. The
southeast lies open.19

Because the Department of State up to then had made no perceptible
headway in persuading the Brazilian Government to consent to the
establishment of Army defense forces in Brazil, the planners urged "that the
Secretary of War suggest directly to the President the immediate dispatch of a
special emissary, high in his confidence, and of high rank, with instructions
to present the foregoing views to President Vargas in person, as an expression
of the President's own opinion." 20 Acting on this recommendation,
Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall tentatively arranged for Vice
President Wallace to fly to Brazil as spokesman for the Brazil project. They
discussed the plan for a special emissary with President Roosevelt on 22 and 23 December, and the President's initial reaction was favorable. Mr. Wallace "volunteered" his services on the morning of 23 December; that afternoon he was thoroughly briefed on the Army's Brazil plans by Colonel Ridgway of the War Plans Division, and on the following day the Secretary of War approved the detailed arrangements for Mr. Wallace's trip. Nevertheless, the Vice President did not go to Brazil, presumably because

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the President was persuaded by Under Secretary Welles that this special mission would compromise his position at the foreign ministers' meeting scheduled to assemble at Rio de Janeiro on 15 January. 21

Although President Roosevelt decided against sending a special emissary to Brazil, he was fully aware of the vital significance of the South Atlantic airway and of the dangers inherent in the Brazilian situation. He discussed the problem at some length in the first formal ARCADIA meeting on 23 December, at which it was also decided that the United States should have exclusive responsibility for planning and executing the Brazil operation.22 In the meeting of 4 January, the President again "went into detail about why President Vargas of Brazil could not leap into action and give us permission to put more troops on the Natal Peninsula." President Vargas, Mr. Roosevelt remarked, "had to feel his way-be sure of his ground." 23 The President announced that the Army and Navy must be prepared for action in Brazil, but that no decision to act could yet be made.24

The Army's plan for action in Brazil contemplated the establishment of a Brazil theater with an ultimate Army strength of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops, or such smaller combat force, down to General Marshall's minimum of 3,600 men with air support, as the Brazilians might willingly admit to their territory. It will be recalled that General Headquarters had substantially completed an Operations Plan for a Northeast Brazil Theater on the eve of Pearl Harbor. The War Plans Division approved this plan on 17 December and designated the 9th Division as the principal component of the initial force. The 45th Division was to be sent as a reinforcement, if that became
necessary. General Headquarters was directed to organize a task force for Brazil and, at General Headquarters' suggestion, General Marshall designated Maj. Gen. George Grunert, Commanding General, VI Army Corps, with headquarters at Providence, Rhode Island, as commander of the Brazil expedition. General Grunert was the first task force commander to reach Washington after Pearl Harbor. He and members of his VI Corps staff, and Brig. Gen. Rene E. deR. Hoyle, Commanding General, 9th Division, with members of his staff, reported to General Headquarters on the morning of 24 December to study and revise the Brazil theater plan. The generals and their staffs, members of the General Headquarters staff, and members of the joint Planning Group that had visited Brazil the preceding summer worked together on the Brazil plan for six days. Thereafter, General Grunert and his staff continued to develop the plan—now designated LILAC—at their Providence headquarters. The LILAC plan, like the Brazil plans drafted before Pearl Harbor, proposed the concentration of United States Army forces around the Belém, Natal, and Recife air bases, with the greatest strength at Natal. It provided for an initial ground force of about 15,000 men (the reinforced 9th Division less detachments) with air support, and for two reinforcing echelons, as needed, of 19,000 men each. Considering the shortage of shipping and the urgent demands of other theaters, the Army probably could not have sent more than 15,000 ground troops to Brazil until much later in 1942. Despite the planning for a larger movement, the dispatch of a 15,000-man force, with adequate air support, would probably have ended the Army's apprehensions about the situation in Northeast Brazil and in the South Atlantic.

The Army's preparations for sending a task force to Brazil coincided with the establishment of a new Brazilian-American military board to coordinate defense arrangements in Northeast Brazil. The War Department in October 1941 had readily agreed to Brazil's proposal that a permanent joint military board be established to plan and supervise the construction of new base facilities, and by early November the United States and Brazilian Armies had informally arranged the details of the board's organization and duties. They
agreed that its specific mission should be to "select the actual site of each installation, determine its cost, and recommend the share each country should bear of that cost." This last element promised difficulties, since the division of costs would depend on what forces each nation contributed to the joint defense. After some delay General Miller, as Chief of the Military Mission, and General Dutra, the Brazilian Minister of War, signed an agreement on 17 December 1941 creating the joint Military Board for the Northeast. It provided that, in addition to a Brazilian general officer as president, the board was to have six members, with each nation contributing engineer, air, and naval officers. The board was to be located permanently in Northeast Brazil after preliminary meetings in Rio de Janeiro.

The Army selected Col. Robert C. Candee of the Air Corps and Col. Lucius D. Clay of the Corps of Engineers as its members of the new board and brought them into General Headquarters to study the Army's Brazil plans. Like the members of the joint Planning Group, they were given a dual mission: in addition to doing the prescribed joint planning, they were to be General Grunert's and General Headquarters' advance agents in Brazil, since General Headquarters anticipated that they would eventually serve on the theater staff. The Army members of the board left Washington on 2 January 1942 and reached Rio de Janeiro five days later.

Formal meetings of the new board began on 14 January, and nine days later Colonels Candee and Clay recommended the expenditure of $2,700,000 for airway improvements essential to the Ferrying Command's operations. In addition, they urgently recommended that small groups of United States Army mechanics and communications specialists be put at each airfield and that emergency shipments of ammunition and machine guns be sent to Northeast Brazil to permit transient air crews and Brazilian Army troops to defend the fields and planes against any locally organized fifth-column attack. The Joint Military Board was not able to take any effective action on these or any other proposals until the outcome of the Rio de Janeiro Foreign Ministers Conference was known and the separate discussions in
which Under Secretary of State Welles was then engaging with President Vargas and his principal advisers were concluded. The day before the Rio conference adjourned, Colonels Candee and Clay described their position in these words:

We left Washington with the impression that the War Department regarded Northeast Brazil as a highly strategic area where hostile military operations might develop at any moment and—where it was therefore imperative to have U.S. troops-air and ground—as

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soon as possible. We find in Rio much "solidarity," Good Neighborliness, and a willingness to concede the importance of the defense of N.E. Brazil, but practically no inclination to do anything concrete in the matter. The Brazilians agree that the area should be, defended and say that they will seek our air units, or even ground forces, when attack becomes imminent. In the meantime, they will gladly permit the conversion of commercial fields into military airports and the installation of other facilities and improvements by us while they furnish the ground protection. The Ambassador agrees that we should have troops in NE Brazil but believes that these must be limited to air units for the present. Mr. Sumner Welles regards Brazilians as among our best friends but holds that the War Department has put a considerable strain on their friendship by blocking the delivery of certain military equipment which we have promised to furnish Brazil. 34

In early February the American members of the board made a reconnaissance of Northeast Brazil that helped in the preparation of more detailed plans for airfield improvements. But when Colonels Candee and Clay returned to Rio de Janeiro, they found nothing more could be done by the board until the Brazilian and United States Governments arrived at a more general understanding, and therefore they recommended and General Headquarters approved their recall to the United States. 35 Their final report, submitted by Colonel Clay after he reached Washington, stated that the joint Military Board could make no further progress because its Brazilian members held that the board's jurisdiction must be restricted to supervising a construction program that would not involve or imply participation of United States Army ground forces in the defense of the Brazilian bulge. Informally, the Brazilian president of the board had advised that nothing could be arranged about joint defense until the Brazilian and United States Governments had negotiated a formal agreement delimiting their joint defense responsibilities. 36 General
Miller had reached this same conclusion a month earlier and had "urgently recommended that some general agreement be reached between the two governments, through diplomatic channels, which will satisfactorily solve this question of participation of the armed forces in the defense of Northeast Brazil." 37

The Approach to Collaboration

The approach to a new plan for wartime collaboration between the United States and Brazil began with the harmonious cooperation between the two governments in the Rio de Janeiro Foreign Ministers Conference. On

the eve of this meeting, the United States Army was not sanguine about the prospect for military cooperation with the Brazilian Army and Air Force. In a frank discussion on 3 January 1942 with Under Secretary of State Welles, General Marshall confessed that what worried him most was that the Brazilian military leaders had apparently changed their minds since 1939 and 1940 about wanting American assistance in the defense of the Brazilian bulge. It was also pointed out to the Under Secretary that Brazil had promised in the 1940 Staff Agreement that if the United States was attacked by an Old World nation Brazil would permit American forces to use its air and naval bases and transit its territory, even though Brazil itself was not at war. Mr. Welles insisted that the Brazilian Government and Army were loyally supporting the war effort of the United States, and that Brazil would break relations with the Axis nations and collaborate more closely in consequence of the Rio conference. 38 A few days later the Under Secretary left for Rio de Janeiro, bearing with him a letter addressed by President Roosevelt to President Vargas containing these passages:

The public, of course, knows very little of the helpful and effective steps your Government has taken. I, on the other hand, have been kept fully informed by Mr. Welles and General Marshall and my other advisers of your magnificent cooperation, and I know that it goes far beyond any narrow interpretation of Hemisphere defense. I appreciate from the bottom of my heart your generous attitude and assistance with regard to such matters as the ferry
service to Africa and the naval and air patrols from your ports and airfields, to mention only a few.

I did not fail to catch the import of your reference in your speech of December 31 to the delivery of "the material elements which we still lack." . . . I assure you that before long we shall be able to supply you with the equipment for which you have been waiting.39

At the close of the Rio conference, on 28 January 1942, Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the Axis nations—a definite step toward military cooperation, though not one toward the entry of American security forces into Northeast Brazil.

In Rio de Janeiro Under Secretary Welles thoroughly explored the problems in Brazilian-American defense collaboration in a series of conferences with President Vargas and with the Brazilian Minister of War and Army Chief of Staff. He learned that the Brazilian Army leaders had objected to severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis nations because they believed that that meant war in the near future, and they felt Brazil’s armed forces were in no condition to participate in the war. They were also concerned about the ambiguous position of Argentina. In breaking relations, President

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Vargas had overruled the Army on that point, but he told Mr. Welles that stationing American ground combat forces in Brazil was out of the question for the time being. In the future it would be contingent upon the delivery of substantial quantities of military equipment that would permit Brazilian and American troops to engage in joint defense measures on an equal footing.40

President Vargas and Mr. Welles also developed a plan for a new organizational relationship between the Brazilian and American armed forces. This involved, first of all, the replacement of General Miller and also of Lt. Col. Thomas D. White, the air attaché and Chief of the Military Air Mission. At Mr. Welles’s urging, the Chief of Staff finally agreed to the recall of General Miller and Colonel White, though after their return to Washington General Marshall kept them on his planning staff for several months as
informal advisers on Brazilian problems. The second step in the new military relationship with Brazil was to be the establishment of a joint Brazilian-American defense commission. The commission, with headquarters in Washington, was to be staffed by high-ranking officers of the two nations. It was intended that the commission should become the main channel for all military communication and arrangement between the two nations. General Marshall and Admiral Stark readily agreed to its establishment, and the Chief of Staff tentatively selected General Embick to serve as its senior Army member.

The crux of a satisfactory defense arrangement with Brazil in early 1942—as it had been since the summer of 1939—was the ability of the United States to deliver munitions to the Brazilian Army and Air Force. Under the lend-lease allocations in effect in January 1942, Brazil was to receive very few modern combat items before the fall of 1942. On 19 January Mr. Welles telephoned from Rio de Janeiro to President Roosevelt and asked the President to find out just what additional items the Army could release to Brazil in the near future. Mr. Roosevelt called General Marshall, and the Chief of Staff after consulting with his staff promised the immediate or early delivery of sixty-five light tanks and more than two thousand military vehicles of various types. The President also inquired about more coast defense equip-

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ment, but General Marshall explained that the Brazilians did not want the obsolete weapons that were available. Neither did the Brazilians want all of the motor vehicles offered, but they did want a good many more light tanks, and many items not offered—medium tanks, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and combat airplanes—items that the Army did not believe it could release for months to come.

The Brazilian Minister of Finance, Mr. Souza Costa, who came to Washington in early February, headed a group of Brazilian officials that pressed the Munitions Assignments Board and the War Department for a more favorable allocation of ground arms than that promised through President Roosevelt in January. On 12 February the new War Department
Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) devoted its entire first meeting to a consideration of Brazilian requests, but the meeting ended with a decision that not much more could be done to increase or speed up deliveries to Brazil. The War Department at this time was terribly pressed by the demands of its own forces, and by the President's insistence that the terms of the Soviet protocol be fulfilled. Furthermore, the British representative announced at the 12 February meeting that "if an increase were contemplated for Brazil or any other country, then an all-round reconsideration of the position of all of these countries would be necessary." Minister Costa met this situation with a statement on 17 February that he was completely dissatisfied with the Army's program for Brazil. Mr. Welles thereupon indicated that he intended to back the Brazilian demands for an enlarged program.45

This impasse was broken on 21 February, after the intercession of Mr. Hopkins. The War and State Departments worked out a compromise that involved immediate delivery to Brazil of twenty additional light tanks and four 3-inch antiaircraft guns (taken out of the New York City harbor defenses for this purpose), and the drafting of a new lend-lease agreement that promised substantially larger munitions deliveries to Brazil in the future than had hitherto been planned. On 3 March the United States and Brazil signed four agreements, three of which were concerned with a $100,000,000 credit to be advanced by the Export-Import Bank for the development of Brazilian production of strategic materials. The fourth was the new lend-lease agreement, calling for the eventual delivery to Brazil of military equip-

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tment to the value of $200,000,000, or double the amount planned in 1941 and provided for in the Brazilian-American Lend-Lease Agreement of 1 October 1941. Separately, but at the same time, the United States Army agreed that it would deliver certain items to Brazil before the end of 1942—one hundred medium tanks, more than two hundred light tanks, fifty combat airplanes, and a substantial number of antiaircraft and antitank guns. The new lend-lease agreement and the accompanying pledges on deliveries in 1942 went far to satisfy the Brazilian quest for arms.46
The final impetus for a general Brazilian-American agreement on military collaboration came from the United States Army Air Forces. The rapidly mounting volume of military air traffic through Brazil made enlarged air base facilities and the services of Army mechanics and technicians mandatory. On 15 February Brig. Gen. Robert Olds, commanding general of the Ferrying Command, personally presented his problems to President Roosevelt. He needed at least seven hundred and fifty additional men in Brazil, at the Belém, Natal, and Recife air bases, housing constructed for these men, and enlarged gasoline storage and other new base facilities. He also wanted to obtain blanket clearance for Army-controlled flight operations through Brazil. The President told General Olds to ask Under Secretary of State Welles to submit these requests to the Brazilian Government. Mr. Welles declined to do so until the Brazilians had been satisfied on the score of lend-lease [47] Thereupon, Secretary Stimson sent a personal appeal to the President, urging him to submit General Olds's requests directly to President Vargas, and adding as a postscript:

I cannot tell you how important I think this Natal danger is. With the redoubled necessity of planes for Burma and China; with the French fleet moving in the Mediterranean; with subs in the Caribbean, we can't allow Brazil, who is not at war, to hold up our life line across Africa. [48]

The Army accompanied Mr. Stimson's plea for action with the more generous proposal on early and future deliveries under lend-lease mentioned above, and the settlement of the lend-lease question a few days later paved the way for the submission of the Ferrying Command's requests to the Brazilian Government at the end of February. The Army had also proposed,

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once these requests were approved by Brazil, to send General Olds to Brazil to arrange the details of the Ferrying Command's new program. [49]

That program received Brazil's quick sanction following the signature of the new lend-lease agreement on 3 March. On 9 March President Vargas
approved "a wide reaching program for Northeast Brazil" that included the stationing of eight hundred additional United States Army maintenance personnel, new construction, and unrestricted flight privileges for Army aircraft. Two days later the Brazilian Chiefs of Staff (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and Foreign Minister Aranha agreed among themselves on the draft of a Brazilian-American defense agreement to be proposed to the United States.50

Thus, when General Olds arrived in Brazil in mid-March, he found a situation and an attitude very different from that existing only a month before. Everything he wanted had already been granted or was now agreed to in conferences with Generals Dutra and Goes Monteiro, and with Brazilian Air Force authorities, including General Eduardo Gomes, the northern Brazil air commander.51 General Olds invited General Gomes to return with him to the United States and promised to provide his air force with thirty modern bombers and thirty pursuit planes as soon as possible. The first increment of this reinforcement—six B-25's and six P-40's — was lined up at Bolling Field in Washington for General Gomes' inspection before he returned to Brazil. After American crews flew these planes to Brazil in mid-April, there were still no more than one hundred fifty or so United States Army officers and enlisted men in Northeast Brazil; but they were firmly established there, and the way was open for enlarging their number in friendly cooperation with the armed forces of Brazil.52

In the meantime, the War Department had given its immediate and enthusiastic approval to the Brazilian draft of a defense agreement, the War Plans Division advising Mr. Welles, "we should lose no time in accepting it in principle." To expedite the preparation of a final draft satisfactory to

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both nations, the Army proposed that conversations take place in Rio de Janeiro as soon as possible between delegations headed by Ambassador Caffery and Foreign Minister Aranha. The Army would be represented in the conversations by Air and Plans officers to be sent from Washington, and the Navy by the Chief of the Naval Mission in Rio. Their purpose would be the
conclusion of an agreement that would provide for the establishment of one or (as suggested by the Brazilians) two joint defense commissions, and that would also fix basic policies for their guidance. Once established, these defense commissions could work out the specific joint defense measures deemed necessary. The Navy and State Departments concurred in the Army's proposals. Under Secretary Welles indorsed in particular the Army's hope that the defense commissions would produce "a joint war plan similar to ABC-1 now in effect between the United States and Great Britain." The Brazilian Government promptly agreed to the proposed conversations in Rio de Janeiro to iron out the details of a defense agreement.

To participate in the Rio conversations, the Army chose Col. Robert L. Walsh, then chief of the Air Intelligence staff, and Col. Henry A. Barber, Jr., of the Operations Division, who was General Ridgway's successor as the Army's principal Latin American planning officer. These officers were told that the "primary result" of the Rio conversations "should be the creation of joint Defense Commissions in Washington and Rio for the purpose of preparing staff plans for the joint defense of Northeast Brazil," but that the conversations "should not involve the question of the stationing at present of large forces of American troops in Northeast Brazil." The Army also warned its conferees against insisting on any changes in the draft agreement that "would in any way react unfavorably from a political standpoint so as to jeopardize the operations and functions of present Air Corps ferrying activities." Colonels Walsh and Barber departed for Brazil on 5 April. By 18 April the Rio conversations had produced a text agreeable to the United States and Brazilian delegations, although matters beyond their control delayed its signature until 28 May 1942.

The new defense agreement provided for the establishment of two joint military commissions, one to be located in Washington and the other in Rio de Janeiro, and specified the general policies that were to guide the work of the commissions in terms very similar to those contained in the prewar staff agreement. The Washington commission was to draft a joint
defense plan for Northeast Brazil and make such other recommendations for joint action as the terms of the agreement and the developing international situation made necessary. The Rio commission was to act in association with the existing American Military and Naval Missions in improving the combat readiness of Brazilian forces.57

The negotiation of the Brazilian-American defense agreement of May 1942 coincided with a fundamental change in the United States Army's policy toward Brazil. Since 1939 its objective had been to put its own ground and air forces into Northeast Brazil to protect that vital area against overseas attack. By June 1942 the Army had replaced this "original conception," as the Operations Division now called it, with the "present concept . . . that Brazil and the United States will collaborate on the preparation of defense measures to be carried out by the Brazilian armed forces, with the full support of the United States armed forces for instruction and training in the use of the materiel which will be found necessary for us to supply." Furthermore, the Army intended to make "every effort . . . to maintain the flow of critical materiel established by the Lend-Lease program" for Brazil.58 Actually, German submarine activity in the Caribbean area and off the Brazilian coast held up lend-lease deliveries until midsummer, and the first shipload of goods promised to Brazil in January and February did not reach Recife until 20 June.59 Thereafter, the flow of military equipment was steady and increasingly large.

The United States Army chose Maj. Gen. J. Garesche Ord as its representative on the joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission established in Washington, and the Brazilian Army chose General Leitao de Carvalho, who had commanded the ground forces in northern Brazil. The formal sessions of this commission, which functioned most harmoniously from the outset, began immediately after Brazil declared war on the European Axis in August, and its first recommendations were issued in September.60 The Rio commission was not organized until December 1942, after the Army had established a theater organization in Northeast Brazil—the United States Army Forces South Atlantic.61
The United States Army Forces South Atlantic

The Army had launched its Brazil theater organization in preliminary form six months earlier, in May and June 1942. After Colonels Walsh and Barber returned to Washington at the end of April, they recommended the assignment of a general officer to coordinate all Army activities in northern Brazil. "It is high time," advised Colonel Walsh, "that we had a definite organization there to tie together the Ferry Command bases, the airport development work, intelligence activities, Pan American Ferries, Panair do Brazil, and innumerable lesser projects, as well as to afford assistance to the Brazilians in defense matters." 62 An Army headquarters in Northeast Brazil could also handle relationships with the Navy, with the several United States civilian agencies operating in the area, and with the local Brazilian authorities. The Army's acceptance of the idea that Brazilian forces would provide the ground and air defense for the area made closer liaison with Brazilian commanders highly desirable. As Colonel Walsh also pointed out, these commanders exercised a good deal of autonomous authority, and many matters could be settled much more readily if presented directly to them instead of through the diplomatic channel at Rio de Janeiro.

General Marshall and his staff advisers agreed that a general coordinating headquarters in Northeast Brazil ought to be established, but at first they could not see how it could be done without the consent of the Department of State and of Brazil itself. Ambassador Caffery or Mr. Welles might object to the idea, or at least insist on superior control by the embassy at Rio. The proper channel for obtaining Brazilian consent would be the joint commission that was to be established in Washington, but that commission might not be organized and in a position to act for many weeks to come. The need was immediate. The Operations Division therefore proposed to establish the new headquarters in British Guiana at the outset and then move it to Brazil when the consent of the joint commission could be obtained. General Marshall approved this plan on 20 May, and chose Colonel Walsh to be the Army's South Atlantic and Northeast Brazil commander. The Operations Division arranged for him to be promoted and designated as the commanding general of the Air Forces' newly organized South Atlantic Wing, with jurisdiction over airway operations from Florida and Puerto Rico to the shores of Africa. This position would require him to make frequent trips to
Northeast Brazil from his British Guiana headquarters, so that in practice he could act as the

Army commander in the Brazil area. On the basis of formal instructions issued by the Ferrying Command, General Walsh established his headquarters at Atkinson Field, British Guiana, on 26 June 1942. He also had detailed informal instructions from the Operations Division explaining his duties as Army coordinator in Brazil. In this capacity he represented the Army in its conduct of business with Brazilian authorities, the United States Navy, and civilian agencies.

When General Walsh made his first trip to Natal at the beginning of July, he found its air base—the most important of the Brazilian airfields—virtually defenseless against any sort of attack. Brazilian forces in the Northeast numbered about eighteen thousand men, but they were too widely dispersed and poorly equipped to provide much protection for the air bases. Aside from its fifty United States marines, the Natal base had a Brazilian guard of ninety men equipped with fifteen pistols. It had no antiaircraft guns in place, no radar or aircraft warning system, no protective measures in force such as the dispersion of aircraft and of gasoline, and the nearest defensive aircraft were an hour's flying distance away at Recife.

Two months earlier General Marshall had been distressed to learn that none of the twenty-four tactical aircraft (eight bombers and sixteen pursuit planes) that had been supplied by the United States in March and April had flown for a week, not only because of the lack of 100-octane gasoline but also because of the lack of Brazilian pilots qualified to fly them. His vigorous protest had good effect. General Gomes was supplied with more pilots, and he was presently able to set up fairly effective training programs with American instructor personnel for pursuit planes at Recife and for the medium bombers at Fortaleza. Under United States Navy auspices the bombers while jointly manned by Brazilian and United States crews engaged in a good deal of offshore patrolling during the summer of 1942, but lack of spare parts and of adequate engineering facilities, as well as a rapid turnover of
personnel, made the pursuit group at Recife of little value in air defense. It was mid-1943 before the Brazilian Air Force obtained enough planes and trained pilots to provide the major air bases with more than a modicum of interceptor protection.66

On several occasions during July and August General Walsh and the Brazilian commanders discussed measures for improving the ground defenses of the air bases. As a matter of policy the War Department had decided by August that any weapons for this purpose sent to Brazil should be "initially manned and operated by U.S. Army personnel and turned over to the Brazilians after a sufficient period of training." 67 In accordance with the policy, and also with a September recommendation of the joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, the Army arranged to ship 135 machine guns with ammunition from the United States, and to send three detachments (one officer and fifteen enlisted men each) from the 66th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) Regiment in Puerto Rico to each of the three major Brazilian air bases.68 After the completion of the sixty-day training period at the end of the year, these detachments were returned to Puerto Rico. Thereafter, Brazilian soldiers continued to man the guns, but the United States Army kept title to them.69

The defense of the Brazilian bulge against external attack during 1942 was mainly provided far afield by the Soviet forces resisting the sweep of Nazi arms, by the British forces checking the Axis drive into Egypt, and by the United States Navy's success in stopping the tide of Japanese advance in the Pacific. Nearer at hand, the United States Army had ground and air forces in the Caribbean area and in the continental United States that could have been deployed to Brazil in the event of a real emergency. The most effective combat element close at hand was the United States Navy's South Atlantic Force, with which Brazilian naval and air forces began to operate in informal association in the spring of 1942.

The South Atlantic Force (redesignated Fourth Fleet in March 1943),
commanded by Vice Adm. Jonas H. Ingram, was a relatively small light cruiser and destroyer force with a very wide field of operations and a variety of duties. It ranged the western South Atlantic, escorting convoys, intercepting blockade runners that were operating from the Far East around Cape Horn to Axis Europe, and searching for Axis submarines and surface raiders. It also gave protection of a sort to the long coast line of Brazil from Bahia northward, as well as to the mid-ocean garrison of American forces established on Ascension Island in 1942. Navy seaplanes had begun their operations from Brazilian bases in December 1941, and in April 1942 the Navy brought in land-based amphibian planes to operate in patrols from the air bases at Natal and Recife. In the same month President Vargas directed his Minister of Marine to put Brazilian naval vessels under Admiral Ingram's informal operational control. Also, Admiral Ingram worked out an arrangement with General Gomes under which Brazilian Air Force operations in the bulge area were integrated with operations plans of the United States Navy.70

The Army Air Forces in Washington looked askance at the Navy's plans for expanding its Brazil-based air operations, the Air Forces preferring if possible to keep the Navy out of the land air bases on the Brazilian airway altogether. In April 1942 the Air Forces proposed that its technician detachments being sent to Belém, Natal, and Recife replace the small Marine garrisons. The Ferrying Command needed their housing and the full use of the other facilities that the Navy wanted to share. The Navy agreed to withdraw the marines from Belém, but it insisted on keeping them at Natal and Recife to guard its amphibian operations from those bases.71 The Navy also insisted on a new joint agreement to cover the use of Brazilian air bases. On 27 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved an agreement that accorded the Navy "the use of Army facilities as . . . necessary for the operation and maintenance of land-based, carrier-based, or amphibian type aircraft, subject to determination by the Army as to time and duration of such use, in order not to interfere with the primary purpose of these facilities." 72 Thereafter, the
Navy conducted or controlled all over-ocean patrol operations from Brazilian bases. These operations started in earnest in the same month that German submarines moved into the western South Atlantic.

