A CENTURY OF U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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FOREWORD

For three decades since his retirement from the U.S. Navy, Captain Wyman H. Packard has worked diligently to compile his monumental history of U.S. Naval Intelligence. Two previous editions appeared in classified, limited distribution form, but former Director of Naval Intelligence RAdm. Thomas A. Brooks foresaw a wider audience for Capt. Packard's labors and directed that a new, revised edition be prepared for open publication.

The resulting work is the product of a gratifying cooperation between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Historical Center, which throughout the project has provided major support to Capt. Packard's researches and which saw this volume through the publication process. The joint effort is intended to provide intelligence professionals, scholars, and the general public with a detailed, topical accounting of the long and varied activities of U.S. Naval Intelligence on behalf of the nation. Equally important, it is hoped that the book's detailed references to resources for further research will spark more work in a field that has not been adequately explored by historians in the past.

The role of naval intelligence in the success of the U.S. armed forces in time of war and in periods of often precarious peace deserves wider appreciation; Capt. Packard has indeed performed a magnificent service to the Office of Naval Intelligence through his painstaking labors.

M. W. CRAMER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, the Director of Naval Intelligence was in general charge of the Office of Naval Intelligence and was responsible for all official correspondence, including correspondence with the U.S. naval attachés abroad and with foreign naval attachés in the United States. The other officers on duty in ONI were in charge of the functional desks for ships, communications, ordnance, personnel, and engineering.[61]

ONI policy was to limit collection to technical information that would assist the Navy in improving the capabilities of the fleet rather than to gather intelligence of an operational nature. In 1914, ONI had eight officers and eight civilians, and 75 percent of their time was spent in clipping and filing newspaper articles, a duplication to some extent of the clipping services being performed by various Navy bureaus.[62]

Information collection by naval attachés was expanded in 1914 by ending double accreditation of the naval attaché in Paris to both France and Russia. Capt. Newton McCully was assigned to Petrograd in hope of improving the flow of information about Russia's participation in World War I.[63] Full-time naval attachés were also assigned to Tokyo and Peking, thus discontinuing the practice of using one officer to cover both posts. Also in 1914, in order to obtain better observations of the wartime use of aircraft, two aeronautical specialists, Lt. John H. Towers and 1stLt. Bernard L. Smith, USMC, were assigned as assistant naval attachés at London and Paris, respectively.[64]

With the creation of the post of Chief of Naval Operations on 3 March 1915, the Office of Naval Intelligence was designated the Division of Naval Intelligence (OP-16), one of nine divisions of the Office of Naval Operations (OPNAV). Incident to the change was a comprehensive reorganization of the naval intelligence service intended to provide the machinery for obtaining all possible information from available foreign sources and for processing and filing it in ONI.[65] Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels expressed the view that "complete and correct information is the first requisite for judicious decision and intelligent action."[66]

One of the new divisions of Naval Operations was responsible for the development of war plans, thus relieving ONI of its long-standing direct involvement with that function. Of course, ONI continued to produce the intelligence needed for war planning and provided it to the War Plans Division as required.

The sinking of the liner *Lusitania* on 7 May 1915 shifted U.S. public opinion about the war in Europe from neutral to pro-Allies. For ONI, preparations for possible participation in the war included taking a greater interest in the activities of potential German agents in the United States. There were only eight officers and eight civilians in ONI in 1915. So, little was done other than planning a major reorganization to add counterintelligence to ONI's functions.

With World War I underway in Europe, the need for improved intelligence collection became apparent, and in October 1915, ONI set up the War Information Service in response to a recommendation by the General Board. Funds for the service were provided by Congress in the Naval Appropriation Bill of 29 August 1916. The Naval Information Service was the overseas version of the War Information Service. Both services were undercover operations reporting directly to ONI. Branch offices were set up for domestic collection, separate from the Aid for Information organizations at the naval district headquarters. The overseas augmentation was to operate from neutral countries after the outbreak of hostilities.[67]

One of the agents placed by the Naval Information Service was Edward Breck, who had served as a Navy agent in Spain during the Spanish-American War. Breck reported on German activities in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and worked to influence public opinion in those countries in favor of the Allies and against Germany.[68] John Held, Jr., (later to become famous as a cartoonist) conducted land reconnaissance of the eastern coast of Central America for the Naval Information Service, sketching coastal areas and ports and keeping lookout for potential hiding places for German submarines.[69]

In 1915, the Navy took a step toward the development of aerial photo reconnaissance when it requested the Eastman Kodak Company to develop an aerial camera. Specifications for the camera had been determined from experiments with various hand-held cameras conducted at Guantanamo and Pensacola, as well as from combat experience during the Vera Cruz incident. The first production order for aerial photo equipment was placed by the Naval Observatory on 10 January 1917 with Eastman Kodak for twenty "aero cameras and accessories."

Beginning in 1916, the war in Europe induced a rapid expansion in ONI. Counterintelligence, in which ONI had not previously been involved, received the greatest emphasis. It was reasoned that the Allies were already producing intelligence for the support of operating forces, but that the U.S. Navy was very vulnerable internally to German acts of sabotage. Strong security measures were needed quickly.[70]

In testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, on 16 March 1916, CNO RAdm. William S. Benson stated that he wanted the Office of Naval Intelligence expanded. At the same hearings, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels on 31 March stated that

he wished to add $50,000 to the Navy appropriation for collecting information "at home," in addition to abroad, without having to specify how the funds were spent. As finally written and passed, the appropriation bill gave ONI the new authority for confidential collection of information at home but limited the funds to $30,000.[71]

With the funds made available for confidential use, an undercover ONI branch office was established in New York City, and others followed in major U.S. industrial cities.[72] See Chapters 21 and 22 for more details on domestic intelligence activities during World War I.

The United States entered the World War on 6 April 1917 with six naval attachés and two assistant naval attachés accredited to ten countries, including Germany and Austria. The attachés were withdrawn from these two countries upon the severing of diplomatic relations. During and after the war, naval attachés were accredited to the following additional capitals: Madrid, Spain; Christiania, Norway; Stockholm, Sweden; Copenhagen, Denmark; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Santiago, Chile; Lima, Peru; Quito, Ecuador; Caracas, Venezuela; Montevideo, Uruguay; Mexico City, Mexico; Havanna, Cuba; Lisbon, Portugal; Warsaw, Poland; Constantinople, Turkey; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Bucharest, Romania.[73] See Chapter 3 for additional details.

RAdm. William Sims arrived in England in early April 1917, just prior to the U.S. declaration of war, to act as Commander U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. At a meeting on 10 April with the British First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir John Jellicoe, Sims learned for the first time the extent of the losses that the Allies were suffering from German unrestricted submarine warfare.

On 14 April, Sims cabled the Navy Department to explain the seriousness of the situation. Sinkings were reaching a scale that would have England militarily impotent in a few months if the trend was not soon reversed. The destruction of German submarines was being greatly exaggerated in the open press (ONI's principal source for war loss information). For morale purposes, the British government had not been disclosing the facts concerning Britain's plight. Furthermore, until the United States entered the war, the naval attaché in London was not given the true statistics either. After RAdm. Sims was designated commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, he also took over the title and duties of Naval Attaché, London.[74]

Capt. Roger Welles, Jr., relieved Capt. Oliver as Director of Naval Intelligence on 16 April 1917 and served in the position throughout World War I. He was promoted to rear admiral during his tenure, becoming the first flag officer to fill the post of Director of Naval Intelligence.[75]

Secretary of the Navy Daniels, in his *Annual Report* for 1918, stated:

> The exigencies of war have imposed new and important duties upon Naval Intelligence. . . . Its duties abroad have increased many fold; at home it has been in touch with the 15 Naval Districts and branch offices—done a most important work in protecting naval and other plants making war materials, preventing sabotage, and in keeping an eye on alien enemies or others with a destructive propensity. A staff of vigilant and discrete confidential officers and civilians have been on alert to ferret out spies and other dangerous characters and secure their arrest. Too much commendation cannot be given to the zealous, discrete [*sic*], and patriotic men, the character of whose services was necessarily unknown to the public. To Rear Admiral Roger Welles, and his exceptionally fine assistants, the country owes more than can ever be known.
>
> A detailed account of the work of the office may not be stated as it is of a highly confidenital character, but, generally speaking, the scope of its activities include observation, investigation, and report of all subjects affecting the Navy and the prosecution of the war from a naval point of view. It includes naval operations at sea and on land, the status, changes, and progress of the material and personnel of foreign navies, and a close counterespionage watch at home. This latter includes the investigation of unauthorized radio stations, of alien enemies and suspects, of matters connected with the cable and mail censorship which affect the Navy, the protection of waterfronts and vessels, and of plants having contracts with the Navy Department with a view of safeguarding those against sabotage.
>
> The guarding of our ships while in port and the guarding against the danger from enemy agents among the passengers and crews on both our trans-Atlantic and coastwise ships have been largely performed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the results achieved bear eloquent witness to the efficiency of the service rendered.[76]

When the Armistice was declared on 11 November 1918, there were 306 naval reservists plus 18 civil service clerks and messengers serving in ONI.[77]

ONI moved twice in 1918. In February, it shifted quarters from the Navy Building to Corcoran Court, a temporary building next door on New York Avenue. Then, in September, it went to the newly built Main Navy Building in Potomac Park on the south side of Constitution Avenue, between Seventeenth and Nineteenth Streets.[78]

Between Two World Wars

ONI activities diminished at the end of World War I, but its policy did not change. It dealt "pri-

marily with strategic subjects and to a lesser extent with tactics and logistics." Strategic intelligence was needed to prepare the annual reports submitted by the Director of War Plans to the Chief of Naval Operations. The reports were known as the "Estimates of the Situation and Base Development Plans." They had two sections, "Political Situation," which reflected world conditions, and "Information," which summarized the needs of the Naval Intelligence service.[79]

RAdm. Albert P. Niblack reported as the relief for RAdm. Welles as DNI on 1 May 1919, Welles having been detached on 31 January 1919. The Assistant Director had probably served as Acting DNI during the three-month interim. RAdm. Niblack had previously served as naval attaché at Berlin and Rome in 1897 and early 1898 and as the first naval attaché to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1910 and 1911. One of his lasting contributions to ONI, which he performed while in office, was the production of *The Office of Naval Intelligence: Its History and Aims*, published in 1920 by the Government Printing Office.

When the U.S. Government failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, it lost the right to have representation on the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, to which the German government was required to turn over technical information on the design of its naval ships, weapons, and equipment. Consequently, an American delegation, headed by Capt. Walter R. Gherardi of ONI, was sent to Germany in January and February to gather such information on its own.[80]

In July 1919, Secretary of the Navy Daniels directed that the Library and Office of Naval Records in the Secretary of the Navy's office be combined with the Historical Section of the CNO's staff creating the Office of Naval Records and Library in the Naval Intelligence Division of OPNAV.[81]

Following the war, ONI dropped back to an office force of forty-two in 1920 and returned to its prewar interests in all maritime countries. Most of its counterintelligence responsibilities were terminated. The monograph system of filing data on foreign countries was implemented, and with limited staff and little supervision ONI started to accumulate a mass of undigested, unclassified material on many non-naval subjects. (The monographs were post-bound, looseleaf folios of related papers on a given topic and, as time went on, often grew to almost unmanageable size.) The Foreign Branch was organized geographically, except for the section on foreign merchant shipping. The branch consequently lost interest in what its customers wanted, and the customers lost interest in what ONI should have been doing for them.

Through its intelligence officers in the naval districts, ONI rendered valuable assistance to the district commandants in their apprehension of military deserters. Officers were detailed for intelligence duty at New York, San Francisco, and Honolulu. The work of the intelligence officer on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet (CINCAF) proved so successful that the assignment of officers for similar duty to all fleets was considered.

The general policy of ONI was to make itself a center for the collection of information of value to the Navy. Information was compiled for the Planning Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board of the Navy, and the Naval War College. Dissemination of information was also continued to other government departments and to the bureaus of the Navy, and information was published and disseminated for the use of officers afloat.

RAdm. Andrew T. Long took over as Director of Naval Intelligence on 24 September 1920, RAdm. Niblack having been detached from that post on 17 September to report to London as naval attaché.[82]

All communications between the Office of Naval Intelligence and other U.S. Government departments and agencies had to be carried on between the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the organization involved. Furthermore, communications between ONI and the Office of the Attorney General (which included all correspondence to and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation) had to be routed via the Navy's Judge Advocate General.[83]

The primary mission of the Foreign Branch of ONI was to produce evaluated information about all foreign navies. But, particularly during the period 1920 to 1939, the Foreign Branch apparently concerned itself more with secondary objectives, such as military, political, economic, and sociological intelligence, which could have been provided by the Army's Military Intelligence Service, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and other government agencies.

There was a lack of any stable, comprehensive plan of organization for the best use of the personnel and facilities available to ONI. The lack of adequate funds and personnel, and the lack of continuity of personnel, contributed to the problem. The bulky, undigested, and unevaluated monograph materials accumulated by ONI made effective fulfillment of the Navy's intelligence requirements virtually impossible.[84]

Capt. Luke McNamee reported as the next Director of Naval Intelligence on 27 September 1921, RAdm. Long having been detached on 29 June. (RAdm. Nathan C. Twining is listed as the DNI in the *Navy Directory* of 1 July 1921; actually, he was

on temporary duty at ONI, preparing for assignment as Naval Attaché, London, where he reported on 27 August 1921.)

On 12 January 1922, the Director of the War Plans Division, in a memorandum to the CNO, recommended the establishment of a Press Relations Office to be located within ONI. Its purpose would be

> to furnish correct information; to actively and definitely contradict incorrect public statements; to familiarize the people of the United States with the work and needs of the naval service; and to promote interest in the Navy. . . . It is but necessary to refer to the recent [Billy Mitchell] bombing tests to show the power of propaganda and the weakness of the lack of propaganda.

ONI concurred in the recommendation on 14 January 1922 and stated: "The closest liaison would be necessary between the publicity office and the head of the Navy Department." The ONI endorsement also requested an officer "to maintain close contact with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, ONI, and the Bureaus and to be responsible for all information and news releases." The Secretary of the Navy approved, and he issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, dated 21 February 1922 and entitled "Navy Department Information Section under the Office of Naval Intelligence" (for details, see Chapter 33).[85]

In 1922, the one officer responsible for the Japanese area was additionally assigned the general supervision of all intelligence work and all correspondence with U.S. naval attachés in foreign countries.[86]

According to the organization chart for ONI in 1923, the Director of Naval Intelligence had general supervision over all intelligence work, handled the correspondence with U.S. naval attachés in foreign countries (the task that in 1922 had been assigned to the Japanese desk), and maintained liaison with foreign naval attachés in the United States.

Section C of ONI, the geographical analysis organization, in 1923 comprised seven desks. Desk A had cognizance over South and Central America and the West Indies, compiling the monographs on those areas. Desk B gathered information from other government departments, prepared statistics on foreign navies, and tried to gather material for eight different monographs. Desk C collected information on the Near East, Southern Europe, and the new Baltic states. Desk D supervised the Japanese monograph and tried to bring compiled data concerning the Japanese navy up to date. Desk E collated information about foreign shipping and accumulated data for monographs about U.S. overseas possessions. Desk F was interested in Western Europe and also gathered statistics on the comparative naval strengths of the Washington Treaty nations (other than Japan). Desk G gathered material for the monographs dealing with China, India, Siberia, and other Far East areas.[87]

ONI continued censorship of photographs and motion pictures of naval subjects, but by 1923 it discontinued its censorship of publications and articles written by naval authors.[88]

Capt. Henry J. Hough replaced Capt. McNamee as Director of Naval Intelligence on 20 December 1923, the latter having been detached on 1 November. In the same year, the District Intelligence Officer, 3rd Naval District (DIO-3ND) successfully acquired the Japanese naval code then in effect from the office of the Japanese Naval Inspector of Material in New York, beginning the U.S. Navy's effort to exploit Japanese naval communications.[89]

On 1 September 1925, Capt. Hough was detached as DNI, and on 9 October Capt. William W. Galbraith reported as his replacement.

Naval attaché posts continued to be maintained during 1925 at London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, The Hague, Tokyo, Peking, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago.[90]

The Naval Intelligence Volunteer Service was created by the Naval Reserve Act of 28 February 1925 (Public Law 512, Sixty-eighth Congress, First Session). Initially, very little effort was devoted to procuring reserve officers for the service because of the predominantly pacifist outlook of the general public and press at that time. For more information on the Intelligence Reserves, see Chapter 29.

An article about the Office of Naval Records and Library published in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* of January 1926, entitled "Our Vanishing History and Traditions," by Capt. Dudley W. Knox of ONI, pleaded the cause of preserving the vanishing naval archives. Knox appealed especially to former officers, their descendants, and their families to make available any documents in "family papers." The article sparked widespread interest and ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Naval Historical Foundation, a nonprofit organization that accepts and retains gifts of documents, relics, etc., for the Office of Naval Records and Library (now the Naval Historical Center).[91]

On 1 July 1926, Capt. Arthur J. Hepburn reported as DNI, relieving Capt. Galbraith who had been detached on 11 June. The billet was gapped for approximately three months when Capt. Hepburn left on 20 September 1927 and Capt. Alfred W. Johnson reported on 12 December.

Naval Intelligence policy during the late 1920s was expressed in the "Estimate of the Situation and Base Development Plans" dated 19 April 1927:

> All preparation for war and operations in war must be premised upon the best available information. This information is of three general classes, (a) information concerning our own forces, numbers, conditions, rate of mobilization; (b) similar information on enemy forces; (c) information regarding probable theatres of operation. The [Office of Naval Intelligence] is the principal agency of the Department in the gathering and dissemination of information in regard to the forces of possible enemy navies.[92]

Activities continued by ONI in 1927 included dissemination of information to the several executive departments and bureaus of the Navy Department; publication of secret information for the use of the Navy; maintenance of liaison with foreign officers in the United States, particularly the foreign naval attachés; public relations duties; and the collection, classification, and filing of old records.[93]

In 1928, ONI continued to collect information pertaining to naval matters and to disseminate it to interested parties, including Congress. Censoring photographs and motion pictures about naval subjects continued. The Public Relations and Records and Library Sections also continued to operate as before. Naval attachés were located in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, The Hague, Tokyo, Peking, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Mexico City.[94]

The evaluation of information was considered by some not to be a function of ONI. In a lecture on "Naval Intelligence" at the Army War College on 6 June 1928, Capt. David McD. LeBreton, a former Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, stated that the Navy Department had two agencies where such evaluations should be made, the Naval War College and the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He also declared that, as that held true for political and general military information, it should also be the case with technical information. LeBreton continued that there were five large bureaus in the Navy Department, each concerned with a special branch of engineering. It was the business of ONI (F-Branch), he said, only to obtain information from abroad for the bureaus and to distribute it to them for interpretation and evaluation. The continuing general bias in the Navy against the evaluation of information by ONI would haunt the organization in 1941.[95]

The prejudice against ONI's evaluating the information it collected was corrected in a Statement of Functions for the Intelligence Division approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on 15 April 1929 that specified the primary duty of naval intelligence to be "the collection of all classes of information concerning foreign countries . . . the evaluation of this information, and its dissemination as intelligence." This was the first documented Navy recognition that information must be evaluated before it can become "intelligence."

Through its naval attachés abroad and intelligence officers afloat and ashore during the late 1920s, ONI followed foreign naval and military progress and developments in technical fields of special interest to the Navy and the U.S. merchant marine. In cooperation with the Military Intelligence Divison of the Army and other executive departments of the government, ONI acquired useful information about the national and military policies of foreign powers and their political, social, economic, and industrial conditions, and information relating to the strength and disposition of foreign armed forces. The information was supplied to the President and Congress for use in considering appropriation bills and also for use by the American delegates to the various conferences on the limitation of armaments. Public Relations and the Naval Records and Library Section continued to function as before.[96]

A proposal to centralize all United States intelligence efforts was received at ONI from the DIO-3ND in April 1929. The idea had been initiated by John A. Gade, a New York businessman who had been the Naval Attaché, Copenhagen, during World War I. Gade proposed that "the various intelligence units of the government be left exactly as they are now but that they may be considered as spokes of a wheel, the hub of which is a Central Intelligence organization. Into this Central Intelligence pours all information from the various spokes—Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Secret Service, Department of Justice, and Department of Commerce." The Army received the same proposal, but, after joint discussion with the Navy, no action was taken. Gade was nearly two decades ahead of his time.[97]

During 1930, ONI continued collecting information about foreign navies and air forces and sent it to Congress for use in determining the annual naval appropriation bill. Naval public relations and the accumulation of documents and reports was also continued. A U.S. naval attaché, with headquarters at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, was accredited for the first time to the Central American countries.[98]

Another collateral duty was added for ONI's Office of Naval Records and Library on 28 April 1930 when a Secretary of the Navy Order appointed retired Capt. Dudley Knox as curator for the Navy Department. The curator was responsible for the collection and preservation of objects, trophies, and relics of historical and inspirational value to the

Navy, except for materials permanently assigned to the Naval Academy and other naval stations. Knox also had cognizance over matters connected with a proposed naval museum in Washington, D.C.[99]

On 20 June 1930, Capt. Harry A. Baldridge reported as DNI, Capt. Johnson having been detached on 18 June. Upon his detachment, Alfred Johnson was nominated by President Herbert Hoover to represent him in Nicaragua "to carry on to a further point of advancement the cooperation of the Government of the United States in electoral matters which was extended during the Presidential elections in 1928, and which the Government of Nicaragua has requested shall likewise be extended in connection with the impending Congressional elections and the later Presidential elections." As a result of the nomination, Capt. Johnson was appointed by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court as chairman of the National Board of Elections. He served with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.[100]

Navy policy toward Naval Intelligence was stated in the "Estimate of the Situation for 1933," dated 27 April 1931:

> The importance of providing ample funds and adequate personnel for the efficient functioning of information agencies of the Navy Department can hardly be overemphasized. Any curtailment of their needs in this direction will adversely affect the preparation of the Navy for national defense and hence the value of the Navy in providing its share towards the national security. During the period covered by the estimate [1933], due to probable extensive readjustments, it is particularly important that constant and intimate contact be maintained with trends of thought and events throughout the world as regards naval forces. This adds to the peacetime activities of the ONI, and is of vital importance in the consideration of our own estimates and plans.[101]

Capt. Hayne Ellis reported as DNI on 1 June 1931 as the relief for Capt. Baldridge, who was detached on 29 May.

By 1931, the work involved in the production and updating of intelligence monographs had become so great that the limited number of personnel assigned to ONI could not cope with it. A decision was, therefore, reached to limit the scope of the work on monographs to those sections that represented essential naval, political, and economic information required by the War Plans Division and by the commanders of forces afloat for their "Estimates of the Situation."[102]

The 1931 policy was commendable in concept, but, because of resource constraints, its execution was less than successful. A DNI secret memo of 31 July 1934 mentioned a task to watch movements of Japanese merchant shipping because any interruption, change, or cessation in shipping operations would be one of the earliest indicators of hostile intent. That important job had to be given to a temporary duty officer in the Far East Section of ONI.

Insufficient personnel, both officer and clerical, was a constant handicap. The Foreign Branch had ten permanent personnel and one temporary staff member, compared to twenty-one Army officers and clerks in the Foreign Intelligence Section of the War Department (G-2). By way of further contrast, the U.S. section of the Imperial Japanese Navy's equivalent of ONI was headed by a captain and had eleven commanders and lieutenant commanders assigned, plus an undetermined number of clerical assistants. Obviously, the Imperial Japanese Navy was more interested in the United States than the U.S. Navy was in Japan, in spite of Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931.[103]

Data on the navies and air forces of foreign nations were prepared by ONI throughout the 1930s for use by Congress in preparation of the annual naval appropriation bill and for naval technical advisors of the U.S. delegation at the International Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments at Geneva in 1932. ONI also continued its public relations and historical records operations. ONI's *Quarterly Information Bulletin* had to be discontinued in 1932 for lack of funds; it had been published monthly or quarterly since 1919.[104]

Starting in 1932, the Far East Section (OP-16-B-12, the old Desks D and G of Section C) became very active during the Sino-Japanese conflict. In addition to keeping informed on the Japanese Empire, China, Siam, Manchukuo, the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hawaii, Samoa, the Aleutians, and the strategic harbors of the Pacific, OP-16-B-12 prepared periodic summaries of the Sino-Japanese situation, estimates on the Japanese internal situation for the War Plans Division, and articles for ONI publications.[105]

In 1933, as funding continued to dwindle, the naval attachés at Rio de Janeiro, Tegucigalpa, and The Hague were withdrawn. The Netherlands accreditation was assigned to the Naval Attaché, Berlin. Liaison with foreign attachés, the War Department, and the State Department was handled by the Assistant DNI. A roster of the foreign attachés was updated and posted in the ONI Office Orders by the Chief Clerk. Foreign requests for visits to naval and industrial establishments were handled by the Security Section.[106]

To provide up-to-date guidance on intelligence to the Naval Establishment, ONI produced the *Naval Intelligence Manual* (ONI-19), a confidential regis-

tered publication submitted on 5 October 1933 by DNI Capt. Hayne Ellis and approved by CNO Adm. William H. Standley.

The need for intelligence in the Navy, and therefore the major objective of Naval Intelligence, was expressed in 1933 as follows:

> The intimate relations now existing between the nations of the world, caused by the close interlocking of political and social interests and their economic interdependence bring about rapid changes in the sentiments of the nations of the world; and furthermore, the political opinion of the masses of nations may be rapidly swayed by the utilization of the press, radio and similar means.
>
> The mobility and destructive power of army, navy and air arms are such that a nation surprised by war is on the verge of defeat. Therefore, it is vital to national security that plans for possible wars be made in advance, that possible wars be foreseen in time to permit the development of forces which will be required to enforce threatened national policies, or if not this, at least to permit the disposition of available forces to affect favorably the international situation or to facilitate the desired strategical deployment.
>
> The Naval Limitations Treaties, together with the rapidity of technical developments in ship and aircraft construction, propulsion machinery, all weapons, and methods of attack and defense, necessitate technical superiority; therefore, the closest observation for (and the collection of) information of such developments in foreign navies is essential to prevent "surprise" and maintain if possible "technical superiority."
>
> The increased number, types and mobility of naval units, [and] the increased range, rapidity and efficiency of naval communications has so increased the area, rate of development, and complexity of naval operations and naval warfare that during war timely intelligence of the enemy forces and the existing conditions within the theatre of operations is a vital factor of success in naval war.
>
> To successfully present a timely and up-to-date picture of the above situation and other pertinent factors, is a major objective of Naval Intelligence.[107]

All normal ONI activities were continued in 1934, including the collection of information, the conduct of public relations activities, and the accumulation of records. ONI handled arrangements for the Navy Department for the cruises of foreign ships and aircraft in U.S. territory and the visits of foreign naval officers to Washington. The naval attaché in Santiago and the assistant attaché for air in Rome were both brought home due to lack of funds. After serving for almost three years as Director of Naval Intelligence, Capt. Hayne Ellis was detached on 21 May 1934, being replaced on 4 June by Capt. William D. Puleston.[108]

When the United States established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1934, the U.S. Embassy staff that arrived in Moscow on 7 March included Marine Capt. David R. Nimmer as the assistant naval attaché. A Navy captain was supposed to have been assigned as naval attaché, but ONI's interest in Soviet naval affairs at that time was minimal. No Navy captain was assigned, and Capt. Nimmer served as the naval attaché for almost one year. The office was closed officially on 16 February 1935, ostensibly because of the Soviet government's refusal to settle debts owed to the United States by the previous regime; actually, however, the closing was due to the lack of courtesies extended to Nimmer, and the restriction on contacts imposed on him, compared to those granted the Soviet naval attaché in the United States. The value of the information being obtained in the USSR, it was judged, did not justify the cost of maintaining the office in Moscow.[109]

In 1935, a serious threat to the morale and efficiency of U.S. naval personnel developed from the subversive efforts of radical groups in the United States. It became essential to uncover the sources of harm and to seek the means to counter them. In addition, the activities of foreign secret agents, both in the United States and in neighboring countries, threatened the safety of the fleet and the naval shore establishment. In light of the subversive activities, the ONI-produced "Estimate of the Situation for 1937," dated 30 March 1935, pointed out the great need for funds and adequate personnel for the various intelligence agencies, stating that "agencies are now inadequate to accomplish their mission." Specific mention was made of the need for more clerical personnel to properly evaluate and disseminate information and to administer more effectively the field services of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Also mentioned was a plan to strengthen fleet intelligence and to provide measures for combating foreign agents and subversive organizations in the United States.[110]

The officer allowance for ONI in 1935 was sixteen active duty U.S. Navy line officers, two retired officers recalled to active duty, and three Marines. The disturbed conditions throughout the world placed ever-increasing demands upon the Intelligence Division, and the shortage of officers was rendering it more and more difficult to carry out the division's mission properly and efficiently. The absolute minimum of officers on permanent duty to handle adequately the conditions existing in 1935 was deemed to be twenty-four, distributed within the organization as follows: Director and Assistant Director, two; Administrative Branch, two; Intelligence Branch, one; British Empire Unit, one; Far East Unit, three; European Unit, two; Latin America Unit, two; Dis-

semination Unit, one; Investigating Unit, one; Security Unit, two; Public Relations Branch, three; Planning Section, one; and Historical Branch, three.

The permanent civilian force in OP-16 in 1935 totaled twenty. The number was so inadequate and had such serious adverse effects on accomplishing the Intelligence Division's mission that three clerks and two translators were made available under National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) funds. The steadily increasing demands on ONI made it essential that the temporary increases be made permanent. Due to representations made about the personnel shortages in ONI, Congress appropriated funds for Fiscal Year 1936 for an additional seven research clerks and two clerk stenographers. The increase was over and above the temporary help furnished under NIRA and did not lessen the need for making the temporary help permanent.[111]

As of March 1935, OP-16-B remained the "OP-Code" designator for ONI's Intelligence Branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. B-1 was responsible for dissemination, and B-2 through B-7 constituted the Domestic Intelligence Section. The Foreign Intelligence Section was made up as follows: B-10, the British Empire Unit; B-11, the Far East Unit; B-12, the Western Europe Unit; B-13, the Central Europe Unit; B-14, the Eastern Europe Unit; B-15, the Balkans and Near East Unit; B-16, the Latin American Unit; and B-17, the Foreign Commerce Unit (which was inactive in peacetime).[112]

The permanent civilian force was reduced to nineteen in 1936. In addition, two translators and three clerks were employed under NIRA funding, and, from other available moneys, six more clerks were employed for an average period of three months each on temporary appointments. Even with the eleven additional employees, it was not possible to meet the output demands on the Intelligence Division, although their presence was most helpful.

Naval attaché offices were established during 1936 in Rio de Janeiro and Lima in addition to the attaché offices that were continued in Berlin, Brussels, Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Peking, Rome, and Tokyo.[113]

The United States naval mission to Brazil had been so successful that it was expanded to eight officers in 1936. At that time, ONI was made responsible for naval missions to foreign countries, and the personnel assigned to the missions received a six-week briefing period before proceeding to their assigned countries. Reports were made to ONI by the naval mission staffs on the proficiency and personnel of the navies they assisted in training. Close and cordial contact was maintained between the Naval Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, and the head of the naval mission to Brazil.[114]

District intelligence offices were in urgent need of adequate clerical assistance in 1936. In all naval districts, the organizations for collecting information vital to security were being impeded by a lack of personnel. District intelligence office work was far in arrears. It was recommended that one additional position be established in each district, except the 7th and 8th, to provide proper support for the district intelligence officers.[115]

In the ONI "Estimate of the Situation for 1939" dated 16 April 1937, particular emphasis was placed on the need for counterintelligence. Rapidly changing political and military situations had resulted in a marked increase in international espionage. Damage to the fleet and to naval shore installations and industrial plants was anticipated.[116]

In 1937, naval attaché offices were added at Santiago, Chile, and Bogota, Colombia. Funds were obtained for the establishment of nine additional clerks for the naval district intelligence offices under the Fiscal Year 1938 congressional appropriation. Funds were to be requested for three additional clerks under the Fiscal Year 1939 estimate in order to complete staffing an intelligence office for each naval district.[117]

In June 1937, the Chief of Naval Operations assigned the following duties to the foreign intelligence sections of ONI:

> 1. Collection of all classes of pertinent information especially affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign naval forces;
> 2. Dissemination of the above;
> 3. Direction of the activities of the U.S. Naval Attachés;
> 4. Cognizance over all communications with U.S. Naval Missions abroad and also with foreign naval attachés accredited to the United States; and
> 5. Maintenance of liaison with other government departments for the exchange of information from abroad.[118]

Capt. Puleston was detached on 30 April 1937 after nearly three years as DNI, and RAdm. Ralston S. Holmes replaced him on 1 May. Work continued throughout 1938 on collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information, and on keeping records. Naval attachés were established at Guatemala City and Lisbon, and the naval attaché office was disestablished at Brussels.[119]

Preparations for War

On 11 June 1939, RAdm. Walter S. Anderson relieved RAdm. Holmes as Director of Naval Intelligence. Anderson believed strongly that the United States was going to become involved in the impend-

ing war, and he began to try to get the naval intelligence organization ready. He sent out additional naval attachés to capitals that had not previously had them, including all member countries of the British Commonwealth. Anderson established a section in ONI to keep track of the merchant shipping routes of the world, and he initiated the training of officers for censoring duties. Approximately 225 Naval Reserve officers were trained in groups of twenty-five. Anderson established a Strategic Information Section to gather information on request and furnish it to the requestor, and a Secret Intelligence Section to handle confidential agents.

With the start of World War II in Europe, the Navy was ordered on 6 September 1939 to establish a Neutrality Patrol in the western Atlantic to observe and report the movements of "combatant vessels of nations in a state of war." Before the end of 1939, the types of ships to be reported were expanded to include German merchant vessels.[120]

A reorganization for ONI was approved on 5 December 1939. Immediately under the Assistant DNI was the Foreign Intelligence Branch (OP-16-F) with the following sections: F-1, British Empire; F-2, Far East; F-3, Western Europe; F-4, Central Europe; F-5, Eastern Europe; F-6, the Balkans and the Near East; F-7, Latin America; and F-8, Enemy Trade (inactive in peacetime).[121]

Naval attaché offices were reestablished at Brussels, Mexico City, Havana, and The Hague in 1939.[122]

The chairman of the Navy General Board, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated 31 August 1939 titled "Are We Ready?" discussed the Navy's deficiencies and included the following comments on intelligence:

> Generally speaking, the Naval Intelligence Service is approaching adequacy as deficiencies in funds and personnel are being remedied. The need [for] additional personnel and facilities increases with deteriorating world conditions. Additional civilian personnel will require additional funds.
>
> The Domestic Intelligence Service comprises the Intelligence Organizations in the Districts, including regular Naval Officers, Reserves, and a small number of agents. Expansion is dependent upon the use of Reserves. . . . Disregarding allocations for censorship duties, the Reserves now enrolled are more than half of those required for intelligence duties.
>
> The Foreign Intelligence Service comprises Naval Attachés. Information and reports are also received from State, War, Commerce, commercial firms, and individuals. The network of information is good as far as it goes, but the information obtained consists primarily of that which foreign countries are willing to release. More adequate coverage is considered essential.[123]

DNI Anderson, in his memo of 21 May 1940 on "the Readiness of the Naval Establishment to Meet a Serious Emergency," stated that "the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans are considered sufficient and effective, at home and aboard, to execute the task assigned Naval Intelligence in Basic War Plans"; and that, if the requirements for personnel and material necessary to carry out the war plans on M-day were provided, "the Organization of the Naval Intelligence Service will be sufficient and effective," but that "the present organization of the ONI is not considered sufficient for effective operation. Additional officer and civilian personnel, additional office space, and additional funds are required to meet present conditions."[124]

On 10 June 1940, in a personal memo from Anderson to RAdm. Ernest J. King, then a member of the General Board, the above statements were reiterated, and Anderson added:

> We have at present no intelligence network abroad other than Naval Attachés. When and if the need for agents appears, I believe we can handle the situation. Our plan and organization for combating espionage and subversive activities at home are progressing continuously. We are constantly considering new "fields" and methods for "tightening up."[125]

During 1940, naval attaché offices were opened in Venezuela, Sweden, the Dominican Republic, and Turkey.[126]

According to regulations issued on 23 October 1940, the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of ONI included securing "all classes of . . . information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces," and evaluating the information collected and disseminating it "as advisable."

There were rumors in 1940 that German submarines were operating from bases in the West Indies. At the specific direction of President Roosevelt, the Navy sent an American civilian yacht on a cruise to the area, manned and officered by Navy personnel in civilian attire. They examined various ports in the West Indies and along the northern and eastern coasts of South America. The Navy personnel found no evidence that any of the ports were being used by German submarines.[127]

When the main battle fleet moved from its West Coast ports to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS) directed the preparation and execution of plans for the security of the fleet while it was berthed in the Hawaiian area. The plans included daylight-to-dusk naval air patrols, seven days a week, by Patrol Wing (PATWING) Two, using twelve aircraft daily to search the

sea around the islands to a radius of 180 miles. When the return of the fleet to its West Coast home ports was deferred indefinitely, the commander of PATWING-2 became concerned about the engine time being accumulated on his aircraft and the resultant overhaul workload. In July 1940, he reduced the patrol effort to six aircraft daily. CINCUS efforts to get the Navy Department to fill the additional patrol-plane needs in the Pacific were unsuccessful.

On 1 November 1940, Capt. Patrick N. L. Bellinger took command of PATWING-2. He advised CINCUS that the 300-mile patrol of only the western sector, then being flown by six to twelve planes each day, was inadequate protection. Bellinger estimated the need for an 800-mile radius search 360 degrees around the Hawaiian islands, with Pearl Harbor as the center. This patrol would require fifty ready aircraft each day; Bellinger had only sixty, each of which could be flown only every second or third day.

On 28 November 1940, CINCUS Adm. James O. Richardson sent CNO Adm. Harold R. Stark, a draft of a proposed revision of a CINCUS directive to improve the security of the fleet in the Pacific. The plan required a long-range air reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor by fleet patrol planes. Adm. Stark replied that wartime measures, such as the continuous air patrols, were not necessary. As a result, the requirement for additional patrol aircraft was not included in the CINCUS directive issued on 5 December 1940, a deficiency that continued until the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack and contributed to its success.[128]

In December 1940, the Director of Naval Intelligence hired an American businessman to develop a covert intelligence collection organization. The private citizen was authorized to establish an office in New York as a "representative of the DNI in matters relating to [ONI's] Foreign Intelligence Service." He selected and hired undercover agents for foreign placement. After the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI, subsequently OSS, Office of Strategic Services) was established in the summer of 1941, the ONI covert organization was shifted to OCI on 15 October 1941. At the time of the transfer, thirteen agents had been recruited. The Public Relations Branch was removed from ONI and was set up directly under the Secretary of the Navy as the Office of Public Relations by a SECNAV directive dated 28 April 1941.[129]

In January 1941, the Foreign Intelligence Branch (OP-16-F) was expanded by the addition of three new sections: F-9, Special Intelligence; F-10, Statistical; and F-11, Strategic Information. F-8 was renamed Foreign Trade. The new organizational format was in effect at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.[130]

During 1941, naval attaché offices were opened in the Union of South Africa, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina.[131]

During the year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, there were four different directors of Naval Intelligence. RAdm. Walter Anderson finished a regular two-year tour in January 1941, and he left for a battleship division command. Anderson was replaced on a temporary basis by the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Capt. Jules James, who served as Acting Director until March 1941. James was replaced by Capt. Alan G. Kirk, who served as DNI from 1 March to 15 October and then was detached for a command at sea. RAdm. Theodore S. Wilkinson then assumed the post and was in charge of ONI at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Wilkinson had had no previous experience in an intelligence billet.[132]

On 27 January 1941, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo reported receiving rumors that the Peruvian minister had heard from several sources that, in the event of trouble between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their forces and equipment. On 1 February, the same day that Adm. Husband E. Kimmel relieved Adm. Richardson as CINCUS, ONI passed Grew's report to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. ONI advised that it placed no credence in the rumors and that, based on the current disposition and employment of Japanese Navy and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for the foreseeable future.[133]

In April 1941, Capt. Kirk, in a discussion on the scope of his duties with Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and Capt. Richmond Kelly Turner, head of the War Plans Division, stated rather strongly that his DNI job should include "interpreting possible enemy intentions, and that ONI should prepare the section of the formal estimate known as 'Enemy Intentions.'" Turner felt the War Plans Division "should prepare this section and should interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations, from whatever source received." Turner also believed ONI "was not charged with sending out any information that would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets anywhere." Adm. Stark approved the position taken by Turner, but the written instructions of 23 October 1940 requiring ONI to evaluate and disseminate information remained unchanged.[134]

RAdm. Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence from June 1939 to January 1941, stated that there had been no restrictions placed on his dissemina-

tion of intelligence to the operating forces, and that if there had been, he would have requested detachment. He had had no problems with Capt. Turner when the latter took over as head of War Plans Division in 1940.[135]

In connection with the dissension between Capt. Kirk and Capt. Turner over the evaluation of intelligence information, it is worth noting that Turner had been commanding officer of the heavy cruiser *Astoria* (CA 34) when that ship returned the body of the deceased Japanese ambassador to Japan in April 1939. As a result of the approximately ten days he had spent in Japan on the mission, Turner felt that he knew a great deal about the Japanese. His views were constantly at variance with those of ONI on the subject.[136]

Another endemic problem at the outset of World War II was the dissension between the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications (DNC) over the control of the dissemination of communications-derived intelligence. The transcript of the Japanese navy operational code had been broken by the Office of Naval Communications, and the translation was done by Japanese linguists supplied by ONI. The DNC maintained that he had a prior right to present the translations of the more interesting items at the Secretary of the Navy's morning conference. The Director of Naval Intelligence countered that the translation should be evaluated and interpreted by the experts in ONI and that he should make the presentation to the Secretary. The problem was resolved in favor of the Director of Naval Intelligence, but the loss of the responsibility continued to rankle the communications organization.[137]

In response to the need for a general government agency to collect and analyze strategic information, as well as to develop a secret undercover intelligence service, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was established by a presidential order on 11 July 1941. The order directed that the departments and agencies of the government make information relating to national security available to OCI. It was noted that nothing in the duties and responsibilities of OCI should interfere with the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisors to the President.[138]

Liaison with OCI was established initially under the Administrative Branch of ONI, and Cdr. Richard E. Webb was appointed as administrative liaison officer. All requests from OCI and DNI for information or data were to be sent through Webb, although it was desired that direct contact also be maintained between personnel in ONI and OCI. In September 1941, LCdr. Alvin D. Chandler became liaison officer, and by 9 October 1941 eleven Navy and two Marine Corps officers had been detailed by ONI to serve in the coordinator's office at OCI. LCdr. John L. Riheldaffer, USN (Ret.), replaced LCdr. Chandler in October when liaison with OCI was placed under the Special Intelligence Branch (OP-16-Z), where it remained throughout the war.[139]

The Director of Naval Intelligence, in a 10 October 1941 letter to all branch and section heads, directed that, when providing information to representatives of OCI, they should ensure that "the Navy Department's evaluation and interpretation of the data is made clear . . . so that the compilation of similar data, and the preparation of the Coordinator's report, may not suffer from a lack of full appreciation of the Navy Department's evaluation."[140]

In the summer of 1941, in anticipation of U.S. involvement in a world conflict, ONI began positioning naval observers, naval liaison officers, and consular shipping advisors in principal ports and potential "hot spots" throughout the world. Naval observers had been sent to various ports in Brazil earlier in the year in connection with support to U.S. Navy ships operating in the Neutrality Patrol.[141]

In August 1941, the U.S. Navy language students in Japan were withdrawn, reaching Shanghai on Labor Day. The Naval Attaché, Tokyo, had recommended the precautionary move to ensure against the students being interned when and if Japan initiated hostilities.

Cdr. Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East Desk of ONI, left for London on 25 August 1941 and returned in October. When he returned, McCollum found that the *Intelligence Digest* had projected an attack on Siberia by the Japanese. The interpretation had been published at the direction of the Director of War Plans, Kelly Turner. McCollum saw no change in the situation to warrant the projection. Accordingly, the next *Digest* went out without the Siberian fairy tale. The omission did not sit well with Turner, and soon a directive came out that ONI could not send out any evaluations; it could only report facts.[142]

A CNO message of 16 October 1941 reported the resignation of the Japanese cabinet and directed due precautions and preparatory deployments. Adm. Kimmel's response included putting submarines on "war patrol" and sending twelve patrol planes to Midway to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island.[143]

Another CNO message dated 24 November alerted CINCPACFLT Adm. Kimmel, CINCAF Adm. Thomas C. Hart, and the commandants of the 12th, 13th, and 14th Naval Districts about the possibility of Japanese hostile action, stating that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction in-

cluding an attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."[144]

The 27 November 1941 warning message directed the entire naval establishment to take the defensive dispositions required by the effective war plan, WPL-46 (RAINBOW). The message required that contributory (supporting) plans be put into operation. The contributory plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor required the establishment of aerial reconnaissance against possible attack. The war-warning message went not only to the Pacific Fleet but also to the Atlantic Fleet, which was practically at war already in carrying out the neutrality patrols, and it went to the Asiatic Fleet, where Adm. Hart took all of the necessary defensive steps. Hart got his ships and aircraft out of the Philippines. The only ships left in Manila Bay were those that couldn't be used in operations at sea. The message was also addressed to every naval district in the United States and to the Panama Canal Zone.

The only forces that did not carry out their contributory plans were the Pacific Fleet and the 14th Naval District. The latter, which covered the Hawaiian Islands, had no aircraft under its command because all planes in the Hawaiian Islands were under the control of Adm. Kimmel's Pacific Fleet.[145]

The so-called Stark 27 November 1941 warning message was released by Adm. Ingersoll and was addressed to CINCAF and CINCPAC for action, and to CINCLANT (Commander in Chief, Atlantic) and SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer), London, for information:

> This is considered a war warning message.
>
> Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prepatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO [London] inform British. Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

In the first week of December 1941, intercepted diplomatic coded messages from the Japanese foreign office directed their offices in London, Paris, and other cities to burn communications codes and confidential papers. A check confirmed that the Japanese were actually carrying out the order in Washington and New York. On 3 December, ONI sent messages to CINCAF, CINCPACFLT, and the commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts informing them of the Japanese action. At the same time, ONI sent instructions to all endangered outposts to destroy their codes and papers and to signal back when these actions had been accomplished. Information copies went to CINCPACFLT and CINCAF. The replies came back from all of the various posts by 5 December 1941, confirming that the prewar steps were being taken. The military commanders were expected to recognize that the precautions were a serious preparation for war. Also at that time, Maj. Gregon A. Willams, USMC, Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, was ordered to go to his war post at Foochow.

The naval aide to the President, Capt. John R. Beardall, was informed of ONI's message when it was sent out, and the State Department was also informed. ONI's message raised no alarm because the U.S. Government was set for war; it just was not known when or where the conflict would begin.[146]

Two other intercepted diplomatic messages had been received that would have been indicators that Pearl Harbor was the possible target, if they had been available at CINCPACFLT. On 2 December, Tokyo asked its Honolulu consul "whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise whether the warships are provided with anti-mine nets." On 6 December, the Japanese consul at Honolulu responded to Tokyo, "In my opinion battleships do not have torpedo nets."[147]

The attempt to make ONI into a mere collection agency had serious consequences that the OPNAV's War Plans Division refused to acknowledge in 1941. Without an organization devoted exclusively to collecting, correlating, and evaluating all available naval intelligence information received from all sources, a serious gap existed in the Navy's readiness. The Navy was ripe to become a victim of surprise.

Although disagreement between War Plans and ONI had been noisy during the early stages of Kirk's administration of ONI, by the time Wilkinson took charge, the subordinate position of Naval Intelligence relative to War Plans was a fait accompli. Turner, now a rear admiral, was keeping to himself the job of evaluating intelligence information and the results of his work. He had daily strategic estimates made up in his own division, but he did not show them to ONI, and Adm. Stark did not require them to be "chopped" by ONI.[148]

RAdm. Wilkinson had ready access to Adm. Stark, although he met most frequently with Stark's assistant, Adm. Ingersoll. The relations between Wilkinson and Turner, on the other hand, were something less than cordial. This was not a personal matter. Adm. Turner always distrusted Naval Intelligence, no matter who headed the organization.

Turner could not distinguish between types of information, particularly later during congressional hearings, when he tried to blame ONI for failing to send out information that he had previously claimed as the prerogative of his office but which his office had failed to send.[149]

There were many investigations to determine who in Washington and Honolulu was to blame for the Japanese success in achieving surprise at Pearl Harbor. The investigations all seem to have failed to recognize that, prior to its attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's other operations and actions had created a successful deception that covered the preparations and movements of forces positioning for the Pearl Harbor attack. The movement of Japanese forces toward targets in Southeast Asia had not been covered up and had been reported from Japan and China and by air patrols from the Philippines. On the other hand, complete secrecy had been achieved on the movements by the Pearl Harbor striking force.

Voluminous information had been received to indicate that a Japanese attack was coming somewhere, and for several months alerts had been sent out to the operating forces, culminating in Adm. Stark's war-warning message to Adm. Kimmel on 27 November 1941 identifying the targets as "either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo." The most significant clue—the requirement for a report on the berthing locations of ships in Pearl Harbor from the Japanese consul in Honolulu—had not been available to Kimmel; it had been lost in Washington in the mass of other intercepts, including messages to Japanese consuls for similar information about other U.S. and world ports. The U.S. high command could not believe that the Japanese would make such a strategic mistake as to attack Pearl Harbor, and all intelligence reports were evaluated in that context. See Chapter 35 for more discussion on this controversial subject and subsequent events in the Pacific.

World War II

Soon after the United States entered World War II, submarines were ordered to conduct reconnaissance of selected Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific. Little was known in the United States about the defenses and support installations in the Japanese-controlled islands. Based on the information collected by the submarine missions, RAdm. William F. Halsey's carrier task force attacked the Marshall Islands on 1 February 1942.[150]

In June 1942, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was abolished by the President, and its intelligence functions were turned over to the Office of Strategic Services, an agency established directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The liaison between the Division of Naval Intelligence and the OSS continued as it had previously been carried on between Naval Intelligence and OCI.[151]

A special intelligence officer, already charged with passing on the qualifications of applicants for intelligence appointments in the Division of Naval Intelligence, was assigned duty at the Bureau of Personnel to process the applications. The officer was given additional duties as liaison officer with the Division of Naval Intelligence for planning procurement of Class I-V(S) Naval Reserve intelligence specialist personnel.[152]

On 20 July 1942, RAdm. Harold C. Train relieved RAdm. Wilkinson as Director of Naval Intelligence.

In September 1942, reflecting on the experiences of the war to date, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations commented on the Naval Intelligence service as a whole:

> Decentralization has been carried out in the past. A minimum of positive directives and control has been exerted by the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, actual experience under war conditions has demonstrated that these policies have not fulfilled the purpose of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.[153]

A major reorganization of ONI took place in March 1943, and the title of the second in command was changed from Assistant Director to Deputy Director (see Chapter 28).

As part of the March 1943 reorganization, a North American Desk was established in the Intelligence Branch and was given cognizance over the collection of intelligence (as opposed to counterintelligence) within the continental United States and Alaska. Valuable information on foreign countries was available within the United States, and each naval district intelligence office set up a foreign intelligence section to exploit domestic resources and to collect intelligence information of value to the operating forces. To improve administration of the domestic collection program, a contact register, containing the names of sources in each naval district, was begun in September 1943.[154]

The Operational Intelligence Section was established for a short time (April to August) in 1943. Its brief existence was due mainly to the strong view of most of the senior officers in ONI that no part of that organization should be devoted exclusively to the production of intelligence for one type of customer (see Chapter 18).

On 25 September 1943, RAdm. Roscoe E. Schuirmann, Intelligence Officer to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), relieved

RAdm. Train as Director of Naval Intelligence, serving thereafter in both billets (see Chapter 16).

The first successful U.S. Navy wartime periscope photo reconnaissance mission was conducted by *Nautilus* (SS 168) in September 1943 to obtain information for the landings by U.S. forces on Tarawa. The panoramic photographs obtained by the submarine provided information on gun installations and beach defenses. The photographs also confirmed beach contours and the locations of exposed reefs. On 19 November, which was D-Day minus one for the Tarawa landings and the end of five days of air attack and preliminary bombardment by surface ships, *Nautilus* again entered Tarawa lagoon to update previously obtained information and to determine the success of the softening-up effort. The submarine found a new, still-undamaged, six-to-eight-foot wall of heavy logs built on the beaches. *Nautilus* also observed large coastal-defense guns and still-operable small guns on the beaches. This information, plus information on surf conditions, was reported to the amphibious task force commander.[155]

The use of submarines to support coastwatchers and guerrilla forces in the Philippines was inaugurated on 14 January 1943 when *Gudgeon* (SS 211) landed six men and one ton of equipment and supplies on the island of Negros. A second such mission was carried out by *Tambor* (SS 198) on 5 March at Mindanao. Thereafter, small landing parties and supplies were landed at about five-week intervals in the central and southern Philippines by selected Seventh Fleet submarines in conjunction with their regular war patrols. Supply operations continued until 23 January 1945, for a total of forty-one missions. *Seawolf* (SS 197) did not make its 6 October 1944 landing and was listed overdue as of that date—the only submarine lost on support operations.[156]

Between January 1943 and April 1945, as "Cdr. Robert E. Norden, USN," LCdr. Ralph G. Albrecht, USNR, of the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z), made 309 radio broadcasts directed to officers of the German navy, particularly submarine officers, to undermine the morale of the enemy and to lower German combat efficiency. The success attained in Albrecht's psychological warfare effort was confirmed by evidence from German naval prisoners of war and other sources that the broadcasts were consistently listened to. "Norden's" reports of submarine losses and other facts, prior to official disclosure by the German Ministry of Marine, won him a following of interested listeners and served to discredit the German leaders who, on numerous occasions, found it advisable to refute "Norden's" statements.[157]

In May 1944, the Special Activities Branch was made responsible for determining escape and evasion methods that could be used by captured United States personnel. An officer from the Air Intelligence Group (OP-16-V) was temporarily detailed to OP-16-Z for the purpose of determining to what extent existing Army arrangements for escape and evasion might be applicable to naval personnel.[158] The OP-16-V officer on loan to OP-16-Z handled liaison with the Army Military Intelligence Service's X-Division (MIS-X), which was concerned with escape and evasion matters. Selected Navy and Marine personnel were given MIS-X indoctrination prior to assignment to fleet or field duty so they might, in turn, brief combat personnel as required. Material, both physical aids and intelligence, was distributed to fleet and other commands through MIS-X or OP-16-V in accordance with requirements.[159]

The capture of the German submarine *U-505* by a U.S. carrier task group on 4 June 1944, although netting a major haul for technical intelligence from captured hardware, could have caused a loss of critical intelligence in other areas had German naval headquarters learned too soon of the submarine's capture. The codes that *U-505* carried had previously been broken by the Allies. Coming on the eve of the Normandy landings, the capture of the codes might have induced the Germans to change to another code just when the ability to read their communications was most urgently needed. The disclosure of the capture would also have temporarily reduced the very valuable support of communications-derived intelligence to the Allied antisubmarine effort.

Captured documents of naval interest were becoming available in increasing quantities in 1944 as the invasion of Europe expanded and as more islands were captured in the Pacific. Japanese ships sunk at island atolls and in the harbors of the Philippines were found to be fruitful sources of information for future operations. Intelligence teams went ashore right behind the early landings to ensure that documents and equipment of intelligence value were acquired and exploited before the souvenir hunters started their collection efforts. Information in the captured documents was often of immediate tactical value, showing strengths and weaknesses and characteristics of defensive installations yet to be attacked or that could be circumvented. Enemy documents were sometimes found in the pockets of U.S. dead or wounded. Had the documents been turned in by the souvenir hunters and been properly exploited, such action might have saved them from becoming casualties.

On 3 October 1944, the Technical Intelligence Center of ONI was established and was designated OP-16-PT (see Chapter 11).

RAdm. Leo H. Thebaud relieved RAdm. Schuirmann on 24 October 1944 as Director of Naval Intelligence and Intelligence Officer for COMINCH.

The Washington Document Center, a central agency for handling captured Japanese documents, was made a part of ONI on 14 February 1945 and was designated OP-16-WDC. It was located at the Steuart Building at Fifth and K Streets, NW, Washington, D.C.[160]

In April 1945, the title of the OPNAVs' intelligence organization was changed from the Division of Naval Intelligence to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the name it had had throughout its early years until 1915. On 6 September 1945, Commo. Thomas B. Inglis relieved RAdm. Thebaud as DNI and soon thereafter he was promoted to rear admiral.

Post–World War II Period

Following the conclusion of World War II, the COMINCH organization was dissolved and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) was reorganized on 10 October 1945. The part of COMINCH that had been responsible for operations and was to continue as part of OPNAV became OP-03, while COMINCH's intelligence organization became part of ONI. In the new OPNAV organization, ONI was assigned to OP-02 (Administration) and was designated OP-23. The title of Director of Naval Intelligence was changed to Chief of Naval Intelligence.

As a result of the valuable technical information developed from the interrogation of German scientists captured as Germany was overrun, Project Paperclip was established in July 1945 to procure and exploit foreign technical personnel. The Navy technical bureaus were particularly interested in acquiring the services of German naval construction and ordnance specialists. See Chapter 11 for further details on Paperclip.

The first area conference of naval attachés was held in London on 26 November 1945 under the auspices of the Commander Naval Forces, Europe (COMNAVEU). Such a conference had been proposed by the naval attaché in London, Commo. Tully Shelley, to the Chief of Naval Intelligence and COMNAVEU; both supported the idea. Twenty-five naval attachés and naval observers from Europe and the Mediterranean area attended.

