

Field Artillery In Offense

By

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Colonel Bacon's article is based largely on a conference given by him during the course of instruction at the Command and General Staff School. This accounts for the brevity of some of the information which, in actual practice, served only as background for classroom discussion. It is believed that this article lends itself for instructional use by commanders of units of all arms.—THE EDITOR.

The purpose of this conference is to discuss certain general principles on the use of Field Artillery in offensive combat. Particular emphasis will be placed on division artillery; corps and army artillery will be mentioned briefly.

In the offensive, troops are distributed in two or more principal tactical groupings: one or more main or decisive attacks, and one or more secondary or holding attacks. The greatest possible offensive power is concentrated in the tactical grouping for the main attack. The mission of field artillery in the attack is to support the infantry with fire. This support is rendered by neutralizing or destroying the most dangerous enemy targets within range. Such targets may be the enemy's artillery, centers of resistance, troop concentrations, movements of reserves etc.

Division artillery is most effective in fire on unprotected personnel. It is used to blind enemy ob-

servation, to prevent movement of reserves and to assist in counterbattery fires.

Corps Artillery has as its principal mission the neutralization or destruction of the hostile artillery. It is also used in the destruction of hostile defenses, in fire on rear areas and to reinforce the fires of division artillery.

There is no artillery organically in an Army. Army has an artillery headquarters and such units as may be allotted to it by G.H.Q. Its principal missions are distant interdiction and destruction and to reinforce the fires of Corps artillery. Some or all of the units given to Army by G.H.Q. may be suballotted to lower units.

When there is additional artillery attached to the division, either from corps or through corps from Army, temporary groupings may be formed for convenience in the execution of missions. Such groupings are based on the nature of the mission rather than on the type or caliber of the weapons.

Infantry has two principal means of action—fire and movement. Infantry uses fire to overcome enemy resistance. Artillery is the most powerful supporting arm in the division. Artillery moves its fire from one portion of the front to another as requested by the infantry unit it supports or as directed by the division commander. It is a powerful means of adding to the fire of infantry weapons. Fire is moved to best support the infantry. Guns are never moved as long as they can do this support job effectively.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT.

Now, how is this fire controlled? The answer to that question is the key to proper artillery support in any combat. There are two methods. One is for the division to keep the artillery under centralized control and so enable the division commander to mass fires where and when they are needed. The other method is to attach the artillery to subordinate units, say an infantry regiment. There are advantages to each method. Sometimes a combination of the two is best. The question to be decided is, who can best exercise that control?

Direct Support.—When artillery is kept under division control it is placed in direct support of an infantry unit or in general support of the division as a whole. When the division order specifies that a battalion of light artillery will be in direct support of a certain infantry regiment, orders are issued to that battalion to be prepared to fire in the zone of action of that infantry regiment, to respond directly to

Types of British and German Land-Mines

A Desert Minefield Being Laid, and In Operation

(Illustration on Page 50)

Minefields play an increasingly important part in land warfare. With the development of the tank, the tank-mine became an inevitable development against these mobile land forts, and is probably most important of all defensive weapons against the tank. A minefield is laid in such a way that a tank cannot pass over a field without exploding one or more mines, and these are capable of smashing the track, bogie wheels, suspensions and axles of the heaviest tank. The method employed is to make a hard bed for the mine, remove the safety cap from the detonator and lightly cover it. The fields are very carefully charted, as with sea-mines, and when a minefield is laid near a well-used track, the "road" through is marked by tapes and pegs, as shown, these being, of course, withdrawn when an attack is apprehended. In laying or removing mines near an enemy position the work is carried out at night and is a dangerous job for the skilled Sappers employed on it. There are various secret devices used in detecting the position, like the Russian-type detector in this illustration, so constructed that when passed over hidden metal it detects the mine's position. Our artist's drawings give a comprehensive picture of mines, a tank minefield being laid, and in operation.—Extract from *The Illustrated London News*, 6 June 1942.

calls for fire from that regiment and to maintain liaison with the headquarters of the infantry regiment and with its front line battalions. Of course they must be able to observe in that zone of action. It means that the battalion will comply with every request for fire made by the infantry regiment, but that instructions from the division will have priority. The division may have ordered that battalion to be prepared to reach a certain area in another regimental sector with its fires; so the artillery battalion commander may not be able to comply with a request from the infantry that he occupy certain positions which the infantry commander feels may be more desirable. He will occupy positions from which he can support the infantry, all right, but from which he can also comply with division orders as to where he shall be able to move his fire.