Brazil's formal entry into the war followed a German decision in June to launch a concentrated submarine attack against shipping off the North-

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east coast. When a pack of ten submarines sank five Brazilian vessels between 14 and 17 August, including a troopship with heavy loss of life, Brazil countered by declaring war on Germany and Italy, on 22 August 1942. As General Marshall remarked two days later, the Brazilian declaration of war did not materially change the situation. Brazilian forces merely shifted from covert to overt cooperation with United States forces, and Brazil asked for a more rapid delivery of lend-lease supplies so that it could take a larger part in the military-effort of the United Nations. Brazil entered the war with enthusiasm, though with some fears at first that the German submarine attack in the north might be part of a concerted plan that would involve an internal uprising among the foreign minorities in southern Brazil. Actually, German submarines soon found it healthier to operate at a much greater distance from the Brazilian coast, and the Brazilian people united behind the Vargas administration in a manner that ended the threat of internal subversion. This was Brazil's own war brought on by the sinking of thirteen Brazilian ships in the months preceding, and Brazil joined with earnestness and purpose in the common effort to defeat the Axis nations.73

Eight days after the Brazilian declaration of war, Admiral Ingram met with his staff and with General Walsh and other Army representatives, and announced that as senior United States commander in the area he was assuming operational command as "Chief of the Allied Forces in the South Atlantic." A few days later the British West African naval commander visited Admiral Ingram's headquarters at Recife, and in consequence the United States Navy and British Royal Navy arranged a geographical division of the South Atlantic that made its western half, to and including Ascension Island, an American defense responsibility. Since the only South Atlantic combat
operations then under way were strictly naval in character, the Army did not challenge Admiral Ingram's unilateral assumption of operational responsibility, but his action probably helped influence the Army's decision to establish a command headquarters on Brazilian soil.\(^{74}\)

In conferences with General Walsh during July and August, General Gomes had suggested that the Army move its headquarters from British Guiana to Brazil. During July the South Atlantic Wing commander had set up an "advance echelon" headquarters at the Natal air base to supervise air-

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way operations, and, at Atkinson Field, he had divided his small staff into two groups, one handling Air Transport Command affairs and the other defense and supply matters. Following the Brazilian declaration of war, General Walsh asked the War Department for authority to move his "sector and SOS" staff to Recife, so that he could work more closely with Brazilian commanders as well as with the Navy in the planning and execution of defense measures. Since the Brazilians themselves had suggested this move, Ambassador Caffery had also requested that the Army move its headquarters to Brazil.\(^{75}\)

General Walsh's recommendation resulted in the establishment (officially on 24 November, actually in early December) of the Army theater headquarters at Recife known as the United States Army Forces South Atlantic. A separate South Atlantic Wing headquarters had been established in the meantime at Natal on 10 November. General Walsh commanded both. The wing headquarters continued to control airway operations from Trinidad to the shores of Africa until mid-1943, whereas the territorial jurisdiction of the theater headquarters extended only from Brazil's northern border to Ascension Island. Since Army airway and intelligence operations and personnel were exempted from its control, the new theater organization had virtually no troops to command at the outset except the two-thousand-man defense garrison on Ascension. Its real task was that visualized the preceding May: a coordinating headquarters to handle Army problems and relationships in Brazil. Recife was the logical place for this headquarters, even though...
Army air operations were concentrated at Natal, because Recife was the headquarters of the Brazilian commanders in the area, of the Navy, and of the other agencies with which the Army command had to deal. Furthermore, Recife had good docking facilities and was therefore the best site for a theater supply base. Furnishing supplies and services to the airway establishment was to be the new theater's chief operating function.76

The establishment of Army headquarters at Natal and Recife coincided with the launching of the Anglo-American North African offensive. On the one hand, this first major offensive of United States Army forces in the Atlantic war put an end to apprehensions of a Nazi move toward the South Atlantic; on the other, it emphasized more than ever the vital significance of the South Atlantic airway. With the North Atlantic air route again closed down for the winter, for a period of six months the Brazilian route handled virtually all air traffic to Europe and Africa, a large part of the planes and emergency supplies for India and China, and some of the lend-lease materials for the Soviet Union. This traffic included about twenty-five hundred combat planes moving to overseas air forces. By May 1943 the Natal air base was handling more plane movements each day than it had handled in a month a year earlier. The airway to Brazil, planned for hemisphere defense, became in 1943 the air funnel to the battlefields of the world.77

After the Army command moved to Brazil, it continued to defer to Admiral Ingram's operational control of defense forces in the South Atlantic area. General Walsh and Admiral Ingram appear to have gotten along very well together from the outset, and State, War, and Navy Department spokesmen united in testifying to the success of Army and Navy commanders in dealing with the Brazilian and South Atlantic situation under the informal working arrangements in effect. Nevertheless, at the Navy's insistence, the Army agreed to the issuance of a joint directive that formally vested unity of command in the Navy over all antisubmarine and other combat operations at sea in the South Atlantic area.78
Brazil and the United States in December 1942 proceeded to organize the second of the two mixed commissions provided for in the defense agreement of May. On 28 October the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission had recommended the establishment of a joint Brazil-United States Military Commission at Rio de Janeiro, with the general mission of making "arrangements for the implementation locally of approved recommendations and plans prepared by the Commission in Washington." The Rio commission began its work before the end of the year. Col. Francis B. Kane, Chief of the Military Mission, was its senior United States Army member. In effect, this commission absorbed the work and personnel of the existing Military and Military Air Missions. With the increased flow of military equipment to Brazil under lend-lease in 1943, and with Brazilian preparations for sending troops to the fighting front overseas, the work of the Rio commission rapidly increased in volume and variety, and the Brazilians enthusiastically availed themselves of its services. General Walsh, as Army commander in Brazil, had no authority over the Rio commission and, initially, relatively little con-

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nection with its work. By 1944 this latter condition had changed, the United States Army Forces South Atlantic having become more and more concerned with the training and equipment of Brazilian forces. The consequence was that by the summer and fall of 1944 the Army had two headquarters in Brazil engaging in essentially the same functions. The War Department did not correct this situation until early 1945, when it put the United States Army section of the Rio commission under the supervision and administrative control of the United States Army Forces South Atlantic.80

Defense Planning and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force

In the spring of 1942 the United States Army had anticipated that the principal business of the commission about to be established in Washington would be the drafting of a detailed plan for the joint defense of northern Brazil by United States and Brazilian forces. The commission began work on the defense plan in August 1942, but before it completed the plan in January
1943 the United States no longer wanted to put any of its own ground or air combat units into Brazil. The defense plan, embodied in the commission's Recommendation No. 14 of 20 January 1943, provided for a ground garrison for northern Brazil to consist of three infantry divisions, one armored division, eleven antiaircraft regiments, and eleven coast artillery battalions—all to be Brazilian troop units. The plan stated that the units were to be equipped by the United States with modern material to be furnished under lend-lease. The commission itself recognized that the forces proposed were larger than actually needed for defense purposes, but it pointed out that these units, when properly equipped and trained, could eventually collaborate with United States forces in overseas combat operations. On General Ord's informal recommendation, the Operations Division and the Chief of Staff approved the new defense plan in principle, subject to the qualification that the United States should not plan to equip more than the three infantry divisions and three antiaircraft regiments.81

Actually, of course, northern Brazil no longer needed a defense force of the size recommended by the joint defense commission, nor was the United States as yet prepared to furnish modern combat equipment for three Brazilian infantry divisions. What lay behind the recommendation was Brazil's desire to play an active combat role in the war overseas. The Brazilians had manifested this desire soon after their declaration of war, and during the fall of 1942 some Brazilian Army officers were urging an independent operation against Vichy-controlled French Guiana, or even Dakar. Immediately after the North African landings the United States War Department began to investigate the possibility of using a Brazilian unit in that theater. The Department of State wanted a Brazilian battalion sent to North Africa, but the Army, after studying the problem, "demurred on the grounds that the sending of Brazilians would make necessary 'the sending of other Latin American troops, and that none could be sent before they [were] . . . supplied, reequipped, and properly trained." 82

It was presumably in consequence of President Roosevelt's conversation with
President Vargas at Natal on 28 January 1943 that the Army reversed its position and supported the employment of Brazilian troops abroad. 83 Thus, when President Vargas and General Carvalho in April informally presented a plan for a four-division expeditionary force, General Marshall agreed; in early May, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan in principle. The Army then sent General Ord to Brazil to arrange its details. As a result the United States in the summer of 1943 agreed to send 50 percent of the equipment for one infantry division to Brazil, where it was to be used to train Brazilian divisions in rotation. The Brazilian troops that were sent overseas were to be re-equipped by the United States in the theater of operations.84

General Ord returned to the United States in June 1943 with the conviction that Brazil had a fixed intention to participate in the fighting overseas and that it had a real army that would fight well if given four to eight months of modernized training with proper equipment. Also, he reported that President Vargas had agreed to accept and follow the strategic direction of the United States in the employment of Brazilian forces overseas, and that General Dutra, the Minister of War, had asked that Brazilian units serve under United States high command in the theater to which they were sent.85 By

its Recommendation No. 16 of 16 August 1943, the joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission formally launched the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. After extensive training under the supervision of the Rio Military Commission, Brazilian troops began to move overseas in June 1944. Considering the circumstances of their training, movement, and equipment, the twenty-five thousand Brazilian ground forces and the air squadron that saw active service in the Italian theater between September 1944 and May 1945 acquitted themselves as well as General Ord had forecast they would.

In consequence of its large and active role as a participant in the war, Brazil received the lion's share of the ground and air equipment distributed by the United States among the Latin American nations during World War II. The value of lend-lease material assigned by the War Department to Brazil
reached $77,000,000 by August 1943, a total that included principally the munitions promised in the spring of 1942 and the initial equipment needed to train the Brazilian expeditionary forces. By the end of the war the value of Army wartime deliveries to Brazil under the lend-lease agreement of 3 March 1942 amounted to about $230,000,000, considerably more than that agreement had promised and more than twice the total value of all other Army lend-lease deliveries to the Latin American nations. The value of all lend-lease aid rendered to Brazil during and after the war amounted eventually to about $366,000,000, approximately three fourths of the total amount of assistance given to all of the Latin American republics together.  

Preparations for the reduction and close-out of Army operations in Brazil began in March 1945. During the summer, activity along the string of air bases temporarily increased as soldiers were redeployed by air from the European and Mediterranean theaters, but this operation came to an end soon after Japan's surrender. On 31 October 1945 the Army inactivated its theater organization, the United States Army Forces South Atlantic, and its few remaining troops were turned over to the South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command. The Navy had already withdrawn from Brazil, and in the autumn of 1945 the Air Transport Command was also preparing to close out most of its activities, although negotiations were in progress to determine the future use of Brazilian air base facilities. The joint commissions that had been established in Washington and Rio de Janeiro in 1942 were retained after the war as instruments for military collaboration between the two nations in a troubled postwar world.

The wartime military partnership of the United States and Brazil paid rich dividends to both nations. Brazil's armed forces were greatly strengthened, both by American armaments and training assistance and by their own active participation in the fighting. From Brazil the United States received large quantities of materials, several types of which were vital to the successful prosecution of the war. In collaboration with Brazilian naval and air forces, the United States Navy used Brazilian bases to cleanse the South Atlantic of
German submarines and to blockade it against the shipment of war materials to or between the Axis nations. The airway through Brazil, which the United States was permitted to use freely and virtually without restriction after 1941 for military purposes, was one of the vital links with victory in the war. Above all, the defense arrangements between the United States and Brazil, the largest and most strategically located of the Latin American republics, helped immeasurably in maintaining the stability of the Western Hemisphere nations against Axis machinations, and, until the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942, these arrangements provided prime insurance against a German invasion of the New World.

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1 Memo, Maj William T. Sexton, OCS, for Gen Marshall, 8 Dec 41, OCS Conf Binder 29, relaying telephone message from Department of State.

2 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204:

3 Par. 11, ABC-4/CS1, 31 Dec 41.

4 Various papers, and notations thereon, dated 10 and 11 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204; Stimson Diary, entry of 11 Dec 41.

5 Various memos and notations, dated 13 and 14 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204.

6 Memo, Commandant, Marine Corps, for CO 17th Provisional Marine Co, 15 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204. On authorship of these instructions, see Pers Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, Marine Corps, to Gen Marshall, 15 Dec 41, and notations thereon, WPD 4224-204.

7 Pets Ltr, Gen Marshall to Under Secy Welles, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204; Memo, WPD for Gen Miles, G-2, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4380-8; see also papers in GHQ 045.3 NEB.

8 Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD (Attn: Col Ridgway), 17 Dec 41; Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Marshall, 17 Dec 41. Both in WPD 4224-204. Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Dec 41; entries of 17, 20, and 22 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Bind 2; Marine Corps Memo for Record, 29 Dec 41, WPD 4224-204; Notes on SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 42.

9 On FAA radio stations, see Memo, Col Bissell for Gen Gerow, WPD, 7 Dec 41, WPD 4224202; and various papers, dated Feb 42, WPD 578-136. On AAF control officers, see Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 329-30; and Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. III, p. 121. On flight arrangements, see Ltr, SW to Secy State, 29 Nov 41, OCS 21238-16; Note for Record, Col Ridgway, WPD, 28 Dec 41, WPD 4113-77; and Dept of State Memo for Record, 8 Jan 42, OPD Misc 10.
10 Various papers, dated 8 Dec 41-2 Jan 42, WPD 578-127; Memo, Gen Arnold, DCofS, for Under Secy State, 19 Dec 41, and other papers, WPD 4224-207.

11 Recommendations for immediate action in Memos, WPD for CofS, 12 and 18 Dec 41, WPD 4622-37; and Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 15 Dec 41, GHQ 381, Sec. 2.

12 Craven and Cate, *AAF I*, P. 332.

13 Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Dec 41; WPD study, 21 Dec 41, sub: Immediate Mil Measures, OPD Exec 4, Book 2.


15 Brief Jt Estimate, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4402-136.


17 Stimson Diary, entry of 11 Dec 41; Notes on SLC mtg, 20 Dec 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 40.

18 Remarks of Mr. Welles at SLC mtg, 20 Dec 41, as recorded in Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 41, WPD 4224-208. The Department of State transcript of Mr. Welles's remarks reads: "I think the opening wedge has now been placed and I think that can be enlarged fairly rapidly." SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 40.

19 Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 41, WPD 4224-208.


21 Notations on Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 41; Memo, Col Ridgway for CofS, 24 Dec 41. Both in WPD 4224-208. Stimson Diary, entry of 22 Dec 41; Note for Record, Col Handy, WPD, 23 Dec 41, WPD 4516-41; Memo for
Record, Gen Gerow, WPD, 23 Dec 41, WPD 4622-43; Memos, Col Ridgway for CofS, 23 and 24 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, Book 4; Memo, Miss Grace Tully for President, 23 Dec 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


24 Notes on White House mtg, 4 Jan 42, OPD Exec 8, Book 2.


26 Until October 1941 General Grunert had been Commanding General, Philippine Department. In April 1942, after the shelving of the Brazil plan, he became Commanding General, Sixth Corps Area, with headquarters at Chicago, Illinois.

27 Reports of DCofS GHQ, 22, 24, 29, and 30 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Binder 2; Entries of 23 and 24 Dec 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Memo, SGS for GHQ, 23 Dec 41, OCS 1637444; GHQ Memo for Record, GHQ G-1 file No. 123; Memo, DCofS GHQ for Gen Grunert, CG VI Army Corps, 24 Dec 41, sub: Directive, GHQ 045.3 NEB.

28 Reports, 14 Jan 42-12 Feb 42, GHQ 337 Staff Conf Binder 2; Memo, Maj Mathewson for Gen Eisenhower, WPD, 18 Feb 42, WPD 4224-230.

29 Memo, Col McCunniff for WPD, 21 Oct 41; Memo, WPD for Ln Off Dept of State, 29 Oct 41; Telg, Gen Miller to G-2, 3 Nov 41; Memo, WPD for Ln Off Dept of State, 6 Nov 41. All in WPD 4516-28. Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, pp. 602-03.

30 Memo, WPD for G-2, 24 Nov 41, WPD 4115-63.

31 Agreement entitled, Organization and Regulating Directives of the Joint Military Board for the Northeast, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 17 Dec 41, copy
in WPD 4516-37.
On the same day that the agreement was signed, General Miller was transferred from his position as Chief of the Military Mission to that of military attaché. Memo, G-1 for CofS, 20 Feb 42, OCS 16770-537.

32 WPD Note for Record, 24 Dec 41, WPD 4516-28; Entry of 24 Dec 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Ltr, TAG to CG FF, 25 Dec 41, and 1st Ind, GHQ to TAG, 8 Jan 42; Directive for Senior U.S. Army Member, Jt Mil Bd for Northeast Brazil, 1 Jan 42. Last two in AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

33 Ltr, Col Candee (through Gen Miller) to CG GHQ, 23 Jan 42, GHQ 381 NEB.

34 Memo, Col Candee for CG GHQ, 27 Jan 42, GHQ 686 NEB.

35 Memo, Col Candee for CG GHQ, 11 Feb 42, WPD 4516-28; Telg, MA Rio to G-2 (embodying msg, Col Candee to GHQ), 11 Feb 42, WPD 4516-42; Report of G-3 GHQ, 16 Feb 42, GHQ 337 Staff Confs Binder 2.

36 Memo, Col Clay for WPD, 24 Feb 42', GHQ 381 NEB.

37 Report, MA Rio to Amer Ambassador, Rio, 30 Jan 42, WPD 4424-204.

38 Notes on SLC mtg, 3 Jan 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 42.

39 Ltr, President Roosevelt to President Vargas, 7 Jan 42, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

40 Mr. Welles's report of his Brazil trip, verbatim in Dept of State minutes of SLC mtg, 10 Feb 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 46.

41 Memo, Gen Miller for G-2, 30 Jan 42, WPD 4224-204; Telg, Gen Marshall to Gen Miller, 2 Feb 42, -WPD 4224-223; Mr. Welles's Report at SLC mtg, 10 Feb 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 46.

42 Notes on SLC meg, 10 Feb 42, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 46; Memo, SGS for Gen Embick, 15 Feb 42, OCS 6526-89. This was to be an addition to
General Embick's duties as senior Army member of the Canadian and Mexican joint commissions. See Chs. XIII and XIV, below.


44 Memo, Col Barber, WPD, for CofS, 5 Feb 42, WPD 4224-217; Memo, Gen Burns, Exec Munitions Assignments Board, for Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand, Def Aid Dir, 10 Feb 42, OCS 21210-32.

45 Min No. 2, WD Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), 12 Feb 42, OCS 21210-32; Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Feb 42, WPD 4224-217.

46 Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Feb 42, WPD 4224-217; Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Feb 42; Memo, ASW McCloy for Under Secy State, 23 Feb 42. Last two in WPD 4244-47. Memo, WPD for Def Aid Dir, 1 Mar 42, WPD 4224-217; Hq USAF South Atlantic, MS, History of United States Army Forces South Atlantic (hereafter cited as Hist of USAFSA), App. IV (copy of 3 Mar 42 Lend-Lease Agreement); Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. III, pp. 132-33; ASF Int Div, MS, Lend-Lease, II, 1255ff:

47 Min, War Council mtg, 16 Feb 42, SW Conf Binder 2, OCS Records; Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Feb 42, WPD 4224-217.

48 Ltr, SW to President Roosevelt, 19 Feb 42, SW file, White House.

49 Ltr, ASW for Air to Under Secy State, 19 Feb 42, OPD 380 Brazil; Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. III, pp. 129-30.

50 Telg, MA Rio to G-2, 9 Mar 42, Hist of USAFSA, App. V; Ltr, WPD to Actg Secy State, 20 Mar 42, and other papers, OPD 381 Brazil.

51 The measures authorized included the construction program previously recommended by the Army members of the joint Military Board. Colonel Candee's recall from Brazil had been countermanded at the end of February, and he remained there to present this request jointly with General Olds.
Colonel Candee returned to Washington with General Olds, and the War Department thereafter considered that the work and existence of the joint Military Board had ended. WPD Memo for Record, WPD 4224-233; Memo, OPD for Cols Robert L. Walsh and Barber, 1 Apr 42, OPD 336.6 Braz-U.S.

52 Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. III, pp. 135ff; Telg, Gen Olds, Rio, to Gen Arnold, CG AAF, 19 Mar 42, and other papers, OPD 452.1 Brazil; OPD Diary, entries of 3 and 13 Apr 42; Memo, OPD for Adm Turner, 15 Apr 42, OPD Exec 8, Book 4.

53 Ltr, WPD to Actg Secy State, 20 Mar 42, OPD 381 Brazil.


55 Memo, OPD for Cols Walsh and Barber, 1 Apr 42, OPD 336.6 Braz-U.S.

56 Hist of USAFSA, pp. 34-36.

57 Ibid., App. X.

58 Memo, OPD for Col Walsh, 9 Jun 42, Hist of USAFSA, App. XII.

59 Statement of Adm Spears at SLC mtg, 22 Jun 42, SLC Min, Vol. III.


61 Memo, OPD for G-2, 1 Dec 42, OPD 334.8 it Braz-U.S. Mil Comm.

62 Memo, ACofAS A-2 for Gen Strong, ACofS G-2, 2 May 42, Hist of USAFSA, App. VI.

63 Memo, Gen Miller for CofS, 4 May 42, and other papers, OPD 381 Brazil; Min, Gen Council mtg, 12 May 42; Memo, OPD for CofS, 16 May 42; Memo, OPD for TAG, 27 May 42. Last two in OPD 381 Brazil. OPD’s initial proposal designated the new position and organization as the
"Commanding General and Staff South Atlantic Wing, Air Forces Ferrying Command." In late May it was called the "South American Wing." When activated, it was designated the "24th Ferrying Wing." The Ferrying Command itself became the Air Transport Command on 1 July 1942. On 16 July it was officially designated the "South Atlantic Ferrying Wing, Air Transport Command." Subsequently, it was designated "South Atlantic Division." To avoid confusion, it is referred to in this text as the South Atlantic Wing, its customary designation at the time.

64 Memo, CG Ferrying Command for Col Walsh, 19 Jun 42; Memo, OPD for Col Walsh, 9 Jun 42. Both in Hist of USAFSA, Apps. IX and XII. Hist of So Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. IV.

65 Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. IV, pp. 82-84.

66 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 10 May 42, WDCSA 42-43 Brazil; Ltrs, Under Secy State to CofS, 13, 14, and 16 May 42, AG 381 (5-13-42); Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. V, pp. 116-18; Hist of USAFSA, pp. 287-97.

67 Memo, OPD for DCofS, 9 Aug 42, WDCSA 42-43 Brazil.

68 Memo, OPD for SOS, 16 Sep 42; Memo, OPD for AAF, 23 Sep 42. Both in OPD 580.82 Brazil.


71 Memo, CG AAF for CofS, 10 Apr 42, and notations thereon, OPD 045.3
(3-2-42); Memo, Brig Gen St. Clair Streett for Gen Eisenhower, OPD, 24 Apr 42, OPD 580.82 Brazil.

72 Memo, Secy JCS for CofS and CINCUS, 28 Apr 42, OPD 580.82 Brazil.

73 Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, p. 381; Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. IV, p. 90; Min, War Council mtg, 24 Aug 42, SW Conf Binder 2, OCS Records; Military Intelligence Service study, *title: Summary of the Situation in Brazil Since Declaration of War*, 11 Nov 42, OPD 336 Brazil.

74 Hist of USAFSA, pp. 61-63; Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, p. 383; Min, War Council mtg, 11 Nov 42, SW Conf Binder 2, OCS Records.

75 Memo, CG South Atlantic Wing for CG ATC, 24 Aug 42, Hist of USAFSA, App. XIV; Notes of Gen Walsh, Jan 44, quoted in Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. V, p. 206.

76 Various papers, dated November-December 1942, OPD 320.2 Brazil and OPD 320.2 Atlantic Theater of Operations; Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. V, pp. 205-08; Hist of USAFSA, pp. 52-54.

For accounts of the United States Army's garrisoning and use of Ascension Island during World War II, see Hist of USAFSA, Ch. V, and Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Chs. IV and V.

77 Hist of South Atlantic Div, ATC, Ch. VI, pp. 2ff.

78 Notes on SLC mtg, 8 Feb 43, SLC Min, Vol. IV; Ltr, Adm King to Gen Marshall, 8 Apr 43; Ltr, Gen Marshall to Adm King, 21 Apr 43. Last two in OPD 336 Brazil. Jt Directive, Adm King and Actg CofS McNarney to Comdr South Atlantic Force and CG South Atlantic, 4 Jun 43, OPD 384 (4-3-42).

79 Recommendation No. 10, 28 Oct 42, OPD 334.8 Jt Braz-U.S. Def Comm.

80 Memo, OPD for G-2, 1 Dec 42, and atchd Ltr of Instructions to U.S. Army members, OPD 334.8 Jt Braz-U.S. Mil Comm; Memos, Gen Secy of Jt Braz-U.S. Def Comm for Senior Army Member, Jt Braz-U.S. Mil Comm, 26 Feb 43 and 4 Apr 44, OPD 334.8 Jt Braz-U.S. Def Comm; OPD Memo for
Record, 7 Apr 44; Memo, OPD for DCoS, 8 Feb 45. Last two in OPD 334.8 Jt Braz-U.S. Mil Comm. Hist of USAFSA, pp. 82-83.

81 Memo, Gen Ord for OPD, 12 Feb 43; Memo, OPD for CofS, 16 Mar 43. Both in OPD 320.2 Brazil.

82 Min, War Council mtg, 16 Dec 42, SW Conf Binder 2, OCS Records.

83 No detailed record of this conversation has been found, but it was publicly announced that this topic had been discussed by the two Presidents.

84 Memo, Gen Ord for CofS (through OPD), 12 Aug 43, WDCSA 42-43 Brazil. There is a good and fairly detailed account of the training, movement, and combat operations of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in the History of USAFSA, Chapter VII. The liaison and training task in Italy was performed by officers and enlisted men of the United States Army Forces South Atlantic.

85 Memos, Gen Ord for CofS, 7 Jun 43; Memo, Gen Ord for G-2, 16 Jun 43. Both in OPD 336 Brazil.

86 Memo, OPD for DCoS, 16 Aug 43, WDCSA 42-43 Brazil.

87 Tod and Croft, Lend-Lease section of Statistics, Table LL-7. ASF Int Div, MS, Lend-Lease, 11, 1255-76, describes Army lend-lease transactions with Brazil after March 1942 in some detail. ASF pamphlet, Lend-Lease Transfers, Brazil (1946) lists all transfers of ground equipment by item.


89 Hist of USAFSA, Ch. IX.

90 For a tabulation of such imports during 1941-43, see Paul B. Woodward, "Brazil's Participation in World War II," App., Plate XII. (Georgetown University M.A. thesis, 1951, copy in Library of Congress microfilm collection.)
Within a few days after the Japanese attack on Hawaii and the Philippines, the nations of the New World had begun to range themselves alongside the United States. Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the six republics of Central America immediately declared war against the Axis. Brazil, whose security was considered vital to the defense of the hemisphere, had pledged its cooperation, but had not for the time being broken its diplomatic ties with the Axis. Mexico, which on occasions had not been on the best of terms with its neighbor to the north, responded as promptly as any and with marked friendliness.

On the second evening after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the President of Mexico, the Honorable Manuel Avila Camacho, publicly affirmed his country's devotion to the cause for which the United States was now fighting. Announcing over a special radio network that Mexico had severed diplomatic relations with Japan, President Avila Camacho placed his nation at the side of all those who could "not admit that international intercourse should remain indefinitely subject to the arbitrary acts of the more powerful countries, and who strive to contribute, by peaceful means, to the building of a world in which man shall be the friend of man . . . ." The peace-loving nations, he continued, were now beset by the forces of aggression. Under the circumstances, it was the destiny of Mexico and the United States to provide the "intimate collaboration that may serve to link together in solidarity the action taken by all the Americas." Then, speaking more particularly to his countrymen and advising them to "maintain the serenity required by the circumstances," President Avila Camacho promised that the government would act with firmness, but ever in conformity to the will of the people and to the dignity and honor of the nation.¹
If, in 1939, one had considered the background of contention between the two countries, there would have appeared little prospect of active military collaboration with Mexico. Twenty-two years earlier, when the United States had been on the brink of entering World War I, Mexico was at best an unsympathetic neighbor, and seemingly a potential enemy. United States troops, moving into northern Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, a popular hero, had left a trail of animosity behind them. An alliance between Imperial Germany and Revolutionary Mexico, such as the Zimmerman Note offered, seemed to be not impossible. In the realm of fact, some of the reforms provided for in the Mexican constitution of 1917 could only be achieved at the expense of American landowners and oil companies in Mexico. This was one of the major irritants during the next two decades. Some degree of understanding and good will was built up by Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow during the late 'twenties and by Ambassador Josephus Daniels a decade later, but no real settlement was possible so long as any step taken by the Mexican Government in that direction could be made to appear as a compromise with the ideals of the revolution or with the spirit of the constitution. After breaking with former President Plutarco Elias Calles, "The Iron Man" of Mexican politics, President Lazaro Cardenas proceeded to launch an intensive expropriation program. The resulting controversy and other long-standing differences had not been completely liquidated when the European war broke out in 1939.²

If the background of contention made military collaboration with Mexico seem uncertain, the strategic outlook at first made it appear unnecessary. During the first twelve months or so after the outbreak of war in Europe, eastern Brazil and the South Atlantic had been the undisputed focal point of hemisphere defense. After the summer of 1940 there were times when Army planners were compelled to divert their attention elsewhere, but by and large they focused their interest on the bulge of Brazil. Mexico, with the consent of its government, might offer a convenient corridor for air movements to the Panama Canal, but the main route to Brazil followed the sweep of the Antilles. And although the disastrous shift in the military situation in Europe during the summer of 1940 began to point to Canada as a more probable partner in arms, nevertheless the narrow seas between Brazil and the Guinea coast continued to engulf most of the attention of the military planners until
The United States entered the war.

The fall of France had raised the possibility that American planners of defense would have to view the hemisphere through a bifocal lens, to consider not only remote but also adjoining neighbors, north as well as south. The very crisis itself and the fear that danger was approaching, irrespective of the direction from which it might appear, served to bring the United States closer to its neighbors on both sides. Certain elements in the situation were exerting a definite pull toward a closer relationship with Mexico. A presidential election was approaching in Mexico which might give rise to disorder and domestic disturbances. The fear that Axis agents would take advantage of circumstances such as these to pave the way for a Nazi or Fascist domination of Latin America was not the least of the factors governing United States military planning. Furthermore, Mexico no longer had any firm ties to the Old World. Unlike Canada, which was an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Mexico was a stanch member of the Pan-American family, committed to the principle that "every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one" of the American nations. Taking one consideration with another, the prospect for collaboration with Mexico was now becoming rather favorable, but neither Mexico nor Canada rushed headlong to act in concert with the United States, nor did the United States woo either one impetuously. Circumstances pushed the nations of the New World together.

Gathering Momentum

In a vigorous demonstration of their unity of feeling, all the American republics on 19 May 1940 had protested against the German invasion of the Low Countries. The problem, however, was to translate collective indignation into common policy, and common policy into joint action. The United States, on its part, made solemn declaration to its neighbors and to the world that it would "cooperate fully, whenever such cooperation is desired, with the other American Governments in crushing all activities which arise from non-American sources and which imperil our political and
economic freedom." 3 Mexico, Brazil, and all the other Latin American nations except Argentina expressed their readiness to collaborate with the United States. In order to make their collaboration effective, the United States would have to provide many of the material war-making means. Before this could be done the United States would have to know how far each government could go in defending its own territory, how far it could and would go in assisting its neighbors,

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whether it would permit the United States to use its bases for the assistance of a third American nation, and whether it would join in staff conversations and authorize the drafting of joint plans. 4

While the Battle of France was raging toward its climax in early June 1940, Department of State officials held a series of conversations with the Mexican Ambassador, in which these basic problems of hemisphere defense were explored and the groundwork of active collaboration laid. Before the technical military conversations began, United States Army and Navy staff representatives met with the Ambassador on 11 June to hear a statement of Mexico's position. President Cardenas was fully aware of the threat to the security of the hemisphere, the Ambassador declared, and Mexico, he assured the American officers, "was prepared unreservedly to collaborate with the United States in the development of plans for the common defense." Mexican plans, he continued, were based on the assumption that any physical intervention by the Axis Powers would be a possibility only in the remote future and that German activities in Mexico could be discounted as a serious threat to continental security. The Mexican Government, the Ambassador said, had already taken measures to control the small German element in the country. Mexico's greatest need, he continued, was equipment and munitions, which in the past had always been obtained from Europe. As its contribution, the Mexican Government was, he intimated, prepared to develop air and naval bases "at places to be chosen strategically, not only from the purely national point of view but from the broader point of view of hemisphere defense." The Ambassador then ended his remarks by pointing out that the necessary basis of joint military action in an emergency was a
general political agreement between the two countries.\textsuperscript{5}

The conversations were resumed in July after the Mexican elections, and representatives of the naval and military agencies of both countries participated. Although only conditional agreements resulted, these July conferences succeeded in creating an atmosphere of frankness and harmony, and served to place on record the views of the two War Departments. Both countries expressed their complete willingness to cooperate; neither was ready to go as far as the other wished. Brig. Gen. Tomás Sánchez Hernandez, the senior Mexican representative, reiterated what the Ambassador had said concerning the Axis threat to Mexico and the importance of Mexico's obtaining equipment and munitions from the United States, but he was not prepared to elaborate on the Ambassador's hint that Mexican airfields might be available for purposes of hemisphere defense. When asked point-blank whether Mexico would permit the use of its airfields for movements to Panama and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, and whether Mexico could guarantee the security of the airfields, he replied that he was not authorized to say "yes," but his opinion was that the President of Mexico would extend "full and sincere cooperation." As to the protection of the airfields, he pointed out that except in the State of Chiapas the fields were owned principally by Americans. As to purchasing arms and machinery in the United States, he emphasized that Mexico's participation in hemisphere defense depended upon its ability to participate without disturbing the economy of the country. The best solution, the general concluded, would be for the United States to grant credits to Mexico and allocate arms and machinery simultaneously. Colonel Clark, the senior United States Army representative, agreed that this was undoubtedly a sound idea, but hardly within the province of the War Department.\textsuperscript{6} Meanwhile, the naval conferences had succeeded in disposing of certain particular problems of cooperation and liaison that were more detailed than the general questions of national security, the solution of which had been the concern of the Army staff conferences. Nevertheless, the Navy
Department's major objective, base rights at Acapulco and Magdalena Bay, was not included in the series of specific recommendations to which the naval representatives of the two nations put their names on 24 July. The Army conferences had come to an end two days earlier. Although it was then agreed to reassemble at the call of General Sanchez, the meetings were not resumed until the next year, 1941.