In December 1945, ONI designated Cdr. Rufus L. Taylor as the U.S. member of a so-called Five Power (U.S., Britain, France, the USSR, and China) Committee to exploit the abandoned offices and material of the Japanese military attachés in Europe. It was uncertain what might be found, but the United States chiefly hoped that some cryptologic information might be recovered. Cdr. Taylor was selected for the job because of his Japanese language qualifications and for his ability to recognize cryptologic material and information. Little of intelligence value was discovered, however. A Belgian cryptologic system was found by Taylor in the Japanese naval attaché's office in Paris; he recovered a complete description, wiring diagrams, etc., but not the machine itself. Taylor was able to extract the documentary material without Soviet and Chinese members knowing about it (the French and British members had dropped out).[161]

Although ONI had been in existence since 1882, no specific delineation of its duties or its relation to the rest of the Navy had been incorporated into *Navy Regulations* until the publication on 20 June 1946 of the *Advanced Changes to U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920*, was approved by President Truman on 14 June. The revision inserted a new Section 9, Article 425, in Chapter 6, stating that Naval Intelligence, under the CNO, was "the organization charged with the execution of the intelligence and counterintelligence mission of the Naval establishment." Paragraph 3 of Section 9 declared that the Chief of Naval Intelligence shall have cognizance over all phases of collection, evaluation, and dissemination of all types of intelligence in the Naval establishment, except as provided in Article 421, which covered communications intelligence. Paragraph 6 stated that the Chief of Naval Intelligence was to have cognizance over the security of classified information and control over the disclosures of naval classified information to foreign governments. Paragaph 7 stated that although naval intelligence was under the CNO, the Chief of Naval Intelligence "shall disseminate immediately to appropriate parts of the Naval establishment intelligence within their cognizances which does not relate to matters under the jurisdiction of OPNAV as set forth in Article 433." Paragraph 7 also stated, "Activities of the Naval establishment shall coordinate all intelligence matters with the Chief of Naval Intelligence."[162]

To achieve the most effective implementation of the new provisions in *Navy Regulations*, the Chief of Naval Operations expressed to the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps the desire to have Marine Corps intelligence activities in the operating forces and in the Navy Department fully integrated with naval intelligence. The integration was to include all aspects of naval intelligence, especially the development of plans and doctrine for the use of amphibious operational intelligence, the assignment and training of regular Marine Corps officers in intelli-

gence work, and the procurement and training of Marine Corps Reserve officers as specialists for intelligence duties in anticipation of mobilization.[163]

On 1 August 1946, ONI was shifted from the Administration Division to the Operations Division of OPNAV, and its designator became OP-32. Concurrently, the Office of Naval Records and Library was removed from ONI and was combined with the Office of Naval History under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Administration (OP-02).

Article 12-006 of the *Naval Intelligence Manual* (ONI-19[A]) stated:

> Upon Executive Order of the President, the U.S. Coast Guard becomes a part of the Naval establishment in time of emergency or war. For this reason, a close relationship must exist between Naval Intelligence and the intelligence organization of the U.S. Coast Guard. This relationship will be delineated, for guidance of Naval Intelligence, in accordance with agreements reached between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

A joint ONI–Coast Guard committee was set up in 1946 to review the intelligence relations between the Navy and the Coast Guard. The ONI representatives were Cdr. Thomas R. Mackie and Capt. Herman E. Keisker, USNR (Inactive). They were instructed to pay special, but not exclusive, attention to espionage, sabotage and subversion; security of classified naval information; cooperation in Washington, the naval districts, and the operating forces; and cooperation in foreign and operational intelligence aspects. The committee was to recommend, in detail, agreements that would accomplish the above. Since the interests of all ONI branches were to be considered and included in the agreements, ONI branch heads were directed to render all possible assistance to the ONI–Coast Guard committee.[164]

In October 1946, the Kilgore Committee of Congress requested "information regarding the amount of money expended annually by the Navy Department on all its intelligence operations from 1936 to 1946." It amplified the request to include "total amounts of money expended annually by ONI, including all direct and indirect charges such as the salaries of civilian and military personnel on duty with Naval intelligence."

To indicate to the congressional committee the scope of the research necessary to produce the requested figures, it was pointed out that (a) during the period from 1936 to 1946, naval intelligence had received no single appropriation to cover all its expenditures; (b) the only appropriation made directly to, and administered by, naval intelligence was "Salaries, Office of Naval Intelligence," covering salaries of civilian personnel working in ONI in Washington, and, in addition, a portion of the appropriation "Miscellaneous Expenses, Navy" (maintenance of naval attachés and collection of information) was administered and accounted for by Navy intelligence; (c) as an integral part of the Navy, Naval Intelligence received salaries, services, equipment, supplies, etc., from various appropriations under the cognizance of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the Bureau of Aeronautics; (d) in the case of naval districts, expenditures from the above allotments were made by the district commandants, who, in turn, furnished civilian personnel and services to the district intelligence officers; and (e) all military salaries were paid from the appropriation "Pay and Subsistence of Naval Personnel."[165]

In the years immediately following World War II, there was a drastic reduction in the size of the Navy's operating forces and in the number of its personnel, but the need for intelligence expanded as the scope of the subjects requiring coverage escalated under the pressures of the Cold War. To retain and provide career opportunities for a selected number of World War II Naval Reserve intelligence personnel who had acquired significant expertise, a series of "ALNAVs" (messages addressed to the entire naval establishment) was issued in 1945 inviting the reserve personnel to request transfer to the regular Navy. The restricted line (Special Duty Intelligence) personnel designator 163X, was created and incorporated in the Officer Procurement Act of 1947.[166]

In 1948, a selection board was convened to select, from unrestricted line officer applicants, ten regular officers to be designated as 1630 (Special Duty Intelligence) officers. The number was in addition to the transferees from among the naval reservists. Subsequent annual selections were to build the 1630 community to thirty. The input into the 1630 community was almost exclusively from among former unrestricted line intelligence subspecialists, plus an additional limited number of Naval Reserve graduates from the Naval Intelligence School.

The *Naval Intelligence Manual* was superseded on 1 May 1947 by ONI-19(A), *Naval Intelligence Manual–1947*, a confidential, registered publication incorporating many of the lessons learned in World War II. It was signed by Chief of Naval Intelligence RAdm. Thomas B. Inglis and was approved by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

The National Security Act of 1947 provided, among other things, for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. As a result, the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Intelligence were broadened to satisfy the require-

The Combs Board reviewed the specialist and subspecialist programs in the Navy in 1964 and, in its report of 17 December 1964, recommended that the rank structure for officer intelligence specialists (1630s) in the grades of lieutenant commander through captain should be increased from 60 percent to 75 percent. It also called for the Director of Naval Intelligence to be designated as the "code sponsor" for the 135X (Air Intelligence) officers and recommended that a quota of ten 135X officers be established at the Defense Intelligence School. It was recognized that the requirements for intelligence special duty officers had increased substantially in the past four years, primarily due to the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency and its requests for more 1630s.[191]

RAdm. Taylor was relieved as Director of Naval Intelligence on 27 May 1966 by his deputy, Capt. Maurice H. Rindskopf, who served as Acting Director of Naval Intelligence until RAdm. Eugene B. Fluckey, a well-decorated World War II submariner, arrived on 22 July 1966. Capt. Rindskopf continued as Fluckey's deputy.

The Israeli-Egyptian crisis of late May 1967 and the Israeli attack on the *Liberty* (AGTR 5) on 8 June stimulated the updating of available intelligence on the Middle East. Many Naval Reserve intelligence officers were used on two weeks' active duty under training to assist in the effort, particularly at the Fleet Intelligence Center, Atlantic (FICLANT).

When the Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINTCOM) was established on 1 July 1967, RAdm. Fluckey dropped the title of Director of Naval Intelligence and became Commander Naval Intelligence Command. He retained the title of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO) for Intelligence, OP-92. See Chapter 28 for more details about the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Command.

Following the establishment of NAVINTCOM, pressure became strong to move its headquarters out of the Pentagon. As far as OP-09B, ACNO (Administration), was concerned, it was more important that the headquarters leave than that a suitable new location be found. Under such pressure, a temporary, less-than-satisfactory location was the only acceptable solution, and a move to the privately owned Hoffman Building, then under construction in Alexandria, Virginia, was to be carried out as soon as possible. The cost of establishing secure spaces and communications at the new location assured that the so-called temporary location would be essentially permanent. Advantages to the move were the availability of space for expansion and the chance for needed personnel force growth outside the stringent OPNAV personnel ceiling.

The capture by North Korea of the euphemistically designated Environmental Research Ship *Pueblo* (AGER 2) on 23 January 1968 put a temporary damper on all sensitive collection operations peripheral to Communist coastal areas. For more details on the event, see Chapter 5.

On 10 June 1968, Capt. Frank M. Murphy, Deputy ACNO (Intelligence), relieved RAdm. Fluckey temporarily until RAdm. Frederick J. Harlfinger II, another submariner, reported on 12 August as OP-92 and Commander Naval Intelligence Command.

In 1968, a change to Title 10, U.S. Code, allowed for the expansion of the special duty officer community, and many air intelligence officers changed from the 1350 to the 1630 designator, causing an increase in the 1630 community to over 1,100 officers.[192]

On 23 June 1969, major elements of the Naval Intelligence Command commenced moving into the Hoffman Building from the fifth floor of the Pentagon, and the Translation Division moved to the Hoffman Building from the Naval Security Station on Nebraska Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. On 15 September, the Naval Investigative Service Headquarters started its move to the Hoffman Building from the Fairmont Building in North Arlington, Virginia. Portions of the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center and the Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity (NIPSSA), another ONI subsidiary, started moving to the Hoffman Building from various locations. By 30 October, all the moves had been completed.

On 15 March 1971, a change in the OPNAV organization dropped the Director of Naval Intelligence one command level below that which the office had maintained since June 1954. The Office of Command Support Programs (OP-094) was established on the same date, and the Office of ACNO (Intelligence), OP-092, was disestablished and made the Intelligence Division of OP-094. Its new designation was OP-942. The development of a detailed organization for OP-094 and a proposed mission and functions statement for the various staff officers, divisions, and branches was to be submitted for approval by 1 May 1971.[193]

Capt. Earl F. Rectanus, who had already been selected for promotion to rear admiral, was "frocked" and relieved RAdm. Harlfinger on 22 July 1971 as Commander Naval Intelligence Command. Harlfinger was promoted to vice admiral as OP-094.[194] RAdm. Rectanus became OP-942 and OP-009; the latter was a double-hat for OP-942 according to OPNAV Notice 5430 of 5 March 1971.

In February 1973, the designation of the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence changed from OP-942 to OP-009, and the director returned to an

organizational position directly under the CNO. The director was also assigned additional duty as OP-094Q, Assistant for Intelligence Support, Command Support Programs. The resumption of the traditional title, Office of Naval Intelligence, was also approved at that time.[195]

Chapter Notes

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5. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 28, 1881* (Washington: GPO, 1881), 5–6 (hereafter *SECNAV Annual Report* with date).

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23. Mahan ltr to RAdm. Stephen B. Luce, 3 Sep 1901; and *Naval Directory*, 1889.

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29. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1893*, 6–12.

30. Capt. Damon E. Cummings, *Admiral Wainwright and the United States Fleet* (Washington: GPO, 1962), 177.

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32. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1896*, 48–49.

33. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1897*, 45.

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February 1919. Several similar missions were sent to Germany and Central Europe following World War I, most of which included naval officers as members.

Article 209 of the Treaty of Versailles required the German government to turn over to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all information and documents on the design of warships, including details about their guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and, in general, everything relating to naval war material. The U.S. Government, having failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, was not represented on any of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and most of the technical information obtained under authority of Article 209 of the treaty was consequently not turned over to the United States.[22]

Between Two World Wars

In time of peace, the Navy's sources of intelligence information were naval attachés; consular reports; State Department dispatches (reports from ambassadors and ministers); the files of ONI; reports from Navy shipboard intelligence officers, tourists, businessmen, newspaper correspondents, and commercial travelers; and commercial reports from business firms, newspapers, periodicals, and agents. In time of war, information was to be obtained through agents, code breakers, travelers, and spies. In time of peace, an intelligence officer was designated on board each U.S. Navy ship, and it was his duty to forward reports on every port visited and to act as an agent of ONI. A source that became increasingly important was code breaking, which, in time of peace, had to be studied and mastered. A potentially fruitful, but never properly exploited, source of information was U.S. citizen travelers, who should have been questioned at once upon their return from an area of interest.[23]

To provide guidance to the naval service on the information to be collected on foreign areas, *Instructions for Intelligence Officers* (ONI-8) was published on 1 May 1923. ONI-8 was the first formal publication on collection known to have been published by ONI. It was approved by CNO Adm. Robert E. Coontz and Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby and was designed primarily for use by the operating forces. In its introduction, ONI-8 stated:

> Our first thought on entering a foreign harbor must be, "What information can I collect which would be of value to me as the commander of an attacking force? What information must I have after having taken this place in order that I may intelligently administer its affairs? What information must I have if I am to hold this place against attack from land and sea?"

ONI-8 began with an alphabetical list of subjects for which information was required, giving monograph section numbers for each subject, followed by a numerical arrangement of subjects by monograph section numbers. ("Monograph" was the term applied in ONI to the continuously updated dossiers maintained on various countries.) The final section was an arrangement of subjects by order of military importance, with detailed guidance on the elements of information needed under each subject and, in some cases, how to collect it.

Reports were to be made on the Intelligence Report Form, with the title sheet giving the subject, subheading, and corresponding monograph index numbers as shown in ONI-8. Thus, reports received by ONI could be readily collated with information on the same subject that had been received from other sources. Ships' intelligence officers were encouraged to submit reports to ONI on persons in foreign areas who were pro-American and who might serve as channels of communication in peace or as sources of information in time of war without incurring suspicion.[24]

When Japan received a mandate over the former German islands in the Pacific after World War I, it was agreed that the United States could send men-of-war to visit the islands at any time. When the United States indicated an intention to do so, however, Japan refused permission. The United States did not strenuously insist upon its rights, but finally, in 1923, permission was obtained for the light cruiser *Milwaukee* (CL 5) to visit the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The ship made excellent surveys of several islands, and the photographs, soundings, and other information obtained were of great value. Stops were made at Truk, Jaluit, Eniwetok, and other islands of particular interest to ONI.[25]

During 1923, other light cruisers in the Marshall and Caroline Islands added materially to ONI's supply of important information. There were serious gaps in the information on the Aleutian Islands and practically no charts, although it was believed that the Japanese had made good surveys of the U.S.-owned islands. Correction of these deficiencies was needed as soon as possible and was therefore prescribed by the Director of War Plans in his "Estimate of the Situation and Base Development Plan" of 17 March 1924.[26]

In October 1927, the light cruiser *Marblehead* (CL 12) proceeded from Shanghai to Kobe, Japan, while the Japanese fleet was conducting major exercises in the area of the cruiser's track. The Japanese fleet's tactical communications circuits were monitored in what is believed to be the first use of a ship by the U.S. Navy to gather intelligence by radio intercept.

Lt. Ellis M. Zacharias, the Asiatic Fleet Intelligence Officer at the time, was on board *Marblehead* during the collection cruise. The Naval Attaché, Tokyo, met *Marblehead* at Kobe and brought Zacharias back to Tokyo. From there Zacharias went with Lt. Edward S. Pearce out into Tokyo Bay to look at the Japanese fleet when it returned from maneuvers.[27]

Beginning in 1927, the Latin American Desk (OP-16-B-16) of ONI sought to keep its monograph material on Latin America current by requesting various units of the U.S. Fleet on cruises to correct or enlarge the monograph information in ONI. Monographs and reports of pertinent information were furnished to naval operating units in Latin American waters. From 1935 on, the effort was particularly fruitful and apparently well organized, judging by the frequent reports from the Special Service Squadron.[28]

When Lt.(jg) Henri H. Smith-Hutton was a Japanese language student in Japan in the late 1920s, he was given the task of accompanying Lt. J. J. Ballantine, an aviator on the staff of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, while Ballantine, who didn't speak Japanese, inspected Japanese naval air stations over a two-month period. Before the pair visited an air station, they studied previous reports to see what information might have been omitted. Then, after the visit, they would compare the reports with what they had seen and update them accordingly. Ballantine was well liked by the Japanese naval aviators, and he reported that they were good pilots. As was proven later, such reports by experienced observers did not receive appropriate distribution. The aviators of the U.S. Navy had to learn in actual combat that the Japanese naval aviators were very good, as were their aircraft and weapons.[29]

To take advantage of the collection potential of officers visiting foreign countries, the following procedures prescribed in *Navy Regulations* were repeated in the *ONI Intelligence Manual* (ONI-19) in 1933:

> No officer of the Navy or of the Marine Corps shall proceed to a foreign country on special duty connected with the service except under orders proposed by the Bureau of Navigation or by the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps as the case may be. A copy of each such order shall immediately be filed in the Bureau of Navigation and in the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence shall in each case prepare a letter for the Secretary of the Navy's signature informing the Department of State of the intended visit and the general nature only of the duty on which the officer is to be sent, in order that the diplomatic representatives of the U.S. in the countries to be visited may be informed in regard thereto. The written official report made by such officer with respect to this mission shall be transmitted by him to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further reference and ultimate file.[30]

Navy Regulations also required that "the Naval Constructor shall examine all foreign ships and naval establishments he may be permitted to visit, and shall make detailed reports thereon to the Office of Naval Intelligence of all matters that may be of interest in his particular branch."[31]

In 1933, the sources available for collection of intelligence information for the Navy Department were considered to be personal observation and studies by naval attachés, intelligence officers of naval units, and individuals or unofficial agencies cooperating with ONI; intelligence furnished by the Army's Military Intelligence Division; intelligence furnished by other government departments, primarily State, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury (Coast Guard); foreign and U.S. Government documents; foreign and domestic professional periodicals; foreign and domestic press; foreign and domestic charts, maps, etc.; and merchant marine officers and personnel.[32]

In the mid-1930s, some of the principal sources for ONI's Far East (OP-16-B-11) were reports from Marine Corps intelligence officers stationed in China. Pertinent reports on Japanese-controlled islands in the Pacific were also submitted by overseas units of the Marine Corps.

The results of reconnaissance during cruises by units or squadrons of the Asiatic Fleet provided monograph data on China, Japanese ports, Russian Pacific ports, and other points of importance in the Far East. The Far East Desk requested extensive photo and hydrographic intelligence covering the approaches, harbors, beaches, and installations at Japanese Mandate Islands, such as Truk, Wotje, and the Palaus, from destroyer *Alden* (DD 211) during the ship's passage from the United States to Asiatic waters, and the resulting reports revealed an early grasp of the extent of intelligence information needed for amphibious operations.[33]

In 1936, the Japanese Combined Fleet anchored in Tokyo Bay, and hourly trips by launches were made around the fleet to permit the public to get a close look. The Naval Attaché, Tokyo, did not miss the opportunity to collect information on the Japanese navy and sent all his officers, singly, to make the launch trip. Cameras were not allowed, but a refreshment stand on the dock had packets of photo postcards of Japanese navy ships for sale to the public. A complete set, which included several ship pictures not previously held by the naval attaché, was purchased.[34]

A request was sent by the Western European Desk of ONI to light cruiser *Boise* (CL 47) to supplement monograph material during the ship's visit to Monrovia, Liberia, during the fall of 1938; a similar request was sent to light cruiser *Honolulu* (CL 48) to obtain information on the possible use of Madeira and the Azores for aviation purposes.[35]

Reports were also received from individual officers attached to other bureaus of the Navy Department. The reports indicated that the gathering of intelligence often depended upon the initiative and foresight of these officers. Awareness of the value of intelligence reports was also displayed by individual Americans traveling or residing in Japanese territories.[36]

As commander of a naval task force that visited Trinidad in 1938, RAdm. Walter S. Anderson drew up an intelligence report on Trinidad and its harbor and submitted it to ONI. Such reports were supposed to be made by officers of ships whenever the opportunity arose.[37]

In 1939, a secret CNO memo stated:

> A real undercover foreign intelligence service, equipped and able to carry on espionage and counter-espionage, does not exist. Compared with the organization and activities of foreign nations, this lack on the part of ONI is recognized as a distinct weakness. Naval Intelligence is spending nothing. The amount of intelligence received is in direct ratio to the amount of money made available, and spent. . . . The lack of a real undercover intelligence service, in the foreign field, is considered a serious defect that should be remedied.[38]

On 6 September 1939, the CNO ordered Commander Atlantic Squadron RAdm. Alfred W. Johnson (a former Director of Naval Intelligence) to set up a neutrality patrol for the Atlantic Ocean. The initial orders stated, "At earliest practicable date, establish combined air and ship outer patrol for observation approximately along the line east from Boston to latitude 42°30'N, longitude 65°W, thence south to latitude 19°N, then around eastward outline of Leeward and Windward Islands to Trinidad. Observe and report in code, movements of combatant vessels of nations in state of war."

The first major breach in "impartial" neutrality was made when the movements of German merchant ships were required to be reported and those of the Allied nations were not. In mid-December 1939, heavy cruiser *Tuscaloosa* (CA 37) and other ships trailed the German merchant vessel SS *Columbus* out of Vera Cruz and picked up survivors when the German ship was scuttled upon being intercepted by a British destroyer.[39]

A worldwide network for the surveillance of Japanese merchant ships was in effect in 1939. Included in the network was a coast-watcher service in China under the direction of the Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai. The worldwide collection effort was under the supervision of Cdr. Arthur H. McCollum, head of ONI's Far East Section.[40]

As Director of Naval Intelligence in 1940, RAdm. Walter Anderson was very much aware of the need for a secret intelligence service, especially in Mexico and South America. In December 1940, he hired Warren B. Phillips, an American businessman, to develop a covert intelligence collection organization. Phillips was authorized to establish an office in New York as a "representative of the DNI in matters relating to its Foreign Intelligence Service." Anderson felt it would be desirable for Phillips to be in close contact with Maj. F. D. Sharp, head of the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Division's New York office. Phillips learned that Sharp had office space and would be willing to have Phillips move in. On 11 December 1940, BGen. Sherman Miles, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, agreed to a request from Anderson to permit the arrangement.

By 6 February 1941, Phillips had two offices, one with Sharp at 1260 Sixth Avenue and the other at District Intelligence Office, 3rd Naval District (DIO-3ND). Phillips now had the position of Representative of the Special Intelligence Service of the Division of Naval Intelligence. Initially, Phillips believed that his tasks, like Sharp's, included interviewing persons newly arrived from foreign countries and that he and Sharp should coordinate their efforts to avoid overlapping. When Capt. Alan G. Kirk took over as Director of Naval Intelligence, however, he made it the responsibility of the DIO-3ND to perform the debriefing task, and Phillips was instructed to work "solely with special agents in the field."

Next, Phillips ran into problems from Cdr. W. Vincent Astor, USNR, who had been designated by President Roosevelt in June 1940 "to coordinate the intelligence work in the New York area." Astor learned that Phillips had been in touch with a former British intelligence operator in New York, that he was selecting agents to be sent abroad whom he had hired at what Astor considered exorbitant salaries ($4,000–$6,000 per year and $10 per day plus travel expenses), and that Phillips had entire charge of expenditures from the Navy's "Secret" fund of about $100,000. Astor felt that Phillips was indiscreet, unreliable, and a social climber. He so informed the commandant of the 3rd Naval District, RAdm. Adolphus Andrews, and then the President. Andrews took the problem to CNO Adm. Harold R. Stark, who on 20 May 1941 informed Andrews: "You should know that ONI, with approval of the Secretary and others, is attempting to create what we call here a Special Intelligence Service." Stark defended Phillips's loyalty, patriotism, and integrity

and concluded with the statement that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had determined to continue Phillips in the job. After the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI) (subsequently Office of Strategic Services [OSS]) was established in the summer of 1941 and the military services had decided that the new organization should take over undercover intelligence operations, Phillips and the thirteen agents he had recruited were reassigned to OCI on 15 October 1941.[41]

World War II

To expand foreign collection capabilities, naval observers, naval liaison officers, and consular shipping advisors were assigned to various foreign port cities and other focal points. Naval observers were similar to naval attachés but were stationed in selected locations for the performance of specific duties. They were not under cover, and they were accredited through the usual diplomatic channels.

Consular shipping advisors were stationed in countries that, for diplomatic, political, or other reasons, could not appropriately receive naval observers. Consular shipping advisors could be naval officers or civilians, but in accordance with an agreement between the Department of State and the Navy Department, they were required to be attached in a civilian capacity to the staffs of consulates. Consular shipping advisors were available to perform some of the duties outlined for naval observers but, to protect the position of their consulates, it was necessary that they come under the control of the senior foreign service officer at the post.[42]

The sources of intelligence information being exploited by ONI in 1941 were naval attachés; government departments (State, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, and Commerce); journals, newspapers, and other publications; observations and information obtained from naval units visiting foreign ports; specially appointed naval missions; naval observers stationed overseas; and overt and covert agents. In the Western Hemisphere, agents were used only on special occasions, the collection of intelligence at that time being primarily an FBI responsibility. Outside the Western Hemisphere agents were employed for covert activities, and, as previously mentioned, an office was operating in New York to maintain contact with private individuals and firms.[43]

Following the commencement of hostilities in December 1941, "target squads" in the continental United States began the collection and evaluation of enemy technological developments and personnel. These squads were organized by certain district intelligence offices to obtain information in the files of subdivisions of federal, state, and local government offices.[44]

A standard procedure was set up to interrogate Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers returning from areas about which information was either limited or inadequate.[45] Excellent intelligence information was also obtained from individuals in the United States who had been to or had lived in foreign countries of interest. The collection effort was also carried out by each district intelligence office, and the results were forwarded to ONI.[46]

In August 1942, two submarines carried Marine Corps Col. Evans F. Carlson, LtCol. James Roosevelt, and the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, a small raiding force, to Makin Island to harass the Japanese garrison and conduct reconnaissance. "Carlson's Raiders" returned to Pearl Harbor with many captured documents, including plans, charts, battle orders, and one top secret map that provided the air defense capabilities of all Japanese-held Pacific islands, the strength of the air forces on them, and the forces' radius of operations, methods of alert, types of aircraft, and operation plans for future emergencies. It was assumed that the Japanese would immediately change their plans, since they would know the plans had been compromised, but they did not do so until the Iwo Jima landings in 1945.[47]

In 1941, ONI had decided to establish the post of U.S. Naval Observer, Suez, to keep the Navy Department informed of happenings in that port and to act in a service capacity to American merchant ships discharging there. The Red Sea had been opened to American ships by a presidential Executive Order of 11 April 1941, and the first ship arrived at Suez on 4 July. Orders were issued on 8 October for a lieutenant (jg), U.S. Naval Reserve, and a second lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, to proceed to Suez. The naval officer arrived on 7 December.

The activities of the Suez office mainly involved compiling reports on current happenings of naval and military interest and rendering service to American merchant ships. After the establishment of the U.S. Naval Armed Guard on board merchant vessels, the naval observer was required to make salary payments to the Navy personnel.[48]

On 27 March 1942, the title of the Suez post was changed to U.S. Naval Liaison Office. All the intelligence that emanated from the office was obtained from the British authorities or with their assistance. Close contact was maintained with other U.S. naval activities in the Middle East. In that area, the Joint Intelligence Committee, Africa/Middle East (JICA/ME), acted as a clearinghouse and exercised authority over intelligence matters. Intelligence reports to ONI were sent via JICA/ME. At

least once a fortnight an officer carrying mail from Suez went by car to Cairo, 90 miles away. On those trips, visits were made to JICA/ME, the naval attaché office, and many other offices in Cairo, both American and British.[49]

On 14 April 1942, the destroyer *Roper* (DD 147) sank the German submarine *U-85* just north of Cape Hatteras. There were no survivors, but the recovery of the notebook of an engine room rating gave particulars on the submarine's construction, its operations, and the arrangement of the engineering spaces. During the salvage efforts, an officer from the Special Intelligence Section of ONI and a British officer temporarily assigned to the section noticed certain discharges from the hull that were one of the first clues to what was subsequently identified as the "submarine bubble target"; it was a device used by the Germans to confuse sonar operators by creating a turbulence to give a false submarine echo. Details of the device, learned while it was still in an experimental stage, were subsequently obtained through prisoner-of-war (POW) interrogations.[50]

On 16 June 1942, the ONI Special Intelligence Section (OP-16-Z) was designated as being responsible for the dissemination of information derived from examination and analysis of captured enemy naval equipment, as well as for the control and disposition of the equipment itself. On 25 June 1942, a directive establishing the procedure for processing such material was issued by the VCNO to the naval districts and forces afloat. Working relationships were developed with the technical bureaus of the Navy Department, the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Office of Economic Warfare. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the establishment of a centralized enemy equipment control organization, similar to that set up by the Navy, for the Army and the Navy. On that basis, a complete and rapid exchange of information between the services in the field of technical intelligence exploitation was effected.[51]

The Japanese repatriation transport *Asama Maru*, with North and South American diplomats and other repatriates from Japan, Hong Kong, Saigon, and Singapore, arrived in Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa on 23 July 1942 to exchange passengers with the Swedish liner *Gripsholm*, which brought Japanese repatriates from the United States.

Upon his arrival at Lourenco Marques, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, a repatriation passenger on *Asama Maru*, received a secret State Department message from the local American consul stating that one of the Chilean newsmen arriving on the ship who was to leave on the *Gripsholm* was known to be carrying a roll of 35mm film. The film had been given to him by the Japanese military and contained pictures of Japanese triumphs in Saigon, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. The pictures were to be used to illustrate Japanese propaganda stories in South America. The message further stated that the Navy Department had agreed that Cdr. Henri Smith-Hutton, the former Naval Attaché, Tokyo, who was also among those being repatriated, was to be directed to search for the Japanese film and bring it back to the United States. Smith-Hutton was authorized to select only one officer to help him. He suggested Marine Corps Maj. Gregon Williams, who had been Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai.

After the *Gripsholm* departed Lourenco Marques en route to Rio de Janeiro, the Chilean newsmen were identified and found to be occupying a stateroom well below decks. Their daily routine was observed, and plans were made for an undetected search of their room and luggage. Fortunately, it was hot below decks, and the newsmen spent most of their time topside and were seldom in their stateroom during the day. Smith-Hutton's wife was detailed to keep an eye on the men while her husband and Maj. Williams took turns searching and standing guard in the passageway. On the second attempt, Williams found the roll of film, and Smith-Hutton took it to the United States as directed.[52]

The North American Desk (OP-16-FN) was established in the Intelligence Branch of ONI on 20 March 1943 and was given cognizance over intelligence activities (as opposed to counterintelligence) within the continental United States and Alaska. Every naval district contained valuable information on foreign countries. Each district intelligence officer set up a Foreign Intelligence Section to coordinate the collection of all intelligence of value to naval operating forces.

In September 1943, work on a "Contact Register" was begun. A record of all sources of information was received from the naval districts and filed in OP-16-FN; each source was listed on an 8-by-10.5-inch form that showed his identification and gave data on area(s) and/or subject(s) of knowledgeability, with one copy filed by name and one or more by area, as appropriate.[53]

A group operating under VAdm. H. Kent Hewitt, Commander Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters (COMNAVNAW), had a specific mission in Italy: "to use investigative experience amplified by language background to obtain information of immediate technical and strategic importance which was not currently available through established sources."[54]

Two teams of naval intelligence officers landed near Gela in Sicily with advance Army combat troops on 10 July 1943. They moved west along the

coast, surveying the ports of Gela and Porto Empedocle. At Agrigento, they located the Italian naval headquarters building. The find was reported to the commander of the Advanced Bases Group at Licata. The senior naval intelligence officer urged that a thorough search of the Italian naval headquarters building be made. Permission was granted to send out a reconnaissance party, but the group was instructed to open up the port of Porto Empedocle first.

The reconnaissance party, consisting of LCdr. S.A.D. Hunter and Lts.(jg) George G. Brownell and Paul Alfieri, finally reached their objective. They found the headquarters to be the nerve center for the entire southern coast of Sicily. The quantity of classified documents, both in cabinets and desks, was tremendous. It took two days and three nights to screen the material. Three safes, when finally opened, contained safe routes through Italian minefields for various ports and the Straits of Messina, secret code books, recognition signals, and demolition plans for ports and cities, including Porto Empedocle, Messina, and Palermo.

After the group's efforts to get transportation for the mass of material were unsuccessful, they carried it on foot in several trips to Porto Empedocle, a distance of about 4 miles. Although the commander of the Advance Bases Group still didn't recognize the importance of the documents, he arranged to have those considered by others to be most important put aboard the amphibious force flagship *Biscayne* (AGC 18), lying off Gela. The chief of staff of the task force commander, RAdm. Richard L. Conolly, was so impressed by the sampling of documents that he ordered a destroyer into Licata to pick up the rest and take the material to VAdm. Hewitt at Algiers. Instead, however, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean (CINCMED) Adm. Cunningham, RN, had the destroyer put in at Malta. From there, the documents were flown to London for processing by the British Admiralty.

Fortunately, some of the material of immediate importance to the U.S. Army had been delivered directly to Gen. George S. Patton's advance intelligence officer. He was quick to realize its value and had the documents translated, duplicated, and distributed to U.S. Seventh Army and British Eighth Army units.[55]

A considerable number of German naval documents were also captured by U.S. Navy intelligence officers at the headquarters of the Third *Schnellboots* Flotilla at Porto Empedocle and Agrigento, Sicily, between 10 and 14 July 1943. The documents formed part of a collection of German and Italian papers that was taken directly to Malta aboard a U.S. warship on orders of CINCMED. Some materials were returned to U.S. naval authorities and were used as the basis for reports by COMNAVNAW on S-boat (from the German word for "fast boat," or motor torpedo boat) characteristics, organization, operations, personnel, discipline, lack of Nazi indoctrination, tactics under air attack, etc.[56]

The German submarine *U-505* was captured by the destroyer escort *Pillsbury* (DE 133) on 4 June 1944 with the help of *Chatelain* (DE 149) and aircraft from the escort carrier *Guadalcanal* (CVE 60). Coming on the eve of OVERLORD (the invasion of mainland Europe through Normandy), the capture of the *U-505*, which had everything from acoustic torpedoes to the most secret German code books and tactical publications aboard, proved one of the war's major windfalls for Allied intelligence. Fortunately, the capture did not cause the Germans to change their codes at that critical time.[57]

The increased number of sunken Japanese ships made it desirable to equip teams for light salvage work and diving. One of the most successful hauls from a sunken ship was made by a Seventh Fleet team exploiting the Japanese heavy cruiser *Nachi*, which had been sunk in Manila Bay by Third Fleet carrier aircraft in November 1944. Carrier pilots, Philippine guerrillas, and Japanese prisoners who saw the vessel go down furnished rough fixes on the *Nachi*'s position, which was finally located by echo ranging in 93 feet of water. Many hydrographic charts found aboard the ship carried annotated locations of minefields and defenses. There were also secret plots, diaries, ship's logs, blueprints, technical documents, and volumes on Japanese doctrine and tactics. Most important among the captured papers were fleet operation plans and orders dating back to before Pearl Harbor.

Intelligence centers commenced early in the war to organize teams to follow up all landings and important operations. The teams normally included specialists in naval and aviation material, bomb and mine disposal, and the appropriate languages. The invasion of Saipan alone produced 27 tons of Japanese documents, and the Crash Intelligence Section of the Saipan intelligence exploitation team found 23 Zeke fighters, most of them in flyable condition, as well as 30 aircraft engines and 300 boxes of spare parts.[58]

During the first six months of 1944, approximately 130 large cases of Japanese documents were received by ONI from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA). In addition, documents were received by OP-16-FE (Far East) from other sources, such as the Naval Research Laboratory, the Hydrographic Office, and the Air Intelligence Group (OP-16-V), for translation from Japanese into English. The documents were from areas such as the Marshalls, Gilberts, Kiska, and Guadalcanal and included blue-

prints of Japanese equipment such as the latest airplanes, carburetors, and radars; also examined were Japanese charts, ship logs, war diaries, field manuals, and a code book.

The backlog of untranslated material accumulated so rapidly that, in May 1944, approximately twenty recently arrived graduates of the Navy School of Oriental Languages were brought into ONI's Washington offices on temporary duty to work solely on the accumulated documents.[59]

In September 1944, thirty additional language officers, mostly WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service), were assigned permanently to the OP-16-FE translation unit. By February 1945, eighty-one officers (including WAVES), nine enlisted personnel, and five civilians were assigned to processing, translating, evaluating, and disseminating captured Japanese documents. Even these personnel were insufficient in number to handle the task.[60]

A directive issued by ONI on 23 June 1945 advised of the establishment of the Captured German Document Center, run by the Army, and assigned eight officers, nine yeomen, one civilian analyst, and two clerk-stenographers to help process the sudden influx of large quantities of German documents taken prior to the official German surrender on 8 May 1945. The processing of documents by the center included receiving, recording, summarizing, indexing, and disseminating. The index proved to be a valuable aid to the Bureaus of Ships, Ordnance, and Aeronautics and to the Hydrographic Office, as well as to various other groups and agencies interested in research and historical projects.[61]

Representatives of the Navy and War Departments, the British War Office, the Australian and Canadian armies, and the various Pacific theaters of operation attended the Japanese Document Conference held from 28 December 1944 to 15 January 1945. This group proposed that the Washington Document Center (WDC), although a joint-service section, be placed under the Director of Naval Intelligence, who would be "solely responsible for its operation." Upon official approval of the plan, the Director of Naval Intelligence established the WDC (OP-16-WDC) by his letter OP-16-Z serial 197916 of 14 February 1945. The WDC was located at the Steuart Building at Fifth and K Streets, NW, Washington, D.C.

The mission of the Washington Document Center was to serve as a central agency for the handling of captured Japanese documents. Its duties were to receive from theater document sections all Japanese documents of intelligence value after theater exploitation, to pre-scan and sort documents by general subject categories, to assign documents to Army and Navy translation agencies, to maintain the minimum records necessary for efficient and expeditious receipt and distribution, and to maintain close working liaison with the Pacific Military Research Section (PACMIRS) and the Far East Section of ONI.

On 29 August 1945, a second Japanese Document Conference was convened at which the representatives proposed that the translation sections of PACMIRS and ONI's Far East Section be consolidated with the Washington Document Center and that an advance echelon of WDC be established in Japan. A library of seized Japanese documents was to be established at the WDC. The first component of the advance echelon arrived in Japan in November 1945, composed of Army and Navy specialists "trained and briefed in current Washington interests to insure high quality of documents to be evacuated." During the period 4 March 1945 to 21 October 1945, the WDC received, processed, and disseminated 146,324 Japanese documents ranging from calling cards to encyclopedia sets.[62]

In the postwar ONI plan of October 1945, the North American Desk, with its files, functions, and personnel, was taken out of the Foreign Branch and shifted to the Domestic Branch as OP-23D3, the Contact Register. Arrangements were completed whereby the officer detail sections of the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) would advise OP-23D3 of the names of all naval officers applying for permission to travel abroad (in accordance with *BUPERS Manual*, Article H-1804) so that they could be contacted and briefed about needed information.[63]

The clearing of approaches to landing beaches was the primary function of underwater demolition teams (UDT). Beginning in 1943 in World War II, beach reconnaissance prior to the execution of amphibious landings was a secondary function of great importance to the success of the subsequent landings. UDT observations afforded the best means of substantiating or disproving prior intelligence on an area, as well as providing new information to be used in charts by the attacking forces.

In the European theater, where it was essential not to disclose in advance the location of prospective landing beaches, the demolition phases of operations coincided closely with the first assault waves. In the Pacific theater, however, demolition and extensive reconnaissance could be, and was, conducted up to seven days before a landing, there being little chance for the enemy to move in reserves from other islands or areas to reinforce threatened objectives.

Each UDT was briefed on conditions to be expected at the landing area, based on pre-assault information that was often sketchy and inadequate. An initial reconnaissance was usually necessary to determine the presence of mines, obstructions, and

natural breaks in the offshore reefs before demolition work could begin. Each UDT or reconnaissance unit was debriefed as soon as possible upon return to its ship to record conditions it had observed. These included the surf at the beach, the depth of the water where the surf broke, the distance from the beach where the surf broke, the set and speed of the observed currents, the extent and type of obstacles to be found in the approaches to the beach, the gradient (slope) of the beach out to the 3-fathom line, the location of any antiboat mines, and the extent and type of any obstacles found on the beaches. An estimate was made of the team's ability to clear the approaches to the beach, and to neutralize any defensive positions that had been observed. A master chart of all beaches, incorporating the above information, was produced and provided to landing force commanders.[64]

The U.S. Navy, as part of its Atlantic antisubmarine warfare effort, established radio direction finder (D/F) stations at Amagansett, Long Island; Bahia and Belem, Brazil; Curacao, Dutch West Indies; Dupont, South Carolina; Cape Farewell, Greenland; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Jan Mayen Island; Jupiter, Florida; Poyners' Hill, North Carolina; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Toro Point, Canal Zone; Trinidad; and Winter Harbor, Maine. The British and Canadians also had D/F stations on the shores of the Atlantic. All of these stations were grouped into nets; each net possessed its own internal communications system with external radio links from the net control station to the main plotting centers in London, Ottawa, and Washington. All stations were able to tune immediately to any enemy submarine transmission heard by any other station. Tip-offs on enemy transmissions were also received by Navy ships that had radio D/F equipment. The main plotting center in Washington plotted bearings on each enemy submarine transmission from all receiving stations and would send a fix to the hunter-killer groups at sea.[65]

The Cold War Era

In 1949, a *Naval Intelligence Requirements-Periodic Summary* (NIRPS) was first published by ONI to furnish a secret, comprehensive, and detailed statement of the information required for the production of intelligence necessary to fulfill the "Primary Intelligence Objectives" of the Navy.[66] It was to be revised periodically; the first change was issued on 11 June 1952 as ONI Instruction 003820.21, Change 1.

To improve Navy intelligence on Soviet undersea warfare, it was proposed in early 1950 to strengthen field collection agencies in countries contiguous to the USSR that offered good "listening post" prospects; expand activities concerned with the interrogation of returning POWs and defectors, including provision for additional naval interrogators; give more guidance to naval attachés on undersea warfare (USW) intelligence requirements; furnish the Office of Special Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with precise collection requirements pertaining to USW intelligence; increase merchant ship and commercial aircraft reporting on submarines and mines; increase the flow of Russian periodicals and documents; and train additional Russian linguists and employ more effectively those who had received language training at the Naval Academy and at the Naval Intelligence School.

As a follow-up to its presentation to the Low Board (headed by RAdm. Francis S. Low), ONI canceled its previous collection guidance on information required on foreign submarines (Chief of Naval Intelligence letter, serial 00234P32 of 30 September 1948) and issued Naval Intelligence Requirements Memorandum No. 13, *Submarine Warfare Intelligence*, which listed those items that ONI considered to be the most important to collect on foreign submarines, their ability to conduct combat operations and their vulnerability to countermeasures.

The collection of intelligence information by merchant ships was handled in 1950 by selected merchant marine personnel who were briefed prior to departure from U.S. ports by district intelligence officers and other interested agencies. When additional requirements or guidance developed after their departures, further briefings were given by naval attachés, if possible. After ports of interest were visited, merchant marine personnel were debriefed by naval attachés or observers at their next port of call or at the earliest opportunity. Upon their return to the United States, further debriefing was accomplished by district intelligence officers and any other agencies that had participated in the predeparture briefings. Liaison with the home offices of the owners of the merchant ships was maintained by the district intelligence offices.[67]

Special collection organizations that were active during the Korean War included the Field Research Unit, Far East Command, which operated covert collection agencies covering all phases of enemy activity; the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity in Korea, which coordinated all unconventional warfare operations in the Korean theater; and Task Force Kirkland, a guerrilla agent unit operating on the east coast of the Korean peninsula from the bomb-line to Wonsan. By 1952, however, the concentrated efforts of the North Koreans to tighten their security considerably reduced the effectiveness of friendly agents, and photo reconnais-

porting, and provided general intelligence of interest to individual ships or units.

To assist fleet collection managers in identifying the high priority collection requirements applicable to specific COLOPs, the Naval Intelligence Command started a Requirements Advisory Program during fiscal year 1973 whereby the requirements applicable to each COLOP target could be identified relative to collection resources and priorities. The advisories varied in length from a single page to thirty or forty pages and covered a wide variety of subjects from port visits to major Soviet fleet exercises.

A six-month test of a Navy concept to expedite the feedback of evaluations to collectors was completed in February 1973. The value of using the new message evaluation format over the old Department of Defense evaluation form, which was sent by mail, was proven. In addition to providing timely advice and evaluation to collectors, the message format expedited cancellation of satisfied collection requirements, thus permitting earlier redirection of collection resources to other collection requirements. Based on the results of the test, the Defense Intelligence Agency took steps to modify *DIA Manual 58-2* accordingly.[97]

Collaboration with other navies in the collection of information continued during fiscal year 1973. The Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC) at Suitland, Maryland, and the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center (FOSIC) at Norfolk, Virginia, received ship location data and other reconnaissance information. In the Pacific, the FOSIC at Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet headquarters in Oahu, Hawaii, received HF/DF information.[98]

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Naval Attaché, Stockholm

The naval attaché office at Stockholm was established during August 1917, with LtCol. Breckinridge in charge. Almost the first work of the office was to attempt to change public opinion in favor of the Allies. Breckinridge found that American movie pictures were better and more popular with the Swedish public than German films. By allowing films to come into the country under control of the naval attaché, the films were shown only in theaters where a contract had been signed stipulating that German films were not to be shown and requiring American and Allied educational and propaganda films to be shown twice a day. As a result, German films were excluded from most of the theaters. With the assistance of Liberal and Socialist leaders in the Swedish government and of certain strong financial groups whose interests lay with the Entente powers, a news bureau was formed to take over the distribution of Allied and world news to the Swedish press. Breckinridge reported:

> Thus, we finally, after many months of work, in the face of hostile public opinion and of an organized press campaign against the scheme, took from the hands of the German-controlled bureau the distribution of our own news. The result was that all American and Allied news reached the press and a certain kind of Central Power and Russian news which had hitherto been suppressed because it was not in the interests of the Central Powers to have it published was also given to the press of Sweden.[30]

Advantage was taken of visits to Germany by Swedish businessmen and by officers of the Swedish army and navy to obtain information. Information was also obtained from Germans visiting Sweden, from Swedish and German sailors from vessels trading with Germany, and from German deserters.

Movements of German war vessels through the Kattegat were learned about by a system of coast watchers established along the western coast of Sweden. Considerable information on Germany was also secured from Swedish government officials with whom the naval attaché's office had formed a close relationship.

Information on Russia, Finland, and the Baltic provinces was secured from Allied and neutral representatives and others coming out of those countries, as well as from agents sent there. Information about Sweden was largely secured from official sources. In addition to the agents employed exclusively by the attaché's office, other agents were employed jointly with the U.S. military attaché and with the British and French attachés. Working with the British, the U.S. attaché's office set up an office in Finland to get information across the border from Moscow.[31]

Naval Attaché, The Hague

The Naval Attaché, The Hague, during World War I was Lt.(jg) Eugene D. McCormick. He secured his information about the German navy from German naval deserters, refugees, neutral travelers, and workers in enemy countries and obtained news from agents with lines of communications into enemy territory, along the Dutch coast, and along the Dutch-German and the Dutch-Belgian frontiers.

The German intelligence service took all possible steps to prevent the U.S. naval attaché in The Hague from gaining access to German deserters and attempted to involve the naval attaché's office in trouble with the Dutch police authorities on account of its activities. As a rule, it was found that deserters who had just crossed the frontier gave accurate information but that, after a few weeks in Holland, their information became unreliable.

Some of the best information came from Belgian refugees who had been at work on dredges in Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, Knocke, and Ostend or had been involved in constructing gun platforms, coastal railways, aviation fields, and other installations of military value. Getting naval information from Dutch commercial travelers who had been in Germany for business purposes met with little success; they were usually either pro-German or else afraid of being convicted in Germany for espionage.

McCormick's office in The Hague was not successful in establishing a permanent line of communication into enemy country. U.S. agents established along frontiers were able to obtain information about the movements of German ships going in or out of Zeebrugge Harbor and on the Ems River. They obtained a number of German deserters and interviewed travelers going to and from Germany.

The counterespionage efforts directed by McCormick were carried out by two groups of agents, the head of each reporting directly to the naval attaché. The agent groups attempted to keep enemy agents off ships plying between America and Holland, tried to prevent smuggling on those ships, investigated suspects, and confiscated German propaganda material.[32]

McCormick's office at The Hague also handled agent reports from Ostend about German ships, searchlights, and gun emplacements, and made extracts from the German press. One report stated that the Netherlands was full of unreliable Belgian agents who were more bother than the German agents.[33]

Naval Attaché, Madrid

The office of Naval Attaché, Madrid, was reopened 26 May 1917 with Capt. Benton C. Decker as naval attaché. To begin the intelligence work in Spain, a general call was sent out through all the U.S. consulates in Spain requesting Americans in Spain with a knowledge of the Spanish language and character to communicate with the naval attaché. The majority of the American agents in Spain were obtained as a result of this request.

Capt. Decker was advised that his principal duty would be to prevent enemy agents from embarking secretly for America and that U.S. agents should only be of sufficient number to accomplish the desired results. A complete surveillance of the Spanish coast was not deemed necessary.

The cooperation among the Allied representatives in Spain was excellent. In April 1918, the first combined meeting of the naval attachés from Allied countries was held in the office of then-RAdm. Decker, who was still serving as Naval Attaché, Madrid. Afterwards, the conferences were regular weekly affairs.

In May 1918, RAdm. Decker was relieved by Capt. Walter S. Crosley. Crosley endeavored to obtain more money for extending the work of his office but was unable to do so.

The conditions in Spain were not strictly neutral. There were good grounds for believing that German refugees and crews from interned vessels were being used for war purposes. Spanish officials were believed to be working for the Germans and against the Allies. Propaganda against the Allies was permitted, but Allied propaganda was restricted. Signal stations on Spanish territory were used to communicate with German submarines at sea; there were frequent communications by boat between Spanish territory and German submarines; and Allied ships had been torpedoed in Spanish territorial waters. The U.S. naval attaché was constantly trying to obtain data to enable Allied forces to capture enemy submarines and to prove that Germany and Austria were violating the neutrality of Spain.[34]

Naval Attaché, Lisbon

The Naval Attaché, Lisbon, during the latter part of World War I was LCdr. Edward Breck, USNRF, of Spanish-American War fame. Breck devised a scheme whereby the Portuguese government itself took over the task of watching the frontiers. Two agents of the Portuguese Preventive Police were assigned to the office of the naval attaché, placing Breck in the position of a police commissioner with the power to arrest anyone.

In addition to the regular work of the office at Lisbon, the naval attaché had to arrange for the repairs of the smaller types of Allied warships at facilities in the area as well as for the payment of repairs through the force commander in London. All arrangements for docking, provisioning, patrolling, unloading, and storing ammunition were made by Breck.[35]

Naval Attaché, London

When the United States entered World War I, Capt. William D. MacDougall was Naval Attaché, London. On 9 April 1917, RAdm. William Sims, with his aide, Cdr. John V. Babcock, arrived in England as a representative of the U.S. Navy. Sims's mission was to study the naval situation and learn how the U.S. Navy could best and most quickly cooperate in the naval war. The naval attaché and his two assistants served as Sims's staff until August. After Sims was designated Commander U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, he relieved Capt. MacDougall, taking over the duties of naval attaché in addition to his other duties. Cdr. Babcock became the head of the Intelligence Section of the European force commander's headquarters.[36]

Retrenchment Post–World War I

At the conclusion of hostilities many wartime attaché posts were discontinued or consolidated. By 1921, the office in Copenhagen was again responsible for all Scandinavia, a good area from which to observe the new Communist regime in Russia. By 1925, the naval attaché in Berlin was also accredited to the Scandinavian countries.[37]

The method of obtaining information in foreign countries was principally through the exchange of information of equal importance. The acquisition of information by any questionable method was strictly frowned upon. It was ONI's policy that naval attachés should use only reputable business methods and that they were to avoid anything savoring of "gumshoe" techniques in their collection of information. One of the difficulties in finding suitable officers to serve as naval attachés had been that maintenance allowances were ridiculously small, and officers who volunteered for the duty did so with the full knowledge that their pay and allowance would not be sufficient to meet their expenses. Seldom was a naval attaché able to live on his pay and satisfactorily perform the duties expected of him, which led to the deduction that only officers with private means could afford to take the position. Therefore, the pay situation created automatic prejudice and a gratuitous assumption that the position of naval attaché was something of a sinecure.[38]

RAdm. Roger Welles, Jr., Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I, also found great difficulty in selecting officers for the duty of naval attaché:

> The mere fact that an officer knew a foreign language was not positive proof that he would make a good attaché. . . . He should be a man with a keen imagination, able to draw correct conclusions from very scanty evidence, courteous in manner, a man of the world (but not too worldly) and, in general, with sufficient intelligence to be a good mixer in all classes of society.[39]

The prospective attachés, Welles believed, should not only study foreign languages, but also diplomacy, international law, the constitutional law of the countries to which they were assigned, the foreign policy of the countries, and modern international relations in general.

As the likelihood dimmed for a responsible government emerging in Russia that the United States would approve and recognize, the need for assigning an attaché there lessened. Ambassador Francis left for health reasons in November 1918, and the other members of the legation and the American military forces in northern Russia departed a year later. RAdm. McCully departed in November 1919 and reported for duty with Allied forces operating in the Black Sea and southern Russia. There, at the request of the State Department, he engaged in various kinds of intelligence work and, on several occasions, traveled inland to observe conditions firsthand.[40] But since the United States did not recognize any Russian government at that time, McCully was not accredited or given the privileges or title of naval attaché.[41]

In 1920, naval attachés were maintained at London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, The Hague, Copenhagen, Tokyo, Peking, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, Chile. There were also assistant naval attachés at London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo. The naval attaché at Copenhagen was also accredited to Norway and Sweden. A naval officer was stationed in Berlin as an unofficial advisor to the U.S. Commissioner of Control, who oversaw U.S. interests during the occupation of Germany by the victorious Allied forces. In addition to naval data, the naval officers furnished information concerning political changes, social disturbances, and conditions in the former Central Powers countries.[42]

There was no limitation on freedom of movement by U.S. naval attachés in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. Any non-Japanese person entering "fortified zones," such as the areas around Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo, was quickly spotted by the police, however, and followed while in that area. Photographing and sketching were forbidden, and the Japanese police were firm but courteous in their enforcement of the constraints.

ONI guidance to the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, was in the form of requesting reports that were as complete as possible on specific subjects, usually subjects mentioned in previous reports. The requests were usually contained in personal letters from the head of the ONI Far East Section. Personal letters were exchanged frequently and conveyed ONI's feelings about the work the attaché was doing.

In Tokyo, it was known that any information on the Japanese Mandated Islands was of great interest and importance, so every scrap of relevant information obtainable from any source was sent to ONI. Unfortunately, the few Japanese who could be contacted and had ever been to the former German-controlled islands were simple merchants who had made no unique observations, and they added little to the information on hand. Efforts to arrange for ship visits or to get visas to go to the Mandates were unsuccessful.[43]

In April 1921, the American ambassador to Poland wrote to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes about the excellent opportunities for securing information about the Soviet Union at his post because Polish missions would soon be going into Russia. Soviet delegations were also arriving in Poland, and trade posts were being established along the frontier. The U.S. Embassy in Poland also recommended LCdr. Hugh W. Koehler because of his experience in Russian affairs and his fluency in the language. Koehler had assisted Adm. McCully for over a year in the Crimea in 1919–1920 and had traveled in disguise "all through the Ukraine." LCdr. Koehler was appointed to the naval attaché post at Warsaw on 25 May 1921.

A further discussion in connection with Koehler's assignment was whether he would be given a roving commission as naval observer in the newly established Baltic republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The State Department questioned the advisability of the roving commission, believing that the U.S. commissioner for the area and the consuls in Latvia and Estonia covered it adequately. Any of Koehler's activities in Lithuania, the State Department felt, should be coordinated with the commissioner. It seems likely that, in the end, Koehler received some sort of permission to operate at will in the three countries, although there are no formal letters of appointment to give specific dates. Koehler completed his tour in July 1922.[44]

In the years after World War I, the number of attachés assigned to foreign countries was never great; at times they numbered only eight or ten. It was difficult to keep even that small number in the

field. For example, in 1922 the naval attaché in Warsaw was paid with Department of State funds and was, for all intents and purposes, an officer of that department. A similar situation happened at Havana in 1923. In some cases, the practice of early ONI days was resorted to, and an attaché would be assigned to more than one post. The attaché accredited to Paris in 1923 also was accredited to Madrid and Lisbon; the naval attaché at Berlin covered Copenhagen and Oslo.[45]

In 1922, Capt. Edward H. Watson, Naval Attaché, Tokyo, received publicity concerning his return to the United States as the result of an entrapment effort by a Japanese naval officer who tried to sell him secret Japanese publications. Watson had also clandestinely inspected Japanese naval ports, according to the Japanese press.[46]

In early 1923, Naval Attaché, Berlin, Cdr. William F. Halsey, Jr., wrote to Robert Murphy, Vice Consul, Munich, that he had picked up rumors that Bavarian factories were turning out diesel engines especially designed for Japanese submarines in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Murphy was able to confirm the rumors.[47]

While serving in Berlin, Halsey was also responsible for obtaining a newly invented stereoscopic range finder and for sending it back to the United States, where it was tried out by the Navy and adopted to take the place of the coincidence range finder then in use in both the British and U.S. navies.[48]

From 1926 through 1928, naval attachés were located in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, The Hague, Tokyo, Peking, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Mexico City. The latter post was established in 1926.[49]

The Naval Attaché System in the 1930s

In the 1930s, under standard procedures, a naval attaché was ordered to report to the American ambassador or minister in the country to which he was accredited and to consider the State Department official to be his superior officer. The attaché was, by courtesy, a member of the diplomatic corps but was not a diplomat. He was the direct representative of the Navy Department and an official agent for gathering information. The attaché forwarded his reports directly to ONI but was expected to keep the ambassador or minister informed as to their content, except for contents of reports of a purely technical nature. The attaché had a dual responsibility, first to the Navy and secondly to the ambassador or minister. His role was a delicate one, requiring tact and judgment. The Navy Department laid down the principle that a fleet commander in chief on his own station could not issue an order to a naval attaché.

After an officer had been selected for assignment to duty as an attaché, it was the practice to order him to Washington for temporary duty in ONI for the purpose of having him review the intelligence reports on the country to which he was accredited. The prospective naval attaché also visited the technical bureaus of the Navy Department to see if they had any information that would be of value to him or if the bureaus desired any particular information from the country to which he was going. The naval attaché was also a special disbursing officer, and during his briefing period he was given instruction in keeping his accounts. When there was a change of attachés, it was normal practice to have the officer report at his post two to four weeks before taking over the duties of the office so that he could be thoroughly instructed by the officer to be relieved. The officer being relieved was usually ordered to duty in ONI so that he could review and update all of his reports.[50]

Commencing in 1930, a naval attaché for air was attachéd to a foreign legation when a separate air ministry had been established in the country to which he was accredited. Usually, the one officer would perform the dual roles of naval attaché and naval attaché for air.