When the division order attaches a light battalion to an infantry regiment the infantry regimental commander does not request, but orders what he wants as to position areas and fires. In such cases the artillery battalion has *one* mission—that of supporting the particular regiment to which it is attached. It does not have to consider any requirements for fires in support of another infantry unit except as so ordered by the unit to which it is attached. The distinction between direct support and attached artillery is one of command. Attached artillery is under the command of the supported unit; direct support artillery remains under control of the division commander. Field Service Regulations tell us that Field Artillery operates most effectively under centralized control. Insofar as the artillery support received by an infantry regiment from a battalion of artillery is concerned there is absolutely no difference between direct support and attached artillery. In either case the artillery sends liaison officers to the supported unit. It sends out forward observers, puts its CP with or near the infantry CP and complies with every possible request for fire. The first consideration in the location of a battalion CP is control of the firing batteries. The second is to be with the supported commander. The location of CP's is something staff officers should check on during the training period. If artillery and infantry CP's are not together, find out why. It may be that no good reason exists for the separation. Cooperation is essential. In some cases the infantry may find it to their advantage to locate their CP's in the same area selected by the artillery, especially in those cases where the artillery cannot come to the infantry location because of the necessity of control of the batteries.

Artillery should be attached to subordinate units when control can not be efficiently exercised by division. Situations when attachment may be desirable are: marches, advance or flank guards, pursuits, unusually wide frontage, difficulties of terrain or when signal communication is incomplete or insufficient.

Direct support artillery functions as attached artillery when communication with division is broken, and continues to so function until communication is reestablished. On the march artillery is placed within the column so as to insure its protection but primarily to insure its availability for early and adequate support of the security forces and the initial action of the main body. At the earliest indication of contact the advance guard artillery occupies positions to render timely support. Against a strong enemy a decision to develop and deploy for attack directly from march columns risks loss of control and sacrifices some of the capabilities of the artillery. Many infantry commanders will be found who want the artillery attached to their regiments under all circumstances. In making such a request they are passing up a valuable means of support. Direct support is actually more desirable from the standpoint of the infantry. By this organization for combat the infantry that needs additional fire can get it. Whereas if all the light artillery is attached, only the general support artillery is available for reinforcement.

Centralized control and centralized planning for the use of the artillery means that infantry regiments are to get the maximum artillery support at all times. It is true that artillery in direct support may be called on to fire outside the zone of action of the regiment it is supporting and so deprive its infantry of support while so engaged. Remember though that such a mission takes only a short time and that direct support artillery will immediately and automatically switch its fires back to its own supported unit upon completion of the mission. There are going to be many times when every infantry regiment will want additional artillery fires on its front. Infantry commanders should feel more secure when they can get the bulk of division artillery to support them than they would if that support were going to be limited to the artillery attached to them. Many officers have seen the demonstration at Fort Sill of the massing of fires of all the division artillery. It is an impressive sight. The effect of that fire is devastating. It is desirable that that power be kept under division control whenever the division is able to exercise such control. Please don't get the impression that artillery should never be attached. There are many situations when attachment is best. When such situations arise don't hesitate; decentralize. Remember that decentralization due to wide fronts and frequent displacements may be the rule rather than the exception. In this connection take steps during training to develop the battery as an effective fighting unit. It may be well that batteries will have to be attached to battalions; communications may break down. If such situations arise, batteries will be wanted that are able to function away from the fire direction center of the battalion.

General Support.—Artillery placed in general support, supports the entire unit. In the infantry division the medium artillery is normally placed in general support. Light artillery whose companion infantry regiment is not committed may also be placed in general support. Remember that it is unusual to place artillery in reserve. The artillery reserve is its ammunition. An artillery battalion held out of an offensive is of no value. If the infantry regiment which it normally supports is held out the artillery should be used. By placing it in general support it can be changed quickly to direct support or attachment if and when the infantry regiment is committed. All or part of the artillery in general support may be ordered to reinforce the fires of light artillery in direct support when it is not firing some mission ordered by higher authority.