In the meantime, the War and Navy Departments tried to obtain a formal, signed agreement as the finishing touch to the conferences. Without undue delay, the record of the conversations was approved and forwarded through customary diplomatic channels to the Mexican Government for its approval. Throughout August and September the two departments awaited word that Mexico had accepted the staff agreements. December arrived and the new president, Avila Camacho, was inaugurated in Mexico City, but the new government, like its predecessor, withheld formal approval. There had been talk of establishing a joint defense board similar to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, and President Avila Camacho, although for the moment unwilling to concur publicly and officially in such a step, was agreeable to another series of informal staff conversations by the men who would later become members of the board. Prominent among the items on the proposed agenda was a recommendation by the Army and the Navy that the agreements conditionally made in the July conferences be formally ratified. All efforts along this line were unsuccessful until after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

The delay did not appear to reflect any genuine unwillingness on the part of either government to cooperate with the other; rather it seemed to represent a bowing to expediency on the part of both and to the circumstances of the moment as seen by the Mexican Government. For a time after the July elections a revolution in Mexico seemed probable. Adherents of the defeated candidate declared that the will of the people had been circumvented by fraud and would triumph through force. By September sporadic rioting and
demonstrations had spread from Mexico City to the Rio Grande. A rump government installed itself in the southern hills, while the northwest-Mexico's cockpit of revolution-began to seethe. An open, publicly announced understanding between the federal government and the United States would have added more fuel to the turmoil. After the threat of revolution had passed, Nazi agents and a small "fifth column" tried to keep the flames alive by charging that a "Cardenas-Avila Camacho combine had sold Mexico down the river to the United States in payment for our recognition of Avila Camacho." 9 A spurious "treaty" was circulated as evidence. Wholly fictitious, the document was supposed to have been signed at Cuernavaca on 14 November by Cardenas, Avila Camacho, and three United States Army officers, and purported to give the United States the whole of Baja California, the use of all Mexican ports as naval bases, as well as a monopoly on all oils and minerals, and, finally, to permit the occupation of Mexico by the United States Army.10 The virulence of the attack went far beyond the customary post-election anti-Americanism. Until it died down President Avila Camacho undoubtedly preferred not to make any formal commitment or public announcement of collaboration with the United States.

A misapprehension by the War Plans Division of what the Mexican representatives had agreed to in the conferences of July 1940 probably contributed to the Mexican Government's hesitancy. On this point the record of the conversations is clear. General Sanchez agreed only to inform the Mexican Ambassador, first, that the United States desired to use Mexican airfields for purposes of "continental defense" and, second, that the United States requested

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Mexico to provide adequate protection for the fields. Yet the War Plans Division, in a memorandum for General Marshall on 31 July, gave the following as two of the bases of agreement brought out in the conferences:

Mexico will agree to allow the United States to use its airfields for movement of U.S. combat aviation to the Panama Canal or elsewhere in Latin America, as required to
accomplish the tasks of Hemisphere Defense. Mexico will agree to protect its airfields so as to afford security for their use by US aviation, . . . 11

The mistaken idea that a formal acceptance by Mexico of the conditional agreements reached in the conferences would obligate the Mexican Government to permit the United States to use Mexican airfields persisted until mid-February 1941.12

One of the major stumbling blocks to a hard and fast defense agreement, after a measure of domestic tranquility had returned to Mexico, was the continued failure of the two countries to settle their claims controversy. After President Avila Camacho took office, the United States made a determined effort to reach a general accord, but the oil question remained as turbid as ever. Little progress, if any, could be discerned until midsummer of 1941, when the two governments approved a tentative formula of settlement. Almost simultaneously the course of military collaboration became smoother.13 Although the final agreements that settled the oil problem and its related issues were not signed until three or four months afterward, neither government was responsible for the delay. Both hailed the settlement with deep satisfaction. Its importance to the joint military effort lay principally in the interpretation placed upon it by the Mexican Government, and Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla was unsparing of his praise. The November agreements, he told the Mexican Senate, marked a change in the foreign policy of the United States. They were "a clean sweep of the irritation and barriers that had lasted for several decades," and "one of the most eloquent demonstrations of the spirit of the new America." They were, he concluded, the "logical, imperative and indispensable" leaven of liberty, proof of continental solidarity.14 Five or, six years later, Cordell Hull looked back over his long career and decided that the settlement of November 1941 was "a large

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factor in having our neighbor to the south in full accord with us at the moment of Pearl Harbor." 15
Running parallel to, and simultaneously with, the Department of State negotiations that ended in the claims agreement was a series of military staff conferences. Picking up where the conversations of the previous July had left off, Mexican and United States staff officers had been meeting fairly regularly since February 1941. Although nominally informal discussions of matters of common interest, the 1941 conferences actually were official parleys between representatives of the War and Navy Departments of the two countries for the purposes of reaching a formal agreement on important military and naval problems. They accomplished much, and later, in 1942, they developed into the joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission.

The Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission

The first tangible evidence of President Avila Camacho's intent to collaborate in matters of defense had appeared within three weeks of his inauguration. In reply to an inquiry about setting up a joint defense commission, Foreign Minister Padilla on 20 December 1940 had informed the American Embassy that the Mexican military and naval attaches in Washington had been instructed to begin preliminary discussions whenever it was agreeable with the Department of State and the Mexican Ambassador.16

The first meeting was held on 17 February 1941, soon after the new Mexican military attaché, Col. Cristobal Guzman Cardenas, arrived in Washington. The American Army representatives, chosen three months earlier were: Brig. Gen. John N. Greely, chairman of the American section; Lt. Col. Delmar E. Wilson; and Colonel Ridgway, who served as secretary. Captain William O. Spears, USN, Comdr. F. T. Thomas, and Comdr. C. T. Durgin represented the Navy. The Mexican representatives, in addition to Colonel Guzman, were Comdr. Manuel Zermeno, Mexican Navy, and Lt. Col. Jose Perez Allende, Mexican Army. The last of the "preliminary discussions" was held on 3 December 1941, there having been twenty sessions in all. Only one change of personnel took place. At the end of March General Greely was given command of the 2d Infantry Division, and his place in the discussions was taken by General Embick, the senior Army member on the Canadian defense board.17
It was decided at the first meeting that the staff conversations of July 1940
would be a good starting point for the new discussions. On this, the
representatives of both governments were agreed. To the Mexicans, the July
1940 conferences had been an attempt to explore the ways of cooperation
and not to settle the detailed means of defense, whereas to the American
staff representatives the goal had been a definite agreement on the transit of
military planes through Mexico and the acquisition of naval bases on
Mexico's Pacific coast. The same lines of approach were taken in February
1941.18

During the whole period before the official establishment of the joint
commission in 1942, these two topics—the use of Mexican airfields by
American Army planes en route to the Panama Canal or to South America
and the acquisition of naval bases—dominated the discussions. The major
achievement was the flight agreement on the use of the airfields. The use of
Mexican ports by operating units of the United States Navy was not obtained
until after the United States had entered the war, notwithstanding the fact
that Captain Spears, the senior United States Navy member, had taken up the
subject with the staff representatives whenever the occasion offered. But, as
a scholarly history of American policy in this period points out,

Throughout the negotiations for naval base facilities in Mexico it was fully realized in
Washington that a satisfactory solution of this problem was dependent upon the
settlement of various other issues between the two Governments and above all upon
disposition of the protracted dispute over the claims of American oil companies resulting
from the nationalization of the petroleum industry by the Mexican Government in
1938.19

After the resumption of the staff talks in February 1941, the Army
representatives had more than once expressed the opinion that the time had
come to establish a joint defense commission, and as soon as all the details
of the flight agreement were settled the question of formally constituting and
publicly announcing a defense commission was again raised. A
recommendation to this effect, pointing to the alarming international
situation, was addressed to the Department of State by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on 15 July, but, to quote again the previously cited history of American foreign policy, "the project for a joint Defense Commission was not pressed, since the State Department felt that American claims for compensation arising from Mexico's expropriation of foreign petroleum properties should first be settled and that the issue of naval base rights should also be given precedence." 20

Not until late December was a formal announcement of the commission worked out by the two governments. The inadvisability of further postponing it had been made evident by urgent requests from the Army Air Forces that permission to place aircraft detector stations in northwest Mexico and to make unrestricted flights in time of emergency be obtained from the Mexican Government. Outlining the situation for the Chief of Staff on 1 December, General Embick pointed out that requests of this kind would multiply if the United States became involved in the war. There was no reason, he concluded, why the appointment should be delayed any longer.21 A week later Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The United States was at war.

Without the slightest delay, President Avila Camacho hastened to express Mexico's indignation at the treacherous blow and to affirm his government's determination to stand by the United States. There were in Mexico, as there had heretofore been in the United States, varying shades of popular opinion as to how far to go in support of the embattled democracies. The morning after the Pearl Harbor attack one of the more widely read Mexican newspapers, La Prensa, which was then numbered among the more staid journals, appeared on the streets of Mexico City with a front-page editorial urging an unmistakable alignment with the United States. The war against Japan, declared La Prensa,

is precisely Mexico's war, as it is the whole continent's war. Our stand is unquestionable, clearly commanded by conscience and unqualified. Our place, in history as in geography, is with the neighbor who was at our side during our War of Independence and during our
war with the French invaders . . . 22

Other newspapers took a more conservative stand. *El Nacional* agreed that Mexico's sympathies were entirely with the United States and that her place was with the democracies, but at the same time the paper insisted that Mexico should concentrate on her own house and limit her support to a vigilant guard against possible infiltration by the enemy.23 Another respected journal, *El Universal*, reiterated the desirability of preserving neutrality at all cost, but not to the point of permitting international vandalism to guide Mexico's destiny. Mexico could not disregard the possibility of an attack, continued *El Universal*, and "should therefore proceed from now on as though hostilities with totalitarian Japan were going to break out." 24 All three papers applauded the president for his statesman-like conduct. Emblematic of popular approbation, former President Cardenas wired President Avila Camacho that he was placing himself at the disposition of the government, an offer the president accepted by naming General Cardenas Commander in Chief of all Mexican forces on the Pacific coast. On 24 December the Mexican Senate

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gave its assent to a presidential message opening Mexican ports and airfields to naval and military planes of the United States.25

Meantime, in Washington, officials of the War, Navy, and State Departments had met and discussed the joint commission question. At a conference on 18 December the War Department's view of the matter was accepted by the representative of the Department of State, who promised to see what could be done. Within ten days the Department of State was able to inform the War Department that Mexico had formally agreed to establishing the commission. The Department of State thought that most of the work of the commission would concern problems of the Pacific coast and that consequently Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt and the senior admiral on the Pacific coast would be the most appropriate representatives of the United States; but the staff conversations had been ably presided over for some months by
General Embick, who was thus familiar with Mexican problems and who, being senior Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, was in a position to coordinate the northern defenses with those to the south. These considerations led to the designation of General Embick.26

A brief announcement on 12 January 1942 revealed to the public that the two governments had decided to establish a joint defense commission. The American members, it was announced, were to be General Embick and Admiral Johnson, who as commander of the Atlantic Squadron in 1939 had organized the neutrality patrol-America's first experience in hemisphere defense. Their Mexican colleagues were Maj. Gen. Miguel Gonzalez Cadena, chairman of the Mexican section, and General Sanchez Hernandez, who had participated in the discussions of July 1940.27 When General Embick left the commission toward the end of the year, he was replaced temporarily by Maj. Gen. John P. Smith, sometime Chief, Operations Section, War Plans Division, and more recently Chief, Administrative Services, Services of Supply. Admiral Johnson thereupon acceded to the chairmanship of the American section. General Smith served only briefly and was then replaced by Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry. General Henry, like General Embick, was one of the Army's "Elder Statesmen." After a long career distinguished by assignments as Chief of Cavalry, as commanding general of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (mechanized), and as Commandant of the Cavalry School, he had retired, only to be recalled to active duty in 1941 as a member of the War Depart-

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ment Personnel Board, on which he was serving when appointed to the joint Defense Commission. The Mexican representatives, too, were replaced by new members during the year. In early June 1942 the Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Francisco Castillo Najera, who had done as much as anyone to lay the groundwork two years before, was commissioned a major general in the Mexican Army and appointed to the joint Defense Commission in place of General Gonzalez, who returned to other duties in Mexico. Three months later, in September, Brig. Gen. Luis Alamillo Flores
was appointed to succeed General Sanchez, the second member of the Mexican section.28

Both in the nature of the subjects it dealt with and in its procedure, the commission differed from the Canadian-United States Board on Defense, established a year and a half earlier. President Roosevelt's Executive order of 27 February 1942, which brought the United States section of the commission formally into being, had no counterpart with respect to the Canadian-United States board, though it might have applied equally well to the latter. The purpose of the joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, the Executive order stated, "shall be to study problems relating to the common defense of the United States and Mexico to consider broad plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the United States, and to propose to the respective Governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion, should be adopted." 29 After being in operation for some months, the commission drew up a statement of rules and regulations, which it appended to its first annual report and which took the same broad view of the commission's functions. After citing the Executive order, the statement continued: "The Commission shall have cognizance of all matters relating to the common defense of Mexico and the United States and to military cooperation between them." 30 A considerably narrower precept had been proposed by the War Plans Division. When called upon for a broad definition of objectives, the War Plans Division had cited only such details as "unrestricted flight privileges for military aircraft of the United States over Mexican territory, use of airports and facilities, permission for the movement of ground forces into or through Mexican territory, etc." 31 And for this reason the War Department vetoed, with the concurrence of the Navy Department, any suggestion that there be a representative of the Department of State or any other civilian on the commission, as there was on the Canadian-United States board. The narrower view, not the statement of the commission, was the one

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that prevailed. Confining its deliberations principally to the technical details
of military and naval cooperation, the commission seldom ranged very widely into a consideration of broad plans and peripheral problems. An ever larger share of its attention became occupied with lend-lease requests, which the commission passed upon and channeled to the proper authorities.

During the first year of its official existence, beginning with March 1942, the commission made almost exactly as many formal recommendations as the Canadian-United States joint board made in the corresponding period. Those of the Canadian-United States joint board were the end result of a unanimously agreed upon opinion. They were a joint product, reached after thorough discussion by both sections of the board. A "recommendation" of the joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission was, on the other hand, nothing more than a memorandum outlining a specific course of action for a particular situation or requesting that certain measures be taken, which one section drew up and formally presented to the other for approval. The recommendation represented the views of the section that drafted it. When the concurrence of the section to which the proposal had been submitted was received, the recommendation was sent to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the appropriate military and naval authorities in Mexico, for execution. On at least two occasions the Mexican section, instead of approving an American recommendation that had been submitted for approval, presented the identical proposal as of Mexican origin for the approval of the American section.

Nearly all the details that went into the making of military collaboration between the two countries, whether handled by the commission or not, fell into three major groups. The first, and perhaps the most important category down to December 1941, included everything relating to Mexico's role in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. A second, rather amorphous, group took shape around the relation of the United States to Mexican security, particularly to the defense of Baja California. The third, and the one that presented an aspect of greatest urgency after the attack on Pearl Harbor, comprised all the details relating to Mexico's part in the defense of California. The formal recommendations of the commission followed this pattern. Beginning in March 1942, the first four recommendations all related to the defense of the two Californias; thereafter they were about evenly divided in number.
Lend-lease projects, which became increasingly numerous in 1943 and 1944, were principally designed to further the internal security of Mexico, and in some instances were an informal *quid pro quo* for measures belonging in one of the other two groups.

*The Mexican Corridor*

On the broad stage of hemisphere defense Mexico had a double role: to make available to the United States the aviation facilities that would permit the ready movement of American military planes to Panama, and to provide the naval bases that would facilitate United States fleet operations in the Pacific in defense of the Panama Canal. Mexico's willingness to accept this role was affirmed and reiterated by several spokesmen of the government, but always with the condition, either express or implicit, that nothing would be undertaken that might involve the slightest infringement of Mexican sovereignty or national dignity. The staff conferences of 1941 wrestled with this problem for nearly six months before complete accord was reached on the details of a flight agreement that would give the Army an air corridor to Panama.

The flight agreement was the great accomplishment of 1941. It began with what General Greely, chairman of the American staff representatives, called "remarkably quick action," for less than two weeks intervened between the time the subject was broached at the meeting of 11 March and the date the Mexican Government's approval was announced. But if the staff conferences of 1941 were the continuation of those held the summer before, then the flight agreement was the culmination of eight months of effort. In its original form, the draft agreement submitted to the Mexican staff representatives by General Greely on 11 March neglected to specify any route for seaplanes, omitted any mention that the subject had been discussed in the previous staff conversations, and failed to include reciprocal privileges for Mexican planes. While the necessary additions were being discussed in the meeting of 11 March, Commander Zermeno, the Mexican naval attaché, expressed the opinion that his government would approve the agreement, but
he pointed out that neither he nor any of his colleagues had authority to speak for the government. Nevertheless, he was more prescient than the Mexican military representative who had spoken in similar vein at the time of the July 1940 conversations, for on 25 March the head of the delegation announced that the Mexican Government had agreed to the unrestricted use of Mexican airfields by United States military planes en route to Panama, on the under-

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standing that the United States would extend a like courtesy. And at the same time the Mexican representatives submitted a list of arms and equipment that they were desirous of obtaining from the United States.

Although the general lines of agreement were smoothly laid down, the procedural details were somewhat more troublesome. Six meetings during the month of April were devoted entirely to the problem of deciding on a set of flight rules, and by the end of the month most of the particulars were settled. The question whether the planes should follow the usual commercial routes was finally solved by specifically designating the routes permitted; the question to whom the advance notification should be given was settled; and the more embarrassing question whether American flight personnel should be confined to the limits of the fields at which they landed was cleared up by acceding to the wishes of the Mexican Government. By the end of April the flight rules agreed upon in the staff conferences had been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and had been forwarded by them to the Secretary of State in order to obtain the formal approval of both governments. This was done on 22 May by an exchange of notes between the Department of State and the Mexican Embassy. But no sooner was the ratification completed than a still more delicate problem arose. For some time, the Air Corps had been proposing to send about eighty new-type pursuit planes to Panama, and if they were sent by way of Mexico, a number of Air Corps mechanics would be necessary at each landing field. When this question had been raised during the staff conference of 22 April, the Mexican representatives held that special
arrangements would have to be made since this was a topic not covered by
the flight agreement. There was no further discussion of the point until after
the flight rules agreement was approved.

Then a misunderstanding, serious enough to have wrecked the staff
conversations but for the patience and mutual good will of the men, occurred
in the course of pursuing the matter. At the meeting of 6 June the American
representatives presented a request for permission to station small
detachments of aviation mechanics at the Tampico, Veracruz, and Tapachula
airfields. Colonel Guzman, in what must have been a considered reply, cited
a provision in the Mexican constitution forbidding the stationing in Mexican
territory of the armed forces of another power, although the American
representatives pointed out that the mechanics would wear civilian clothes
all the time. After some discussion Commander Zermeno offered the
suggestion that

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the men be given positions in the office of the United States military attaché,
and the upshot was that the Mexican representatives agreed to discuss the
American request with Ambassador Castillo Najera.38 Ten days later, on 16
June, Colonel Guzman called a meeting to lodge formal protest against what
seemed to be a bypassing of the staff discussions. According to the
memorandum he presented at the meeting, Ambassador Daniels in Mexico
City had informed the Mexican Government two days before that the United
States proposed to station mechanics at the fields immediately. Since the
United States Government had not waited for the Mexican Government's
reply to the proposal of 6 June and had handled the matter through
diplomatic channels, Colonel Guzman continued, the Mexican
representatives could only consider the question as having passed beyond
the immediate jurisdiction of the staff committee. As for the proposal itself,
the opinion was now expressed that the permanent stationing of men at the
airfields would transform the simple use of the fields into their use as air
bases, and this could not be permitted. By proceeding in such fashion,
Colonel Guzman protested, the United States had jeopardized the "fine
harmony that has hitherto characterized the military relations between the
two countries.” 39

What had apparently happened was that the Air Corps, bypassing the American staff representatives, had requested the Department of State to obtain permission for the mechanics to enter Mexico, and this request, traveling the customary Department of State channels, had eventually become the note delivered by Ambassador Daniels on 14 June. Although it was officially withdrawn by the Ambassador later the same day, perhaps at the prompting of the War Department, word of it was immediately relayed to the Mexican staff representatives in Washington.40

The discussion that followed Colonel Guzman's formal protest revealed the Mexican representatives as less intransigent than his memorandum had given one to believe. They were agreeable to continuing the discussion of the American proposal and were willing to accept Colonel Ridgway's apologies as a satisfactory end to the affair.

Colonel Ridgway's reply gave no explanation of the misunderstanding, but did express profound regret that it had occurred and gave assurance that the staff conferences would continue to serve as the means for negotiating matters of this sort. In accepting it, Colonel Guzman explained that not all the misunderstanding had been on the part of the American agencies, that some of it was the result of a too hasty report from Mexico City of the note presented by Ambassador Daniels. The note, it now appeared, had been much less peremptory and of quite different tenor. The question that had caused all the confusion was soon solved along lines proposed by the Mexican Ambassador, namely, that the mechanics, wearing civilian clothes, could enter Mexico and remain at the airfields not as members of the United States Army, but as employees of Pan American Airways.41

A staging route from Miami to Panama via western Cuba and the history-steeped Yucatan peninsula had already suggested itself as an alternative to
the primary route by way of Tampico, Veracruz, and Tapachula. Of the several fields in Yucatan that were discussed at the staff meetings, the one on Isla Cozumel seemed best for the Army’s purposes. It was a short distance up the eastern coast of the peninsula, conveniently located—midway between the proposed San Julian field at La Fe, Cuba, and Belize in British Honduras—and offered plenty of room for expansion. Permission to carry out the necessary improvements was obtained from the Mexican Government in late August along with the privilege of using the Pan American Airways field at Merida until the work at Cozumel, which was expected to take a year to complete, was finished.\(^42\) When the reciprocal flight agreement was revised the following summer, in June 1942, the Yucatan route was included among the specific routes over which American military planes were authorized to travel.

In the meantime had come the attack on Pearl Harbor. Describing the aftermath of the blow, one of America's foremost historians has written: "It was the most appalling situation America had faced since the preservation of the Union had been assured . . . . Anything might happen. Even strikes on Puget Sound, San Francisco or the Panama Canal were not beyond the range of possibility."\(^43\) So it had seemed to Army planners in the dark days of December 1941. From his headquarters on Quarry Heights, overlooking the Pacific entrance to the Canal, General Andrews took immediate steps to push long-range air patrols out into the Pacific. A squadron of medium bombers (six B-18's) was operating from Guatemala City before the month was out,

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another was sent to San Jose early in January, and General Andrews began raising the question of a bomber base in Mexico.\(^44\)

The use of Mexican airfields as operating bases was something that Mexico had resolutely refused. But with the war coming closer to Mexico, with the break in diplomatic ties between Mexico and the Axis, and with the Mexican Senate having approved the opening of airfields to American military planes,
there were grounds for hoping that the opposition would soon disappear. Nevertheless, formal consideration of this and other military matters waited upon the resumption of staff conversations. Progress can be dated with exactitude only from 17 April, when the American section of the joint defense commission submitted a request for a heavy bomber airdrome at Tehuantepec to be used for patrolling the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. Although approving the request at once, the Mexican section suggested that the formal recommendation be drawn up as coming from the American section. As agreed upon at the meeting of 30 April, the recommendation proposed that the construction of an airfield in the Tehuantepec area suitable for heavy planes be undertaken by the Compañía Mexicana de Aviación at the expense of the United States Government. When completed, the airdrome and all its installations were to remain under the command of Mexican military authorities.45

By this time the passages into the Caribbean, not the Panama Canal, were under assault. German submarines, not Japanese carriers, were the attackers, and Mexican merchant vessels, as well as American, were the victims. The sinking of two Mexican tankers, one hard upon the other, with the loss of twenty-one men, and Germany's contemptuous ignoring of Mexico's note of protest brought Mexico into the war in May 1942 as a full-fledged ally of the United States. The submarine blitz in the Caribbean continued into the summer. The B-18's operating out of bases in Guatemala were no answer, and the Tehuantepec base also, even if it had been ready, was well outside the Caribbean combat area. Emergency facilities were hastily pressed into service. The Navy quickly converted San Julian field into an operating base for patrol planes and shortly afterward sent four Catalinas to patrol from Grand Cayman Island.46 The airfield on Cozumel suddenly assumed an importance beyond that of a mere stop along the staging route to Panama. When the United States requested permission to use Cozumel as a base for antisubmarine operations, the Mexican Government at once authorized its use for

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this purpose for a period of thirty days and soon extended the permission
indefinitely.\textsuperscript{47} By the end of the year the countermeasures had begun to take effect. Although victory over the submarines was by no means in sight, the battle was no longer one-sided.

More encouraging was the change in the whole strategic situation of the war. After the Battle of Midway in June, the air strength of the Japanese Fleet, if not completely shattered, was at least blunted. In the Far East the belief that Australia was dangerously threatened had been dissipated by the beginning of the new year, 1943. The struggle for Guadalcanal was in its last stages; the first victories in Papua had been won. The Allies were on the way to Tokyo at last. The turning of the tide in the far Pacific was felt nine thousand miles eastward by the men looking out over the same ocean from their guard posts on the heights of Panama, and the result was an easing of fears for the safety of the Canal. In the Atlantic, the Allied Powers had also taken the offensive by invading North Africa. German submarines, withdrawn from the western Atlantic to harry the invasion routes, were unable to cut the supply lines to Africa, while the slackening of activity in western waters gave the United States an opportunity to strengthen the defenses along the outer fringes of the Caribbean. The island bases were built up and more adequate convoy measures provided, and the need for operating bases in Mexico and Central America was correspondingly reduced.

The result was an agreement reached by the joint defense commission on 11 January 1943 (the so-called Alamillo-Glantzberg agreement) in pursuance of which construction at Cozumel and two other fields in Yucatan, and at the bomber base at Tehuantepec was to be curtailed.\textsuperscript{48} Before he left Panama early in December 1942 for a new command, General Andrews had expressed his dissatisfaction with the conditions under which the use of the Tehuantepec base had been granted. Negotiations to permit the United States to station ground troops and technical service detachments at Tehuantepec came to nothing, and early in January Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, the new commanding general in Panama, notified the War Department that he had dropped the plans for using Tehuantepec as an operating base.\textsuperscript{49} In the meantime the Tehuantepec and Cozumel fields were brought under the maintenance provisions of the Pan American Airways contract. By the spring of

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1944, Tehuantepec and the Yucatan airfields were being maintained only as emergency fields.\textsuperscript{50}

The flight agreement of 1941, which established the general principles underlying the use of Mexican airfields, had meanwhile undergone some modifications. There had been the changes of June 1942 revising and adding to the designated routes, but the only genuinely substantive change came in the spring of 1943. During the previous fall, delays in the weather and communications service in Mexico, under the control of the Pan American Airways subsidiary, Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, had given rise to concern for the safety of planes flying the Tampico-Veracruz-Tapachula route. At the desire of the Army Air Forces, the American section introduced at one of the October meetings of the defense commission a request for permission to set up an Army airway control station at each of the three airfields. In addition to the necessary equipment, the facilities would require a total of nine American officers and fifty-seven enlisted men. The complication that in earlier months had snarled all discussion of service detachments at the airfields and of radar stations in Baja California now raised itself again. The Mexican Government agreed that improved weather and communications facilities were needed and was willing to permit the United States to furnish the additional equipment, but it insisted upon manning and operating the stations with Mexican personnel. Upon this, the American section of the commission offered a compromise, one similar to the arrangement worked out for radar stations, under which United States Army technicians would operate the equipment jointly with Mexican personnel until the latter were sufficiently versed to take over the operation.\textsuperscript{51} The compromise provided a basis for agreement, which was finally reached in mid-April 1943.\textsuperscript{52} Although it required the Americans to report and work in civilian clothes and to be under the command of the local Mexican Army commanders, the agreement, according to General Henry, represented the most liberal terms that could be obtained. He was confident that close cooperation with the, Mexican authorities would result, as it had in other instances, in a freedom of action far beyond the actual terms of the agreement.\textsuperscript{53} In forwarding it to the Operations Division of the General
Staff for approval, General Henry recommended paying scrupulous attention to a consideration that was more often disregarded than not, pointing out:

The success of this operation and subsequent relations with Mexico will, in a large part, be dependent upon the care with which the personnel . . . is selected and {upon] their conduct after arrival in Mexico. Every effort must be made to select personnel not only well qualified technically in their specialty, but also qualified temperamentally to work . . . (in) daily close association with the Mexican personnel involved in this operation . . . . They must, at all times, be on the alert not to give the impression, either by word or expression, of impatience or disapproval of local customs.54

Next in importance to the weather and communication service agreement was a procedural change adopted in 1944. Under the original flight agreement the United States was required to notify the Mexican Government twenty-four hours in advance of each flight. The prescribed channel-through The Adjutant General's Office, the Mexican Embassy in Washington, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City, and thence to the appropriate Mexican military authorities-was devious and the 24-hour requirement was cumbersome. Early in 1944 the defense commission agreed upon a change in procedure. In effect, the new requirement was simply that the commander of each flight would, upon departure from the American base, notify the first Mexican airfield by radio.55

The burdensome features of the original flight agreement had not detracted from its importance as long as the situation seemed to call for reinforcing the air defenses of the Panama Canal. One of the solid facts in the hurly-burly of 1941 and a bright spot in the perilous days immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor was the existence of a convenient, safe, and friendly air corridor to Panama. The later modifications in the agreement were symbolic of the closing ties between the two countries, an increasing cooperation, which found concrete expression in the measures the United States was taking to help insure the security of Mexico and in the parallel steps taken by Mexico to assist in the defense of the continental United States.
The United States and the Security of Mexico

During the twenty-seven months that intervened between the German invasion of Poland and the attack on Pearl Harbor, Mexico's chief problem of defense was one of internal security. Discussion in the staff conversations of 1940, although it took place at a time when fear of an Axis victory was very real, discounted the danger of an Axis assault on Mexico. The Antilles, it was believed, presented an almost impervious defensive screen against raids from across the Atlantic; a strike from the far side of the Pacific seemed extremely unlikely. Much more ground existed for the belief that a "fifth column" was at work undermining the security of Mexico. Even before the European war started, Nazi agents had been placed in Mexico in hopes of organizing the rather large body of Mexicans of German descent into a propaganda and potential espionage agency, of securing a hold on the Mexican mining industry, and of preparing an "underground railroad" into the United States against the time it might be needed. Anti-Americanism, always a convenient host for any kind of political parasite, was crossed with totalitarianism and took on a malignant form. The Sinarquista Movement, which an American news correspondent in Mexico considered as potentially the most dangerous fifth column in the Americas, was a good example of Nazi funds and intrigue at work. A local movement of obscure origins, Sinarquismo was carefully fostered by the Axis agents in Mexico. Even if it seldom emerged into the open, Nazi sentiment by its very existence was a threat to internal security, for the Mexican Government gave every appearance of being determined to carry out the letter and spirit of the Panama and Havana agreements. As the American airport development program progressed, Nazi activity in Mexico became a matter of more direct concern to the War Department. At one point it was "reliably reported" to the Military Intelligence Division that Nazi agents had obtained full sets of the detailed plans for all the new fields. As the United States saw it, this side of Mexico's security problem was foremost.
In the spring of 1940, shortly before the Nazi armies broke the lull in the European war by invading Norway and Denmark, the Tar Department G-2 Division prepared a long, detailed "combat estimate" of Mexico's military establishment. The burden of the report was that the Mexican Army, although adequate for suppressing domestic uprisings and maintaining internal security, would, for lack of equipment and training, be unable to wage a successful war against any strong opponent. The principal shortages were in artillery and planes and munitions of all sorts, the report continued, and neither officers nor men had been trained "as a cohesive team in the tactics and technique of modern warfare." The Mexican Navy, which had existed as a separate service only since 1 January 1940, a matter of three months, consisted of little more than a few coastal patrol boats. The obvious conclusion was not lost upon either the Mexican or the United States Government;

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both saw the problem of Mexican defense as one of obtaining war materials in the United States and of establishing training programs for Mexican soldiers there.

