Representative Ross A. Collins: You are going to cling to the 75-mms?
General C. M. Wesson [Chief of Ordnance]: Well, I suppose so, for the time being.
Mr. Collins: There are many people here in the Army who want to cling to them?
General Wesson: Yes; and it may be observed that we have a lot of ammunition for the 75-mms.
Mr. Collins: And that would be the only reason?
General Wesson: No. It has been greatly improved, and is a splendid weapon. France has not abandoned it.1

12 March 1940

THROUGHOUT the history of the United States, Army officers have argued that Congress and ultimately the American people have been at least partially responsible for the Army's unpreparedness at the outset of our major wars. Emory Upton and others have claimed that the Americans' fear of permanent standing armies and their genuine regard for peace and antipathy for war influenced Congress to make parsimonious appropriations to the Army during peacetime, thus rendering the Army unprepared for war. The negligible danger of foreign invasion and the necessity for limiting expenses have also been put
forth as contributing factors. And yet, in one instance it was the Army that was reluctant to adopt a new weapon. It was not until after the fall of France in June 1940 that the War Department made a concerted effort to replace the obsolete 75-mm. gun with the 105-mm. howitzer, the weapon that was to become the backbone of the divisional artillery in World War II.

Because of conflicting views within the Army as to the proper role of the 105-mm. howitzer, its adoption as a replacement for the 75-mm. gun was delayed until after World War II began in Europe. In the years immediately after World War I, most artillery officers had seen the 105-mm. howitzer as a replacement for the 155-mm. howitzer, the divisional general support weapon. But as the years passed and the 75-mm. gun became more obsolete, many artillery officers wanted to adopt the 105-mm. howitzer as a replacement for the 75-mm. gun instead.

In World War I the armament of the divisional field artillery brigade had consisted of two light 75-mm. gun regiments (48 guns) and one 155-mm. howitzer regiment (24 howitzers), plus a trench mortar battery. In furnishing direct support to the infantry, there were enough guns to provide one battalion (12 guns) for each infantry regiment. The 75-mm. gun was a light weapon with a slightly longer range than the 105-mm. howitzer, but its projectile was small and not very powerful and its trajectory flat. The 155-mm. howitzer provided high-angle fire support for the division as a whole and counterbattery fire, but it was heavy and not as mobile as the 75-mm. gun and 105-mm. howitzer. Even during the war artillerymen saw the need for a weapon heavier than the 75-mm. gun and for a howitzer lighter and more mobile than the 155 to provide high-angle fire. Major Charles P. Summerall, who had commanded the 1st Division’s artillery at Cantigny and had risen to command the V Corps, recommended that the divisional artillery brigade be increased by one regiment of 105-mm. or 3.8-inch howitzers. Summerall felt that the light howitzer was indispensable in all classes of warfare and was especially suited for wooded areas and ravines. It was the best weapon for giving depth to barrages, and it had the same mobility as the 75-mm. gun.

After World War I General John J. Pershing and others thought that the Army should be organized into small, highly mobile, hard-hitting units, but throughout the twenty-year period before World War II, the divisions remained slow, large, not particularly hard-hitting, and not well adapted for maneuver. Modern equipment and improved means of transportation were needed before smaller units could be made as effective as large organizations, but during the interwar period the Regular Army was small, and the necessary funds were not available. For field artillery, as well as for the division as a whole, the main problem lay in trying to balance the two important requirements of power and mobility. Writing in the years immediately after the war, theorists blamed the artillery for the positional warfare that had developed and felt that the solution to breaking the stalemate lay in surprise and forward movement with emphasis on the tank and machine gun. In reacting against positional warfare, they stressed mobility, smaller units, and less artillery.

Suggestions for changes needed in the field artillery of World War I were incorporated in the report of the Hero Board, a board of officers named after its chief, Brigadier General Andrew Hero, Jr. Appointed on 9 December 1918 by the Chief of Field Artillery, the board studied the experiences gained by the artillery of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The same month Chief of Staff Peyton C. March, another former artillery officer, appointed a board of artillery and ordnance officers headed by Brigadier General William I. Westervelt to study the armament, caliber, types of materiel, kinds and proportions of ammunition, and methods of transportation to be authorized for a field army. The reports, submitted in early 1919, became the basis for field artillery development for the next twenty years.