When the division is part of a corps, the corps artillery may be in general support of the corps as a whole, or part may be in general support and part attached to one or more divisions of the corps. The corps artillery brigade consists of a 155 gun regiment, two 155 howitzer regiments and an observation battalion. This observation battalion should not be confused with an observation squadron. It consists of sound and flash ranging batteries. It is a two battery battalion, both batteries having the same organization: one sound ranging platoon and one flash ranging platoon. If your division has corps artillery attached to it plan to push those units well forward. If it operates under corps control, expect to see corps do the same. One can expect to see units of the observation battalion well forward to enable it to get timely information on enemy artillery positions for counterbattery purposes. When the division is operating as part of a corps, the corps artillery will usually execute the counterbattery fires. Corps may call on the medium artillery to assist in this important task. Corps must also assist the medium regiment. There is no counterbattery section in the battalion headquarters battery. Personnel from the corps brigade counterbattery section should be attached to the medium regiment when that regiment is expected to execute all counterbattery fires.

POSITION AREAS.

In the offensive the artillery is put in positions initially just as far forward as the situation will permit. By so doing all the artillery will be able to fire longer as the infantry advances, thus rendering maximum support as deep into the hostile position as the range of the piece will permit. Placing artillery well forward facilitates observation and the installation and maintenance of communications. A battalion in direct support usually occupies positions in the zone of action of the unit it supports. A battalion in general support usually occupies positions in the zone of action of the division. Corps and army artillery should be placed well forward so they will

be able to furnish support during displacement of the division artillery. Division artillery should start to displace forward by batteries within battalions before the infantry gets out of range. Artillery positions should be kept as far forward as conditions permit. Take advantage of any lulls in action to displace forward. It is especially important for the armored division artillery to do this even though it means more frequent moves. Artillery must render close and continuous support. The artillery battalion commander has two things to look out for—he must not let the supported unit get too far ahead nor get beyond the range of some of his guns.

While echelons are moving forward the support will be decreased in proportion to the number of batteries on the move. Some artillery should always be in position to support its infantry no matter how fast or how far that infantry may advance. Leave the selection of position areas to the artilleryman unless for some reason it is necessary to restrict him to certain terrain in a particular situation. Tell the artilleryman where the fire is wanted but let him select the position areas to meet such requirements.

How can the staff officer assist the artillery in planning displacement? Everyone has heard and will continue to hear a lot about advance planning. Its value to the artillery can be illustrated in connection with displacement of artillery. Artillery must be permitted to displace forward without orders from division headquarters. Just as soon as artillery can do its job better in a more advanced position it should be moved. This means better support for the infantry. In this way only will there be close and continuous support. The division staff must keep the artillery informed of plans for the advance of the division. Where are the artillery fires to be massed? The area prescribed for this will influence the position area which will be occupied. If the artillery commander—the artillery battalion commander—knows this he can select his new positions intelligently with a view to supporting his infantry and the division as a whole. Don't make him delay his displacement and consequently weaken his support to the infantry because there are no plans for him. Of course, he can displace forward without your plans; however, he may then move into positions from which he can do a good job for his supported unit but from which he can not reach the area later prescribed for him to be able to mass his fires. This may cause an extra move, or the division may go without the fires of that battalion when it is needed badly.

SUPPORTING FIRES.

Artillery fires in support of offensive combat are divided into three phases.

1. Fires prior to the artillery preparation.
2. The preparation.
3. Fires during the attack.

Fires prior to the preparation comprise fires in support of the advance guard action, including the development and deployment of the main body, and fires in support of preliminary combat to drive in the enemy covering force and develop the main hostile position. They include long range interdiction, counterbattery, neutralization and harassing fires.

Interdiction fire is fire delivered on points or areas to prevent the enemy from using them. Examples of characteristic targets for this type of fire are roads, crossroads, assembly areas, railroad stations, detrainment points, defiles and bridges. All echelons of artillery use interdiction fire; however it is the particular job of the corps and army artillery. They interdict the more distant points of areas.

Harassing fire is fire delivered during relatively quiet periods to interfere with and annoy the enemy, to keep his troops alerted unnecessarily. All echelons use harassing fire; it may be by single pieces, platoons or battery and is intermittent. The division artillery may use roving guns and fires usually in the enemy forward areas.

Neutralization fire is intended to cause heavy losses and interrupt movement or action. Best results are obtained by surprise fires in intense masses. A transfer of fire is necessary to obtain surprise.