At this time, the Mexican Government was negotiating in the United States for the purchase of thirty-two 75-mm. guns, fifty thousand rifles, fifty to a hundred observation planes, eighteen pursuit planes, and all the necessary ammunition. The problem involved obtaining not only the guns and planes but also the dollar credits to pay for them. Unwilling to set up political hurdles or assume financial obligations that might lead to budgetary complications, the Mexican Government throughout 1940 and 1941 remained chary of accepting financial aid from the United States. By the beginning of 1941, three Central American republics and Mexico were the only Latin American countries that had not submitted a list of arms requirements to the War Department. In October, seven months after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, Mexico presented its first list. Included in it were one hundred 60-mm. mortars, twenty 37-mm. antiaircraft cannon with a thousand rounds of high-explosive shells for each cannon, seventy-six
training planes, ten amphibian bombers, parachutes, machine guns, and two hundred armed and armored motorcycles. Although every item was of the highest priority to Mexico the staff representatives, having been instructed not to discuss terms of payment, were unable to tell the American representatives whether or not the materials were to be obtained under lend-lease. Further delay followed. On 27 March 1942, a little more than a year after lend-lease was enacted, the first lend-lease agreement with Mexico was signed. The approach of war had broken down Mexican scruples against accepting American credits, while the oil and claims settlement of November 1941 had removed a major obstacle in the way of granting them. Preliminary discussion leading to the lend-lease agreement indicated a maximum credit of $29,000,000 would be provided, but in the final agreement of 27 March the credit advanced, at the express request of Mexico, was reduced to $10,000,000. A second lend-lease agreement, signed a year later on 18 March 1943, increased the original credit to $40,000,000.

Although the coming of war to America had solved the question of financial credit, its effect upon the availability of war materials themselves was quite another story. From the beginning of the Latin American arms pro-

gram, and particularly after June 1940, scarcely any of the type of equipment desired by the Latin American nations had been available, and the attack on Pearl Harbor thoroughly disrupted the program. Mexico's requirements, and all like requests, were now subject to scrutiny under a new light. When the actual war needs of the United States itself were considered, the items that Mexico most needed appeared more than ever to be the very materials the United States could least afford to part with. Antiaircraft ammunition, planes, and machine guns were all insufficient for the United States' needs, and there were other commitments, with higher priority, that awaited fulfillment.

Nevertheless, as soon as the lend-lease agreement was signed and came into
effect the flow of aid began. Small at first, it grew larger and larger until by
the end of December 1946 a total of $39,000,000 in goods and services had
been provided. Of this amount, the War Department's share came to
$31,000,000.66

The joint defense commission, which for the first time sat as a formal
commission four days before the official signing of the lend-lease
agreement, became the board of first review for all Mexican lend-lease
requests. The security of the Pacific coast and the construction of the
Tehuantepec air base were the immediate objects of the commission's
attention; then the commission turned to lend-lease matters. Three projects
submitted to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration in April seem to have
been indorsed, although not formally recommended, by the commission.
They were, first, the rehabilitation of the Mexican railway system; second, a
shipbuilding program designed to provide small coastal vessels; and third,
the machinery, equipment, and funds for building a high-octane gasoline
refinery. But the Lend-Lease Administration, holding strictly to the
limitation that lend-lease projects must be "necessary for the war effort,"
declared these three proposals ineligible because they would be in the nature
of public works or of commercial character.

Mexico's entry into the war, toward the end of May 1942, gave a new
urgency to its defense requirements. At all the June meetings of the
commission, and there were four of them, most of the discussion dealt with
the details of getting planes and artillery and trucks and ammunition into the
hands of the Mexican Army. On 27 June, having reconsidered its previous
dictum, the Lend-Lease Administration suggested that a positive program of
economic assistance to Mexico might be in order, namely that transportation
facilities might be built up, east and west highways constructed, and docks
and airfields improved.67 At the 11 September meeting of the defense com-

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mission, General Castillo Najera stated that Mexico's lend-lease allotment
had been increased to $70,000,000, and that the greater portion was to be
applied "to land defenses, of which the railroads and highways are a part." 68 What the general had in mind, apparently, were the credits established by the Export-Import Bank as part of the November 1941 claims settlement, for the only increase made in the original lend-lease credits was that of March 1943 when the allotment was raised to $40,000,000.

The Lend-Lease Administration again turned reluctant when the defense commission seconded a request of the Mexican Government for machine tools and equipment to establish a munitions industry in the vicinity of Mexico City. Only a part of the munitions program-the proposed ordnance plant at Mexico City for the manufacture of 75-mm. shells-went beyond the discussion stage. Known as Military Project No. 1, recommended by the defense commission, approved by the American War and Navy Departments, and finally accepted by the Lend-Lease Administration in December 1943, it was 80 percent complete when the end of the war brought a sudden end to lend-lease deliveries in September 1945. The machinery, tools, and equipment to the amount of $1,000,000 that had been turned over to Mexico for the plant did not rust away unused. They were retained by the Mexican Government and installed in publicly operated plants.69 Two complementary projects-a factory for smokeless powder and a small arms factory-failed to receive the approval of the Lend-Lease Administration before the end of hostilities terminated lend-lease operations. Both had been strongly, though not formally, recommended by the joint defense commission.70

Almost half the aid Mexico received from the War Department, in dollar value, was in the form of airplanes. Including the twenty-five P-47's turned over to the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron, a total of 305 aircraft of various types was provided for the use of the Mexican Army. Most of the planes were trainers, a few were patrol bombers. One of the very earliest lend-lease transactions with Mexico involved the transfer of five naval patrol bombers during the submarine blitz of March 1942. In the next year the War Department assigned thirty Douglas light bombers to Mexico for antisubmarine patrols and escort duties. The total value of the planes transferred by the War Department came to $14,619,440.71

Training programs for members of the Mexican armed forces, which had been instituted in 1942 at the various service 'schools in the United States,
were an important segment of defense aid. They reached their peak in the twelve months following 1 July 1943, when about 165 officers and men of the Mexican Army and Navy could be found enrolled at any time. The largest programs were at the two naval training schools, the Subchaser Training Center at Miami and the Air Training Center at Corpus Christi; somewhat smaller numbers, about fifty in all, were enrolled in the Army's flying schools, in aviation mechanics and Link trainer courses, and in logistics and supply schools. In 1944 the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron began its training in the United States and the other pilot training programs were reduced accordingly. The costs of all the training programs were charged as lend-lease aid.

Mexico and the Defense of California

American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Cardenas, singly and jointly for the defense of the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.

There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and General Cardenas.

The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas...
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American territory. "An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our Aircraft Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory." The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain Mexico's permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California. These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in Wash-

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ington. The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers it inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory, as it is convinced that the Mexican Government would reject such a request at this time." In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway, then serving as one of the American staff representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis attack is delivered or imminent." 76

No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations. Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites. An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho
the same day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install
the radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added
that of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A separate
party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering
Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify the
Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed
to the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it.78 Although no signs of
enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until
the end of January to investigate suitable sites for landing fields, to report on
the availability of water and other supplies along the route of
communications from the border south, and in general to add to the Army's
store of information about the area.79 As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor
frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the Ebright mission
became clarified,

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General DeWitt's Western Defense Command headquarters gave it firmer
support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern
California Sector.80 Meanwhile, other groups had crossed the border, and
had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta Salispuedes,
20 miles northwest of Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of
Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.

With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations
over staging fields the previous summer—whether Mexico would permit the
entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to
become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the
reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives
on 3 December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the
survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable. The
first draft of the instructions for "the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9
December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States
personnel will be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing,"
but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel Ridgway,
this particular restriction was deleted. Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially insistent that no soldiers cross into Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington. Consequently, the Ebright group was turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their weapons behind. Sometimes, depending on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform, but never under arms, and not even the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Cardenas could bring about a definite acceptance of the American view. The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might be to send American soldiers into Mexico in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to install the radar sets refused would be even more undesirable. Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes in the matter. His efforts to obtain a less dangerous and more face-saving solution continued but met with slight success. After the summer of 1942 this particular issue ceased to be a matter of record. The establishment of the radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California, and the withdrawal of American personnel were probably responsible.

Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use. The equipment itself was turned over to the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the sets, and the Americans had withdrawn except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station. The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and
saw no need to install additional equipment. By the summer of 1943 retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for one officer and three enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused. By mid-May 1944 the Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of California and, much to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first of June. When, at a meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City, General Henry was obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the Navy's supplying and maintaining the operation of the sets. For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed operation with gasoline and oil supplied by the Navy. The other two were moved away. During the two years they had been in operation, the stations performed a useful function. They had closed all but a small gap in the network around the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent, and valuable training in the use of highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.

As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz. Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations. Both the War Department and the joint defense commission, when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April 1942. After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and
recommended three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south of Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south of La Ventura. Later, four other fields were surveyed. For three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the joint defense commission, called a halt to all activity in connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to give General Cardenas an opportunity to make a decision. After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Cardenas and especially General Juan Felipe Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the peninsula. General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was committed to assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.

By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields. The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations, the discussion became academic.

In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance with its
general principles. With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Cardenas plan of February-March 1942 for the defense of the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the members—Admiral Johnson and General Castillo Najera—understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Cardenas agreements. A casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to send American troops into Mexico.

In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General Cardenas. It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas—Mexican and American—by the forces of the respective countries, for an exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permitted the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval of General Cardenas. The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American personnel, and insisted that the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were operating. Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one for the decision of the two governments." The points on which the two
commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense commission.

The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940.93 Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section, suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in December 1942. The new scheme—to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense plan—was no more easily agreed upon than the old. General Henry, recently appointed senior Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican section. Discussion during the meetings the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The question of command proved to be the stumbling block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan. Finally, after more than two years of effort, the commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for other plans of collaboration between any two nations." 94

In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California, by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Cardenas, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two countries. The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which American fliers died, these were the true measure of the
cooperation that began in 1941. There were indications that ties so strongly forged would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been formally designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission represented the United States, to continue the defense commission in the postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries that developed out of their wartime association are proof that the New World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.

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Endnotes

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1 Manuel Avila Camacho, *La Participacion de Mexico en la Defensa Continental* (Secretaria de Gobernacion, Mexico, 1941). An English text of President Avila Camacho's address has been re-leased by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations under the title *Mexico and the War in the Pacific* (International Press Service Bureau, National and International Problems Series, No. 10, Mexico City, 1942).


3 From an address by the American Minister to Uruguay, delivered at Montevideo on 23 June 1940, quoted in Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, p. 614.

4 See Ch. VIII, above, and Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 616-17.

5 Memo of Conv (Dept of State), 11 Jun 40, WPD 4338. A condensed report of the same con­ference is in Memo, Capt Spears, USN, for CNO, 10 Jul 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

6 Memo of Conv, 19 Jul 40, sub: Co-operation Between Mexico and the U.S. in Hemisphere Def; Memo of Conv, 22 Jul 40, sub: Co-operation Between Mexico and the U.S. in Hemisphere Def. Both in WPD 4338.

7 Report of Capt Spears, USN, and Capt David Coello Ochoa, Mexican Navy, title: Result of Staff Convs . . ., 24 Jul 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

8 Jt Memo, SW and SN for Secy State, 31 Dec 40, sub: Agenda, Proposed Jt Mexico-U.S. Def Comm, WPD 4338-9; Notes on Staff Convs to Date With Mexico, prepared by Col Ridgway, 12 Feb 41, WPD 4338-12; Memo, Capt Spears, USN, for Col Ridgway, 24 Jan 41, OPD Misc 61.

9 Betty Kirk, *'Covering the Mexican Front* (Norman: University of
Oklahoma, 1942), p. 252.


11 Memo, WPD for CofS, 31 Jul 40, sub: Staff Convs, Mexico-U.S., WPD 4338-3. See also, Summary of Staff Conversations, n.d., but about 28 Dec 40, WPD 4115-44.

12 Notes on Staff Convs with Mexico, prepared by Col Ridgway, 12 Feb 41, WPD 4338-12.

13 Ltr, Under Secy State Welles to President Roosevelt, 8 Aug 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Memo for Record, Col Ridgway, 11 Aug 41, WPD 4338-26; Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 1140-43.


16 Memo, Ind with Ltr from Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations to U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, 20 Dec 40, JMUSDC files

17 The minutes of the 1941 meetings are among the records of the joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission.

18 Jt Memo, SW and SN for Secy State, 31 Dec 40, sub: Agenda, Proposed Jt Mexico-U.S. Def Comm, WPD 4338-9; Min of mtg, 17 Feb 41, MDG7, 1941.


21 Memo, Gen Embick for CofS, 1 Dec 41, MDC-1/16, Book 1.

22 *La Prensa* (Mexico City, D.F.), December 8, 1941.

23 *El Nacional* (Mexico City, D.F.), December 9, 1941.

24 *El Universal* (Mexico City, D.F.), December 10, 1941.

25 Kirk, *Covering the Mexican Front*, p. 73; *Facts on File*, *1941*, p. 487; Telg, Amer Embassy, Mexico City, to Dept of State, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4338-37.

26 Memo for Record, Maj Mathewson, WPD, 18 Dec 41, WPD 4316-40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Dec 41, OCS 21188-1G; Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 31 Dec 41, WPD 4338-40.


29 Executive Order 9080, 27 Feb 42, JMUSDC files.


31 Memo, WPD for CofAAF and CofS GHQ, 7 Jan 42, WPD 4338-43.

32 Memo for Information, n.d. [Oct 50], sub: Background for Creation of JMUSDC, MDC-1. The Department of State designated the assistant chief of the American Republics Division to be consultant to the commission. He attended a few of the meetings in 1942, but soon this practice was discontinued for the duration of the war.


35 Min of mtgs, 11-12 Mar 41, MDC-7, 1941.

36 Min of mtg, 25 Mar 41, MDC-7, 1941. The flight agreement was signed on 1 April by Under Secretary of State Welles and the Mexican Ambassador. It became effective upon the exchange of ratifications by the two governments on 25 April.

37 Min of mtgs, 15, 17, 18, 24, 26 Apr 41, MDC-7, 1941; Ltr, Secy State to SW, 22 May 41, AG 580.81 (4-7-41); AAF Reg No. 61-1, 18 Jul 41, Flying, Foreign Countries, Mexico.

38 Min of mtg, 6 Jun 41, MDC-7, 1941.


40 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 May 41, and atchd papers, WPD 4338-18; Min of mtg, 16 Jun 41, MDC-7, 1941. It should be noted that by the WPD memo of 24 May the Chief of Air Corps was made responsible for carrying out the flight agreement and rules and was to maintain "appropriate liaison" with the War Plans Division and G-2.


44 Ltr, CG CDC to GHQ, 25 Dec 41; Ltr, CG CDC to GHQ, 5 Jan 42. Both in WPD 437210. Min, Gen Council mtg, 29 Apr 42.
45 Min of mtgs, 17 Apr, 24 Apr, 30 Apr 42, MDC-7A.


47 Min, Gen Council mtg, 21 Jul 42; Memo, OPD for WDCMC, 3 Aug 41, sub: Use of Air Base at Cozumel Island, being a msg for transmittal to CG CDC, OPD 336 Mexico, Case 13.


49 Ltr, CofS to Gen Brett, CG CDC, 23 Dec 42, OPD 336 Mexico, Case 17; D/F, JMUSDC to G-2, for rad to Col Frederic E. Glantzberg, 11 Jan 43, JMUSDC files; Min, Gen Council mtg, 1 Feb 43.

50 Memo, ASW Lovett for CofS, 9 May 44, with atchd paper entitled, Purpose of Airport Development Program Air and Sea Plane Bases, and accompanying map, OPD 580.82, Sec. III-A, Case 71.

51 For the radar negotiations, see below, pp. 356 ff.

52 OPD Memo for Record, no signature, 15 Feb 43, sub: U.S. Personnel for . . . Service in Mexico; Memo, Gen Henry for OPD, 14 Apr 43. Both in OPD 336 Mexico, Case 21. Min of mtg, 22 Mar 43, MDC-7A.

53 Memo, Gen Henry for OPD, 17 Apr 43, OPD 336 Mexico, Case 28.

54 Ibid.

55 Second and Third Annual Reports, JMUSDC files.

56 Memo of Convs, 19 Jul 40, WPD 4338.

57 Kirk, *Covering the Mexican Front*, pp. 315-16; Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations, 15 Nov 41, ONI, in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, pp. 1799-1800; see also Cline, *The United States and Mexico*, pp. 293-
94.

**58** Ltr, Ambassador Daniels to President, 3 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; G-2 Report, 4 Sep 41, sub: Pan Amer Airports in Mexico, WPD 4338-29.

**59** Mexican Combat Estimate, 1 Apr 40, WPD 4338 Bulky Package.

**60** *Ibid.* The strength of the Mexican Army was estimated at 10,000 officers and 52,000 enlisted man, with a like number of reserves.


**62** Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 18 Dec 40; Memo, Mr. Wilson, Ln Off, Dept of State, for Col Ridgway, 2 Jan 41. Both in WPD 4338-8.

**63** Min of mtg, 9 Oct 41, MDC-7, 1941.

**64** C. W. Kempter, draft MS, "United Mexican States," a chapter from A History of Lend-Lease to the Other American States (hereafter cited as Kempter MS), pp. 2-3, JUSMDC files; ASF Int Div, Lend-Lease, II, 1232.

**65** See above, pp. 224, 232-33.

**66** Kempter MS, pp. 96, 110.

**67** Kempter MS, pp. 4-6; Min of mtgs, June 1942, MDC-7A.

**68** Min of mtg, 11 Sep 42, MDC-7A.

**69** Kempter MS, pp. 20-24, 29, 36-40.

**70** *Ibid.*, pp. 42-5G.


73 Third Annual Report, JMUSDC files; Kempter MS, p. 76.

74 8th Ind, CG AFCC to TAG, 8 Jul 41, on Ltr, CG GHQ AF to TAG, 10 Apr 41, sub: Extension of AWS-Mexico, AG 660.2 AA (4-10-41).

75 D/F, WPD to TAG, 23 Jul 41, WPD 4484. Other communications on this proposal are in the same file and in WPD 3640-7 through 3640-21, AWS.

76 Note dated 17 Jul 41 on 8th Ind, cited in fn 74, above.

77 Min of mtg, 3 Dec 41, MDC-7, 1941.

78 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 10 Dec 41, OCS 20648-40; Rad, Adams to CG WDC, 11 Dec 41, WDC 092 Mexico (4); Tel Conv, Col Sandusky, G-2 Southern Calif. Sector, with Col Dumas, G-3 WDC, 17 Dec 41 (9:10 A.M., 12:15 P.M., 1:55 P.M.) and 18 Dec 41 (2:10 P.M.), WDC 092 Mexico (3).

79 Major Ebright's report of his reconnaissance, a 45-page document covering the period 16 December 1941-25 January 1942, is in WDC 092 Mexico (7). The Signal officer's report of the same reconnaissance is in WDC 092 Mexico (3).

80 Tel Conv, Mai Gen Walter K. Wilson, CG Southern Calif. Sector, with Col Dumas, G-3 WDC, 3 Jan 42 (10:45 A.M.); Tel Conv, Gen Wilson with Gen Omar N. Bradley, CofS WDC, 3 Jan 42. Both in WDC 092 Mexico (3).

81 Memo, DCoF S Mai Gen William Bryden for CofAAF, 9 Dec 41, OCS 20648-39, copy in WPD 4484. The WPD copy bears the following Note for Record: "11 Dec 41. G-2 suggested and I concurred that the last sentence of Par. 1 be rescinded. I personally informed [Brig.] Gen {Martin F.] Scanlon, Air Staff of this decision . . . ." /s/ M. B. R.

82 For the view of the War Department, see Min, SLC mtg, 20 Dec 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 40; Memo, Gen Arnold, DCoF S for Air, for SGS, 20 Dec
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41, OCS 20648-44; Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Mil Rcn in Mexico, WPD 4338-36; and Rad, Marshall to CG WDC, 22 May 42, No. 2306, WDC 092 Mexico (4). For Gen DeWitt's position, see Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Bryden, DCoFS WD, 18 Dec 41 (9:55 A.M.); and Tel Conv, Gen Bryden with Gen Bradley, CofS WDC, 19 Dec 41 (2:45 P.M.). Both in WDC 092 Mexico (3). On the same general subject, see also Tel Conv, Col Thomas L. Martin with Capt E. M. Boylin, IV Interceptor Comd, 28 May 42, WDC 092 Detectors (12).

83 3d Ind, Hq IV Fighter Comd to CG 4th AF, 18 Jul 42, on Ltr, SDC to CG WDC, 1 Jul 42, sub: AWS, WDC 092 Detectors (13); 3d Ind, CG IV Fighter Comd to CG 4th AF, 29 Aug 42, on Ltr, TAG for SW to CG WDC, 22 Aug 42, sub: Radar Operation in Mexico, WDC 092 Detectors (12).

84 Tel Conv, Col Stockton, G-3 WDC, with Col Mathewson, OPD, 23 Oct 42 (2:15 P.M.), WDC 092 Mexico (3).

85 Memo, Chief Mexican Sec, JUSMDC, for U.S. Sec, JUSMDC, 12 Jul 43; 1st Ind, CG WDC to TAG, 2 Aug 43, on Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 23 Jul 43; Ltr, CG 4th AF to CG AAF, 6 Jul 44; Rad, McKee, Ln Off, to CG WDC, 9 Nov 44; Memo, G-4 and G-2 for CofS WDC, 28 Mar 45. All in WDC 092 Detectors (14). Min of mtg, 14 Aug 44, MDC-7A, Book 3, JMUSDC files.

86 Ltr, CG WDC to CG FF GHQ for Gen Embick, 27 Feb 42, WDC 092 Mexico (2); Min of mtg, 10 Apr 42, MDCr7A (1).

87 Ltr, CG IV Fighter Comd to CG WDC, 1 Jun 42, WDC 092 Airfields (10).

88 Ltr, CG 4th AF to CG WDC, 8 Jun 42, sub: Additional Airfields in Lower California; 2d Ind, SW through TAG to CG WDC, 25 Jun 42; 4th Ind, SW through TAG to CG WDC, 16 Jun 42; Tel Conv, Col Mathewson, OPD, with Asst G-3 WDC, 18 Jun 42; Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Embick, 4 Jul 42 (12:30 P.M.); Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Henry, 24 Jul 42 (9:50 A.M.). All in WDC 092 Airfields (10). Tel Conv, Col Stockton, G-3 WDC, with Mr. Nelson, Nelson Equipment Co., Los Angeles, 25 Aug 42, WDC 092 Detectors (12).
89 Note of Mr. Wilson on SLC mtg, 8 Feb 43, SLC Min, Vol. IV; Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Rico, 26 Mar 43, WDC 092 Airfields (10); Min, Gen Council mtg, 29 Mar 43; OPD Memo for Record, 1 Jul 43, OPD 336 Mexico, Case 38; Min of mtgs, 26 Jun, 13 Aug 43, MDC-7A (Book 2).

90 Jt Plan for the Def of the Pacific Coastal Regions . . ., /s/ Lt Gen J. L. DeWitt and Rear Adm J. W. Greenslade, 22 Feb 42. The earlier versions were a DeWitt-Greenslade Plan of 20 Jan 42 and a General Cardenas Plan of Collaboration, 5 Feb 42, WDC 092 Mexico-U.S., Vol. I.


92 Gen DeWitt, in a Tel Conv with Col Martin, ACofS WDC, 18 Mar 42, WDC 092 Detectors (12).

93 See Ch. XIV, below.

94 Min of mtg, 1 Nov 44, MDC-7A, Book 2. The foregoing is based on the journals of the commission for the years 1942-45.

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CHAPTER XIV

The United States and Canada: Copartners in Defense

Politically and sentimentally attached to Great Britain, Canada for many years before the outbreak of the war had been linked by the facts of geography, by a mutual cultural tradition, and by economic ties to the United States. The Dominion's "Sunday religion," as a witty Canadian scholar has put it, came from Britain, but her "weekday habits" were North American. In early years, the interplay of Sunday religion and weekday habits had not been without friction. There had been those in the United States who could not refrain from casting covetous eyes on their weaker neighbor to the north and who sporadically urged Canada to exchange her bonds with Britain for a marriage of convenience with the United States. The result was that defense, to Canadians, meant protection against their impetuous and more powerful neighbor. Notwithstanding those in England who told them to "loose the bonds and go," Canadians felt they had to rely on their British connection to save them from the fate of the Sabine women, but the position began to shift in the decade before World War I. As Canada ceased to be a subject for expansionist oratory in the United States and developed a sense of security on her own borders, she became aware that in disputes with the United States the British connection could not invariably be depended upon. After World War I came a drive toward independence in the conduct of international relations, a drive that brought the establishment of direct diplomatic ties with the United States, but which was held in check "by a cautious desire to retain the advantages of the British connection and, as far as might be, to follow a line not dissimilar to that taken by the United States." 1 More than a century of peace was proof that among nations, at least, a triangle could be a more satisfactory arrangement than a marriage of convenience.

During the 'twenties and early 'thirties Canadians as well as Americans found it difficult to see any real threat to their respective countries. In Ottawa as in Washington wishful optimism and a concomitant aversion to international commitments had become so deep-rooted that the activities of Japan's
"Manchuria Gang" and the ruffians of Hitler and Mussolini could scarcely shake them. The discerning few who saw the beginnings of a world-wide conflagration in the successive challenges of the totalitarian powers could barely make their warnings heard against the many who imagined the Western Hemisphere to be a fireproof house. As the international situation deteriorated, it became clear to President Roosevelt and others that the United States must assume responsibility for defending the Americas. The step from a "Good Neighbor" policy to a policy of hemisphere defense was short, clearly indicated by logic and necessity, and had the merit of commending itself to various shades of opinion. To the great majority of Americans hemisphere defense was a means of putting off, and to others it was a way of preparing for, the day when the evil intentions of the dictatorships would reveal themselves.²

Rapprochement

Neither Canada nor the United States could be hurried into a defensive alliance. Perhaps it was, as one authority has written, that "the ghosts of Blaine and Theodore Roosevelt still walked." ³ Nevertheless, some progress was made. A trial balloon sent up by the President in a speech at Chautauqua in August 1936 was followed, in March of the next year, by the first of a series of meetings between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the President in which the matter of common defense was discussed. The problem of coastal defense was explored in other meetings between the President and the Prime Minister and in informal talks between American and Canadian staff officers in January 1938.

President Roosevelt spelled out American policy more precisely in his address at Kingston, Ontario, on 18 August 1938. "We in the Americas," he said, "are no longer a far away continent, to which the eddies of controversy beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm." Canada and the United States, Mr. Roosevelt continued, could "in friendship and in entire understanding" resolve to explore every pathway and possibility that might
lead to world peace. "Even if those hopes (of world peace) are disappointed," the President told his listeners, "we can assure each other that this hemisphere at least shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilization can flourish unimpaired. The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other

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Empire." 4 Prime Minister Mackenzie King gave a warm welcome to the neighborly sentiment expressed by Mr. Roosevelt. Canada, the Prime Minister armed, was determined to look after its own defenses. "We, too," he said, "have our obligations as a good friendly neighbor, and one of them is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory." 5

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 the problem of coastal defense in particular and of the defense of the Western Hemisphere in general took on more vital importance; at the same time the relationship between the two countries was radically changed, for Canada immediately entered the war at the side of Britain. The United States was determined to stay out and to maintain a technical, and for the time being a strict, neutrality. The difference in status of the two countries made less feasible a joint approach to their common problems of defense. Canada thrust its energies into the task of getting men and material to the battle front in Europe; the United States continued to devote itself to the matter of Western Hemisphere defense, especially that of Brazil.

The incredibly swift rush of events on the European front in May and June of 1940 shattered any complacency that existed in either Canada or the United States and eventually, though not immediately, brought the two countries into each other's arms. The plunge of German armies through the Low
Countries and northern France, the tragedy of Dunkerque, and the subsequent fall of France seemed to offer the probability that Hitler would become master not only of Europe but of the Atlantic Ocean as well. Both Canada and the United States were forced to consider the alarming possibility that by the following winter England would have ceased to be an active combatant.

Within the space of a few weeks following the German breakthrough, an expanded defense program was hurried through Congress and the War Department. The authorized strength of the Regular Army was increased, the goal of the Army's aviation program was raised, the movement for selective service and for inducting the National Guard into the Army was given official blessing, and war planning was hastily recast to conform more closely to the situation.