The Westervelt (or Caliber) Board based its recommendations on recent war experiences, relying heavily on the Hero Board’s suggestions, the stocks of materiel on hand, and probable post-war reductions in appropriations. It classified the recommended materiel into two types: practical types for immediate development and ideal types for future development. As a basic principle, the board recommended that one of these types should ideally accomplish all the requirements of divisional artillery. Since such a solution was impractical, the board suggested that in addition to the 75-mm. gun, a light field howitzer such as the 105 be substituted for the 155-mm. howitzer in the division. Field artillery was supposed to be sufficiently mobile to neutralize the infantry of the opposing forces. The immediate targets were those obstacles preventing the advance of the friendly infantry. Close contact with the supported infantry, forward displacement with reasonable facility, and sufficient ammunition supply were necessary to accomplish the task. For these requirements the 155-mm. howitzer was too heavy, even though it was motorized. (Motorization had not yet reached the point where the howitzers were sufficiently mobile for divisional support in terrain where there were no good roads.)

After each arm or branch of service had evaluated its organization, a general board (known as the Superior Board) met to incorporate the recommendations on organization and tactics. In the meantime, the Organizational Section of the General Staff was preparing outlines for tables of typical divisions, corps, and armies, based in part upon those recommended by the Superior Board, but differing somewhat because of the growing belief that the AEF division (approximately 28,000 men) was much too large and unwieldy.

General Pershing, one of the critics of the cumbersome AEF division, felt that much of the Superior Board’s report was based too heavily on the needs of positional warfare in Western Europe and not enough on a war of movement. Pershing thought the only way a mobile division could have its organic artillery with it at all times was to reduce the artillery permanently assigned to it. He suggested a division of 16,875 men that included one field artillery regiment of 75-mm. guns rather than three regiments of 75-mm. guns and 155-mm. howitzers. This would have reduced the number of divisional artillery weapons from the 72 of the AEF division to 36, and placed the general support mission with the corps rather than with the division. The division which the Organizational Section of the General Staff contemplated, on the other hand, had an approximate strength of 24,000 men and included one field artillery brigade of two 75-mm. gun regiments (48 guns). This plan conformed to Pershing’s idea that the 155-mm. howitzer should be eliminated from the division, but differed in that it retained the artillery brigade structure.
These and other points of disagreement seemed so important that the War Plans Division of the General Staff appointed a special committee (known as the Lassiter Committee after its head, Colonel William Lassiter, also an artilleryman and former AEF general) to resolve the differences and to plan the organization of the Army to conform to the recently passed National Defense Act of 1920. Meeting in June 1920, the Lassiter Committee discussed the merits of the large AEF division and the smaller one recommended by General Pershing, taking into consideration that the increased range and mobility of artillery indicated that the forces of major foreign powers encountered in future warfare would be organized in great depth. Although the committee wanted a division that would insure mobility, the division’s firepower and power of penetration were also important. A division of two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade was not as mobile as a division of one infantry brigade and one artillery regiment, but its mobility could be improved if auxiliary and smaller units were reduced, and it would have greater striking and penetrating power.

Copies of the report were forwarded to the chiefs of arms and services with instructions to prepare tables of organization. The recommended division had an approximate strength of 19,000. With regard to the field artillery brigade, the committee thought it could be reduced by eliminating the howitzer regiment without disturbing the brigade structure. The committee decided to retain the brigade with two 75-mm. gun regiments; with the development of a light howitzer with the same mobility as the 75-mm. gun, as had been recommended by the Westervelt Board, the howitzer regiment would be reinstated in the divisional artillery brigade.

Although the improved plan of 1920 called for the eventual replacement of the 155-mm. howitzer in the division by a new 105, there were those artillery officers who felt that the 75-mm. gun should be the weapon replaced. They argued that the latter gun could not reach an enemy positioned behind a good-sized hill because of its flat trajectory. Nor, for the same reason, could the weapon be placed behind a hill. In addition, the 75-mm. projectile was too small to be of sufficient power. During the war the United States and France had been the only major belligerents not equipped with a light field howitzer. Many artillery officers believed that from the standpoint of mobility, ammunition supply, and rate of fire, there were many advantages in adopting the light howitzer to replace the light gun.