An artillery preparation is heavy fire delivered during the period just prior to the jump off of the attack. It is designed to secure domination over hostile artillery and infantry. All artillery participates in the preparation. The preparation should last long enough to accomplish the effect sought but should not be so long as to permit time for the enemy to change his tactical dispositions. The amount of ammunition available may govern the duration. An artillery preparation is divided into two or more phases. During the first phase all echelons of artillery—army, corps and division—try to knock out or neutralize the hostile artillery. Units not required for counterbattery neutralize the enemy systems of command, communication and observation. During the second phase the corps and army artillery maintain the neutralization of the enemy artillery. Division artillery executes interdiction, blinds enemy observation and neutralizes enemy defense areas and reserves, destroys mine fields and obstacles. During the third phase, army and corps artillery continue to maintain neutralization of enemy artillery. The division artillery, reinforced by units of corps artillery not required for counterbattery, concentrates on the enemy forward defenses. All available artillery participates. Start working on the enemy in his rear, maintain the neutralization attained, and in the final phase put everything available on his forward defenses. The division artillery during this last phase masses its fires on defensive positions in the forward area with priority to those areas which most seriously threaten the attack. During the attack, fires are concentrated on the front where the attack

is making the most progress. During the attack, the division artillery assists the infantry by attacking defensive areas, mine fields, wire entanglements and emplaced weapons. They assist the infantry in gaining fire superiority for each successive objective at the proper time and place. They also protect the supported unit during periods of reorganization. The division artillery does all of this with successive concentrations. A concentration is a volume of fire placed on an area in a limited time. Prior planning for the use of artillery is essential. Cooperation and coordination is of the greatest importance. The supported infantry and the supporting artillery commanders plan together prior to the attack. They plan for as many fires as possible.

The infantry commander informs the artilleryman of his plans. He points out areas and if possible specific targets on which artillery fire should be placed prior to and during the attack. The artillery commander states how he can most effectively support the infantry attack. If possible, he points out or indicates his position area, his observation posts and the terrain on which he can deliver fire. In particular he indicates observation posts that should be captured during the advance. Here are some of the things covered by the artillery battalion commander and his supported infantry unit commander.

Points or areas to be covered during the preparation—remember that the decision as to what preparation is to be fired is a command decision. Its duration and time for opening fires will be prescribed by a higher commander. If it is a division attack the division commander, if by corps or army the corps or army commander.

Areas to be smoked.

Which infantry assault battalion is to receive priority of fires.

Areas where bulk of fires is to be massed.

Other fires to be prearranged as to location and fired on call.

The signal to be used for lifting or shifting the artillery fire.

All of these have to be coordinated with fires ordered by higher headquarters. There are some ways staff officers can assist these infantry and artillery commanders in their planning. Give them early information on the division plans. Don't wait until the division order is published to inform both of them about plans. Keep them informed and keep them up to the minute with changes. The more time that is given these two to work up their plans, the more effective will be the support which the artillery can render. Staff officers must insist on cooperation and give their share of it. Inspect to see that it is being achieved.

In an attack against an organized position time will usually be available to plan these fires in considerable detail. In a fast moving situation less time will be available and there will be less information

of the enemy. Only the initial fires can be planned for delivery on a prearranged time schedule. Subsequent fires will be planned for delivery during the attack on call from the infantry when needed. In addition the artillery will be prepared at all times to fire on targets which appear during the attack and which are dangerous to assault echelons.

Staff officers must all be deeply concerned over the resupply of ammunition. G-4 is not the only staff member who has to worry about that. Remember that artillery without ammunition is of no value. The more ammunition you fire, the more help your artillery is going to be in any attack. Don't let the unit of fire as defined in your text books limit you. Remember that is an average for purposes of estimating your requirements. At least one battery of light artillery in 1918 fired four thousand rounds of ammunition in one day. That requires lots of transportation, lots of man hours of labor to handle. When artillery trucks are taken to motorize an infantry battalion, as is often done in maneuvers, some infantry unit is being deprived of valuable help. The more artillery ammunition that can be handled and fired, the more the infantrymen are going to appreciate artillery support. It is a fact that unless one can move infantry units where they are wanted, artillery is not going to have support work to do. On the other hand infantry without maximum artillery support is not efficiency. The officer must strike his own balance in each situation. One hears it said that ammunition is expensive and, because of shipping difficulties, should be used sparingly. Ammunition is cheaper than human life and a lot easier to ship to any theater of operations.