Now given highest priority, the RAINBOW 4 plan was rushed to completion and submitted to the President on 13 June. Of the five RAINBOW plans, this was the only one for which the Joint Planners assumed a collapse of British and French resistance in Europe and the loss of the British and French fleets. Recognizing the preponderant strength that under these circumstances could be brought to bear against the Western Hemisphere, and which it was thought would be directed first against South America, the Joint Planners took for their "primary immediate concern" the defense of Panama, the Caribbean area, the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and northeastern Brazil. Brazil was the pot of gold at the rainbow's end.

The fact that the War Plans Division was inclined to view the South Atlantic with particular concern and to minimize the threat in the North Atlantic was one element in the situation that tended to retard progress toward a joint United States-Canadian defense effort. The RAINBOW 4 plan recognized Canada as a potential and necessary ally. It envisaged an alliance, "for the immediate purpose of cooperation in the defense of Newfoundland and Greenland," under which United States forces would have the use of Canadian ports, airfields, highways, and railroads. It was essential, the plan
continued, that a "definite understanding" be reached as to the extent Canada could provide for its own defense with its own forces. 7 But partly because men and equipment were in short supply, partly because Canada was a belligerent while the United States was not, and partly because the danger seemed to come from the opposite direction, Army planners were reluctant to commit American troops for defense garrisons in Newfoundland and Canada. Instead, they believed it would be preferable to rush forces northward when an emergency developed.

How circumstances took the RAINBOW 4 plan in tow might well be the lesson for the year 1941.

In Canada the reaction to the critical turn in the wax took much the same course as it did in the United States. There was the same headlong rush to expand the armed forces, to speed up the production of war goods, and much the same concern about England's chances of surviving. On this point, Canadians were more concerned, but less skeptical, than Americans. For the first time, the feeling of security that the British fleet and the Atlantic Ocean had engendered was shaken, indeed badly shaken, but the result was not a reshaping of Canada's strategy of defense. The policy of defeating the enemy before he could reach Canadian soil now merged with the classical military doctrine of concentrating at the decisive point. Thus the Canadian Govern-

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These active preparations for defending the continent and the possibility of the British fleet's withdrawing to Canadian bases and of Canada's becoming the citadel of the British Empire, which, despite Canadian confidence in Britain's ability to hold, was still a possibility to be considered, seemed to call for a shift toward a continental, rather than a national, war effort. This shift was the keynote of a program that a group of prominent Canadians belonging to the Institute of International Affairs urged in July 1940. They analyzed the situation as follows:

While self-respect demands that Canadians conduct their own defense as much as possible, the United States will, in order to protect herself, insist on intervening at once if Canada is attacked or threatened—particularly if she is not sure of Canada's strategy and strength. Therefore, Canada's best chance of maintaining her national existence is the frank admission from the beginning that her defense must be worked out in cooperation with the United States, on the basis of a single continental defense policy. The emphasis must therefore be on continental effort rather than on national effort.  

It would be unwise, they said, to set up geographic limits of responsibility but they pointed out that Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland were of greater strategic interest to Canada than were Iceland, Bermuda, and the West Indies. Canada could and should undertake the defense of Newfoundland and Labrador; that of Greenland, it was suggested, might be shared. However, these were matters they considered it best to leave until a political agreement and financial arrangements of some sort were worked out with the United States and until there was the closest collaboration between the two general staffs. Although the group proposing this course of action included several men who occupied official positions, the program at the time represented only a segment of Canadian opinion, not official policy.

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In the meantime, Canada had been scraping the barrel to send aid to Britain, and now, with the Battle of France drawing to an unhappy end, Mr. Mackenzie King called on the United States for assistance. Canada's most urgent needs, the Prime Minister asserted, were arms and equipment and
training facilities. In June the Canadian Government listed its arms requirements: 250,000 Enfield rifles and whatever .30-caliber ammunition the War Department could spare; 100 75-mm. field pieces; 800 machine guns; and 500 Thompson submachine guns, with 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. 10

Unfortunately, the Canadian requirements were also the trouble spots of the American defense program. On 1 July the War Department could promise Canada only 28,500 rifles, and extend the possibility of 20,000 more that had been provisionally allocated to the Irish Free State. There was, according to the War Department, no surplus ammunition for sale, and neither field pieces nor machine guns could be spared. Nevertheless, in the course of the next few weeks the War Department revised its first estimates, and by the end of July Canada had been definitely promised 80,000 rifles and 4,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition. 11

Among the problems that faced Secretary Stimson when he took charge of the War Department in July, none was more puzzling or more troublesome than this one of providing Canada with arms. When it came to seeing surpluses, General Marshall and his staff officers generally viewed the problem through dark glasses. On the other hand, the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry L. Morgenthau, who before Mr. Stimson's appointment had been handling many matters that properly belonged to the War Department, were inclined to be overly generous. But the actual figures given in the various lists of urgent requirements drawn up by the Canadian Government or in lists of the available equipment and arms drawn up by the War Department are not significant, for Canada was anxious to obtain as much as it could and the American "surplus" was whatever the War Department chose to make it. 12

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Material aid was more easily given than the help that Mr. Mackenzie King sought for the pilot training program. The alarming events of May and June had made necessary an immediate expansion and revision of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which was just getting under way and
which was intended to be Canada's greatest contribution to the war. Until the expanded and revised program was functioning at full speed Mr. Mackenzie King hoped that "thousands" of pilots could be trained in the United States, but the Operations and Training Division of the United States General Staff (G-3), to whom the Canadian inquiry had been referred, was opposed on grounds that the American Air Corps training program would be seriously disrupted and delayed. This was irrespective of any legal restriction or possible violation of neutrality. 13 The President, in spite of his paternal interest in the policy of aid to Canada, agreed that it would be better if Canadian pilots were not trained in the United States, although at the same time he was willing to leave the door slightly open to the possibility. 14 For the moment, planes, engines, and tools were to be the extent of American aid to Canada's air training program.

The first move in the direction of a truly "continental effort" was a proposal made by the Canadian Prime Minister in mid June that talks be held between representatives of the two general staffs. The proposal was a source of some embarrassment to both the Department of State and the War Department, for neither was ready to accept. But after the President, in early July, assured the War Department that the talks would be informal and that no commitments would be requested or entered into, conferences got under way between Army, Navy, and Air officers of the two countries. 15 Not much progress had been made before new machinery for the staff talks presented itself in the shape of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States. This link between the two countries was forged by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King at the Ogdensburg conference of 17-18 August.

The Ogdensburg Meeting and Its Result

Mr. Churchill had once described Canada as "a magnet exercising a double attraction, drawing both great Britain and the United States towards herself
and thus drawing them closer to each other," but in the summer of 1940 the magnetic force was running in the opposite direction. One would have to transpose Canada and Great Britain in the simile. Although the long-standing personal friendship between the President and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, their previous meetings, and the new and sudden concern for the safety of North America undoubtedly paved the way for the Ogdensburg meeting, the impulse that brought them together at this time was the proposed transfer of American destroyers to Britain.

By mid-August the Roosevelt-Churchill exchanges on the question of destroyers for bases had reached the point where the mechanics of the transaction were involved. On 14 August President Roosevelt received an urgent message from Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who had been informed of the negotiations by Mr. Churchill. This message, according to the memory of Under Secretary of State Welles, included the suggestion that the President meet with Mr. Mackenzie King to discuss the destroyer question. Up to this time Mr. Roosevelt had apparently been planning to spend the following weekend cruising on the Potomac. Now he decided to go to the First Army maneuvers at Pine Camp, in upper New York State, and to invite Mr. Mackenzie King to meet him there. The decision was clinched by a report from the United States Minister in Ottawa on 16 August, which advised that pressure was mounting in Canada for an understanding with the United States on joint defense. The President, considerably ahead of his military advisers in his concern for the northeastern seaboard, was turning over in his mind the possibility of acquiring a naval base in Nova Scotia. At the same time, he realized that the closer to hemisphere defense he could tie the destroyer-base transactions the easier it would be to obtain popular approval. A meeting with Prime Minister Mackenzie King at this particular moment would emphasize this connection, would give Canadians the assurance of American interest in defending the top of the continent, and would permit discussion of a base site on Canada's eastern coast. The First Army maneuvers presented an opportune time and place. The President and his party, of which Secretary of War Stimson was a member, left Washington on the evening of 16 August.

Arriving at Pine Camp the next morning, the President and Secretary Stimson spent the day watching the maneuvers. On their return to Ogdens-
burg in the evening, Secretary Stimson was much surprised, he wrote in his
diary, to find the Prime Minister of Canada there, in President Roosevelt's
railroad car. Mr. Roosevelt opened the conversation with an account of the
destroyer-base negotiations. Turning to the matter of a base in Canada, he
emphasized that the arrangements must be with Canada, since it was a
.Dominion, and that this was the purpose of the meeting that evening. Then,
in the words of Mr. Stimson's diary:

. . . the President suggested that there should be a joint Board composed of representatives
of the Army and Navy and Air Forces in Canada, together with one lay member, and a
similar cup from the United States. The function of this Committee should be to discuss
plans for the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere, but particularly in
regard to an attack from the Northeast, and he pointed out how vitally important it was
that there should be conferences, discussions and plans made between the services of the
respective countries in case there should be an attack by way of the St. Lawrence or
northeastern coast of Canada, where sudden attack was very likely. 18

The President next pointed out the need for an American air and naval base
at Yarmouth or farther east along the coast of Nova Scotia. According to
Secretary Stimson, Mr. Mackenzie King was "perfectly delighted with the
whole thing." The President's "courage and initiative," the Prime Minister
said, "would be a most tremendous encouragement to the morale of Great
Britain and Canada," and for his part, Mackenzie King declared, "he would
at once agree to the creation of such a Board and that it should be done
immediately . . . ." 19 Mr. Stimson's own feeling about the meeting was that
"it was very possibly the turning point in the tide of the war, and that from
now on we could hope for better things." 20

A brief press announcement was issued the next day:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual
problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United
States.
It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set
up at once by the two countries.
This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and materiel. It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

For the important suggestion that the board should be a permanent body designed to meet a continuing problem instead of a particular situation, the Prime Minister was apparently responsible. 21

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On both sides of the border only a relatively few voices were raised in opposition. Some Americans were only lukewarm, and there were a few Canadians who saw in the Ogdensburg declaration the old problems of imperial relations being revived in a new form; but the critics were in the minority. Mr. Mackenzie King even went as far as to asseverate that "no development in our international relations has ever received such unanimous acclaim in this country." 22 The first reaction of the War Plans Division to the news of Ogdensburg was that something definite would undoubtedly have to be done to inject new life into the staff conversations. If "serious attention" were now to be given to joint planning, wrote Colonel Clark, the acting head of War Plans, there should be conferences in Canada, for the point had been reached where actual reconnaissance on the ground was needed. 23 The Permanent Joint Board on Defense would, it was thought, be a direct continuation of these earlier staff conferences.

The Functioning of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense

As soon as President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced their intention of establishing a joint board, the Canadian Government moved posthaste to set it in operation. On Tuesday, two days after the Ogdensburg meeting, the Canadian Minister in Washington suggested that the board hold its first session at Ottawa that Thursday. The
Canadian capital was acceptable as a meeting place; the proposed date was out of the question, for the American members had yet to be named. In the next few days the American section was appointed, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York was designated its chairman, and on Monday, 26 August 1940, scarcely more than a week after the President and the Prime Minister had agreed on the idea, the first meeting of the board took place.  

Canadian military planners had approached the first session of the board with certain questions remaining from the previous discussions. They were proceeding upon the expectation that if the defensive screen provided by the British Navy were rendered ineffective a large-scale attack against Canada might be launched sometime during the summer of 1941. As they assessed the possibilities, April 1941 would be the critical month, for that would be the time when the prelude to the attack—the attempts of the enemy to establish a foothold in Newfoundland and eastern Canada—would have to be started if an invasion of the American continent were to follow. In the meantime, during the nine months preceding April, hit-and-run raids could be expected, and although it was clear that the United States would enter the war as soon as enemy forces actually invaded Canada, American intervention was by no means certain in the event of a small-scale attack. It was therefore hoped that out of the deliberations of the Permanent Joint Board would come a statement of intentions from the United States. By an agreement reached with the Newfoundland Government only two or three days after the Ogdensburg meeting, Canada had taken over the defense of Newfoundland. How to apportion responsibility for the sea, air, and coastal defenses of that island was, according to the Canadian Government, the most pressing question the board had to consider. Next on the agenda proposed by Canada were the defenses of the Pacific coast. Third was the question of reciprocal maneuvers. The Canadian General Staff had received no assurance, finally, that the United States would provide the assistance in arms and equipment that Canada desired pending American participation in the war. The procurement of arms and ammunition therefore appeared on the agenda drawn up by the Canadian Government, but only as the last item of the
agenda. As a matter for deliberation by the board, long-range planning seems to have been given precedence over immediate needs.

American staff planners took somewhat the same approach. Like their Canadian counterparts, they were inclined to view the Permanent Joint Board as a means of proceeding with the unfinished business left over from the staff conversations. They were interested, in connection with the RAINBOW 4 planning, in knowing such details as what Canadian facilities—roads, airfields, and the like—would be available to American forces. The prospect of having an American base in Newfoundland and the talk of acquiring one in Nova Scotia now gave to such questions a timeliness that had previously been lacking, and the board would seem to have been a convenient instrument for obtaining the answers. But in this particular, the board had very little latitude because all matters relating to the Newfoundland base were being strictly confined to discussions with the British Government in London. Furthermore,

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President Roosevelt, for his part, saw the board as something more than a medium for exchanging information. He held the view, reflected in the phraseology of the Ogdensburg declaration, that the board should consider joint United States-Canadian operations in their broadest aspect only, and he instructed the American section to this effect just before the first meeting. General Embick, Secretary Stimson's old comrade of World War I who had been appointed senior United States Army member, agreed that the board should only establish the general policies of cooperation without attempting to work out the details, but the trouble was that what General Embick might consider merely an administrative detail might sometimes be a matter of basic policy to Capt. H. W. Hill, the senior United States Navy member.

The business of the board, as Prime Minister Mackenzie King said when he returned from Ogdensburg, was to study and recommend. Its function was purely advisory. Nevertheless, in the course of time and quite informally, the board took on some of the aspects of an administrative agency. It became in some respects a clearinghouse for matters of common interest. And in
addition to its strategic functions, the board became involved in what might be called operational planning when, as in the matter of command relationships, it not only recommended a general policy but also worked out the arrangements by which the policy could be carried out.

The details of its own procedures were never of deep concern to the board, and only two or three of its wartime recommendations had to do with procedural matters. The Canadian section reported to the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet, putting before it the recommendations agreed upon by the board, which were then considered by the Prime Minister and Cabinet after the advice of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee had been obtained. The American section reported directly to the President. As a general rule, Mayor La Guardia first obtained the concurrence of the executive departments most concerned and then submitted the recommendations of the board to the President for approval, but for a time he sent them direct to the President, who might, as he saw fit, obtain the views of the appropriate Cabinet members. Some of the recommendations do not appear to have been submitted to the President, and not all of those submitted received formal approval before they were placed in effect. Even the general procedure of the American section was on one occasion reversed. In this instance, that of bringing the Alaska Highway into being, a special committee of the Cabinet made the original recommendation; the President's approval followed immediately and work was started on the preliminary plans; next, the Canadian Government gave its

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permission for a survey, and the Chief of Engineers was ordered to begin construction; only then was the question submitted to the Permanent Joint Board whose recommendation on the subject was thus drawn up after the project was well under way. 27 Until the end of the war in 1945, the board made only one formal report, that drawn up after the third meeting and submitted to the President on 4 October 1940. It was submitted not so much because the board thought an accounting of its activities was required, but because it was thought best that the two governments approve at this time the allocation of responsibility and the immediate measures that were to be
included in the board's first basic defense plan. After the first and only report, whenever matters of especial interest were dealt with, the President was apt to receive a very informal and personal account written in Mayor La Guardia's matchless style.

Up to the surrender of Japan in September 1945 the board made thirty-three formal recommendations, two thirds of them before the United States entered the war and none of them during the last year of hostilities. Each recommendation represented the unanimous decision of the board, but this unanimity, as the wartime secretary of the Canadian section has pointed out, did not mean that each member was satisfied with every decision of the board; it meant rather that everyone was agreed that no other decision would be generally acceptable. Differences often cropped out in the course of the discussions, but they seldom occurred on strictly national grounds. More often the divisions were along service lines. On other occasions later, when Americans came into contact with colonial officials and representatives of the British armed forces, similar lines of cleavage were observed. Then, as with the Permanent Joint Board, it was not unusual for Army representatives to join in agreement against the naval officers without regard for national lines.

At the very start, the board decided that "there should be a full and complete exchange of military, air and naval information between the two sections of the Board, with the understanding that each section would be free to convey to its government any information it received." From this basic principle, adopted as the First Recommendation, much of the success of the board followed. After laying down this precept the board proceeded to con-

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sider the defense of the eastern coast and its approaches. Ten of the first twenty recommendations, as well as most of the discussion during the first meeting, concerned this paramount problem, namely, the defense of Newfoundland and eastern Canada. After it came the defense of the Pacific coast and of the Sault Ste. Marie Canals, the projection and protection of routes to Alaska and toward the British Isles, the establishment of weather
stations in the frozen north, and all the details of a working partnership.

**Basic Problems of Responsibility and Command**

The whole framework of cooperation, naval as well as military, rested on two joint defense plans, one based on existing strength and on the assumption that Britain had ceased to be an active and effective combatant, the other based on estimated strength as of 1 May 1941 and on the assumption that Canada and the United States were allied with a fighting Britain. Work on the first of these plans, the joint Basic Defense Plan-1940, was begun soon after the first meeting of the board, and by the end of the second meeting, on 11 September, a joint draft had been agreed upon. The real task was to transform this blueprint into a finished, detailed plan acceptable to both Canada and the United States. In a radio broadcast on 20 October, Col. O. M. Biggar, the Canadian chairman, gave a résumé of the difficulties that faced the board. With gravity and earnestness, and taking a realistic view of the road ahead, Colonel Biggar reported to his listeners:

> All the possible dangers from enemy operations must be the subject of profound study in advance of common action. The governments . . . must reach agreement as to the responsibilities each is to assume. These responsibilities must be carefully defined. Each government must be satisfied that the other is capable of carrying out the task allotted to it. There must be an understanding about the way the forces of each are to be reinforced by those of the other. Troop movements must be coordinated; the capacity of the available transportation facilities taken into account; methods of communication between the forces of each country arranged; and points with regard to supply and the like worked out in detail. In addition to all this you have to provide for elasticity in the plans. You must provide for their modification from time to time as events require. All this takes time, indeed it takes a long time.32

During the preliminary discussions within the War Department General Embick had proposed that when the need arose each government reinforce its peacetime garrison in Newfoundland "to a total of one division." He further proposed that Canada take primary responsibility for the defense of the
Gaspé Peninsula, that the United States be primarily responsible for the land defense of Canada's Maritime Provinces against major attack, and that the United States augment Canadian forces in the Victoria-Vancouver area "by one division initially." General Embick suggested to the Chief of Staff that the United States could discharge its responsibility toward the Maritimes by incorporating those provinces into the New England Sector of the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, and in this way commitments that might be found irrevocable when put in practice could be avoided. The proposals were approved by General Marshall as the position to be taken in the discussions with the Canadian members. The coastal frontier idea may have been discussed by the board, but no hint of it appears in the first joint draft. Also, in this version, American responsibilities toward Newfoundland were somewhat broadened. Instead of each government augmenting its forces, the United States undertook to provide the entire emergency reinforcement-one reinforced division-"including a detachment for Greenland." The reference to Greenland was not out of keeping with the current RAINBOW 4 planning of the War Department, which considered Newfoundland and Greenland together as one sector or theater. But after this first mention the Permanent Joint Board took no further cognizance of Greenland.

The plan worked out by the service members of the board had rough sledding in the War Plans Division in spite of the fact that Colonel McNarney of the American section of the board was also a member of the War Plans Division's Plans and Projects Group, whose chief, Colonel Clark, was at the moment acting head of the division. A memorandum for the Chief of Staff on 20 September stated, as the view of the War Plans Division, that the plan had "certain defects of a minor nature . . . ." In the original version of the memorandum drafted by Colonel Clark three days earlier, but never sent, these "minor defects" loomed as "serious inadequacies." The whole issue of command, according to Colonel Clark's original draft, had been side-stepped; the allocation of responsibilities was so obscure that no one could grasp the actual intent; and the joint mission, it was claimed, had been drawn up out of politeness rather than military necessity. Colonel Clark's initial
reaction may have reflected a misgiving that some of the planning functions of the War Plans Division might be taken over by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, a

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misgiving that on further reflection he may have considered unwarranted. 36 Although Colonel Clark revised his views before he submitted them to the Chief of Staff, the criticism he had made of the provisions dealing with the subjects of command, mission, and responsibilities set forth the basic issue on which the two national sections of the Permanent Joint Board were divided.

In drawing up joint Basic Defense Plan-1940, the board adopted as its considered approach the view that the plan should merely state what was required, without specifying in detail how it was to be done. 37 To achieve unanimity and facilitate the labors of the board, the general principles of joint defense were to be agreed upon first and then the particulars, on which more controversy could arise, were to be worked out afterward. This first draft of the 1940 plan was adopted in the very understanding that it did no more than outline the respective responsibilities and specify the several tasks involved. 38 At the meeting of 25 September an attempt was made to reach a text that would be satisfactory to both countries. The general principles set forth in the original draft, stripped of anything resembling particular commitments, soon reappeared as the board's first formal report.

A new draft of the joint Basic Defense Plan-1940 was drawn up at the October meeting of the board. It contained no major changes, according to General Embick, who went on to inform the War Plans Division that the purpose of this revision was merely "to clear up obscure matters, eliminate unnecessary verbiage and incorporate minor changes suggested by the Canadian members." 39 In this draft of 10 October responsibility was allotted according to sovereignty. All Canadian territory and coastal waters were designated as the responsibility of Canada; the defense of United States territory, including Alaska, and of American coastal waters was to be the
responsibility of the United States. Newfoundland, not being a part of either country, was a case of overlapping responsibilities. If the allocation was in general less obscure than in the earlier draft, it nevertheless contained implications extremely distasteful to anyone who held the opinion that American soldiers must never be placed under foreign command, for it was to be expected that command would go along with responsibility.

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The War Plans Division again had a number of comments to make, comments that again emphasized the question of command and responsibility. This time the yardstick was the Army's RAINBOW 4 plan. Most of the provisions of the new draft, the Plans Division found, were in accordance with RAINBOW 4 except for the allocation of responsibilities, which was "too general to permit revision of tasks now assigned in RAINBOW 4." To use RAINBOW 4 as a gauge for measuring a joint Canadian-American defense plan was like using a yardstick to measure cubic content, since RAINBOW 4 was a unilateral plan in which the problem of sharing strategic responsibility and operational command did not arise.

The difficult task of giving a shape of mutuality to the War Department's unilateral plans for defending the northern part of the hemisphere now devolved upon Colonel McFarney, who had succeeded Colonel Clark as head of the Plans and Projects Section of the War Plans Division. Thus it was Colonel McFarney who prepared the War Plans Division comments on the 10 October draft of the joint defense plan and who attempted to spell out the allocation of responsibility and command along the lines of RAINBOW 4. Rejecting "mutual cooperation" as too difficult of achievement and insufficiently productive of results and doubting whether "unity of command" would be acceptable, McFarney elaborated on General Embick's proposal of early September by suggesting the Coastal Frontier system as a solution. He recommended that Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces, Alaska, and British Columbia all be incorporated into the existing system as sectors of the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier and the Pacific Coastal Frontier, respectively. Command of the British Columbia Sector would be vested in Canada, and that of the Alaska Sector in the United States. On the
Atlantic coast, command of the two sectors-Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces-would be vested in Canada until, in the case of Newfoundland, the major elements of a reinforced American division arrived and, in the case of the Maritime Provinces, a corps of two or more American divisions arrived. In effect, this would have meant that Canada would probably command both the British Columbia Sector and the Maritime Provinces Sector, for the likelihood of two American divisions moving into the Maritimes was rather remote. Thus, on the face of things, an allocation along lines of territorial sovereignty similar to that of the draft of 10 October would have been provided. Actually, there would be no such division of command, for it was intended that the

North Atlantic and the Pacific Coastal Frontiers both continue as American commands.

The War Plans Division proposals gave only a gloss of mutuality, which was not enough to make a satisfactory plan of joint defense. Canadians were just as reluctant as Americans to place their troops under foreign command, particularly in Canada and at a time when the early summer's feeling of crisis was beginning to pass. Furthermore, Captain Hill, the senior United States Navy member of the board, objected to the proposals of the Army planners, and it was thought best not to submit a paragraph on organization and command until the American section could present a united front. Finally, as a result of the growing belief that England might hang on successfully and beat back any attempted invasion, Admiral Stark began to urge the President to authorize staff conferences with the British, a step that the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, and Admiral Pound had been suggesting for some time. This challenged the very assumptions on which the joint Basic Defense Plan-1940 rested. At the January 1941 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board, the Canadian Army representative declared the plan obsolete and proposed that a joint Basic Defense Plan No. 2-1941 be drawn up at once. This was the plan intended for a situation in which Britain was still an effective combatant and in which Canada and the United States were allied with Britain in bringing the war home to the Axis. The 1940 plan was not so
easily laid to rest, nor was the 1941 plan so readily produced. An "extended
discussion" of a 1941 plan at the February meeting of the board revealed
how little progress had been made. There had not yet been sufficient
preparation for the service members to meet and set to work on a draft.\footnote{45}

In spite of the fact that joint Basic Defense Plan-1940 was at least
obsolescent, if not actually obsolete, the service members of the Permanent
Joint Board undertook to draft a joint operational plan designed to implement
it, while simultaneously preparing to draw up the new joint Basic Defense
Plan No. 2. The command issue continued to be an obstacle. A version of the
joint operational plan, implementing what Canadian planners considered an
outmoded plan, was accepted by the Canadian service members of the board
on 15 April 1941. This version vested "strategic direction" of Canadian and
American forces in the Chief of Staff, United States Army, subject to prior
consultation with the Canadian Chief of Staff concerned. War Department
planners held that the same principle should apply to the joint Basic Defense
Plan No. 2. A War Plans memorandum for General Embick, written early in
May, proposed that Canada have tactical command (or what the British
called "operational control") of all forces operating in Canadian territory and
in Newfoundland, subject to a provision that would have prevented
American troops from being distributed in small bodies and attached to
Canadian forces. Strategic direction of all forces in the Maritime Provinces
and on the Gaspé Peninsula and in British Columbia and the Puget Sound
area would be vested in the United States.\footnote{46} These proposals were no
different from the position taken by General Embick and Colonel McNarney
some six months earlier, although the terminology was slightly changed. The
operational plan premised on joint Basic Defense Plan-1940 contained
somewhat similar provisions. However, in the case of joint Basic Defense
Plan No. 2 the Canadian Chiefs of Staff objected to giving the United States
strategic direction on the grounds that to do so would in effect, if not in fact,
place Canadian forces in Canada under the supreme command of
Washington and also that North America was in no danger of becoming an
active theater of operations. Their contention was that specific operational
tasks could be assigned to the armed forces of both countries and that coordination of responsibility could be achieved satisfactorily by mutual cooperation.47 At the meetings of 28 and 29 May, the board devoted the entire two days to the problem without reaching any agreement, and it was finally decided that the only feasible approach was command by cooperation.48

The decision was one in which the War Plans Division was reluctant to join. Its views on the subject had been clearly set forth by Colonel McNarney; they were now reaffirmed:

As pointed out in previous memoranda relative to earlier drafts of the subject plan, the War Plans Division considers mutual cooperation an ineffective method of coordination of military forces. The present draft of the plan therefore is considered defective in its provisions relative to command arrangements.49

Unsatisfactory though it might have been to the War Plans Division, mutual cooperation was the only acceptable compromise.50 It was, furthermore, the normal method of coordinating operations of Army and Navy

forces, and the services' current handbook on the subject provided a convenient model for General Embick and his fellow planners. The phraseology of the 1941 plan, as finally adopted, followed quite closely that of the handbook. The plan provided:

Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. . . . A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established . . . when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command . . . .

In explanation of what constituted unity of command, the plan continued:
Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations . . . [Its does not authorize a commander . . . to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination . . . [nor to] move naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Ocean, nor to move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land areas, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned . . . .

Apart from the near impossibility of the two forces ever agreeing as to which should exercise unity of command, the great defect according to American staff planners was that unity of command, as defined in joint Basic Defense Plan No. 2, did not confer authority over administration and discipline. Without this authority, there was, they contended, only the semblance of command. Given men of the right temperament in command of the respective forces, mutual cooperation might produce the better results. The problem continued to vex Army planners. Only when the threat to North America had receded and the efforts and attention of the United States and Canada were directed elsewhere did command cease to be a point at issue between the forces of the two countries.

*The Pre-Pearl Harbor Pattern of Joint Defense*

The 1941 plan, officially known as joint Basic Defense Plan No. 2 or ABC-22, was not directed toward hemisphere defense as an end in itself. It was intended instead to supplement the agreements reached in the United States-British staff conversations, the aim of which was to bring to bear against Germany the combined might of the United States and the British Commonwealth when the United States entered the war, assuming that it did. According to this conception, Newfoundland, for example, would be the first in a line of outposts from which to catapult the invasion of Europe, or it would at least be one of the piers in a vast bridge of ships and planes leading...
to Britain. All this was in sharp contrast to the defensive strategy of RAINBOW 4 and the 1940 joint defense plan. Certain tasks to be undertaken jointly by the armed forces of Canada and the United States, should the latter enter the war, were listed in ABC-22. First on the list, in keeping with the purpose of the plan, was the protection of overseas shipping in the northern portion of the Pacific and western Atlantic areas. Primary responsibility for executing this task was assigned to the United States Navy, with the support of all Canadian services and the United States Army. The roles assigned to the Canadian and American armies in the execution of the other four joint tasks were as follows:

Joint Task Two — the defense of Newfoundland.

Canadian Army — Defend Newfoundland, in cooperation with other Canadian and United States services. Cooperate in the defense of the United States bases in Newfoundland.

Joint Task Three — the defense of eastern Canada and the northeastern portion of the United States.

Canadian Army — Defend the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula.

Joint Task Four — the defense of Alaska.

Canadian Army — (No specific responsibility. The RCAF was assigned a supporting role.)
United States Army — Deny the use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Defend United States military and naval bases and installations in Alaska.
Support associated naval operations.

Joint Task Five — the defense of western Canada and the northwestern portion of the United States.