On 11 March 1931, all naval attachés were especially instructed by a Director of Naval Intelligence letter to collect special items of intelligence. These included information on U.S. overseas commercial interests, the overseas commercial interests of foreign countries, combat intelligence material, data for limitations-of-armament studies and congressional hearings, and advances in technical naval science in foreign countries.[51]

The naval attachés at Santo Domingo and Mexico City were withdrawn on 24 July 1931 and 1 January 1932, respectively.[52] The naval attachés at Rio de Janeiro, Tegucigalpa, and The Hague were withdrawn on 21 December 1932, 31 May 1933, and 30 June 1933 respectively, and on the latter date the Naval Attaché, Berlin, was additionally accredited to The Hague. Establishment of the Naval Mission to Brazil on 15 November 1932 was the reason for the decision that the naval attaché could be withdrawn there. Naval Missions in Latin America came under ONI's OP-16-FL until January 1942, when they were transferred to the Pan-American Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), OP-17.[53]

The office of Naval Attaché, Brussels, was established on 21 August 1933, and LCdr. John Gade (former Naval Attaché, Copenhagen, during World War I) was detailed to the station with the express understanding that the U.S. Government was to be subjected to no expense incidental to his office. The Com-

munications Division of OPNAV, however, did allot $150 to cover the cost of his official communications.[54]

The Navy Department made available to the naval attaché at Tokyo a "maintenance allowance" of $300 per month. The assistant naval attaché similarly received $200 per month. The allowances were provided for entertaining and bettering the acquaintance of officials and other knowledgeable sources. The funds permitted the attachés to widen their circle of friends and contacts and thus to improve the reporting capabilities of their office.

Great attention was paid to newspapers, magazines, and all official publications issued by the Japanese navy department and government. One valuable member of the attaché's staff was a retired chief yeoman, Leonard Wagner, who had been in the office since 1920. He had become an expert on the Japanese budget, among other things, and each year he prepared a detailed breakdown of the naval budget as it appeared in the Japanese *Official Gazette*, a publication that corresponded to the U.S. *Congressional Record*.[55]

When the U.S. Navy sustained a 15 percent pay cut in 1933, the Naval Attaché, Tokyo's maintenance allowance was cut about 25 percent to $225 per month, and the assistant naval attaché's allowance was cut to $150.[56]

Special collection instructions were seldom received from ONI, but the assistant naval attaché at Tokyo frequently exchanged letters with the officers of the Far East Section of ONI, particularly with Lt. Arthur H. McCollum. While the letters were not the same as official word from the Director of Naval Intelligence, they did provide helpful guidance, and there was no feeling of working in the dark on the part of the staff in Tokyo.[57]

The naval attaché office in Japan concluded that about 95 percent of the information it sought was readily available in open sources if one knew where to look and could read Japanese; only 5 percent was secret and obtainable only with luck or by clandestine means. The Japanese were justifiably proud of their merchant marine and published excellent pictures in maritime magazines whenever a new ship went into service. The photographs proved valuable in World War II for use by U.S. Navy submarines in identifying the ships that they attacked.

The naval attaché's office in Tokyo in 1933–1934 had an allowance of $300 per year to pay for information obtained through informants, but the fund was seldom touched.

Japanese police made each naval attaché pass a test within a few months after arrival in Japan. A phone call would be made by an anonymous caller requesting an appointment. When met by the attaché, the "informant" offered to sell plans for a naval base or proposed that he be hired as an undercover agent. It became part of the turnover routine to warn one's relief that such an approach would be made and to decline it.[58]

U.S. naval attachés were required to conduct themselves in a spirit of entire frankness and to be careful to show willingness to observe all the local rules regarding forbidden zones and police regulations. Every government knew that the naval attaché was detailed to get information concerning the local naval establishment and recognized that the attaché was entitled to take every legitimate means to procure that information. It was held that resorting to dubious methods would not bring results that could compensate for the loss of prestige in the eyes of foreign officials. The Navy Department directed that a naval attaché in the performance of his duties would employ "only such means as are consonant with his official position and the diplomatic relations that he bears to the government which receives him as naval attaché."[59]

The tasks of the naval attaché were stated in ONI's official manual in 1933 to be:

> In time of peace, to collect information on the naval strength and power for waging war of the country to which he was accredited and to cooperate with other U.S. Goverrnment agencies in the collection of information.
>
> In time of war, to collect information on the composition of enemy naval forces, their movements, and probable intentions; to cooperate with other government agencies in the collection of war information; to cooperate with the Chief of Mission in the performance of his duties; to evaluate and supply the Navy Department, and other governmental agencies concerned, with the information collected.[60]

The same manual indicated that the standard sources and methods available to naval attachés for collecting information were

> the host country navy department and air service; visits to ships, dockyards, and other host government establishments; associations with naval and military officers; visits to industrial establishments; associations with industrialists and other civilians; and the press correspondents, press clipping bureaus, and U.S. foreign service and commercial officers.[61]

A Joint Senate House Naval Affairs Committee indicated in one of its reports in early 1934 that maintenance allowances for naval attachés should be cut in half. Capt. Walter S. Anderson explained to the naval committee that this change would make it possible for only rich officers or men with rich wives to take jobs as naval attachés. The funds were restored.[62]

The office of naval attaché in Santiago, Chile, was closed on 30 June 1934 and the assistant naval attaché for air in Rome was ordered home without relief because of lack of funds.[63] Naval Attaché, Rome, was additionally accredited as naval attaché for air, and within a few years all naval attachés were accredited as naval attaché and naval attaché for air in order to facilitate their contacts with foreign air arms.[64]

The assistant naval attaché at Paris and his counterpart at Rome served during Fiscal Year 1934 without maintenance allowances for the extraordinary expenses incidental to their official positions.[65]

When the United States established diplomatic relations with the USSR and sent an initial embassy staff to Moscow in March 1934, Capt. David R. Nimmer, USMC, accompanied the group as the assistant naval attaché. Capt. Nimmer had previously been a Russian language student in Harbin, Manchuria, just prior to the time that Japan established the Kingdom of Manchukuo. A Navy captain was supposed to have had the attaché post, but he turned down the assignment at the last minute out of a desire to obtain command experience at sea. Consequently, a Marine officer gained the distinction of being the first U.S. naval attaché officially accredited to the USSR.

According to Nimmer, there was no one in ONI in 1934 who was interested in Soviet naval affairs per se. The original staffing plan for the naval attaché's office included three officer attachés, plus a dentist, surgeon, and paymaster, and twenty-nine enlisted men to support them and perform general Embassy duties as guards, messengers, chauffeurs, pharmacists, and electricians. In actuality, Capt. Nimmer and two Navy and six Marine enlisted men arrived in the Soviet Union on 7 March, and no more Navy or Marine personnel were assigned at that time.[66]

The specific information that ONI had instructed Nimmer to attempt to obtain included particulars on aircraft armament, cannon, and projectiles larger than .50-caliber; data on gunsights for flexible aircraft machine guns; methods of mounting bombs and torpedoes on large seaplanes; and chemical notes on diesel fuels. Nimmer's letter of 31 October 1934 to ONI attests to his lack of success in fulfilling the requests:

> Both the Chancery and the Consulate General, as well as the military and naval attachés, are experiencing the greatest difficulties in obtaining replies to communications, or unevasive answers to verbal queries. This conduct on the part of the Russians is not confined solely to dealings with Americans, but all diplomatic missions seem to be having like troubles.[67]

The difficulties that Capt. Nimmer had encountered in obtaining meaningful and useful information from the Soviet government, especially concerning publications and requests for specific information, were summed up in a letter to ONI written toward the end of his tour on 14 December 1934:

> As to the difficulties with the Russians, their fanatical secretiveness over the most trivial matter and their abject terror to make decisions without first referring, through the chain of command, the business in hand to the Minister of Defense [Voroshilov], makes the complete accomplishment of any single piece of business a major and generally unsuccessful undertaking; and of the officials all along the line, evaders and liars.

The Navy Department was becoming increasingly unhappy with the lack of cooperation being extended to Capt. Nimmer by the Soviets in comparison with the cooperation that the United States gave to the Soviet naval attaché in Washington, Adm. Paul Oras. In November 1934, ONI registered a complaint with Oras during one of his visits to the office. Oras immediately cabled Minister of Defense Klimenty Voroshilov. The latter arranged a meeting with Nimmer and claimed that his orders had been for the American to be shown "everything," implying that any shortcomings were the result of unofficial acts by individual commanders and not a reflection of Soviet government policy.

By December 1934, Capt. Nimmer was becoming increasingly pessimistic about what the Moscow naval attaché office was accomplishing. Thus, when a crisis in Soviet-American relations arose in early 1935, a convenient way of showing Washington's displeasure was to withdraw the military and naval attachés. The crisis concerned the Soviet refusal to make any settlement of the debts owed to the U. S. Government and private U.S. companies by previous Russian regimes. On 6 February 1935, Secretary of State Cordell Hull officially informed Ambassador William Bullitt that the naval attaché office would be closed and its personnel withdrawn immediately. The office was closed on 16 February 1935.

The lack of ONI protest at Nimmer's recall indicates that the cost of operating the Moscow office far outweighed the value of the information being received from it. Even the increased efforts of the Soviets after the Oras incident failed to make the post more attractive.[68]

Other naval attachés during Fiscal Year 1935 were stationed at London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Brussels-Lisbon, Tokyo, Peiping, and Buenos Aires.[69]

The uncertain conditions and technical developments in Europe, on which the Navy Department needed to be kept as fully informed as possible,

made necessary a strengthening of the naval attaché offices in certain countries. An additional assistant naval attaché (intended to be a Construction Corps lieutenant commander who would also be qualified as a naval aviator), was ordered to London, and plans were made to send an assistant naval attaché to Rome. Lack of funds, however, precluded the employment of additional clerical help, the need for which was being acutely felt in London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome. It was recommended that additional funds be provided for the employment of four additional clerks or that four chief yeomen be ordered to attaché office duty.[70]

Naval attaché offices were established in Rio de Janeiro and Lima in August 1935. Other attaché offices were continued during Fiscal Year 1936 in Berlin, Brussels, Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Peiping, Rome, and Tokyo.[71] In 1937, new offices were established at Santiago, Chile, and Bogota, Columbia.[72] During 1938, naval attaché offices were continued in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Peiping, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Bogota. The office in Brussels was closed.[73]

The naval attaché organization abroad consisted of attachés and, in some cases, assistant attachés, each accredited to one or more foreign countries in Europe, Asia, and South America. In addition, there were a small number of officers attending schools or engaged in the study of foreign languages whose activities came under the Office of Naval Intelligence. Naval missions in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, each consisting of a few officers and enlisted personnel, were also in part under ONI but were not included in the Naval Intelligence Service. Altogether, in 1938, there were twenty-seven officers assigned as attachés or assistant attachés, assisted by approximately thirty enlisted personnel or civilians; in addition, there were twenty-two officer students under ONI control or sponsorship.

Each naval attaché had a unit in ONI directly concerned with the activities of the attaché's organization and to which matters concerning his activities, whether originating within or outside the organization, were referred for consideration or recommendation. In addition, under the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, there was an active Foreign Intelligence Section to coordinate and administer the entire naval attaché system's activities, both within ONI and in the field.[74]

In January 1938, Naval Attaché, London, Capt. Russell Willson participated with Capt. Royal E. Ingersoll, who was assigned to the Office of the CNO, in conversations with the British about removing the limitations on the size of naval ships established by the Second London Naval Limitation of Arms Conference of 1935. Ingersoll represented President Roosevelt, and with Willson also initiated arrangements for developing joint codes, joint radio call letters, and the means for distributing these items prior to war conditions. Planning for collaboration against Japan in the Pacific was also discussed with the British.[75]

Additional naval attaché accreditation by post in 1939 was as follows:

NA Office	Also Accredited to
London	Naval constructor was assistant to France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands
Paris	Spain (until May); assistants to Spain and Portugal; Supply Corps assistant to Italy, Netherlands, England, Germany
Rome	Yugoslavia
Berlin	Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland
Buenos Aires	Uruguay
Bogota	Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador
Guatemala City	El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua

Offices also continued at Tokyo, Peiping, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Santiago (Chile), and Lisbon. New offices were reestablished at Mexico City in August 1938, at Brussels on 15 April 1939, and at Havana in May 1939; the naval attaché at Havana was also accredited to the Dominican Republic. The Hague office was reopened in August 1938.[76]

Prelude to World War II

On Thursday, 24 August 1939, the naval attaché at Paris, in a message to the Chief of Naval Operations, estimated that all German forces were in position to enter Poland not later than Friday night. He also expressed the opinion that England and France would fight. Germany invaded Poland on 3 September, and Great Britain and France did declare war on Germany.[77]

The Naval Attaché, Berlin, Cdr. Albert E. Schrader, maintained a war diary as a daily record of events from 1 September 1939 to 24 March 1941 that was submitted to ONI as a series of reports. Schrader's sources of information, in addition to the various U.S. press and radio broadcasting representatives in Germany, included the daily (but often thrice-weekly or even less) briefings of foreign attachés by the German naval ministry (attaché group), initially by a LCdr. von Davidson, then by a Capt. Mirow; news from local press and radio; German navy head Adm. Raeder (who, when he had special items to be passed to the United States,

would call in Cdr. Schrader); the naval attaché community, particularly the Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Soviet attachés (there was considerable sparring with the latter two); limited travel outside Berlin, usually on diplomatic courier trips to external neutral cities; other members of the U.S. Embassy staff; and foreign attaché trips to English Channel ports, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Paris in July 1940 after the French surrender. As an example of Schrader's liaison with the press, George Kidd of the United Press was interviewed on 13 September 1939 following his return from witnessing the start of the war from Danzig; Kidd also called on Schrader on 10 March 1940 after making a two-day tour of the Upper Rhine front, bringing information on gun emplacements manned by the German navy east of Strasbourg.[78]

LCdr. Henri H. Smith-Hutton returned to Tokyo as naval attaché on 28 April 1939, relieving Capt. Harold M. Bemis. In reviewing the files of the Tokyo office, Smith-Hutton found that the best reports submitted to ONI had been those prepared in 1936–1937 by naval aviator LCdr. Ralph A. Ofstie, Assistant Naval Attaché for Air. Ofstie had inspected the Japanese naval air installations thoroughly and had learned a great deal about them.[79]

During the last few months of Capt. Bemis's tour, however, the Japanese navy department declined to allow visits to some of the Imperial Japanese Navy yards and bases that Bemis had requested, informing Bemis that the Japanese naval attaché in Washington had not been given permission to visit similar facilities in the United States. Since attaché visits were based on reciprocity, Bemis could not visit bases and airfields as he had previously been allowed to do. In turning over the post, Bemis advised Smith-Hutton not to make similar visit requests; it might induce the Japanese to try again at ONI, and he understood informally from Washington that they would prefer not to give the Japanese permission to visit U.S. yards and bases because of the big naval building program then in progress. Thus, the mutual inspection arrangements that had existed for many years were terminated, and thereafter there was no chance to visit Yokosuka, Kure, or Sasebo, the Imperial Japanese Navy's main shipbuilding yards.

Although many contacts with Japanese friends were lost because of the increasing practice by the police of interrogating visitors to U.S. residences, the Naval Attaché, Tokyo's reports continued to be voluminous. The *Official Gazette* was followed very closely for every mention of the Japanese navy in debates in the Diet or the House of Peers. There were a number of popular naval publications and magazines, and there was quite a lot published on the merchant marine, with many pictures. Publications provided much information worthy of reporting. All pictures of Japanese merchant ships appearing in magazines and newspapers, and the detailed plans available from unclassified sources, were forwarded to ONI for use in preparing recognition manuals. In addition, every week for a year and a half, a few detailed maps of different sections of the country had been purchased, until a complete topographic map of all Japan was in hand. It was then bound and sent to ONI. Although the maps didn't show fortified areas or military and naval bases, they did show cities, towns, railroads, and terrain features, all of which were of value in planning air targeting operations in wartime.[80]

Most of the above reports contained no startling information but were full of nonclassified data of potential wartime interest and value to the Navy. Very few reports were sent by cable because of their lack of urgency. Furthermore, cables were expensive.[81]

One covert source provided information that the torpedoes carried by Japanese destroyers appeared to be larger than 21 inches in diameter and were probably nearer to 25 inches (they were in fact of 24-inch diameter). The source also reported that the torpedoes used oxygen for fuel. No comment was received from Washington when this new information was sent to ONI. Another report from the same source noted that the cruiser *Mogami*'s main battery weapons were not as shown in *Jane's Fighting Ships*. Instead of five turrets with three 6-inch guns each, *Mogami* had five turrets with two 8-inch guns each. The Bureau of Ordnance commented on the report that it was impossible to reconfigure a ship designed for 6-inch guns to one for 8-inch guns. Both reports, however, were later found to be entirely correct.[82]

One of the pre–World War II intelligence collectors in Japan was Lt.(jg) Stephen Jurika, Jr., the assistant naval attaché in Tokyo from June 1939 to September 1941. Under LCdr. Smith-Hutton, Jurika participated in most of the collection effort conducted outside of the office. As naval attaché, Donald J. Smith-Hutton handled the policy, protocol, and entertainment activities of the office; LCdr. McCallum, the senior assistant naval attaché, handled the office work.

Jurika attempted to witness all ship launchings. In Kobe, he would reserve a room overlooking the shipyard, either at the Tor Hotel up on a hill, or on the fourth floor of the Oriental Hotel. Fairly good pictures were possible with a telephoto lens. At Yokohama, it was easier. Some of the Standard Oil representatives lived on a bluff overlooking the Mitsubishi yards.

In 1940, a Japanese Zero fighter aircraft was on display at the Haneda International Airport. Ju-

rika, a naval aviator, went to see it and was allowed to sit in the cockpit, where he found the nameplate written in English. He noted that the weight of the Zero was about half that of the U.S. Navy's F4F Wildcat, but that the horsepower was the same, giving the Zero better speed, climbing, and maneuvering capabilities. About three months after he submitted his report, ONI chided him that he should be more careful in reporting the characteristics and estimated weight of Japanese aircraft.

Permission was never given to visit Japanese naval installations, but seaplanes were operated from a naval air station on the Chiba peninsula on the east side of Tokyo Bay, where there was also a good golf course nearby from which Jurika could observe their activities.

Jurika went once a quarter to the Philippines to get in his required flight time. He made the trip from Tokyo to Manila and back on regularly scheduled President Lines ships, and he got to know the masters of the ships quite well. They were all U.S. Naval Reserve officers and glad to cooperate. The first stop was Kobe, Japan, and, on leaving port, the ship would pass as close as possible to the Mitsubishi shipyards, where naval ships were being built. On the landward side of the shipyard, observation of construction progress was blocked by matting. Jurika always had a stateroom on the starboard side of the ship and would take a series of pictures from the porthole, with his Leica mounted on a tripod, as the liner passed the shipyard. Comparing the pictures on successive trips gave a good appreciation of progress of the construction.

If, on Jurika's trips to the Philippines, the ship was passing southeast of the island of Kyushu when any Japanese aircraft carriers were operating out of Ariake Wan, the President Lines ship would slow down so that Jurika could check the timing of their landing or launching operations and note the characteristics of other maneuvering evolutions.

Jurika made a special effort to collect target intelligence. There were many commercial pamphlets available, and whenever he drove from Tokyo to Yokohama, Jurika would travel via a different route, noting all the industrial complexes that stretched without interruption between the two cities. Jurika was also able to get a complete series of land-use maps of Japan and, beginning in July 1940, he worked to fill in on the maps what were considered primary targets and the points of identification needed for aerial approaches to the targets.

Jurika obtained a lot of the information for the target maps from the Soviet assistant naval attaché. Jurika met him on the tennis court and, after they had lunched together, the Russian wanted to know what information on Japan he and Jurika could exchange. The Soviets had been collecting information on Japanese industrial establishments for years, and their attaché supplied Jurika with information on the locations of factories in Tokyo and its suburbs. The U.S. Navy officer responded with information from Japanese newspapers and magazines. The Soviet-supplied information saved Jurika three or four months of driving around, and he found the data to be accurate. The Russians had the best espionage collection net in Japan, using Japanese Communists as sources.

Jurika made many attempts to reach the Mandated Islands. There was a four-engined flying boat that went each week from Tokyo to Ponape and Truk. For six months he tried to buy a ticket on the plane, but each request was refused for various reasons. Finally, Jurika obtained a written statement from the Japanese that he was not allowed to visit the Mandated Islands. He did get some third-hand information, however, from the Soviet assistant naval attaché who had contacts with Japanese fishermen who had been to the islands. The main information of value was the identification of those islands that were prohibited to the fishermen and were thus assumed to be military bases.

The American Club, located in the commercial district of Tokyo, was the meeting place for news correspondents and industrial representatives, both those based in Japan and those passing through. They would often hold forth and analyze conditions and situations in the Far East, and they often served as good sources and provided leads to anticipated events. Japanese newspapers and magazines became better information sources when, in mid-1940, the Japanese government found it desirable to bring the war in China home to its people and to enlist their support. More and more articles, photos, and news accounts of the war in China appeared in the public media.[83]

On 20 March 1940, the Naval Attaché, Berlin, was relieved of his Scandinavian accreditations by LCdr. Ole O. Hagen, USN (Ret.). On the 31st, the assistant naval attaché in Berlin, LCdr. Edward R. Durgin, was detached prior to the arrival of his relief, LCdr. Arthur H. Graubart, who reported on 24 May. LCdr. Hagen was stationed in Sweden, with additional accreditation to Norway, Denmark, and Finland.[84]

Other new posts in the naval attaché system opened during Fiscal Year 1940 in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Turkey.[85]

Transportation available from Berlin to the United States in July 1940 was a daily train to Geneva (which took one day), followed by a once-a-week bus from Geneva to Barcelona (which took two days), then a train from Barcelona to Lis-

bon. From Lisbon one could proceed by Pan American Clipper or by ship to the United States. The same route was used for official diplomatic pouch mail.

The sale of fifty overaged destroyers to the British by the United States in August 1940 upset the German navy ministry and made it less cooperative in handling the naval attaché's requests for information.

Hitler was apparently a believer in astrology. Foreign attachés in Berlin, therefore, were usually influenced in their forecasts on the timing of possible big events, such as the invasion of England, by checking to see if the right planets were in alignment. Two such days viewed with apprehension were 24 July and 15 August 1940, but other anticipated preparatory steps failed to materialize.[86]

After the invasion of Belgium and northern France in July 1940, Naval Attaché, Paris, was transferred to Vichy, France. After the German occupation of all of France on 11 November 1942, all personnel at the naval attaché's office at Vichy were transferred to Baden Baden under German custody.[87]

Cdr. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the naval attaché to Vichy France, made a quick trip to Morocco and Algeria in 1940. He reported to the U.S. Embassy at Vichy that he was agreeably surprised and encouraged by what he had observed: contrary to rumors (planted by the Germans), Hillenkoetter found that the Nazis had left French Africa almost completely to its own devices. He stated that "if France is going to fight again anywhere in this war, I believe North Africa will be the place."[88]

In April 1940, President Roosevelt decided to send a senior naval officer to London for informal discussions with the British Admiralty. The orders, first issued in July 1940, provided that RAdm. Robert L. Ghormley would serve as naval attaché, with his assistants to be designated as assistant naval attachés. Since this was to be a special (and probably temporary) assignment, however, Ghormley's title was changed to "Special Observer." Ghormley was attached to the U.S. Embassy but accredited directly to the British Admiralty.

Members of the office of Naval Attaché, London, were invited to attend special-observer joint meetings with the British when British proposals for Anglo-American naval cooperation pertaining to their specialties were to be discussed.

In September 1940, the British Committee for Joint Cooperation with the United States under Sir Sidney Bailey had been designated by the Admiralty to receive all requests from the U.S. naval attaché for technical information. Between 12 September 1940 and 2 July 1941, 395 such requests were made. In addition, the naval attaché continued to use Section V of the (British) Naval Intelligence Division (NID) as the normal liaison channel with the Admiralty for naval matters relating to the British Empire. Officers sent by the various Navy bureaus to observe British tactics, inventions, etc. came under the U.S. naval attaché as did officers who were assigned aboard British ships as observers. On 22 October 1940, there were thirty-two officers designated as Assistant Naval Attaché, London.[89]

In early 1941, ONI began sending naval observers to various key Brazilian ports. The first was LCdr. William A. Hodgman, USN (Ret.), who arrived at Recife on 26 February. At first Hodgman obtained office space in the U.S. consulate, but he later moved to the third floor of the Bank of London building, close to the waterfront, where he could overlook the harbor.[90]

When Commander Cruiser Division Two, RAdm. Jonas H. Ingram, arrived on 10 May 1941 to check out Recife and Bahia as replenishment ports for the Neutrality Patrol, LCdr. Hodgman was able to advise Ingram on the facilities of each port and to point out the superiority of Recife over Bahia for naval patrol purposes. Hodgman also had made the initial contacts with local Brazilian authorities that led to Ingram's later favorable relationship with them.

Recife became the center of U.S. naval activity in the South Atlantic, and in August, 2ndLt. D. J. Kendall, USMCR, arrived as assistant naval observer to help provide services to the increasing number of U.S. ships visiting Recife.

Other naval observers assigned in Brazil in 1941 were Lt. M. B. Saben, USN (Ret.), to Bahia, arriving 1 October; LCdr. Hugh C. Frazer, USN (Ret.), to Natal on 14 October (relieved on 28 October 1941 by Lt. L. K. Winans, USNR); and LCdr. Edward Breed, USNR, to Belem, on 17 November.[91]

Cdr. Schrader was relieved by Capt. Adolph von Pickhardt as Naval Attaché, Berlin, 1 April 1941, shortly after passage by Congress in March of the Lend-Lease bill, an event that made the Germans even less friendly than before.[92]

New naval attachés were assigned during Fiscal Year 1941 to the Union of South Africa, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina.[93] In anticipation of an approaching world conflict, ONI, in the summer of 1941, began sending naval observers, naval liaison officers, and consular shipping advisors to all the principal ports and hot spots in the world.[94]

The U.S. naval attaché system at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack employed 133 officers, 200 enlisted men, and no civilians.[95]

The Navy Department in 1938 had started planning for the reestablishment of the naval attaché office in Moscow, but the plan had been vetoed by

the State Department. The question was again opened in May 1941, and again the State Department opposed the idea because of strained Russo-American relations and because of American disapproval of Soviet foreign policy. Inadequate living quarters and the difficulty in obtaining information were again cited. After discussions on 15 May 1941 between Capt. Alan G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence, and Ray Atherton and Loy Henderson, Acting Chief and Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, State Department, respectively, the matter was referred to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow. The Embassy, in turn, sounded out the Soviet government.

On 22 June 1941, the Germans invaded the USSR, and the next day the Soviet ambassador to the United States informed Henderson that the Soviet government agreed to the stationing of a U.S. naval attaché and his staff in Moscow. The Soviet government questioned the need for four officers, the number requested by ONI. The explanation that two would be concerned with naval aviation partially satisfied the Soviets, but the request to assign one to live in Vladivostok caused further delay.

On 7 August 1941, the Soviets agreed to four officers (the German armies were getting close to Moscow), but they still opposed stationing a naval observer or U.S. shipping advisor at Vladivostok. Navy Lts. Samuel B. Frankel and George D. Roullard arrived in Moscow at the end of September.[96]

When George Roullard finally got approval to go on to Vladivostok, he went as an assistant naval attaché with the same privileges that he would have had in Moscow, but he was not permitted to wear a uniform. Roullard, together with a yeoman first class, set up an office in February 1942 at the U.S. consulate, where he was to act as if he were a member of the Vladivostok consulate staff. Roullard was not to reveal his U.S. Navy identity except to personnel of the Soviet navy who were permitted liaison with him. The Soviets didn't want to give the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok any justification to request similar privileges. Roullard's primary duties were to report ship movements and information of interest concerning the movements of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR via the Pacific route.[97]

Naval Attachés During World War II

Japan, 1941

When military extremists took control of the Japanese government on 16 October 1941 and Gen. Hideki Tojo became prime minister, all foreign naval attachés in Japan were informed that the navy ministry had to be advised one week in advance of any plans to travel more than 15 miles from Tokyo, and the exact itinerary had to be provided. Capt. Henri Smith-Hutton, the naval attaché, made a test run west to the tourist resort of Miyajima accompanied by his wife, going by train through Osaka and Kobe. At stops in Hiroshima (an important military center) and Kure (a naval base), the train attendant pulled down the shades and told them to remain in their compartment. At Miyajima, they were escorted by a policeman and a detective to their hotel and whenever they left their rooms. Following the trip, Smith-Hutton notified Ambassador Joseph Grew and ONI that he could not be counted on to give advance warning of Japanese naval moves.

On 8 December 1941, Capt. Smith-Hutton was alerted that something serious had happened when he tuned in the American radio station at Shanghai shortly after he awoke at 0630. The announcer was reading a directive from the American consul general advising Americans to remain calm and to stay off the streets. There was no clarifying announcement, and the station signed off.

Smith-Hutton called his wife and told her something had happened in Shanghai, and he suggested that they walk over to the U.S. Embassy chancery in the adjacent garden. At his office, he learned that Radio San Francisco had announced the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Smith-Hutton notified Ambassador Grew, who instructed Smith-Hutton to go to the Japanese navy department, four blocks away, to find out if the broadcast from San Francisco was correct. Smith-Hutton went to the office of RAdm. Nakamura, senior aide to the navy minister, Adm. Shigetaro Shimada. Nakamura confirmed that the broadcast was true. Smith-Hutton returned to the embassy and so advised the ambassador.

Except for one cipher for use in emergency communications, the naval attaché's office had burned its classified papers and codes four days before. The destruction of the code machine was accomplished with a small hammer. The small bits of metal were placed in about twenty envelopes. Late that night, Smith-Hutton and his assistant, LCdr. Martin R. Stone, drove towards Yokohama, dropping one envelope into the water at each bridge they crossed. The final envelope was thrown into the moat at the Imperial Palace.[98]

The embassy staff in Tokyo was locked up in the large embassy compound on 8 December 1941, and all those who lived outside the compound were allowed to visit their homes to bring in clothing, personal belongings, etc. Ambassador Grew's residence had three bedrooms, and he took in a number of the senior embassy officials and their wives, including the Smith-Huttons. The Ambassador's mess in-

cluded the Smith-Huttons plus four other Americans, and other messes were established in the apartments near the chancery. After about six days, the Americans were allowed to send one of the chauffeurs out for fresh vegetables and fish.

After about ten days, the Swiss minister was allowed to come into the U.S. Embassy. After that, he visited fairly regularly, bringing news received via short wave radio. No mail was permitted, but staff members were allowed to receive the *Japan Advertiser*, an English-language newspaper published in Tokyo.

On 18 April 1942, the day of the Doolittle raid, the air raid sirens started about 1100, but since there had been a series of air defense drills, they were not taken to be unusual. Japanese aircraft, however, usually took part in the air attack drills, giving a rare chance to see them from the ground. Capt. Smith-Hutton and his assistant, LCdr. Stone, among others, frequently took advantage of the excellent view from the top of one of the Embassy compound apartment buildings just to see the show. On the morning of the Doolittle raid, there were several fighters in the air, and the interned Americans watched them with binoculars as usual. At 1130, they saw a plane flying low over the northern part of the city, about 6 miles from the chancery. The observers thought they heard faint gunfire but couldn't be sure, and then they saw a cloud of black smoke coming up from an area that looked to be about under the path of the low-flying aircraft. The plane had disappeared to the west, and they decided that the Japanese were making the drills more realistic.

At about noon, they returned to the Embassy for lunch when a plane flying low swooped over the Embassy and quickly disappeared behind the large trees to the west of the compound. It was seen only by Mrs. Smith-Hutton and Crocker, the first secretary, who was very nearsighted, but he agreed with Mrs. Smith-Hutton that the aircraft had had American markings, not Japanese *hinomaru* (sun) insignia. Also, the engines seemed to have a different sound. Neither, however, could describe the plane well enough to permit identification. Later, the Japanese did announce that the aircraft were American. Thereafter, the police at the gates seemed to pay more attention to blackout curtains at the chancery.[99]

During his internment in Tokyo, Smith-Hutton collected a complete file of the English-language newspaper, *Japan Times*, and the Japanese newspaper, *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*. He also made a card file on every Japanese naval officer of the rank of commander and above, with the duty stations of the officer and remarks on his personality. When the naval attaché staff was evacuated, they were told not to take any written material out of the country. Smith-Hutton, however, felt the Japanese would be too busy to bother with a thorough inspection of the passengers' luggage. So, although the file of newspapers he had was quite bulky, he divided it up among numerous boxes and suitcases. In addition, Smith-Hutton carried on his person a diary of important events and observations that he had kept during internment. Fortunately, there was no inspection, and Smith-Hutton turned over all the material to the Far East Section of ONI upon his return to Washington.[100]

The Embassy staff in Tokyo remained interned in the Embassy compound until 17 June 1942, when they embarked on the first diplomatic exchange ship, *Asama Maru*, which departed Yokohama on 25 June. After stops at Hong Kong, Saigon, and Singapore, the Japanese liner rendezvoused with the neutral Swedish passenger ship *Gripsholm* at Lourenco Marques in the Portuguese East African colony of Mozambique. Here an exchange was made with the Japanese Embassy staff internees from the United States. Cdr. Ethelbert Watts was sent there from ONI to assure a body-for-body accounting.[101]

Naval Attaché, London

The post of Naval Attaché, London, was held by the following officers during World War II:

Name	Dates
Capt. A. G. Kirk	1 Oct 1939–Nov 1940
RAdm. R. L. Ghormley (also Special Naval Observer [SPENAVO])	Nov 1940–Mar 1941
Capt. C. A. Lockwood, Jr. (also SPENAVO)	9 Mar 1941–12 Mar 1942
Cdr. E. W. Litch (Acting NA)	12 Mar 1942–12 May 1942
RAdm. A. G. Kirk (also Chief of Staff, Commander Naval Forces Europe [COMNAVEU])	12 May 1942–9 Feb 1943
Capt. P. H. Bastedo (also Chief of Staff COMNAVEU, 13 Feb–25 May 1943)	9 Feb 1943–17 Oct 1943
RAdm. G. B. Wilson (also Chief of Staff COMNAVEU, 25 May 1943–13 Apr 1945)	17 Oct 1943–13 Apr 1945

system. DIA refused to recognize representation requirements as co-equal to collection requirements, even though representation contacts were usually needed first in order to establish contacts for collection. The Navy recommended that control of the attachés be returned to the respective services.[178]

This recommendation was disapproved on 31 March 1970, but the Joint Chiefs concurred that the operation of the Defense Attaché System was unsatisfactory and requested increased access to the attachés by the services and greater emphasis on representational matters.[179]

The military services, particularly the Navy, had a compelling need for authoritative and responsive representation in many foreign countries. The service attachés, as elements of the DAS, an identified component of the Defense Intelligence Agency and under its administrative and operational control, were too obviously intelligence-oriented, to the detriment of service representation needs (and collection capabilities). As field representatives of an intelligence agency, their accessibility as service representatives was inhibited. Furthermore, the title worn by the defense attaché often preempted the other service attachés from involvement in issues and functions of exclusive concern to the respective services or in which their knowledge and experience made them most competent to take action or to provide authoritative guidance. Also, the designation of the representative of one of the services as *the* defense attaché degraded the position of the representatives of the other services in the eyes of foreign officials.[180]

In April 1973, the responsibility in the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC) for overseeing the naval attachés was transferred to the Foreign Operations Division (NIC-32). As a result, NIC-32 became the focal point for all overt foreign naval intelligence cooperation programs. The Attaché Programs Section within NIC-32 was responsible for reviewing and endorsing personnel nominations for attaché billets, monitoring attaché training, arranging briefings and debriefings for attaché personnel, staffing Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, preparing Director of Naval Intelligence correspondence on attaché programs, and coordinating actions within the DIA on all matters pertaining to the Defense Attaché System.[181]

Table 3.1.
Naval Attachés Accredited Under Defense Attaché System, 1974

Country	NA Rank	ANA Rank	DATT	AAT*
Australia	Capt.	LtCol., USMC	Air Force	—
Belgium	Cdr.	LCdr.	Army	—
Brazil	Capt.	LCdr.	Air Force	—
Canada	Capt.	LCdr.	Air Force	—
Chile	Capt.	Lt.	Navy	—
Denmark	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Navy	—
Dominican Republic	LtCol., USMC	—	Navy	—
Ecuador	Capt.	—	Army	—
Finland	Cdr.	LCdr.	Air Force	—
France	Capt.	LCdr. & LtCol., USMC	Army	—
Germany	Capt.	LCdr.	Army	—
Greece	Capt.	LCdr. & Maj., USMC	Navy	—
Hong Kong	Capt.	LCdr. & LtCol, USMC	Navy	Diplomatically assigned to UK
India	Capt.	LCdr.	Air Force	Nepal
Indonesia	Col., USMC	LCdr./Lt.	Army	—
Iran	Cdr.	—	Air Force	—
Israel	Cdr.	LCdr.	Air Force	—
Italy	Capt.	Cdr. & Maj. USMC	Navy	—
Jamaica	LtCol., USMC	—	Navy	Haiti
Japan	Capt.	Cdr.	Navy	—
Khmer Republic	LCdr.	LCdr.	Army	—
Lebanon	Col., USMC	—	Navy	Cyprus
Liberia	Cdr.	—	Navy	Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Ghana
Malagsay	LCdr.	—	Air Force	—
Malta	Cdr.	—	Navy	—
Mexico	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Army	El Savador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica
Morocco	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Navy	—
Netherlands	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Air Force	W. Samoa
New Zealand	Capt.	—	Navy	—
Norway	Capt.	Cdr.	Air Force	—
Pakistan	Capt.	(Vacant)	Air Force	—

Country	NA Rank	ANA Rank	DATT	AAT*
Peru	Capt.	—	Navy	—
Philippines	Cdr.	—	Air Force	—
Poland	Cdr.	—	Army	—
Portugal	Capt.	Lt.	Air Force	—
Senegal	LtCol., USMC	—	Navy	Gambia, Mali
Singapore	Capt.	LCdr.	Army	—
South Africa	Cdr.	Maj., USMC	Air Force	—
Spain	Capt.	LCdr.	Army	—
Sri Lanka	Cdr.	—	Navy	—
Sweden	Capt.	LCdr.	Air Force	—
Taiwan	Capt.	(Vacant)	Air Force	—
Thailand	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Air Force	Laos, Burma
Turkey	Capt.	Maj., USMC	Air Force	—
United Kingdom	RAdm.	Capt.; LtCol., USMC; Capt. and Cdr. resident at Bath	Navy	—
Uruguay	Capt.	—	Navy	—
USSR	RAdm.	Cdr., LCdr., LtCol., USMC	Navy	—
Venezuela	Capt.	LCdr.	Air Force	Trinidad and Tobago
Vietnam	Capt.	—	Army	—

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CHAPTER 4

Air Reconnaissance

This chapter includes a sampling of the information contained in the files of the Aviation History Section of the Air Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations about the various types of intelligence collection performed by naval air squadrons. This sampling, in turn, is based on histories submitted by the participating squadrons and is arranged chronologically by types of collection, such as photographic, patrol, and multisensor.

Much of the data collection by naval air reconnaissance squadrons was in direct support of the operating forces of the Navy. As a consequence, the initial processing of data was performed by fleet resources within the areas where the collection was performed. Final processing and the correlation of information from other sources has been at the fleet or Washington level. Therefore, there is a close relationship between this chapter and Chapters 12, 13, 15, 18, and 34.

Development of Aerial Photographic Intelligence Capabilities (VD, VC, and VJ Squadrons)

Aerial photography in the U.S. Navy had its origin about the time that naval officers were first learning to fly. Snapshots from handheld cameras were taken by many of the early naval aviators. Officially, some experiments in taking aerial photographs were conducted at Guantanamo in 1913 when the small naval air arm first operated with fleet units. During the Vera Cruz incident in April 1914, Lt. Patrick N. L. Bellinger made flights to photograph the harbor. Such pioneering efforts were undertaken using personal cameras rather than government supplied equipment.

A more formal program was developed at Pensacola during the winter of 1914–1915 when SC3 W. L. Richardson, whose hobby was photography, introduced improvements on earlier efforts. He was later made an officer and designated the head of the Navy's first photography school.

In 1915, the Navy requested the Eastman Kodak Company to develop an aerial camera to meet certain specifications, and during that year and the next, tests were made at Pensacola of this and other makes of camera. On 10 January 1917, the Navy placed its first production order for aerial photo equipment when the Naval Observatory requisitioned twenty "aero cameras and accessories" from Eastman Kodak.

A few aerial photographs were taken of enemy bases and of combat action during World War I, but there appears to have been little operational application made of the results of these pioneer efforts, probably because photo interpretation had not developed very far toward its current sophisticated state. In the postwar period, aerial photo equipment and techniques slowly progressed as experience was gained when filling requests from various civil agencies of the government. For example, in the summer of 1926, a Navy photographic unit, equipped with three Loening OL-1 amphibious aircraft, made the first aerial mapping photographs of Alaska at the request of the Department of the Interior. Other units made aerial surveys of different parts of the United States, Central America, and the Caribbean islands.

In the 1920s and 1930s utility squadrons and sometimes patrol squadrons generally carried out photographic work for the fleet. The missions included some mapping and photographing of ships, stations, and torpedo and gunnery practices.

One exception was the search for Amelia Earhart Putnam after she disappeared on 3 July 1937 on the Lae, New Guinea, to Howland Island leg of her around-the-world trip. Aircraft carrier *Lexington* (CV 2) was sent from Long Beach to search the probable area of Earhart's flight track and her last-known position near the Gilbert Islands. No docu-

mentary evidence has been found that the Navy took advantage of the opportunity to collect photo intelligence on Japanese activities in the islands in proximity to the search area. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations RAdm. James O. Richardson labeled the reconnaissance effort a headache for the Navy. He stated that the tremendous expenditures for gasoline for *Lexington*'s search aircraft had put a severe strain on aviation funds.[1]

The establishment of special photographic units in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets took place only a short time before the United States became an active participant in World War II. The Fleet Air Photographic Units were set up in May 1941 to receive and assimilate photographic personnel and material and to coordinate and conduct advanced training in all aerial photo services as required. The formation of the Atlantic unit was complete by 9 June 1941, and a photo lab was set up in the Administration Building at Naval Air Station (NAS), Norfolk. Its first aircraft was received in September 1941. In the Pacific, although Commander Scouting Force had recommended the establishment of a photo unit in each patrol wing to be composed of photographic and interpretation sections able to move to any area as required, only one unit, set up in May 1941, was in existence when the war began.[2]

On 15 July 1942, less than a month before the Marines landed on Guadalcanal, photo interpretation officers and photographer's mates making up the first photo interpretation unit reported for duty in the South Pacific. The first reconnaissance mission over Guadalcanal was flown from Australia on 17 July by Army B-17s using Navy photo equipment. The cameras were operated by LtCol. Merrill B. Twining and Maj. William B. McKean, 1st Marine Division operations officers who were acting as observers on this flight.

Until November 1942, when Marine Photographic Squadron (VMD) 154 reported, the only airplanes available in the South Pacific for long-range photo missions were Army B-17s, although some local missions were made by Navy PBY Catalinas. In April 1943, the Navy's Photographic Squadron (VD) One arrived in the South Pacific. In August 1943, photographic interpretation and photographic squadrons in the South Pacific were combined as Fleet Air Photographic Group One.

In the Central Pacific, Photographic Squadrons Three and Four were commissioned on 15 February and 15 July 1943, respectively, to become Photographic Group Two on 4 January 1944. On 1 June 1944, VD-5 was commissioned and was added to Photographic Group Two in November. The four VD squadrons covered the entire combat area of the war in the Pacific, operating long-range aircraft from land bases.

In the Atlantic, VD-2 was primarily involved in training carrier photo pilots for both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. A squadron detachment was set up in May 1944 at the Naval Air Facility, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and its Photographic Reconnaissance Training School provided photo pilots for carrier duty in all areas until the end of the war.

Post–World War II Navy plans provided for the retention of two long-range photographic squadrons, VD-5 in the Pacific and VD-2 in the Atlantic, under the new designations VPP-1 and VPP-2, respectively. In 1948, the squadrons were redesignated VP-61 and VP-62; they were decommissioned in 1950 after two composite squadrons had been organized in early 1949.

Composite Squadrons (VC) 61 and 62 were assigned carrier-type aircraft and were the first formally organized carrier photo units. The need for a long-range shipboard photo reconnaissance capability soon became apparent, and Utility Squadrons (VJ) 61 and 62 were commissioned in 1951 to fulfill the requirement. The subsequent light photographic squadrons (VFP) and heavy photographic squadrons (VAP) were the direct descendants of the VC and VJ squadrons.[3]

The first propeller-driven aircraft complement of Composite Squadron 62 included ten F8F-2P Bearcats, and four F4U-5P and two F4U-4P Corsairs. VC-62 was commissioned on 3 January 1949; its mission was "to train and maintain the readiness of units for carrier-based photographic reconnaissance of designated targets in areas of Naval Operations." VC-62 was to provide detachments of two photo planes and specially trained pilots to each East Coast air group.

The F8F-2P Bearcats and F4U-4P/5P Corsairs were essentially standard fighters with a camera mounted in the fuselage. In many respects, the pilots found these airplanes poorly suited to their photo reconnaissance missions. Neither aircraft type was equipped with a trimetragon camera installation, but the problem was solved in the F8F-2P by attaching a camera capsule to the centerline bomb rack. The arrangement did not work for the F4Us because their inverted gull wings blocked the field of view of the oblique cameras. Another problem was the lack of a photo viewfinder. With the restricted visibility that both aircraft types afforded the pilot, getting the right object in the center of the picture was largely a matter of luck until professional skill was gained through experience.

The first jet-powered photo reconnaissance aircraft was the F2H-2P Banshee. It carried three cameras, all of which could be aimed from the cock-

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCUSNAVEUR for contribution toward the national collection effort.[77]

During 1972, VQ-2 maintained detachments on board Sixth Fleet carriers operating in the Mediterranean as well as detachments on a regular basis at Athens, Greece; Ramstein, West Germany; and Key West, Florida. In support of special operations, squadron aircraft and flight crews were deployed to other areas such as Sola and Bodo, Norway; Sigonella, Sicily; Incirlik, Turkey; Lajes, in the Azores; Souda Bay, Crete; and Aviano and Decimomannu, Italy.

Mediterranean Floor Door missions were flown from Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers and shore facilities at Rota, Aviano, and Athens. Frequently, missions flown from carriers were performed in conjunction with RA-5C Vigilante shipboard aircraft flying nationally scheduled Floor Sponge missions. The coordinated missions proved effective, with the EA-3B providing tactical evaluations of the target environment while the RA-5C readout offered a strategic picture of the total environment.

Baltic Floor Door missions were flown from Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany by EP-3E aircraft of VQ-2, with the EA-3B as the alternate aircraft. Three missions per month were scheduled. VQ-2's primary tasks were concerned with Soviet naval activity and with monitoring Soviet RDT&E (research, development, test, and evaluation) from the Soviet fleet testing and weapons range areas.

Splinter Arm missions were flown from Key West to provide SIGINT support for CINCLANT contingency plans concerning Cuba. Operational control for the Splinter Arm missions was under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

Floor Leader missions were flown by VQ-2 only in the Mediterranean, where their primary task was to collect ELINT in support of national-level requirements promulgated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A secondary task was to collect SIGINT in support of national and direct fleet support requirements. Floor Show missions were scheduled by CINCUSNAVEUR, in support of peacetime COMINT and ELINT collection programs and also provided direct support to Sixth Fleet units in the Mediterranean.[78]

Commanding officers of VQ-2 between 1954 and 1976 were as follows:

Name	Dates
Cdr. M. L. Kalin	Sep 1955–Jul 1957
Cdr. R. R. Sparks	Jul 1957–Oct 1958
Cdr. C. H. Sigley	Oct 1958–Oct 1959
Cdr. P. D. Halpin	Oct 1959–Apr 1961
Cdr. A. G. Elder	Apr 1961–Apr 1962
Cdr. H. E. Fitzwater	Apr 1962–May 1963
Cdr. R. M. Davis	May 1963–May 1964
Cdr. C. A. Kiser	May 1964–May 1965
Cdr. J. H. McConnell	May 1965–Jun 1966
Cdr. A. D. Burkett	Jun 1966–May 1967
Cdr. E. V. Laney	May 1967–May 1968
Cdr. T. E. Daum*	May 1968–Jun 1968
Cdr. R. W. Arn	Jun 1968–Jul 1969
Cdr. H. G. Hatch	Jul 1969–Jul 1970
Cdr. A. A. Gallotta	Jul 1970–Jun 1971
Cdr. J. E. Taylor	Jun 1971–Jul 1972
Cdr. J. F. McRae	Jul 1972–Jul 1973
Cdr. J. D. Meyer	Jul 1973–Jul 1974
Cdr. D. J. Alberg	Jul 1974–Jul 1975
Cdr. D. N. Hagen	Jul 1975–Jul 1976

*Killed on active duty while serving as commanding officer.

Table 4.1. Primary U.S. Navy Electronic Reconnaissance Aircraft

Designation	Mfg.	Approx. Yrs. of Service	Description
1. PBY-5 (Catalina)	Consolidated	1944–1945	Twin reciprocating engine amphibian; eight-man crew
2. PB4Y-1 (Liberator)	Consolidated	1943–1947	Four-engine reciprocating; twin tail; 10-man crew
3. PB4Y-2 (Privateer)	Consolidated	1945–1950	Four-engine reciprocating; single tail; 10-man crew
4. P2V (Neptune)	Lockheed	1947–1960	Twin reciprocating; 10-man crew
5. P4M-1Q (Mercator)	Martin	1950–1960	Twin reciprocating and twin jet; 16-man crew
6. A3D-1Q (Skywarrior)	Douglas	1956–1959	Twin jet; four-man crew
7. A3D-2Q (Skywarrior) redesignated EA-3B in 1962	Douglas	1959–	Twin jet; present seven-man crew
8. WV-2Q (Warning Star) redesignated EC-121M in 1962	Lockheed	1960–1974	Four-engine reciprocating; 31-man crew
9. EP-3B (Batrack*)	Lockheed	1969	Four-engine turboprop; 28-man crew
10. EP-3A (Aries*)	Lockheed	1971–present	Four-engine turboprop; 28-man crew

*Unofficial nickname

Source: Capt. Don Charles East, USN, "History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two (VQ-1 and VQ-2)," Newport, RI, 1986, privately printed monograph.

Table 4.2. Incidents of U.S. Navy Electronic Reconnaissance Aircraft Facing Hostile Fire

Date	Parent Unit	Type of Aircraft	Location	Casualties	Country
8 Apr 1950	VP-26, Det A	PB4Y-2	Baltic Sea	10 Missing	USSR
6 Jun 1951	VP-6	P2V	Sea of Japan	10 Missing	USSR
19 Jan 1953	VP-22	P2V	Formosa Strait	11 Dead	PRC
4 Sep 1954	VP-19	P2V	Sea of Japan	1 Dead 9 Rescued	USSR
22 Jun 1955	VP-9	P2V-5	Bering Strait	7 Wounded	USSR
22 Aug 1956	VQ-1	P4M-1Q	Off PRC Coast	16 Missing	PRC
16 Jun 1959	VQ-1	P4M-1Q	Sea of Japan	1 Wounded	N. Korea
14 Apr 1969	VQ-1	EC-121M	Sea of Japan	31 Dead	N. Korea
20 Sep 1969	VQ-2	EA-3B	Danang, RVN	None	N. Vietnam

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CHAPTER 6

Submarine Reconnaissance and Support

Reconnaissance Missions

Only a few days after the United States entered World War II, submarine reconnaissance missions were ordered. *Pompano* (SS 181), for example, was ordered to patrol the Marshall Islands, sink Japanese ships, and determine what forces and equipment the Japanese had at their various island bases. Four days later, that submarine's orders were changed to make reconnaissance her primary mission, and *Pompano* proceeded to take a look at Wake, Eniwetok, Ujelang, Ponape, Rongelap, and Bikini.

A similar patrol was made by *Dolphin* (SS 169), which reconnoitered the Arno, Maloelap, Wotje, Kwajalein, and Jaluit Atolls to within 500 yards of the offshore reefs. Shortly thereafter, *Tautog* (SS 199) conducted surveillance of the Bikini, Rongelap, Kwajalein, Ujae, Utirik, and Taongi Atolls. Little was known of enemy installations on the isolated Pacific islands at that early stage of the war. Based on the information collected by the submarine reconnaissance patrols, the Navy made its first retaliatory strikes against enemy territory with the attack by RAdm. William F. Halsey's carrier task force on the Marshalls on 1 February 1942.

Periscope photography had been contemplated prior to World War II, and preliminary steps taken to obtain suitable cameras and adapt them to periscope use. No thought, however, had been given to the degree of exactness required if reconnaissance photographs were to be of intelligence value. Periscope photography was considered useful in identifying ship targets and proving that ships had been sunk.

Periscope photo reconnaissance was not fully developed until near the end of 1943, and much credit for the effective experimental work that went into perfecting it goes to the crew of *Nautilus* (SS 168). Amphibious landings were being planned for the Gilbert Islands for November 1943, and RAdm. Richmond Kelly Turner requested submarine reconnaissance of Tarawa, Makin, and Abemama. *Nautilus* was designated to perform the mission. Brackets for mounting the camera on the periscope were built at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and an enlisted photographer was assigned to the submarine for temporary duty. A darkroom was fitted in the submarine's lower sound room, because it was thought necessary to process the film on board to permit retaking any pictures that didn't turn out satisfactorily.

Thus equipped, *Nautilus* departed Pearl Harbor on 16 September 1943. Photographic problems that had to be overcome included vibration in the periscope and the low light available through the optical system of the periscope. Tactical obstacles included offshore reefs and possible defensive minefields that had to be watched for and avoided, the danger of detection by Japanese lookouts and sentries, and possible chart inaccuracies. In spite of these and other problems, the mission was accomplished. It revealed that the Hydrographic Office charts for the target area were generally correct about the contours of the various islands but that their orientation was out as much as 11 degrees in some instances. The panoramic photographs provided information on gun installations and other beach defenses, particularly the wire and log barricades erected on reefs and beaches.

On 19 November, D-Day minus one, *Nautilus* again entered Tarawa lagoon. The atoll had been under air attack for the past five days, and a preliminary surface bombardment was then in progress. *Nautilus* found that new, 6- to 8-foot, heavy log walls had been built on the beaches since the submarine's first visit and that the defenses were so far undamaged. The large coastal defense guns and the small beach guns were also undamaged, and the latter were fired at *Nautilus*. The new information was reported to the task force commander, along with estimates on the height of the surf at the various beaches.

The work of *Nautilus* on this first submarine reconnaissance mission solved the most difficult of the problems inherent to periscope photography proce-

dures and proved the value of submarine reconnaissance. As a consequence, all subsequent amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II were preceded by submarine photo reconnaissance. Each reconnaissance mission involved taking up to 2,000 individual pictures. When the submarine had returned to port, the prints, negatives, and charts showing the locations from which the pictures had been taken were turned in to the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) for further processing, interpretation, and dissemination.

The following submarine photo-reconnaissance missions were conducted in the Pacific during World War II:

Ship	Date	Commanding Officer and Area
Nautilus (SS 168)	Sep 1943	W. D. Irvin Tarawa, Makin, Abemama
Seal (SS 183)	Nov 1943	H. B. Dodge Kwajalein
Spearfish (SS 190)	Nov 1943	J. W. Williams Jaluit, Kwajalein, Wotje
Tarpon (SS 175)	Dec 1943	T. B. Oakley, Jr. Wotje, Kwajalein, Mili, Maloelap
Searaven (SS 196)	Jan 1944	H. M. Dry Eniwetok
Seal (SS 183)	Jan 1944	H. B. Dodge Ponape
Thresher (SS 200)	Mar 1944	D. C. MacMillan Oroluk, Nomi
Greenling (SS 213)	Mar 1944	J. D. Grant Saipan, Tinian, Guam
Salmon (SS 182)	Apr 1944	H. K. Nauman Ulithi, Woleai, Yap
Seawolf (SS 197)	Jun 1944	R. B. Lynch Palau
Burrfish (SS 312)	Jul 1944	W. B. Perkins Palau, Yap*
Spearfish (SS 190)	Nov 1944	C. C. Cole Iwo Jima
Swordfish (SS 193)	Dec 1944	K. E. Montross Okinawa†

*In addition to conducting photo reconnaissance, *Burrfish* made a landing party reconnaissance on the beaches of Palau and Yap using a landing party supplied by Commander, Amphibious Force, Pacific. Much valuable information was obtained on the beach and landing conditions on one Palau beach. Intense Japanese radar activity at other Palau beaches made landing party reconnaissance impracticable. Two landings were made on Yap; three men were lost on the second landing.
†Failed to return. Cause unknown.

In the closing months of the war in the Pacific, *Redfish* (SS 395) and *Runner* (SS 476) made submerged reconnaissance of coastal waters of Hokkaido and Honshu in early July 1945 to determine the existence of Japanese minefields in those waters prior to Third Fleet coastal bombardments during the period 10–20 July.[1]

Submarine Support to Coast Watchers

After the formal surrender of the Philippines to the Japanese early in 1942, the few Americans who escaped hid in remote parts of the archipelago, where there was no rapid and dependable means by which they could send Allied forces any information. Accordingly, it was decided to test the feasibility of making landings by submarine to supply the "coast watchers" with lightweight communications and surveillance equipment.

The first supply attempt was made on 14 January 1943, when the *Gudgeon* (SS 211) landed six men and 2,000 pounds of equipment and supplies on the island of Negros. This was followed by *Tambor* (SS 198), which landed a small party with about two tons of supplies at Labangan, Mindanao, on 5 March 1943. Thereafter, at about five-week intervals, small parties of personnel, each with about two tons of stores, were landed at various points in the central and southern Philippines by special missions carried out by selected submarines during their regular war patrols.

The cooperation of the natives in the southern part of the Philippines area was extremely good, and an organization of guerrilla forces, under the direction of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command, was set up along recognized military lines.

The success of a guerrilla organization in the Philippines was due in large measure to the feasibility of supplying it with a modicum of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, radios, and funds. When the requirements of the supply effort, plus the expansion of the coast watcher and communications net, mounted to proportions that could not be handled by submarines as part of their regular war patrols, a special supply unit was organized in October 1943.