GENERAL SUPPORT ARTILLERY.

Lets discuss briefly the use of general support artillery. Medium artillery is usually in general support. Light artillery whose companion infantry regiment has not been committed may be placed in general support. Medium artillery in an attack is going to have some counterbattery fires to execute. If the enemy artillery can be neutralized prior to or during the attack, chances for success are greatly increased. Enemy battery positions are going to be hard to find. Remember, he is not going to disclose or even occupy his positions until the attack is about to start. The corps observation battalion with its sound and flash ranging batteries is going to help locate them. However, the division now has its own means of assisting. I refer to the light observation planes now a part of the division artillery. It is planned to have two of these light planes for each artillery battalion. They are to be flown by artillerymen; the observer is to be an artilleryman. Artillery is going to have its own elevated OP's. This is going to be of great help in improving support given to infantry. In country like Louisiana it is almost impossible to find a ground OP where anyone can see very much. Now, when operating in such coun-

try, the guns will have much better eyes than before. These light planes can land and take off in small areas, even on country dirt roads. They will fly about 500 feet elevation, stay up just long enough to do the job assigned and then come down and hide. We are going to have losses, but then, a forward OP has always been a dangerous place. Attempts are made to knock out or blind the enemy's OP, and of course he does the same with ours. G-2's are going to get a lot of information from these planes; they are going to want to send them off on G-2 missions away from the artillery. Infantry regimental commanders are going to want to use them; G-3's will want to use them to find out where their own units are and how they are progressing. Here again one has to strike a balance as to how they should be used. Before taking them or allowing the infantry regimental commanders to take them, consider that possibly the artillery can get all the information needed while the planes are being used for the purpose for which they are intended, namely, adjustment of fires and observation. Remember, they are not suitable for use over the enemy lines. They are too slow and too vulnerable to enemy small arms fire. They have no armor or armament. They must rely on accomplishing their mission in a hurry and then getting back on the ground to a camouflaged position.

Counterbattery is only one use for artillery in general support. In fact, this use may take a relatively small part of the time since it will often be taken over by corps artillery. All general support artillery may be called on to reinforce the fires of direct support units. Plans for this should be made in advance. When placing artillery in general support it may be prescribed that certain units will be prepared to reinforce the fires of certain direct support units. Usually it is the unit supporting the main effort whose fires you want reinforced. Such a prescription in the division order will limit the position area of the general support unit. It must select positions from which it can deliver these reinforcing fires, possibly at the expense of some other portion of the division front. The general support unit will establish liaison with the unit whose fires it is ordered to reinforce. This liaison will include the necessary signal communications. It permits requests from reinforced units to be answered quickly.

COORDINATION.

At the beginning of this article it was stated that in the offensive there are usually two tactical groupings, one making the main attack and one the secondary or holding attack. These attacks are often launched in converging directions. Careful coordination is necessary to prevent the artillery supporting one attack from firing into troops making the other. This is particularly true as troops near the objective. One means of attaining this is to establish

coordinating lines, laterally and in depth, beyond which units are forbidden to fire after a certain hour or after receipt of a prearranged signal or message.

FLEXIBILITY.

An attack seldom proceeds exactly as planned;

for example, the secondary attack may make unexpected progress and become, in effect, the main attack. Artillery plans must be flexible in order to meet this contingency and also to meet counterattacks.

If Japan and America Fight

A Japanese Forecast of the Present Conflict.

By

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In 1920 there appeared in Tokyo a book with the title "If Japan and America Fight," by Lieutenant General Kojiro Sato, retired, of the Japanese army. He was known as the Japanese Bernhardt. An English translation appeared May 26, 1921, which was almost immediately suppressed. Only two copies are known to exist. One was secured for the state department by Mr. Edward Bell of Tokyo and the other is in the possession of the Reverend John Cole McKim, who has kindly made it available for this study—most interesting in the light of recent events.

The author, General Sato, disclaims any belligerent intention or desire to produce ill feeling between his country and the United States, which he admits might result in disaster to the Japanese Empire. His purpose, he states, is to arouse his fellow countrymen from their dreams of self complacency in the face of the third great national crisis since the foundation of their nation.