Canadian Army — Defend western Canada. Cooperate with the United States Army in the defense of the Strait of Juan de Fuca-Puget Sound area.

United States Army — Defend the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the defense of western Canada. Cooperate with Canadian forces in the defense of the Strait of Juan de Fuca-Puget Sound area. Support associated naval operations. 53

Both plans, the 1940 and ABC-22, however much they differed in "general strategic concept," did have in common certain preliminary steps that were meant to be taken in advance of the United States becoming a belligerent, although the plans themselves, it must be remembered, were wax plans and were intended to become generally effective only when the United States entered the war. These preliminary, prewar steps, as listed in ABC-22, were:

On the east coast, Canada was to provide the following for the use of either country:

Facilities for the operation of a composite group (seventy-three planes) of United States Army aircraft at the Newfoundland airport (Gander) and storage for 1,500,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

Storage for 1,000,000 gallons of aviation gasoline in the Botwood-Lewisporte area and shore facilities permitting the operations of one squadron of United States Navy patrol planes.
Land-plane staging facilities, including radio facilities, at Sydney, Nova Scotia.

A fighter airdrome in the vicinity of St. Johns, Newfoundland.

Port defenses at St. Johns, Botwood, and elsewhere as required.

Expanded aircraft operation facilities in the Maritime Provinces to permit the early operation by the United States of one squadron, and the ultimate operation of four squadrons of naval patrol planes.

The United States, for its part, was to provide:

A defended base at Argentia for the operation of two squadrons of patrol planes (twenty-four planes), including storage of 110,000 barrels of fuel oil and 1,800,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

Staging facilities, including radio facilities, at Stephenville for short-range aircraft between Sydney and the Newfoundland airport.

Improvement of the Newfoundland Railway and an increase in its rolling stock to meet United States requirements.

Development of airways and other transportation facilities leading into eastern Canada.

On the west coast, Canada agreed to provide:

Staging facilities for aircraft between Alaska and the continental United States.
An airdrome on the northern end of Vancouver Island and one at Ucluelet, midway down the west coast of the island.

Additional coast defenses at Christopher Point, British Columbia.

The United States agreed to provide:

- Army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks.
- Land aviation facilities at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel, Nome, Boundary, and Big Delta.
- Naval air stations at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor and their defenses.
- Airways between Ketchikan and Kodiak and between Nome and Boundary.
- A "readjustment" of coast defenses in Juan de Fuca Strait "to coordinate with" Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.
- Aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Whidbey Island, Tongue Point, Aberdeen, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia, and Spokane County. 54

During 1941 these measures were gradually put into effect, but it would be wrong to infer that by doing so the United States ranged itself alongside Britain and Canada as an active combatant. The mere fact that the measures were incorporated in war plans did not, by that fact, make them acts of war. Whether Hitler would have accepted the challenge presented in the North Atlantic had there been no attack on Pearl Harbor, no one can say.

From the beginning, the Permanent Joint Board assumed considerable responsibility for seeing that these steps were carried out. At each meeting reports of progress were submitted by the service members. On occasion, personal investigations were made by individual members of the board, while the board as a group made at least two field trips to the Pacific coast and twice visited the Newfoundland-Nova Scotia area. In addition to the
various branches of the armed services a number of governmental agencies, both in Canada and in the United States, were involved in the actual conduct of operations. Physicians of the United States Public Health Service helped put down disease in Newfoundland; the Civil Aeronautics Board procured equipment for airfields in western Canada; and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation provided the funds for rehabilitating the Newfoundland Railway. The Permanent Joint Board was the catalyst.

Thanks to the American bases in Newfoundland, the responsibilities the United States assumed on the Atlantic coast were more direct and more significant of purpose than those undertaken on the other side of the continent. Much was done in the name of the Newfoundland Base Command. In fact, the first units of the American garrison arrived in Newfoundland before there was a base to defend. With the troops went extra arms and equipment, ostensibly for their own use but actually for a Canadian antiaircraft battery that was only partly equipped.

Two incidents, five months apart, illustrate the course of collaboration during 1941. Late in May, when the German warships *Bismarck* and *Prinz Eugen* were at large, the Royal Canadian Air Force found it had no planes available that could reach the area where the German ships were operating, and as a last resort the Royal Canadian Air Force inquired about the possibility of getting twelve or so B-17's, to be flown by Canadians but "with such United States military 'observers' as required to insure the operation of the aircraft." The United States reluctantly turned aside the appeal for help. Both General Embick and the War Plans Division agreed that nothing of the sort could be done "without active participation in the war." This was before construction began on American air bases in Greenland, before American troops landed in Iceland, before the United States Navy undertook to escort convoys to Iceland and to protect any other ships bound in that general direction. Then, at the end of October 1941, German submarines for the first time began concentrating off the Strait of Belle Isle and one of them
made the discovery that the United States was now actively neutral at the side of Canada and Britain. It was just at dusk, the U-boat was lying on the surface partly submerged, when an RCAF bomber winging its way home from a reconnaissance mission spotted the German raider. The plane released two bombs in perfect pattern, but unfortunately they had been "safetied" and failed to explode. The next day, sleet and snow and winds of near hurricane force put an end to air operations. On the following morning, at daybreak, a B-17 of the Newfoundland Base Command dove out of the thick low-lying clouds and found itself practically on the deck of a submarine. From an altitude of less than five hundred feet the plane dropped one bomb that missed the submarine by a fairly close margin. By the time the B-17 was in position for another attack the submarine had disappeared underneath the water, its course completely hidden by the thick weather. Newfoundland "is going to be a most interesting place . . .," wrote the newly appointed American

commander, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Brant, when he reported the incident.58 One outcome was that American air patrols were coordinated with the Canadian patrols, and plans were made to operate in conjunction with the Navy should the submarines move southward into the waters off Cape Race.59

On the Pacific coast, cooperation between the services of the two countries, although just as close, was more compartmented. Geographically and strategically, Vancouver Island occupied a position roughly comparable to that of Newfoundland, but its defenses were determined by the international boundary. American troops cooperated in the defense of the island, but they stayed on the American side of the strait. Canadians helped defend Puget Sound, but from north of the boundary. Much emphasis was therefore placed on the interchange of information-the integration of the respective communications and air warning systems-and on the coordinated disposition of harbor defenses. A survey by a group of American and Canadian officers in October 1940 had disclosed weaknesses in the existing defenses on both sides of Juan de Fuca Strait. The proposal then had been to install additional
long-range guns and four 155-mm. guns in the vicinity of Port Angeles, Washington, a 155-mm. battery near Oak Bay, British Columbia, and two 8-inch howitzers on Vancouver Island, near Church Point. Another 155-mm. battery was to be installed on York Island in Johnstone Strait. After the original plan had acquired nine indorsements and after eight months of further study and reconsideration the situation reduced itself to the following: the United States would install two 16-inch guns at Cape Flattery and two near Port Angeles, which meant that Canadian needs could be reduced to a pair of 8-inch railway guns instead of the four 8-inch and four 155's previously required. There were several delays while the War Department and the Commanding General, Fourth Army, awaited each other's communications on the subject, and in early May 1941 the War Plans Division lagged about three weeks behind actual developments. By mid June orders were issued to ship the two 8-inch guns to Canada and on 21 July they left Aberdeen, Maryland, for Victoria, British Columbia. They had been installed for two or three months but were still lacking fire control equipment when Pearl Harbor was attacked.

The United States undertook to strengthen the defenses of Alaska as another segment of the common defense, while Canada for its part agreed to build the string of airfields between Alaska and the rest of the United States. A beginning of sorts had already been made on both, but little progress had been made on either by the time the Permanent Joint Board came into being and identified the two programs as separate components of the same over-all scheme. By the close of 1941 the five airfields of the Canadian program—at Grand Prairie, Alberta, Fort St. John and Fort Nelson, British Columbia, Watson Lake and Whitehorse, Yukon Territory—could be used with danger and difficulty. With the entrance of the United States into the war this air route to Alaska—the Northwest Staging Route—assumed great importance and because of it the Alaska Highway, one of the most spectacular, most grandiose examples of United States-Canadian collaboration, was launched.
Endnotes for Chapter XIV


3 Ibid., p. 314.

4 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1938, pp. 492-93.


6 Ltr, with Ind, JPC to JB, 31 May 40, sub: Jt A&N Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 4, JB 325, set 642-4. See also Chapter II, above; Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 104-07.

7 Jt A&N Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 4, JB 325, set 642-4.


9 Paper, 17-18 Jul 40, written in Ottawa, title: A Programme of Immediate Canadian Action, WPD 4330.

10 Memo, TAG for WD Rep, President's Ln Com, 1 Jul 40, WPD 4323-1.


12 In addition to references cited in preceding note, see Memo of Conf between General Marshall and Gen Strong (WPD), 13 Jul 40, OCS Misc Conf Binder 3; Memo, A. E. P. [Mr. A. B. Purvis, British Purchasing Comm] for Mr. Philip Young, n.d. [forwarded to SW, 12 Jul 40], sub: Canadian Army Requirements; Ltr, Mr. Young to Mr. Purvis, 19 Jul 40. Last two in AG 400.3295 (12-9-39) Release of Information to Canadian Government re Manufacture of Small Arms Ammunition; Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945* (Washington: 1959), (hereafter cited as Dziuban, *U.S.-Canadian Relations*), Ch. IV.


14 Hopkins Calendar, Book IV, Item 2, FDRL.

15 Ltr, Actg SW to Secy State, 8 Jul 40, WPD 4330; Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 702-03.


18 Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Aug 40.


23 Memo, WPD for Lt Col Orlando Ward, SGS, 19 Aug 40, WPD 4330.

24 The American members, in addition to Mayor La Guardia, were: General Embick, senior U.S. Army member; Capt. H. W. Hill, USN, of Navy War Plans Division; Col. Joseph T. McNarney, AC, and Cmdr. F. P. Sherman, USN, who represented the aviation arms of their respective services; and Mr. J. D. Hickerson of the Department of State, who acted as secretary. Their Canadian counterparts were: Col. O. M. Biggar, a retired officer and distinguished lawyer, chairman of the section; Brigadier K. Stuart, Deputy Chief of the Canadian General Staff; Capt. L. W. Murray, RCN, Deputy Chief, Naval Staff Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe, RCAF; and Mr. H. L. Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs, secretary of the Canadian section.

25 Memo, sub: Common Defence Measures in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland by United States and Canadian Forces, incl in Ltr, Brigadier Stuart to Gen Strong, 5 Aug 40, PDB 104-1; Memo, Canadian Legation, Washington, for Actg Secy State Welles, 20 Aug 40, SW tile, Naval Bases-Destroyer Transaction.

26 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Aug 40; Paper, 23 Aug 40, title; Summary of Mtg of Canadian Staff Conf Members, WPD 4330-2.

27 In addition to the journal of Discussions and Decisions file of the Permanent Joint Board, see Maddox "Canadian-American Defense
Planning," *Foreign Policy Association Report*, XVII, No. 17 (November 15, 1941), and Dziuban, *U.S.-Canadian Relations*, Ch. II.

28 A copy of the First Report, with War Department comments and recommendations, is in WPD 4330-12. A draft copy of a Second Report dated 29 April 1941, which apparently went no farther than the files of the American section of the board, is in PJBD 135-3.

29 The recommendations of the board are in PJBD 124-1. See also Keenleyside MS, in PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2).

30 First Recommendation, 26 Aug 40, PJBD 124-1.


33 The acquisition of a site for a U.S. base in Newfoundland in the destroyer-base arrangement made it necessary to plan for a peacetime garrison. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States.

34 Memo, Gen Embick for CofS, 7 Sep 40, WPD 4330-4; First Joint Draft, Canadian-U.S. Basic Def Plan-1940, 11 Sep 40, WPD 4330-5.


36 Memo (not used), WPD for CofS, 17 Sep 40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Sep 40. Both drafted by Col. Clark and both in WPD 4330-5.


38 Journal of 11 Sep 40, PJBD files.
39 Memo, Gen Embick for ACofS WPD, 18 Oct 40, WPD 4330-5.

40 Memo, Gen Embick for CofS, 15 Oct 40, WPD 4330-12.

41 Memo, Col Jonathan W. Anderson, Actg ACofS WPD, for Gen Embick, 9 Nov 40, WPD 4330-5.

42 Ibid.

43 Memo, Col McNarney for Gen Embick, 9 Nov 40, WPD 4330-5.


45 Journal of 27 Feb 41, PJBD files.

46 Memo, WPD for Senior Army Member, PJBD, 2 May 41, WPD 4330-22.


48 Journal of 28-29 May 41, PJBD files; Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 23 Apr 41, sub: Revision of Jt Def Plan No. 1, Canada-U.S.; Memo, WPD for Gen Embick, 7 May 41, sub: Revision of Jt Def Plan No. 1, Canada-U.S. Both in WPD 4330-24. Other papers on the subject of command in relation to both defense plans are in WPD 4330-19, WPD 4330-21, WPD 4330-23, WPD 4330-24, and WPD 4330-25.

49 1st Ind., Gen Gerow, ACofS WPD, for Senior Army Member, PJBD, 17 Jun 41, on Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 7 Jun 41, WPD 4330-21.

50 Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 7 Jun 41, WPD 4330-21.

52 Jt Canadian-U.S. Basic Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), Sec. 1, Purpose of This Plan, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1586-87; U.S.-British Staff Convs Report (ABC-1), Sec. 12, General Strategic Concept, Ibid., pp. 1490-91.

53 ABC-22, Sec. 5, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1589-90.

54 Jt Canadian-U.S. Basic Def Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), Annex II, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1592-93. The ABC-22 plan was approved by the Chief of Staff on 18 August 1941, by the President on 29 August, and by the Canadian Government on 15 October.


56 Note for Record by Lt Col C. L. Bissell, 24 May 41, WPD 4330-27.

57 Penciled note, Bissell to Gen Embick, atchd to Note for Record by Col Bissell, 24 May 41, WPD 4330-27.

58 Ltr, Maj Gen Gerald C. Brant to Maj Gen William Bryden, DCoF, 29 Oct 41, WPD 4351-9, Sec. 6.

59 Ibid.

60 International Jt Def Plan for Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound Area, 21 Oct 40, WPD 4330-9.

61 Journal of 16 Apr 41, PJBD files; action copy of Memo, WPD for TAG, 26 Mar 41 sub: Jt Plan, Puget Sound Area; and other documents on this general subject in WPD 4330-9, Memo, CofS for Col Russell H. Brennan, n.d.; Memo, Lt Col R. W. Crawford for Gen Gerow, 16 Dec 40; Memo, Col Bissell for Col Crawford, 16 May 41. Last three in WPD 4323-9. See also, AG 472.1 (12-18-40), which deals exclusively with this subject. Charts of Canadian coast defenses on the west coast as of December 1941 are in large envelope attached to WPD 4486.
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The United States and Canada: Elements of Wartime Collaboration

The cooperation that was built up with Canada during the war was an amalgam compounded of diverse elements of which the air and land routes to Alaska, the Canol project, and the CRYSTAL and CRIMSON activities were the most costly in point of effort and funds expended. There were other elements that were perhaps of greater intrinsic importance to the winning of the war. Such a one was the First Special Service Force, a unique international undertaking. Composed of Canadians and Americans distributed indiscriminately among the ranks, carrying the colors of both nations, taught a hybrid close-order drill, trained together as paratroopers and demolition experts, as ski troops, and then as an amphibious unit, the force won renown for its ruggedness and tough fighting in the Italian campaign, where a reputation of that kind was not lightly earned. It was a successful experiment, proof that, given the will to do it, men of different national armies could serve together without being kept in separate, distinct units. Another element was the epic-making air and naval collaboration in the North Atlantic, in which Britain also had a part. Still another was Canadian participation in the defense of Alaska. Royal Canadian Air Force planes joined in the attacks on the Japanese in the Aleutians, Canadian antiaircraft units defended the American airfield on Annette Island in southern Alaska, and more than five thousand Canadians took part in the anticlimactic assault on Kiska. The cooperation extended to the training of Canadian soldiers in American camps and schools, to the passage through Canada of American military vehicles by no other formality than "local notification," and to the interchange of scientific developments.

Collaboration in the economic field was broad in scope and of utmost importance, but in this field civilian agencies played the major role. Although Canada, as one of the leading industrial nations of the world, did not request direct lend-lease assistance during the war, a certain amount of war material and a much larger amount of industrial goods were sold to Canada through lend-lease channels as a matter of administrative
them, the Canadian Government maintained a dollar fund with the United States Treasury. The total of defense materials and services that Canada received through lend-lease channels amounted in value to approximately $419,500,000. Of this total, only $167,158,000 represented War Department shipments. Nearly 56 percent of the War Department shipments, in value, consisted of ground material including rifles, revolvers, antiaircraft and machine guns, ammunition of various types, and trucks. The remainder was aircraft and aeronautical material. By far the great bulk of goods and material that Canada purchased in the United States was obtained from American suppliers by direct negotiation with them. Army representatives of the War Production Board handled the allocation of controlled materials for these Canadian orders. The appropriate supply services of the United States Army cleared and scheduled the desired production. Some idea of the scope of economic collaboration can be had from the fact that from the beginning of 1942 through 1945 Canada, on her part, furnished the United States with $1,000,000,000 to $1,250,000,000 in defense materials and services. From September 1943 to September 1945, 14 percent of Canada's total war production went to the United States.

The Air and Land Routes to Alaska

The idea of an overland highway to Alaska was nothing new. For years the people of that Territory and of Washington and Oregon and British Columbia had been its advocates. A number of commissions and committees, appointed to investigate the idea, had reported in its favor. The War Department, on the other hand, was consistently of the opinion that the military value of the proposed road would be negligible. As long as the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and western Europe were the critical sectors there was no basis for thinking differently, and as late as August 1940 Secretary Stimson informed Congress that a highway to Alaska could not be justified on military grounds. The subject was discussed at length by the
Permanent Joint Board at its meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, in November. Although

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urged by various organizations and by such prominent individuals as Premier T. D. Pattullo of British Columbia to take a stand in favor of the highway, the board unanimously concurred in the opinion long held by the War Department. Persuaded that the project lacked military utility and apparently detecting a whiff of political pork, Mayor La Guardia joined his Army and Navy colleagues and the Canadian members in opposing the road. It was considerably more urgent, according to the board, to bring the air staging route to a speedy completion. Then came the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, which muddied the already seething situation in the Far East and seemed to bring closer to Alaska the danger that Alaskans had been advertising for years. On the day after Hitler flung his armies across the Soviet frontier General Embick wrote, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff,

. . . the progress of events has inclined me to the view that the construction of an Alaskan road is advisable as a long range military measure, provided its construction is controlled so as not to delay other more pressing military construction requirements, such as aviation fields.  

The next day, 24 June, the Chief of Staff directed the War Plans Division to rewrite its report on the latest Alaska Highway bill and to "interpose no objection" to its passage. The language was almost identical with that of General Embick's memorandum. When the War Department's past opinion is considered, this new point of view represented a definite shift, even though it was far from being an enthusiastic acceptance of the project.

What seems to have been a retreat toward the old position almost immediately took place. The War Department's statement of its views on the highway bill, requested as early as May, was not forthcoming until October. When it was presented at last to the Congressional committee considering the bill, it was only lukewarm, less favorable to a highway than the views of
late June had been.

The explanation undoubtedly lies in the crystallization of Japanese plans early in July, in the lack of agreement on a specific route, and in the opposition of the American Federal Works Agency and of the Canadian members of the Permanent Joint Board. The Japanese decision of 2 July to preserve, for the time being, the status quo with the Soviet Union and to advance southward into Indochina and the Malay Archipelago was known to the United States Government within a week at most. Unless something happened to divert Japan's intentions away from southern Asia and toward the United States, the threat to Alaska was now eased. A factor of probably greater weight was the lack of agreement among all concerned as to the route the Alaska highway ought to take. There were at least four proposed routes, each with its own group of advocates. Pacific coast interests in Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia were pressing strongly for a road west of the Stikine Mountains, and it was this route that General Marshall specified in his instructions of 24 June. The Canadian highway commission favored a route farther to the east, through the Rocky Mountain trench; the prairie sections of Canada and the United States favored a third route, east of the Rockies; and the well-known explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson advocated still another, by way of the Peace and Mackenzie Rivers. When General Embick and the War Department veered round to a cautious approval of the route indorsed by General Marshall, none of those advocating other routes followed along. Nor is there evidence that the United States Navy members and the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board shifted away from their opposition to any highway irrespective of the route. The Federal Works Agency, sensitive to any suspicion of "boondogging," was likewise opposed to the project.

The question of defense preparations on the Pacific coast again became a matter of concern at the end of July, when the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States chilled relations between the two countries sharply and
immediately. 9 Noting the gravity of the situation in the Pacific and recognizing the possibility of having to rapidly reinforce the air strength in Alaska, the Permanent Joint Board made formal recommendation at its meeting in Montreal on 29 July that all other considerations give way to the completion as quickly as possible of the air staging route. 10 Thus the question of an overland route would seem to have been disposed of. Although the War Plans Division several days later made note of the views set forth by the Chief of Staff at the end of June, the situation apparently called for no particular haste in reporting them to Congress as the considered opinion of the War Department. When the department officially stated its views, in October, its approval was qualified so heavily as to almost scuttle the pending bill. No objection would be interposed, wrote Secretary Stimson, provided the Federal Works Agency supervised the construction; but that agency, as Mr. Stimson pointed out, was opposed to the highway. 11 There the question was resting when on 7 December the United States suddenly found itself at

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war with Japan, and there the question continued to rest for another month or so.

New interest in an overland road as a guide path for fliers and as a means of more readily improving the facilities at the staging fields was precipitated in January 1942 when the first attempt to reinforce Alaska by air, over the Northwest Staging Route, ended in disaster. These fields and the airway to Alaska were being built by the Canadian Government, which was not convinced that either highway or additional landing strips along the route were needed.

Before the Permanent Joint Board reached an agreement and made its recommendation, the question of building a road along the air route had already been decided by a Cabinet committee on 2 February 1942 and approved by the President on 11 February. 12 None of the routes previously proposed suited the purpose that the President and his Cabinet advisers
currently had in mind for the road. For the first six hundred miles from Dawson Creek, British Columbia, the line of airfields that the road was designed to serve followed in general the so-called Prairie Route, the highway route just east of the Rockies; then the air route crossed the mountains to join, at Whitehorse, the westernmost highway route—advocated by coastal interests which was followed the rest of the way to Big Delta, Alaska. This route, which more or less combined two of those advocated earlier, was now decided upon for the Alaska highway.

When the subject was broached at the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board, two weeks later, it turned out to be no easy matter to obtain the concurrence of the Canadian members. The Canadian section expected a "terrific political backfire," to use the expression of Mayor La Guardia, who, with his American colleagues, employed every argument that any proponent of the road had ever conjured up, including the rather wishful point that it would be of great value for an offensive against Japan by way of Alaska. The American members assured the Canadians that the United States would bear the entire cost of construction, estimated at $75,000,000 or more, and take care of the upkeep of the road during the war, after which it would be turned over to Canada. The arguments failed to convince all the Canadian members that the road was a military necessity, but they agreed that it was perhaps desirable as a matter of general policy and they deferred on these grounds to the views of the American section. Once the board had agreed on a formal recommendation, the delay that Mayor La Guardia had feared failed to materialize.13

The Canadian Government approved the recommendation on 5 March and on 7 March President Roosevelt followed suit, giving his approval for the second time. Ten days later the first contingent of Engineer troops arrived at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, to begin work on the road. While they were still unloading their supplies and getting squared away for the job, the agreement was confirmed by the two governments through an exchange of
notes in which the understanding arrived at by the Permanent Joint Board was incorporated and in accordance with which the United States pledged itself to: (1) make the necessary surveys and construct a pioneer road, using United States Army Engineer troops; (2) arrange for the highway to be completed by civilian contractors under the United States Public Roads Administration; (3) maintain the road for the duration of the war and six months afterward; and (4) transfer the highway to Canada at the end of the war for integration into the Dominion highway system. For its part, Canada agreed to: (1) provide the necessary rights of way; (2) waive import duties and transit charges on all through shipments between Alaska and the United States; (3) waive import duties, sales taxes, and license fees on all equipment and materials used on the road and on personal effects of the construction people; (4) remit income taxes of United States residents employed on the project; (5) facilitate the entry of United States citizens for employment on the road, it being understood that they would be repatriated at no expense to Canada; and (6) permit the use of local timber, gravel, and rock.14

As soon as the first moves to build a highway were taken, in February, the Air Corps Ferrying Command entered into a contract with Northwest Airlines, Inc., which undertook to operate an air service to Alaska and to make whatever improvements the route might require for handling the anticipated traffic. An application for authority to operate the service was presented by the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense at the meeting of 25 February, and the Canadian section of the board undertook to obtain the approval of its government; but haste on the part of the Air Corps led to an unfortunate contretemps. When, on 27 February, a Northwest Airlines survey plane landed at Edmonton, Alberta, before the project had been formally approved, the Canadian Government as a matter of course ordered the plane taken into custody. Some of the misunderstanding can be traced to a procedural snarl, for Mr. C. D. Howe, Canada's United States-born Minister of Munitions and Supply, had expected the airline itself to make application through the United States Civil Aeronautics Board. There
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was, too, a conviction on Mr. Howe's part that either Pan American Airways or a Canadian airline was better prepared for the job. However, a day or two after the plane was grounded and after a telephone conversation between Mr. Howe and General Olds, head of the Ferrying Command, permission was given for the plane to proceed. After the incident had been smoothed over, an American newspaper columnist, who claimed he knew "the inside story," charged Mr. Howe with "haggling" for weeks in an attempt to block an American airline from getting what might be a foothold in the postwar carrying business. A rather heated letter that Mr. Howe immediately sent off to Under Secretary Robert P. Patterson was, in the circumstances, admirable for its restraint. The delay was negligible and does not seem to have postponed the start of actual operations to any great extent. The lack of a clearly defined channel for transmitting matters from the Permanent Joint Board to the appropriate civilian agencies for action and approval, which the incident revealed, was not remedied for another year and then only partially. By that time the period of expansion, of building up the defenses, was over. During most of 1943, and from then on, the problem was not how to get started but rather how to complete or cut down projects already under way.

15 Meanwhile, the Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska had pushed Alaska into the foreground of the strategic picture, into a position of greater prominence than it perhaps deserved.

As a result of the Japanese attack on the Aleutians in June 1942, traffic along the Northwest Staging Route increased suddenly and enormously, while at the same time plans were in the making to use the route for ferrying planes to the Soviet Union. Both situations pointed to the urgent need for additional facilities along the route. Tentative arrangements for meeting the new and higher American requirements at the five Canadian-built fields were made without delay, and on 29 July Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, urged the immediate construction of eight landing strips along the Alaska Highway to supplement the fields that constituted the staging route. 16 The eight landing strips, finally approved early

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in September 1942, were to be located at Dawson Creek, Sikanni Chief River, Prophet River, and Liard River in British Columbia, and at Pine Lake, Squanga Lake, Pon Lake, and Burwash in the Yukon Territory. At the same time five additional fields were planned for the staging route. They were to be built at Beatton River and Smith River, both in British Columbia, and at Teslin, Aishihik, and Snag in the Yukon Territory. This would provide a string of landing fields spaced at easy intervals, the longest hop being the 140 miles or so between Fort Nelson and the Liard River flight strip. The first of the fields to be completed was the one at Dawson Creek, which was finished in September 1943. By the end of January 1944 all the Alaska Highway strips had been finished and by the following July the last Northwest Staging field was completed.17

When the expanded program was first getting under way early in 1943 the Air Forces had urged that the United States carry out all unfinished work on the staging route fields as well as on the Alaska Highway landing strips, but even a compromise proposal along these lines failed to receive the approval of the Canadian Government. Except for six or eight months after the completion of the basic program, in late 1943 and early 1944 practically all the construction work on the Northwest Staging Route was in Canadian hands.18 When the Canadian Government in June 1944 decided to assume the expense of all permanent airfield construction in Canada and Newfoundland undertaken in accordance with either American or Canadian requirements, the War Department viewed the new financial arrangement with concern. The possibility that the new agreement would hamper and delay the additional construction proposed at this time by the United States Air Force was apprehended. But the possibility failed to materialize. While the War Department was viewing with alarm the reluctance of Canadian agencies to officially adopt American technical specifications (although both the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Department of Transport had informally expressed the desire to provide facilities satisfactory to the United States), and while the War Department was predicting the dire consequences that would follow from the new policy, planes were arriving at Fairbanks at a rate of sixty to eighty a week. In June 1944 more than 340 planes arrived at Ladd Field from the United States, and in the following six months the total at-
rivals amounted to more than 1,600. 19 Most of the aircraft were for delivery to the Soviet Union.

The painful experience of January 1942, when only half the planes in the first wave of reinforcements managed to reach Alaska, was never repeated. In the next three years the total of plane crashes along the route was less than half that of the first harrowing month. This record is a tribute partly to the rapid.- technical advances made by the aviation industry and partly to the more thorough training and greater skill of the pilots who came later, but mostly it was made possible by the engineering genius and by the sweat and toil of the men, both Canadians and Americans, who built the Alaska Highway and the string of airfields that the highway served. This, and not the insignificant amount of freight delivered by road to the Alaska Defense Command, should be the measure of the highway's wartime usefulness; for the Alaska Highway was designed for one primary purpose, and that was to facilitate the building of the airfields and serve as a guide path for flyers. Whether that purpose was essential to the defense of the continent is another question, one that should not obscure the fact that the highway and the staging route amply fulfilled their principal role.20

The Canol project stood in much the same relation to the staging route as the Alaska Highway. The Norman Wells oil field in the valley of the Mackenzie River was first suggested as a source of petroleum supply for Alaska by the War Department's special adviser, Dr. Stefansson, but no serious consideration was given to developing the field until after the President approved the Alaska Highway. Resurrected then in connection with the supply of the staging fields and highway, the project quickly became one of the more controversial enterprises of the war. It was objected to by the War Production Board, questioned by Mr. Harold L. Ickes, the petroleum coordinator, and investigated by a Senate committee. The Canadian Government discounted the scheme in the beginning and had nothing to do with it in its later stages.21 Nevertheless, the pipelines that lay unused and rusting after the war and the capped wells along the Mackenzie River stood as monuments to wartime collaboration, for the Canadian Government in spite of its objections and serious doubts about the project, promptly gave
the United States permission to proceed and placed no obstacles in the way of progress. Doubtless because of the Canadian Government's views, the Canol project never appeared on the agenda of the Permanent Joint Board; the arrangements were handled by the Department of State and the Canadian Department of External Affairs and never ran afoul of the board's rule of unanimity.