The submarines *Narwhal* (SS 167), *Nautilus*, *Seawolf* (SS 197), and *Stingray* (SS 186) were assigned the primary duty of carrying out supply and evacuation missions in the Philippines area. That the efforts were highly successful was proved by the rapid growth of an efficient net of coast watchers, weather observers, and aircraft spotters. At the time of the initial U.S. landings in Leyte, a net of 120 small radio stations completely covered the central and southern Philippines, with additional, but incomplete, coverage of Luzon. The Navy staffed and operated two control stations in Mindanao to screen the guerrilla traffic and to pass on to Seventh Fleet units those intelligence items of operational importance. The military supplies brought in by the submarines played no small part in the organization of the Filipino natives into effective combat and reconnaissance units until, at the time of the amphibious

landings on Leyte, there were an estimated 65,000 organized guerrilla troops in the Philippines south of 12°N. The coast watchers in the Philippines rendered valuable service during the ensuing campaign.

Trout (SS 202), LCdr. Albert H. Clark commanding, was ordered to deliver a party of six or seven men, $10,000 in cash, and two tons of equipment and supplies to a designated spot on Basilan Island for the purpose of establishing a secret intelligence unit in the Sulu Archipelago and Zamboanga area. This unit was to become a coast watcher net to conduct a general reconnaissance survey and arrange for delivery of extra supplies to guerrilla units. *Trout*'s mission was completed on 26 May 1943.

While on patrol on 7 May 1944, *Crevalle* (SS 291), LCdr. Francis D. Walker, Jr., commanding, was ordered to pick up captured documents believed to be of high value at a site on the south coast of Negros, near Tolong, together with twenty-five U.S. evacuees. The special mission was accomplished on 11 May 1944; forty persons were evacuated, including twenty-eight women and children. The passengers were disembarked at Darwin on 19 May. Incident to the mission, a limited amount of food, ammunition, and canteen supplies was transferred to forces ashore. While in Molucca Passage during the return trip, *Crevalle* was subjected to severe depth-charging by Japanese forces.

Nautilus, LCdr. G. S. Sharp commanding—after delivering men and supplies off the mouth of Amney River, Mindoro, off Canayaon, Bohol and off Lagoma, Leyte, between 9 and 14 July 1944—was directed to make a pickup of important captured documents at Balatong Point, Negros. The additional special mission was accomplished on 16 July 1944.

Cero (SS 225), LCdr. Edward F. Dissette commanding, departed from Woendi on 17 October 1944 to discharge fourteen men and twenty tons of supplies at a pre-arranged spot on the west coast of Luzon. After arriving there, first at Darigayos Inlet on 25 October, and making no contact on the 25th, 26th, 27th, or 28th, or at Santiago Cove on the 29th or 30th, *Cero* finally made contact off the mouth of the Masanga River on the east coast of the island, and the personnel and supplies were off-loaded. Two Navy pilots and two evacuees were picked up for return to Pearl Harbor. Important, urgent Army intelligence sketches for Commander Southwest Pacific, and documents containing Philippine intelligence for Commander Seventh Fleet were brought back and disseminated to the proper authorities.

While on patrol, *Blackfin* (SS 322), under LCdr. George H. Laird, Jr., was directed on 14 November 1944 to pick up captured cryptographic and other secret documents plus technical equipment at a site west of Camuong River on the north coast of Mindoro. The mission was completed on 18 November, and the submarine rendezvoused off Morotai for transfer of the documents, which were then transported by air through the facilities of Commander Thirteenth Air Force to Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center, Hollandia (now Djajapura, Indonesia).

Seawolf, LCdr. Albert M. Bontier commanding, departed from Darwin on 1 August 1944 and on 7 August delivered a party of one officer, four radio operators, and one meteorologist, together with 14,538 pounds of supplies, to Tawitawi to reinforce an existing intelligence party. *Seawolf* then landed a party of one noncommissioned officer and five men and 7,153 pounds of supplies at a new site on northern Palawan on 9 August to set up a coast-watcher intelligence station. The missions were accomplished without undue incident, and *Seawolf* received a "Well Done" from Commander Task Force 72.

On its next mission, *Seawolf* was lost. The submarine departed Brisbane 21 September 1944 to discharge a party of seventeen men and six tons of cargo at a spot on the east coast of Samar and to pick up a Maj. Sabarre and eleven men who were to be landed on Batan Island together with nine tons of cargo. The estimated time of arrival at Samar was 6 October 1944, but the date was not met, and the submarine was listed overdue as of that date.

Gar (SS 206), LCdr. Maurice Ferrara commanding, departed Woendi, Biak, on 4 December 1944 with orders to deliver thirty-five tons of supplies to a prearranged spot off Darigayos Inlet (16°49′N, 120°19′E) and, upon completing the mission, to shift to operational control by Commander Submarine Force, Pacific for routing to Pearl Harbor. The mission was completed on 11 December with an added stop at Santiago Cove (17°17′2″N, 120°24′5″E) for a dawn pick-up of intelligence and Japanese documents of utmost secrecy to be delivered to the Army. One naval officer passenger was also picked up for the return trip.

A total of nineteen Seventh Fleet submarines were assigned to carry out supply and evacuation missions in the Philippines from 1 February 1943 to 23 January 1945. They participated in a total of forty-one missions over the two-year period. *Narwhal* participated in nine, followed by *Nautilus* with six and *Stingray* with five. *Seawolf* was the only submarine lost in the two-year period. On three other missions, the enemy attacked, but the submarines involved escaped without damage. Four missions involved delivery of important mail in addition to the delivery of personnel and cargo. Seven missions involved the pickup of "important captures or secret documents of intelligence value." During the nineteen missions, 331 persons and approximately 1,325 tons of supplies were delivered, and approximately 472 personnel were evacuated from the Philippines.[2]

Post–World War II Reconnaissance in the Pacific

Sea Dog (SS 401) conducted the first of a series of reconnaissance patrols outside Soviet territorial waters along the Siberian coast in May 1948. The primary benefit from the first patrol was the determination that there were no shoal water, pinnacles, anchored mines, or other dangers to submerged navigation in the international waters in that area. Efforts to sweep up to the 12-mile limit, however, were foiled by ice. Capt. T. A. Huckins, an intelligence officer from the Alaskan Joint Staff, was a passenger from Adak back to Kodiak during the patrol. He brought on board known Russian radio calls and frequencies, intelligence estimates on locations of Russian air bases, and a Russian dictionary. The material was passed on to *Blackfin*, the next submarine involved in the series of patrols.[3]

When the Korean War started on 25 June 1950, there were four submarines and one submarine rescue ship in the Western Pacific area. On 1 July 1950, Commander Seventh Fleet ordered all submarines to Yokosuka, Japan. It had been determined that any use of submarines would have to be confined mainly to the acquisition of intelligence information.

On 13 July 1950, Joint Zones for submarine operations were established as follows:

Zone 1: Between 24°26′N and 121°30′E to the China Coast.

Zone 2: Between 22°24′N and 116°20′E.

Zone 3: The sea area west of a line connecting 26°N, 122°42′E and 30°N, 124°E.

Zone 4: The sea area west of a line connecting 26°N, 121°30′E and 28°N, 122°42′E.

The first submarine reconnaissance patrols were started on 17 and 18 July by *Catfish* (SS 339) and *Pickerel* (SS 524) in Zones 3 and 1, respectively.

On 22 July, Joint Zones 5 and 6 were established south of 45°45′N, extending from 140°E to 145°E and bounded on the south by the island of Hokkaido. On 23 July, *Remora* (SS 487) departed Yokosuka for the first patrol of the La Perouse Strait.

On 1 August, China coast Zones 1 through 4 were taken over by surface patrols. Joint Zone 7 for periscope photo-reconnaissance was designated as the east coast of Korea between 40°N and 41°N latitude.

The primary mission of the submarine patrols in the La Perouse Strait was to obtain intelligence information for Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) and other operational commanders about the movement of foreign shipping. Between July and November 1950, the main items of interest obtained by the patrols were the large amount of Soviet shipping observed, the sighting of three Soviet submarines, and the Russian use of searchlights to identify passing ships.[4]

In December 1950, *Besugo* (SS 321) was assigned to the La Perouse Strait patrol area, but the weather conditions were so bad that reconnaissance efforts were ineffective, and the submarine patrols were discontinued for the duration of the winter months.[5]

From 4 April to 6 December 1951, submarine reconnaissance was conducted continuously in the La Perouse Strait area. Both visual and photographic collection provided much needed intelligence information on Soviet ships and shipping trends.[6]

Submarine patrols of La Perouse Strait were resumed on 1 March 1952 and continued until 10 December; visual and photographic surveillance was conducted of shipping east, north, and west of Hokkaido. The submarines also made reports to COMNAVFE on Soviet and Chinese Communist sea and airborne activity. To increase the effectiveness of the patrols and to improve the security of submarine operations, patrol areas were expanded by the establishment of Joint Zone 10 in August and Joint Zone 11 in October 1952. Zone 10 was bounded by latitudes 44°30′N and 46°30′N and longitudes 138°45′E and 140°E; Zone 11 included waters north of latitude 46°N and between longitudes 143°55′E and 145°E. In December 1952, a reconnaissance patrol was conducted by *Scabbardfish* (SS 397) off the South China coast.[7]

On 22 January 1953, patrols of the La Perouse Strait were again resumed in order to maintain continuity of shipping surveillance and to provide submarine crews with experience in cold weather operations. Limited amphibious landing and raiding operations from submarines were also carried on during the period of February through July 1953. The cessation of Korean War hostilities on 27 July 1953 caused no change in the submarine reconnaissance operations. *Pomfret* (SS 391), on station at the time, remained on patrol until relieved in August by *Ronquil* (SS 396).[8]

Chapter Notes

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5. CO *Besugo* (SS 321) ltr with encls., 23 Dec 1950.

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CHAPTER 7

Prisoner-of-War Interrogation

POW Interrogation During World War II

The Special Intelligence Section (OP-16-F-9) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, set up in January 1941, was responsible for, among other things, prisoner-of-war (POW) interrogations. Early in the summer of 1941, members of the staff commenced drawing up plans for the interrogation of naval POWs. In September 1941, a comprehensive recommendation on the organization and its methods of operation was submitted. Instead, a joint Army-Navy committee was designated by the Secretaries of War and Navy to draft recommendations on the handling and custody of POWs. The recommendations were made to, and approved by, the Secretary of the Navy on 4 October 1941 and approved by the Secretary of War on 10 October 1941. The agreement provided that the Army would assume custody of all POWs and that persons captured by the Navy would be delivered to the Army as soon as practicable.

Other preparatory actions for POW interrogations were taken by OP-16-F-9 in October 1941. A Naval Reserve officer was assigned to London to receive training in British methods of interrogation. Also, Navy Department activities were requested to furnish questionnaires on desired subjects to be covered during the interrogation of POWs. Following OP-16-F-9's receipt of the questionnaires, they were promulgated to all ships and stations by the Chief of Naval Operations on 5 December 1941, together with instructions as to procedures for the interrogation of POWs.

Also in October, the first ONI opportunity to conduct a POW interrogation arrived when the German cargo ship M/S *Odenwald*, running the blockade from Japan and at the time of its capture masquerading as the American vessel *Willmoto*, was apprehended off Brazil by the light cruiser *Omaha* (CL 4). Although attempts were made by the German crew to scuttle the vessel, *Omaha* was successful in bringing *Odenwald* and her crew into San Juan. The crew was brought to the United States for internment. From documents captured with the vessel and through interrogations of the crew, valuable information was developed by the Special Intelligence Section on operational aspects of German blockade running, such as the routes and rendezvous points for blockade runners making French ports.

A joint Army-Navy conference on organizational needs, interrogation procedures, and internment facilities resulted in more recommendations that were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 18 December 1941 and the Secretary of War on 6 January 1942. In accordance with the recommendations, the War Department undertook to establish two joint interrogation centers, one in the vicinity of Washington, D.C., at Fort Hunt, Virginia, on 2 August 1942, and the other on the West Coast at Byron Hot Springs, California, on 15 December 1942.

The first German naval prisoners captured by U.S. forces were from the submarine *U-352*, sunk by the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Icarus* (WPC 110) off the Carolina Capes on 9 May 1942. Interrogation was eventually conducted when the joint interrogation center at Fort Hunt was opened in August, and a fairly complete history of the boat was obtained.[1]

On 5 August 1942, the Special Intelligence Section became the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z) and was organized as follows:

— Chief of Section: In charge.

— Administrative Officer: Washington Office Administrator, and in charge of security, procurement of supplies, assignment and direction of clerical personnel, indoctrination of new personnel, and acting as custodian of registered publications.

— Interrogators: Interrogated prisoners at interrogation centers and ports of arrival, participated in salvage operations and in preparation of reports.

— Censorship Officer: Responsible for the censoring of POW mail.

— Research and Analysis Unit: Reviewed all incoming intelligence material, indexed pertinent information in the master, ship name, and boat lists, and circulated reports of general and specific interest throughout the section.

— Personnel on Watch List: Available for watch standing at interrogation centers, for transcription of recordings, and for editorial work in preparation of reports.[2]

In October 1942, two Japanese language officers were detached from OP-16-Z, one to be assigned to the 14th Naval District and the other to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section then being established in Brisbane, Australia. The head of the German Interrogation Section accompanied the officers to Australia to assist in the establishment of interrogation facilities on a combined service basis. He returned to the United States in company with the head of the British Admiralty interrogation unit with recommendations for more interrogation facilities and procedures for the Pacific theater.

When the Brisbane unit became operational, the officer at the 14th Naval District was transferred to Australia, and three additional officers were sent to Brisbane from the United States. In the summer of 1943, one of the officers in Australia was transferred to Noumea, New Caledonia, to assist in interrogations there. An officer was also ordered to Brisbane in February 1943 to handle captured enemy equipment and, after a few months, was transferred to Noumea for similar work there.[3]

Early in 1943, two officers from OP-16-Z were assigned to the collection of material derived from POW interrogations that might be of use for psychological warfare purposes. The two offices worked closely with the Special Warfare Branch (OP-16-W) in the preparation of the material.[4]

At the time of the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency in North Africa in March 1943, the head of the Special Activities Branch went to London and worked out an arrangement with the Admiralty for combined participation by the Allies in interrogation centers at Algiers and Cairo. Three officers trained by OP-16-Z were assigned to Algiers and two were assigned to Cairo.[5]

On 6 May 1943, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) approved a joint agreement on the operation of interrogation centers. The agreement clarified and formalized existing procedures for Army administrative control, and it provided that operational, tactical, and technical information from military and naval POWs be disseminated only by the cognizant service in order to ensure proper evaluation. Under the agreement, it was possible to reduce the size of the naval interrogation unit, with the Army taking over certain functions that naval personnel had previously performed.[6]

U-118, sunk on 12 June 1943, was a new type of minelaying submarine weighing 1,600 tons. Through interrogation of prisoners from the German submarine, it was possible by mid-July to obtain scale drawings of the boat and details of its mines and their method of operation. The intelligence success was illustrative of the changed direction of POW interrogation that put emphasis on determining enemy technical developments in the fields of electronics, torpedoes, and armament. Improved interrogation techniques and the increased willingness of some prisoners to divulge information made it possible to derive much information on enemy developments in new technologies that were still in an experimental stage.[7]

With the increased emphasis on technical subjects, interrogators were able to obtain complete information and drawings on new types of German acoustic torpedoes, supplementary data on the circling torpedo used against convoys, information on the stationing of communications intelligence personnel on U-boats, information on radar and counter-radar installations and methods, details on modifications of armament, and information on German submarine tactics. Much intelligence acquired from POW interrogations during the period was regarded by operational and technical personnel as being of immediate importance for adapting Allied antisubmarine warfare equipment and methods to counter enemy devices and tactics.

Because of the increased submarine activity off Brazil, Commander Fourth Fleet requested an officer to facilitate preliminary interrogations. In August 1943, one ONI officer, Lt.(jg) J. R. Mullen, USNR, from OP-16-Z was assigned to the task.[8]

Because only a few Japanese POWs were being sent to the United States, it was decided in September 1943 to bring all Japanese language personnel from Byron Hot Springs back to Washington and assign them to the Far East Section of the Intelligence Branch of ONI. Navy personnel remaining at Byron Hot Springs after the shift were one officer, one enlisted person, and one civilian.

The large numbers of enemy naval personnel captured in July and August 1943, and the increasing volume of Army prisoners from the Mediterranean theater, proved the inadequacy of the interrogation center at Fort Hunt. As a temporary expedient, the Army developed facilities at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Pine Grove Furnace, Pennsylvania, as holding camps for POWs await-

ing interrogation. The facilities became available in late September.

German naval POWs taken in the Mediterranean were sent to London or Washington after a brief preliminary interrogation. If a ship was sailing for the United Kingdom first, the prisoners went to London; if it was sailing to the United States first, the POWs were sent to Washington. Special exceptions were made for talented technical personnel, who were flown to London.

The Naval Intelligence Division (NID) 1/PW was the British counterpart to ONI's OP-16-Z, and Lt. C. L. Kuhn, USNR, was assigned as the liaison between OP-16-Z and NID 1/PW. The British asked Kuhn what plans OP-16-Z would furnish Navy interrogators if and when cross-channel operations took place. Lt. Kuhn checked with Capt. Norman S. Ives, the officer on the staff of Commander Task Force 122 responsible for port administration, and Ives said he wanted a minimum of four Navy interrogation teams to accompany the American assault forces.[9]

Naval POWs interrogated by OP-16-Z in 1942 and 1943, numbering in excess of 700, came from the following enemy ships:

— German *U-352*, sunk by USCG *Icarus* (WPC 110) on 9 May 1942 off Cape Hatteras.

— Japanese heavy cruiser *Mikuma*, sunk at the Battle of Midway, June 1942.

— German *U-210*, sunk by HMCS *Assiniboine* on 6 July 1942 in the North Atlantic, south of Cape Farewell.

— German *U-701*, sunk by an Army bomber on 7 July 1942 off Cape Hatteras.

— Japanese submarine *RO-61*, sunk by *Reid* (DD 369) in August 1942 in the Aleutians.

— German *U-94*, sunk by corvette HMCS *Oakville* and a U.S. Navy plane on 27 August 1942 in the Caribbean.

— German *U-162*, sunk by destroyers HMS *Quentin*, *Pathfinder*, and *Vimy* on 3 September 1942 off Trinidad.

— German *U-512*, sunk by U.S. Army bomber on 10 October 1942 in the Trinidad area.

— Japanese heavy cruiser *Furutaka*, sunk on 12 October 1942 in the Solomons at the Battle of Cape Esperance.

— German *U-595*, sunk by a British plane on 14 November 1942 off Cape Khamis, Algiers.

— German cargo ship *Anneliese Essberger*, scuttled on 21 November 1942 in the South Atlantic after being intercepted by *Milwaukee* (CL 5), *Cincinnati* (CL 6), and *Somers* (DD 381).

— Japanese destroyer *Takanami*, sunk 30 November 1942 in the Solomons at the Battle of Tassafaronga.

— German *U-164*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 6 January 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-606*, sunk by USCG *Campbell* (WPG 32) and Polish destroyer *Burza* on 22 February 1943 in the North Atlantic.

— German merchant ship *Speybank*, sunk by probable German submarine 3 March 1943 in the South Atlantic.

— German merchant ship *Kota Nopan*, scuttled 10 March 1943 in the South Atlantic after intercept by *Savannah* (CL 42) task group.

— Italian submarine *Archimede*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane 15 April 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-203*, sunk by planes from carrier HMS *Biter* and by destroyer HMS *Pathfinder* on 25 April 1943 in the North Atlantic.

— German *U-128*, sunk by Brazilian aircraft and *Moffett* (DD 362) and *Jouett* (DD 396) on 17 May 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-569*, sunk by plane from *Bogue* (CVE 9) on 22 May 1943 in the North Atlantic.

— German *U-521*, sunk by *PC-565* on 2 June 1943 off the Virginia Capes.

— German *U-118*, sunk by a plane from *Bogue* on 12 June 1943 near the Canary Islands.

— German *U-409*, sunk by destroyer HMS *Inconstant* on 12 July 1943 in the Mediterranean.

— German *U-487*, sunk by a plane from *Core* (CVE 13) on 13 July 1943 off the Azores.

— German *U-67*, sunk by a plane from *Core* on 16 July 1943 off the Azores.

— German *U-513*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 19 July 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-662*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 21 July 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-527*, sunk by a plane from *Bogue* on 23 July 1943 off the Azores.

— German *U-598*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 23 July 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-591*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 30 July 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-199*, sunk by a Brazilian plane on 31 July 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-615*, sunk by a Navy patrol plane on 7 August 1943 east of Trinidad.

— German *U-664*, sunk by a plane from *Card* (CVE 11) on 9 August 1943 north of the Azores.

— German *U-604*, scuttled after an attack by a Navy plane 11 August 1943 off Brazil.

— German *U-185*, sunk by a plane from *Core* on 24 August 1943 in the North Atlantic.

— German *U-841*, sunk by HMS *Byard* 17 October 1943 in the North Atlantic.

— German *U-848*, sunk by a Navy plane during November 1943 in the South Atlantic (only one survivor, who died).

— German *U-172*, sunk by *Bogue* task group during December 1943 in the Mid-Atlantic.[10]

Navy POWs interrogated by OP-16-Z during 1944 came from the following ships:

— Three German blockade runners intercepted in January in the South Atlantic.

— German *U-231*, sunk by British aircraft on 13 January north of the Azores.

— German *U-177*, sunk in the Atlantic in February.

— German *U-761*, sunk in the approaches to the Mediterranean on 24 February by U.S. and British aircraft and HMS destroyers *Anthony* and *Wishart*.

— German *U-575*, sunk in the mid-Atlantic by U.S. and British aircraft and ships from the *Bogue* task group on 13 March.

— Japanese submarine *I-35*, sunk by *Frazier* (DD 607) off Tarawa during the attack on Tarawa.

— German *U-801*, sunk by *Block Island* (CVE 106) task group on 17 March off the Cape Verde Islands.

— German *U-1059*, sunk by *Block Island* task group on 19 March off the Cape Verde Islands.

— German *U-856* sunk by destroyer *Champlin* (DD 601) and escort *Huse* (DE 145) off Long Island, New York.

— German *U-515*, sunk by *Guadalcanal* (CVE 60) task group on 9 April near Madeira.

— German *U-68*, sunk by *Guadalcanal* task group on 10 April northwest of Madeira.

— German *U-371*, sunk in the Mediterranean by U.S., British, and French escorts on 5 May.

— German *U-66*, sunk by *Block Island* task group on 1 May west of the Cape Verde Islands.

— German *U-616*, sunk in the Mediterranean on 17 May by U.S. destroyers and British aircraft.

— German *U-960*, sunk in the Mediterranean on 19 May by *Niblack* (DD 424) and *Ludlow* (DD 438) and British aircraft.

— German *U-505*, captured in mid-Atlantic by *Guadalcanal* task group on 4 June.

— German *U-490*, sunk in the central Atlantic by *Croatan* (CVE 25) task group on 11 June.

— German *U-860*, sunk in the south Atlantic by aircraft from *Solomons* (CVE 67) on 15 June.

— German *U-233*, rammed and sunk off Halifax by escorts *Baker* (DE 190) and *Thomas* (DE 102) on 5 July.

— German *U-1229*, sunk in the North Atlantic by aircraft from *Bogue* (CVE 9) on 20 August.

— A German destroyer sunk in the Mediterranean during 1944.[11]

On the basis of information and drawings produced from the interrogations of German naval prisoners in the United States, research agencies were able to construct a working model of a new German acoustic torpedo. This development made it possible to continue tests and experiments for the development of countermeasures.[12]

In March 1944, one officer and two civilian agents were detached from their Washington duties and returned to the West Coast interrogation center because of the increased number of Japanese POWs arriving there. The influx was the result of a change in Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet policy intended to speed up the transfer to the United States of prisoners taken in the Pacific. In view of the amphibious character of Japanese military operations in the Pacific, arrangements were made with the Army to interrogate all Japanese prisoners jointly. This was different from the practice with German POWs where, in general, interrogations were conducted exclusively by officers of the cognizant service.[13]

Personnel from OP-16-Z were sent to Europe prior to the Normandy landings to assist in the interrogation of German prisoners of war. Some were assigned to various front-line activities for tactical debriefings. Those assigned to British port parties worked along the French coast. Similarly, some OP-16-Z personnel were attached to the Joint U.S. Navy-Royal Navy 20th Assault Unit, exploiting captured documents and hardware as well as POWs; they also visited all major coastal installations, especially submarine pens, from Le Havre to Lorient and including Brest and Cherbourg. Other OP-16-Z personnel worked with Alsos units (technical specialists sent to Europe ostensibly to recover weapons technology but primarily charged with obtaining information on the German nuclear weapons program) and Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit 3 prior to the latter's breakup to form the Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NAVTECHMISEU). Various mine and bomb disposal personnel assigned to assault units in the European, African, and Mediterranean areas also participated in the POW interrogation effort.[14] See Chapter 11 for further information on the Alsos effort and NAVTECHMISEU and Chapter 39 for a fairly detailed report on the interrogation effort in that area following the Normandy landings.

During 1945, naval POWs interrogated by OP-16-Z were from the following enemy ships and submarines:

— German *U-546*, sunk in the North Atlantic by eight U.S. escorts on 24 April.

— German *U-1228*, *234*, *805*, *873*, *548*—all surrendered 9 May in Europe at the end of hostilities.

— German *U-858*, surrendered 14 May and sent into Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

— German *U-530*, surrendered at Buenos Aires on 10 July.

— German *U-977*, surrendered at Buenos Aires on 17 August.

— Japanese submarine *I-365*.

— Japanese cruiser *Natori*.

— Japanese escort destroyer *Matsu*.

— Japanese submarine *I-24*.[15]

Obtaining "negative information" was occasionally an important factor in the interrogation of prisoners. As an example, reports received from Stockholm early in November 1944 indicated that the Germans were installing launch platforms for V-1 missiles on some of the new Type XXI submarines. Norwegian reports also concluded that the boats were being prepared for attacks on New York City and other U.S. ports. This alarming intelligence understandably aroused the concern of those responsible for the defense of the East Coast, particularly when six German submarines in Group *Seewolf* were detected heading west in the North Atlantic in the early spring of 1945. When one of the submarines, *U-546*, was sunk on 24 April and her survivors rescued, it became very important to determine, if possible, the mission of the group, perhaps thereby refuting the previous reports. Survivors from *U-546* were sent to Argentia, Newfoundland, and before many hours passed it became evident to naval interrogators that Group *Seewolf* had not been dispatched to deliver the long-heralded V-1 attack against East Coast cities but simply to conduct a vigorous diversionary campaign against shipping in North American waters.

Subsequent Turkish reports that the Germans planned to begin bombarding the Atlantic seaboard with stratospheric V-3 bombs served further to confirm suspicion that the warnings were Nazi-inspired psychological warfare.[16]

In May 1945, intensive interrogation was conducted of the German army and navy officers and technical specialists who were passengers in the *U-234* en route Japan when it surrendered to U.S. forces at the end of European hostilities. Details about the exchange of information between Germany and Japan were particularly important and proved to be invaluable not only in connection with the continuing war against Japan but also as a windfall in support of U.S. advances in electronics and other fields of research.[17]

A contemporary listing of the outstanding accomplishments of the German Interrogation Section of OP-16-Z during World War II concluded that it

— was one of the principal sources on which Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Combat Intelligence, had based its appreciation of German U-boat warfare. POW interrogation provided information on U-boat tactics, new equipment, morale, and unit disposition;

— was the sole source of advance information on the German acoustic torpedo;

— was the sole source of advance information on the *schnorchel* breathing device that permitted German submarines to operate their diesel engines while running submerged at shallow depths;

— was the sole source of advance information on German high-underwater-speed U-boats;

— had provided information of great value on German communications;

— had provided continuous and detailed information on the development of a German search receiver that was built to intercept Allied radar;

— had deduced the operational use of the German submarine bubble target during salvage operations of *U-72* in May 1942 and confirmed it during interrogation of *U-701* POWs in July 1942; and

— was the principal source of information on a number of other U-boat developments such as radar decoy balloons and spar buoys, antiradar covering for *schnorchels* and U-boat superstructures, the helicopter carried by some long-range U-boats, mines and torpedoes, U-boat minelayers, and infrared sensors.

In the spring of 1944, a German espionage agent, Oskar Mantel, who was to have been landed in the United States, was picked up from a U-boat sunk in the Atlantic. He was turned over to the FBI and corroborated a great deal of information on the German intelligence service, particularly its methods of operation and the identity of the personnel in the Paris *Abwehrstelle*.[18]

POW Interrogation During the Korean War

Interrogations of POWs within the Korean theater were conducted in accordance with Army intelligence directives. The lack of trained interrogators within the Navy was partially offset by the use of Republic of Korea navy personnel, particularly in connection with intelligence teams that had been sent ashore. The contents of POW interrogation reports from the Army were disappointingly lacking in items of naval interest. As of May 1951, the 200 POW interrogation reports then completed mentioned nothing on the enemy navy or naval matters, although some of the prisoners had lived in, trained at, or passed through such ports as Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, Hamhung, and Yanggang.

An example of the continuing problem concerning unsatisfactory interrogation of POWs by the Army is the capture of a large, new, heavily constructed sampan on 22 May 1952 by the minesweeper *Murrelet*

(AM 372). One of the crew of five taken prisoner volunteered information about the location of a minefield but gave no details on its location. The results of later official interrogation of the prisoner, which should have expanded the information on this very important subject, were never made available to Commander Mine Squadron 3.[19]

The Interrogation Desk (OP-322Y4E) was activated in the Office of Naval Intelligence in October 1951. By March 1952, the organization was ready to inaugurate an interrogation training program. At that time, there were no trained POW interrogators in ONI to fill Navy requirements in Russian or Soviet satellite languages. To correct the situation, it was recommended that a vigorous program be initiated to procure civilian linguists as volunteer reserves to be trained in POW interrogation in OP-322Y and that a specific number of graduates from each class of the Russian language course at the Naval Intelligence School be assigned to intensive POW interrogation training in OP-322Y.[20]

POW Interrogation During the Vietnam War

Throughout the Vietnam War, the South Vietnamese were responsible for the custody and processing of prisoners of war. Frequently, knowledgeable POWs who had information of interest to the U.S. Navy were not interrogated on naval subjects by their captors or, if they were, the interrogations were inadequate. On a number of occasions, Navy personnel were unable to question high-interest POWs until after the South Vietnamese were finished. The POWs had on occasion been physically abused by the South Vietnamese and, by the time U.S. Navy interrogators were given access to them, they were no longer capable of recalling information of interest. Additionally, any time-sensitive information the POWs may have had was no longer of value. In the few instances where early access to potentially important POWs was gained by the Navy, the access had to be obtained through high-level negotiations by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.[21]

The author has not had the opportunity to research the files of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for information relating to the interrogation of prisoners of war during the Vietnam conflict. Such debriefings, of course, were conducted in-country and often on an ad hoc basis. Thus, unless a full report had been sent back to DIA in Washington, it is quite probable that many of the records of naval-related interrogations were not preserved.

Chapter Notes

1. OP-16-Z, "History of the Special Activities Branch, 17 Jun 1942–31 Oct 1943," MS, 4–5, 9–10, OA.

2. *ONI Roster*; Capt. John L. Riheldaffer ltr to LCdr. Ralph G. Albrecht, 8 Sep 1942, OP-16-Z misc. file, OA.

3. "History of Special Activities Branch," 14–15.

4. Ibid., 18.

5. Ibid., 16.

6. Ibid., 20–21.

7. Ibid., 18.

8. Ibid., 20–21.

9. OP-16-Z ltr to Lt. Kuhn, 29 Dec 1943, OP-16-Z misc. file.

10. "History of the Special Activities Branch," 9–20; and Erich Gröner, von Dieter Jung, and Martin Maass, *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 1815–1945* (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1985) 3:82–119.

11. Ibid.

12. OP-16-Z memo, 1 Mar 1944.

13. OP-16-Z memo, 1 Apr 1944.

14. Capt. C. J. Oleniecz ltr to author, 13 Dec 1974.

15. "History of the Special Activities Branch," 9–20; and Gröner, et al., *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe.*

16. Philip K. Lundeburg, "American Antisubmarine Operations in the Atlantic, May 1943–May 1945" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1953), chap. 12, 25–26.

17. OP-16-Z memo, 4 Jun 1945.

18. George Kidd (OP-322F114) memo to Capt. Harris W. Baltazzi (OP-32B1), 23 Dec 1948. Kidd, who later became ONI's senior civilian, had been a POW interrogator during the Normandy landings on detachment from OP-16-Z and is believed to have written much of the manuscript history cited above; in 1948 he was the naval officer in charge of the ONI German Desk.

19. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 2: Korean War Naval Operations*, 1744–45.

20. OP-322Y4E memo, 12 Mar 1952, box 1, "Incoming Correspondence File, 1952–1953," Job 12876, FRC/WNRC.

21. Task Force 168, Lessons Learned in Vietnam (LLIVN), Annex C, 29.

CHAPTER 8

Human Intelligence

This chapter discusses the field of human intelligence (HUMINT) in a necessarily fragmentary format, and the story of the Navy's formal involvement in HUMINT is ended in 1970 because of security concerns. Many other chapters in this history discuss various aspects of human intelligence, but this chapter relates specific events not covered elsewhere. It also describes the evolution of the administration of Navy HUMINT.

World War II Experience

Recognizing the need for an undercover intelligene collection organization within the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1939, various ONI officers considered action to correct the deficiency. Cdr. Francis D. Pryor, USN (Ret.), ONI's Plans Officer (OP-16-X) since 1931, devoted considerable time to the collection and preparation of material for the publication of ONI-22, a preliminary effort toward the production of a manual on espionage. Lt. Marsden J. Perry, USNR, had also collected material on the subject. Cdr. Elliot B. Nixon, head of Domestic Intelligence in 1939, was placed in charge of ONI's espionage functions.[1]

The Special Intelligence Section (OP-16-F-9) of ONI's Foreign Intelligence Branch was established on 17 June 1940 for the purpose of obtaining, training, and administering secret agents. It was staffed by one retired officer, Pryor, and a chief yeoman.

In the spring of 1941, arrangements were made with the State Department for the assignment of control officers or vice consuls by the Army and Navy to locations in North Africa for the purpose of collecting intelligence. By the summer of 1941, two Navy representatives, selected by OP-16-F-9, had been posted to Algiers, and one each to Casablanca, Oran, and Tunis. Later a vice consul was sent to Dakar.

Also in April 1941, the OP-16-F-9 section head, Cdr. John L. Riheldaffer, USN (Ret.), made a trip to the 11th Naval District and arranged for the development and operation of an intelligence network along the west coast of Mexico under the immediate direction of an assistant to the district intelligence officer. Riheldaffer held the ultimate responsibility for the administration and direction of the net in Mexico, and he received all reports from it. In July 1941, one of Riheldaffer's agents detected Japanese smuggling of mercury from Mexican ports; the detection resulted in the smuggling being stopped.[2]

OP-16-F-9 also engaged in the cultivation of contacts within business organizations abroad that might be in a position to furnish information concerning possible enemy countries. The Special Intelligence Section also employed a number of agents under special contract; one went to the Far East, two traveled through the Far East and Middle East, three were assigned in the Middle East, one was sent to Spain, one went to West Africa, and two traveled to the Caribbean and Mexican areas. In general, the agents were individuals who traveled in the areas of interest for open purposes and who accepted the task of collecting and reporting information that might be of value to the Navy.

Upon the establishment of the Office of Coordination of Information in July 1941, all Navy special intelligence activities were transferred to that office. The civilian employee who had been participating in the work in OP-16-F-9 took over the direction of espionage in the new organization.

As of 1 April 1942, the Coordinator of Information turned the operation of the special intelligence activities conducted in Mexico back to the Navy. From the 11th Naval District, a network was maintained that covered lower California and the Pacific coast of Mexico. In addition, two fishing boats were acquired for collecting offshore intelligence. The fishing boat cover was successful, at least insofar that a substantial monetary profit was made from the boat's catch. The principal intelligence service performed by the Mexican operation, however, was

to disprove the existence of Japanese activities in the area.

A special intelligence office was established in San Antonio, Texas, from which contact was maintained with a chain of informants along the Gulf of Mexico and in Mexico City. In 1942, particular attention was paid to the possibility that enemy agents were making contact with German submarines operating extensively in the Gulf of Mexico. The counterespionage effort failed to find any evidence of shore-based support for the U-boats.

On 5 August 1942, the Special Intelligence Section was removed from the Foreign Intelligence Branch and established as the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z).[3]

In September 1943, the North American Theater Desk (OP-16-FN) of ONI was charged with the responsibility of supervising coastal intelligence collection and the collection of strategic intelligence from sources within the United States. FN sections were set up in each naval district to contact domestic sources, both companies and individuals, that might have information on foreign subjects and places of interest to the Navy.

OP-16-FN received the information collected by its offices in the naval districts, logged it, tabulated it on cards, indexed it, and sent it on to the analysts at the cognizant ONI geographic desks for evaluation and processing. Sources were tabulated according to their knowledge, identity, naval district of contact, and the evaluation of the information they supplied. The list of sources thus developed was the start of what eventually became known as the Navy Contact Register.

Many of the reports derived from domestic sources contained excellent information. One such report obtained by the District Intelligence Office, 9th Naval District from an old copra trader who had visited many of the islands of the Western Pacific contained information, maps, charts, and photos of the island of Tarawa, including the locations of coral reefs. The value of the report was immediately recognized, and it was quickly reproduced and distributed—but not in time to reach the Marines, who were landing with heavy losses on Tarawa, due partly to their landing craft getting hung up on the coral reefs.[4]

Post–World War II and Korea

U.S. Naval Forces Western Pacific, following World War II and the disestablishment of Commander Naval Group, China, established the Intelligence Liaison Office (ILO) in Shanghai for the purpose of maintaining contact with the various factions competing for control of China and observing their activities.

In that connection, ILO Shanghai maintained discreet contact with various officials and members of the *Ching Hung Pang*, a Chinese secret society and progenitor of the *Kuomintang*. When ILO Shanghai was first established (circa 1946), officials of the society frequently and voluntarily supplied a considerable amount of early and usually accurate political, economic, military, and counterintelligence information. The *Ching Hung Pang* also provided cover, protection, and introductions when needed in connection with intelligence and security activities. In early 1948, when the Central Government's control of metropolitan centers was becoming more tenuous, several ranking officers active in the society offered to arrange for a flow of pertinent information to the ILO and for the protection of U.S. and foreign lives and property in case of a possible general breakdown of law and order, a major emergency arising from mob action, or an attack on Shanghai by dissident military forces.[5]

During the preparations for the 15 September 1950 Inchon landing, intelligence collection was performed by Lt. Eugene F. Clark who, while assigned to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff, had been asked to volunteer for the task. With two interpreters, some weapons, a radio, and other supplies, he was put ashore on the island of Yonghung-do at the mouth of the channel leading to Inchon. Clark set up a "command post," recruited and organized 150 South Korean youths into his "army," and sent them on intelligence gathering missions to obtain information about Inchon's harbor defenses. Clark himself reconnoitered potential landing areas in and near Inchon, sending in information on beach conditions, tides, and navigation problems in the winding channel leading to the city.

Nightly harassing attacks against Clark's station on Yonghung-do by Red soldiers from a nearby island were initially small-scale and were beaten off. A week before the Inchon invasion, the North Koreans attacked in some force but again were repulsed when Clark attacked their boats with an armed sampan.

On the night of the invasion, when the United Nations fleet approached, Clark climbed the darkened Inchon harbor lighthouse and relighted its beacon. He then sailed out to and boarded the American command ship as it entered the harbor.[6]

In March 1951, very little coordination or liaison existed between naval forces and the covert agencies that were operating along the coasts of Korea behind enemy lines. On several occasions, United Nations naval forces and aircraft fired on small craft that were found later to have been carrying friendly agents or guerrillas. Gradually, the various agencies were identified, and measures were taken

CHAPTER 9

Translation Services

From the Origin of ONI to World War II

In 1800, President John Adams wrote to the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, showing an early recognition of the importance to the Navy of information contained in foreign documents. He advised his Secretary to estabish a library that would include the best writings on all aspects of naval science and theory as well as biographies of those foreign admirals most skilled in naval combat.[1]

The importance of foreign documents to the Navy was still recognized when the Office of Naval Intelligence was established in 1882. Department of the Navy General Order 292 directed that the new office be combined with the Navy Department Library to facilitate its work in collecting and recording naval information.[2]

One of the earliest forms of collection used by ONI was the translation of foreign books and periodicals obtained by the Navy Department Library and the various ships, bureaus, and offices of the Navy. Lt. Theodorus B. M. Mason, the first head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was an accomplished linguist and well aware of the wealth of information on foreign naval developments available in open literature published in foreign languages. The officers initially assigned to assist Lt. Mason, however, were not necessarily proficient translators and had to exploit the publications, word by word, using foreign language dictionaries.[3]

The first appropriation bill passed by Congress to specifically mention funds for the Office of Naval Intelligence was for Fiscal Year 1900 and authorized the employment of one translator at $1,400 per year.[4]

By 1902, translations of foreign language documents were being regularly made by ONI for the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Bureau of Navigation, and, when required, for other bureaus of the Department of the Navy. The volume of the work was reportedly considerable.[5]

The ONI organization in 1918 contained a Translating Section (OP-16-E) that was charged with translating intelligence documents from French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Dutch, Japanese, Chinese, and German. It also had to clip, file, and distribute certain foreign newspapers and periodicals received by ONI.[6]

As a result of U.S. failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, captured documents on the German design of warships, armaments, munitions, torpedoes, mines, wireless apparatus, and related naval war material were not made available to the United States by the Allied powers. In consequence, Capt. Walter R. Gherardi headed an American delegation sent to Germany in January–February 1919 to gather whatever information and documents it could find. Several similar missions were sent to Germany and Central Europe following World War I, and most of them included naval officers. The foreign-language material had to be translated later at the Office of Naval Intelligence.[7]

In 1930, it was recorded that the Translating Section was unable to keep up with the amount of translation work requested.[8]

By 1932, the Translating Section had three translators: Eva M. Smith, principal translator, in charge; Mary P. Stevens, senior translator, stenographer, and typist; and Johanna Boernsen, senior translator. The work of the section consisted entirely of making translations into English from French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and Dutch, and occasionally from Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian. The translations were made to meet the needs of not only ONI but also the various bureaus of the Navy, the Naval Research Laboratory, the Naval Observatory, and other government departments.

Much of the translation work was in highly technical areas and required the translators to con-

sult with knowledgeable technicians and research technical reference books in order to achieve correct terminology. Lack of standardization of terms among various countries added to the difficulty in translating technical subjects. An additional German language translator was requested in 1932. In 1933, however, the Translating Section (OP-16-A-6) was reduced to two translators; a request was made for another translator, this time for one qualified in French.[9]

The need for additional translators was again expressed in 1934. A total of 1,619 pages had been translated between 1 July 1933 and 30 June 1934, but the backlog was 284 printed pages, plus a number of books, pamphlets, and other records awaiting translation when higher priority workload circumstances would allow.[10]

As of 1 December 1939, the Translating Section consisted of Johanna Boernsen as chief translator and Bluma Karp, Mildred Mervine, Edwin Niggli, and a Miss Grande as translators. The section was part of the Administrative Branch and was still located in the Main Navy Building on Constitution Avenue.

World War II

During reorganization of ONI in mid-1941, the Translating Section became the Translations Unit of the Services Section of the Administrative Branch, and its designator was changed to OP-16-A-4-d. Other translators added since 1939 included Mary Masser, Beatrice Dillon, Mildry Sluth, and H. Pearson Hopper. Language translation capabilities included French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Latin, Greek, Dutch, German, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Russian and other Slavic languages, Lithuanian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Hebrew. The Far East Section (OP-16-FE-2) of ONI, essentially an analytical organization, handled Japanese translations. In late 1941 or early 1942, the Translations Unit moved to the new temporary "L-Building," across the reflecting pool from the Main Navy Building.[11]

The mission of the ONI Translations Unit during World War II was to supervise the preparation of all translation work and the servicing of all language problems originating in the Navy Department. Its task was to plan, assign, and supervise the work of twelve translators and three stenographer-typists; maintain liaison with outside agencies that could handle material the section could not; and do occasional interpreting and translating that required an officer to meet prescribed security requirements.

On 4 April 1942, James N. Mosel, a civilian, came to the Translations Unit on a six-month contract to survey its work and to assist in translating. In September, he was commissioned as an ensign, and he assumed the duties of officer in charge in November. Mosel attained the rank of lieutenant by the end of the war.[12]

The first major collection of captured Japanese documents was made in August 1942 when two submarines carried Marine Col. Evans Carlson, Lt. Col. James Roosevelt, and the 1st Marine Raider Battalion to Makin Island to harass the Japanese garrison. The documents, which were brought back to Pearl Harbor, included plans, charts, air defense details on all Japanese-held Pacific islands, and battle orders.[13]

During 1942, Sluth (who had become Mrs. H. Pearson Hopper in 1941) retired and Dillon died, but the Translations Unit acquired two new translators, G. E. Hyde and A. M. Wilson. In 1943, Mervine resigned, and another translator, Gertrude W. Holinger, joined the section, as did a typist, Caroline Crichlow.[14]

The voluminous receipt of German and Italian naval documents started with the occupation of Sicily in 1943. The headquarters of the Italian navy in Sicily was captured before its files could be destroyed and yielded information on the entire disposition of the Italian and German naval forces in the Mediterranean, along with charts of minefields and safe conduct routes.[15]

The capture of the German submarine *U-505* on 4 June 1944 provided code books, logs, and tactical publications to be translated in addition to the hardware and weapons of a complete submarine.[16]

Sunken Japanese ships provided large quantities of documents, many of them of immediate as well as historic value. The heavy cruiser *Nachi*, which was sunk in Manila Bay in November 1944, provided a major haul of annotated charts of minefields and defenses, diaries, logs, blueprints, fleet operation plans and orders dating back to before the Pearl Harbor attack, and numerous books on Japanese naval tactics and doctrine.[17]

During the period that the Translations Unit was located in L-Building (1942–1944), about one-third of the office production consisted of translations of letters to and from Navy personnel for the Censorship Branch. It was an intolerably heavy load, and Ens. Mosel, the officer in charge of the unit, after repeated attempts, managed to have the task diverted to the General Censorship office in New York. Another major task, which took up about 10 percent of the unit's time between 1942 and 1945, was a translation of the German War Law that had been requested by the Foreign Intelligence Branch (OP-16-F). The task was never completed because of the pressure of more important work.[18]

In April 1945, the name and designator of the office were changed back to the Translating Section (OP-16-A-6).[19]

While the Translating Section was in the Steuart Building at 5th & K Streets, N.W. (where it had moved in November 1944), Dr. Francis R. Preveden joined the staff. Toward the end of World War II, he was also giving instruction to a rotating group of graduates of the Navy Russian language course at Boulder, Colorado, who were assigned to the section for temporary duty under instruction. The training continued into 1946 until the Boulder school closed.[20]

During the first six months of 1944, approximately 130 large cases of Japanese documents had been received by ONI from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area. In addition, ONI's Far East Section (OP-16-FE) received many documents for translation from Japanese into English from the Hydrographic Office, the Naval Research Laboratory, the various Navy bureaus, and other offices. The documents had been picked up on the captured islands of the Pacific and included blueprints of Japanese equipment, charts, logs, war diaries, field manuals, and code books. The backlog of untranslated material accumulated so rapidly that it was necessary to have approximately twenty recent graduates of the Navy School of Oriental Languages ordered to the Office of Naval Intelligence in May 1944 for temporary duty to work on translating the materials.

In September 1944, thirty more language officers, mostly WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service), were assigned to permanent duty in the Translation Unit of OP-16-FE. By February 1945, the unit consisted of eighty-one officers, nine enlisted personnel, and five civilians. Even these personnel were insufficient in number to keep up with the task of processing, translating, evaluating, and disseminating captured Japanese documents.[21]

The Washington Document Center (WDC), a joint service center for processing Japanese documents, was placed under the Director of Naval Intelligence as the result of a proposal made by the Japanese Document Conference commencing 28 December 1944. Upon official approval, the Director of Naval Intelligence established the WDC as OP-16-WDC in a letter dated 14 February 1945. The WDC office was located on the fifth floor of the Steuart Building.[22]

Although the Translation Unit of OP-16-FE and the WDC were concurrent occupants of the Steuart Building in the latter part of World War II and both were involved in the translation of foreign documents, they were not combined organizationally. Apparently, there was some effort by the WDC to do so, but when the Director of Naval Intelligence took over WDC, the effort ceased.[23]

During the period between 4 March and 21 October 1945, the WDC received, processed, and disseminated 146,324 Japanese documents ranging from calling cards to encyclopedia sets.[24]

On 23 June 1945, the Director of Naval Intelligence assigned eight officers, nine yeomen, one analyst, and two clerk-stenographers to the Captured German Document Center, run by the Army, to help with the sudden influx of German documents captured prior to the official German surrender on 8 May 1945.[25]

A second Japanese Document Conference, convened on 29 August 1945, proposed the consolidation of the translation sections of the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section and ONI's Far East Section with the WDC and the establishment of an advanced echelon of the WDC in Japan. The first component of the advanced echelon arrived in Japan in November 1945 and was composed of Army and Navy specialists familiar with Washington interests to ensure that the documents had significant intelligence value.[26]

During World War II, the translation units of ONI prepared translations from twenty-two foreign languages into English on a variety of naval and technical subjects. Sixty percent of the work was for bureaus and offices of the Navy other than the Office of Naval Intelligence. It was estimated that the translating of correspondence alone could have kept three translators fully occupied. For additional information on World War II foreign document collection and exploitation, see Chapters 11 and 17.[27]

Korean War to the 1970s

Shortly after the start of the Korean War, Lt. James Mosel, who had been head of the Translations Unit during most of World War II, was recalled to active duty to serve again as its head. He immediately instituted a change in policy, making each translator responsible for the quality and correctness of his or her own products. Prior to the change, the chief translator had reviewed each product; this practice had had an adverse effect on productivity and morale. Mosel's change remedied the problem. In May 1951, the Translations Unit moved from the Pentagon to Building 52 at the Naval Observatory on Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.[28]

The handling and distribution of captured documents during the Korean War was controlled by directives issued by the Army's General Headquarters, Intelligence Section (GHQ-G2). No provision was made for the distribution of documents of naval interest to naval commands. The lack of Korean linguists in the Navy and the scarcity of docu-

ments of value to the Navy, however, made this deficiency in procedures unimportant.[29]

In 1955, much of the work of the Translations Section (by then OP-923M4) was in the translation of technical documents. The section was co-located with the Technical Intelligence Section (OP-922F2) at the Naval Observatory.[30]

Dr. Preveden, the senior special translator in the mid-1950s, worked in approximately twenty-seven languages and was learning others. Preveden introduced the dictation system of translating, using a dictaphone with a wax cylinder. Each cylinder was capable of taking only about two minutes of dictation and had to be scraped down between each use. Even that crude equipment permitted a dramatic increase in the productivity of each translator.[31]

In December 1957, the Translations Section of the ONI completed the translation of *The Soviet Russians as Opponents at Sea*, an analysis of German and Russian naval operations in World War II, prepared for the U.S. Navy by a group of former German naval officers under German VAdm. Friedrich Ruge. The 300,000-word study provided a baseline for all subsequent studies on the operational developments of the Soviet navy since World War II and was later published, in a greatly condensed form, by the U.S. Naval Institute.[32]

The Naval Reserve Translation Program was inaugurated in October 1959 for the purpose of using the foreign language skills of Naval Reserve personnel. Originally, eligibility for the program was limited to Intelligence Reserves, but the scarcity of linguists led to authorizing eligibility for all Naval Reserves for the translation program about two years later. The program permitted reserves to earn retirement points by doing translation assignments at home. As of 1976, there were sixty-five officers and five enlisted personnel participating.

In November 1959, one of the ONI translators, P. Thomas Koines, completed a two-year project for the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in helping to revise the CSC standards for translators and in preparing examinations in the Greek and German languages.

When the Naval Intelligence Command was established on 1 July 1967, the Translations Section was renamed the Translation Division (NIC-15). The elevation to division status and the concurrent authorization to hire four additional translators permitted setting up a more rational organization that was also more responsive to the Navy's needs. It enabled the division to hire persons with the experience needed to conduct an active, coordinated foreign document exploitation program.

Beginning in about 1968, the Translation Division started maintaining a list of private individuals with unique language capabilities who were willing and had the spare time to perform translation tasks and interpreter assignments. Individuals on the list were contacted to perform tasks or assignments that were beyond the linguistic or staff capabilities of the division. For example, in July 1970, one served as an interpreter for the meeting of the U.S. and Spanish negotiators of the Spanish Base Rights Agreements.

In January 1970, the Translation Division initiated regular publication of translations of selected excerpts from the monthly Soviet *Naval Digest (Morskoy Sbornik).*

When the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations received messages in a foreign language, usually for the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations and consequently requiring prompt distribution, the Communications Duty Office would phone the Translation Division for an oral translation. The prompt response of the division on each and every occasion induced the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications and Cryptology on 25 March 1970 to express his "most sincere appreciation" to the Commander Naval Intelligence Command for the division's proficient assistance.

Although not strictly a function in the intelligence field, the Translation Division was called on during the Vietnam War to produce manuals in Vietnamese to go with the naval equipment and weapon systems turned over to the South Vietnamese navy. For example, in 1972, several such manuals were produced for the PADD Sonar System at the request of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland.

In another example of assistance to other bureaus of the Navy in 1972, the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) requested and received prompt translation services in the production of questionnaires for use in surveying Icelandic nationals who worked at U.S. Navy facilities at Keflavik. The survey was needed for the BUPERS Intercultural Relations Program in order to determine how to improve interpersonal relationships between host nationals and U.S. naval personnel at overseas bases.

On 8 May 1972, at 1300, the Translation Division was tasked to prepare, in camera-ready copy, a warning to shipping regarding the mining of Haiphong harbor in North Vietnam. The text of the warning was to be translated into twelve languages and was to be delivered to the pilot of a plane departing at 1100 on 9 May for the West Coast and thence to Vietnam. A frantic several hours by the Translation Division, particularly its division head, Thomas Koines, plus assistance from Voice of America and CIA personnel solicited in the President's name, enabled the deadline to be met.

In September 1972, the Translation Division initiated a regular publication containing selected translations from the Soviet monthly periodical, *Shipbuilding (Sudostroinye)*.

The first translation workshop for Naval Reserve personnel proficient in Russian was conducted by William Cramer of the Translation Division at Naval Air Station, New Orleans, on 20–31 October 1975. Cramer had become the head of the Naval Reserve Translation Program in December 1970. Funding problems kept participation down to four. The enthusiasm of those attending, however, made the workshop a success. Cramer taught translation techniques that would help make the participants more productive and competent in their translation program efforts. A second workshop was conducted by Cramer on 14–25 June 1976 at Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts, again for reservists proficient in Russian; there were seven participants.[33]

The following officers and civilians headed ONI's Translation Section from 1942 to 1976:

Name	Date*
Ens. James N. Mosel	Nov 1942–Mar 1946
Lt. S. Frank	Mar 1946–May 1946
Johanna Hensoldt (Chief Translator)†	May 1946–Sep 1950
Lt. James N. Mosel	Sep 1950–1952
LCdr. P. A. Wadsworth	1952–1954
Lt. H. Feeney	1954–Jun 1957
Lt. Robert B. Bathurst	Jun 1957–Jun 1960
Lt./LCdr. R. L. Muros	Jun 1960–Apr 1963
Lt.(jg) G. A. Lillquist	Jun 1963–Jun 1964
P. Thomas Koines	Jun 1964–[34]

*Approximate. Based on available rosters.
† Formerly known as Johanna Boernsen; she had been in the Translating Section since at least 1932.

Table 9.1.
Title and Organizational Designator of ONI's Translation Sections

Title	Designator	Date*
Translating Section	OP-16-E	World War I
Translating Section	OP-16-A-6	1933
Translations Unit†	OP-16-A-4-d	Jul 1941
Translating Section	OP-16-A-6	Apr 1945
Translating Section	OP-23C4	Oct 1945
Translating Section	OP-32C4	1 Aug 1946
Translations Unit	OP-323M4	1 Oct 1948
Translations Section	OP-923M4	1 Jun 1954
Translations Section	OP-923M2	Oct 1964
Translation Division	NIC-15	Jul 1967
Translation Division	NIC-15/STIC-034	Jul 1971
Translation	STIC-34/NIC-15	1 Jan 1972
Translation Services Division	NISC-62	1 Jul 1972
Foreign Languages Services Office	NIC-00S3	—

*Dates in most cases are approximate and are based on when changes were first noted in available rosters.
† The Far East Section (OP-16-FE) also worked on Japanese translations.
Source: ONI personnel rosters

Table 9.2.
Locations of the Translation Section

Locations	Date*
Corcoran Court†	1917
Main Navy Building, Constitution Ave.†	Sep 1918
L Building, Mall†	1942
Steuart Building, 5th & F Streets, NW†	Nov 1944
Main Navy Building†	Sep 1946
Pentagon†	Dec 1948
Naval Observatory†	May 1951
Malvern Building, Alexandria, VA	Mar 1967
Naval Security Station, Nebraska Ave., NW†	Jun 1968
Hoffman Building, Alexandria, VA	Jun 1969
NIC Building 1, Suitland, MD	——

*Dates in most cases are approximate, based on where changes were first noted in available rosters.
† Washington, DC.
Source: ONI personnel rosters.

Chapter Notes

1. John Adams, *The Works of John Adams* (Boston: Little Brown, 1854), 9:47.

2. General Order 292, 23 Mar 1882.

3. RAdm. Albert G. Berry, USN, "The Beginning of the Office of Naval Intelligence," *USNIP*, Jan 1937, 102–3.

4. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1899*, 464.

5. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1902*, 95.

6. ONI Office Organization Chart, 1 Sep 1918, 24.

7. Department of the Navy, *U.S. Naval Activity Relative to the Armistice of 1918 and the Peace Conference of 1919* (Washington: GPO, 1919), 17, 26.

8. Capt. Herbert E. Cocke, USN, "History of ONI," MS, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1931, 16.

9. OP-16-A, *Annual Reports, 1932*, 13–14; *1933*, 15.

10. OP-16-A, *Annual Report, FY 1934*, 13.

11. ONI rosters; and H. Pearson Hopper memo to author, Jan 1978.

12. Department of the Navy, "Administrative History of the Office of Naval Intelligence in World War II," 10 Jul 1946, unpublished MS, 137–38, hereafter *ONI WWII Admin History*.