In order to provide the weapons recommended by the Westervelt Board, the War Department launched an ordnance program. In field artillery development, the Ordnance Department constructed new weapons after receiving instructions from the Field Artillery branch. The department would develop a pilot model, which would then be tested for technical qualifications at the Ordnance Proving Ground in Aberdeen, Maryland, and for its utility by the Field Artillery Board. If found satisfactory, the model would be adopted as a standard; if not, the department could build a new model and attempt to correct the deficiencies of the original. Before or after standardization, the weapon could be issued to the Field Artillery School and to tactical units for extended testing in the field to determine its serviceability under war conditions.

In the interwar period, however, insufficient funds caused more effort to be placed on modernizing the large stocks of existing weapons, especially their mobility, rather than on developing new ones. Efforts were made throughout the 1920s to produce a satisfactory 105-mm. howitzer, but the economy made considerable production of new materiel and equipment almost impossible. Using captured German 105-mm. howitzers as models, the Ordnance Department built two prototypes before the end of 1921. Unfortunately, the Field Artillery Board found both weapons too heavy (based on a six-horse draft), too clumsy to be easily maneuverable by hand with a normal gun crew, structurally weak, and generally unsuitable for adoption.

Standardization of a 105-mm. howitzer, M1, designed primarily for draft by horses or slow tractors, was accomplished in 1927. The Field Artillery Board found the weapon generally satisfactory, although the carriage needed some improvements. In 1929 the possibility of manufacturing enough 105-mm. howitzers for use as divisional general support artillery seemed extremely remote, even though the new models of the 155-mm. howitzer were more mobile than the old because of improvements in their carriages. Since there was a small increase in the budget that year, the War Department decided to reinstate the 155-mm. howitzer in the division, while reducing the authorization for each corps artillery brigade by one 155-mm. howitzer regiment.

Although the War Department reinstated the 155-mm. howitzer in the infantry division, interest in developing the 105-mm. howitzer did not wane. Its development was hampered, however, by an increased desire to have an all-purpose weapon for the infantry division, a weapon that would also be capable of performing as antiaircraft artillery. In 1930 Chief of Field Artillery Harry G. Bishop reported that ten 105-mm. howitzers, M2 (only slightly different from the M1), were under manufacture, but not yet ready for issue. In October of the following year four 105-mm. howitzers were delivered to Battery F, 1st Field Artillery, at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for testing. Although they expressed faith in the basic idea of the weapon, the Field Artillery School staff found the M2 unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Nevertheless, after extended testing and some modifications, the M2 model of the 105-mm. howitzer was approved as a standard on 23 May 1934. Because of reductions in allotments, however, its manufacture had to be eliminated from the program for fiscal year 1934. Again in 1935 redesign of the 105-mm. howitzer’s carriage was postponed to enable the modernization of the 75-mm. gun, the weapon that was fast becoming the Army’s idea of an all-purpose gun. The modernization program for that weapon had been so successful that plans were made to equip all active divisional 75-mm. gun batteries with new carriages by the end of fiscal year 1937. These modifications permitted high-speed towing (motor-drawn) and wider traverse, but they did not really improve the firing capacity of the gun. At the same time the program for modernizing the 155-mm. howitzer continued.

In the 1930s the Army again made efforts to reorganize the division in light of war experiences and recent developments in motorization, mechanization, air power, and firepower. A grant from the Public Works Administration had made it possible to increase the motorized equipment in both the National Guard and the Regular Army. The major western
European nations and Japan had reorganized their troops into smaller divisions, based on three infantry regiments rather than two brigades of two regiments each. In January 1936 Chief of Staff Malin Craig appointed a committee to study the modernization of the Army. The committee was to consider the recommendations of the chiefs of arms and services, the service schools, and other individuals; the organization of foreign divisions; and modern improvements in weapons and transportation. The tentative organization of the proposed division included one completely motorized field artillery regiment of one 105-mm. howitzer battalion for general support and three direct support battalions, each with two 75-mm. howitzer batteries and one 81-mm. trench mortar battery. The light howitzer had recently been developed for direct support in the cavalry division.