CRYSTAL and CRIMSON

Stupendous, spectacular, and controversial as they were, the projects in western Canada by no means eclipsed what was simultaneously taking place in the east. By virtue of the head start that had been made, the Atlantic defenses were further along than those on the western side of the continent. During 1941 Newfoundland had been built up as a strong Canadian-United States base; an American garrison had landed in Iceland; American troops and civilian workers were building airfields in Greenland, Labrador, and northern Quebec, while the Navies of Canada, Britain, and the United States were jointly guarding the Atlantic sea lanes. By the time the attack on Pearl Harbor took place, the defenses of the northeastern half of the hemisphere were being projected out toward Europe and preparations had been started to link the bases into an air staging route three thousand miles long from Presque Isle, Maine, to Prestwick, Scotland.

A direct ferry route from Newfoundland to Scotland, with no way stations, had been pioneered by Canada and Britain in 1940 but, under the best of conditions, was passable only for medium and heavy bombers, and the best of conditions seldom obtained. As soon as the April 1941 agreement with the Danish Minister in Washington made possible the building of American air bases in Greenland, the War Department, under instructions from the President and pressure from the British, undertook to study the delivery of short-range aircraft, pursuit planes, and attack bombers to Britain by way of
Labrador and northern Canada and Greenland. Two good base sites, one of them at Narsarssuak (BLUIE WEST 1) near the southern tip of Greenland and the other at the head of Sondre Stromfjord (BLUIE WEST 8) about four hundred and fifty miles farther up the western coast, had been discovered, and by the middle of July construction work was under way at BLUIE WEST 1. Meanwhile, traffic congestion at Gander airport in Newfoundland had become a source of concern and led to a search for an alternate jumping-off spot in southern Labrador. The choice narrowed down to Cartwright, at the mouth of Sandwich Bay, and the village of North West River on the shore of Lake Melville. Either would in fact be somewhat nearer Prestwick than Gander airport was. In recommending the North West River site on 29 July, the Permanent Joint Board made no mention of Air Forces plans for a short-range staging route via Greenland, but it was doubtless no coincidence that the preferred location lay exactly on a line with Presque Isle, Maine, and BLUIE WEST 1 and almost midway between them. A site was staked out some thirty miles up Lake Melville from North West River, at Goose Bay settlement, and by the end of September the Canadian Government had started work on the airfield.

With Reykjavik airport in Iceland already available, all the links of the staging route would be forged as soon as the Goose Bay and BLUIE WEST 1 bases were completed. Distances between the fields would be short: approximately 570 miles from Presque Isle to Goose Bay; 775 miles to BLUIE WEST 1 and the same distance to Reykjavik; and then about 840 miles from Reykjavik to Prestwick. They were just within the range of light bombers and pursuit planes fitted with extra fuel tanks.

Space could be conquered, but the weather could only be coped with. No amount of human ingenuity could still the hurricanes, dissipate the impenetrable fogs, or moderate the extreme cold that made Arctic weather the enemy it was. It was possible only to avoid and cover up against it, and
then only provided there was sufficient warning. Three small detachments were therefore sent north late in September 1941 to set up meteorological stations at Fort Chimo (CRYSTAL 1), Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL 2), and Padloping Island (CRYSTAL 3), from which the movement of weather could be observed and reported. As outposts against the most formidable enemy in the north, they were essential adjuncts to the flying fields. When operations over the staging route began in the summer of 1942, the maintenance of fully dependable weather and communications services demanded constant attention.25

In the spring of 1942, after the decision had been made to move the Eighth Air Force overseas, the Army Air Forces conceived a much more grandiose project than the original, still not completed, staging route, and presented it to the Canadian Government by way of the Permanent Joint Board. Tapping the centers of aircraft production on the Pacific coast and in

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the Midwest, two new ferrying routes were to converge in the neighborhood of Frobisher Bay, where they could meet an extension of the already established eastern route, and then pass through BLUIE WEST 8 in the direction of Iceland. BLUIE WEST 8, CRYSTAL 1, and CRYSTAL 2, Southampton Island, Churchill, and The Pas were to be important air bases, with two five-thousand-foot runways at each place, housing for a garrison of four hundred or five hundred men and almost as many transients, and storage for ten times the amount of gasoline originally planned for. Instead of only three, there were to be twenty-five or so weather stations placed in a great arc around Hudson Bay. This grand design was soon known as the CRIMSON project. It was intended to provide for the movement of as many as one thousand combat aircraft a month.26

The plan was outlined, discussed, and approved by the Permanent Joint Board at its meeting of 9 June 1942. The board agreed that Canada would either build the necessary airfields or authorize the United States to build them, and a formal recommendation to this effect followed. Existing
facilities, expanded whenever necessary, were to be incorporated into the project. The costs would be shouldered by the government that carried out the construction work. Although the Canadian Government approved the recommendation, it found itself prevented by existing conditions of manpower, materials, and finance from accepting at this time any new commitments of such magnitude as the CRIMSON project. It was prepared to carry out the responsibilities already accepted and the construction at Goose Bay that was already started, but as for the rest of the project the Canadian Government could only offer its permission for the United States to tackle the job.27

Meanwhile, the CRIMSON project had been taken under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who were particularly concerned about the shipping it would require. On 12 June, the same day the Canadian Government approved the project, the Combined Chiefs directed that it be restudied with a view to reducing the requirements. The result was a major revision. The airfields at Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay, and in East Greenland (BLUIE EAST 2) were now to be winter fields instead of all-weather ones; the central route through Moose Factory and Richmond Gulf, on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, was to be eliminated; and one of the proposed stations on Baffin Island was to be dropped. Priority was to be given to expanding the existing bases at Goose Bay, BLUIE WEST 1, and BLUIE WEST 8, then to improving the facilities along the western route—at The Pas, where the airfield was to be built by Canada, and at Churchill, Southampton Island, and Frobisher Bay. Thus curtailed, the project received the approval of the Combined Chiefs on 2 July. The next day President Roosevelt approved the Permanent Joint Board's recommendation of 9 June.28

While the CRIMSON plans were undergoing these revisions, the Eighth Air Force had begun its move to England. During the next six months nearly nine hundred aircraft traveled the North Atlantic route before it was closed
down because of the weather in mid-December. Of all the planes that set out, only thirty-eight failed to reach Prestwick, and eleven of the losses occurred during the first three weeks. The significance of this surprisingly good record lay in the fact that, except for a few B-17's that went nonstop from Gander to Prestwick, all the planes flew from Goose Bay direct to Greenland, most of them to BLUIE WEST 8, without going by way of Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay.29

The lesson was apparently lost, however, until operations over the North Atlantic were resumed the following April. During the winter the curtailed program was reinflated almost to its original proportions. Although little could be done then in the way of actual construction, plans were drawn up early in December giving priority to the three bases that in the previous revision had been relegated to winter landing fields. Now, under the new program, Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay were to have hard-surfaced runways, more hangar space, and additional housing and storage. Similar plans and the same priority were set up for BLUIE EAST 2. But before the new program received the Operations Division's stamp of approval the Air Forces had decided on another general modification.30 The revision, in April 1943, reflected the experience of the Eighth Air Force, technological advances in aircraft design, and improved shipping methods, all of which lessened the need of intermediate bases and of an alternate route. A radically reduced program was therefore presented to the Permanent Joint Board at its meeting of 6-7 May. It was immediately approved by the board and by the Canadian Government, but the approval of the latter had scarcely reached Washington before the War Department again revised the CRIMSON program.31 One's sympathy

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goes out to the author of the monograph on engineering activities at Fort Chimo, who had this to say:

Not the least of the factors which affected the work and retarded progress especially in preparation of plans was the fluctuation of the requirements of the War Department as reflected in directives. It was very difficult to plan ahead and to have the proper labor,
materials, and equipment on hand at the proper time.\textsuperscript{32}

These revisions in the spring and summer of 1943 were a clear indication that the days of the CRIMSON project were numbered, that for ferrying planes to England the eastern route through Goose Bay and Greenland would suffice as an alternative to the direct Gander-Prestwick route. There was no intention however of abandoning the air bases under construction at Fort Chimo, Southampton Island, Frobisher Bay, and Churchill, even though the original need for them no longer existed, for it was considered "gross waste" not to finish what had been started. A directive to this effect was accordingly issued. No new construction was to be started unless specifically authorized by the War Department, but whatever was in progress was to be completed.\textsuperscript{33} Although work was later started (and carried to completion on weather stations in Labrador and northern Quebec) the time of expansion, of new projects, was over. Except for some small jobs at Frobisher Bay, the construction work was completed and the contractors' men had departed by the end of 1943.

\textit{The Cost, Control, and Permanent Disposition of Facilities in Canada}

Although most of the actual construction of joint defense facilities, except the Alaska Highway and the Canol project, had been carried out by Canada, most of the original cost was borne by the United States. The agreement was that all temporary construction for the use of American forces and all permanent construction required by the United States forces beyond Canadian requirements would be paid for by the United States, and that the cost of all other construction of permanent value would be met by Canada. Although it was not entirely reasonable that Canada should pay for any construction that the Canadian Government considered unnecessary or that did not conform to Canadian requirements, nevertheless considerations of self-respect and national sovereignty led the Canadian Government to suggest a new financial agreement.

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Under the new arrangement in June 1944, Canada agreed to purchase all airfields and aviation facilities of permanent character, whether or not they were considered to be of permanent value, and to assume the construction costs of further fixed improvements. Of the $37,320,000 that the United States had expended on the Northwest Staging Route, all but about $6,000; 000 was to be repaid by Canada, and the entire cost of the flight strips along the Alaska Highway as well as those that were part of the Canol project, amounting to some $4,526,800, was to be refunded also. In exchange for the CRIMSON bases, on which the United States had spent approximately $39,500,000, Canada agreed to pay a little more than $31,630,000. There was, however, some doubt in Ottawa as to the wisdom of this particular transaction. The total amount that Canada agreed to pay under the new arrangement came to about $76,800,000, which was some $13,870,000 less than the United States had spent on the facilities.34

The financial settlement of June 1944 reflected the view, to quote a Canadian historian of considerable eminence, that "it was important to ensure that arrangements entered into for a specific purpose in time of war were not allowed to drift on when their immediate object had been fulfilled and when they might begin to cause embarrassment." 35 The arrangements for disposing of the facilities after the war were shaped by the same point of view and hinged upon the arrangements for financing the facilities. Discussions by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, beginning in November 1942, produced a formula adopted by the board on 13 January 1943 as its Twenty-eighth Recommendation. It provided that all immovable facilities should pass to the Crown within one year after the cessation of hostilities, that all movable facilities should, within the same time limit, be removed to the United States or be offered for sale to either the Dominion or the provincial government concerned, and that all other movable facilities, not removed or bought by Canada, be offered for sale on the open market.36 Although the formula was without prejudice to any agreement concerning the postwar use, as distinct from the physical disposition and ownership, of the joint projects and facilities in Canada, the two subjects were nevertheless related. Discussion of postwar use rarely found its way into the journals of the Permanent Joint Board, but it was during one of these infrequent discussions, dealing with the airport at Goose Bay, that the subject of disposition was reopened. This
was in November 1943, and the Canadian Government was beginning to make known its desire to obtain clear title to the permanent facilities by right of purchase. The board agreed that further study should be given to the question.37

Negotiations between the two governments during the following months led to the financial settlement of June 1944 and made necessary a new arrangement covering the postwar disposition of the facilities. A new formula, amending the Twenty-eighth Recommendation, was accordingly adopted at the meeting of the board on 6-7 September 1944, and it proved to be the board's last recommendation of the war. It provided that:

Within three months of the date on which the recommendation was approved, the United States Government would draw up a list of immovable facilities to be sold to the Canadian Government at a price decided upon by two appraisers, one appointed by each government.
Any existing immovable facility not recorded on the list should, within a year after the end of the hostilities, pass to the Crown, either to the Canadian Government or to the provincial government concerned, without cost. The United States Government should remove from Canada all movable items it desired.
All remaining movable items should be purchased by the Canadian Government or transferred to an agency of that government to be sold, for the account of the United States Government.
Any movable items remaining unsold after two years of their being transferred to the Canadian Government, should at the option of the United States Government, either be declared of no value and the account closed or be removed by the United States authorities.38

By the end of 1944 the detailed procedures by which, in accordance with this general formula, specific facilities could be disposed of were being satisfactorily worked out.
During the two years and more in which the board had been dealing with the postwar disposition of facilities the problem of postwar use had been generally postponed in favor of the more pressing problems of allocating responsibilities for the immediate defense, maintenance, and control of the facilities. As early as November 1941 the Permanent Joint Board adopted a statement of policy applying to the care and upkeep of facilities provided by one government for the forces of the other. The board assumed that respons-

ibility for maintenance would rest with the occupying forces, an assumption that was called in question later on, and in general it provided only for the particular services and maintenance for which the occupying forces would be responsible. Actual experience and further study led to a more definitive recommendation at the meeting of 6-7 May 1943. Applicable to the principal type of project — airfields — this recommendation provided that the government whose forces chiefly used the facilities would be responsible for their defense, maintenance, and control. In all cases, however, defense measures would be of a standard acceptable to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. In accordance with this recommendation a schedule was worked out that assigned to Canada the airfields of the Northwest Staging Route, and the fields at Moncton, New Brunswick, and Dorval, Quebec; and to the United States the flight strips along the Alaska Highway and of the Canol project, and all the airfields of the CRIMSON project except Goose Bay, which had been covered by a special arrangement.39 The schedule could be changed only by mutual agreement. The financial settlement of 1944 had no effect upon it.

Completing the Machinery of Collaboration

An extra gear had been added to the machinery of collaboration after the United States entered the war. In the ABC staff conferences early in 1941, the United States and Britain agreed to exchange "duly accredited representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff vis-à-vis the Chiefs of Staff of the other Power . . . ." ⁴⁰ Canada, it was agreed by the ABC
conferees, would be represented on the staff of the British mission by the Canadian attaches in Washington. This was apparently intended as nothing more than a liaison arrangement between the Canadians and the British mission, for at the same time the service members of the Permanent Joint Board made provision, in the ABC-22 plan, for the United States and Canada to exchange staff representatives through a separate organization from that of the British. The final draft of the ABC-22 plan, dated 28 July 1941, stipulated that "to facilitate common decision and action, Canada and the United States will establish in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, officers of all Services who will be charged with the duty of representing their own Chief of Staff, vis-à-vis the appropriate Chief of Staff of the other nation." 41 Although it was the expressed purpose not to put the ABC-1 report or the ABC-22 plan into effect until

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the United States entered the war, certain of the responsibilities were undertaken almost immediately. Plans for exchanging staff representatives with the British were carried to completion in May, and in June the British mission arrived in Washington. Shortly on its heels came a proposal from Ottawa that, in view of these developments, the exchange of similar missions between the United States and Canada would not be untimely.42 The arrangement recommended in the ABC-1 report, that Canada be represented on the British mission, was unacceptable to the Canadian Government, which took the position that the British Military Mission could not properly speak for the Dominions and that the arrangement was inadequate for handling the common Canadian-United States problems of defense. But in spite of precedent and the Canadian argument and the commitment that was even then being incorporated in the joint basic defense plan, both the War Department and the Navy Department agreed that the moment for establishing a Canadian staff mission had not arrived. A counterproposal that the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board be permanently installed in Washington was rejected by the Canadian Government on the ground that membership on the board was a part-time job and the other important duties of the Canadian members would keep them in Ottawa.43 The possibility of designating the Canadian military
attachés in Washington as alternate members of the board seems to have been considered, but the entrance of the United States into the war soon afterward changed the situation.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor the joint basic defense plan, ABC-22, which provided for the exchange of staff representatives, came into effect. Nevertheless, it was not until the beginning of March 1942 that Maj. Gen. M. A. Pope, recently Vice Chief of the Canadian General Staff, arrived in Washington as representative of the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet. The arrangement was placed on a more formal basis in July, after the negotiations for an exchange of military missions between the United States and Brazil had been concluded. Under the new arrangement, as announced by the Canadian Government on 3 July 1942, General Pope and the senior Canadian air and naval officers in Washington became the Canadian Joint Staff representing the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Individually, the members of the Canadian Joint Staff acted as representatives in Washington of their respective Chiefs of Staff, while General Pope, as head of the staff, represented

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Canada before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of which Canada was not a member. Since responsibility for the coordination of the war effort in the North American area had been assumed by the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff, the establishment of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington made it possible to relegate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to the role for which it had apparently been intended, the preparation and revision of long-range defense plans and projects.

Preface to the Present

There was little of the dramatic in the story of the wartime relations of the United States with Canada. There had been no great challenge met and overcome in concert, only a latent threat. There had been no great conflict of interest faced and successfully resolved, only differences of opinion. The
drama, such as it was, had ended when cooperation began. Once started, the course of collaboration took the two countries along a pathway of roses whose occasional thorns seem only to have quickened their progress.

In 1945, with the end of the war approaching, the Permanent Joint Board began considering the matter of peacetime collaboration. The discussions lacked urgency, but the success of the wartime relationship had established a pattern. Throughout the discussions there was never the slightest doubt of the permanence of the board. It was taken for granted that the collaboration of the preceding five years would continue. To American defense planners, the success of the wartime alliance with Canada seemed to vindicate the old suspicions of multilateral action and to confirm the preference for bilateral arrangements. While other wartime associations were breaking up with the end of hostilities, the United States and Canada were an example to the rest of the world. Their relationship was indisputable evidence that two partners could work together amicably in time of peace as well as war, and that two nations could each relinquish a measure of independence of action without losing self-respect or national dignity.

Collaboration with Canada, like the leasing of bases from the British and the general policy of hemisphere defense, had been accepted in the summer of 1940 with some degree of popular enthusiasm primarily because it accorded with the atavistic impulse of every individual to find safety in numbers, to huddle together behind a ring of shields. Army planners, less governed by impulse, were more restrained, and even reluctant to accept it. Tied to relatively fixed lines of operation and relying on weapons whose effect was generally limited to the range of the pieces themselves, the Army by its very nature was committed to an area defense, and the bigger the area the larger were the forces required to defend it. From this point of view the obligations of hemisphere defense might appear to be a dangerously thin dispersion of American forces. On the other hand, the traditional role of the Navy and to a certain extent the new, still developing role of airpower were facilitated. By making it easier to bring air and naval power into contact with the forces
from which attack was to be expected, by providing the bases from which the counterassault against the enemy could be launched, the arrangements with Canada made their most valuable contribution. It was not mere coincidence that the defensive strongpoints in the north fitted equally well this other structure, whose significance was not entirely that of hemisphere defense, which was slowly being built up into a second front against the Axis. But whether as the cornerstone of hemisphere defense or as one of the piers from which the arch of victory was projected, the collaboration of the United States and Canada was essential.
Endnotes for Chapter XV


2 Tod and Croft, Statistics section of Lend-Lease, Table LL-11, p. 20, and Table LL-14, pp. 23-34.


4 The Alaska Highway-Control Div Report 175, ASF and, particularly valuable, the separate volume of exhibits. Both in OCMH Hist MS file. Unless otherwise noted, the material on which the following account of the Alaska Highway is based can be found in the volume of exhibits.

5 Keenleyside MS, p. 25, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2).

6 Memo, Gen Embick for CofS, 23 Jun 41; AG 611 (4-24-41).

7 Memo, SGS for WPD, 24 Jun 41, AG 611 (4-24-41).

8 See Ch. VI, above, and Feis, Road To Pearl Harbor, pp. 215-16, 219.

9 Ibid., Chs. 31, 32.

10 Journal of 29 Jul 41, PJBD files; Recommendation 19, 29 Jul 41, PJBD 124-1.

11 Ltr, SW to Hon, Wilburn Cartwright, 6 Oct 41, Exhibit E, Alaska Highway Exhibits, Control Div ASF.

12 Secy Stimson's notes of a mtg in his office on 2 Feb 42; Excerpt from notes of Brig Gen Clarence L. Sturdevant same date; Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Feb 42, sub: International Highway. All in Exhibit F, Alaska Highway
Exhibits.

13 Ltr, La Guardia to President, 27 Feb 42, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Keenleyside MS, pp. 2527, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2); Mins of PJBD 26 Feb 42, in Exhibit G, Alaska Highway Exhibits.

14 Notes exchanged between the American Minister at Ottawa and the Canadian Secy State for External Affairs, 17-18 Mar 42, Exhibit G, Alaska Highway Exhibits.

15 Keenleyside MS, pp. 29-31, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2).


18 Progress Reports of U.S. Army and RCAF members, notably the reports of 20-21 Aug 43, 3-4 Nov 43; and 30 Mar-7 Apr 44, in OPD 334.8 PJBD, Sec. II, Cases 27-34; Recommendation 29, 24 Feb 43, PJBD 124-1.

19 Keenleyside MS, p. 27, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2); 1st Ind, Senior U.S. Army Member, PJBD, to ACofS OPD, 22 Jul 44 (basic Ltr missing), OPD 580.82 Canada, Sec. I; Official History . . Alaskan Department, App. K; and Exhibit U, Alaska Highway Exhibits. Last two in OCMH Hist MS file.

20 For a discussion of the relation of the highway and staging route to the strategy of defense, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts.


23 Comment of General Arnold during conference in office of DCofS 17 Jun 41, OCS Conf Binder 18. See also Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIII.


27 Journal of 9 Jun 42, PJBD files; Recommendation 26, 9 Jun 42, PJBD 124-1; Keenleyside MS, pp. 27-28, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2).


30 Memo, ACofAS Plans for OPD, 1 Dec 42, sub: Projected Airfields, Greenland and NE Canada; Memo, ACofAS Plans for OPD, 2 Apr 43. Both in OPD 580.82, Sec. II, Cases 44, 66.

31 Journal of 6-7 May 43, and journal of 1-14 Jul 43, in PJBD files; Memo,
OPD for DCofS, 18 Jun 43, WDCSA 676.3 Canada (31 Dec 43).

32 ASF, CE, Hist Monograph, Province of Quebec, Canada-Fort Chimo, Sec. VI, p. 7, in OCMH Hist MS file.

33 Hq, USAF, Central Canada, History of U.S. Army Forces, Central Canada, CE Exhibit B-2, p. 7 (History of the United States Army Air Field . . . Minneapolis, Minnesota) and Exhibit A12, p. 2 (TAG Ltr to CG's, 25 Jun 43, sub: Modification of the CRIMSON Project), in OCMH MS file.

34 Keenleyside MS, p. 27, PJBD 100-2, Organization and Agendas (2); American Aviation, Vol. VIII, No. 7, September 1, 1944; Alaska Highway Exhibits, Tab W, and fiscal data in historical monographs dealing with the various bases, in OCMH Hist. MS file.


37 Journal of 8-9 Nov 43, OPD 334.8 PJBD, Sec. II, Cases 27-34.

38 Journal of 6-7 Sep 44, OPD 334.8 PJBD, Sec. III, Cases 35-46; Recommendation 33, 6-7 Sep 44, PJBD 124-1.

39 Recommendation 21, 10-11 Nov 41; Recommendation 31, 6-7 May 43; Recommendation 32, 24-25 Aug 43. All in PJBD 124-1.

40 ABC-1, Annex 1, Par. 2, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1497.

41 ABC-22, Par. 16, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1588.

42 Ltr, Actg Secy State Welles to SW, 3 Jul 41, and atchd Memo, Canadian Legation for Dept State, AG 336 (7-3-41) Establishment of a Canadian Mil Mission in Washington.
43 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 3 Oct 41; Memo by Mr. P. Moffitt, American Minister to Canada, of a conversation with Mr. L. Pearson, Canadian Dept of External Affairs, in Ottawa, 5 Sep 41. Both in WPD 4543.


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Some Conclusions and Observations

Before it entered World War II, the United States had committed itself to defend or help defend the entire land area of the Western Hemisphere against military attack from the Old World. In the course of planning for this purpose, the United States Government had defined the hemisphere as including the land masses of North and South America plus Greenland, Bermuda, and the Falklands (but not Iceland or the Azores) in the Atlantic area, and all islands east of the 180th meridian and all of the Aleutians in the Pacific. The armed power of the United States did not prevent minor enemy operations on New World territory, as the Germans in Greenland and the Japanese in the Aleutians demonstrated, but its forces were strong enough by late 1941 to make any major attack on the hemisphere an unprofitable venture for the Axis Powers.

The commitment to defend the whole hemisphere by force was a new departure in the military policy of the United States, although it was a natural outgrowth of American policy and practice under the Monroe Doctrine. It was also a natural extension of the primary mission of the armed forces defense of the homeland. For more than a century the possibility of a serious attack across continental land frontiers had been exceedingly remote, and until the late 1930's an effective attack by land-based airpower was impracticable. Therefore, the Army had concentrated after World War I on protecting the continental United States against attack by sea and against coastal invasion backed by sea power. It was almost equally concerned with the defense of the Panama Canal Zone and Oahu, as the principal outlying bastions for continental defense. By the late 1930's a rapid increase in the range and striking power of aircraft posed a new threat that could become serious if hostile airpower obtained a New World base or bases. The development of airpower coincided with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the secret and formidable preparation of the German nation for war. It was this coincidence that gave birth to the prewar policy of hemisphere defense in 1938, after Hitler had made clear his power and his warlike intent during the
Munich crisis. The United States decided that as soon as possible it had to have the means to forestall the establishment of any hostile base on Western Hemisphere territory from which the continental area or the Panama Canal could be threatened or attacked. To prevent the establishment of enemy bases remained the essence of hemisphere defense during the prewar period of American military preparation from late 1938 to December 1941.

Whatever the United States did for hemisphere defense, it did primarily to safeguard its own national security and interests. As General Embick put it, "In the formulation of all these plans, the vital interests of the United States must be uppermost in our minds." 1 The over-all purpose of the new policy, an Army planner noted, was to "deny an enemy bases from which he might launch military operations against any of the democratic nations of this hemisphere"; but its basic design was "to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of accepting war upon our own territory." 2 All of the measures planned and taken in the name of hemisphere defense, including those for the salvation of Great Britain and the British life line across the North Atlantic, had the fundamental object of promoting the security of the United States itself.

The basic threat to national security, as conceived by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull from late 1937 onward, was the increasing probability that Germany in combination with Japan might achieve domination over the land masses of the Eastern Hemisphere, wreck the British Commonwealth of Nations, and eventually and almost inevitably threaten the Western Hemisphere with military attack and conquest. The Munich "settlement" gave reality to this specter. Nazi Germany acquired a superior military position for launching an offensive war, and the League of Nations henceforth became completely ineffectual as an instrument for preventing a general war in the Eastern Hemisphere. The amoral leadership of Hitler together with the tremendous lead Germany had over the
democratic nations in rearmament made it appear probable by early 1939 that Germany would soon launch an offensive war of unpredictable dimensions.

On the other side of Eurasia, Japan had been engaged since 1937 in the conquest of China, and increasingly the Japanese Government was succumbing to the control of war lords who aimed at Japanese domination of all East Asia and Indonesia. Between 1938 and 1941 these developments made for a constant and serious threat of war between Japan and the United States, though not for a serious Japanese threat to territory in the Western Hemisphere. It was in the realm of possibility only that Japan could establish bases in the Aleutians or western Alaska, in outer islands of the Hawaiian group,

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or in islands southwest of Hawaii and east of the 180th meridian. That Japanese aircraft carriers might launch hit-and-run attacks on Hawaii or Panama was a more likely possibility. Since the United States after 1937 kept the bulk of its naval strength in the Pacific, the Army and the government generally tended to discount these dangers to hemisphere territory, and hemisphere defense came to mean very largely Atlantic defense against the menace of Nazi Germany.

President Roosevelt and American military planners foresaw in 1939 that the greatest danger to the United States and to the rest of the hemisphere would be the defeat of France and Great Britain with the surrender or destruction of their naval power. Widespread German influence in Latin America, much of it clandestine and subversive in intent, constituted a more nebulous danger but a serious weakness in the American position. The smashing German victories of 1939 and 1940 naturally bolstered this influence. After France's defeat the Germans planned two specific operations which, if successfully carried out, would have required much more vigorous measures of defense on the part of the United States and the other American nations than were actually put into effect. The Germans planned to invade Great Britain and to sweep through Spain in order to capture Gibraltar and northwest Africa.
Hitler's decision to postpone these operations until he had conquered the Soviet Union greatly eased the Atlantic situation in 1941, but did not dissipate American fears for the bulge of Brazil and other New World targets until Germany lost its ability to shift its major war effort from east to west in 1942. The German threat that had most to do with drawing the United States into World War II was the air and sea attack on Great Britain and its North Atlantic life line, which in 1941 turned the military focus of the United States toward the northeast and into the Battle of the Atlantic.

In planning for hemisphere defense after September 1939, the United States assumed that Hitler had embarked on a calculated scheme of world conquest; and in 1941 it assumed that Germany and Japan were acting in close military concert. These were the safe and proper assumptions for military planning. Actually, the Germans and Japanese became associates rather than partners in conquest and did not act in close military concert either before or after Pearl Harbor. Hitler, whatever schemes for world conquest he may have had in mind, never spelled out more than Old World domination (except in what he construed as Japan's proper sphere) and appropriate revenge against the United States for supporting his enemies by such tactics as a bombardment of New York City. Known Japanese plans for conquest were also limited to the Eastern Hemisphere, but unlike Hitler the Japanese, in

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furtherance of their plans, felt ready in 1941 to challenge the military power of the United States. After the Japanese unleashed their attack in December, and notwithstanding its unanticipated scope and violence, the United States Government decided that Hitler and German military superiority still posed the greater danger to the national security and to the whole Western way of life, and it reaffirmed its earlier decision that if the nation were drawn into the war it should strive to defeat Germany first.

The seriousness of the German threat in 1940 had led the United States, for the first time in its history, to seek and enter into close military relations with most of the other Western Hemisphere nations. Generally, the other
American nations were as aware as the United States of the Nazi menace to democracy, and Canada had almost immediately joined with Great Britain in the war. Inter-American solidarity in World War I furnished some precedents for wartime collaboration, but not for the military staff agreements and defense boards of World War II or for the extensive deployment of United States forces throughout the hemisphere that occurred between 1941 and 1945. In view of the preponderant strength of the United States and its very recent abandonment of intervention, the other American nations entered into these military ties with an understandable concern for their own national sovereignty and interests.

Military relations with Canada differed from those with the Latin American nations, not only because Canada became a belligerent in September 1939 but also because Canada had not participated in the Pan-American gatherings that formulated the basic principles for association with the nations to the south. The close military contacts that developed with Canada in 1940 and 1941 were also tied in with the growing military intimacy of the United States and Great Britain. Thus the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was an immediate outgrowth of the destroyer-base negotiation in August 1940, and joint war plan ABC-22 with Canada was based in large measure on the ABC strategy developed jointly with Great Britain. On the other hand, the prewar and wartime association of the United States and Canada naturally reflected the tradition of the long-unguarded frontier, the economic and demographic intimacy of the two nations, and the precedent of joint boards and commissions created for various purposes during the preceding decades of the twentieth century.