13. Capt. Ellis N. Zacharias, *Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer* (New York: Putnam, 1946), 318.

14. Hopper memo, Jan 1978.

15. *ONI Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1958, 11–13.

16. Philip K.Lundeburg, "American Antisubmarine Operations in the Atlantic, May 1943–May 1945" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1953) chap. 10, 29–32.

17. *ONI Review*, Nov 1945, 41.

18. Hopper memo, Jan 1978.

19. ONI Organizational Diagram, 6 Apr 1945.

20. Ibid.

21. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 716–17.

22. Ibid., 894–95.

23. Hopper memo, Jan 1978.

24. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 897–98.

25. Ibid., 683–84.

26. Ibid., 897.

27. Ibid., 138.

28. P. Thomas Koines to author, notes on Translating Section, 3 Jan 1977.

29. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), *Interim Evaluation Report No. 2: Korean War Naval Operations*, 1745.

30. W.E.W. Howe to author, notes on the development of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC), undated.

31. Koines and Howe notes.

32. Koines ltr to author, Nov 1976; and Friedrich Ruge, *The Soviets as Opponents at Sea* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1977).

33. Information on translating services, 1957–1976 in Koines ltr, Nov 1976.

34. ONI personnel rosters.

CHAPTER 10

Production

This chapter deals mainly with the Navy's processing and production of intelligence, including participation in joint service production efforts. The emphasis is on the products rather than on the processes of production. More specific discussions of processing appear in Chapters 11 through 20.

Beginnings

The first steps taken by Lt. Theodorus B. M. Mason in 1882 to give the Office of Naval Intelligence a capability to produce intelligence included a determination of customers' needs and the development of a filing and indexing system that would most readily meet those needs. ONI's primary clients were the Secretary of the Navy, the Navy Department bureaus, and the Congress of the United States. Their intelligence needs were almost exclusively for information from abroad that would provide guidance in rebuilding the fleet.

Many of the Navy bureaus had been collecting intelligence information from world naval powers to meet their own technical requirements. Lt. Mason, with the Secretary of the Navy's concurrence, assembled the needed information in the Office of Naval Intelligence and correlated it with that held by the Navy Department Library. Many of the foreign books and periodicals in the library were in foreign languages, and one of the earliest collection and production techniques was the selection and translation of foreign publications judged to be authoritative and containing information on foreign navies.

Early in the history of ONI, the balance between collection and production capabilities became a problem—one that has remained to this day. The mass of uncorrelated material already on hand was beyond the processing capability of ONI's limited staff and probably was the chief deterrent to the deployment of more than one naval attaché in 1882 to collect more information.

The first publications produced by the Office of Naval Intelligence were a War Series called *Information From Abroad*, which ran through only four numbers:

No. I, 1883 *Operations of the French Navy During the Recent Wars in Tunis*

No. II, 1883 *The War on the Pacific Coast of South America Between Chile and the Allied Republics of Peru and Bolivia, 1879–1881*

No. III, 1885 *Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882*

No. IV, 1893 *The Chilean Revolution of 1891*[1]

The General Information Series (unclassified) ran through 21 numbers from 1883 to 1902 and included the highly regarded and much-used annual *Notes on Naval Progress*. (See the end of this chapter for a complete list.) In January 1902, the *New York Sun* reported praise for *Notes on Naval Progress* by a correspondent of the London *Times*:

> The Admiralty conceals its knowledge even from the House of Commons. . . . When the Parliament insists on obtaining a return on the fleets of the Powers, the bare return is given without any attempt at summarizing the results, or any endeavor to make the information of practical use for purposes of discussion. We have to go to the American Naval Intelligence to obtain a summary on this information.[2]

Publication of the General Information Series was discontinued in 1903 so that the ONI staff might occupy their time in more important work. It was the only unclassified publication produced by ONI at that time. The last issue was No. XXI, *Notes on Naval Progress in 1902*, which was mainly of interest to members of Congress. On 15 April 1902, the Senate had passed a joint resolution providing for the printing of an edition of future volumes of the General Information Series for use by Congress. Apparently, the resolution did not pass the

House Joint Committee on Printing, resulting in the termination of the series.[3]

President Theodore Roosevelt, in a note dated 2 October 1902 to the Secretary of the Navy, had stated: "The naval intelligence report is very interesting, but in my opinion altogether too bulky. The mere bulk of any document of that nature is against it." Roosevelt's Secretary amplified the complaint in a note of 6 October:

> He (the President) thinks there is much useless matter and a large number of unnecessary and expensive illustrations included in many of the reports and documents published; that many are issued at great expense which accomplish no practical good and that there is too much public printing generally.

The comments referred to the latest *Notes on Naval Progress*. Chief Intelligence Officer Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee replied to the Secretary of the Navy on 4 October that the next report would be trimmed "to the narrowest limit." On 10 October, in another memo to the Secretary, Sigsbee further explained that the annual report was made up mainly of extracts from foreign publications. Further reports would be condensed, but the extra work required to do so would "be a great tax on the time of the Staff Intelligence Officers." This was probably another factor that contributed to the decision to cease publication of the General Information Series.[4]

In 1888, the office published the first edition of *Coaling, Docking, and Repair Facilities of the Ports of the World with Analyses of Different Kinds of Coal*. The series ran through four editions and a supplement. In 1911, the publication was reissued under the title *Port Directory of the Principal Foreign Ports*. A series of Spanish-American War publications called *War Notes*, in eight volumes, was in great demand, and, in 1900, Congress authorized them to be published in one volume with the title *Notes on the Spanish-American War*.

In 1915, the office began to issue a periodic *Information Bulletin* series. In 1918, the series was retitled the *Semi-Monthly Compilation* and was subsequently issued in mimeograph form and, later in the same year, in printed form. In January 1919, the publication was superseded by the *Monthly Information Bulletin*, which was issued through 1941 and then replaced by the *ONI Weekly* in January 1942.[5]

Material prepared by the ONI for publication in reports of other divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations after World War I included strategic intelligence needed for the Political Situation section of the annual reports submitted by the Director of War Plans to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), which were known as Estimates of the Situation and Base Development Plans. The Political Situation section reported on world conditions.[6]

Between the World Wars—Establishing Series Publications

From 1920 to 1939, the Foreign Intelligence Branch of ONI was weak, and personnel shortages hamstrung its efforts. The desks of Section C and the sections (units) of B Branch, which later became F Branch, were largely depositories for information. They received and filed but did not collate or evaluate, and dissemination was intermittent and inconsistent. One officer, with or without clerical help, could not effectively process information on up to twenty-two countries.[7]

Cdr. George McD. Courts, in a confidential letter of 11 April 1931 to the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), offered some underlying causes for Navy apathy and the inadequate staffing, and thus ineffective functioning, of the Foreign Intelligence Branch:

> (1) Our geographic isolation and consequent difficulty of visualizing a national menace; (2) the fact that in World War I the problems of wartime intelligence were handled largely by the British; and (3) the non-aggressive character of our national policies toward other countries.[8]

Following World War I, ONI initiated a series of publications, which continued until 1956. The series included reference publications on foreign subjects or areas and guidance publications on intelligence procedures and techniques. Some of the early publications in the series follow.

ONI-1 *British Monograph—Dominions and Colonies*
ONI-2 *Monograph of Brazil*
ONI-3 *Monograph of Mexico*
ONI-4 *Monograph of Japan, 1920*
ONI-5 *British Monograph—British Isles*
ONI-7 *Nicaraguan Monograph*
ONI-8 *Instructions for Intelligence Officers, 1923*
ONI-9 *Chinese Monograph*
ONI-11 *Naval Estimate of Japan*
ONI-12 *Strategic Harbours of the Pacific, 1921*
ONI-12 *Strategic Harbours of the Pacific, 1929*
ONI-13 *Monograph of Japan, 1931*
ONI-16 *Instructions and Orders for Port Guards and Naval Ship Inspectors, 1932*
ONI0-18 *Pamphlet of Information on Cuba*
ONI-19 *ONI Intelligence Manual, 1933*
ONI-19 *Naval Intelligence Manual, 1936 Revision*
ONI-19(A) *Naval Intelligence Manual, 1947*
ONI-19(B) *Naval Intelligence Manual, 1949*

ONI-20 *Monograph Index Guide*

ONI-21 *Extracts from Chinese Monograph, 1934, Change #1*

ONI-22 *Notes on Espionage, Counter-Espionage and Passport Control, 1935*

ONI-23(A) *Outer Hawaiian, Wake and Marcus Islands*

ONI-27 *Monograph of Luzon and Islands off the North Coast*

ONI-29 *Geographic Monograph, Palau and Marianas Islands*

ONI-34 *Monograph of Zamboanga Peninsula, Gulf of Davao, North and South Coasts of Mindanao*

ONI-35 *Cable and Radio Censorship*

ONI-37 *Monograph of Netherlands East Indies, General, Volume I* (1935)

ONI-38 *Monograph of Netherlands East Indies, Volume II*

ONI-39 *Monograph of Aleutian Islands, Volume I*

ONI-40 to -99 More monographs

As of 1923, ONI was engaged in the preparation of monographs on the various countries of the world, concentrating on those in which U.S. national policy had the most immediate interest. The monographs were divided into subject sections as follows:

Section	Subject
100	State
200	Social Conditions
300	Finance
400	Industrial
500	Commerce
600	Communications
700	Army
800	Navy
1000	Port Directory [9]

Concept of Intelligence Production Prior to World War II

In a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School on 16 February 1929, DNI Capt. Alfred W. Johnson discussed some of the intelligence processing pitfalls:

> Information is inherently such an exceedingly broad thing that it is obviously very necessary that we should exercise the greatest judgement [sic] and discrimination if the value of our output is to be in proportion to the size of our personnel and to the needs of the services. It is a simple matter to collect great quantities of information which no one will ever want. It is also easy to fail to collate valuable items from a mass on its way to cold storage. And after collation has been done, it is not hard to let the "chip-munk" instinct work and hide it away under lock and key where it will never do anyone any good.[10]

Naval intelligence in 1933 included Navy Department (or strategic) intelligence and combat (or operational) intelligence. Navy Department intelligence was defined as

> that produced by ONI in peace and in war. It is the product of a scientific and systematic collection and evaluation of information on the Political, Economic, Social and Psychologic, Military, Air and Naval Forces; and the Geographic Situation of a specified nation, for the purpose of arriving at a definite conception of its naval strength and effort, and an estimate of the probable initial intentions of its naval forces in case of war.
>
> It deals primarily with subjects that are strategical in nature and to a less extent with others that have to do with tactics and logistics.
>
> This intelligence is the knowledge required by the CNO to formulate an Estimate of the Situation from which may be derived basic War Plans; it is likewise essential to the Commander in Chief and subordinate commanders concerned in the formulation of basic campaign plans, or such plans that a particular situation may demand.[11]

Naval combat intelligence was described as

> that produced after the outbreak of hostilities primarily obtained by the naval forces afloat and intelligence agencies operating under orders of the commander responsible for the conduct of naval operations within the designated theatre (Fleet Zone), and secondarily such pertinent information that may be furnished by the intelligence agencies without the limits of this area and the Navy Department.
>
> This intelligence is the evaluated information required by a commander regarding the enemy forces within or approaching the Fleet Zone which will enable him to make timely distribution and employment of the forces under his command.
>
> As a general rule, this intelligence is confined to the location, strength, composition, disposition, movement, tactics, probable intentions, and condition of the enemy forces opposing or likely to oppose our own forces; together with the weather and meteorological conditions in the area of probable operations.
>
> It constitutes a vital element of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation and is essential to the preparation and execution of strategic and tactical plans.[12]

Navy Department intelligence, in time of peace, was divided as follows:

> A. Statistical—for use in Congressional Hearings, making studies on Limitation of Armament and other requirements, and for making comparative studies and estimates of naval strength.

B. Technical—for use of the Bureaus concerned, to prevent "technical surprise" and maintain if possible "technical superiority."

C. Domestic—for familiarity with the domestic situation and to permit the necessary expansion for war requirements in a rapid and systematic manner.

D. Foreign—for use of the CNO and other Naval Commanders in estimating the war capacity and naval power of the various nations, together with their probable intentions, their alliances, treaties and pacts that may effect our own naval policies and plans both in peace and in war.[13]

Evaluation was considered by ONI in 1933 to be the "critical and systematic analysis of enemy information for the purpose of determining its probable accuracy, significance and importance."

Information subjected to the evaluation process became intelligence. The officer who merely transmitted to his commander the information that he had received performed only part of his duty. Naval intelligence was to be concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use. It had to convey the facts and their significance and the deductions to be drawn from a consideration of the facts in connection with other intelligence already at hand.[14]

Lt. Arthur H. McCollum, who had ONI's Japanese Desk in 1933–1934, gathered photographs of Japanese ships and had scale models built from which identification data could be produced in what was apparently a "first" for that technique. Information was also obtained from pilots and engineers by which speed-power curves were devised for many Japanese warships and merchant ships. Information thus derived was published and distributed in classified publications.[15]

Overlapping jurisdiction among ONI desks, units, and sections resulted from the assignment of colonies to desks responsible for the countries to which the colonies belonged. For example, the Central European Desk (B-13) had the Dutch East Indies and Aruba, and the Western European Desk (B-12) had French colonies in the Far East. In the latter case, both B-11 (Far East Section) and B-12 were writing independently to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet (CINCAF) requesting the same information on French colonies in the Far East.[16]

Desk E, British Empire, had to prepare monographs on Great Britain and its dominions, protectorates, mandates, and colonies, which encompassed the whole world and overlapped virtually all the other desks in the Foreign Intelligence Division.[17]

Peacetime chores were assigned to ONI during the late prewar days of the 1930s. For example, when President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Adm. William D. Leahy as Governor of Puerto Rico in June 1939, ONI produced a background study on politics and personalities for Leahy's use. Eunice Willson, one of the civilian analysts in the Latin American Section (OP-16-B-16), prepared the study.[18]

Shortly after then-LCdr. Arthur McCollum returned to ONI in 1939, he took on the project of updating the Japanese ship recognition publications that he had produced during his earlier tour in 1933. The work had been so secret that it took six months to locate the original ship models, and McCollum found that the previous modelmaker had died in the interim. McCollum nonetheless persevered, and his new recognition publications, with pictures and updated speed-curve data, were issued in 1941 and proved to be of considerable value to submarine operations after the United States entered the war.[19]

Each foreign section prepared a Daily Information Memorandum for the DNI to meet the demands for information on all aspects of the war in Europe. The procedure started on 5 September 1939 and continued until 29 May 1941, when such production was taken over by a special section.[20]

The *Daily Summary of World Events*, still being produced in 1952, contained items of a timely nature, consolidated and published by ONI's Foreign Intelligence (OP-322F1). No authority could be discovered at that time for the publication of the summaries, but a format had been established for them in 1945 at the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence. (The daily summaries were continued until December 1955.)[21]

World War II Intelligence Production

Organization and Concepts

In March 1940, a CNO letter to "All Ships and Stations" explained the dissemination of intelligence information by the Division of Naval Intelligence and how the intelligence should be used. There were two general classes of documents: Class A consisted of individual reports, usually on standard report forms but also in letters and tabulations, to meet specific requirements. Class B consisted of Naval Intelligence Bulletins on subjects of general interest to the naval service that were compiled periodically. Class A reports were distributed to heads of bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, to fleets and subdivisions thereof, to naval districts and activities of the shore establishment, and to other government departments and subdivisions. Class B reports were given a wider distribution and sent to all important subdivisions, particularly when documents or pamphlets were classified "restricted" or were unclassified. For Class A reports, recipients were expected to disseminate

information within the recipient organization and to other units or activities to which the recipient's interest extended to assure full use and application of the information, as well as to obtain the evaluation of technical information over which they had cognizance. Both the Library of Congress and the U.S. Naval Institute were included in the distribution of the CNO letter.[22]

In 1940, shortly after Germany had precipitated World War II, the German Desk in ONI had one officer, one civilian analyst, and one clerk. There were no functional sections; in other words, no desks devoted to processing intelligence relating to a specific subject or function, such as ships, aircraft, or amphibious warfare. Foreign naval intelligence was organized geographically. Consequently, the three workers on the German Desk had to be ready to answer spot questions and to furnish any studies required about geographic, political, economic, technical, or naval matters involving Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia.[23]

With ONI's limited personnel, contacts between all production levels were direct and personal; when the Director of Naval Intelligence wanted something, almost everyone knew of it at once, and the entire organization at the working level experienced a minor crisis. The simple structure of the intelligence organization tended to accelerate the process of intelligence production.

In June 1940, CINCAF Adm. Thomas C. Hart wrote the Chief of Naval Operations:

> About intelligence etc., we seem never to receive from ONI or other divisions of your office anything in the way of an estimate or evaluation of intelligence concerning the Far East. In fact, about a year ago, when I was in your office trying to inform myself about the situation out here, I was given nothing and told nothing except what was contained in the regular incoming reports. I thought at the time that something in the way of an evaluation, or... a distillation, might be a regular function of that part of ONI and might be extremely valuable.... I do at least directly request that we be informed of those respects in which our own estimates are disagreed with by your people.[24]

The *Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations* was started by ONI in December 1940. The summary was to present condensed, broad-view reports about the diplomatic situation in Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Latin America; the Japanese military situation; the Japanese naval situation; the Chinese military situation; German military, naval, and air statistics; and Italian naval and air statistics. As problems became greater and the workload heavier, the production sections of ONI were not able to contribute adequate information for the summary, and, in due course, a new section was set up that published the *Weekly Summary*.[25]

The Foreign Intelligence Branch was divided into eleven sections, seven for geographic and political areas, and four topical. Each geographic and political section maintained a monograph on each foreign country assigned to its section. The monographs, in 1940, were divided into eleven main sections: Political Forces, Social Forces, Economic Forces (Finance), Economic Forces (Industry), Economic Forces (Commerce), Cities and Towns Geography, Communications, Army, Navy, Air, and General Summary. The sections were further broken down into subtitles when the volume of material warranted.

Generally, each monograph consisted of one loose-leaf binder for each main title. Theoretically, the eleven binders making up a monograph about a foreign country contained all the evaluated material that ONI had about that country. Secret material required safe storage; material of a lower classification could be kept in a locked file. Some sections set up secret monographs that contained only items classified secret in order to reduce the volume of material requiring safe storage. Under the stress of an increased wartime workload, and suffering from inadequate numbers of personnel, the geographic sections, almost without exception, fell far behind in keeping up their monographs, and material was entered without editing, collating, or summarizing. Thus, the monographs became bulky and unwieldy. Frequently, more than one binder was needed for some of the principal titles.

The four ONI sections handling information and intelligence by topic were Foreign Trade, Special Intelligence, Statistical, and Strategic. The Foreign Trade Section collected and maintained information about cargo movements everywhere, with the exception of Japanese cargoes, which were followed in the Far East Section and in Domestic Intelligence. The Statistical Section compiled information on the strengths of navies and air forces, especially of the United States and Great Britain. The Statistical Section also compiled information on the aircraft production capacities of foreign countries. The Strategic Section gathered data on cities, towns, geographic characteristics, rail centers, communications, industrial developments, etc., and coordinated its work with the geographic sections.[26]

Identification and Characteristics Publications

Before the start of World War II, intelligence about the disposition, characteristics, and appearance of foreign naval vessels, merchant ships, and aircraft was being received and evaluated largely

by ONI's foreign intelligence desks. Little information on these subjects had been distributed to the fleets. A few publications (in most cases highly inaccurate, incomplete, and elementary) had been issued about Japanese naval vessels, merchant ships, and aircraft. Two recognition manuals depicting U.S. warships had been distributed by the Bureau of Ships, but nothing was available to the fleets on the units of other nations.

In 1940, the Statistical Section, OP-16-Z, ceased to exist as a separate branch and became OP-16-F-10 of the F Branch. It took over, in addition to an increased volume of statistical work, the preparation of certain elementary publications that would provide U.S. forces with data on the appearance and characteristics of foreign ships, weapons, and aircraft.

By the fall of 1941, requests from the fleet for more information of increased scope, both in the number of countries and in the types of information covered, made creation of a separate section necessary. On 31 December 1941, the establishment of the Identification and Characteristics (I&C) Section, OP-16-F-20, was approved by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Its functions were to collect, evaluate, codify, correlate, and disseminate all available information on the characteristics and appearance of all foreign naval and merchant ships, and to translate design characteristics of U.S. and foreign ships into tables, line drawings, and models from which identification studies could be produced for use by all U.S. armed services.

The concept of a master file drawing of every ship was developed, and it proved of great value as the war progressed. The preparation of the drawings required translating photos, general arrangement plans, inboard profiles, and even prisoner-of-war sketches into highly accurate, carefully delineated plan and profile drawings. From the drawings were developed silhouettes, models, fields-of-fire diagrams, and other devices of tactical value to the operating forces.

Carefully constructed models, as accurate as possible in every detail, were built by the David Taylor Model Basin, professional model builder Van Ryper at Martha's Vineyard, and an expert model maker in the I&C Section. Photos of the models were taken from the various target angles that a submarine, surface ship, or aircraft might find of use in making an approach on the enemy. Photos of the models were provided to Time, Inc., which had a contract to produce identification manuals for the Navy.[27]

The responsibility for the preparation of complete statistical information on aircraft was less clearly defined. The Aviation Intelligence Branch of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) was preparing performance and characteristics data on foreign aircraft, and the Special Devices Section of BUAER had initiated the drafting of preliminary drawings as a basis for mass-producing training models. In the fall of 1942, an informal agreement on workload distribution was arrived at whereby the I&C Section would prepare basic master file drawings of all foreign aircraft and maintain complete photo files while the Aviation Intelligence Branch of BUAER would be responsible for characteristics data.

It was not until early 1943 that much effort could be expended on the technical aspects of ship equipment, and files were started on enemy guns, fire-control equipment, radar, and similar subjects. That aspect of the I&C Section's activities increased in importance until the Technical Intelligence Center was established in October 1944.

The various Navy technical bureaus (Ships, Ordnance, Aeronautics, etc.) and organizations such as the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Naval Research Laboratory were all vitally interested in foreign technical development and had collected varying amounts of intelligence data.

Publication of information was undertaken jointly by ONI with other activities—initially with the Bureau of Ordnance (BUORD)—to make information on enemy ordnance collected by ONI and evaluated by BUORD available to all interested activities.

In the March 1943 reorganization of ONI that consolidated the five sections dealing with the preparation of publications, the I&C Section became OP-16-P-2. Its name, functions, and duties remained unchanged. A large percentage of the work of the section depended on the interpretation of photos. For more details on the interrelationship of the I&C Section and the Photo Interpretation Center, see Chapter 13.

Late in 1943, a close tie between personnel in the I&C Section, who were preparing basic drawings and therefore were interpreting photos of aircraft, and people in BUAER, who were preparing statistics on aircraft performance data, was so essential as to require consolidation of the two organizations. The BUAER activity had become a part of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Air (see Chapter 12) and was organizing field teams to investigate and analyze captured and crashed Japanese aircraft. The air element of the I&C Section was transferred to the Air Information Branch of DCNO (Air) on 19 October 1943.

By a Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) directive of 13 July 1943, Adm. Ernest J. King directed initiation "of suitable measures to effect close coordination in the Division of Naval Intelligence" of all recognition publications produced by the Navy Department. This action made Naval

Intelligence directly responsible for the coordination of all information, including information from BUAER and the Army, published in the restricted monthly periodical *Recognition Journal*, prepared under contract by Time, Inc.

By 1944, the I&C Section was able to concentrate its attention on the processing and evaluation phases of its mission and to divorce itself from the details of actual publication. The art and layout staff of the section were transferred to the Publications Section.[28]

Recognition material being produced by ONI and available in 1943 included the following:

JAN #1 *Uniforms and Insignia*

ONI-41-42 *Japanese Naval Vessels*

ONI-41-42 *Recognition Supplement: Aerial Views of Japanese Naval Vessels*

ONI-54 Series *U.S. Naval Vessels*

ONI-201 *Naval Vessels of the British Commonwealth*

ONI-202 *Italian Naval Vessels*

ONI-203 *French Naval Vessels*

ONI-204 *German Naval Vessels*

ONI-205 and 235 *Russian Naval Vessels and Military Aircraft*

ONI-206 *Minor European Navies*

ONI-208J *Japanese Merchant Vessels (Revised)*

ONI-208R *Russian Merchant Vessels (Revised)*

ONI-220M *Axis Submarines*

ONI-222 *Statistical Data on Foreign Navies*

ONI-223 *Ship Shapes—Types and Anatomy of Naval Vessels*

ONI-223 K *Warships in Code*

ONI-223 M *Merchant Ship Shapes*

ONI-225 J *Japanese Landing Operations and Equipment*

ONI-226 *Allied Landing Craft*

ONI-232 *Japanese Military Aircraft*

ONI-233 *Italian Military Aircraft*

ONI-234 *German Military Aircraft*

FM-30-30 *Recognition Pictorial Manual, etc.*

FM-30-50 *Recognition Pictorial Manual, Naval Vessels*[29]

Air Intelligence Production

The establishment of an Aviation Intelligence Branch in the Bureau of Aeronautics in September 1941 (see Chapter 12) was the first of several actions taken by individual customers of intelligence to correct deficiencies in ONI's policy of producing general intelligence without regard to the specific needs of specific customers. ONI did not and could not have as complete an understanding of the needs of each customer as an in-house intelligence organization could. Soon after the United States entered World War II, COMINCH and individual operating forces set up or extensively expanded their own intelligence organizations to tailor the intelligence received from ONI and their own resources, according to their specific wartime requirements.

Foreign Intelligence Branch Production

The nature of the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Branch is indicated by the type of information in summaries and statistical tables sent to the Director of the War Plans Division in 1941. The information dealt with existing naval situations for the United States, the British Commonwealth, Germany, Japan, Italy, Turkey, France, and the Netherlands East Indies. The finished intelligence studies included (1) the strength, type, and general distribution of naval forces with expected increases of strength every six months for the next two years; (2) brief estimates of the political, economic, and financial situations insofar as they might indicate an ability to sustain military operations; and (3) statistics about British shipping losses, the amount of shipping available, and the merchant shipbuilding programs of the United States and Great Britain.[30]

Prior to the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, one of the big jobs and major accomplishments of ONI's French Desk (headed by Ens. Charles A. Rocheleau) was the continuing analysis of which French naval personalities were located at which bases and aboard which ships, the pro- or anti-Allied views of those personalities, and their anticipated reactions when confronted with the landings. Dr. F. McKechnie of the French Desk spent a lot of time and effort on the study; during the landings it proved to be highly accurate, according to LtCol. Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., USMC, an intelligence officer at one of the landings.

Other activities of the French Desk at the time of the North African landings included briefing personnel who were about to depart for assignment to naval billets that would be in contact with the French; debriefing personnel returning from the North African landings; and maintaining contact with "Giraud French" and "Free French" naval representatives in Washington.

In connection with the last function, a French naval mission, representing Adm. Henri Giraud and headed by Adm. Raymond Fenard, had been established so that the French could be involved in the rehabilitation of French ships in the United States that had turned themselves in to the Allied forces following the North African landings. The U.S. Navy's liaison officer with the French mission, Lt. Cedric Worth, recognized the intelligence potential of his job and made contact with ONI's French

Desk, thus keeping himself briefed on ONI's requirements. The French Desk was part of the Western European Section (OP-16-F-3), and the chief of the section at that time was LCdr. Norman T. Ball.[31]

On 28 January 1942, the first *ONI Weekly* was issued "for the confidential information of the officers of the United States Fleet." In due course, the organization of the *ONI Weekly* stabilized into two sections: Progress of the War, consisting of events arranged by combat theaters, and Special Articles, covering strategic and tactical subjects, combat information, and historical data. The *ONI Weekly* was published throughout the war, and the sections on the progress of the war provide a excellent reference material. However, because the highest classification used was confidential, some significant events of higher classification were not mentioned.[32]

Combat Narratives

ONI during World War II produced the following Combat Narratives:

Published:

The Aleutians Campaign, June 1942–August 1943

The Battle of the Coral Sea, 4–8 May 1942

The Java Sea Campaign

The Assault on Kwajalein and Majuro, Part I

The Battle of Midway, 3–6 June 1942

The Landings in North Africa, November 1942

Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean, 1 February–10 May 1942 (Marshall & Gilberts, Rabaul, Wake & Marcus, Lae)

Solomon Islands Campaign

Miscellaneous Actions in the South Pacific, 8 August 1942–22 January 1943

Unpublished manuscripts:

"The Navy's Share in the Tokyo Raid"

"Anti-Aircraft Action, 7 April 1943, Guadalcanal-Tulagi"

"The Anzio-Nettuno Landings, January 1944"

"The Capture of the Gilberts"

"Convoy to Gaeta, 1944"

"Guadalcanal & Tulagi Bases"

"Japanese Attacks on Shipping in Guadalcanal-Tulagi Area, 1943"

"The Movement of Supplies into the Guadalcanal-Tulagi Area"

"Operations in the Marianas, Phase I: The Conquest of Saipan"

"Operations in New Guinea Waters"

"The Salerno Landings, September 1943"

"The Mediterranean Convoys"

"Pearl Harbor, 1942"

"Submarine Encounters, 31 August–15 September 1942"

"The Solomon Islands Campaign, Part XIII, Bougainville Operations 1943"

Post–World War II Intelligence Production

Operational Notes

In May 1945, *ONI Operational Notes*, Volume I, Number 1, published as the first issue of an official monthly magazine, was produced by the Operational Intelligence Branch of ONI "for the confidential information and instruction of operational intelligence officers." Publication ceased after the August 1945 issue (Number 4). Many of the articles had been prepared by operational intelligence (OPINTEL) officers recently returned from combat duty, and in the articles they related their experiences in carrying out their OPINTEL responsibilities.[33]

ONI Review

The *ONI Review* was published monthly, commencing with the November 1945 issue. It took the place of the *ONI Weekly*, which was discontinued with the 26 September 1945 issue. The *ONI Review* was to "concentrate on intelligence relating to the armed forces of foreign nations, particularly their naval forces" and from time to time would report "on such diplomatic, political or economic trends abroad as may potentially affect the security of the United States."[34]

The *ONI Review* was published regularly through April 1963. The magazine was classified confidential, and each issue contained six to ten articles on foreign naval subjects or on intelligence activities and experiences. It also carried a section entitled Intelligence Briefs that summarized recently received reports on events in various specific countries. *ONI Review* was published for the information and guidance of officers of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps so they could have the background necessary to interpret intelligence of higher classification when required to do so. In May 1963, the *ONI Review* was combined with the *Army Intelligence Review* and the *Aerospace Intelligence Digest* and was issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency under the title *Defense Intelligence Digest*. It was to "provide all components of the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies with timely intelligence of wide professional interest on significant developments and trends in military capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign nations."[35]

In February 1952, because of a trend toward higher classification in the material that might be used, the *ONI Review* requested reader reaction to receiving a more interesting secret-level publication.

to appoint representatives to study the merchantship logistic problem.[63]

Soon thereafter, a meeting was held in London, with the United States represented by two persons from the Central Intelligence Agency, one from the State Department, and Cdr. Meyertholen from ONI. The British had two representatives from Counter-Intelligence Division (CID) and a Cdr. Alywyn from the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division. According to Meyertholen, the CIA and CID representatives minimized the importance of shipping and over-estimated the tonnage carried by the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Following the meeting, Adm. Arthur W. Radford requested that Commander in Chief, Pacific be represented at any such subsequent meetings. The second meeting was held six to eight months later in Washington, and LCdr. H. H. Calhoun represented CINCPAC. Calhoun, who relieved Meyertholen as OP-322Y3C in December 1954, also attended the third meeting in London in May and June of 1954.[64]

Project Control

The Project Control System was redefined in ONI Internal Instruction 5201.1C on 23 November 1956 as "the system to coordinate and control the production of intelligence within the Office of Naval Intelligence and to maintain production statistics for use in manpower and budget estimates and justifications." The system was operated by the project control officer (OP-922B2), under the direction of the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence for Production (OP-922). Production efforts were classified as projects under the cognizance of Project Control whenever one or a combination of the following situations prevailed: (1) a total of four or more work hours was required; (2) more than one branch was involved; (3) expediency dictated designating the effort as a project; or (4) production was associated with CNO special briefings, or lectures and briefings to be delivered outside of ONI, or presentations requested by an outside activity.[65]

Summary of ONI Periodicals, 1915–1967

Periodical and Dates

Semi-Monthly Compilation April 1915–December 1918

ONI Monthly/Quarterly Information Bulletin 15 January 1919–1941 (omitted 1932–1935 for lack of funds)

ONI Weekly 28 January 1942–26 September 1945

International Developments of Naval Interest March 1945–December 1954

ONI Review November 1945–April 1963

Naval Intelligence Quarterly 1948–1959

Daily Information Memorandum 1939–1949 (?)

Daily Summary of World Events April 1949–December 1955

ONI Review Supplement 1954–1957

Weekly Summary of World Events August 1956–November 1961

Scientific and Technical Abstracts and Reports 1953–1967

ONI Operational Notes May–August 1945

Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations 1 December 1940–15 January 1943

Office of Naval Intelligence Bulletins 1958–?

Early ONI Publications, General Information Series

Issue and Title

No. I, 1883 *Operations upon the Korean Coast, Japanese-Korean Ports, and Siberia*

No. II, 1883 *Report of the Exhibits at the Crystal Palace* [London] *Electrical Exhibition, 1882*

No. III, 1884 *Examples, Conclusions, and Maxims of Modern Naval Tactics*

No. IV, 1885 *Papers on Naval Operations During the Year Ending July, 1885*

No. V, 1886 *Papers on Squadrons of Evolutions and the Recent Development of Naval Materiel*

No. VI, June 1887 *Recent Naval Progress*

No. VII, June 1888 *Naval Reserves, Training and Materiel*

No. VIII, June 1889 *Naval Mobilization and Improvement in Materiel*

No. IX, June 1890 *A Year's Naval Progress*

No. X, July 1891 *The Year's Naval Progress*

No. XI, July 1892 *Notes on the Year's Naval Progress*

No. XII, August 1893 *The International Columbian Naval Rendezvous and Review of 1893, and Naval Maneuvers of 1892*

No. XIII, July 1894 *Notes on the Year's Naval Progress*

No. XIV, July 1895 *Notes on the Year's Naval Progress*

No. XV, July 1896 *Notes on the Year's Naval Progress*

No. XVI, October 1896 *Notes on Naval Progress*

No. XVII, Part I, January 1898 *Notes on Naval Progress*

No. XVII, Part II, April 1898 *Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics*, by VAdm. S. J. Makaroff, *IRN*

No. XVIII, November 1899 *Notes on Naval Progress*

No. XIX, July 1900 *Notes on Naval Progress*

No. XX, July 1901 *Notes on Naval Progress*

No. XXI, July 1902 *Notes on Naval Progress*

Chapter Notes

1. Capt. Herbert E. Cocke, USN, "History of ONI," MS, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1931, 7–8.

2. *Army-Navy Journal*, 25 Jan 1902, 529.

3. Chief Intelligence Officer, *Annual Report, 1903*, passim; and *SECNAV Annual Reports, 1902*, 95–96; *1903*, 492.

4. Roosevelt's secretary's and Sibsbee's ltrs 14958–2, box 620, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Alpha File, RG 80, NA.

5. See Cocke, "History of ONI," 7, for details on the establishment of the series.

6. Department of the Navy, "Administrative History of the Office of Naval Intelligence in World War II," 10 Jul 1946, unpublished MS, 15–16, hereafter *ONI WWII Admin History*.

7. Ibid., 577.

8. Letter in OA.

9. ONI-8, *Instructions for Intelligence Officers*, 1923, 4.

10. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 575–76.

11. ONI-19, *ONI Intelligence Manual*, 1933, para. 2004, 2005.

12. Ibid., paras. 2006, 2007.

13. Ibid., para. 2009.

14. Ibid., para. 5006.

15. RAdm. Arthur H. McCollum, Oral History, USNI, Annapolis, MD, 1971, 1:141–43.

16. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 586, 597.

17. Ibid., 601.

18. Mrs. R. H. Rice (nee Eunice Willson) ltr to author, 14 Apr 1976.

19. McCollum oral history, USNI, 1:251–52.

20. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 623.

21. "Report of Functions and Workload of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Feb–May 1952," 117.

22. CNO (OP-16F) ltr ser 110P16, 18 Mar 1940, box 6, Naval Info File, Job 3770, OA.

23. *ONI Review*, Sep 1952, 367.

24. Naval Intelligence School, lecture notes, 2 Aug 1946.

25. Director Naval Intelligence (DNI) (SC) ltr A8-2/EF ser 048712, 12 Dec 1940.

26. Booz, Fry, Allen and Hamilton, *Special Survey of ONI*, 27 Aug 1941, 14–15, 57–58. Special Intelligence Section (OP-16-Z) was not discussed in the survey.

27. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 927–32.

28. Ibid., 938–44.

29. ONI-54, Dec 1943, in OA provided the listing.

30. Ibid., 516.

31. Charles A. Rocheleau, taped interview, 1 Oct 1975; and *ONI Roster*, Mar 1943.

32. *ONI Weekly* file, OA.

33. *ONI Operational Notes* in OA contains all four files.

34. *ONI Review*, Nov 1945, note on inside front cover.

35. *Defense Intelligence Digest*, May 1963.

36. *ONI Review*, Nov 1952, 423.

37. ONI Instruction 05602.1 of 29 Nov 1957.

38. *Report of Functions and Workload of ONI*, Feb–May 1952, 117.

39. OP-32C1 ltr, ser 1877P32, 25 Mar 1948. The periodical was revived with the fall 1977 issue (13 December 1977) and is prepared by naval reservists drilling with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

40. Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (NAVSTIC), *Command History, 1967*, 4.

41. Note on inside cover of Air Intelligence Reports.

42. CNO (OP-32F) ltr, ser 0516P32, 27 Jan 1948.

43. CNO (OP-922F4) ltr, ser 000951P92, 23 Aug 1955.

44. Copies of this publication are retained in OA.

45. ONI Internal Instruction 02110.3 of 28 Jun 1954.

46. ONI Instruction 5213.7A of 10 Nov 1959.

47. *ONI Review*, Aug 1955, 429.

48. *ONI Review*, Jan 1958, 29–30.

49. ONI-70-1, *U.S. Naval Intelligence Manual*, 20 Jun 1956, 28. ONI-70-1 superseded ONI-19B.

50. *ONI Review*, Mar 1952, 121.

51. *ONI Review*, Feb 1952, 74.

52. Ibid., 80.

53. *ONI Review*, Jan 1958, 33.

54. Ibid., Oct 1956, 435.

55. ONI-70-1, 27.

56. Navy Department, "History of Administrative Problems, Korean War," 1955, 2:16–17. The series is in eight looseleaf binders.

57. OP-322 memo, 4 Aug 1952.

58. W.E.W. Howe memo on acoustic intelligence (ACINT), 10 Nov 1958.

59. ONI Instruction 5201.1C of 23 Nov 1956.

60. ONI Instruction 5600.1A of 13 Jan 1960.

61. *ONI Review*, Jul 1956, 310.

62. ONI Instruction 5600.6 of 18 Apr 1956.

63. Cdr. Joseph A. Meyertholen, interviews by author, 24 Mar 1980 and 3 May 1980.

64. Ibid.; and Meyertholen ltr to author, 6 May 1980. OP-322F3C became OP-322Y3c in 1952.

65. ONI Instruction 5201.1C of 23 Nov 1956.

CHAPTER 11

Technical Intelligence

Beginning of Technical Intelligence in the U.S. Navy

One of the main justifications for establishing the Office of Naval Intelligence was to have an office in the Navy for coordinating and correlating the technical information in foreign books, periodicals, reports, and studies on progress being made in naval science by the maritime nations of the world. Up to that time, such technical information had been collected independently by the various bureaus of the Navy, each according to its own interests and with little or no exchange of collected data.

With the establishment of ONI in 1882 and the placement of naval attachés in appropriate countries, much of the information continued to be collected and processed primarily for use by the technical bureaus. Accordingly, ONI's initial organization, as mentioned in earlier chapters, was functional rather than geographic, with a desk for each of the principal technical bureaus to make sure that information received and studies produced were passed on to the bureaus according to their interests.

Many of the early ONI products pertained to technical and logistic support subjects and were distributed in the ONI General Information Series, which included the highly regarded and much-used annual *Notes on Naval Progress* (see list of early ONI publications in Chapter 10).

In 1890, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy commented in his annual report that, with the increase in construction and the growing work of arming and equipping new ships, the importance of ONI was being felt by every bureau and office of the Navy Department and by those in the service at large.[1]

By 1896, ONI was keeping the Navy Department informed on developments abroad that were likely to affect the construction or equipping of the battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats that the United States was then building or designing.[2]

It was ONI policy in 1914 to gather technical information with an emphasis on assisting with improvements to the fleet rather than providing intelligence of an operational nature. The office was still organized along functional lines to cover specific subjects such as ships, ordnance, and engineering.[3]

Collection of technical intelligence was carried out quite extensively by the technical bureau of the office of the U.S. Naval Attaché, Paris, during World War I. All technical inventions relating to naval matters that were submitted to the U.S. ambassador or the U.S. naval attaché in France were inspected by Capt. George R. Evans, USN (Ret.), and his technical bureau in Paris. Descriptions of inventions found sufficiently interesting were translated, dossiers were prepared, and the reports were then sent to ONI. Few inventions turned out to be of much use.

Frequently, ONI requested reports on various technical subjects relating to Allied material. The reports were researched extensively, and answers were prepared by a technical bureau, usually in collaboration with technical experts of the Allied government involved.

A technical bureau also made lengthy translations of enemy submarine reports and studies covering activities in the Atlantic Ocean, English Channel, and Mediterranean Sea. The documents came from the French Ministry of Marine. In addition to submarine reports, other documents from the French ministry were screened along with French scientific publications, and the interesting items were forwarded in translated form to ONI in Washington. The technical bureau also arranged for the purchase, or manufacture in the United States, of Allied items desired by the Navy Department.[4]

A problem confronting ONI in the late 1930s was to convince the Navy's technical bureaus that the information collected by ONI sources should be taken seriously. Reports from impeccable sources,

and sometimes samples of genuine hardware, would be rejected by the bureaus, based on the assumption that no foreign power could build better than the United States. So, it was assumed the reports must be in error.[5]

Technical Intelligence During World War II

Chief of Naval Operations letter serial 0225716 of 28 September 1940 removed practically all restrictions on the exchange of technical information with the British government. Sending large numbers of scientists and technical engineers to England from the Navy's bureaus and laboratories in conjunction with the order increased the volume of scientific and technical material being received by the British Empire Section of ONI for passing on to the Navy's various bureaus and laboratories. The volume of such material was soon beyond the section's capacity; all it could do was record, duplicate, and disseminate.

The Identification and Characteristics (I&C) Section (OP-16-F-20) of ONI was established on 31 December 1941 as a result of the Director of Naval Intelligence's verbal approval of a memo proposing creation of the organization by Cdr. Charles G. Moore, USN (Ret.), dated 11 December 1941. Capt. William A. Heard, on 8 January 1942, outlined the functions of the new section:

> The Identification and Characteristics Section will . . . collect, evaluate, codify, correlate and disseminate all available information on the characteristics and appearance of all foreign naval and merchant vessels. It will carry as continuing projects the design characteristics of U.S. and foreign vessels and translate them into tables, line drawings and models from which identification studies will be produced for the use of all the United States armed services."[6]

On 9 January 1942, the functions of the I&C Section were expanded to include collaboration on the production of aircraft identification studies. The concept of having a single section responsible for the characteristics and appearance of warships, merchant ships, and aircraft was based on the recognition that one centralized drafting, production, and publication force could better serve the analytical and evaluating specialists in these three hardware fields.

At its inception, I&C consisted of Cdr. Moore who was also head of the Statistical Section (OP-16-F-10), a civilian analyst, and an architect awaiting a naval officer commission.

The requirement to place highly accurate ship identification material in the hands of the operating forces and training activities received first priority. Statistical and photographic information on naval vessels was available to I&C from the various foreign desks and was employed to produce detailed drawings and models for recognition publications and for vulnerability studies.

As related in the previous chapter, the models were built by the David Taylor Model Basin, professional model builder Van Ryper at Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, and an expert model maker in I&C. The models were then photographed from all angles by Time, Inc., which was under contract to publish the recognition manuals.

After the recognition documents had been produced, the section was able to put more time and effort into the analysis of the performance and development of statistical characteristics of warships. Many sources had not been previously researched, and the process of searching every prisoner-of-war report, reading every captured document, and rescrutinizing every pertinent photograph culminated in *A Statistical Summary of the Japanese Navy* (ONI-222-J), which was followed by numerous other similar documents.

In early 1943, it was possible to put more effort on the technical aspects of ships' equipment. Files were started on enemy guns, fire-control equipment, radar, and similar developments. There was a tremendous increase in liaison with the Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS), Bureau of Ordnance (BUORD), and Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) and with such special organizations as the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Joint publications were issued containing information collected by ONI and evaluated by the appropriate bureaus. In the March 1943 reorganization of the Office of Naval Intelligence, OP-16-F-20 became OP-16-P-2, retaining the name, Identification and Characteristics Section.[7]

At about the same time, an Intelligence Analyst Unit was established outside of ONI in the Progress and Planning Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development. Such a unit had not been included in the original organization of the coordinator's office; it had been assumed that ONI would make preliminary analyses of incoming reports. The magnitude of the task, however, had been very much underestimated. Most reports did not deal primarily with scientific and technical matters, and any clues on weapon developments were obscured by other unrelated matter and were recognizable only by those familiar with research matters. ONI personnel involved in dissemination who were also qualified to screen out information of that kind were limited in number and inadequate to deal with the magnitude of the task.[8]

In early 1944, it had become increasingly apparent that a centralized organization was needed for the collection and dissemination of naval technical intelligence information. There were numerous instances of the failure of such information to reach the technical activity having primary cognizance. Furthermore, with the intensification of the war in the Pacific, the fleet had an increasingly urgent need for timely technical information in a processed format.

Accordingly, RAdm. Roscoe E. Schuirmann, Director of Naval Intelligence, issued a memorandum on 3 October 1944 establishing the Technical Intelligence Center (TIC) within the Publications and Dissemination Branch and designating the center OP-16-PT. The memo stated the duties of TIC to be as follows:

> a. Establish and maintain central technical intelligence files of all information relative to foreign warships, merchant ships, and naval and military equipment for the use of all service activities;
>
> b. Expedite and insure adequate routing and interchange of reports and information on these subjects;
>
> c. Maintain a panel in which representatives of all interested technical bureaus and activities will participate for the purpose of determining requirements of the activities either from incoming material or from the central files; and
>
> d. Collaborate with technical bureaus, through their representatives, in the preparation of technical intelligence articles on foreign naval equipment, on warships and on merchant ships, for dissemination through a common medium.

The I&C Section served as the nucleus around which OP-16-PT was formed. One officer and one yeoman were also added from the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z) to control captured enemy equipment.[9]

A Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) Program, sponsored by the Bureau of Ordnance, assigned field personnel to both Europe and the Pacific, supplied them with cameras and CEE documents, and gave them orders to photograph, properly identify, and serialize every piece of equipment forwarded to the U.S. for exploitation. The field teams had the capability to write preliminary reports on CEE items and disseminate them rapidly to area units when appropriate. For example, in case of booby traps, data were to be disseminated immediately to infantry units after a preliminary checkout by explosives experts.[10]

LCdr. C. H. Watson, USNR, was the first acting head of ONI's Technical Intelligence Center. The center became involved in the filing, translation, distribution, and control of German documents of naval interest that were picked up by the Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NAVTECHMISEU) as elements of Europe were liberated. TIC functioned generally as a library and clearinghouse for the control of the unevaluated documents. A Control Section was established, and later an Estimates Section was formed, but, initially, no formal intelligence studies of the captured documents were undertaken.

The "reading panel" system was adopted to help TIC personnel keep in close touch with representatives of agencies interested in the technical material available at the center. Representatives visited the panel several times a week from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of Research and Inventions, all the Navy technical bureaus, the British Admiralty Delegation, the Joint Electronics Intelligence Agency, the Marine Corps, and the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department representing the Army. Dissemination was also made to the Naval War College, the Navy's General Board, the Ship Characteristics Board, and the Joint Army-Navy Experimental and Testing Board.

On 28 August 1945, an abstract system was inaugurated by TIC to supplement its reading panel. The abstracts consisted of a brief summary of each document, with no evaluation of content. Specialists in the following subjects drafted the abstracts: warships and warship equipment, merchant ships and their equipment, ordnance, electronics, aeronautics and miscellaneous—the last covering synthetics, chemicals, medical intelligence, electrical instruments, etc.[11]

Capt. George R. Phelan, by February 1945, had relieved LCdr. Watson as head of the Technical Intelligence Center. He, in turn, was relieved by Capt. Francis R. DuBorg in December 1945. The designation of the center was changed to OP-23F2 in October 1945 when ONI's designation was changed from OP-16 to OP-23.[12]

Exploitation of German and Japanese Technical Developments

Naval Technical Mission in Europe

The Readiness Division of Commander Naval Forces, Europe (COMNAVEU), a unit that had performed well in the field of technical intelligence in England, prepared extensive plans for the exploitation of the vast sources of German technical information of interest to the Navy. Capt. Henry A. Schade was sent to Europe to investigate the best means of exploiting technical data about the German navy. In May 1944, the War Department had proposed a joint Army-Navy mission, known as the

"Alsos Mission," for technical intelligence work in Europe. (*Alsos*, the Greek word for tree, was a play on words derived from the organization's having been established at the instigation of Army Maj-Gen. Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project.) The mission's primary purpose was to acquire the leading European nuclear scientists and data on the German atomic bomb project; the mission's other scientific data-gathering work was, in effect, a cover for its principal mission.

In August 1944, Capt. Schade was assigned as head of the Navy Section of the Alsos Mission, to report to COMNAVEU and to be under COMNAVEU administrative control. Alsos naval members were to represent COMNAVEU Readiness Division on the continent, and Commander Naval Forces, France provided assistance in personnel, billeting, and office space.[13]

On 4 December 1944, the Secretary of the Navy approved the establishment of the U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe. Its mission was to exploit German science and technology for the benefit of the Navy Department's technical bureaus and the Coordinator of Research and Development. The mission's tasks were to coordinate all U.S. Navy activities on the continent of Europe that were exploiting German scientific and technical intelligence and to form a pool of technically qualified personnel under Navy control to operate as field teams, either independently or with Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee teams, Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee teams, Alsos teams, or U.S. Army or British teams exploiting targets of naval interest.

The naval Alsos group that had been established to help in the search for information on, and personnel involved in, Germany's nuclear research served as the nucleus of the personnel pool. The senior Navy representative on the Alsos mission was designated by Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet to be Chief NAVTECHMISEU. The Navy technical bureaus and the coordinator of research and development provided technical officers, civilian technicians, and the necessary administrative personnel to staff NAVTECHMISEU. An office for the representative of NAVTECHMISEU was established in ONI (OP-16-R) to keep Chief NAVTECHMISEU continuously informed as to the plans and activities of the Technical Intelligence Committee and the technical missions of the War Department.

Chief NAVTECHMISEU was to report directly to COMNAVEU, and to the senior U.S. naval authority in the areas being exploited. He was authorized and directed to:

> (a) travel, and order travel, anywhere in Europe; (b) obtain and expend funds as necessary in procuring technical intelligence; (c) obtain necessary assistance from U.S. naval authorities in Europe; (d) obtain assistance from U.S. Army authorities in Europe, using Alsos Mission channels wherever possible; (e) forward Information Reports (IRs) direct to the Director of Naval Intelligence, with copies to appropriate Navy Department offices and to U.S. activities in Europe, and to communicate directly with the Navy Department regarding the intelligence operations of the missions; (f) ship material to the United States of special interest to the Navy Department; and (g) return to the United States for consultation when necessary.[14]

NAVTECHMISEU was activated on 20 January 1945. Commo. Henry A. Schade was the first chief of the mission and was a direct representative of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, reporting to Commander Naval Forces, Europe, with the designator Commander Task Force (CTF) 128. NAVTECHMISEU absorbed most of the officers from COMNAVEU's Forward Intelligence Unit, Task Group (TG) 125.8, and they became the Intelligence Section of the mission. Civilian technical specialists were provided by Navy contractors. One such civilian was the aviator Charles A. Lindbergh. The administrative headquarters for TG 125.8 was established in Paris, with forward headquarters located variously at Bad Schwabach (mid-April), Heidelberg (late April), Bremen (late May) and Munich (mid-July).[15]

The personnel of the NAVTECHMISEU Intelligence Section (six officers and two enlisted) had been engaged in intelligence collection work on the continent since Normandy D-Day and were the most experienced naval field intelligence officers and men in the European theater. Their language qualifications, previous experience as interrogators of German prisoners of war, and familiarity with U.S. Army field procedures were their principal assets.

At its peak, the Intelligence Section had thirty-eight officers and two enlisted personnel. The additional officers were recruited from CTF 124, the Special Activities Branch, and other naval activities, including the Bureau of Personnel.

Some interpreters were assigned on a semipermanent basis to other NAVTECHMISEU sections, and about half were retained in an interpreter pool. Those assigned to a specific section made trips with officers of that section and later assisted in report writing and translating pertinent German documents.[16]

Various sections of the NAVTECHMISEU found a number of noteworthy German technical developments. The researchers discovered that the Germans had produced hydrogen peroxide, concentrated to 85 percent and solid-free, to support combustion in submarine and torpedo power-plants

and in propellants. A captured one-ton-per-day output plant was shipped to the United States. They had also developed fin-stabilized, rocket-assisted projectiles for high-velocity guns, and a number of sophisticated guided missile programs were uncovered. A Mach 4.3 wind tunnel that had been used to conduct initial tests on V-2 rocket models was disassembled and shipped to the Bureau of Ordnance in the United States.[17]

German developments in ship design and engineering were also investigated. High-speed diesel propulsion systems, closed-cycle diesel engines, and a 2,500 horsepower hydrogen-peroxide Walter-cycle turbine capable of propelling a submarine at 26 knots submerged were obtained. Examples of clandestine attack craft and saboteur equipment were also acquired. Nine aircraft were shipped to the United States for exploitation, and, by agreement with the Army Air Force and the British Royal Air Force, the U.S. Navy studied captured German turbojet engines.

German infrared and guided missile electronic systems were investigated through a U.S. joint working group. Other electronics systems recovery and investigative work was performed through the Committee on Captured Enemy Electronic Equipment.[18] NAVTECHMISEU personnel maintained a target information card index file to permit technical officers to brief themselves on information collected previously by other agencies.

The interrogation of German naval personnel was facilitated by Adm. Karl Doenitz's directive that the German navy furnish all information requested after hostilities ceased.[19]

When NAVTECHMISEU was disestablished on 1 November 1945, eleven officers were attached to the Naval Advisor, Office of Military Government, Europe (in Berlin) and given the title U.S. Naval Technical Unit, Europe. The unit took care of any new intelligence objectives and worked to complete joint U.S.-British projects such as torpedo tests and procurement, shipment of heavy armor to the United States for ballistic tests, hydrogen-peroxide supply programs, and obtaining data on the manufacture and tests of German gas turbine engines.[20]

Although NAVTECHMISEU was blocked by the Soviets from collecting information on various German naval installations, such as the torpedo plant in Gdynia and the submarine base at Danzig, it did visit German ships in Russian-occupied Baltic ports and targets in Russian-occupied Berlin and Vienna. To run down leads on German intelligence, investigations were also conducted on a limited scale in Sweden and Switzerland and some visits were made to France, Belgium, Holland, and Norway.

During its eleven-month existence, NAVTECHMISEU faced a number of problems and deficiencies. The initial estimates of personnel requirements were too low; tours of duty for officers and civilian technicians were too brief; investigators were not sufficiently briefed about information that had already been obtained prior to their field projects; inadequate language training had been provided for investigators; interrogation of enemy personnel had not been fully exploited; and interrogation centers were too far from the point of procurement. Furthermore, there was no planning officer to plan and organize priority projects for the most effective exploitation, and difficulties in obtaining U.S. Army clearance for field operations had been experienced.[21]

During its existence, NAVTECHMISEU submitted 240 letter reports and 350 technical reports. In addition, a great amount of material and equipment was sent to the United States for study. A total of 309 officers, 109 civilian technicians, and 340 enlisted men was assigned to NAVTECHMISEU at various times.[22]

Naval Technical Mission to Japan

The U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan (NAVTECHJAP) was established on 14 August 1945 by the Chief of Naval Operations, in accordance with the Intelligence Appendix of Operation Blacklist, the operational plan for the occupation of Japan. Capt. Clifton C. Grimes, Fleet Intelligence Officer in Charge of Technical Intelligence for Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA), was designated chief of mission. The nucleus of personnel came from among those attached to JICPOA who had technical and language qualifications and from technical personnel at other commands. The initial group was designated JICPOA Team No. 29 and entered Sasebo harbor on 23 September on board the attack transport *Shelby* (APA 105) on the date of the initial occupation of Kyushu. Another group, designated JICPOA Team No. 30, joined the Third Amphibious Group in the occupation of certain areas of China. Elements of the intelligence groups of Commander Seventh Fleet joined in Sasebo, and on 28 September all units were consolidated as NAVTECHJAP. The headquarters, initially located at Sasebo, was soon moved to Tokyo to improve coordination with the other occupation activities.

The purpose of the mission was to survey all Japanese scientific and technological developments of interest to the Navy and Marine Corps in Japan, China, and in Korea south of 38° north latitude. The mission's work involved seizure, examination, and study of intelligence material; interrogation of personnel; and preparation of reports.

Before the cessation of hostilities, ONI had prepared a list of all the Japanese technical "targets" it desired, including lists of specific items and information sought by the technical bureaus of the Navy Department. As early as 15 September, copies of "Intelligence Targets Japan" of 4 September 1945, prepared by ONI, were received by NAVTECHJAP, permitting the movement of the mission without much additional planning.

NAVTECHJAP was organized into two departments: Executive (administration, etc.) and Technical. The latter was divided into sections: Ships, Electronics, Ordnance, Medical, Special, and Petroleum. One other section had the job of filing, printing, editing, and distributing intelligence material. The Technical Liaison Section, located at the Intelligence Staff (G-2), Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), attended policy conferences and other meetings and maintained contact with SCAP headquarters. The Special Intelligence Section exploited any non-technical targets that might be assigned. It also assisted in the completion of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey after the departure of the survey's personnel from Japan.

By 1 November 1945, NAVTECHJAP had 295 officers, 125 enlisted personnel, and 10 civilian technicians assigned to it. Among the officers were approximately twenty-three British technical specialists and language officers.