He finds their situation paralleling that of Japan just before the Mongol invasion or that during the period of the Russian aggression, and laments the fact that his countrymen fear themselves no match for America. Japanese statesmen, travelers, and even military men, he states, are afflicted with American phobia and ideas of Japanese inferiority.

His thesis is that the Japanese are superior in mind and spirit and the Americans only in material things. American successes in the first world war he ascribes to the exhaustion of the other combatants. This success, he states, has made Americans brag and boast and seek to interfere with Japan's historic and geographic mission to develop the continent of Asia. This, he says, would not be aggression, because continental development is necessary for the existence of Japan. America is pursuing her capitalistic imperialism and cruelly trying to cut the roots of Japan on the continent. The American menace is greater than the Russian menace in 1904 because it is more insidious. Japan always wins her wars by

her moral strength though her enemy be superior in material strength. He warns the American reader of his book of the foolishness of attacking Japan, or of irritating her about the California question. The immigration restriction and denial of a quota to Japan was to come later.

General Sato has in mind a war between the United States as it would have been fought twenty-two years ago, and did not foresee the present alignment of world powers. He takes for granted the neutrality or non-interference of Great Britain and the impotence of Russia and China. He did not foresee the clash of ideologies or the important part destined to be played by air craft.

The book is intended to be a study and comparison of Japanese and American psychology with reference to waging war. His purpose is to reassure his countrymen as to the advantages which he believes they have in this respect. That this subject is of interest to our military authorities is evidenced by two articles on the psychology of the Japanese soldier by Captain (now Lt. Col.) Warren J. Clear, assistant military attache at Tokyo, 1923-1927, in the *Infantry Journal* about 1929. The General's book presents the Japanese view on this subject.

The average American according to the General resembles the traditional "Yedoko," or citizen of Tokyo, "who makes a show of authority with characteristic caustic remarks, giving the devil to his adversary, but when faced with pluck proves a coward at heart." American courage and morale are not so well able to withstand the shocks of disasters such as the sinking of large naval vessels and transports. Occupation of the Philippines and Alaska will render attack by the American fleet most hazardous. During the first phase the main Japanese fleet will hide in a suitable rendezvous, while the American fleet will come sailing through a deserted ocean. The nerves of the American sailors will be all unstrung by such objects as flying albatrosses and floating

whales. The American captains will be unable to sleep or rest. Submarines and mines will still further contribute to their anxieties. Meanwhile the Japanese will wait with ease for the exhausted Americans and suddenly attack them from the flank as they begin to waver like a spent bullet.

The General agrees with Bernhardt that an attack on the mainland of America would be a difficult feat, but that Japan could occupy the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii without paying too high a price. He expects a ten-year war requiring the utmost economy of powder, coal, oil, and money. It will be necessary to draw on China and Siberia for provisions and war materials. For this Pacific war, peace on the continent of Asia will be necessary. The Japanese must there make the money necessary to carry on the war. The help of British, French, Italian, German, and Austrian experts is expected.

The role of the Japanese army in this struggle will be to safeguard Japanese economic roots on the continent of Asia. Natives and foreigners in Asiatic countries are to be allowed to engage in their industry in peace and even be protected so long as they do not interfere with the economic development of Japan.

General Sato hopes for the neutrality of Britain, but is of the opinion that crafty Britain is not to be trusted, particularly if the initial surprise attacks on the United States should be defeated. The Japanese are urged to wage the war within the limits of justice and humanity so as not, like Germany, to lose the sympathy of the world.

If the Americans, becoming impatient, should attack early in the contest, they would have to cross thousands of miles of water and consume enormous daily amounts of war materials. If the American fleet should not attack, Japanese strategy would then be to build up her commerce and industry with and on the Asiatic continent, meanwhile inflicting losses on the American fleet by submarines and mines. Public opinion in the United States would be against the capitalistic war. Meanwhile, death-daring bands of 2,000 or 3,000 men would make surprise attacks on various points on the mainland and possessions of the United States in order to terrorize the American people. In the words of Sun Tze, the ancient Chinese sage, "To wait at ease to take advantage of the exhausted enemy," or "to wait quietly to take advantage of the excited enemy," as is done in the practice of judo or jujitsu.