Most of the armament was not available, however, and the committee suggested substituting available older weapons. Tables of organization were prepared and theoretically tested at the service schools and by small units. By September 1937 the 2nd Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was directed to test the new divisional structure in the field. A basic criticism of the proposed division was its lack of sufficient artillery support.14

Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, commander of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade of the 2nd Division, pointed out that the War Department reorganization committee had placed too great an emphasis on artillery in close support of the infantry. This emphasis was reflected in the number and organization of the 81-mm. mortars and the substitution of the 75-mm. howitzer for the 75-mm. gun. He believed that modern artillery had great power in the individual projectile and that the key to success lay in the massing of fires on decisive points. Rarely in war, he reasoned, would there be sufficient artillery to cover all points thoroughly and continuously; therefore, fire should be massed in succession on the most important targets. The procedure required centralized control, great flexibility in delivery, considerable range, and good communications. Given improved methods of fire direction and using firing charts upon which base points could be plotted with fair accuracy, McNair thought that the gain in close support in the proposed division was more than offset by the loss in effectiveness of the artillery support as a whole. If artillery lost its power to mass fires over a wide front and was dissipated in local combat, then it would no longer exert the influence that had given it such importance in the past. McNair urged that close support weapons (the light howitzers and mortars) be kept at a minimum and direct and general support weapons at a maximum. The division needed more heavier weapons and fewer lighter ones.15

Others, too, had mixed reactions concerning the proper armament of the proposed division's artillery. There was a general trend to have weapons of heavier calibers than the 75-mm. gun in foreign armies. The German army was rearming with a new 105-mm. howitzer, and other major powers were taking an interest in the weapon. Also, the modernized 155-mm. howitzer with its high-speed carriage was much more maneuverable than previous models. Since many infantry officers still considered the 75-mm. gun unsatisfactory for close infantry support because of its flat trajectory and its small projectile, some hoped that if the 105 were ever introduced, it would replace the 75-mm. gun instead of the 155-mm. howitzer. Even though the United States showed increased interest in the 105-mm. howitzer, there were still too many 75-mm. guns (with ammunition) left from World War I. As an economy measure, these weapons were being modernized with new carriages. The project for developing a satisfactory carriage for the 105-mm. howitzer to match its already satisfactory tube was too low in priority to receive much attention while the 75-mm. guns and 155-mm. howitzers were being updated.16

By June 1938 new tables were prepared, and the 2nd Division was selected for extended testing. Although the 1937 tests had shown that a four-battalion field artillery regiment presented no major tactical problems, the shortage of experienced commanding officers and the trend of foreign armies to increase artillery resulted in the regiment's division into light and medium units. The light regiment consisted of nine 75-mm. gun batteries, organized into three battalions. The medium regiment consisted of one 105-mm. howitzer battalion and one 155-mm. howitzer battalion. The armament of the proposed division thus consisted of thirty-six 75-mm. guns, eight 155-mm. howitzers, and eight 105-mm. howitzers, for a total of fifty-two weapons. The 1937 tests had shown that the 155-mm. howitzer was superior to the 105 because it had greater firepower and, most of all, availability. Still, the tests also pointed out that the 105-mm. howitzer was a better weapon against personnel in the open. Despite the test results, Chief of Staff Craig reported that the project of supplying Regular Army divisional units with the modernized 75-mm. gun was progressing and that of rearming the divisional units with the 105-mm. howitzer had begun.17

Chief of Field Artillery Robert M. Danford had directed the Field Artillery School in June 1938 to study the 105-mm. howitzer to determine what desirable characteristics the weapon should have and what the weapon's proper role should be in the division. According to the directive, the school staff was to choose between using the howitzer as the sole weapon in the division or as the accompanying general support piece for the 75-mm. gun. But the staff instead suggested that a combination of 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers be adopted. As a substitution for the 155-mm. howitzer, the 105, they felt, had little to recommend it except increased mobility. The small gain in mobility, however, would be more than offset by the sacrifice in firepower. Noting experiences in recent wars, especially the civil war in Spain, the staff felt that any reduction in firepower was unacceptable.18