Collection centers were established at Sasebo, Yokosuka, Kure, and Kobe for documents and equipment. Field personnel wrote reports, and the NAVTECHJAP headquarters in Tokyo edited, typed, and/or printed the reports after checking them for completeness, accuracy, and acceptability.[23]

As of June 1946, NAVTECHJAP had finished its work in the field and moved to Pearl Harbor to finish its reports.[24] It was then disestablished on 1 November 1946. During its existence, 350 officers, 260 enlisted, 29 British officers and enlisted, and 16 civilian naval technicians, for a total of 655 personnel, had worked on its projects at one time or another. Approximately 3,500 documents had been seized and shipped to the Washington Document Center and the Navy technical bureaus, and 15,000 pieces of equipment had been shipped to U.S. laboratories for investigation. The largest items were two 18.1-inch guns shipped from Kure, each weighing 180 tons and measuring 75 feet in length.[25]

OVERCAST and PAPERCLIP: German Scientists and the U.S. Navy

As territory was occupied after the European landings, NAVTECHMISEU teams roamed far and wide, sometimes just behind the advancing troops, questioning, searching, and trying to find the answers to Germany's amazing wartime technical progress. One day in April 1945, while one of the teams was searching at Oberammergau in Bavaria, they found a group of German missile designers and their leader, Professor Herbert Wagner. Wagner had been the chief missile design engineer for the Henschel aircraft works and had masterminded the development of the Hs-293, a radio-controlled glide bomb. In the nearby Hartz Mountains, buried blueprints, models, and prototypes were found, enough to fill seven large cases.

By early May 1945, Professor Wagner, his four assistants, and their files were in Washington. Many organizations were interested in exploiting them, including the Navy Bureaus of Aeronautics and Ordnance and the Army Air Force, but none was willing to take custody of the missile team. So they were placed in a Washington hotel, where ONI officers stood watch as Wagner and his men worked to perfect a controlled antiaircraft rocket for use in the continuing war against the Japanese.

The hotel arrangement was too expensive for ONI's staff and funding resources. The Office of Research and Inventions (later known as the Office of Naval Research) and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics were asked to help. What was needed was a secluded estate where life would be pleasant but secure. The Guggenheim Foundation was found to have such a place, the Jay Gould medieval castle at Sands Point on Long Island, which became the Special Devices Center of the Office of Naval Research. Initially, its use was kept quite secret; guards were placed at the gate, and no Germans left the grounds except under escort.

In the summer of 1945, the Technical Information Center published *German Technical Aid to Japan* to delineate "those German techniques, devices and weapons, the use of which by the Japanese would have a bearing on the war in the Pacific." The surrender of the German submarine *U-234* to U.S. forces at the time of Germany's collapse contributed significantly to the survey: the submarine had been en route to Japan with a valuable cargo, including complete drawings for the Messerschmitt Me-163 rocket fighter, an entire German electronics library, fire-control equipment, radar, and radio equipment.

Dr. Heinz Schlicke, a German electronics expert, was one of the passengers aboard the *U-234*. He was going to deliver a series of lectures in Japan on German electronic development and had extensive documentary material with him. Arrangements were made for Dr. Schlicke to give the same lectures in the Navy Department between 19 and 31 July 1945.

CHAPTER 12

Air Intelligence

Pre–World War II U.S. Navy Air Intelligence

One might consider the Navy's air intelligence as having been first tried out on 3 August 1861 when John La Mountain made his first ascent in a tethered balloon from the Union ship *Fanny* at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to conduct aerial reconnaissance of Confederate batteries on Sewell's Point. The effort apparently proved to have some merit (or, at least its potential was not disproven) for similar aerial reconnaissance efforts were tried several more times during the Civil War.[1]

The airplane's use as a platform for collecting intelligence information needed by the Navy was recognized officially by Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer in his annual report for 1912 in which he commented that aircraft could be carried, stowed, and used by all large ships to reconnoiter an enemy's port or to search out the enemy's advanced bases and extend the eyes of the fleet in naval scouting or blockading operations.

The Navy's first use of airplanes for reconnaissance in a combat situation was in April and May 1914, during fleet operations in connection with the occupation of Veracruz, Mexico. Two seaplanes were carried by the pre-dreadnought battleship *Mississippi* and the scout cruiser *Birmingham* to Veracruz and Tampico, respectively. The aircraft's scouting work for the fleet commander in chief assured him of the absence of mines and located underwater obstructions. The aircraft were judged to have been "of inestimable value in scouting for the combined operations of the Army and Navy," much of their operations having taken place over the trenches protecting Veracruz. See Chapter 4 for more details on the collection phase of air intelligence.[2]

At the outbreak of World War I and before the United States became involved, three of the Navy's pioneer aviators were sent as assistant naval attachés to U.S. embassies in Europe to serve as expert observers in aviation matters: Lt. John H. Towers to London; Lt. Victor D. Herbster to Berlin; and 1st Lt. Bernard L. Smith, USMC, to Paris.[3]

The instructions for the intelligence officer at Naval Air Station (NAS), Porto Corsini, Italy, Ens. A. R. Tilburne, USNRF, were typical of the guidance given to intelligence officers at air stations during the latter stages of World War I:

> The Intelligence Officer shall, under the direction of the Commanding Officer, procure and prepare for distribution literature concerning the operation of aircraft. He shall keep posted up to date, a military map and a hydrographic chart of the area coming under the jurisdiction of the station to which he is attached. He shall keep posted up to date on such information as he may be able to obtain of all enemy dispositions within his area. He shall keep on the largest practicable scale map, the position of the Allied, enemy and American aeronautical enterprises. He shall prepare the daily station report and keep on file all statistical data therein required. He shall be responsible for all signal equipment of aircraft and station.[4]

The concept of the status and duties of peacetime intelligence officers at naval air stations under the naval district commandants was explained by Capt. Thomas T. Craven in March 1920, in an article that was repeated in the Office of Naval Intelligence *Monthly Information Bulletin* of 15 September 1920:

> The intelligence officer should be an aid for operations, strategy and confidential information. He should be a line officer, especially trained and, when possible, a pilot or ex-pilot. His duties include keeping track of enemy movements; keeping track of the movements of own forces; keeping custody of confidential books; taking care of communications including radio, telephone, telegraph and pigeons; having cognizance of photography, reports of operations, and meteorology.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, information on foreign aviation reached the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) from many sources, including naval and military air attachés in Europe, foreign representatives of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and certain foreign contacts of U.S. aircraft manufacturers. Information collected by naval and military air attachés was received via ONI, and the NACA representative in Paris, LCdr. John J. Ide, USNR, forwarded his technical information to both NACA and ONI. BUAER thus received Ide's reports from both NACA and ONI.

With the collapse of the French armies in June 1940, NACA closed its Paris office. LCdr. Ide was recalled to active duty and assigned to BUAER as head of its Technical Information Section in December 1940. In the following months, he attempted to convince the Chief of BUAER of the need for formally establishing an intelligence section to build up and systematize the work of evaluating, interpreting, and drawing conclusions from air operational and technical information.[5]

To improve the distribution of intelligence to the various Navy technical bureaus, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) letter serial 981116 of 26 November 1940 directed all bureaus and divisions of the Navy Department to establish organizations to receive and circulate naval intelligence reports to cognizant sections of their organizations. As a result, the chief of BUAER designated a liaison officer to work with ONI.

In the summer of 1941, intelligence reports on radar, fighter direction and antisubmarine warfare, particularly from Cdr. Ralph A. Ofstie and LCdr. John P. W. Vest, Naval Attaché for Air and Assistant Naval Attaché, London, respectively, were not getting through to the proper desks at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and BUAER. The side-tracking of the reports was found to be taking place in the technical bureaus themselves.[6]

Also in the summer of 1941, the air intelligence function in BUAER had grown to where it made up a large part of the workload of the Technical Information Section. On 1 August 1941, LCdr. John Ide proposed that the intelligence and technical functions be separated and that intelligence be given the status of a separate section.[7]

A Chief BUAER letter of 29 September 1941 set up Ide's recommended Aviation Intelligence Branch in the Administration Division of BUAER. The branch consisted of the Air Intelligence Section under LCdr. Ide and the Technical Applications Section under LCdrs. Frank C. Sutton and Steadman Teller. For Ide's section, the principal sources of information were ONI and the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID), with which close liaison was maintained. The initial functions of the Air Intelligence Section were to collect, index, and distribute information on Allied and enemy aviation within BUAER and to naval air stations. The Technical Applications Section prepared studies for the Chief of BUAER on the development and tactical use of aircraft, radar, night fighters, aircraft carrier complements, etc.[8]

Air Intelligence During World War II

With the U.S. entry into the war, air intelligence was shifted on 26 December 1941 from the Administration Division to the Planning Division of BUAER, thus reflecting an appreciation of the increasing importance of operational intelligence in support of planning.

By early 1942, a large volume of foreign and U.S. information was being received by the Air Intelligence Section from ONI and from British sources. During January 1942, new specialized functions were added, and the Air Intelligence Section was given branch status. As of 24 February 1942, the Aviation Intelligence Branch comprised four sections:

(1) The Foreign Intelligence Section disseminated foreign aviation intelligence to BUAER and to naval aviation shore establishments. It also compiled foreign data and statistics, assisted in the evaluation of all foreign information, and participated in logistic and tactical planning by keeping readily available all information on landing fields and seaplane operating facilities.

(2) The U.S. Information Section collected and collated data on U.S. forces; maintained liaison with the War Plans Division of OPNAV; and prepared periodic reports, records of current operations, daily war diaries, and war maps.

(3) The Tactical Applications Section analyzed all information coming into the branch for implications pertinent to the Navy's current air tactics. It also developed summaries and analyses for the United States from information available to the branch.

(4) The Strategic Information Section interviewed selected officers returning from operating areas and edited and published the information collected.[9]

Four Army-Navy teams were sent out in early 1942 to obtain crashed or captured enemy aircraft and equipment, take pictures, and make special reports to ONI and MID. The teams were assigned to cover India-Burma, China, the Southwest Pacific, and the Pacific Ocean. They furnished commands in those areas with "hot" information of operational value.

Once they had reached combat areas, the air combat intelligence (ACI) officers were sources of

valuable information on the characteristics and performance of the various types of Japanese aircraft. The information they obtained was generally acquired through debriefings of combat pilots, examination of captured equipment, and, occasionally, from interrogations of prisoners of war.[10]

The need for an organization to collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence derived from our own air combat experiences also became clearly evident. The information on the Navy's first air combat actions was not adequate or in sufficient detail to permit analysis that would provide guidance for improvement in tactics in future air combat situations. To remedy the situation, it was decided to train specialists in air intelligence in the same manner as had been done by the Royal Air Force, and the Naval Air Combat Intelligence School was set up by BUAER at NAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island, in April 1942. While collecting and reporting air technical intelligence had been recognized as a responsibility of ONI and its attachés since World War I, the collection, analysis, and application of air combat intelligence was of immediate interest to the Navy's aeronautical organization. The Bureau of Aeronautics, therefore, assumed responsibility for meeting the new intelligence requirement and assigned it to its Air Intelligence Branch.[11]

The Aviation Intelligence Branch was renamed the Air Information Branch in December 1942 to avoid confusion with ONI's internal organization of the same name. At the same time, the title air combat intelligence officer was changed to air combat information officer.[12]

In connection with the mutual exchange of intelligence between ONI and BUAER, there was some concern in ONI that air intelligence collection opportunities were being missed during ONI's interrogations of captured German submariners. Many of the Germans were former aviators. An undated memo by LCdr. Henry J. White to Capt. Adolf Von S. Pickhardt of ONI expressed the view that Air Combat Information officers who were technically competent and linguistically qualified should be additionally trained as prisoner-of-war (POW) interrogators. None of ONI's POW interrogators were technically competent in aviation matters. White's memo also expressed the expectation that there would be an increasing number of German submariners who had been pilots and air-crewmen.[13]

Many of the first graduates of the Air Combat Intelligence Officers School were assigned to the South Pacific for the Guadalcanal campaign. Some were put ashore on Guadalcanal, some were sent to Espiritu Santo, and the remainder were assigned to Commander South Pacific Forces at Noumea, New Caledonia. They became involved in many aspects of air intelligence, such as locating downed enemy aircraft in order to salvage equipment and retrieve documents; updating maps and charts of the area and developing new operational maps and charts; developing air-sea rescue procedures; and devising escape and evasion nets for retrieving downed airmen. ACI officers even assisted the torpedo boat squadrons until intelligence specialists could be assigned to those squadrons.[14]

Briefing pilots and air crew before each mission was, of course, a primary duty of the ACI officers. They briefed not only on the target and its defenses, but also on all possible survival, evasion, and escape information that would be of help if the pilots were forced down behind enemy lines. Upon their return from a mission, pilots were interrogated by ACI officers regarding the target, enemy forces encountered, and other details that would be of value to future missions. Men who returned to their units from a successful evasion of capture in enemy-occupied territory were debriefed, and their experiences were tabulated by ACI officers and given speedy dissemination.[15]

By early 1943, the Air Information Branch was processing a tremendous volume of intelligence information. To improve its efficiency and to meet the needs for wider dissemination of aviation intelligence information, the branch was reorganized on 20 January 1943 and expanded to six sections:

(1) The Special Foreign Projects Section (former Foreign Information Section).

(2) The Strategic Air Information Section (former Strategic Information Section).

(3) The Material and Performance Section specialized in technical information on Japanese aircraft and to a lesser extent on German aircraft, and also had general cognizance over all aircraft information.

(4) The General Information Section was organized to assemble information on U.S., Allied, and enemy aviation; supervise and set up machine data card records of air combat reports; and furnish statistical data as requested.

(5) The Dissemination Section collected all excerpts and briefs; evaluated studies and material in the branch for the purpose of editing, duplicating, and publishing material as approved by the head of the branch; and distributed information within BUAER, the Navy Department, aviation shore establishments, and the fleet. It also filled special requests for information and maintained a constant check on the adequacy of the air intelligence distribution system.

(6) The Administration Section, in addition to routine duties of office management, personnel, and

files, supervised the administration of the Air Combat Intelligence Officer program.[16]

As the war progressed, the work of the Air Information Branch of BUAER became less concerned with the technical aspects of air intelligence and more involved with operational intelligence matters. When planning, personnel, and training were consolidated in the new office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Air, it was decided that the Air Information Branch of BUAER more properly belonged in the new office. On 18 August 1943, it was transferred and reorganized into five branches:

(1) Combat Information Branch (former General Information Section);

(2) Technical Intelligence Branch (former Material and Performance Section), which also took over the responsibility for studying foreign air forces, a task previously performed by the Special Project Section;

(3) Analysis and Statistics Branch, which made statistical studies of U.S. and enemy aircraft, tactics, weapons, loss and damage, and flak analysis and maintained combat statistics;

(4) Photo Interpretation Branch; and

(5) Services Branch.[17]

In September 1943, the Air Information Division under the DCNO (Air) was renamed the Air Technical Analysis Division, a name it retained until it became part of ONI four months later.[18]

On 19 October 1943, the air functions of the Identification and Characteristics Section (OP-16-P-2) of ONI were transferred to the Air Technical Analysis Division of DCNO (Air), and on 13 November the entire master file of eighty-one Japanese, German, Italian, and Russian aircraft drawings and the complete photographic files were assigned to the division.[19]

An example of duties performed by ACI officers were those of Lt. Charles S. Melvin, assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 23, which flew PBY-5 Catalina flying boats and was based at Tulagi in 1943. Melvin found that his duties included not only the usual intelligence functions but also service as recognition officer, assistant operations officer, assistant ground training officer, and assistant communications officer. VP-23 was involved in reconnaissance, search and rescue, antisubmarine warfare, coastwatcher supply, and bombing operations. Melvin made up flight schedules, assigned crews and missions, briefed and debriefed crews, wrote up reports, and coded and decoded radio messages. As ACI officer, Melvin was also custodian of classified material, provided charts and maps, and served as material and supply officer for the squadron.[20]

On 24 January 1944, the Air Technical Analysis Division (OP-35) was incorporated as a branch of ONI when the Air Intelligence Group (OP-16-V), was created. It was organized and functioned as follows:

(1) The Evaluation Section (OP-16-VE) performed liaison with BUAER and DCNO (Air), prepared air combat information for air units, and analyzed and summarized air combat action reports.

(2) The Service Section (OP-16-VS) filled needs of air combat intelligence officers in the fleet for intelligence, reproduced and distributed intelligence material prepared by OP-16-V; maintained an intelligence library; collected, analyzed, and distributed information on foreign air facilities; conducted the terrain model workshop in the American Museum of Natural History in New York; and collaborated with the Hydrographic Office in preparation of aviation charts and target data as developed by OP-16-V.

(3) The Analytical and Statistical Section (OP-16-VA) collected and summarized operational data on naval air combat, and studied air technical documents.

(4) The Technical Air Intelligence Section (OP-16-VT) produced data on the performance and characteristics of Allied and enemy aircraft engines and equipment, as well as on design and construction details about enemy aviation material; it also prepared updated drawings, master models, and photography of enemy and Allied aircraft, and it trained, equipped, and supervised technical air intelligence field personnel.

(5) The Photographic Interpretation Section (OP-16-VP) conducted liaison with the Photo Interpretation Center at the Naval Air Station, Anacostia, whose functions included training officers in photogrammetry, map reading, aerial photo interpreting and the making of rubber terrain models (see Chapter 13).[21]

OP-16-VT, in accordance with Secretary of the Navy letter serial 1296916 of 28 June 1944, was moved to NAS Anacostia and became the Technical Air Intelligence Center. Also on 28 June 1944, the Overseas Air Facilities Subsection of OP-16-VS was combined with the Air Movements Branch of the Army Air Force at Gravelly Point in the District of Columbia to form the Air Facilities Branch, AC/AS-2.

On 5 May 1944, management and control of the U.S. Navy Terrain Model Workshop in New York was transferred to the Photo Interpretation Center. The workshop itself remained in New York.

On 30 May 1944, the Flak Intelligence Unit was activated as a subsection of OP-16-VA to study

enemy antiaircraft (AA) fire by type, effectiveness, and weapons. A four-week flak analysis course was inaugurated in July 1944 at the Naval Air Combat Intelligence School at Quonset Point, Rhode Island.[22]

Joint Services Air Intelligence

In November 1944, personnel from OP-16-VA who had been working on economic analysis and damage assessment of targets were shifted to the newly established Joint Target Group to provide Navy and Army Air Corps commands with lists of air targets, including detailed target information and the recommended munitions to be employed; standard air objective folders; damage assessments following attacks; and technical studies of effects of different weapons against specific targets. Administrative control of the Navy unit of the Joint Target Group was held by the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI).

In June 1945, the Flak Intelligence Subsection of OP-16-VA joined the Flak Agency of the Army Air Corps to form the Army-Navy Flak Intelligence Group. Kamikaze tactics, guided missiles, night carrier operations, and other developments expanded the areas of interest and requirements of the group. On 30 October 1945, the Air Intelligence Group was renamed the Air Branch and designated OP-23V (ONI's designator had been changed from OP-16 to OP-23 on 10 October 1945).

To continue joint Army-Navy action in the field of air intelligence, a Joint Army-Navy Air Intelligence Division (JANAID) was approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in JCS 1020/3 of 14 November 1943. JANAID was instructed to prepare continuing estimates of alien air forces and their potentialities, strategic objectives in alien countries, and conditions and installations in alien areas of specialized concern to air operations. JANAID was specifically excluded from the collection of basic data and was intended to replace existing joint Army-Navy air intelligence activities.[23]

Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, in a 2 October 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, recognized their joint interest in air intelligence production and directed that there should continue to be a joint arrangement for the evaluation and production of air intelligence and that naval personnel should participate in such an arrangement. He further stated, "I wish to emphasize dominant interest does not mean preclusion interest." National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 dated 13 January 1948 stated that "for the purpose of intelligence production," the Department of the Air Force would have "dominant interest" in air intelligence.[24]

As a result of a "Joint Agreement for the Production of Air Intelligence"—dated 29 March 1950 and signed by DNI RAdm. Felix L. Johnson and MajGen. C. P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force—naval personnel assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, were completely integrated at all levels within the Air Intelligence Production Divisions (AIPD). Paragraph 3C of the agreement stated:

> It is recognized that new situations may require changes in the organizational structure or the functions of the Air Intelligence Production Divisions. When such changes are of concern to the Navy, the Director of Naval Intelligence will be consulted. Otherwise, such changes are considered to fall in the category of routine Air Force administration, which is a responsibility of the Director of Intelligence, USAF.

One achievement worthy of mention came out of ONI's collaboration with the Air Force in the production of air intelligence during the Korean War. A classical correlation of hundreds of bits of raw intelligence consisting of personalities, places, events, and times led to publication in the *ONI Review*, in 1952, of the first evaluated and collated information on the first of the long series of Soviet antiship missile systems, Komet III. The analysis was followed by appropriate ONI (OP-322V2) recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations for countermeasures and led to initial funding for a defensive electronic countermeasures systems for ships.[25]

On 29 April 1952, the Director of Intelligence, USAF, with the approval of the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, unilaterally abolished the Office of the Assistant for Production in violation of the Joint Agreement of 29 March 1950. The Director of Naval Intelligence was not informed until after the fact. Abolition of the office, in effect, disestablished the Air Intelligence Production Divisions. Prior to the forced reorganization, there had been a total of three divisions in the AIPD. The Evaluation Division was headed by a naval officer with an Air Force deputy. The other two divisions, Estimates and Targets, were headed by Air Force officers with Navy and Marine Corps deputies, respectively.

Because of the change in organization, and to ensure a continuation of the desirable and necessary allocation of top billets between the services in the production of air intelligence, the Director of Naval Intelligence wanted a complete and mutually acceptable billet structure approved prior to the signing of a new agreement. However, to assist the Army in obtaining personnel for assignment to air intelligence production and after assurance by the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that a mutually agreeable billet structure would be set up as soon as possible, the Director of Naval Intelligence reluctantly signed the agreement on 16 May 1952.

A major reorganization of the Air Force Directorate of Intelligence was then instituted, with no naval officers as division chiefs and no Army or Navy representatives in a new Policy and Management Group. The group, responsible for "Requirements, Plans and Programs, Development and Management," controlled the production of air target intelligence for use by all three services. Such a unilaterally conceived and controlled intelligence production system was not satisfactory and did not meet the Navy's requirements.

Accordingly, a series of papers were submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CNO Adm. William M. Fechteler, "in order that an obviously unsatisfactory situation may be corrected, to the end that the production of air intelligence may adequately and satisfactorily serve the best interests of all three Services and the Nation."[26] The Air Force response was that it had no requirement for joint participation in the production of air intelligence.[27]

JCS memorandum 2056/47 of 13 May 1953 provided for the integrated participation by Army and Navy personnel in the Estimates and Targets Directorates of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF (AFCIN). An ad hoc committee produced a memorandum of agreement for the implementation of JCS 2056/47, dated 23 October 1953, that was approved by DNI memorandum serial 024676P32 of 18 December 1953.[28]

Following a comprehensive study in 1954 of the mobilization requirements for naval collaboration in joint services air intelligence, a revision of the Navy's representation was recommended:

	New Complement	1954 Allowance
Naval Officers	60	55
Marine Officers	6	6
Civilians	132	132[29]

By authority of the Chief of Staff, USAF; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Air Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force; and the Chief of Air Staff, Royal Air Force, the United States, Britain, and Canada formed an Air Standardization Coordinating Committee for designating Soviet aircraft and guided missiles to satisfy the requirements of operations, intelligence, communications, and training. The system was to be simple, usable with a limited vocabulary, suitable for voice and radio communications, as descriptive as possible, consistent with security, and adaptable to the inclusion of new Soviet aircraft and guided missiles.

The devised and adopted system employed the initial letter of each selected aircraft nickname to indicate the aircraft's operational role (e.g., "F" for fighter, "B" for bomber); single syllable words were used for nicknames of propeller-driven aircraft and two syllables for jet aircraft. For guided missiles, the initial letters indicated the weapon's operational role (e.g., "SS" for surface-to-surface, "SA" for surface-to-air). The names were chosen by coordinated agreement of the three participating nations.[30]

To implement the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive requiring collaboration of ONI and the Air Force's Directorate of Intelligence in the production of air intelligence, a separate organization, Naval Collaboration in Air Intelligence (NACAIN), was established by Secretary of the Navy Notice 5450 of 26 August 1957, with an officer in charge under the military command of the commandant of the Potomac River Naval Command. He also reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence for additional duty as the head of the NACAIN Branch of ONI and to the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, for additional duty as required. His office was under the management control of the Chief of Naval Operations. A joint Navy-Air Force air intelligence production effort had been operating at least since 1948, but the establishment of NACAIN changed the Navy's participating element to a field command, with the officer in charge double-hatted within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as OP-922V2.[31]

As of 1962, Radar Target Materials were being produced for use in the preparation for, and the accomplishment of, all-weather missions involving bombing, mining, navigation, and reconnaissance. The materials consisted of graphic, textual, radar-photographic, tabular, and other presentations of radar target intelligence, both from actual and predicted or simulated radar scope photography. Much of the material was produced under the Air Target Materials Program to meet standards and specifications jointly approved by the Navy and Air Force. Some material was produced by the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to meet unilateral Navy requirements. The Air Branch (OP-922V) of ONI was the CNO–ONI point of contact and coordinator for Radar Target Materials.[32]

Air Intelligence During the Korean War

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, one immediate requirement was to get qualified air intelligence Naval Reserves back on active duty. No real effort had been made to keep track of Naval Reserve air intelligence officers trained during World War II after they were released from active duty in 1945. Some, however, had reestablished contact when the Air Intelligence Reserve program was activated. By October 1950, a total of fifty-two had been successfully recalled; of these, seventeen were assigned to the Pentagon, mostly in OP-322V2

materials required to support a squadron's mission was the primary task for the air intelligence officer of any newly organized or reactivated attack squadron. First, a determination was necessary as to what material was available. On the West Coast, Commander Naval Air Forces, Pacific Intelligence Library at North Island provided clues on what should be obtained for shipboard reference. Then came the task of providing pilots with all the graphics and written material necessary for them to approach, identify, and attack successfully each of the many nuclear and conventional targets listed in current contingency plans. Detailed area studies were assembled, with charts and photographs to show navigation aids, alternative courses for low-level approach to the target, and the defenses to be expected—including missiles, which were fairly new at that time.[42]

An Integrated Air Intelligence System (IAIS), comprising an airborne multisensor collection system (using A-5C Vigilante and A3J-3 Skywarrior aircraft) and a shipboard processing installation called an Integrated Air Intelligence Center, was initiated during 1962. Director of Naval Intelligence secret letter 005187P92 of 6 June 1962 assigned to OP-92B4 (Automation Coordination Staff) the task of directing and coordinating the development of a prototype intelligence database for the IAIS. Production of the database was accomplished by the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center, Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe and the Atlantic Intelligence Center in conjunction with the IAIS surface system development at North American Aviation, Inc., and the aircraft carrier *Saratoga* (CVA 60). A master database was maintained at NPIC. In addition to the above, phase I of the program included providing the initial database and programming for the *Independence* (CVA 62) and for the Naval Air Station, Sanford, training installation. OP-922V was responsible for the direction and coordination of the operational production and maintenance of the IAIS database and for its proper distribution. It also maintained a standardized coding and indexing manual for IAIS use. See Chapter 20 for more details.[43]

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CHAPTER 13

Photographic Intelligence

Early Navy Photo Intelligence

One of the first projects undertaken by Lt. Raymond Perry Rodgers when he took over as Director of Naval Intelligence in 1885 was to write to various men of prominence in science, soliciting their opinions on the value of the camera for surveying and reconnaissance.[1]

A year later, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation commented, "Much progress has recently been made in instantaneous marine photography, and as the process can now be successfully carried out underway on shipboard, it is my intention to supply our cruising ships with photographic outfits as rapidly as practicable."[2]

Thus, the Navy was off to an early start in the use of the camera in collecting information for intelligence. See Chapter 4 for additional information on photographic collection.

A report by Capt. H. E. Ives, received by the Office of Naval Intelligence in September 1918, described British use of aerial photography during World War I. The British employed hand-held cameras to photograph convoys, suspicious objects, and ships that failed to give proper recognition signals, coastal landmarks useful to aviators, and Allied ships and submarines for identification purposes.[3]

The systematic collection and filing of photographs was begun by ONI in 1936. The War Plan for Photographs gave the Naval Records and Library Branch (OP-16-E) the job of receiving, recording, and distributing all incoming photos to the offices primarily interested. The work was made the primary function of the War Records Section (OP-16-E-2), which at that time also maintained the Naval Historical Photographic Files. Naval Records and Library was headed by Capt. Dudley W. Knox, USN (Ret.), who was also curator for the Navy Department. Prior to 1936, there had been no central photo section.

By OP-16-E-2 serial 11247 of 6 April 1937, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed the collection of strategic photos and specified the types of photos desired. From 1936 to 1941, however, very little was actively done to acquire photographs of current interest or potential value for operational use.

In 1940, the handling of strategic photography was shifted from the War Records Section to the Strategic Photography Section (OP-16-E-3). On 25 November 1940 the name of OP-16-E-3 was changed to the Graphic Section.[4]

Navy operational exercises expanded in number and scope in 1940 and incorporated the increased use of photographic reconnaissance.[5]

Navy Photo Intelligence During World War II

Washington-Area Organization

The British first recognized the need for, and the military applications of, information extracted from photos taken over enemy-held territory. To learn their techniques in that method of collecting intelligence information, VAdm. Robert L. Ghormley, Special Naval Observer in London, requested in the spring of 1941 that an officer be sent to England from the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER). LCdr. Robert S. Quackenbush, Jr. was selected to make the study.

LCdr. Quackenbush arrived in England, saw the scope of the task, and recognized the importance of learning as much as possible about photo interpretation. He requested that the Navy send over additional officers, both Navy and Marine Corps, to increase the number who would be knowledgeable about British photo interpretation methods and procedures. Quackenbush also stressed the need for the establishment of a Navy school in the United States to train officers in the science of photo interpretation. As a result, on 12 September 1941, the

CNO authorized the establishment of a photo interpretation school under the Bureau of Aeronautics, to be located at the Naval Air Station (NAS), Anacostia. LCdr. Quackenbush was made officer in charge and Capt. Charles H. Cox, USMCR, and Capt. Gooderham L. McCormick, USMCR, were appointed executive officer and chief instructor, respectively. The initial class of twenty-eight Navy and Marine officers convened on 5 January 1942.[6]

The first photographic intelligence reports were received from the field by the Army and Navy in the summer of 1942. The Army created the first Photo Procurement Detachment, which was to function in coordination with the British in England. A U.S. Navy representative, briefed by the Navy on its needs, was assigned to the detachment. The arrangement was not satisfactory because all material was forwarded to the Army's Military Intelligence Service before dissemination to the Navy. Ensuring that material selected by the Navy representative in England was received by the Navy in Washington was a continuing task.[7]

In general, handling photo interpretation reports paralleled that for aerial photos. Separate sections were set up in both the Graphic Section of ONI and the Map and Photo Branch of Army Intelligence (G-2) to handle the material. The two sections maintained a constant mutual exchange of systems and techniques.[8]

As more trained photo interpreters became available, photo interpretation units were formed either as part of a photo group or as an intelligence center assigned to an area command. The units varied in size from thirty to one hundred officers and were assigned to air and surface units, amphibious commands, Marine Corps detachments, etc.

At the end of 1942, the Navy's Photographic Interpretation School moved into the newly completed Photo Science Laboratory at NAS Anacostia in the District of Columbia.

On 12 November 1943, the Secretary of the Navy established the Photographic Interpretation Center (PIC) at NAS Anacostia as an activity of the Air Intelligence Group of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air (OP-35). On 24 January 1944, supervision of the center was transferred to the Division of Naval Intelligence (OP-16-V). The primary functions of PIC were to conduct a school for training photo interpreters, operate a workshop for the manufacture of terrain models in quantity, and maintain a pool of trained photo interpreters to serve the needs of the fleet.

On 27 February 1945, the Secretary of the Navy established the U.S. Naval Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) at the Naval Receiving Station, Anacostia, under the management and technical control of the Division of Naval Intelligence.[9]

Pacific-Area Organization

Early in the summer of 1942, the Photo Reconnaissance and Interpretation Section, Intelligence Center (PRISIC) was formed at Pearl Harbor to serve as a pool of photo interpreters to be drawn upon by units of the Pacific Fleet and to perform a more thorough and detailed analysis than did those units concerned with interpretation for immediate operational use. PRISIC additionally became the Photographic Section of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (ICPOA) in July 1942 and was divided into four sections in April 1944 as part of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA).

The South Pacific Photographic Interpretation Unit was another early unit. Photographic Interpretation Squadron (INTERPRON) One was formed under Commander South Pacific (COMSOPAC) in July 1943 as part of Fleet Air Photo Group One, with headquarters at Guadalcanal until September 1944, at which time it returned to the United States. While at Guadalcanal, INTERPRON-1 furnished photo intelligence for the Solomon Islands campaign and the Peleliu landing. In July 1945, INTERPRON-1 returned to the Pacific, basing at Okinawa.

INTERPRON-2 was formed as part of Photo Group Two under Commander Aviation Forces, Pacific and was based at Eniwetok from April until October 1944, when it was moved to Guam. INTERPRON-2 provided photo intelligence during the westward drive in the central Pacific, including the landings in the Marianas, and the aerial and surface strikes against the Japanese homeland.

Other photographic intelligence units included the Central Interpretation Unit, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific area. The latter was originally established at Kodiak, Alaska, in October 1942 and was composed of both photo interpreters and air combat intelligence officers; in March 1943 the organization was moved to Adak, where it furnished the intelligence support for the Attu and Kiska invasions and the strikes against the northern Kuriles.[10]

In April 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assigned to the Navy Department prime responsibility for the collection of all graphic and photographic material for the Pacific Ocean area. The Navy set up a photographic review panel for its own use as well as for the use of Army G-2, Army Air Force A-2, and other interested activities.[11]

Submarine Photography

Normally, aircraft photos for intelligence purposes were far superior to submarine periscope

photos. In many instances, however, the distance between the enemy objective and the closest allied air base was so great that aircraft photographic reconnaissance was impractical or inadequate. Also, the presence of many aircraft performing photographic reconnaissance over an enemy island potentially alerted the enemy as to the probable location of the next landing. Submarines could carry out photographic reconnaissance undetected, and, for that reason or because of the distance involved, they were called upon to substitute for, or to augment, aircraft reconnaissance. Submarines could also check the accuracy and orientation of charts, which was impossible for aircraft to do. For more details on submarine photography, see Chapter 6.[12]

Domestic Photographic Services

The "F" sections of each district intelligence office (DIO) throughout the war forwarded to ONI photos of operational areas, many of which were extremely valuable in supplying information on enemy-held areas. The DIOs were ONI's largest original source of graphic material. Between September 1943 and September 1944, approximately 36,000 pictures from the DIOs were received at ONI's Graphic Section. Duplication was very low, averaging 10 percent, and about one of every thirty pictures submitted eventually found its way into the Graphic Section files. At first, all material was used, but, as the files grew larger, directions were given not to process travel brochures, postcards, and similar material.[13]

The National Geographic Society made available its published and unpublished picture files and its records listing the names of picture contributors. The list was disseminated to the cognizant district intelligence offices, which would contact the individuals for any material of intelligence value that had not been sent to the National Geographic Society.[14]

Pictures were filed according to location. Some descriptive matter and the geographic coordinates were added before reproduction. One copy of the reproduced picture was mounted on a card about 13 inches by 9 inches. Across the top of the card were ten classifications into which each picture could fall: Aerodromes [airfields]; Oil Facilities; Utilities; Docks/Port Facilities; Railroads; Roads/Bridges; Coast/Beach Hydrography; Military and Naval Installations; Lakes, Rivers and Terrain; and Cities and Towns.[15]

Identification and Characteristics Section

A large proportion of the work of the Identification and Characteristics (I&C) Section (OP-16-P-2) of ONI during World War II depended on the interpretation of photos. At first, the pictures were mostly surface photos taken before the war, but, as time went on, more and more information was obtained from high-altitude aerial photos. OP-16-P-2 developed a highly trained group of photo interpretation specialists, carrying the process to a greater degree of competency than the Photo Interpretation School of BUAER could teach in its overall course. By informal agreement with the school, students at the school who were destined to specialize in photos of ships and aircraft spent two weeks of concentrated additional training at the I&C Section before assignment to sea or advanced base duty. During 1944 and 1945, ship-photographic interpreters from the school were assigned to I&C for temporary duty. These men, in general, had had overseas experience and were able to point the work of I&C toward specialized needs in the field and to coordinate the activity of the section with the publishing activities of the Photo Interpretation School.[16]

Post–World War II Organization

Because of the cutback in ONI funding, it appeared probable early in the postwar period that the activities of the Photographic Interpretation Center would have to be severely curtailed, if not eliminated. A SECNAV letter of 16 October 1946 disestablished the Photographic Intelligence Center under ONI and established in its place the Photographic Interpretation Center, retaining the acronym PIC, under the Bureau of Aeronautics. On 13 January 1947, PIC was designated a subordinate unit of the U.S. Naval Photographic Center under the military command and coordination control of the Potomac River Naval Command and under the management control of BUAER.[17]

Photographic Intelligence During the Korean War

In the early phases of the Korean War, photographs of intelligence value were sent back to the Photographic Intelligence Center at Anacostia, the Marine Corps headquarters, and other rear-area processing facilities to the detriment of Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE) and Pacific Fleet units that had an immediate need for the intelligence information available in the photographs.[18]

During November 1950, a plan was effected within Naval Forces, Far East for more rapid dissemination of photographs within the Navy. After their immediate operational needs were satisfied, all units within NAVFE that were engaged in taking pictures (except public information photography) were to send all negatives and, if practicable, prints to COMNAVFE. Upon receipt of the material, the Intelligence Section of the COMNAVFE staff screened it for photographs of value to other elements of NAVFE, made prints and positive

the foreign intelligence files in OP-323M5 were concerned, they existed only for the use of OP-322F1. Since the desks of OP-322F1 had their own reference files, the central file for foreign intelligence material was an unnecessary and undesirable complication of their tasks.

There was considerable variation in the form and content of the analysts' files. Most of them used the IFI system; one analyst maintained current files according to titles he devised himself; another had most of his material filed according to the previously used Monograph Index Guide. All analysts felt that they had to keep complete files of their own but seemed to be complying with what they considered to be the letter of the law in regard to OP-323M5. Suggestions were made that Central Files should contain only "Case History," Domestic Intelligence Material, and those reports not readily assignable to the cognizance of an individual desk, and that the desks should keep all raw source material over which they had primary cognizance.

The Board for Review of ONI Functions and Workload believed that it was evident that the Intelligence File Unit was not being used effectively by OP-322F1. The purpose of filing foreign intelligence material in the central files was to make the material available to other components of ONI and other agencies without the necessity of calling upon the individual desks for assistance. Its continued use would also assure a uniform filing system.[21]

In October 1963, ONI's Foreign Intelligence Library, consisting of original Navy Information Reports, enclosures to information reports, and other agency intellience publications (except for Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) finished intelligence publications) was transferred to DIA. Personnel from OP-923M5 who had performed library and loan functions were similarly transferred on 5 November. All intelligence material thus transferred, including documents retired by OP-923M5 to the Federal Records Center, was thereafter to be maintained and serviced by DIA. Needless to say, analytical organizations remaining within ONI after the creation of DIA continued to maintain their own files, and the conflict between centralized filing systems and the analysts' personal filing systems continued. The gradual introduction of automated data retrieval systems, in time, has brought about improved centralization of storage and access.[22]

Chapter Notes

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4. Capt. Herbert E. Cocke, USN, "History of ONI," MS, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1931," 29.

5. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 1145.

6. Ibid., 1147.

7. Ibid., 1165.

8. Ibid., 1154.

9. Ibid., 1160.

10. "History of the Office of Naval Records and Library," 1946, Appendix B, 6, MS history in Navy Department Library.

11. *CNO Annual Report, FY 1941*, 12–13.

12. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 1167–71.

13. Ibid., 1181–82.

14. LCdr. F.C. Caskey, USNR, material in Naval Investigative Service (NIS) files, OA. Caskey was head of OP-16-B-7 at the end of World War II.

15. Military Intelligence Section, Office of Naval Intelligence (MIS–ONI), Joint Editorial Board memo, 27 Aug 1943, encl. 1, box 8, Job 5938, FRC/WNRC.

16. Loretta L. MacCrindle, "History of Operational Archives," Apr 1958, 3 vols., 1:7, 9. MacCrindle was a former head of OA.

17. All information in this section is from RAdm. Ernest M. Eller's paper on the Tambach Archives in OA; hereafter Eller MS.

18. OP-32C memo, ser 01077P32, 26 Aug 1946, Accession 3770, box 1, ONI Day File, OA.

19. Eller MS.

20. MacCrindle, "History of OA," 1:23.

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22. ONI Notice 5070 of 29 Nov 1963.

CHAPTER 18

Operational Intelligence

Operational intelligence (OPINTEL) for the Navy is definable as that intelligence needed by naval commanders for planning and conducting operations, including battle. Although this definition is properly all-inclusive, in practice the emphasis is on the "now" situation—information that may have been needed *yesterday* for today's command decisions.

Because OPINTEL requires rapid communications between the collector and the user of the intelligence, and the processing phase must be carried out with minimum delay, it is a relatively new intelligence concept that came into its own, subsequent to the development of radio.

Sampson and Dewey would not have groped around for the Spanish naval forces if they had been supported by operational intelligence; without radio communications, however, such support was not possible. Intelligence of operational value in those days was gathered mainly by the operating forces themselves, using converted merchant ships of high speed and endurance as scouts, but their sightings lost much of their potential value because of the delay in getting the information to the operational commander who could use it in planning and conducting his counteraction.

Operational Intelligence Before World War II

In the period between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the Navy's scouting forces were recognized as serving an intelligence-gathering function for the fleet commander. In 1915, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was advised by the General Board that, ideally, the fleet had to meet and defeat the enemy before he reached the neighborhood of friendly coasts. But to do that, the fleet had to have an adequate information service to provide early and continuous intelligence on the enemy's movements.[1]

When the United States entered World War I, the Allies already had operational intelligence systems functioning in support of their convoy routing and antisubmarine operations. Allied operational intelligence was made available to the United States, making it unnecessary for the Office of Naval Intelligence to become extensively involved in processing operational intelligence.

At the end of World War I, RAdm. William S. Sims—who had been Commander U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters as well as Naval Attaché, London, and had had direct access to the Royal Navy's operational intelligence—recommended that to meet its two-fold purpose of serving the Navy Department and all the individual naval forces in all areas, the U.S. Navy's intelligence service be divided into groups based on the disposition of forces: "Each group should be under the immediate command of the senior commanding officer of the forces in the area and should have an intelligence officer with an adequate intelligence staff at his command headquarters, whether afloat or ashore."[2]

Also following World War I, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt circulated a letter dated 24 March 1919 that touched on operational intelligence in naval districts defining the first duty of an intelligence officer in time of war as being "the collection and compilation of prompt, reliable, and accurate information concerning the approach, arrival, movements, and position of enemy naval forces . . . [and] the prompt dissemination of the above information" to the commandant of the relevant naval district, the Navy Department, and the fleet operating in the waters adjacent to the district.

Lessons learned in World War I about the need for close cooperation and collaboration between operations and intelligence had been long forgotten by World War II. The British Navy had its operational intelligence organization functioning when the U.S. Navy set up the Neutrality Patrol in the fall of 1939,

and it was not long thereafter that intelligence information of an operational nature was drifting in to ONI from the increasing number of U.S. naval observers and liaison officers assigned to British naval activities.

ONI, however, was preparing for World War II following the basic concept that it had two functions: (1) gathering primarily strategic information about foreign countries, and (2) protecting naval installations against espionage and sabotage by foreign agents. How the various parts of the Navy used the information about foreign countries was their prerogative and was not considered ONI's responsibility.[3]

Consequently, when the United States entered World War II, ONI was unprepared to provide timely tactical intelligence support to operational commands. Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) set up its own operational intelligence organization, and ONI didn't really become involved in—or assume cognizance over—operational intelligence until COMINCH was dissolved after World War II. A few faltering steps were taken during World War II to try to stimulate ONI's interest and action in operational intelligence, but with only temporary or partial success.

ONI and OPINTEL During World War II

The need for intelligence to support operations was obvious, but the need for intelligence on friendly operations was not as well appreciated by operations personnel. Frequently, enemy actions are reactions to friendly actions. As such, they have a far different meaning or significance than if the enemy's actions are spontaneous and based on its own initiative. Thus, operational intelligence cannot be complete until it includes an interpretation of any pertinent input from its own forces' operations staff.

The term "combat intelligence" was originally borrowed from the U.S. Army and defined for naval use by COMINCH as "information about enemy forces, their strength, disposition and probable movements." It was soon found that the definition unduly limited the scope of the intelligence output desired, and the term operational intelligence was adopted as more fully identifying the functions that naval intelligence should play in naval warfare. Combat intelligence, by 1945, was considered merely a phase of operational intelligence and was defined as that intelligence needed by commanders of forces before, during, and immediately after battle. When strategic intelligence is used in conducting operations against an enemy, it becomes operational intelligence. On the other hand, much information obtainable during combat operations is of future strategic intelligence value.[4]

An officer with broad antisubmarine warfare (ASW) experience, in response to a request to name the three most important factors contributing to World War II ASW, emphasized the importance of operational intelligence:

> Harking back to the stated mission for ASW, no matter what line of advance is taken, we always get back not to the "hunt them down and kill them" statement which inspires the fire breathers, but to the basic fact that however the skin is taken off this particular cat, the basic accomplishment must be to "deprive the enemy of effective use of his submarines." Even with discovery ranges of, say, 40,000 yards, we would still, on an open ocean basis, need information as to where to put our searching units, [and] we would still need information as to how to route our most vital shipping. I do not believe that there is any way around the fact that the single most important point which must be covered is the maintenance of a high degree of effective operational intelligence for use in combat. Combat intelligence multiplies our effective forces by factors which are impossible to achieve by simply building more units and training more men. Examples which are known to me are the German evaluation of the number of active hunter-killer groups we were operating in the Atlantic during the war. They estimated 200 operating groups at a time when, in actual fact, we had six operating groups plus a high degree of operational intelligence. . . . Another example is the effect of the performance of USS *England* (DE-635) when she accounted for six Japanese submarines in nine days as a direct result of good operational intelligence. Her performance led the Japanese to believe that a whole fleet had come through the area. Other examples . . . are the performance of our own submarines in hunting down Japanese submarines. What would you estimate as a multiplication factor given you by intelligence, as compared to attempts to perform the same feats without that intelligence?
>
> The Battle of the Atlantic was, in a large measure, a battle of wits in which intelligence played the major role. Unfortunately, this fact is fully understood only by a relatively small group of officers because of the highly classified nature of the subject.[5]

Coastal information sections were established in naval district intelligence offices to perform operational intelligence functions for locally based naval coastal defense forces. By April 1941, it was found necessary to activate ONI's Coastal Information Section (OP-16-B-8) to help support the nascent operational intelligence activities in the naval districts. The new ONI section was placed in the Domestic Intelligence Branch because all other contacts with district intelligence offices were handled from there.

The officer in charge of OP-16-B-8, LCdr. Charles F. Baldwin, USNR, began by making a study of British navy operational intelligence procedures. Baldwin's studies convinced him that intelligence support to operations would not be possible without the closest cooperation between his organization and the operational organizations within the Navy. In June 1941, he recommended steps be taken to coordinate certain operational and intelligence activities to assure the timely exchange of information, as the British navy was already doing.[6]

In May and July 1941, orders were sent from ONI to the naval districts that the coastal information sections of the district intelligence offices should be placed in an advanced state of readiness. The orders caused some confusion, because few people in the naval districts had had any thoughts on what the coastal information sections were supposed to do. On the day after Pearl Harbor, another directive was issued defining in more detail the scope of coastal information and prescribing operating procedures. The main problem in the naval districts was getting operations organizations to accept officers from the B-8 (coastal information) sections of the district intelligence offices as OPINTEL officers or to make use of B-8 facilities and information. On 14 April 1942, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier issued a directive excluding coastal information officers from operational intelligence duties. This was obviously contrary to what the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) had been directing. To correct the conflict, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issued a directive on 29 May 1942 that placed coastal information officers as operational intelligence officers for each Inshore Patrol Section Base or other surface operations center. Passive resistance continued, and finally, on 13 November 1942, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations wrote personal letters to all district commandants and sea frontier commanders referring specifically to the potentially hazardous results of inadequate cooperation between operations and intelligence.[7]

The work of an intelligence plotting room is part of the operational intelligence function, and it existed in a rudimentary sense prior to U.S. entry into World War II. The Situation Room in ONI was not established, however, until 12 January 1942. Prior to that time, some of the activities later performed by the Situation Room were carried out by various units of the F (Foreign Intelligence) Branch of ONI. One of these, OP-16-F-a, was formally established on 6 August 1941, although it had already been operating for some time. OP-16-F-a's job was to prepare a daily Information Memorandum on the war situation based on a digest of Navy, Military Intelligence Division, and State Department dispatches, press reports, and other material. The memoranda, plus similar digests by several of the F Branch theater (geographic) sections, were delivered to DNI RAdm. Alan G. Kirk each morning for his use in making a daily situation report to the Secretary of the Navy.

On 11 January 1942, a DNI directive abolished OP-16-F-a and established the C Branch (Fleet Intelligence), effective 12 January 1942. C Branch (OP-16-C) included C-1, the Intelligence Center, which was to "process, evaluate, plot and disseminate current information from all sources." It was contemplated that C-1 would constitute a complete operational intelligence center for the use of the then still-separate COMINCH and CNO organizations. C-1 continued to produce much of the *Daily Summary*, and its situation room was used by ONI as a display room for current combat intelligence. C-2, the Information Center, produced the *ONI Weekly* and other publications.[8]

When COMINCH Ernest J. King was additionally designated Chief of Naval Operations in March 1942, it was decided that the C-1 Center should include a coastal information plot that would be OP-16-B-8's responsibility to maintain. OP-16-B-8 considered it essential that the OP-16-C plot be near COMINCH Operational Information Section which later became the Operational Intelligence Section. OP-16-C, however, remained physically and organizationally separated from COMINCH, and the Operational Information Section of COMINCH became the Combat Intelligence Division of COMINCH (see Chapter 16).[9]

In June 1942, LCdr. Baldwin recommended that selected officers be trained for operational intelligence duties, and, as a result, he was directed in December 1942 to develop an advanced OPINTEL training program.

The need for operational intelligence on the part of sea frontier, fleet, and advanced base commands grew in direct proportion to their tempo of operations, and ONI was urged by intelligence officers assigned to those commands to establish a true OPINTEL organization within itself to help fulfill the need.

In August 1942, the ONI F Branch theater sections took over exclusive preparation of all parts of the ONI *Daily Summary*, with the exception of the merchant shipping situation report, which continued to be reported by C-1.[10]

In the spring of 1943, the task of making the daily situation report had been delegated to the head of the F Branch. A new situation room was constructed, and, on 20 March 1943, C Branch was abolished. C-1 was redesignated OP-16-FP, the Foreign Plot Section. On 25 March, the new situation

room was put into use for the Secretary of the Navy's morning conferences, and it continued to be used as such for the rest of the war.

The principal attendees at the morning conferences were the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, the Deputy COMINCH, the COMINCH Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, various Navy bureau chiefs, and the division directors in the office of the CNO. It was a matter of policy that the FP Section would not handle or plot any material concerning the strength or disposition of Allied forces, nor would it address some categories of "specially reported material."[11]

The Advanced Naval Intelligence School in New York City was established in January 1943 and started training officers in operational intelligence in February.

In March 1943 LCdr. Baldwin recommended the establishment of an OPINTEL unit in ONI and the shift to the new unit of the Coastal Information Section from the Counter Intelligence Branch. Baldwin's recommendations were approved by DNI RAdm. Harold C. Train, and the Operational Intelligence Section (OP-16-FO) was established as part of an ONI reorganization on 20 April 1943. OP-16-FO was divided into three subsections: Pacific, Euro-African, and American.

The mission of the first Operational Intelligence Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence was stated in DNI letter serial 01020916 of 21 April 1943:

> (a) To insure that information acquired through the facilities of the Naval Intelligence Service, which is of value to naval operating forces, is properly processed and promptly made available to such forces;
>
> (b) To insure that the personnel and facilities, established by the Office of Naval Intelligence for the performance of operational intelligence activities, function efficiently.

OP-16-FO operated for four and one-half months, during which time it prepared an OPINTEL manual and periodic bulletins and supplied valuable data to intelligence officers in combat areas, assigned 180 graduates from the Advanced Naval Intelligence School to combat theaters, and helped the school develop an effective OPINTEL course. OP-16-FO also obtained COMINCH approval to establish a naval intelligence mission in North Africa to provide intelligence support to naval forces in northwest African waters, assign an intelligence officer to each motor torpedo boat squadron, and publicize ONI's program to train and furnish officers for intelligence duties afloat to all fleet commanders.

From its inception to its establishment as a separate organization, operational intelligence faced strong opposition. The main objections were that such an organization was not in accord with the existing war plans and that its functions crossed those of other sections and usurped their prerogatives. The establishment of an OPINTEL organization had also disrupted the naval district intelligence organizations.

In August 1943, Deputy DNI Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias, who had supported the establishment of an operational intelligence section, was relieved by Capt. Adolph von S. Pickhardt. At the time, Cdr. Baldwin was on an inspection trip to Great Britain and the Mediterranean. While Baldwin was away, his opponents convinced RAdm. Train (DNI at the time) that setting up OP-16-FO in April had been a mistake. When Baldwin returned, he found that his office had been abolished and its functions delegated to other sections.

By DNI (OP-16-X-1) serial 01924316 and Assistant Director, Intelligence Group (OP-16-1-F) Memorandum No. 7, both of 9 September 1943, the Operational Intelligence Section was disestablished, and responsibility for all intelligence within the North American area was transferred to the North American Theater Section (OP-16-FN). Operational intelligence activities were to be administered thereafter by the head of the Intelligence Theater Section in which such activities were being conducted. Thus, procurement of operational intelligence personnel for the forces afloat was made the responsibility of the ONI Services Branch (OP-16-A).

The effort by the opponents of OPINTEL to disestablish the Advanced Naval Intelligence School almost succeeded, except that Adm. King had informed fleet commanders about the school and had requested advice on the number of operational intelligence officers they would need. Their responses kept the school (and operational intelligence) alive.[12]

The school eventually graduated 1,300 officers qualified for assignment to operational intelligence billets. Approximately 750 were assigned to billets outside the United States, others were sent to sea frontier staffs, and some made up a pool from which emergency and future requirements could be met. The lack of established doctrine gave the graduates assigned to ships and afloat staffs an opportunity to use their initiative to make operational intelligence of benefit to the commands to which they were assigned, and they did. The amphibious forces in both the European and Pacific theaters relied

heavily on the intelligence sections of their staffs to perform research during planning stages and evaluation during operations. OPINTEL officers assigned to battleships, cruisers, and other individual commands afloat and ashore proved of value for planning and operations.[13]

The next active proponent for operational intelligence was LCdr. S.A.D. Hunter, USNR, who returned to ONI in January 1944 from an extended tour of duty as an intelligence officer with the fleet in the Mediterranean. From his experiences, he advised Deputy DNI Pickhardt of the "great and increasing need for intelligence officers in connection with tactical operations" and the need for an adequate sustaining program for them in ONI. Hunter was then directed by the prospective Deputy DNI, Capt. William A. Heard, to draw up specific proposals for such a program.

On 14 February 1944, LCdr. Hunter submitted his written proposals. With Capt. Heard, he had several sessions with RAdm. Roscoe E. Schuirmann, who had relieved RAdm. Train as Director of Naval Intelligence in September 1943. The same opponents who had frustrated Cdr. Baldwin were still present, and Schuirmann was reluctant to override the majority of his captains in favor of a lieutenant commander. Consequently, the proposals were shelved for the duration of Schuirmann's directorship.

After RAdm. Leo H. Thebaud relieved Schuirmann in October 1944, Hunter reintroduced the subject. Thebaud made a thorough investigation of the ONI organization and the requirement for operational intelligence, and he came to the conclusion that ONI was deficient in its capacity to fulfill fleet intelligence requirements.

To correct the situation, Thebaud designated Cdr. Frank P. Morton, USNR, who had just returned from duty as an amphibious intelligence officer in the Mediterranean, to be the head of an operational intelligence organization in ONI and directed him to draw up appropriate plans. After conferring with various officers, including LCdr. Hunter and several air combat intelligence officers, Cdr. Morton presented a memorandum to the Deputy Director on "Establishment of Operational Intelligence Sustaining Program" dated 16 November 1944. The program, with some slight modifications, was approved, and on 7 December 1944 an Operational Intelligence Section was again established, this time in the Administrative Branch, where it was designated OP-16-A-6. Its mission was stated to be "to support the operational intelligence personnel afloat, abroad, and in training at the Advanced Naval Intelligence School" (but not in the naval districts).[14]

Cdr. Morton and Capt. Herman E. Keisker, USNR, head of ONI's counterintelligence effort and the leader of those opposed to OPINTEL, continued to push their different views, particularly as they related to the operational intelligence organizations in the naval districts. Finally, on 8 February 1945, the director resolved the matter by establishing the Operational Intelligence Branch (OP-16-O) and giving it cognizance over OPINTEL units under the sea frontier commanders. A follow-up memorandum of 26 February 1945 excluded from the jurisdiction of the new branch those personnel performing operational intelligence work purely for the naval districts.