In the crisis of the Mongol invasion and in that of the Russian aggression the Japanese won "by mean of the indomitable will-power of the men of the God's country." Now, a stronger enemy than either has appeared, the United States, the real strength of which is not their army and navy, but their industrial and financial resources. The United States is twenty-one and one-half times as large as Japan proper. The population is only one and one-half times as great. The density of population is 400 per square

mile in Japan but only 31 for the United States. If the same density prevailed in the United States as in Japan, the population would be 1,200,000,000. The weakness of the United States is that about 30,000,000 people are of racial stocks different from the bulk of the population. About 12,500,000 are German and 15,000,000 are colored.

The grace of Heaven or the grace of His Majesty, the Emperor, or perhaps we should say the belief in that grace, is the invisible factor which made Japanese armies, inferior in numbers, more powerful than the larger armies of the Mongols and Russians. The patriotism of the Japanese and the impregnability of Japan make them unconquerable.

Americans are filled with the spirit of enterprise; the Japanese appear ease-loving. The strenuous life is the American ideal. Leisurely retirement is something of which Americans never dream. The Americans build skyscrapers, dig the Panama Canal, and create huge fortunes; but the Japanese have not bridged the Shimonoseki Strait nor tunneled Tsushima Strait. American industrial enterprises employ largely machines, while hand-labor is the rule in Japan. Americans are impatient and quick tempered, and become reckless and careless. The Japanese cannot continue at work steadily without rest like the Americans, but in times of war they show a wonderful energy. The war spirit in America is spectacular; that of Japan is gloomy and quiet, like that of the forty-seven ronin of Ako, who avenged the death of their lord and then all committed seppuku, or honorable suicide, a story well known to Japanese theater goers.

Americans work well in groups in peace as well as in war. The Japanese are far behind the Americans in this respect. The Americans spend much time in discussing. When a decision is arrived at or once decided they show a wholehearted loyalty for the undertaking, even those of diverse racial stocks. Americans are very strong in their sense of duty, especially the educated and the political and civic leaders. In Japan the opposite is the case. The educated and the wealthy shun conscription both in peace and war. The Japanese as a people do not consider death a serious matter. When they meet a desperate situation, lacking in power and endurance, they commit suicide. Americans and other western people do not recklessly commit suicide, and they lack the determination to die when they should.

The Japanese have never fought a defensive war, and should be deeply concerned about the problem of internal morale if they should have adverses. A country on the defensive must unite as one man. The Japanese being one great family, having common imperial ancestors, should do this better than the Americans with their different racial stocks. American patriotism is a kind of self-confidence arising from attachment to a vast and fertile land.

In Japan patriotism calls upon the people to defend the stainless and perfect country with the

Imperial family of lineage unbroken for ages as their national center. It is an ardent devotion and courage born of a sense of duty to regard one's life insignificant in the service of defending the country. The Japanese Navy particularly is noted for its adventurous spirit and deeds of daring, while the United States Navy is untried in modern war.

The Japanese Army has adapted to itself the best lessons of the French and German Armies, even improving on its teachers. In leadership and commanding it is the best in the world. The training of American officers is theoretical rather than practical. The small pay of Japanese officers is a handicap in securing the best material. Americans are more likely to depend upon machine power, but in spite of the importance of these, manpower must be the chief reliance for victory.

Japan, though criticized as a military and aggressor nation, is in no wise different from Spain, Portugal, Holland, Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Weak nations have declined and become the prey of stronger ones and so civilization has progressed.

Where economic development has been promoted by navalism and militarism, capitalistic imperialism has been the result. The conflict of these imperialisms led to the first world war. The Far East in 1920 was like the Balkans before the first world war.

By means of railways and automobile roads, Britain has been planning to secure economic and political control of Africa, the Near East, India, Tibet, and China, and the United States of Alaska, Siberia, and China. These will afford facilities for the passage of armies to east Asia. China thus will become either the battle-ground of Britain and the United States or the Anglo-American sphere of influence. China is thus destined to become the mistress or slave of England and America, unless Japan, her true friend, shall come to her assistance. It is a mistake to say that Japan acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia by aggression. The Russo-Japanese war was a war of self-defense against Russian aggression which was endangering the existence of the empire. Japan did not want to occupy Manchuria and Mongolia if she could control them economically. China should recognize this and cooperate with Japan.