In the area of Latin America, the key to fulfillment of measures for hemisphere defense was the success of the United States both before and after Pearl Harbor in staying within the bounds of its prewar political commitments, which collectively comprised the Good Neighbor policy. By 1938 national

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policy was against further territorial expansion in the New World, and the
United States had ceased its old political and military interventions in certain Caribbean countries and foresworn intervention for any purpose in any American nation. In general the United States had also committed itself not to "play favorites" among the American nations. That the nation kept within these bounds can be attributed in part to the sound judgment and guidance of Under Secretary of State Welles, who rather frequently prevailed in maintaining them against the wishes of military officers and of President Roosevelt himself.

To have any reality, hemisphere defense required the availability of existing or the development of new military bases. United States plans for hemisphere defense assumed that, when necessary, its forces could use existing military bases and essential supporting facilities in other American nations and in colonial territories of the European powers. Until Pearl Harbor the United States as a matter of policy avoided either the lease or outright acquisition of new base sites in other American nations, and at least in theory avoided exclusive acquisition and use of new bases anywhere except within its own territory. After Pearl Harbor it carefully avoided any use of military bases that could fairly be construed as an infringement on the sovereignty of other New World nations.

A fundamental of the policy and defense plans of the United States was that potential Old World enemies must not obtain control over any territory in the Western Hemisphere, either by force or by negotiation. Germany's victory in the West in 1940 naturally made this a problem of great moment, and the United States prepared to take the steps necessary to prevent British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions from falling into German hands or under German control. To avoid any pretext for military attack, the United States also opposed the defense of French, Dutch, and Danish possessions by friendly belligerents, and insisted that these lands should be defended as necessary by United States or Latin American forces. As a result of the destroyer-base agreement, the United States also assumed a major share of the responsibility for defending British North Atlantic and Caribbean territories.

As for the territory of the Latin American nations, the United States pledged itself in the staff agreements of 1940 to employ its forces to assist in defeating any external attack by the armed forces of a non-American state or
internal attack supported by a non-American state, if the recognized government of the nation concerned asked for such assistance. While the larger Latin nations had sizable military establishments, these were not equipped or trained to meet an Old World enemy force in strength. Nor did the United States have the means to help equip and train their forces sufficiently or in time to handle major threats from abroad. Therefore, prewar plans for hemisphere defense had to assume that United States forces would be required to defend the Latin American area against major enemy attacks. The large movement of trained Canadian forces to Great Britain made a similar assumption necessary for the northern reaches of the hemisphere. Acting on these assumptions, the United States in military negotiations with other American nations before Pearl Harbor had as its main objectives assured access to existing military base facilities and warnings of impending enemy attacks in time to allow United States forces to reach threatened areas.

In 1939 the war, plans of the United States assumed the possibility, and in 1940 the probability, of large-scale military operations in the Western Hemisphere. From the beginning of 1941, although the Army continued to plan the deployment of sizable forces for guarding hemisphere positions to the northeast as well as to the south against external attack, the more immediate apprehension of Army planners was the evil that could be done by Axis fifth columnists in Latin America. By early 1941 the policy of the United States was also veering toward a major war effort across the North Atlantic. The Army recognized that in view of this trend a large defensive deployment of forces to the south would be unsound, and during 1941 it tried to keep the number of combat troops sent into the Caribbean area to a bare minimum. Beyond the Caribbean, it wished only to establish an air reconnaissance base southwest of Panama and to send minimum defense forces to the eastern bulge of Brazil.

The Latin American nations were nevertheless increasingly impressed with the growing military strength of the United States and with the genuineness
of its intentions to defend the hemisphere. Understandably, the larger South American nations would have preferred to prepare for a more active role in hemisphere defense than was allotted to them in the war plans of the United States. With their normal European sources of arms and ammunition cut off, these nations looked to the United States for the munitions they needed to rehabilitate and expand their armed forces.

In practice it was impossible for the United States to supply munitions in any quantity to the Latin American nations during 1940 and 1941. In June 1940 the nation had poured a very large part of its surplus of arms into England, and three months later it began a rapid expansion of its own Army forces. During the rest of the prewar period the United States did not have and could not produce the means to arm Latin America and at the same time arm itself and help arm Great Britain, and therefore it staked the safety of the Western Hemisphere on success in meeting the two last-named objectives. After 1940, if the threat of early and serious attack on South America had become more ominous, the United States probably could and would have allotted more arms to the major states of the southern continent. By late 1942 and 1943, when the nation had the means to supply Latin America with modern arms as well as to meet more pressing needs, the danger to the hemisphere had passed. Nevertheless, before the war ended the War Department had furnished arms to Latin American nations in greater dollar value than planned for them in early 1941 or stipulated for them in lend-lease agreements. The bulk of these arms went to Brazil and Mexico, which became active fighting partners in the war.

The rearmament policies and practices of the United States made inevitable a marked shift in the distribution of military strength within the, Western Hemisphere after 1939. In 1939 the active military forces of the other American nations considerably exceeded those of the United States in numbers if not in actual strength. By late 1941 United States forces in the hemisphere not only outnumbered those of the other American nations but
greatly exceeded them in effective military power, and this disparity grew progressively greater after the United States entered the war. The shift in military strength within the hemisphere undoubtedly had an appreciable though indeterminable influence on the policies and attitudes of the rest of the Americas, as well as an evident effect on the policies and plans of the United States for the defense of the hemisphere.

By itself, the story of inter-American military relations after 1938 reflects very incompletely the full extent of inter-American cooperation before and after December 1941. The whole New World contributed its economic strength to the preparedness and war efforts of the United States and of the Old World opponents of the Axis nations. The United States in return helped to maintain and improve the material well-being of the rest of the Americas, which had been seriously threatened by the loss of normal Old World markets and sources of supply. Even by itself, the story of inter-American military cooperation for hemisphere defense had a much greater significance than the rather scant dependence of the United States on other American military forces might imply. Without the assurance of effective and friendly local support, any large effort by United States forces in defense of the hemisphere would have been a truly formidable undertaking.

The leaders of the United States Army realized during the prewar years that even under the most auspicious circumstances the Army was ill-prepared for a large-scale hemisphere operation. Out of its nucleus of trained and equipped troops the Army had to develop a large strategic reserve of units that for the most part would not be ready for action before late 1941. Given this situation, Army planning continued to be dominated by the idea of maintaining a perimeter defense of the citadel, the continental United States. Until 1939 the defense perimeter followed the continental shoreline, and was supported by strong but distant outposts in the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii. With military expansion and in accordance with the new policy of hemisphere defense, the defensive perimeter was extended outward from the citadel. By mid-1941 it included Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda,
Puerto Rico, and Trinidad along the Atlantic front and Alaska with Oahu and the Canal Zone along the Pacific. Army planners also wanted to project the perimeter southward to include the Galapagos in the Pacific and, above all, the eastern tip of Brazil in the Atlantic. They believed that with this further extension the perimeter could be held by a minimum number of combat troops, and that no enemy could establish a base for major operations in the Western Hemisphere without first capturing one or more of the perimeter strongpoints.

As long as the United States Navy kept the bulk of its fleet in the eastern Pacific, neither Japan nor any other nation had the capability of establishing a hostile base from which to launch a major operation against the hemisphere's Pacific front, and Nazi Germany with all of its military might could not act similarly in the northern Atlantic as long as the British Fleet was in being and based on the British Isles. In October 1940 General Marshall described the naval aspects of hemisphere defense as "fundamental," and said: "As long as the British fleet remains undefeated and England holds out, the Western Hemisphere is in little danger of direct attack." But, he added, "the situation would become radically changed" if the British Fleet were sunk or surrendered. 3

If Britain fell and the British Fleet were lost, it was more than conceivable that the Western Hemisphere might be invaded from the northeast via Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence estuary. This was the threat that aroused the interest of President Roosevelt in acquiring bases for United States forces in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; it was a matter discussed at the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense; and it remained a threat covered by Army expeditionary force plans in 1940 and 1941.

Partly because British and American naval power was stationed so far away, the Army was most concerned during the prewar period with the situa-

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and the Gulf of Mexico were the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal and also to the "soft underbelly" of the United States itself—its unprotected Gulf coast. Furthermore, two prime strategic materials—oil and bauxite—originated around these seas and traveled through them. After June 1940 the presence in this area of French colonies loyal to the Vichy Government added to the Army's concern.

In South America the bulge of Brazil, closer to Africa than to the nearest of the Antilles, was the one point in the hemisphere vulnerable to large-scale air attack or invasion. Northeast Brazil was undefended, inaccessible to existing Brazilian Army forces, and beyond the range of United States airpower based in the Caribbean area. Even if Britain survived, it seemed to Army planners that Northeast Brazil must be defended by United States forces if German forces moved into western Africa. Furthermore, they held, the effective defense of this one position would insure the whole southern Atlantic front against external attack and reassure all of the Latin American nations against any serious threat from abroad. It was in order to make the Brazilian bulge defensible that the Army arranged with Pan American Airways to construct two chains of airfields leading from the United States to eastern Brazil. But the Brazilians could not be persuaded to request United States Army defenders for the area.

Germany's smashing victories in western Europe in the spring of 1940 had the immediate effect of re-emphasizing hemisphere defense as the basic military policy of the United States. On 23 May President Roosevelt and his principal advisers decided that the nation must avoid war with Japan and concentrate on what they called the "South American situation." Eastern Brazil was the most immediate cause for anxiety, and over the week end of 25-26 May the President had the Army and Navy engage in hurried planning for a possible expeditionary force to that area. Actually, the services were then unready to carry out any such plan, but they quickly prepared a more comprehensive one for defending the hemisphere on all fronts. This plan, RAINBOW 4, remained the basic guide for American military action until the spring of 1941. After France fell, the President and his principal military advisers reaffirmed the decision to avoid war or offensive action in the Pacific, ruled out intervention in the European war, and decided that the nation must concentrate on mobilizing its manpower and economic strength for hemisphere defense. Underlying these decisions of 24 June was a grave
doubt that Great Britain could survive through 1940.

The first breach in the June decisions on national strategy was the agreement with Great Britain to exchange destroyers for bases, concluded on 2 September. During September Army and Navy leaders as well as the President acquired a conviction that Great Britain could hold out at least six months more, and that even if the British Fleet was surrendered in the spring of 1941 it would take the Germans six additional months to make it useful. Therefore, Germany could not launch a major attack across the Atlantic before the autumn of 1941, and by then the United States expected to have a trained and equipped Army of 1,400,000 men as well as greater naval strength. While eventually Germany might muster the strength to challenge the United States, a transatlantic invasion of the hemisphere by German forces within the next two or three years appeared improbable, even if coordinated with a Japanese offensive in the Pacific. With the bounds of neutrality already broken by the destroyer-base exchange, and with a much more optimistic outlook than in June, the United States Government from September onward charted a new course of much greater aid to Great Britain. Eventually and inevitably this new course disrupted plans for a perimeter defense of the hemisphere as plotted in RAINBOW 4.

While Germany stayed its military hand in the autumn and winter of 1940, the United States reached new decisions on national policy. These reaffirmed a defensive posture in the Pacific and concentration on the Atlantic and European situations. But the new policy went much further: it assumed the salvation of Great Britain and the British Fleet, and it contemplated American entry into the European war to defeat Germany. By December 1940 the civilian and military leaders of the War and Navy Departments were convinced that the United States must eventually enter the war against Germany to save itself, and that to save itself it had to save Great Britain. They also agreed that the eventual "big act" in getting into the war would be the one undertaken by United States forces to help protect the North Atlantic seaway to Great Britain. President Roosevelt matched these convictions with his conception of lend-lease. In effect, the new orientation
of national policy made Great Britain the pivot of measures for defending the nation and the hemisphere during 1941. It also brought the United States Navy into the midst of Atlantic action.

Although the Army was the more active service in preparations for continental and hemisphere defense before 1941, it had actually been playing a secondary role behind a first-line screen of naval power. The Navy much

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more than the Army had kept its eyes on the Pacific, where its main strength lay and where it assumed its main task would be if war came. Nevertheless, as the Army recognized, throughout the prewar years the Navy in conjunction with British naval power was carrying out its primary mission of providing the nation with a first line of defense at a distance. Army leaders were also well aware during these years that only the Navy had a force in being ready for war.

Since 1939 the principal task of the Navy in the immediate defense of the hemisphere had been to maintain a neutrality patrol in Atlantic waters to persuade belligerent warships, and especially German vessels, to keep away from American shores. The Navy had gradually extended its patrol outward into the Atlantic, and the destroyer exchange, though temporarily weakening the patrol, had provided new and improved bases for supporting its operations. Then, in January 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the Navy to prepare for the larger role in the Atlantic of helping to escort American aid to Britain. While the Navy was getting ready for this task, the United States and Great Britain agreed in staff conversations on the course of action they would follow should the United States enter the war, and in March Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. But when the Navy in April came up with a forthright escort scheme in its Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1, President Roosevelt after some indecision ordered a more circumscribed line of action that confined American naval operations to the western half of the Atlantic and to measures short of escort duty. Even so, it seemed to Army and Navy leaders in the spring of 1941 that the nation was on the
brink of open war.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June helped to postpone war in the Atlantic and to precipitate it in the Pacific. Intelligence of the impending German thrust eastward had influenced the decision of President Roosevelt to send American troops to Iceland, and their arrival furnished the justification for escort operations by the United States Navy to the longitude of Iceland. Then in September and October came the "shooting war" and, soon thereafter, escort duties all the way to Britain under the Navy's last Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.

Whether these successive Navy plans of 1941 were really measures for hemisphere defense was a bone of contention for isolationists then as it has been for some of Mr., Roosevelt's critics since. Granted that the broadening military operations of the United States in the North Atlantic were steps toward the defeat of Hitler's Germany, they were also genuine and effective defense measures. The dual purpose of these Navy plans should be recog-

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nized. Certainly under these plans, and the associated plans of the Army, the United States took its most effective action for Atlantic and hemisphere defense during 1941.

The Army played only a secondary role in the vigorous measures of mid and late 1941 for saving Great Britain and its North Atlantic life line. Execution of these measures meant that the Army could not carry out other plans for defense in the areas for which it had previously felt so much concern the Caribbean and South America. On the other hand, with the North Atlantic increasingly secured and the Germans heavily engaged in the Soviet Union, new Army defense steps to the south had less urgency than before mid-1941. Even some of those already taken had begun to acquire a different character, since the main airway to Brazil was becoming the first stage of an air ferry and supply route to Africa and on to Old World fighting fronts.
Chapter XVI: Some Conclusions and Observations

The position of President Roosevelt toward hemisphere defense after the spring of 1940 is somewhat difficult to determine from his addresses and other remarks. As a rule, his intimate conversations with advisers were not recorded. From his known remarks and actions it is apparent that after the summer of 1940 Mr. Roosevelt did not feel any acute concern about the possibility of a major military attack on the hemisphere for several years to come. There is no question about the President's detestation of Hitler and the Nazis, nor about his appreciation of how great the threat to the United States would be if Germany secured a dominating position in the Eastern Hemisphere. Nor is there any question about Mr. Roosevelt's determination to use all courses of action that American public opinion would support to stop Hitler.

One of these courses was an appeal to the traditional American doctrine of freedom of the seas. As early as October 1940, the President and Secretary of State Hull had emphasized in public addresses how essential friendly control of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was to hemisphere defense. In January 1941 the President began to stress freedom of the seas rather than hemisphere defense as a rallying ground for military preparedness. He also took the position that there should be no "aggressors" peace. Furthermore, he believed that saving Great Britain alone was not enough, because the strength, and security of Britain depended upon the continued support of the rest of the British Empire and its sea communications everywhere. In one of his most revealing utterances the President wrote:

A nationally known advertising man wrote me the other day . . . to suggest that we tell the truth, i.e., that we are not concerned with the affairs of the British Empire but are concerned with our own safety, the security of our own trade, the future of our own

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crops, the integrity of our own continent, and the lives of our own children in the next generation.

That, I think, is a pretty good line to take because it happens to be true and it is on that line itself that we must, for all the above purely selfish reasons, prevent at almost any
hazard the Axis domination of the world.\textsuperscript{5}

The President's expressed goals clearly called for a larger effort in 1941 than the nation needed to make for the immediate defense of the hemisphere. They also called for a different sort of effort from that which Army planners advocated, as illustrated in discussions about Iceland and the Azores. From the planners' viewpoint it was not necessary nor even desirable to occupy either as a military outpost for the hemisphere; from the President's point of view, both were essential guardians of Atlantic seaways, which had to be controlled to save Britain, and he was convinced that Britain's salvation was an essential to hemisphere and national security.

Until late 1941 the President was apparently more reluctant about getting into the war than were some of his principal advisers. He kept his ears tuned sensitively to American public opinion and opinion polls, and to judge from the public opinion polls Mr. Roosevelt never let the actions of the United States get very far out of step with the opinion of the majority of its people. Several of the President's advisers thought that he lagged behind the majority. Perhaps there was much truth in the remark of a distinguished English observer, who wrote him: "I have been so struck by the way you have led public opinion by allowing it to get ahead of you."\textsuperscript{6} American opinion remained heavily opposed to any declaration of war until the attack on Pearl Harbor. But in 1940 and 1941 a majority indorsed every action taken in the name of hemisphere defense or freedom of the seas, including the support of Great Britain and military operations in the North Atlantic. The public also approved the action, urged by the President and taken by Congress on 13 November 1941, repealing prohibitions against arming American merchant ships and against allowing them to enter war zones. By that action Congress ended the apparent ambiguity and undercover character of Atlantic operations during the preceding months of 1941 and set the stage for war with Germany.

Then, before a full state of war could develop in the Atlantic, Japan struck in the Pacific: Basically, the United States was no more responsible for Japan's aggression than it had been for Nazi Germany's. The Japanese Government wanted to convert the nations and colonial areas of eastern Asia and Indonesia into subservient tributaries of Japan, and the war in Europe seemed to provide
a golden opportunity for conquest. The Japanese might have been willing to create their so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere by negotiation, but they were not willing to limit their objective. When Great Britain and the United States and the other nations involved decided not to capitulate, Japan cast the die for war.

Until the summer of 1941 new Army measures for defense in the Pacific lagged behind Atlantic preparations. Secretary of War Stimson among others did not believe that Japan would go to war as long as Britain remained undefeated. Alarms in January and July 1941 produced some strengthening of Oahu's Army air defenses and a more rapid garrisoning of Alaska. Since the Army's primary mission in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama was to guard naval bases and installations, the Navy until August 1941 had the chief voice in determining where Army Pacific reinforcements should go. After that, under the impulse of a new design to contain Japan by airpower, the reinforcement of the Philippines instead of hemisphere outposts became the goal. As a result, some of Hawaii's newly acquired air strength was shifted to the Far East, and the movement of modern aircraft to Alaska was further postponed. The decision to reinforce the Philippines broke through the perimeter concept in the Pacific as the defense of Iceland and Great Britain had broken through it in the Atlantic. The Japanese attacked just as this reinforcement was getting under way.

Japan's astounding success at Pearl Harbor opened the whole western front of the hemisphere to the danger of hit-and-run carrier attacks, and opened some of the Pacific islands within the hemisphere to invasion. Within six months the victory of the United States in the great naval air battle off Midway blunted these threats and limited further Japanese action in the hemisphere to a bothersome occupation of the outer Aleutians. In the western Atlantic, during the first seven months of 1942, German submarines took a tremendous toll of merchant shipping off the East and Gulf coasts of the United States and in the Caribbean Sea. Inter-American solidarity was further cemented when a German attack on Brazilian shipping farther south
brought Brazil into the war in August 1942. Three months later the successful invasion of northwest Africa by American and British forces put an end to any justifiable concern for hemisphere defense in the Atlantic.

A glance at the distribution of troops in mid-1942 shows that in the first few months after Pearl Harbor continental and hemisphere defense plans had continued to provide the main guides to the actual deployment of Army ground and air forces, despite the large movement of forces to the Southwest Pacific and smaller movements to the British Isles and Iceland. At the begin-

ning of July 1942, when the Army had about 800,000 officers and men assigned to active theaters and defense commands, Western Hemisphere garrisons and commands contained about three fourths of this strength, divided about equally between defense commands in the continental United States and overseas outposts within the hemisphere. In other words, the Army did not begin to move the bulk of its ready forces across the oceans until after the nation and the hemisphere were reasonably secure. After 1942 the principal task of Army defenders within the hemisphere was to guard outposts that had become bases for the support of overseas offensives.

The focus of Army planning had begun to shift from hemisphere defense to future operations outside the hemisphere long before, in late 1940 and early 1941. During 1941 military men moved somewhat more slowly than political leaders toward the new strategy, partly because the former were more aware than the latter of minimum defense needs and partly because military leaders were painfully aware of the unreadiness of most of the Army until late 1941 for offensive action. Indeed there was a remarkable coincidence between the Army's readiness for limited offensive action and the outbreak of full-scale war. Enough forces were ready in December 1941 so that Army planning and action could turn quickly and naturally to launching operations overseas that would obviate the need for hemisphere defense at home.
Endnotes for Chapter XVI

1 Memo, CG Third Army for WPD, 8 Jun 40, WPD 4175-11.

2 Memo for Rcd, Lt Col Anderson, WPD, 1 Nov 39, WPD 4175-2.


4 Stimson Diary, entry of 16 Dec 40.

5 Pets Ltr, President Roosevelt to Senator Josiah W. Bailey, 13 May 41, in *FDR Personal Letters*, 11, 1154.

6 Pets Ltr, 3 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

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Bibliographical Note

The authors have obtained the bulk of the information used in the preparation of this volume from original records of the Army accumulated before and during World War II. Most of the Army records when consulted were in the custody of The Adjutant General's Office, but they either have been moved or eventually will be moved to the National Archives. The Army, Navy, and joint service records of the war period are described in Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Agencies, prepared by the General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, The National Archives (Washington, 1951), to which the interested reader is referred for more detailed information about the numerous agencies concerned and their accumulation of records.

The files of the War Plans. Division (WPD) of the War Department General Staff, extending chronologically from 1921 to March 1942 (more or less), proved the most valuable single collection for the preparation of this work. The principal plans made and measures taken for hemisphere defense were developed in the period before Pearl Harbor, and the WPD files not only contain the broadest variety of information on the subjects treated but they also provide a key to other relevant collections. The WPD files, which have an excellent subject index, have been kept physically associated with those of the Operations Division (OPD), the general staff division that became the War Department's principal agency for planning and directing military operations from March 1942 to the end of the war. The OPD decimal files have been consulted extensively, and associated with them are many other records that proved to be especially useful, including two binders of Notes on Conferences in the Office of the Chief of Staff, the OPD Diary in many volumes, and particularly a group of miscellaneous files relating to military negotiations with the Latin American nations from 1940 onward (OPD Misc)-and among the latter the files of the joint Advisory Board (JAB) on American Republics that first became active in January 1941. A separate OPD Executive Office file (OPD Exec) contains much valuable data that supplements the regular series of WPD and OPD files, including a copy of a Diary kept by Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow while Chief of the War Plans Division in 1941. The Army files relating to matters considered by the joint Board (JB), kept by the successor agency to OPD when the-authors
consulted them, were also of some use.

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The records accumulated by the Office of the Chief of Staff (referred to as OCS to March 1942, and WDCSA thereafter) have been second in importance only to the WPD-OPD collections. Although the three series of numerical OCS files are incomplete, and fragmentary indeed before 1940, they contain much useful data not readily found in other groups. The WDCSA files, arranged in two series (1942-43 and in 1944-45), are more voluminous but of less value for this work because they postdate the principal events recorded herein. In the Chief of Staffs records there are also about thirty-three binders of conference and miscellaneous notes for the 1939-42 period, separate binders on the emergency action measures of 1939-40, two binders of Notes on the Secretary of War's War Council meetings beginning in May 1941, and four binders that represent the Army file relating to Standing Liaison Committee (SLC) meetings between 1938 and 1943.

The central decimal files maintained by The Adjutant General's Office (AG) have been searched by the authors as a major supplement to the two groups of War Department General Staff records described in the preceding paragraphs. The theory that all official action papers eventually reach the AG files broke down in practice to a considerable extent after 1939,. but the AG files are nevertheless the most voluminous and comprehensive group of War Department records for the World War II period. Other departmental records used included those of the Secretary of War (SW) and of the Supply or G-4 Division of the General Staff. Besides the records of strictly War Department headquarters agencies, the authors have made some use of the files of General Headquarters United States Army (GHQ), pertaining to the planning and launching of operations before early 1942; of the records of the Army Ground Forces (AGF), which inherited GHQ's training functions; and to a small extent of those of the Army Service Forces (ASF). A few items were drawn from the papers of the Army War College (AWC), which suspended operations in June 1940. For the period after March 1942 the minutes of War Department General Council meetings were of some help,
and a fairly complete set of these minutes has been kept in the General Reference Office of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). During work on this volume a good many records of tactical commands in the United States and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere were examined, principally for use in preparation of a sequent volume to this one, and a few records of the Pacific coast's Western Defense Command (WDC) are cited herein.

To supplement the information available in Army records, the small blocks of files kept by American service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States (PJBD), and of the Joint Mexican-

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United States Defense Commission (JMUSDC or MDC) were examined in the preparation of Chapters XIII-XV. Some helpful gleanings were obtained in the Calendar of Hopkins Papers, prepared in connection with the writing of Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*; the papers themselves are now in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL) at Hyde Park, New York. There the authors obtained much greater help from pertinent records in the papers of Mr. Roosevelt, relating to the President's exercise of his broad powers as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army. Permanent locational symbols are not yet available for use in citing individual documents in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Such documents are therefore cited only as being in the Roosevelt Papers. Finally—and very important—the authors had access to relevant portions, for the years 1940-42, of the voluminous Diary kept by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

German attitudes and actions toward the United States and the rest of the hemisphere were studied in the extensive collection of postwar interviews and statements of leading German participants, in OCMH files. The seven-volume translation of the Private Journal of General Franz Halder, the German Army's Chief of Staff until late 1942, was also valuable. Translations of contemporary entries by Dr. Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary kept by the German Armed Forces Operations Staff, National Defense Branch, and monographs by Dr. Greiner on the projected invasion of
England (SEA LION) and capture of Gibraltar (FELIX), illuminated
German plans during the latter half of 1940. Copies of the Halder and
Greiner items have also been kept in OCMH files.

Through the courtesy of Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USN, the authors were
able to use his incomplete but invaluable manuscript narrative, with
extensive documentary annotation, entitled U.S.-British Naval Cooperation,
1939-1942, which permitted them to gain some appreciation of the naval
background of hemisphere defense planning without undertaking a
formidable additional research task. The service historical programs during
and after World War II, both in Washington agencies and in field
commands, left a huge record in the form of unpublished narrative histories,
many of them still restricted as to use. Copies of most of them have been
kept in the General Reference Office, OCMH. A number of these narratives
have been cited in this work, and more of them have been studied for general
background information. Those produced within the Caribbean Defense
Command and its subordinate agencies have been particularly helpful. In
respect to Brazil, the war history program produced two narratives, a one-
volume ground Army History of the United States Army Forces South
Atlantic, and a seven-vol-

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ume Official History of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport
Command. Similar though less comprehensive monographs helped in
preparing the chapters on military relations with Canada and Mexico.

Among printed sources, the natural starting points for almost any Army
history of events before and during World War II are the Annual Reports of
the Secretary of War to the President and the Biennial Reports of General
George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff. On what happened before 7 December
1941, the thirty-nine volumes of testimony and documents printed as Pearl
Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the, joint Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, 1946) contain a wealth of data that-
has fascinated and frustrated a good many historians ever since its
publication. The President's positions before and during the war are
frequently indicated if not fully revealed in the ten volumes of *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1938-50), and in the two volumes entitled F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, edited by his son Elliott Roosevelt (New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950). On the German side, the series entitled *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy*, reproduced in translation by the Office of Naval Information in 1947, helped considerably in understanding Hitler's as well as the German Navy's plans and attitudes in the period 1939-42.


Very nearly as useful for the air and naval aspects of the story have been the first volume of the series *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, entitled *Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948); and two volumes in the *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, by Samuel Eliot Morison, Vol. I, *The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1947), and


Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, 2


Since Army records provided the authors' principal sources of information, a lengthier note of published works, including periodical and newspaper references of which no note is taken here, would be misleading.
Glossary of Abbreviations

A-2    Intelligence section of an air staff
AA    Antiaircraft
AAF    Army Air Forces
ABDA    Australian-British-Dutch-American
AC    Air Corps
ACofS    Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg    Acting
AF    Air Force
AFCC    Air Force Combat Command
AG    Adjutant General
Amer    American
A&N    Army and Navy
A&NMB    Army and Navy Munitions Board
ASF    Army Service Forces
ASW    Assistant Secretary of War
ATC    Air Transport Command
Atchd    Attached
AWC    Army War College
AWS    Aircraft Warning Service
Bd    Board
Br    Branch
Braz    Brazil
Bur    Bureau
CA    Coast Artillery
CAA    Civil Aeronautics Authority
CAB    Civil Aeronautics Board
CDC    Caribbean Defense Command
CE    Corps of Engineers
CG    Commanding General
CinC    Commander in Chief
CINCUS    Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
CNO    Chief of Naval Operations
CofOrd    Chief of Ordnance
CofS    Chief of Staff
Corn    Committee
Comd    Command
Comm    Commission
Conf    Conference
Cong    Congress
Conv    Conversation
COS    Chiefs of Staff (British)

DCofS    Deputy Chief of Staff
Def    Defense
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<tr>
<th>Code Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td>Code name for United States in prewar planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLUIE WEST</td>
<td>U.S. Air bases in Greenland.</td>
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<td>BLUIE EAST</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIMSON</td>
<td>Air routes through central and northeastern Canada, part of the air ferry route to the British Isles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRYSTAL</td>
<td>Three meteorological stations in northern Canada.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FELIX</td>
<td>German plan for capture of Gibraltar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAY</td>
<td>Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GYMNAST</td>
<td>Early Allied plan for invasion of northwest Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIGO</td>
<td>Plan for movement of troops to Iceland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LILAC</td>
<td>Late 1941 plan to concentrate U.S. forces in Belém-Natal-Recife area of Brazil-</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORANGE</td>
<td>Prewar plan for operations in event of war with Japan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>POT OF GOLD</td>
<td>1940 plan to send large expeditionary force to Brazil.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAINBOW</td>
<td>Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis aggression involving more than one enemy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEELOEWE</td>
<td>Planned German invasion of United Kingdom. Canceled.</td>
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<td>(SEA LION)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VELLUM</td>
<td>Force sent to Venezuela, February 1942.</td>
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</table>

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