Another function was added to OP-16-O's duties on 25 May 1945 when the OPINTEL Branch was directed to support, and assume cognizance over, personnel assigned to military government duties in occupied territories. OP-16-O continued to function effectively through the remainder of the war as an administrative home base for personnel assigned to operational intelligence billets with naval operating commands.[15]

ONI Becomes Formally Involved in OPINTEL

Following the cessation of hostilities in the war with Japan, COMINCH headquarters was disestablished effective 10 October 1945. The elements of the COMINCH staff that were continued became the Operations Division (OP-03) of OPNAV. Combat intelligence, one of the elements continued, was renamed the Operational Information Section (OP-32). The section was initially organized as follows:

Head of Section (OP-32), Capt. William R. Smedberg III
Dissemination (OP-32D), Cdr. W. R. Brandt
Pacific Subsection (OP-32P), Cdr. William J. Sebald
Atlantic Subsection (OP-32L), Cdr. Kenneth A. Knowles
Chart Room (OP-32C), Cdr. F. M. Curran

As of 30 October, Capt. Smedberg was given the additional designation of OP-23W, Special Branch of ONI, preparatory to the merging of OP-32 with ONI. Also on 30 October, when ONI's designation was shifted from OP-16 to OP-23, the Operational Intelligence Branch (OP-16-O) became the Operational Branch (OP-23Y).[16]

On 15 February 1946, the transfer to ONI of OP-32, the former Combat Intelligence Section of COMINCH, took place, and a major change was made in the organization and functions of OP-23Y. Some of the functions of the OP-16-0 were retained in the new OP-23Y and some were transferred to the Training Section (OP-23C3). OP-23W was abolished, and its functions were shifted to the new Operational Branch (OP-23Y). The former COMINCH Combat Intelligence Section was designated OP-23Y2, and its head, Capt. Smedberg, was placed in

Chapter Notes

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3. Ibid., 824–26.

4. *ONI Review*, Feb 1948, 46.

5. VAdm. Francis F. Low, *Study of Undersea Warfare* (The Low Report), 22 Apr 1950, Top Secret Annex, 8–10, Post 1 Jan 1946 Command File, OA.

6. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 825, 487.

7. Ibid., 490–94.

8. Ibid., 770–71.

9. Ibid., 488.

10. Ibid., 825–27.

11. Ibid., 772–73, 788–97.

12. Ibid., 827, 830–32.

13. *ONI Review*, Nov 1945, 39.

14. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 834–38.

15. Ibid., 843.

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18. VAdm. Carl F. Espe ltr to author, 25 Sep 1974.

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21. *ONI Review*, Feb 1948, 46.

22. OP-922Y1 memo to OP-92, 20 Nov 1958.

23. VAdm. Rufus L. Taylor, interview by author, 19 Sep 1975, tape recording in author's files, OA.

24. Ibid.

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27. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), *Interim Report No. 5: Korean War Naval Operations*, 5-130; *Interim Report No. 6*, 5-164–5-166.

28. DNI ltr to U.S. Liaison Officer, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), ser 000404P32, 8 May 1953.

29. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 19

Unified and Joint Intelligence 1939–1971

Joint Intelligence in Washington During World War II

On 8 September 1939, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) RAdm. Walter S. Anderson drafted a memorandum to President Franklin D. Roosevelt based on information received from England and proposing the establishment of a National Defense Committee. The memo drew attention to the British Committee of Imperial Defense, which was headed by the prime minister and composed of representatives of the British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, and other departments as appropriate for the development of British national defense plans. In the memo, RAdm. Anderson proposed that the President, as Commander in Chief, should have a similar committee made up of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Treasury, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the heads of other executive departments, as required, to unify and ensure completeness of national defense plans, not only for the armed services but for all phases of national life.[1]

On 14 July 1941, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AC/S, G-2) and DNI RAdm. Alan G. Kirk recommended the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to serve the military services' Joint Board. The proposal was considered by the Joint Planning Committee and resulted in a report (Joint Board No. 329 of 10 September 1941) recommending that JIC should be co-equal with the Joint Planning Committee and have the primary task of preparing daily summaries of military and related intelligence for the use of the President, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and certain other high officials. In addition, JIC was to prepare special information and intelligence studies as might be required. The Joint Intelligence Committee was established shortly after the report was issued and comprised four representatives from the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID) and three from the Office of Naval Intelligence; the senior representative acted as chairman. Five members served full time, one of whom as secretary. The offices of the committee were established in the Main Navy Building, adjacent to the offices of ONI.[2]

As the United States found itself suddenly projected into a global war, immense gaps in the knowledge available on foreign countries became readily apparent. The word "intelligence" took on a fashionable connotation. Each new wartime agency, as well as many of the older departments, blossomed out with an intelligence staff of its own, each producing a mass of largely uncoordinated information. The resultant competition for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental example of waste. The War and Navy Departments developed full political and economic intelligence staffs, as did the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the Foreign Economic Administration, also delved deeply into fields of economic intelligence.

When officials, for example, requested a report on the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions in the Netherlands East Indies, they had the reports of the Board of Economic Warfare, the Army's Military Intelligence Service (G-2), ONI, and OSS from which to choose. Because the agencies had competed to secure the best personnel, each felt that its particular report was the best available and that the others could be disregarded.

Although there had been much informal contact between ONI and MID, the first official relations were established on 19 April 1942 when the Director of Naval Intelligence named RAdm. Neil B. Nichols, USN (Ret.), as the ONI liaison officer with the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

His office was set up in the Munitions Building, where MID was then located. Ill health limited Adm. Nichols's service in the liaison capacity to only one month. On 1 July, Capt. Robert Henderson, USN (Ret.), then on duty in the Industrial Incentive Section of the Navy's office of Public Relations, was transferred to the vacant post. Some months after Henderson's appointment, the title was changed from ONI Liaison Officer to Representative of ONI with the AC/S, G-2.

The liaison office moved to the Pentagon on 28 September 1942. It acted as an information bureau, maintaining a file of naval publications and answering questions received from the Army on naval activities. In November, Ens. Frederick Holdsworth, Jr., was added to the office. In addition to his other duties, Holdsworth was charged with handling secret dispatches routed from the Army's Military Intelligence Services to the Navy. One of the most important functions of the office was assisting officers in ONI or MID to reach the appropriate persons in the corresponding sections of each agency and perfecting the cooperation and collaboration between the two organizations. Capt. Henderson also arranged for Ens. J. W. Woodburn, USNR, of ONI's Intelligence Plot, to make a daily submarine report at the morning situation presentation in the office of AC/S, G-2, and for Lt.(jg) R. T. Bates, USNR, from ONI, to serve on permanent duty with the Army's Order-of-Battle Section to represent the naval part of the activity.[3]

Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), in a memorandum to Gen. George C. Marshall, proposed a survey on the ways and means of merging intelligence activities so that duplications could be eliminated and headway might be made toward a unified intelligence agency. King stated further: "It would be well for agreement to be reached whereby ONI and MIS each undertake certain functions on behalf of both activities. I would expect this survey to lead in the direction of a unified intelligence agency which could be called [the] Joint Intelligence Agency." On 25 November 1942, Marshall agreed.[4]

Committees were appointed by ONI and Army Intelligence, and, as a result of several meetings, the Army AC/S, G-2, Gen. George V. Strong, and DNI RAdm. Harold C. Train submitted a joint memorandum to Marshall and King on 6 December 1942 incorporating preliminary recommendations for a joint agency. They suggested that such an agency should comprise all intelligence activities of the Army and Navy and of the other intelligence agencies at that time under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The proposed Joint Intelligence Agency would include OSS, with the exception of the secret intelligence activities it needed for the discharge of its special operations. The memorandum also recommended that the merged organizations be housed under one roof.[5]

On 15 March 1943, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Director of Naval Intelligence presented a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs outlining what had already been accomplished toward merging the two intelligence services: (1) close cooperation between geographical sections of ONI and MIS through personal contacts; (2) consolidation of mapping and photographic activities; (3) interchange of information on the production of monographs; (4) plans for issuing a "Joint Army-Navy Daily Intelligence Report"; and (5) a permanent interchange of officers between the counterintelligence groups of the two services. The memorandum, JCS 163, also enclosed the draft of a directive for establishing a Joint Intelligence Agency. The directive proposed the merging and placing under the control of the Joint Intelligence Agency prisoner-of-war interrogation, military and naval attachés and observers and joint intelligence collection agencies, mapping and photographic activities, liaison with other government agencies, preparation and dissemination of publications, and preparation of monographs and surveys.[6]

On 23 March 1943, JCS 163 and its associated papers were referred to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for study and appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs. Meanwhile, the exigencies of war demanded immediate practical measures toward cooperation. Consequently, the spring of 1943 saw the initiation of several joint Army-Navy enterprises, facilitated by the March reorganization of ONI, which brought ONI more closely parallel in organization to the Military Intelligence Service.[7]

In the reorganization, the Planning Branch was abolished and the Planning Group was established that was composed of the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, the three assistant DNIs, and such others as might be appointed. Discussions concerning questions of the proposed Army-Navy intelligence integration and merger were entered into by the Planning Group almost from its first session. In an ONI Planning Group (OP-16-X) confidential memorandum of 16 June, it was agreed that the Army, Air, and Navy intelligence agencies should have coordinating subcommittees under the Joint Intelligence Committee to prevent duplication of effort and to effect the integration of activities.[8]

In addition to the general ONI-MID liaison carried on by Capt. Henderson, a special liaison developed between the Report Center (later known as the Reading Panel) of the Dissemination Unit of MID and the Foreign Intelligence Branch of ONI. The

first officer assigned in 1943 to the liaison duty was Lt.(jg) W. T. Lowry, USNR. His duties included attending the Army's daily intelligence panel to review reports and information in order that a proper selection of items of interest to the Navy could be made. Lowry was to determine not only what reports were of interest but also the number of copies needed for proper dissemination within the Navy Department.[9]

On 30 March 1943, the Army and Army Air Force, disregarding all the prior progress toward collaboration, proposed setting up (1) an Army-Navy American Intelligence Service, headquartered at Miami Beach, to be under the operational control of the War Department; (2) an Army-Navy Far Eastern Intelligence Service under the operational control of the Navy Department; and (3) an Army-Navy Atlantic and Middle Eastern Intelligence Service under the War Department.

RAdm. Train did not agree with the Army-Air Force proposals, particularly the set-up in Miami. Neither did he concur with placing intelligence services, charged with specific parts of the world, under either the Army or Navy because to do so would risk excluding the other service from proper participation. Train recommended that decisions on the proposals be deferred pending reports of surveys being conducted by management consultants Rawleigh Warner and Associates, and the Booz-Fry-Allen & Hamilton organization.

Adm. King had requested the Rawleigh Warner and Associates survey to analyze the functions of the Navy Intelligence organization and make recommendations. Their study, entitled *Summary Report of Intelligence Functions*, was submitted to King on 29 April 1943. It recommended (1) creating a Combat Intelligence Branch on the staff of COMINCH; (2) assigning all investigative work to the FBI, except those investigations of service personnel in which the services of naval officers were necessary; (3) combining the foreign intelligence functions (with the exception of certain functions) of ONI and MID, including files and personnel involved in monographing and strategic survey processes, with the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS; and (4) creating a new JCS Joint Intelligence Committee, responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs and working with the Joint Staff Planners.[10]

RAdm. Train did not concur with the Warner proposals either, since they would, in effect, abolish ONI. Such a radical change during a war, he felt, would have "a seriously disruptive effect upon the war effort," except for the first recommendation and part of the second.[11]

Despite its usefulness, the office of the ONI Representative with the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was discontinued on 10 February 1944 because of a staff shortage. In evaluating the work of the ONI representative to Army G-2, it should be pointed out that the Army used the services offered more frequently than did the Navy. One important accomplishment of the office was bringing together Army and Navy intelligence officers. Up to the time of the office's creation, ONI officers had not formally met with their opposite numbers in Army Intelligence. Another significant achievement was the aid consistently given to the movement to amalgamate the naval and military intelligence services. Perhaps the reason the Navy did not use the office as much as did the Army was its location in MID, which was more conveniently accessible to the Army.

After a few months, the Army, sensing the need for a continued relationship between the two intelligence divisions, arranged to provide a liaison officer who would spend a major part of his time at ONI. In June 1944, a LtCol. Cranwell, USA, was assigned to the duty and continued in the billet for the remainder of the war. In addition to his specific assignment to ONI, Cranwell acted as general liaison in all Army and Navy matters. His principal duties were to procure from the Navy Department information needed by the Army that would not come through ordinary channels, to expedite important requests, and to straighten out occasional differences. Cranwell also rendered important services in the establishment of ONI's Technical Intelligence Center (OP-16-PT).[12]

Joint Intelligence Outside the Washington Arena, 1942–1945

Joint Intelligence Collection Agency System

The joint intelligence collection agencies in World War II and their central and controlling organization, the Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center, constituted an almost worldwide organization for coordinating the collection of intelligence materials by the U.S. intelligence agencies with a central clearinghouse for appropriate distribution in Washington.

Indirectly, the organization resulted from the movement in the latter part of 1942 toward greater coordination and eventual integration of ONI and the Army's military intelligence services. In his letter to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) on 13 December 1942 on the subject of intelligence for amphibious operations, Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, gave considerable impetus to the concept of developing joint intelligence collection agencies. Hewitt pointed out some of the inadequacies of intelligence for the North African operations and recommended that

"Naval Intelligence Officers, well qualified in the Italian language and instructed in classes of information important for Amphibious Operations, be sent . . . to North Africa." Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Atlantic, observed in his forwarding endorsement that "the Office of Naval Intelligence should be the clearing house for necessary information obtained from all other agencies, required by any task force of the fleet."

As a result of Hewitt's letter, a VCNO letter (OP-16-B-8 serial 02762316 of 21 December 1942) to COMINCH Adm. King proposed establishing an advanced intelligence center for the Northwest African Sea Frontier. In his reply of 1 January 1943, King approved the proposal but added, "If agreeable to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the center should be a joint activity with appropriate Army and Navy representation."

On 26 January 1943, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, approved the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, North Africa (JICA/NA). The mission of the Naval Section of JICA/NA was to perform the intelligence activities required in connection with operations of U.S. naval forces in the North African theater of operations, to obtain information required by the Navy Department for planning, and to obtain counterintelligence information.

The intelligence collection tasks prescribed for the Naval Section of the JICA/NA by VCNO letter serial 098716 of 19 February 1943 were to collect and disseminate

a. Economic, political, geographic, ethnologic, social, and military information;

b. Information required by Naval Task Force and Task Group Commanders and by the Navy Department concerning enemy and Allied ship and plane movements;

c. Counterintelligence information concerning the enemy;

d. Information obtained by interrogation of prisoners of war;

e. Air combat information, including air reconnaissance;

f. Enemy material and equipment, including ship and plane identification data;

g. Merchant shipping information, including port security; neutral ship movement; interrogation of ship masters, crews and passengers; crew and passenger control; and ship routing data;

h. Information obtained through radio intercept agencies; and

i. Information from all adjacent Naval and Military Attachés and Observers, and from Intelligence Units of other U.S. and Allied Agencies.

The Army consistently took a narrower view of JICA/NA functions. The Navy directives were viewed as infringing on the activities of the Army's theater G-2.

JICA/NA was established at the Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers in February 1943. On 23 April 1943, Gen. Marshall directed the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East to establish a JICA within that command, with headquarters at Cairo. Intelligence teams were to be located at key points throughout the Middle East, as conditions demanded. It was specifically provided that the Office of Strategic Services was to be represented in the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency/Middle East (JICA/ME) and that its intelligence-gathering activities were to be coordinated with those of JICA/ME to eliminate duplication.

On 4 May, Adm. King approved the Navy's participation in JICA/ME. On 9 June, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed all naval attachés, naval observers, and naval liaison officers in the Middle East to forward all intelligence reports to JICA/ME for evaluation and transmittal to Washington.[13]

Subsidiary offices of JICA/NA were subsequently opened at Oran, Casablanca, Port Lyautey, and Tunis. Personnel for the naval sections were supplied by ONI. The agency was particularly active in securing the information used for planning the invasions of Sicily and Italy.[14]

On 3 May 1943, Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, in Washington to support China's military needs, concurred in the proposal to establish a JICA in the China-Burma-India theater. Gen. Marshall and Adm. King also concurred, and JICA/CBI was established at Delhi by JCS directive (JCS 441) issued 5 August 1943. The same directive established standard procedures for theater commanders concerning JICAs and approved tables of personnel for contemplated JICAs in the South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Pacific areas.[15]

On 30 May 1943, Gen. Eisenhower's headquarters issued General Order No. 37, which defined the mission and duties of JICA/NA. It added a positive prohibition: "The JICA will not collect combat intelligence from units in the field, nor will it be charged with counterintelligence activities." Eisenhower's order prohibited the Navy team from complying with the Navy directive, particularly in connection with port security and counterintelligence at ports under U.S. control. Because of the conflict, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters (COMNAVNAW) requested clarification in his letter of 18 June 1943 to Eisenhower. Army Forces headquarters memo of 24 June to COMNAVNAW reaffirmed General Order No. 37. COMNAVNAW (Hewitt) felt it was important that both combat and

counterintelligence activities be continued by the specially trained personnel of the Navy Section of JICA/NA. Upon Hewitt's recommendation, many of the personnel of the Naval Section were removed from the JICA organization and used to establish a Naval Intelligence Unit directly under him.[16]

JCS 441 of 5 August, which established JICA/CBI, also resolved the same conflict in the China-Burma-India area by stating for JICA/NA: "Nothing [in this directive] shall preclude the Navy Section of JICA/NA from performing such intelligence or counterintelligence activities as are required by the Navy Department and which cannot be performed by the intelligence organization of a Naval Command within the Theatre."[17]

Following the separation of the major part of the Naval Section of JICA/NA and establishment of the Naval Intelligence Unit under COMNAVNAW, a skeleton staff of two officers was left as the Naval Section. JICA/NA later became known as JICA/AFHQ (Joint Intelligence Collection Agency/Allied Forces Headquarters).[18]

Because of the frictions between JICA and Army G-2 personnel in the various operational theaters, there was a strong desire, particularly in the Army, for the abolition of the JICA concept. As a result, Gen. Strong (G-2), Gen. Bissel (Air Intelligence [A-2]), DNI RAdm. Roscoe E. Schuirmann, and Whitney Shepardson (Chief of the Special Intelligence Branch, OSS) met in Washington to discuss the issue. They recommended a three-month trial from 1 November 1943 to 1 February 1944; during this period several testimonials were received affirming the value of the JICA organization, and it was decided to continue the JICA system.[19]

In the summer of 1944, after the capture of Rome and the transfer of Allied Forces headquarters to Italy, JICA/NA (AFHQ) was moved to Naples. At the same time, JICA/ME was given the added responsibility for North Africa, and the branch office of JICA/NA at Algiers was placed under it.[20]

Effective 24 October 1944, the China-Burma-India theater was divided into two theaters consisting of the India-Burma (IB) theater, with headquarters at New Delhi, and the China theater, headquartered at Chungking. There were conflicting opinions on the effect of the change on JICA/CBI. The chairman of the JICA/CBI wanted to retain his organization and serve both theaters. The Army Military Intelligence Service thought the reasons for splitting the theater justified splitting JICA. The China theater commanding general wanted a JICA/China, and the commanding general in the India-Burma theater wanted JICA/CBI to remain as it was. On 3 January 1945, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence forwarded a study to the Joint Chiefs recommending the division of JICA/CBI to conform to the new theater boundaries. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff on 7 April 1945 approved the request of Commanding General U.S. Forces, China Theater for a separate JICA for the China theater, and on 27 April, Rear Echelon Headquarters, U.S. Force, China Theater, established a separate JICA/China by its General Order No. 57.

In the spring of 1945, the JICA/AFHQ that had transferred to Naples, together with the majority of the personnel of COMNAVNAW's Naval Intelligence Unit (which had moved to Naples in the spring of 1944), became JICA/MED. Headquarters remained at Naples.[21]

On 27 August 1945, JCS Directive 441/4 delegated to the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and to the Director of Naval Intelligence the authority to "make such disposition of the JICA organization in the Mediterranean, Africa-Middle East, and India-Burma Theatres as they jointly consider to be in the best interests of maintaining U.S. intelligence in those areas." A subsequent memorandum of agreement of 15 September 1945 by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Deputy Director of OSS, abolished JICAs MED, ME, and IB as of 1 October. JICA/China was temporarily continued to 30 November 1945.

The main weakness of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency organization was the lack of a central agency in Washington with adequate authority to give positive direction to activities in the field.[22]

Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas

On 24 March 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in a letter to COMINCH Adm. King, had suggested the establishment of a joint intelligence center at Pearl Harbor and advanced joint intelligence centers at four other locations in the Pacific (Dutch Harbor, Pago Pago, Auckland, and Brisbane). The Chief of Naval Operations endorsed the letter favorably on 31 March and directed that a plan be submitted. The Commandant drew up a plan on 11 April and submitted it to the CNO and Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The plan was very similar to what finally evolved as the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA).

In connection with the Commandant of the Marine Corps' recommended plan for joint intelligence centers in the Pacific, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) on 1 May 1942 proposed to COMINCH that aviation intelligence units composed of air combat intelligence officers be included in the

organizations. A photographic interpretation unit was also recommended to be included at each center.

On 14 May 1942, Adm. King approved the general plan for aviation intelligence units at the joint intelligence centers as proposed by the Chief of BUAER and directed that BUAER train personnel for twelve aviation intelligence units.[23]

On 28 May 1942, CINCPAC Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, in a letter to Adm. King, approved the suggestion for a joint intelligence center, but recommended that the establishment of advanced intelligence centers be delayed until the main center at Pearl Harbor was in operation.[24]

On 26 June 1942 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations responded to the 28 May CINCPAC letter that in "consideration of the difficulties inherent in initiating directly a joint project as such, it appears preferable to constitute this Intelligence Center as primarily a naval center." It was understood, however, that CINCPAC could arrange for inclusion in the center such Army participation as appeared desirable.

On 24 June 1942, CINCPAC had directed the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (COM-14ND) in the Hawaiian Islands to set up an intelligence center. On 19 July, COM14ND advised CINCPAC that the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (ICPOA) had been established and was functioning. The first officer in charge was Cdr. Joseph J. Rochefort (of Battle of Midway code-breaking fame), and the nucleus of the new center was the Combat Intelligence Unit (which included the Radio Intelligence Section). In addition, the center had four ensigns as plotting officers, and thirty-one officers and ninety-one enlisted men were assigned to its photographic section, which was known as the Photo Reconnaissance and Interpretation Section, Intelligence Center (PRISIC).

The first location for ICPOA was with the Combat Intelligence Unit in the basement of the COM14ND Administration Building at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. PRISIC, however, was headquartered on Ford Island and included in its organization photo interpretation officers assigned on temporary additional duty orders to aircraft carriers.

On 24 July 1942, in response to a VCNO personnel requirement estimate that 81 officers and 121 enlisted men would be needed for the center, CINCPAC wrote that the proposed staffing seemed "excessive." Faced with inadequate housing and office space, Nimitz wished to keep personnel levels at an "absolute workable minimum." As a result, only 17 officers and 59 enlisted men were ordered to ICPOA from Washington between 20 and 29 July 1942.

In September 1942, Capt. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter relieved Cdr. Rochefort as officer in charge of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area. On 25 September, part of ICPOA moved from its crowded basement spaces in the Naval District Administration Building to the new Navy Yard Supply Building 167. Sections that were moved to the new quarters included Administration, Air Combat Intelligence, Army Liaison, and Marine Liaison. The Combat Intelligence Unit, with its radio intelligence functions, remained in the administration building and made its reports directly to CINCPAC (usually to Adm. Nimitz's intelligence aide, Cdr. Edwin T. Layton, or his assistant). PRISIC remained on Ford Island until 15 October, when it moved to the Kodak Hawaii facilities in Honolulu.

On 15 October, CINCPAC decided that a plotting room at ICPOA would duplicate work at CINCPAC's plot and ordered that plans for such a section at ICPOA be abandoned. Of the twenty-one officers standing by to staff the proposed ICPOA plot, seventeen then requested and received transfers to other activities.[25]

In the fall of 1942, very little information was being received by ICPOA other than the highly classified information from the Radio Intelligence Section. There were few captured documents, few prisoners to be interrogated, and few aerial photographs of enemy-held territory. The Bishop Museum and the University of Hawaii Library, both in Honolulu, were the main sources of background information about Japanese-held islands.[26]

ICPOA gradually became the despository for all strategic intelligence about the islands of the Central Pacific received by CINCPAC, prompting the establishment of the Objective Data Section of ICPOA in October 1942, with Lt. George Leonard in charge.[27]

During the Battle of Midway, CINCPAC War Planners, much to their embarrassment, sent more B-17 bombers to Midway than the island could accommodate. The War Plans Division insisted that Intelligence should keep War Plans informed on facilities at U.S. bases as well as those at enemy bases. Actually, Operations Division had better and more easily accessible sources on such information than did Naval Intelligence. When the Army transport *President Coolidge* hit a mine and sank in a U.S. defensive minefield at Espiritu Santo, the argument ended. The Objective Data Section of ICPOA started compiling the necessary information, and Lt. John P. Lee and two yeomen were assigned to do the work.[28]

In November 1942, the Objective Data Section of ICPOA began to issue publications containing information on Allied bases and also published *Secret Sailing Directions for United Nations Bases, Central and South Pacific*. At the same time, the nu-

cleus for the Drafting and Production Sections of the future JICPOA was activated in the Objective Data Section. Late in 1942, the services of the 64th Army Engineer Topographic Company were made available to ICPOA for the production of maps. The Army unit worked closely with PRISIC under the direction of the officer in charge of ICPOA and the Army liaison officer.

Prior to the end of 1942, the Marine liaison officer at ICPOA became responsible for the study of captured enemy ground equipment. With the receipt of that new responsibility, his section was retitled the Enemy Land Section.

Early in December 1942, the Air Combat Intelligence Section was taken over by Commander Naval Air Forces, Pacific (COMAIRPAC) and was moved to Ford Island. One air combat intelligence officer, Lt. Richard W. Emory, remained at ICPOA to keep records on Japanese air order-of-battle.

At the start of 1943, ICPOA consisted of the Radio Intelligence Section, the Combat Intelligence Unit, the Objectives Data Section, PRISIC, the Enemy Land Section, the Army liaison officer, and the Administration Section. With the exception of the Radio Intelligence Section and PRISIC, ICPOA was seriously understaffed. No officers had reported since the twenty-one who had arrived in September 1942, and only four remained. To continue operations, the center borrowed four officers from COMAIRPAC and five from PRISIC.

In February 1943, the first contingent of twenty graduates from the Navy's Japanese Language School at Boulder, Colorado, arrived at ICPOA, and the nucleus of the Translation Section was formed with Lt. Forrest R. Biard, a Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPAC) language officer, in charge. Previously, when the first thirty prisoners of war had arrived in June 1942 from the Battle of Midway, Japanese interrogators had to be borrowed from other activities. The new Japanese language officers were permanently assigned to ICPOA and began one of the most important intelligence collection tasks performed during the war by the center—the processing of captured Japanese documents.

In April 1943, ICPOA made its second move, to the new FRUPAC building on the edge of Makalapa Crater. In May, the Objective Data Section was split up into the Enemy Bases Section and the Allied Bases Section. In July, a request was made to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for twenty-three additional officers, and they arrived in the fall of 1943. In addition, twenty-four of forty-four photo interpretation officers reporting to PRISIC were assigned to the Objective Data Section.[29]

As long as there were no large-scale offensive operations planned for the Central Pacific, ICPOA had had few assigned responsibilities. When VAdm. Raymond A. Spruance was detached as chief of staff to Adm. Nimitz on 5 August 1943 to assume command of CENPAC (Central Pacific) Forces and RAdm. Richmond K. Turner on 20 August was ordered to command the Fifth Amphibious Force and plan and conduct landings in Micronesia, great changes were introduced at ICPOA.

The Enemy Bases Section had the task of assembling and preparing information bulletins to assist CINCPAC War Plans in selecting objectives for the first offensive. The section was short-handed for the task, but fortunately, as mentioned above, PRISIC had a temporary surplus of officers. The Photo Interpretation School at Anacostia had foreseen the future need, and graduates had arrived at PRISIC before there were many photographs to interpret. Some of the temporarily surplus officers were assigned to the Enemy Bases Section.

Each analyst in the Enemy Bases Section was made responsible for a specific small area for which he would assemble all available information and produce preliminary bulletins. Students for the Photo Interpretation School had been selected from among geologists, foresters, architects, and other professions familiar with the objects expected to be identified in aerial photographs. They were intelligent, well-educated, and adaptable young men. As the interest of the War Plans organization narrowed to specific areas, the appropriate analysts and their files were moved temporarily to CINCPAC headquarters to work directly with the planners.[30]

In September 1943, ICPOA was designated a joint Army-Navy-Marine organization by a CINCPAC directive (serial 001134 of 7 September) and was given the name Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas. It was placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J-2), Joint Staff, CINCPAC, and CINCPOA (Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas). Its mission was defined as "the collection, collation, evaluation and dissemination of strategic and tactical intelligence for the CINCPOA and as directed by him." The Radio Intelligence Section was shifted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) the day before the establishment of JICPOA, but the Combat Intelligence Unit was included in the transfer and became the Estimate Section of JICPOA. Col. (later BGen.) J. J. Twitty of the Army was assigned as officer in charge, and Cdr. Wilfred J. (Jasper) Holmes, who headed the Estimate Section, was later designated his deputy.[31]

JICPOA was unique among field intelligence organizations. It was staffed by representatives of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Its

strategic studies and estimates were outstanding, and its field operations were incredibly effective.

For example, when the Marines went ashore at Saipan, they landed at Charon Kanoa, the headquarters of the Japanese army on Saipan. The intelligence team from JICPOA went ashore with the first wave of Marines and moved into the schoolhouse that had been the Japanese general's command post. The Japanese had obviously left the post in a hurry and failed to destroy all their documents. The JICPOA team spent all night scanning and translating important documents disclosing where the enemy artillery batteries were sited, where their tanks were dispersed, and what their plans were for counterattack. The information was passed on to the Marines and the bombardment force, and the Japanese tanks were destroyed and their counterattack cut to pieces before it could get started.[32]

For each of the island invasions in the Pacific, instructions were issued to all forces on how to handle captured documents and personnel. Units from JICPOA were assigned for each amphibious assault to examine prisoners and documents for intelligence of immediate tactical value. Instructions stressed that captured documents were often of vital importance, particularly when showing locations of troop concentrations, artillery, or defenses and that documents were not to be pocketed as souvenirs but turned in for examination by intelligence personnel. At Attu, in May 1943, an Army unit found some documents, but they put them in their pockets instead of turning them in, as required by instructions. As the unit advanced, they were taken under fire, and one man lost a leg. Medics took him to the dressing station, where a Japanese document was found in his pocket. Examined by intelligence, the document disclosed the location of the Japanese artillery and mortars that had fired on the Army unit.[33]

On 1 September 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCPAC to retake the Gilbert Islands and Nauru. The terrain model makers at PRISIC made models of Betio on Tarawa atoll and of the island of Nauru. There were plenty of photographs of Tarawa, both vertical and oblique, and the model was accurate. There were few photos of Nauru available, however, and the first model, based on considerable guesswork, was inaccurate according to a former resident of the island, who had been the engineer of the phosphate works on that island and knew it well. A new model was made, based on his knowledge plus a large-scale contour map that he had completed just before the Japanese landed. The planners had never been too happy with the selection of Nauru as an amphibious objective. When they and Adm. Nimitz saw the new model and the difficult terrain that it revealed, the planners recommended that Makin be substituted for Nauru. On 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the change, thus doubtlessly saving many lives.

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps shore-based planes made photo reconnaissance flights of the Gilberts, flying from the islands of Canton and Funafuti. On 19 September, a carrier task force raided the Gilberts and at the same time took low oblique photos of Tarawa. The submarine *Nautilus* (SS 168) took 2,000 photos of beaches at Tarawa, Makin, and Abemama during an 18-day surveillance mission, returning to Pearl Harbor in late October. PRISIC worked day and night to process the many photographs and produce the photo mosaics and maps needed for the landing operations.[34]

Two months after JICPOA was formed, the United States invaded the Gilbert Islands. Intelligence support to all subsequent amphibious operations in the Central Pacific and the Philippines was supplied, or contributed to, by JICPOA. Also in the Gilbert Islands landing, the first JICPOA team accompanied the invasion forces to assist the intelligence staff of the senior ground commander and to collect and study captured enemy equipment and documents. Similar teams participated in each succeeding invasion, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was made responsible for all captured enemy equipment in the Pacific Ocean areas.[35]

Photographs, sketches, and descriptions of Japanese installations made by the JICPOA teams that accompanied the landings on the Gilbert Islands, when compared with the interpretations of aerial photographs of the same islands made prior to the landings, greatly improved the accuracy of identification of similar installations subsequently found by photo interpreters in photographs of the Marshall Islands.[36]

The Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas was a unique organization; it was the only U.S. agency in which Military and Naval Intelligence were formed into a single comprehensive organization servicing all the intelligence needs of ground, air, and naval forces of a theater command. All enemy source material for intelligence, including documents and equipment, was assembled at JICPOA, where the material was evaluated. Initially, the intelligence products of JICPOA received no CINCPAC-CINCPOA authentication. After July 1944, however, documents were prepared under the imprint of CINCPAC-CINCPOA, and the title JICPOA was used only for administrative purposes.[37]

When Adm. William F. Halsey moved from Noumea in the late spring of 1944, a number of his South Pacific Command (SOPAC) staff intelligence officers were ordered to duty at JICPOA. Among them were LCdr. Logan Jenkins and Lt. John Good-

body, who had been involved in the production of a series of publications for Commander South Pacific on "Know Your Enemy." Their arrival at JICPOA made possible the activation of the Bulletin Section to produce the *CINCPAC-CINCPOA Weekly Intelligence Bulletin* for the mass distribution of intelligence material. The publication took the place of the *Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin*, which had been published spasmodically, first by the Fleet Intelligence Office and then by JICPOA, but which had been discontinued in November 1943 due to a staff shortage. Volume I, Number 1, of the *CINCPAC-CINCPOA Weekly Intelligence Bulletin*, in 2,000 copies, was issued on 14 July 1944. Demand almost immediately jumped the circulation to 6,000 copies, and, by the end of the war, the number of copies of each issue was 14,000.[38]

For each prospective island targeted for amphibious assault, JICPOA prepared an information bulletin. The bulletin for Palau incorporated the information gained from submarine and aerial photographic reconnaissance conducted in July and August 1944. The Palau landings began on 15 September at Peleliu. Information on the beaches was good, but behind the beaches, hidden under tropical foliage, were jagged limestone ridges honeycombed with caves, features that had not been spotted by photo interpreters prior to the landing. The resultant cost in lives in the capture of Peleliu was excessive in large part because of the lack of intelligence on the island's terrain.

By collating information obtained from numerous sources, including U.S. Navy action reports, excellent intelligence on Japanese naval losses was maintained by JICPOA. The loss of each Japanese naval vessel larger than an escort destroyer was known, both as to where and when it had taken place. One morning, during the period immediately following the Peleliu landing when Halsey and the Third Fleet were conducting strikes on Luzon, a message was received from Chungking. It relayed a report by a Chinese observer that a powerful Japanese surface force had departed Amoy for Luzon. Fortunately, the names of the ships in this force were provided by the observer. The lack of prior information on the existence of such a force made the report immediately suspect. By checking the names of the ships involved, JICPOA found that they were all ships that had been previously sunk but were losses the Japanese apparently believed were still secret. For example, one of the ships in the force was alleged to be the battleship *Mutsu*, which was known to have been sunk by an internal explosion in the Inland Sea. The bogus report, obviously planted, was intended to divert Halsey from his Luzon strikes. But Capt. M. C. (Mike) Cheek and Lt. Harris Cox, Halsey's intelligence officers in the battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62), had good current information on Japanese naval order-of-battle and quickly spotted the discrepancies. Capt. Edwin Layton, CINCPACFLT Intelligence Officer, also sent a message to Halsey discrediting the report. The effort at deception didn't work because the Japanese underestimated the capabilities of U.S. intelligence.[39]

The increase in the numbers of prisoners of war and captured documents required setting up a Translation Section and an Interrogation Section at JICPOA. A Target Analysis Section was also organized from elements of the Enemy Bases Section in September 1944.[40]

The Translation Section of JICPOA was organized into subsections, eventually numbering fifteen. Each subsection worked on captured documents relating to one particular subject, permitting individual language officers to become especially proficient in those aspects of the Japanese language dealing with their designated subject. The subject-oriented organization also encouraged many of the language officers to take courses in their particular subjects and to visit the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to view related equipment.

The translators were inundated with documents captured on Kwajalein, and one shipment from Saipan contained fifty tons of Japanese documents. Items of low current intelligence value were shipped back to Washington. The JICPOA Translation Section concentrated on documents of direct importance to operations in the Pacific. Notices to mariners were of particular interest for their information on Japanese defensive minefields.[41]

The rapid growth of JICPOA generated a space problem, and in early 1944, plans were made for a new JICPOA building of approximately 40,000 square feet to be located just east of the FRUPAC building. On 16 May 1944, the new JICPOA building was completed, and all sections of JICPOA, except the Estimate Section, moved into the new quarters. The Estimate Section remained on the ground floor of the FRUPAC building. PRISIC also shifted into the JICPOA building from Kodak Hawaii in Honolulu, thus making possible the much-needed integration of their work with that of the other JICPOA sections. With the move, PRISIC was broken up into the Photo Interpretation Section, the Photographic Laboratory, the Model Shop, and the Distribution Section. For the first time, all JICPOA sections involved in research, analysis, production, and dissemination were housed under one roof.

In June 1944, a Propaganda Section was organized to plan and execute strategic and tactical psychological warfare in the Pacific Ocean area.

The first leaflets prepared by the Propaganda Section were used in the Marianas campaign. Also in June 1944, a Translation Section Annex was established in Honolulu, where Nisei translators could be employed on the routine analysis of captured notebooks and diaries.

In July 1944, personnel of the Escape and Evasion Section of the Army's Military Intelligence Service in Washington were transferred to JICPOA and set up as the MIS-X Section. In August, the Cartographic Section was officially organized. In September, distribution units for JICPOA material were established at Eniwetok and Guam. The first joint Army-Navy Flak Intelligence Section in the U.S. armed services was organized at JICPOA in November 1944. In December 1944, the responsibility for technical air intelligence was transferred to JICPOA from COMAIRPAC and was taken over by the Air Section. The move made JICPOA the central agency in the Pacific Ocean area for the collection and preliminary study of all captured aircraft equipment. By the end of 1944, JICPOA had grown to 500 officers and 800 enlisted men.[42]

The many tasks and functions assigned to JICPOA can best be appreciated by summarizing its 1945 sectional organization. The first group of sections dealt chiefly with static information on objectives and enemy bases. They included the Geographic, Photo Interpretation, Reference, Terrain Model, Target Analysis, Medical, Hydrographic, and Cartographic Sections.

The second group handled the constantly changing information on enemy ground, air, and naval forces. They were designated the Estimate, Enemy Air, Enemy Shipping, Enemy Land, and Flak Intelligence Sections. Of these, Estimate was the most important because it had access to top secret material. The principal duty of this section throughout the war was the preparation, for wide distribution, of weekly and monthly estimates of strength and location of enemy units of all services. The Estimate Section also prepared special estimates before each major operation.

Two additional sections, somewhat aloof from the others, were Psychological Warfare and Escape and Evasion; both were more interested in contact with the enemy than in information about the enemy. The former section was not actively established until June 1944 when, in cooperation with the Office of War Information, it embarked on propaganda and leaflet campaigns aimed at the Japanese homeland and at enemy troops and civilians on both bypassed islands and islands in the process of being captured. On 8 November 1944, the psychological warfare system became a separate Pacific theater agency under the officer in charge of JICPOA.

The remaining group of sections in JICPOA were those engaged in the publication of intelligence material. They were designated the Bulletin, Translation, Interrogation, Operational Intelligence, Production, and Administration Sections. The Translation and Interrogation Sections were staffed by specially trained language officers and were primarily concerned with the exploitation of captured documents for other sections.[43]

In early January 1945, when Cdr. Jasper Holmes was promoted to captain and given additional duties on the CINCPAC staff, he turned over most of his responsibilities in the Estimate Section of JICPOA to Lt. Donald M. Showers, USNR, who had been in the section since mid-February 1942. When Capt. Layton, the fleet intelligence officer, moved with Adm. Nimitz to Guam, he took Showers with him to set up a Fleet Combat Intelligence Center. Lts. Paul Yardley and Alex Johnson took over Showers's job in the Estimate Section.

Commander Submarine Forces, Pacific (COMSUBPAC), RAdm. Charles A. Lockwood, moved his operational headquarters from Pearl Harbor to the submarine tender *Holland* (AS 3) in Apra Harbor, Guam, on 24 January 1945, taking Capt. Richard G. Voge, his operations officer, with him. The move ended the daily conference that Voge had held at the JICPOA Estimate Section since early in the war. To replace Voge's daily conference, a special code was issued, held only by the Estimate Section and the Submarine Force Operations office at Guam, to be used for the radio communication exchange of intelligence between COMSUBPAC and the Estimate Section. Later, Voge arranged to have the code issued also to Commander Submarine Forces, Southwest Pacific at Fremantle to permit the submarines operating from that area to benefit from, and participate in, the exchanges.[44]

When the naval war in Europe drew to a close, the British sent a carrier task force to join the operations against the Japanese. The British force arrived in time to participate in the Okinawa campaign. As it had done for U.S. naval forces moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, JICPOA had to provide the British with a complete new intelligence library so that they could receive the same intelligence support as the American forces. The British sent a lieutenant commander to JICPOA at Makalapa to help select material and arrange for its shipment to the staff and ships of the Royal Navy task force.[45]

In January 1945, the Enemy Bases Section was divided into the Geographic Section, the Reference Section, and the Production Section. At the same

time, the Photo Interpretation Section was merged with the new Geographic Section, and photo interpretation officers were assigned to work with the intelligence officers on the various area desks. Also in January, an Enemy Shipping Section was established.

On 28 January 1945, the first personnel for the Advance Intelligence Center (AIC), established at the CINCPAC Advance Headquarters at Guam, were sent from JICPOA. More followed in February, bringing the total staff for the Advance Intelligence Center to sixty officers and fifty enlisted men at the time it became operational on 1 March 1945. Cdr. Richard O. Greene, the fleet photographic officer on the CINCPAC staff and executive officer of JICPOA, became the officer in charge of the Advance Intelligence Center. Initially, it was intended that most of the JICPOA functions of supplying immediate operational intelligence would ultimately be transferred to AIC, but, due to the crowded conditions on Guam and the difficulties involved in moving equipment, the objective was never achieved.[46]

When the CINCPAC Advance Headquarters was established at Guam, an Operational Intelligence Section was added to the Advance Echelon of JICPOA. The Operational Intelligence Section was responsible for procurement and distribution of information obtained by visual and photo reconnaissance; preparation of reports of combat operations; preparation of target and objective data for air bombardment, air support, and amphibious operations; coordination of intelligence reproduction facilities in the Forward Area; and maintenance of liaison between the CINCPAC staff, JICPOA, and the operating headquarters in the Forward Area of the fleet, air, and ground forces. The section was staffed by four or five junior officers, all previously trained at the Air Combat Intelligence School at Quonset Point, Rhode Island. In effect, the Operational Intelligence Section at Guam functioned as a section of the Advance Intelligence Center, serving principally to provide intelligence material for the deputy chief of staff and to coordinate pertinent activities in the Forward Area.[47]

In March 1945, the Allied Bases Section of JICPOA was designated the Hydrographic Section, and in April, personnel and equipment from the Terrain Model Unit arrived from Washington, combining their activities with those of the smaller model shop at JICPOA.

In the spring of 1945, a system was initiated by which officers from the Advanced Naval Intelligence School at New York were ordered to JICPOA for further training and assignment. At first, the Personnel Section of JICPOA took over the training task, but, in July, it was made the responsibility of the Operational Intelligence Section.[48]

When peace came in August 1945, JICPOA at Makalapa was staffed as follows:

	Navy	Army	Marines	WAVES	Total
Officers	409	73	51	11	544
Enlisted	931	182	49	61	1,223
Totals	1,340	255	100	72	1,767

JICPOA's production of studies, maps, and charts averaged two million printed sheets per week and the photographic laboratory was producing nearly two million photographic prints per quarter.[49]

A Central Intelligence Agency

The proposal to establish a central intelligence agency to provide a unified intelligence service for all intelligence agencies of the government was first discussed by the Navy Planning Group (OP-16-X) in November 1944. At that time, the group received from the Joint Intelligence Agency Committee a report opposing the postwar establishment of a central intelligence agency. Shortly thereafter, however, proposals were received from the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Strategic Services that looked toward the creation of such a joint agency after the war.

Coincident with its study of Army-Navy integration, the ONI Planning Branch carried forward a study on the possible establishment of a national intelligence agency. In December 1944, the Planning Branch, which had been reestablished on 14 December, prepared a memorandum for the Director of Naval Intelligence that analyzed both the OSS proposal and the joint Army-Navy proposal (JIS 89). It suggested that the latter was the more acceptable. Approval by the JCS of the idea of a national intelligence agency intensified the work on the project in ONI. In November 1945, RAdm. Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who had been head of the Planning Branch, was named Deputy Chief in ONI with special duties in connection with joint Army-Navy Intelligence and the proposed national intelligence agency. Souers became the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), serving from January to July 1946.[50]

President Harry S. Truman, by his letter of 22 January 1946 to the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State, directed the immediate establishment of a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) to be composed of the addressees plus a representative of the President. The original members were Robert P. Patterson, James V. Forrestal, James F. Byrnes, and FAdm. William D. Leahy, the last as Truman's representative. DCI RAdm. Souers was a non-voting member. The presidential letter also directed

CHAPTER 21

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence activity devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and protecting information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations and material against sabotage. Counterintelligence activity involves investigations and other measures to collect, process, and disseminate related information.[1]

This part of the history of U.S. naval intelligence includes items on the investigative activities of ONI and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS); security activities, plant protection, censorship, foreign disclosure; and the various organizations involved in these activities either directly or in supporting roles. Other chapters cover the topics of plant protection, censorship, and foreign disclosure in greater detail.

As with other elements of naval intelligence, there is much cross-fertilization and mutual dependence between the various parts. But, as a basic rule (with many exceptions), intelligence is concerned mainly with foreign countries and their activities in foreign areas. Counterintelligence is concerned mainly with foreign countries and their intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversive activities particularly in the United States and at ports and U.S. Navy facilities overseas or in their vicinity.

Initially, most of the Navy's counterintelligence work was carried out domestically; as a result, the term "domestic intelligence" is sometimes used interchangeably with "district intelligence" and "counterintelligence."

Origins of U.S. Navy Counterintelligence in World War I

ONI didn't get involved in counterintelligence until World War I. Even as late as 1913, when plans were stolen from the battleship *Pennsylvania* (BB 38), the Navy called on the Burns Detective Agency to investigate.[2]

On 31 March 1916, in testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels requested $50,000 for the collection of information at home by the naval districts. The naval appropriation bill of 26 August 1916 made available $30,000 for this purpose, and the appropriations were increased in both 1917 and 1918.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt was the true instigator of the move to have ONI engage in domestic investigations.[3] Consequently, ONI was the first of the federal intelligence agencies during World War I to have undercover agents.

On 27 July, in compliance with a CNO directive of 18 April 1916, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) submitted "confidential detailed plans for the establishment of the information service and the collection of information for the use of the officer in charge of Naval Districts." On 22 September, the plans were referred by Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt to the General Board for comment and recommendation. On 5 October, Adm. George Dewey, president of the General Board, favorably endorsed the plans, and Secretary of the Navy Daniels approved them on 6 October (see Chapter 22).[4]

Thus was inaugurated the Naval District Information Service and the establishment of an aid for information in each naval district (the term "aid" was originally used in official correspondence, but the more conventional spelling was in general use by the end of the war). This was the start of the naval district intelligence offices, which became major elements of the Naval Investigative Service fifty years later. The aids acted as direct representatives of the district commandants. Each aid was responsible for supervising intelligence work in his district in conjunction with, and under the guidance of, ONI. He gathered information about shipping as

well as information needed to protect shipping against hostile acts by agents or sympathizers of the Central Powers. The aid also arranged for the procurement and placement of coast observers and for their reporting suspicious ship or coastal activities.[5]

Other duties for the aids included detecting and acting against espionage and sabotage along the waterfronts, in navy yards, and in factories and other work areas associated with the navy yards; investigating Navy personnel within the naval district; detecting illegal radio stations; placing guards on each ship entering U.S. ports and while in U.S. ports; checking and inspecting cargoes and manifests; and searching for and locating enemy goods in storage. Much of the ship inspection work was eventually taken over by representatives of the Customs Division of the Treasury Department, but the Navy continued to work in collaboration with Customs.[6]

In a major reorganization plan, developed in ONI by Maj. John H. Russell, USMC, and Cdr. Dudley W. Knox and approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 1 October 1916, ONI was split into four divisions. Division A, Organization & Control of Agencies for the Collection of Information, had suborganizations concerned with counterespionage and secret service activity within the United States. Great emphasis was put on domestic intelligence.[7]

In early 1916, Cdr. Edward McCauley, Jr., Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, asked Spencer Eddy in New York City if he would perform undercover work of assistance to the ONI. Eddy agreed and established an office at 2 Wall Street at his own expense. Eddy found that the workload was more than he could handle by himself. So, with McCauley's permission, he solicited the help of A. Duer Irving and John C. King in the early fall. All requests for investigations for information went directly from Cdr. McCauley to Eddy; the reports of the small organization's investigations were sent directly to McCauley.

In December 1916, those assigned to Eddy's office were officially designated voluntary agents of ONI but continued to work undercover. In mid-December, William C. Van Antwerp was added as a voluntary agent.

On 6 January 1917, Cdr. McCauley called all voluntary agents of the office to Washington, recruited them into the United States Naval Reserve Force (USNRF), and gave them the temporary rank of lieutenant (jg). Spencer Eddy was in Florida at the time and McCauley requested he come to Washington. Upon arrival in Washington, he was also enrolled and given the rank of lieutenant commander, effective 6 March 1917.

Thus, the nucleus for the New York branch office of ONI was established at 2 Wall Street under LCdr. Eddy and with Lts. (jg) Van Antwerp, Irving, and Albert R. Fish, and voluntary agent John King. The men were also designated as special agents of ONI.

On 6 April 1917, with the outbreak of war, all of the above personnel were called to active duty, with Eddy in charge. The office also had one stenographer, Frances E. Reid.[8] The New York office was used as a model for other branch offices that were set up later in Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh. All came directly under ONI and took on operations that could not be turned over to the naval districts, such as the surveillance and guarding of plants handling Navy contracts, investigations of sabotage cases, shipping security, censorship, location of illicit radio transmitters, and investigations of naval civilian and service personnel. Over 5,000 manufacturing plants were (at least theoretically) under Navy protection, and many aliens and active enemy agents were removed from the plants before they were able to fulfill their missions. The branch officers were also responsible for directing and supporting many of the secret agents who were operating in the United States under ONI supervision.[9]

The responsibilities of the branch offices and aids for information overlapped in many respects, and there were occasional conflicts and misunderstandings between the two organizations. But the overlapping of an overt by a covert organization also had many unique advantages and gave a desirable flexibility to the methods of surveillance or investigation and the channels available for the prosecution of cases, which, in turn, made for more effective and rapid solutions.

The General Board drew up a basic plan, identified as Serial 666, General Board No. 425, of 4 February 1917, "Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers." Among its provisions for readiness for war, the following applied to U.S. naval intelligence and investigative capabilities:

> Organize a comprehensive system of intelligence service covering the whole theatre of war in accordance with the plans of ONI. Place under surveillance all citizens of the Central Powers in the Navy, or in Government employ in naval establishments, and remove them from positions in which they may do possible harm.

On 8 January 1918, Chief of Naval Operations RAdm. William S. Benson directed all ships and stations to appoint an officer (lieutenant or above) to serve as confidential intelligence officer (CIO) as a collateral duty. The CIO's identity was to be known only to the commanding officer and the executive officer. The CIO was to make confidential reports to

ONI, noting particularly "the officers and enlisted men whose records, nationality, friendships, associations, or habits, would tend to the probability of their being direct or indirect agents of any enemy government or of any enemy subject or sympathizer." The CIO was also required to investigate any related suspicious cases that came to his or the commanding officer's notice.[10]

Between March and October 1918, ONI issued a weekly *Confidential Bulletin* (Nos. 1–28) containing information on "suspicious individuals and firms" as well as more general information on subversion.[11]

On 14 August 1918, a memo from Secretary of the Navy Daniels cautioned aids for information about "isolated cases of ill-advised zeal" in dealing with certain labor leaders, such as subjecting agitators and union representatives to severe cross-examination or intimidation. He ordered aids "to investigate and report promptly upon labor troubles affecting work for the Navy, particularly those inspired by enemy influence" and not to take sides.[12]

During World War I, eighteen German agents who had been in constant communication with Germany were uncovered in the United States. All were arrested and their papers confiscated, leading to the discovery that wireless radio devices were being manufactured in New York for the German government. Many of the people connected with the illegal wireless device fled, but others were arrested. Again, their papers revealed codes and other secret means of communicating with Germany.[13]

Before the United States entered the war, a careful watch had been maintained on possible German secret service representatives in the Navy. For example, one of the battleships in the Atlantic Fleet reported that a chief petty officer (CPO) on board was suspected of being a German agent. He had served for years and had had an excellent record. He spoke German fluently and when on liberty associated closely with Germans. His duties on board ship gave him access to technical equipment and information. An ONI agent was enlisted as a yeoman and ordered to the ship in the normal way. The agent gradually made friends with the suspect and eventually was invited to accompany him on liberty. The agent yeoman found insufficient evidence to convict the CPO of espionage but was convinced that he was a German agent. Consequently, the CPO was transferred to duty in the interior of the United States where he would not have access to sensitive information. A few days after the United States entered the war, a coded telegram from Holland, addressed to the CPO and confirming his foreign agent activities, was intercepted and forwarded to ONI.[14]

The importance of security control and the supervision of merchant ships, their officers, crews, and passengers was apparent to ONI early in the war. Until July 1917, this control was exercised sporadically and only by the aids for information in the naval districts. Then attention was attracted to the frequent naval attaché reports concerning smuggling, letter carrying, and enemy agents traveling as passengers or in the crews of merchant ships. At that time, the Navy had no legal authority in such matters. The Treasury Department did have such authority, but didn't realize its responsibility or the importance of counterespionage work. Consequently, ONI, recognizing the need, went ahead with the development of an organization to coordinate and support the necessary counterespionage effort (see Chapter 24).[15]

In a report made during the war, DNI RAdm Roger Welles, Jr., discussed the work of ONI and detailed the conditions under which the work was performed, as he viewed them. The report was placed in the record during the testimony of Secretary Daniels on 20 May 1920 in connection with the Senate's investigation of the Navy Department's conduct of the war. The following are some of the portions of that report which relate to counterintelligence:

> It was well known in this country that the Germans had established a wonderful spy system through which Berlin was being informed of the activities in every branch of industry in the country. It is probable that there was not a manufacturing establishment here that did not have at least one paid agent of the German government who kept that government informed of everything that was going on. There is no doubt that, even in the departments in Washington, German agents were at work at all times. It was supposed that bases of some sort for the supplying of gasoline [*sic*] and supplies to German submarines were being secretly established in different points along the coast of Mexico, Central and South America. Before the United States entered the war, Germans were allowed to enter this country freely.
>
> The day the United States declared war, ONI's activities were increased tremendously, for it became the duty of this office not only to continue its peace-time activities, but to form an investigation section to seek out the Germans who had been active in propaganda in favor of Germany, who were attempting to prevent by sabotage, by explosions, or by fomenting strikes, and by many other means the manufacture of munitions of war; who were making bombs for the purpose of blowing up our ships and factories; and in general to prevent the activities of Germans and German sympathizers from continuing their nefarious pursuits.

> This meant expanding tremendously the office in Washington, reorganizing its personnel, and extending its activities to every country of the globe, as well as covering every state in the Union.[16]

All U.S. naval attachés were involved in counterintelligence in varying degrees during World War I. The office in Paris was probably more broadly involved than any other because of ONI's activities in regard to the security of shipping. Most shipping was between France and the United States.

The office in Paris built up a large filing card system on suspects. It controlled the travel of all persons requiring American visas, controlled the issuance of all American passports applied for in France, reported suspects and enemy agents to ONI and other Allied organizations, and controlled crew lists. A black-list of commercial firms was also maintained.

The Inter-Allied Bureau for uniting the Allied counterespionage system was formed in September 1917. No U.S. Navy representative was allowed to attend, and mutual distrust within the bureau generally caused it to fail in practice. The board did serve one useful purpose for the naval attaché office in Paris by publishing the Inter-Allied List of Suspects, which helped the attaché develop his card system and perform his other counterintelligence functions, including investigations of all persons applying for overseas civilian employment with the Navy.

Duplicate reports on suspect persons living or traveling in other Allied nations were constantly being sent back and forth between U.S. naval attachés in Madrid, Berne, London, Rome and Paris. The cooperation between these offices was cordial and effective.

Counterintelligence activities, separate from Allied investigations, were conducted by a bureau set up in the naval attaché's office at Paris under William Chandler, who employed agents to make investigations of suspect individuals. Chandler's agents never knew of his connection with the naval attaché.

In matters relating to suspects, it was the policy of the Naval Attaché, Paris, to make a preliminary investigation, even when the subjects appeared not to be of concern to the Navy. If it was not of Navy concern but worthy of further investigation, and if the case was serious, the facts were sent to the U.S. government agency concerned, usually the U.S. Army. In that manner, people were investigated, detained, watched, and even deported from France.

Closely allied with counterespionage work was the investigation of U.S. Navy deserters and also, on occasion, German deserters found mostly in Switzerland by Naval Attaché, Paris, agents operating there. Information from the German deserters tended to be unique and of special value from a technical aspect.