Although the school's report stated that the proposition to have

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**WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS AS OF APRIL 1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Weight of gun &amp; carriage (pounds)</th>
<th>Muzzle velocity (Ft/sec)</th>
<th>Maximum traverse</th>
<th>Maximum elevation</th>
<th>Maximum range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75-mm. gun &amp; carriage, M1897</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>6°</td>
<td>19°</td>
<td>9,200 (6,930 maximum permitted by carriage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm. gun, M1897 &amp; carriage, M2</td>
<td>3,250 (without shield)</td>
<td>1,805 (M1 shell)</td>
<td>85°</td>
<td>45°</td>
<td>9,200 (M1 shell)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm. howitzer &amp; carriage, M3A1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>45°</td>
<td>50°</td>
<td>13,500 (M48 shell)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm. howitzer &amp; carriage M2A1</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>45°</td>
<td>64.3°</td>
<td>12,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm. howitzer &amp; carriage, M1918</td>
<td>8,262</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>6°</td>
<td>42.33°</td>
<td>12,530 (shell)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**APRIL 1978**
the 105-mm. howitzer as the sole divisional weapon had much to recommend it, the report also asserted that there would be great advantages in retaining the 155-mm. howitzer as a general support weapon for increased firepower and for counter-battery fire, considered one of the best means of infantry support. If the 105-mm. howitzer were substituted for the 155, it seemed very probable that the need for more artillery support would be severely felt. In conclusion, the report assumed that the 105-mm. howitzer was the best and only substitution for the 75-mm. gun, but noted that "in regard to the economic aspect of the situation it is realized that the large stock of 75-mm. guns on hand cannot be scrapped at the present time. For any war in the near future they must be used." The economic situation proved a deciding factor, for in December 1938 Danford warned the school that if a war erupted, the field artillery should expect to use the 75-mm. gun, M1897 modified, since the project to equip the Regular Army units with the modernized weapon was near completion.

The attempt to realize the ideals of the Westervelt Board had resulted in the production and modernization of the 75-mm. gun as an "all-purpose" weapon. The gun was a remarkable accomplishment in design, but in reality it was inadequate for either of its primary purposes. It did not have the necessary characteristics of a first-class antiaircraft gun, and it was too heavy and complicated for division-supporting missions. Its range had been improved by the modifications in its carriage, but its trajectory was still flat and its projectile was not as powerful as that of weapons with higher calibers.

In the early months of 1939 Congress was planning its military appropriations for 1940. Noting threatening conditions in Europe, it was anxious to be prepared for a possible war. After the Bureau of the Budget had approved the authorization for modernizing the 75-mm. gun, Congress tried to eliminate it. The report of the Senate subcommittee on appropriations contained the following statement:

The 75-millimeter gun is being supplanted in foreign armies with the 105-millimeter weapon, which has greater range and fires a heavier missile. Our Ordnance Department is developing such a gun and, undoubtedly, will be ready to go into production. If that is to be the weapon of the future, the committee questions the wisdom of continuing to spend large sums on the old 75's.

The War Department objected strenuously, stating that the range of the 105-mm. howitzer was somewhat less than that of the 75-mm. gun, that the 105 required a longer time to go into action, that the 105 had not been proven in battle, and that there were still about 3,500 French 75-mm. guns with ammunition left over from World War I. Chief of Field Artillery Danford pointed out that replacing the 75-mm. gun with the 105-mm. howitzer would cost $87,500,000. This figure did not include manufacture of the 105's ammunition, of which there was none on hand. The modernization program was reinstated in the Appropriations Bill for 1940.

Tests by the 2nd Division were completed on 31 August 1939, and the preliminary report showed that the organization of the divisional artillery was sound. The Chief of Staff recommended the reorganization of five Regular Army divisions at peace strength under the new triangular structure. This recommendation was approved on 19 September 1939, but the new tables were slow in being published and some of the equipment was not available. As a result, the medium artillery was armed with the 155-mm. howitzer rather than with the 105/155 combination that had originally been planned.

The reorganization committee prompted the Chief of Field Artillery in January 1940 to send questionnaires to each of the five triangularized divisions, in part to determine the policy for wartime production of the 75-mm. gun and the proper armament mix for the division artillery. Of those answering the questionnaire, about 75 percent did not want the 75-mm. gun in the division, the most popular suggestion being a mixture of 105- and 155-mm. howitzers. Their reasons for desiring the 105/155 combination were much the same as those stated by the Field Artillery School in 1938.