If the Japanese fleet is inferior to the American fleet in the coming war in the Pacific, action will be confined to maintaining communications with the Asiatic continent; but if the balance is in Japan's favor, then the struggle will be extended to maintain communications with the rest of the world. The front line of Japan is in Asia as well as on the sea. No strong foreign nation can be allowed to control eastern Asia. Naval officers have suggested that Japanese strategy should be to guard in the north and advance to the south.

The most important lesson of the world war of 1914-1918 is that of the importance of industry in

national defense. Japan cannot wage successful war without development of industries and raw materials on the continent. Even in peacetime the demand for iron in Japan exceeds the supply by 500,000 tons annually. The amount needed must come from China and Siberia. This is also true of coal, wool, cotton, and other raw materials. Aluminum is a material not found in either Japan, China, or Siberia.

"Any number of people may live in Japan as on a ship, if they can get their food supply from elsewhere," so states the General without a qualm as to the ethical aspects of such a declaration, since that is what pirates think. If Japan can maintain her lines of supply on the continent, the growth of population will be no inconvenience. When the center of national defense and industry shifts to the continent, the General proposes to shift the national capitol to Seoul in Korea to give the people of the newly-acquired land the benefit of Japanese civilization.

Japan's mission is then to serve the 600,000,000 people of eastern Asia just as the English and Americans attempt to spread Christianity. So far, Japanese efforts have not been noteworthy in their scope or success in winning support in either Korea or China.

The weakness of Japan's military system is the lack of close relations between the Army, the Navy, and the people. Her lack of industrial power is a severe handicap. The Army takes lessons from France and Germany, the Navy from England, and the people from England and America. Government supervision of industry in time of peace is necessary to a successful industrial mobilization in time of war. There should be an independent department for war materials. The responsibility of developing war industries should rest upon the people as a whole and not upon the Army and Navy. Too much secrecy leads to lack of progress in the development of arms.

The General foresees the decline in the relative efficiency of the dreadnaught through the development of high-angle fire, and air bombing, and urges the development of a surprise attack fleet, but laments the lack of interest in these matters by members of the Diet. In the organization of the Army he favors the training of units in the tactics of surprise attacks by relatively small bodies, assaults, night attacks, and other swift actions.

As the people of Japan are not trained in peace time for organized action like those in England and the United States, the organization of the Japanese civilians for war must be accomplished by militarizing the people and socializing the army. Another defect of the Japanese people is their generally poor physical condition, due to lack of interest in sports and physical culture.

In case of American attacks from the air which the General believes likely, he thinks the Japanese people will be more cool-headed and indifferent than either the English or the Americans. The Japanese are more used to large fires, earthquakes, and other

disasters and will be trained to cope with those caused by air attacks. Simple and cheap air machines will be adequate for defense.

The General admits that in a prolonged struggle on the sea with the United States, Japan would be at a disadvantage, due to the practically unlimited resources of her adversary. In this he agrees with Hector Bywater, the British expert. The landing of an American expeditionary force in Japan he believes impracticable, even with the Japanese Navy completely annihilated, due to transport and supply difficulties over 4,500 miles of ocean. America has no nearby bases such as Vladivostok to menace Japan's communications with the continent.

Japan should take advantage of the natural commercial rivalry between the United States and Britain and play one against the other. Education in foreign languages, especially English, should be encouraged. Practically every Japanese schoolboy studies English but the American or Englishman with even an elementary knowledge of Japanese is very rare.

America should return to her original Monroe

Doctrine; England should maintain her present spheres of influence and leave eastern Asia to Japan. The world will then be controlled by the three great powers. Toward the Russians the Japanese have no other ambitions than to help them to develop industry and establish a stable government.

The Chinese have always been very difficult for the Japanese to deal with as they always use petty tricks such as "playing one devil against another." Driving out American influence from China would settle that difficulty and permit the spread of Japanese civilization and the establishment of a stable government with which Japan could cooperate. The Americans, he warns, should remember that "Those who are boastful will not last long."

He urges the Japanese not to allow their quarrel with America to become protracted nor verbal, but that they should appeal to arms and be done with it, without compromise, because America will tend to become stronger and more the master of the powers of nature and science. The geographical impregnability of the Japanese empire will then be overcome and the stainless and perfect empire will fall.

The politics of all the powers are governed by their geography.

—Napoleon.