The following month Chief of Staff George C. Marshall reported that progress had been made "in the important program for modernizing our field artillery weapons." Appropriations permitted 1,439 of the 75-mm. guns to be modernized, and Marshall thought the modified piece especially suitable for fire against mechanized targets and unsheltered personnel. Still thinking in terms of a defensive war on this continent, Marshall noted that "concrete fortifications and masonry villages of European battlefields may dictate a need for a weapon firing a heavier projectile than...the 75-mm. gun, but our forces would rarely be confronted with such targets in this hemisphere." As for financial considerations, Marshall continued the reasoning of the previous year, stating that,

From a financial standpoint alone the virtual junking of the 75-mm. gun and ammunition and the expenditure of vast sums to equip the Army with the 105-mm. howitzer, and with the necessary reserve ammunition would be difficult to justify. The modernization of the 75-mm. carriage costs $8,000 while the cost of the 105-mm. carriage is $25,000. To substitute the 105-mm. howitzer for the 75-mm. gun would involve an expenditure of $228,000,000...There is no 105-mm. ammunition on hand, and we do have some 6,000,000 rounds of 75-mm. ammunition valued at $60,000,000. To replace those 6,000,000 rounds by an equal number of 105-mm. rounds would cost $192,000,000.

The War Department was aware, however, of the tendency in foreign armies to replace the light gun with a heavier caliber weapon, so in March 1940 the department adopted a standard 105-mm. howitzer for production. Available funds provided for 48 of these weapons to be manufactured, and the Army planned to test these in the infantry division along the modernized 75-mm. guns to determine their proper role. Congress was still not pleased with the Army's attitude concerning the 75-mm. gun, and one representative stated that he thought it was time the guns were shipped off to the Smithsonian. Because of the situation in Europe, the production schedule was increased. The program for modernizing the 75-mm. gun was to be completed by mid-1941.
and the authorization for 105-mm. howitzers was increased from 48 to 120.\(^3\)

In May 1940 conditions in Europe worsened. The Allies, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, were asking the United States to furnish weapons and other supplies. The President and Congress included 75-mm. guns as surplus items that were available for distribution, although the Army continued to protest, declaring that if war were to come soon, the 75s were the only plentiful weapon available. By June, 1,095 of the 75-mm. guns had been sold as surplus (these, however, were not the modernized 75s), and orders were issued expediting the delivery of the 105-mm. howitzers. At this time only fourteen 105-mm. howitzers were available, while all models of the 75-mm. gun totaled 4,236. Even though more 105s were authorized for production (one reason being that more units were being activated) and many of the 75-mm. guns were being declared surplus, the gun was still scheduled for use as the principal divisional direct support artillery weapon while the 105-mm. howitzer was slated to accompany it as the general support weapon.\(^30\)

By June 1940 it became obvious that massive rearmament would be necessary. Manufacturing more 75-mm. guns, weapons that had been in use for over forty years and were only being modernized as an economy measure, was not the answer to the rearmament problem. In addition, the real need for heavier artillery weapons in the infantry division became clearly evident when reports prepared by field artillery officers during the maneuvers held in April and May became available for study. Almost unanimously, the officers recommended removing the 75-mm. gun from the division artillery and substituting the 105-mm. howitzer. While the Field Artillery branch was studying the reports, the War Department was planning to reorganize the triangular division, hoping to have its final decisions made in July. On 27 June 1940, two days after Germany concluded an armistice with France, the Organization and Training Division (G-3) of the General Staff sent a memorandum to the Chief of Field Artillery, stating that the decision had been made to reorganize the division artillery with four battalions—three direct support battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one general support battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. The War Department issued the reorganization orders for nine triangular divisions on 10 September 1940, using tables of organization and equipment that were to be published in October. Although the divisions were to continue using the 75-mm. gun until the 105-mm. howitzers became available (which did not occur on any large scale until 1943), the era of the long outmoded 75-mm. gun in the division was over.\(^30\)

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12. WD Circular 21 (13 April 1929); WD Circular 29 (16 May 1929); WD Circular 39 (29 June 1929); WD Circular 27 (26 May 1930); WD GO 2 (1 March 1928); "Annual Report, CH, FA, FY 26," 86, Box 1342, and Annual Report, CH, FA, FY 29," 25.31, Box 1337, AG 319.12, RG 407, NA; Ordinance Committee Minutes 15639 (20 Feb. 1940), Modern Rec. Div., RG 156, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

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22. Ibid., 4-5, 40-41, 62-66.