Carriers of questionable letters found on merchant vessels were also investigated. Also, close control was made of passport issuance, especially when a passport had supposedly been lost or stolen. Several cases involving passports being purchased by German agents were discovered.[17]

The types of investigations conducted by ONI and its various field activities during World War I were listed as follows:

A. Naval Personnel
   1. Deserters, stragglers, imposters
   2. Suspicious persons attempting to enlist
   3. Collusion between contractors and Navy personnel

B. Navy Yard Employees
   1. Navy Yard suspects
   2. Pro-German activity at the Navy Yards
   3. Thefts
   4. Cases referred by the Commandant
   5. Alien or enemy agitation

C. Miscellaneous
   1. Cases referred by Mail and Cable Censorship
   2. Suspicious individuals reported in the vicinity of Navy piers, wharves, and docks
   3. Applicants for marine pilots licenses
   4. Cases involving radio apparatus
   5. Suspicious fires in Navy areas
   6. Protection of shipyards doing Navy work
   7. Protection of manufacturing plants with Navy contracts
   8. Enemy agents and sympathizers and civilians concerning activities inimical to the interests of the Navy[18]

During the first six months of the war, the Navy rounded up some 600 "spies" in the Great Lakes area alone. It is probable that nearly all of the so-called spies were merely aliens of enemy country origin working in plants having Navy contracts and therefore considered vulnerable to enemy agent recruitment.[19]

At peak load, ONI was processing 1,000 names a day in its security checks, and its suspect list eventually reached a total of 105,000 names.[20]

On 19 November 1918, all branch intelligence offices were instructed by DNI RAdm. Welles to close their pending business by 1 December, if practicable, and to recommend which portions of their files should be turned over to an aid for information and which should be forwarded to ONI.[21]

During World War I, ONI had prepared identification cards for issue to operatives as required to assist them in their work. Cards were restricted principally to agents sent out directly from ONI, but some were issued for special cases at the request of district intelligence officers (DIO). DIO was the new designation for the former aids for information, effective 24 March 1919.[22]

Counterintelligence and Investigation Between the World Wars

In 1920, a morals scandal came to light in Newport, Rhode Island. Secretary of the Navy Daniels ordered an investigation, and Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt reported that the matter had been assigned to ONI and then to his office. DNI RAdm. Albert P. Niblack had not wanted to handle a situation that was not his idea of intelligence. As he later told a congressional committee:

> One of the greatest things I have had to contend with has been to get ONI away from some wartime activities which grew with and had to do with enemy agents. I had absolutely nothing to do with the investigation, and I had refused to touch it. I have positive assurance from the Secretary of the Navy that ONI will not be required to do anything of that kind except in great emergency. In the main, my endeavor has been to get back to the old fashioned system with a naval attaché who is a member of the diplomatic corps and who conforms to all the conventionalities.[23]

In the general field of security, ONI had responsibility for the security of naval information during the 1920s and 1930s. However, one of the chief areas of danger, lax control of communications, was the responsibility of the Assistant Director of Communication Security (OP-20-G), whose activities involved checking on violations of regulations in the coding of messages. The only cases referred to ONI were those in which there was a question of classification. The procedure served no useful purpose, since ONI had no authority to determine classification, which was the responsibility of the originator of the document.

Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), also concerned with security violations in the handling of registered publications, initiated a survey of security conditions in the offices of U.S. naval attachés. The survey established that, quite apart from the possibility of attaché office safes being burglarized, all commercial communication companies retained copies of dispatches sent and received by U.S. attachés. It was thought that at several capitals, including London, Paris, and Tokyo, all such messages were being routed through local government offices.

In May 1920, Secretary Daniels described ONI's security and counterespionage functions as "war activities and not previously recognized as legitimate functions of that office." At the same time he assured congressional investigators that "the naval appropriation bill for next year restricts the activities of the ONI in the matter of collecting information at home and places the office on its original footing prior to the War." There seems little doubt that the sudden demise of the Counterintelligence Branch (B-Branch) was in part the result of the understandable hostility of Congress toward a naval secret service.

It was not possible, however, to bring to an end all the activities previously performed under the jurisdiction of B-Branch; it was still necessary to provide for the security of the naval establishment, including investigation of suspected violations of security regulations. The Navy as a whole, however, was little interested in security, and the investigations requested were both infrequent and trivial. Moreover, the surviving organization was so small that the response to inquiries undertaken could not always be satisfactorily completed. There is little evidence that ONI itself originated any measures for security during the post–World War I period.

For a satisfactory solution, every security problem that came to ONI for attention required a trained investigative agency that ONI didn't have. Theoretically, ONI had at its disposal the various district intelligence officers and their organizations, as well as the inspectors of naval material. It could also call on the investigative agencies of other government departments for assistance. Liaison with other departments was indirect and usually faulty, and the district organizations were inadequate. Not every district had an intelligence officer, and in those that did, the officers were assigned other duties and were often not qualified or trained for investigative work. DIOs were supposed to make use of reserve officers for investigations, but the arrangement, which was intended to provide useful experience for the Reserves, was generally unsatisfactory in its results.

The most useful agents available to ONI within the Naval Establishment were the inspectors of naval material, who sometimes reported directly to ONI and at other times to their respective technical bureaus.

The disproportion between ONI's responsibilities and resources was compounded by ONI often being called upon to perform investigations that had no connection with security.

When a matter requiring investigation was brought to the attention of ONI, the normal procedure was to refer it for investigation to the commandant of the naval district in which the incident occurred. The commandant was to use whatever resources he had available and as he saw fit. There apparently was no follow-up on the referrals. Those conditions continued throughout the post–World War I years until 1935.

All communications between ONI and other departments had to be transmitted between the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the other department involved. Furthermore, letters to the Attorney General, which included all those to the FBI, had to be routed via the Navy's Judge Advocate General.[24]

In ONI in 1921, there was a domestic section for "counterespionage" under Cdr. Royal E. Ingersoll. Ingersoll also had the Japanese Espionage Desk, whose principal activity was to follow visiting Japanese. The Russians were considered to be no particular problem at that time. Although ONI was aware of the possibility of Soviet efforts to subvert Navy crews, the problem had not reached the serious proportions it did later.[25]

ONI was keeping track of Japanese activities in South America and the Panama Canal Zone in the early 1930s. Much of the information on Japanese activities in the Canal Zone was collected by the U.S. naval attaché in Buenos Aires. Close cooperation in regard to Japanese activities was also maintained with the FBI. J. Edgar Hoover and Ingersoll frequently exchanged visits and information.[26]

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in his annual report for Fiscal Year 1933, noted the problem of Communist literature being distributed to fleet personnel at U.S. West Coast ports. To locate and collect Communist handbills left on mess tables and lockers in the crew's quarters, it became standard practice to search ships following visiting periods for the general public.[27]

To provide detailed information on espionage techniques and how to counter them, ONI, on 18 February 1935, published ONI-22, *Notes on Espionage, Counter-Espionage and Passport Control*. It was a secret, registered publication issued under the signature of RAdm. Joseph K. Taussig, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. ONI illustrated the need for counterespionage investigations with the example of an investigation being conducted during February 1935 of two crewmen on board one of the newest U.S. Navy cruisers. The crewmen were accused of selling information about the ship to Japanese agents for $500 during the cruiser's shakedown cruise.[28]

Preparing for Wartime Counterintelligence

As early as 1936, ONI began assigning a few officers for training in investigative work. Arrangements were made for naval officers to attend the FBI school, but the number trained was pathetically small: four each in 1936, 1937, and 1938, and two in 1939. In June 1939, the need for expanded investigative resources was suddenly recognized and led to the formulation of a plan calling for four types of investigative personnel: special agents, agents, investigators, and special employees. The first three categories were to be filled by category I-V(S) Naval Reserve officers who had had the requisite training for investigative work; the fourth category was to be filled by civilian experts (toxicologists, chemists, etc.) needed in connection with special types of investigations. (Women could be employed in this category, but their number was to be kept to a minimum.)

In 1939, it was estimated that 209 persons (179 commissioned and 30 warrant officers) would be required to staff the Naval Intelligence Investigative Service (NIIS) upon mobilization. NIIS was to be a completely separate agency subordinate to the Director of Naval Intelligence. In September 1939, however, the idea of a separate investigative service was discarded, and district commandants were instructed that personnel who had already been assigned to NIIS for mobilization purposes were to be absorbed by the Investigative Section (B-3) of the district intelligence office or Section B-3 of ONI.

In October 1940, after considerable discussion, it was decided that there would be only two classes of operatives—agents and special agents—and that they could be either officers or civilians. Civilian agents were to receive an annual salary of $1,500 to $3,600, and civilian special agents were to be paid $1,800 to $4,500. The low pay scale soon proved to be inadequate, and all five civilian agents hired between 20 June and 4 September 1940 terminated their contracts for "more remunerative positions." Accordingly, it was decided to revert to the plan of using Naval Reserve officers. In December 1940, six I-V(S) reservists who had had investigative experience in civilian life were ordered to active duty.[29]

Counterintelligence in the late 1930s was deemed by ONI to require close and cordial relations with the various "patriotic" societies in their efforts at combating persons whom they believed to be conducting subversive, pacifistic, and defeatist activities. Radical elements were increasing their efforts to subvert naval personnel, and foreign espionage continued to increase.

German espionage activities against the United States prior to Pearl Harbor consisted primarily of building up the German intelligence data base to replace the out-of-date files still retained from World War I. Much of the Nazi collection effort was performed by the German foreign trade offices. German intelligence also interviewed returning German businessmen and merchant marine sources. There is no indication that Germany had much success in establishing espionage networks in the United States, but extensive networks *were* established in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to relay information on Allied shipping, and the work resulted in some ship losses. Most of the prewar activities were carried on by *Abwehr* agents.[30]

The Counterintelligence Branch (OP-16-B) in 1939 was organized into the following sections: Naval Censorship (B-2); Investigations (B-3); Security of Naval Information (B-4); Commerce and Travel (B-5); Sabotage, Espionage, and Counterespionage (B-7); and Coastal Information (B-8). The specific tasks of the B-Branch were to determine (1) enemy plans and organizations for espionage and sabotage; (2) the kind of information and intelligence the enemy was getting; (3) the kind of information and intelligence the enemy needed and especially wanted; (4) The connections or channels between the legitimate and proper sources or custodians of information and intelligence and the enemy's intelligence organizations; (5) the methods used to transmit such information and intelligence to the effective enemy destination; (6) the personnel, organization, and methods used by, or available to, the enemy for sabotage directed against the U.S. Navy, including propaganda; (7) the plans and methods for denying information and intelligence about U.S. naval war operations to the enemy and for preventing interference with those operations by the enemy; and (8) the dissemination of intelligence on (1) through (7) above to the proper action agency or agencies, with recommendations for countermeasures.[31]

The first official action taken to resolve overlapping functions and conflicting jurisdiction over national counterespionage activities was a confidential memorandum from President Franklin Roosevelt, dated 26 June 1939 and addressed to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Commerce, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster General. It declared that "the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage and sabotage matters is to be controlled and handled by the FBI of the Justice Department, MID [Military Intelligence Division] of the War Department, and ONI of the Navy Department. The Directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities."[32]

On 6 September 1939, the President issued a formal statement that instructed the FBI to

> take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations. This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility. To this end, I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the U.S. promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the FBI any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.[33]

Counterintelligence During World War II

During the 1939–1942 period, the work of ONI's Latin American Desk (OP-16-FL) focused on counterintelligence and its related activities. Not only were there believed to be approximately 2.5 million Axis-origin aliens residing throughout Latin America, but their well-entrenched influence upon the political, social, economic, and military institutions of the Latin American republics created the single largest obstacle to effective cooperation by those republics with the United States.[34]

The first formal agreement delimiting the responsibilities for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities was titled "Proposal for Coordination of FBI, ONI and MID." It was dated 5 June 1940 and was signed by J. Edgar Hoover, RAdm. Walter S. Anderson, and BGen. Sherman Miles, USA, as the heads of the three agencies involved. The FBI assumed responsibility for all investigations of cases involving civilians in the United States and in U.S. territories except the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippine Islands. The FBI was also responsible for cases "directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances." ONI assumed responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in the naval establishment, including civilians under naval employment or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa. The Army's MID assumed responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in the military establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control, and for cases involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and the Philippine Islands. The joint FBI/ONI/MID agreement declared that "responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the

obligation to provide a pool of all information in that field, but it does not imply the responsible agency is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity."[35]

On 8 January 1941, a CNO letter to all district commandants forwarded a 12 December 1940 supplement to the Delimitation Agreement of 5 June 1940. The supplement instructed the field services of the three intelligence agencies to "maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives," to include "a meeting of representatives of the three agencies, preferably the O-in-Cs [officers in charge], at least once a week, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities and any other subjects necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work." The personal liaison at all times was to "insure that there is no duplication of effort in any field and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers."[36]

At a meeting in the office of the Secretary of the Navy on 19 May 1942, RAdm. Stanford C. Hooper (OP-14) discussed the danger of Communist party "cells" in the transportation and communications industries and in the armed services. He also pointed out that it was time to prevent formation of such cells and to eliminate those already formed. The temporary military alliance with the USSR was not justification for condoning the establishment of such cells in the United States. A change in the international political situation might occur at any time without advance notice, at which time it would be too late to abolish the Communist cells. A decision was needed as to whether or not the Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel should continue to disapprove employment of Communist radio operators and whether Communists should be accepted as members of the Defense Communications Board Committees. Secretary Knox reportedly replied that he held no brief for the activities of the Communist party, but President Roosevelt had stated that, considering the United States and Russia were allies at that time and the U.S. Communist party's efforts were now bent toward winning the war, the United States was bound not to oppose the Communist party activities and, specifically, not to disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the party, or that he was active in party affairs. The Secretary further stated that this was an order and must be obeyed without mental reservations.

RAdm. Adolphus Staton from the office of the Under Secretary of the Navy then said that, in view of the perceived change in policy, the instructions to the Departmental Qualification Board should be modified. At the time, the instructions stated, "The Board will determine whether such service by the person concerned would be detrimental to the national defense and national safety." Staton said that the board members could not bring themselves to believe that the employment of militant Communist party members as radio operators would not be detrimental to national safety. Secretary Knox agreed to take up the change to the instructions with the Judge Advocate General.

Director of Naval Intelligence RAdm. Theodore S. Wilkinson asked the Secretary if membership in the Communist party constituted a general "whitewash" for all sorts of illegal and other subversive activities. The Secretary answered that it did not.

Knox repeated the order from the President and reiterated that it must be obeyed by all officers without mental reservation. RAdm. Hooper replied that, in the Navy, an order from a superior officer was always obeyed without mental reservation. However, upon receipt of the order (which he considered ill-advised) he had felt it his duty to say so.[37]

In 1942, the policy on the use of confidential informants was expressed in part as follows:

> As a general rule, before using informers, their loyalty and general reliability should be ascertained by an appropriate investigation. When such basic qualifications cannot be checked, information obtained from them should be accepted with reserve. Caution must be exercised regarding their motives, to assure that they don't spring from a grudge or a desire to inflict damage on a competitor.
>
> Informers may be volunteers or work for pay. No person in the Naval Service shall ever be given extra pay as an Informer but may be reimbursed for actual, necessary and extraordinary expenses incurred in obtaining or transmitting information. As a general rule, information should be paid for only on a C.O.D. basis, after verification. Payment of a regular salary to an Informer is a waste of funds.
>
> A signed receipt should be obtained and filed for each payment to an Informant. An alias or other designator may be used, but fingerprints should be obtained from these receipts even when the Informant's real name is not known.[38]

On 9 February 1942, the original Delimitation Agreement was revised. The spheres of responsibility for the FBI, MID, and ONI remained essentially the same, except that ONI now had added responsibility for cases involving civilians on Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands. MID and the FBI were also responsible for additional territories,

including Alaska. New paragraphs covered conditions for operations under a "Period of Martial Law," and "Periods of Predominant Military Interest Not Involving Martial Law," and "Periods of Normal Conditions." The agreement remained in effect without further revision throughout World War II.[39]

Some friction developed between district intelligence officers and the representatives of the other wartime intelligence agencies, especially with FBI field agents. On 9 December 1942, the heads of MID, ONI, and the FBI issued a joint letter to the field offices of the three agencies, calling attention to the Delimitation Agreement as an instrument intended to benefit each of the subscribing agencies and devised to eliminate friction. Representatives were urged to apply its terms in a sensible manner, and they were warned that any attitude other than a cooperative one would not be tolerated. Field relations between FBI and ONI subsequently improved.

The first official liaison between the respective counterintelligence sections of ONI and MID was established early in December 1942. Three Army officers were detailed from MID for duty in the following sections of ONI's Domestic Intelligence Branch: Investigations (B-3), Commerce and Travel (B-5), and Sabotage, Espionage, and Counterintelligence (B-7). Also, three naval officers from those sections were detailed to the Army counterparts of those sections. Although the B-7 liaison was discontinued in early 1944 and the one with B-5 in March 1944, liaison with B-3 existed until the end of the war, with a naval representative on duty in MID for the duration.[40]

In 1943, to simplify classifying and identifying investigative cases by types, the following designators were prescribed:

I. Personnel Investigations
   (a) Service Personnel
   (b) Civilian Personnel
   (c) Applicants (service and civilian)
   (d) Private contractors' employees working in Naval Establishments
II. Sabotage Investigations
III. Espionage Investigations
IV. War Fraud Investigations
V. Investigation of Naval Contractors
VI. Miscellaneous Investigations[41]

The mission of ONI's Case History Section (OP-16-A-7) was to establish and maintain a central file serving all branches and sections of ONI. OP-16-A-7's files contained information on naval and civilian personnel, the heads and executives of business organizations, leaders of various groups (political, possibly subversive, etc.), foreigners of naval interest, and others. The files were used primarily for counterintelligence purposes. The Russell "Soundex" system of indexing was used, as it was adaptable to Japanese names as well as to variations in the spelling of all names. The types of information maintained included case histories that contained a minimum of four evaluated items of significant information on an individual or organization; a visible index of names on which fewer than four items of documented information existed; category files covering various subjects for convenience; and files in a transferred status. In addition to ONI, some twenty to twenty-five outside agencies used the files each month during World War II. During a typical twelve-week period, over 120,000 name checks were made, with an average search time per name of less than six minutes.[42]

Post–World War II Period: Counterintelligence Retained

At the end of World War II, in order to avoid repeating the negative and confused situation that followed World War I relative to ONI's investigative responsibilities, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal issued a letter dated 1 November 1945 to all ships and stations:

> Naval Intelligence personnel are currently authorized to conduct investigations of naval personnel and civilians under naval control in cases of actual or potential espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities, and in those cases which relate to the security of classified naval information.
>
> The investigative jurisdiction of the naval intelligence organization is hereby broadened to permit the use of naval intelligence personnel and facilities to investigate:
>
> (1) Naval personnel
>
> (2) Civilians under purely naval administrative control
>
> (3) Matters under purely naval administrative control in cases not specifically and exclusively within the investigative jurisdiction of other Government Departments or Agencies and subject to the limitations set forth [herein].
>
> Authority to administer, operate, and maintain an investigative service for the Navy to accomplish the purpose outlined in this letter is hereby assigned to the Chief of Naval Intelligence acting under the Chief of Naval Operations.
>
> Investigations . . . shall not be undertaken except on specific request to the Chief of Naval Operations or a District Commandant by competent naval authority.[43]

Experience had shown that the Navy might have an interest in many organizations, groups, trends, and situations that, when they first attracted attention, did not have any discernible immediate naval interest. Thus, the policy in the immediate postwar period was that information for reference and background be compiled by the Sabotage, Espionage, and Countersubversion (SEC) Section (OP-23D4), particularly information about organizations that solicited naval personnel for membership. OP-23D4 was soon renamed the Counterintelligence Section, but it continued to be referred to as SEC on ONI rosters.

Naval authorities were to be advised of threats or dangers to the Naval Establishment by three methods: official communications by dispatch, letter, or memorandum to the appropriate naval command to give warning of any specific immediate danger or threat; periodic studies summarizing subversive trends, to be disseminated usually to the district intelligence officers and, in any case, to commands concerned within the naval service; and special topical studies issued from time to time on special problems. The special studies might be disseminated outside the naval service, depending upon the nature of the study.[44]

With the broadening of ONI's investigative jurisdiction in 1945, the demands made upon the naval intelligence investigative organization steadily increased. This led to the issuance of another letter signed by Forrestal in March 1947, which stated:

> At present there are two classes of cases which are of particular urgency. They are: (1) subversive investigations, and (2) investigations to determine the loyalty of Naval employees and applicants. Other investigations, not of a direct intelligence interest, must be subordinated under present working conditions to permit concentration on those types which directly affect the security of the Naval Establishment.
>
> The need for adequate security of the Naval Establishment is paramount; consequently, in the best interests of the service, requests to Naval Intelligence for investigations of a direct non-intelligence nature must be cleared with the Commandant of the Naval District concerned to assure that the intelligence organization of that district can assume such investigations without jeopardizing the completion of its other work.[45]

A Special Observer–Merchant Marine (SOMM) Plan was issued by a Chief of Naval Operations letter in May 1947 to place informants on U.S. registry merchant ships on foreign runs for the purpose of identifying crew members suspected of subversive activities. The plan had been coordinated with, and formally approved by, the FBI. Implementation was primarily through the district intelligence offices, but naval attachés could become involved.[46]

Executive Order 9835, issued in 1947, established a loyalty program within the federal government. It provided that the FBI check its records for each incumbent employee. If derogatory information from the standpoint of loyalty was uncovered, an investigation would be made.[47] At a Cabinet meeting on 30 October, President Harry S. Truman emphasized that Executive Order 9835 did not mean that a full investigation should be made of every U.S. Government employee. He also pointed out that any department, within the limitations of its organization and funds, could make whatever investigation of employees it considered necessary, but that once evidence of disloyalty was uncovered, the investigation was to be placed in the hands of the FBI, the only agency empowered to conduct loyalty investigations. No funds had been appropriated for any department or agency other than the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations.

As of February 1948, ONI had a backlog of 15,000 investigations pending. This backlog was increasing at the rate of 850 investigations per month. ONI's investigative jurisdiction included all personnel, civilian and uniformed, of the Naval Establishment for any purpose connected with security or the detection of crime. It did not include the President's loyalty program. When an ONI investigation of a Civil Service employee uncovered a suspicion of disloyalty, the FBI was notified and took over the case in accordance with the President's directive.

Several factors stimulated the increasing demand for investigations. Paramount was the atmosphere of suspicion in which the Soviet Union forced the free world to live. Commanding officers consequently demanded investigations of more people than they had in the past. The nation and the Navy became very security conscious. Also, because the weapons being developed for and by the Navy were becoming more complex, the employment of individuals with unique scientific abilities but obscure backgrounds was required. U.S. Navy research authorities were impatient with the delays in research caused by the lengthy investigative process and the excessive backlog.[48]

Beginning in July 1948, ONI used the polygraph as an investigative technique. From 1948 to 1951, ONI polygraph operators were trained at the Leonarde Keeler School in Chicago, but from July 1951, ONI conducted its own training course. Individuals selected by ONI for polygraph training were authorized by the Director of Naval Intelligence to conduct polygraph examinations (but not to provide training in polygraph operation) when

50. DNI ltr, ser 06173P32, 5 Apr 1950, NIS History Files.

51. Commander in Chief, Pacific, *History of Administrative Problems, Korean War*, 2:15–16.

52. Naval Investigative Service, Pacific (NISPAC) Instruction 5400.1D, I-IV-1.

53. ONI Instruction 05520.3 of 8 Aug 1951.

54. DNI memo, ser 025308P32, 19 Nov 1953, NIS History Files, OA.

55. SECNAV Instruction 05500.5 of 29 Sep 1953.

56. ONI Internal Instruction 05010.1 of 28 Dec 1953.

57. SECNAV Instruction 5430.13A of 10 Aug 1954.

58. Briefing on NIS, Aug 1954, NIS History Files, OA.

59. Briefing to the Clark Subcommittee of the Hoover Commission, ONI, 22 Nov 1954, NIS History Files, OA.

60. ONI Instruction 005520.41 of 14 Feb 1955.

61. ONI-70-1, *U.S. Naval Intelligence Manual*, 20 Jun 1956, 28.

62. ONI Instruction 05520.63 of 17 Nov 1958.

63. ONI Instruction 003821.1 of 21 Apr 1960.

64. ONI-70-1, Change 1, 4 Nov 1957, 85.

65. ONI Instruction 05520.57 of 2 Dec 1957.

66. Capt. Martin Randisi, USNR, transcript of interview made for author, 23 Jul 1975, 27–29.

67. *NIS Command History, 1967*, 1–3.

68. Navy Counterintelligence Support Center Instruction P5450.1 of 20 Jan 1964.

69. ONI Notice 5200 of 3 Apr 1963.

70. LCdr. William D. Derryberry, briefing folder on Vietnam, 1 May 1972.

71. Navy Counterintelligence Support Center Instruction P5450.1 of 20 Jan 1964.

72. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), *Annual Report, 1 Oct 1963–26 Jun 1964*, 53.

73. ONI Instruction 05521.14A of 27 May 1964.

74. *CINCPACFLT Annual Report, 26 Jun 1964–30 Mar 1965*, 55.

75. NISPAC Instruction 5400.1D of 1 Apr 1975, I-IV-3.

76. ONI Instruction 3850.2 of 9 Feb 1965.

77. *NIS Command History, 1967*, 2–6.

78. Derryberry briefing folder.

79. Ibid.

80. OPNAV Instruction 5450.97A of 28 Mar 1966, and Change 1 of 2 May 1967.

81. OPNAV Instruction 5700.8A of 27 Mar 1967.

82. OPNAV Instruction 05510.96A of 29 Mar 1967.

83. OPNAV Instruction 5520.2 of 25 Nov 1967.

84. DNI Report to CNO on "Status of Major ONI Programs," 20 Jun 1968.

85. NISPAC Instruction 5400.1D of 1 Apr 1975, I-IV-5.

86. OPNAV Instruction 5500.58 of 8 Mar 1968.

87. Derryberry, briefing folder on Vietnam.

88. NIS, "Shore Establishment Review," 15 Apr 1970, 2, 7, 9, 14–16, 21–43.

89. *DNI Report to CNO, FY 1972*, 13, 14, 59.

90. *DNI Report to CNO, FY 1977*, III-8.

91. Ibid., II-13.

92. Ibid., III-5.

93. Ibid., III-8.

94. Ibid., II-14–II-15.

CHAPTER 22

Naval District Intelligence Activities

The information in this chapter on the intelligence activities in the naval districts is divided into a general section followed by sections on individual districts.

The organizational structures of the district intelligence offices (DIO) were essentially the same. The organization, therefore, is described completely only for the District Intelligence Office, 1st Naval District (DIO-1ND) and is not repeated for the other districts, except where some significant difference has been found.

The surviving records of the district intelligence offices of the 5th Naval District, Norfolk, Virginia; 13th Naval District, Seattle, Washington; and 17th Naval District, Adak, Alaska, were not researched for this chapter. Only very scant documentation on the activities of the District Intelligence Office, 16th Naval District, Cavite, Philippines was located. Chapters 21, 24, 26, and 29 contain additional information on activities in the naval districts.

The district intelligence offices were replaced by Naval Investigative Service (NIS) offices and district staff intelligence officers (DSIO) in March 1966.

Origins of the District Intelligence Office System

The district intelligence office system was established in 1916 to cope with what was predicted to be a rising volume of counterespionage requirements. Counterespionage was a new field for the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the instructions that set up the DIO system are the best single source of descriptions for the duties and responsibilities assigned to the newly established district intelligence officers, who were initially referred to as aides for information. The "Instructions for Information Service" were forwarded to naval district commandants by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) RAdm. William S. Benson on 14 October 1916, to become effective upon receipt:

> 1. The Aid [*sic*] for Information shall, under the immediate direction and control of the Commandant of the Naval District, be charged with the active administration and supervision of the Naval Information Service within the limits of the Naval District to which assigned.
>
> 2. He shall, if practicable, be ordered to temporary duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence preliminary to assuming his duties as Aid for Information in a Naval Defense District.
>
> 3. He shall be charged with the acquisition, compilation, and dissemination of information as specified, observing the instructions issued to him by or through the Commandant of [the] Naval District.
>
> 4. He shall represent the Commandant of the Naval District in matters connected with such information.
>
> 5. In preparation for war the Aid for Information will undertake the following:
>
> a. Prepare and keep posted to date a secret war portfolio, containing all papers and data relating to the war information service, and provide a secure place for filing the same;
>
> b. Seek the general cooperation of the Aid for Information for Communications in the work of organization and preparation, in order to secure prompt and efficient communication with the sources of information, with the Navy Department and with other points as may be required;
>
> c. Familiarize himself generally with the Naval District and its sections and acquire all necessary knowledge in connection with it;
>
> d. Make recommendations for the improvement of the plans for the information service in naval districts;
>
> e. Familiarize himself with the written instructions for the establishment and organization of the war information service in his Naval District, the agencies, sources, and means by

which the information is to be collected, and the facilities available for its transmission and dissemination;

f. As opportunity offers, visit or interview confidentially each of the heads of local branches of departments of the federal government, the officials of the municipal government, heads of steamship and commercial companies, and other individuals, whose cooperation and assistance are contemplated in the war information service;

g. Arrange for the cooperation of the above and ascertain the extent to which they will cooperate and the manner and details of such cooperation;

h. Confer with and arrange for the cooperation of the local military authorities in matters pertaining to information (an officer of the Army is to be detailed on the staff of the Commandant for this purpose);

i. Make written plans for the utilization of all sources of information as specified;

j. Make tentative written plans in cooperation with those directly concerned, for the use of codes, the routing of messages, visits to incoming merchant vessels, instruction of outgoing merchant vessels, the safeguarding of confidential information, the spreading of false information, etc;

k. Make tentative written plans for the supply, control, and expenditure of funds to accomplish the administration, organization, and development of the war information service in his district.

l. Prepare and keep up to date lists of the officials, organizations, firms, individuals, etc., included in the plan for war information service in his district;

m. Draw up written plans for expanding the office force, and if necessary the office quarters on the eve of war, including the installation of telephones, etc., and arrange for a continuous day and night service in the office;

n. As opportunity offers, inform confidentially those concerned of the parts of these plans which concern them, and of the specific duties which will be required or expected of them;

o. Actually write all telegrams, letters, instructions, etc., the need for which can be foreseen, leaving only the date and signature blank, including those for the Commandant to sign; and

p. Take, or send by the hands of an officer, duplicate of war portfolio to the Office of Naval Intelligence, when suitable opportunity presents itself. Take every precaution to prevent the portfolio from being seen by unauthorized persons. The above work will be considered the primary work of the Aid for Information during peace.

WAR INFORMATION SERVICE

6. The mission of the War Information Service in a naval defense district is as follows:

a. The collection and compilation of prompt, reliable and accurate information concerning the following:

(1) Approach, arrival, movements, and position of enemy naval forces;

(2) Approach, arrival, loading, and departure of neutral shipping, whose cargoes may contain contraband of war or articles belonging to the enemy or destined directly to the enemy, his citizens or subjects;

(3) The approach, arrival, and departure of all U.S. merchant vessels;

(4) The identity, nationality, and activities of officers, crews, and passengers of merchant vessels, whether neutral or U.S., arriving in any ports within the limits of the Naval District;

(5) The presence, identity, and activities of enemy agents, citizens, or subjects;

(6) The conduct, progress, and events of the war, information bearing on the enemy, his government, policy, forces and their composition, his subjects or citizens, commerce, finances, and general activities;

b. The prompt dissemination of the above information to the proper authorities, as follows:

(1) The Commandant of the Naval District and through him to:

(2) The Navy Department;

(3) The Fleet, operating in the waters adjacent to the Naval District;

(4) The Commandants of other Naval Districts, of such as may concern their Districts;

(5) The Commanding Officer of the Army within the Naval Districts, of such as applies to the Coast Defense or of concern or interest to the Army; and

(6) The local heads of the Civil Departments of the Government, of such as is of concern or interest to those Departments.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

7. The personnel available in connection with the mission are as follows:

a. All persons under the direct control of the District Commandant;

b. All persons under the control of other departments of the Government;

c. All persons in the employ of state, city, county, or township; and

d. All civilians.

8. Observers Afloat:

a. The Fleet;

b. The Naval Patrol*;

c. Naval Militia and auxiliary organizations (power-boat squadrons, etc.)*;

d. The Coast and Geodetic Survey (Dept. of Commerce)*;

e. The Bureau of Fisheries (Dept. of Commerce)*;

f. The Bureau of Lighthouses (Dept. of Commerce)*;

g. Coast Guard (Dept. of the Treasury)*;

h. Customs Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

i. Public Health Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

j. Secret Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

k. Bureau of Investigation (Dept. of Justice);

l. Bureau of Immigration (Dept. of Labor);

m. Merchant Marine, U. S. and neutral where possible; and

n. Officers and men of private vessels.

9. Observers ashore:

a. United States Navy (including aircraft);

b. United States Army (including aircraft);

c. Coast Guard-Life Saving Service (Dept. of the Treasury*);

d. Bureau of Lighthouses (Dept. of Commerce*);

e. Weather Bureau (Dept. of Agriculture);

f. Bureau of Investigation (Dept. of Justice);

g. Customs Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

h. Public Health Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

i. Secret Service (Dept. of the Treasury);

j. Bureau of Immigration (Dept. of Labor);

k. Postmasters and Inspectors (Post Office Dept.);

l. Shipping Agents;

m. Steamship agents and representatives of steamship lines;

n. Civilians, importers, bankers, financial and commercial men, etc.;

o. Local police and detective branches;

p. Private secret service agencies;

q. Representatives of the press;

10. Observers abroad.

These sources are covered by Office of Naval Intelligence.

*The Marine personnel and ships of the Department thus marked to be under the control of the Navy after mobilization;

SECRET SERVICE SUPERINTENDENT

11. There shall be detailed as Assistant to the Aid for Information an active, trustworthy and experienced secret service operative of a Government Department. Upon recommendation of the Aid for Information, this detail will be arranged for by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

12. He shall have charge, under the Aid for Information, of the Naval Secret Service within the Naval District and the secret service agents detailed to or acting for the Navy.

13. He shall assist and advise the Aid for Information in matters pertaining to secret service within the Naval District.

COOPERATION WITH THE AID FOR COMMUNICATIONS

14. A close and efficient cooperation is necessary between the Aid for Information and the Aid for Communications. The prompt delivery of communications to the District Headquarters from the different sources of information and the prompt forwarding of information to its proper destinations are essential. Arrangements should be made to insure the confidential character of information where secrecy is necessary or desirable and for direct communications where desirable.

COOPERATION OF THE AID FOR INFORMATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT

15. In general, the civil departments of the federal government will assist the Aid for Information in obtaining information, as follows:

a. Department of Justice: Activities of enemy secret agents within the District. Observations of enemy's citizens or subjects, or enemy sympathizers within the District;

b. Post Office Department: Control and supervision of the mails, and resulting information; foreign money orders, etc. Names and location of enemy's citizens or subjects permanently or temporarily in the District.

c. Department of the Treasury: Division of Customs: Clearance, arrivals and departures of vessels; supervision of officers, crews, and passengers; Division of Secret Service: Activities of enemy agents within the District, particularly maritime; supervision of officers, crews, and passengers of merchant vessels; and

d. Department of Labor: Bureau of Immigration: Supervision of passengers of merchant vessels.

COOPERATION OF THE AID FOR INFORMATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

16. Municipal authorities and other local civil organizations, companies, etc., will assist the Aid for Information in obtaining information, as follows:

a. Police Departments: Activities of enemy agents within the District; river and harbor patrol. Location and observation of enemy citi-

zens or subjects permanently or temporarily in the District;

b. Arrivals and departures of vessels; supervision over passengers; information on officers, crews, clerks, and attachés. Information from abroad; and

c. Commercial Companies: Information received from representatives and others in the course of business, letters, conversations, etc., at home and abroad; information from other sources, correspondence, clerks, etc.; information regarding drafts or money orders.[1]

A report made during World War I by Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) RAdm. Roger Welles, Jr., detailed the wartime work of the district organizations:

a. Navy Personnel:

(1) Apprehension of deserters and stragglers; investigations and surveillance of enlisted men reported to the commanding officers of all U.S. ships; reported imposters appearing in the uniform of the Navy.

(2) Suspects attempting to enlist in the U.S. Navy or U.S. Naval Reserve Force.

(3) Collusion between firms holding Navy contracts and [Navy] enlisted men.

(4) Cooperation with other naval districts in the investigation of cases reported by them which fall within the field covered by the Aid for Information.

b. Navy Yard Employees:

(1) Investigation and surveillance of Navy Yard suspects.

(2) Investigation of reported pro-Germanism of Navy Yard employees.

(3) Thefts from the Navy Yard.

(4) Cases referred by Commandant relating to the Naval establishment.

(5) Investigations of labor agitation connected with the Navy Yard.

c. Miscellaneous Investigations:

(1) All cases referred by the Mail Censorship Bureau.

(2) Investigation of suspicious individuals reported in the vicinity of Navy piers, wharves, docks, warehouses, etc.

(3) Investigations of applicants for pilot licenses.

(4) Investigations of cases involving radio apparatus.

(5) Investigations of suspicious fires on piers, docks, and wharves under the Navy Department.

(6) Protection of shipyards within the naval district doing Navy work and of naval vessels building or repairing within those shipyards.

(7) Protection of the operation, product and personnel of plants manufacturing munitions or other material for the Navy.

(8) Investigation of enemy agents and sympathizers, and civilians, concerning any activities inimicable to the interests of the Navy.

(9) Investigation of addresses of such cables as may be referred to the Aid for Information by the Cable Censor.[2]

DIO Organization Between the World Wars

On 24 March 1919, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt directed that the Aid for Information was to be called the District Intelligence Officer (DIO). The directive also set forth the DIO's tasks.[3]

The duties and responsibilities of the district intelligence offices during peacetime were set forth in the *District Manual* and in ONI-19: maintainance of press relations for district headquarters; liaison with the investigating units of federal, state, and city agencies within the naval district; liaison with public and private research agencies and with business interests having information in intelligence fields; liaison with ONI and the intelligence services of the other naval districts, and with forces afloat within the district; counterespionage, security, and investigations; collection, evaluation, and recording of information regarding persons or organizations of value (or opposed) to the Navy; preparation and maintenance of intelligence plans for war; and administrative supervision over the recruiting, training, and activities of the appropriate personnel of the Naval Reserve within the district. Naval intelligence reserve officers were designated I-V(S), meaning Intelligence Volunteer (Specialized); the designator I-V(S) was replaced by S(I)—Special Duty (Intelligence)—in September 1944.

Contacts between the district intelligence service and ONI were almost entirely confined to matters relating to investigations; visits of foreigners; routing and dispatch of correspondence within the naval intelligence service; procurement of funds, special equipment, and civilian assistants for district intelligence officers; and matters connected with the enrollment of I-V(S) Naval Reserve officers. There was no active unit in ONI charged with general administration and coordination of the DIO activities.[4]

As of September 1937, special agents had been employed in the various DIOs as follows: one each in the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th Naval Districts; two each in the 3rd and 12th; and three each in the 11th and 13th, for a total of fourteen.[5]

In 1938, the District Intelligence Services consisted of an officer and a clerk in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Naval Districts; two officers and two clerks in the 3rd and 11th Districts; one officer and one clerk in the 6th District to handle the Naval Intelligence activities of the 6th, 7th, and 8th Naval Districts; and one officer with additional duty as the DIO in the 15th and 16th Districts and at the Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. In addition, a chief yeoman was assigned to the 14th District, two inspectors were assigned to the 3rd District, and civilian assistants were available in various districts. Officers in charge of branch hydrographic offices and of recruiting divisions and offices were ordered as an additional duty to assist the intelligence service of the districts in which they were located.[6]

World War II

Censorship was not intended to be a wartime function of the district intelligence offices, but they were responsible for staffing, selecting station locations, enlisting and training personnel, and providing logistics. Many problems ensued, and it wasn't until March 1942 that all stations were fully staffed and the censorship functions were turned over to a director of censorship who was not associated with the district intelligence office.[7]

In 1939, the DIO-1ND had no counterintelligence section. Such work consisted almost exclusively of adding material to the files; no one evaluated information in advance. Evaluation had to be done as the demand arose. Most information was inadequate, and very little of it could be checked for accuracy.[8]

Close liaison with the FBI and the Army Corps Headquarters, which had been directed by Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) RAdm. Walter S. Anderson in December 1939, was maintained by occasional, unscheduled meetings.[9]

On 4 October 1940, RAdm. Anderson sent a teletype message to all district intelligence officers directing them to take immediate steps to locate and recommend agents and intelligence reserve officers for active duty as needed to establish intelligence units in the Navy yards and the principal naval activities. This message was followed by a CNO (OP-16-B) letter of 8 October 1940 pointing out "the gravity of the present situation" and the need to place "the Naval Intelligence Service in an advanced state of readiness." The letter required that district plans, estimates of requirements, etc., for naval intelligence be completed at an early date and that district intelligence personnel be augmented as specified in the 4 October message. On 11 October, the Director of Naval Intelligence requested that the names of I-V(S)-designated Naval Reserve officers qualified to make industrial facility security surveys be forwarded to ONI not later than 16 October. A related Secretary of the Navy message of 22 October was sent to the commandants of all the naval districts instructing them to "complete plant protection surveys" of all naval shore establishments in their districts "at the earliest moment."

On 23 October, the Director of Naval Intelligence teletyped to all continental DIOs a request to submit by airmail a summation of all information in their files on Japanese, German, and Italian spies and saboteurs, actual or potential, and any other individuals whose activities were of an undercover nature believed to be inimical to the national defense of the United States.

All of these directives placed major work loads on the DIOs and required immediate expansion of the district intelligence organizations, not only to handle the projects but also to expedite the personnel investigations necessitated by the expedited augmentations.[10]

The Delimitation Agreement between the FBI and the military intelligence services, discussed in Chapter 21, made reference to four categories of investigations: espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion. Actually, the DIO organization was expected by ONI and other naval activities to conduct any investigation requested.

On 1 November 1940, the Director of Naval Intelligence sent a teletype to the DIOs: "You are not restricted to any particular field of investigative effort by the delimitation agreement with the FBI." DNI RAdm. Harold C. Train further elaborated on that point in a letter (OP-16-B serial 01640316 of 21 August 1942) to all DIOs:

> It will be noted that no attempt was made to delimit investigative responsibility in cases falling outside the four categories. Certain of these cases, involving violations of federal statutes, fall definitely within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI, such as kidnapping and bank robbery; the Post Office Department, such as the use of the mail to defraud; the Treasury Department, such as narcotics and customs violations; and the Secret Service, such as threats to the President. Except for such cases, however, investigations predicated on purely naval interest, . . . or any other cases outside the four categories specifically covered by the Delimitation Agreement, may be conducted by Naval Intelligence.[11]

In January 1941, the domestic intelligence field offices included the district intelligence offices of the fifteen naval districts plus offices of the Potomac River Command and at Guam, American Samoa, and Naval Station, Guantanamo, Cuba. The Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI served as

Division V, Investigation, investigated suspects in the Navy, suspicious travelers, employees in plants having Navy contracts, persons suspected of espionage in the vicinity of Navy property, civil employees of the Navy Department, and radio operators.

Division VI, Plants and Contracts, inspected manufacturing plants, recommended changes to improve plant protection, and developed informants in plants to determine which employees were causing delays in the production of naval materials, attempting sabotage, or causing labor disturbances.

Division VII, Intelligence Service in Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Curacao, organized, directed, and handled the U.S. Naval Intelligence effort in those countries, where the work consisted of collecting and transmitting to ONI information on the sea coasts, shipping, potential submarine bases, wireless stations, and all that was adjudged significant and relevant to the war with Germany, including German or pro-German activities.

Division VIII, Intelligence Service in South America, except Venezuela and Colombia, had the same basic responsibilities in its area as did Division VII.

Division IX, Intelligence Service in Europe, attended to the correspondence and cables to and from naval attachés in Europe.

Division X, Intelligence Service in the Far East, in addition to supervising the naval attachés in Tokyo and Peking, also supervised the aids for information at Guam and Samoa (and was to supervise Manila if and when an aid was designated there). Division X acted upon information obtained from the Far East or sent the information to other divisions that had jurisdiction. Much information of value relative to Far Eastern matters was also received from the aid for information at Honolulu and the various agencies of ONI along the U.S. Pacific Coast. The division's interests in substantive matters concerned German activities (espionage, propaganda, intrigue) in the Far East; the movement of suspicious ships and cargoes; naval bases and naval operations in the Far East, including the activities of the German commerce raiders; and political changes or anticipated social disturbances in the Far East.

Division XI, Technical Investigative Methods, was charged in general with the chemical, physical, and photographic examination of mail, printed matter, etc., for the detection of secret writing. It also collected, collated, and compiled information on unauthorized radio sets and the transmission of suspicious messages; cable censorship methods to detect hidden messages; the use of animate and inanimate carriers (carrier pigeons, clothing, toilet articles, etc.); the use of secret inks on letters, printed matter, personal effects, and the body; falsification of documents; agents' operating methods; the use of explosives and poisons; identification methods; and the organization of the German intelligence system.

Section B, Transmitting, handled all cables, telegrams and radiograms coming to, or being sent by, ONI. Incoming messages were paraphrased, references appended, and then routed to the proper section for action; outgoing messages were written up in proper form, given a date/time number, and serialized as necessary. A complete file was kept of all dispatches and arranged chronologically and by locality of originator or addressee. Instruction was given in the use of codes and ciphers to those officers, agents, and others whose duties required this knowledge. Section B also arranged for codes to be used by naval attachés, aids for information, agents, etc., and secured, through the Code and Signal Section, the best channels for communicating with all naval intelligence representatives. A 24-hour watch was maintained in Section B not only to look after dispatches, but also to handle any other important matter. All incoming and outgoing secret mail was handled by Section B.

Section C was divided into three divisions:

Division I, Collating, collated, filed, and disseminated information on the ports of the world, including their repair facilities and availability of fuel and supplies; the war resources of various countries and their naval and military activities; international affairs; commerce and trade; communication facilities; and general data on the progress of the European war. Data on merchant shipping and losses incident to the war were disseminated daily, while matters of less value, but of possible interest to the service, were compiled and issued every two weeks.

Division II, Information on All Navies, Operations, Strategic Subjects, Records of Naval Officers, collated and recorded all obtainable information concerning those subjects and disseminated it to the proper bureaus and offices. Information that was of permanent or historical value was passed to Section D for deposit in its archives. Information of temporary importance, such as the movement of ships and current ship construction, was kept carded on a day-to-day basis for ready reference. "All reports, rumors, and intelligence items of every description" were desired by Division II, whenever they concerned "Navies, or Naval affairs, American or Foreign."

Division III, Mercantile Collations, disseminated collated information on merchant marine activities throughout the world, ships' tonnages, ships under construction, and losses to submarines and

from natural causes; shipbuilding facilities; merchant ship routing; new marine machinery, engineering, equipment and fittings; and laws concerning commerce, shipping, and navigation.

Section D, Dissemination, consisted of five divisions:

Division I was charged with registering, carding, and filing all reports on naval and military material, personnel, and operations; receiving and answering all requests for information relative to those subjects; censoring manuscripts submitted by members of the naval service for scrutiny in accordance with *Navy Regulations*; and printing naval intelligence publications. In answering requests for information, Section D obtained, when necessary, special reports from naval attachés or Navy bureaus, collations or copies of previous reports from Section C, or translations from Section E.

Division II was charged with all matters relating to armed guard detachments on merchant vessels. Extracts from the reports of the commanding officers of armed guard detachments were compiled and sent to all ships and stations having an interest. Division II also handled confidential bulletins from the State Department.

Division III compiled the monthly publication *Anti-Submarine Information* and disseminated printed ONI publications to various ships and stations; it was also responsible for war diaries and for the preparation of special papers. The latter included textbooks and information pamphlets on intelligence work.

Division IV compiled a semimonthly bulletin containing all information received that would be of value to principal stations, battleships, cruisers, and transports.

Division V, Camouflage, gathered and disseminated all available information on that subject to the Camouflage Section of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the U.S. Shipping Board (responsible for administering the acquisition and operation of all U.S. flag merchant ships), and allied foreign naval attachés from countries that were investigating the subject. Much of the collection (reporting and photographing of the camouflaged ships) was accomplished by the district aides for information.

Section E, Translating, translated intelligence documents from French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Dutch, Japanese, Chinese, and German into English. The section was also charged with filing, clipping, and distributing certain foreign newspapers and periodicals received by ONI.

Section F, Disbursing, audited and disbursed confidential funds, assisted ONI and its branches with their regular Navy Department accounts, and ordered, received, and kept stocks of office supplies and equipment.

Section G was charged with files and with indexing information cards on suspects and personnel.

Section H, Clipping Bureau, received newspaper clippings from ONI branch offices and aids for information throughout the United States and from naval attachés in European and South American capitals. Section H also clipped numerous papers and received material from press clipping services.

Section I, Chief Clerk, supervised civil employees and their records; procured passports; prepared drafts of orders to naval attachés; maintained corrected copies of *Navy Regulations*, general orders, and uniform regulations; supervised printing and binding; and supervised the sale of war savings and thrift stamps.

Section K, Mail, indexed and routed incoming mail. (There was no Section J.)

The Historical Section, to which a letter designator had not been assigned as of 1 September 1918, was established in ONI to collect all material that would be of historical value. RAdm. William W. Kimball (Ret.) was in charge.[8]

1920

By 1 July 1920, ONI's postwar office force had been reduced to eighteen on the statutory rolls and twenty-four former naval reservists, for a total of forty-two. The office had been reorganized back down to basics and consisted of four sections: Section A, Administrative; Section B, Intelligence (or Incoming Information); Section C, Compiling (or Manufacturing Department); Section D, Historical Section (or by-products). By-products included the Navy Department Library; the dead files, which contained war diaries of ships and stations and their correspondence during World War I; statistics; and international law questions and cases that had arisen during the war.[9]

1921

Cdr. Royal E. Ingersoll reported to ONI in June 1921 and was assigned to the Japanese Espionage Desk. ONI at that time, he later recalled, was divided into foreign desks with different officers having different sections for different countries and also responsibility for different subjects like engineering, radio, and gunnery. Cdr. Ingersoll was also in charge of the Domestic Section, responsible for counterespionage. Ingersoll also kept the Japanese monograph up to date, particularly the section on Japan's naval forces.[10]

1922

On 12 January 1922, the Director of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations (OPNAV), in a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), recommended the establishment of a press relations office, to be located within ONI. The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) concurred with the recommendation on 14 January. The Secretary of the Navy approved the measure and issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, dated 21 February 1922, that established the Information Section under the DNI. For further information on the Information Section, see Chapter 33.

1926

The Director of Naval Intelligence's annual report, OP-16-A (SC) 212-2 of 10 June 1926, Enclosure A, lists the activities of Section C as the preparation of monographs; the collating and compiling of information of military and naval value concerning foreign countries and the dissemination of the information to our naval services and to other branches of the government; and the furnishing of vast amounts of comparative data on the naval and aviation strength of the Washington Treaty Powers to the committees and individual members of Congress.

Those types of intelligence activities remained at a fairly static level throughout the interwar period.[11]

1929–1930

The Office of Naval Intelligence, late in 1929 and early in 1930, was but a small division of the Navy Department. It had two officers in the Far East Section, one officer on the British Desk, one officer on the European Desk, and one on the Latin American Desk. In addition, there were three or four officers assigned to domestic intelligence or security. Considerable emphasis was being placed on preparations for the London Naval Conference. Capt. Alfred W. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence at the time, was swamped with work that included long conferences at the State and War Departments. The Far East Section had a very good filing system, and information that was needed was quickly available, but it did not have enough personnel to prepare special reports.[12]

1931

The ONI organization in 1931 comprised four principal sections: Administrative, including Naval Reserve for intelligence duties; Mail and Translating; Intelligence proper, divided into Domestic and Foreign; Public Relations; and Historical, Library, and Archives. Heavy emphasis was placed on the collection of all classes of information, but particularly that information affecting naval and maritime matters, the evaluation of such information, and its dissemination.[13]

After the reorganization of 1931, the Administrative Branch had seven sections: A-1, Foreign Liaison (under the Assistant DNI); A-2, Personnel; A-3, Mail, Filing, and Archives; A-4, Supply and Accounting; A-5, Legal (inactive); A-6, Translating; and A-7, Photographic (inactive).[14]

The Administrative Branch was staffed by one lieutenant commander, four clerks, two library assistants, and three civilian translators. The nucleus of the branch was within the Chief Clerk's office, which was responsible for handling civilian personnel for all of ONI, all accounts and finances for the office, translations, printing and binding, space allocation, and legal work.[15]

Under the 1931 reorganization, OP-16-B-1 headed the Intelligence Branch. Section B-2 provided Dissemination, and sections B-3 through B-9 handled Domestic Intelligence. The nine Foreign Intelligence sections included B-10, Foreign Intelligence; B-11, British Empire; B-12, the Far East; B-13, Western Europe; B-14, Central Europe; B-15, the Eastern Europe; B-16, the Balkans and Near East; B-17, Latin America; and B-18, Enemy Trade (inactive in peacetime).[16]

1938

Because of personnel limitations resulting from budget problems of the early 1930s, certain ONI branches, sections, and units prescribed in its War Organization were not staffed. There was no peacetime organization chart or other document that set forth the active units of the office to which responsibility had been delegated for various matters assigned to inactive or nonexistent units. Hence, there were certain matters for which no person in the organization, below the assistant director, was responsible to handle administratively. In practice, when such matters arose, they were assigned by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the unit that appeared at the time to be best equipped to handle the particular problem, or they were handled by the DNI himself or the Assistant DNI.[17]

1941–1942

On 28 April 1941, a Secretary of the Navy directive was issued removing the Office of Public Relations from ONI and placing it directly under the Secretary. All the personnel of the Public Relations Branch of ONI were shifted to the Secretary of the Navy's office, with Cdr. H. Raymond Thurber assigned as acting director.[18]

At the outbreak of World War II, the Special Intelligence Section (OP-16-F-9) comprised one retired of-

ficer, two Naval Reserve officers, two enlisted sailors, and one Naval Reserve officer undergoing training in London. Instructions were immediately originated by the section and issued by the CNO to all ships and stations as to the conduct of U.S. Navy personnel in the event of their capture by the enemy.

By 30 June 1942, OP-16-F-9 had been augmented by five officers, and three civilians who were awaiting commissions as German interrogators.

On 1 February 1942, the section head was designated to participate in the drafting of recommendations for a Joint Psychological Warfare (PW) Committee for the planning and control of psychological warfare overseas. The committee's recommendations were approved by the Director of Naval Intelligence and by the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2) U.S. Army, and on 16 February they were submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for final approval.[19]

On 7 December 1941, three previously inactive sections of ONI were opened: Commerce and Travel (OP-16-B-5), Plant Protection (OP-16-B-6), and Censorship (OP-16-D).

In January 1942, the Identification and Characteristics Section was established in ONI for the purpose of collating data on the appearances and characteristics of U.S. and foreign naval ships and merchant vessels and to disseminate identification material. On 12 January, the Fleet Intelligence Branch (OP-16-C) was formed. It included the Intelligence Center and the Information Center. In June, the designation was changed to Combat Intelligence Branch, and OP-16-C-2 became the Publication Section.

On 10 February 1942, the Protocol and Reception Center (OP-16-F-12) was set up to help handle matters of protocol and the increasing numbers of foreign military and naval officials visiting the Navy Department. In addition, OP-16-F-12 had general supervision over U.S. naval officers preparing for intelligence duty abroad.

On 5 August 1942, the Special Intelligence Section was removed from the Foreign Intelligence Branch and reestablished as the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z). Its functions included obtaining, training, and administering secret agents. In June 1942, it had assumed responsibility for information on captured enemy naval equipment. In connection with its work in developing a secret undercover intelligence service, OP-16-Z maintained liaison with the Office of the Coordinator of Information and subsequently with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) when the former was absorbed by the latter.[20]

On 29 May 1942, the OP-16-A-2b subsection of the Administrative Branch, which had been created to handle Naval Reserve enlisted personnel, became section OP-16-A-6.

On 7 October 1942, the Special Warfare Branch (OP-16-W) was established to control psychological warfare and bacteriological warfare activities. Among its tasks was the processing of naval intelligence for the confidential guidance of, and the supplying of naval information to, the Psychological Warfare Planning Board of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI).[21]

1943

The Office of Naval Intelligence was reorganized in 1943 to conform as much as possible with the existing structure of the Army's Military Intelligence Service (MIS). The former Assistant Director was retitled Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (DDNI). The organization as a whole was divided into three main groups, each under an assistant director. The Services Group was composed of the Administrative Branch (OP-16-A) and the Training Branch (OP-16-T); the Intelligence Group was composed of the Intelligence Branch (OP-16-F), the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z), and the Publications and Distribution Branch (OP-16-P); and the Counterintelligence Group was composed of five sections: Naval Censorship (B-2); Investigations (B-3); Security of Naval Information (B-4); Commerce and Travel (B-5); Sabotage, Espionage, and Countersubversion (SEC) (B-7); and Coastal Information (B-8).

Special Warfare (OP-16-W) and Naval Records and Library (OP-16-E) continued as branches under the direct supervision of the DDNI. The Protocol and Liaison Branch (OP-16-L) also reported directly to the DDNI.

Two new groups were formed. The first, Planning (OP-16-X), was composed of the DDNI and the three assistant DNIs and had a permanent secretariat. It was intended to formulate plans for the efficient functioning of ONI and to have charge of War Plans for ONI. The second new group, Evaluation and Dissemination (OP-16-ED), functioned as the Navy component of the Joint Evaluation and Dissemination Staff of the Joint Intelligence Agency. It was composed of the heads of geographic sections of F Branch, the head of the Commerce and Travel Section, the head of the Sabotage, Espionage, and Countersubversion Section, and the head of the Special Warfare Branch.

The Intelligence Branch was organized into sections to cover the four main geographic areas (Europe-Africa, Far East, American Republics, and North America) and the Operational Intelligence (OP-16-FO), Foreign Trade (OP-16-FT), and Intelligence Plot (OP-16-FP) sections.[22]

In May 1943, the North American Theater Section (OP-16-FN) was established in the Intelligence Branch to take over foreign intelligence collection

in the United States (including Alaska). The Coastal Information activities of OP-16-B-8 were transferred to the new section.[23]

When the Operational Intelligence Section was disestablished on 9 September 1943, the North American Theater Section was divided into FN-1 (North American Intelligence) and FN-2 (Coastal Intelligence). LCdr. Frank A. Klaveness was the head of FN and also served as FN-2 on an interim basis. LCdr. J. H. Black was assigned as the head of FN-1.[24]

OP-16-FN was responsible for obtaining intelligence about foreign places from sources within the United States. In each naval district, FN sections were established and directed to contact importers, exporters, banks, oil companies, etc., as well as private individuals who had traveled extensively.[25]

1944

Cdr. John L. Riheldaffer, USN (Ret.), head of the Special Activities Branch (OP-16-Z), was liaison officer for ONI with the Office of Strategic Services. All requests for information or data, or requests for and transfers of documentary data, made by ONI personnel to OSS were to be sent to him for handling and recording. OSS personnel were under instruction to clear any contacts they wished to make with the Navy Department through the Naval Command, OSS. In implementation of this directive, the Liaison Division was established in the Naval Command, OSS, with the duty to initiate, maintain, and renew contacts between the Navy Department and the OSS to exercise control for security purposes over visits of personnel from each agency visiting the other. LCdr. Daniel Ravenel, Jr., USNR, was officer in charge of the Liaison Division.[26]

1945–1946

In April 1945, ONI, known briefly as the Naval Intelligence Division, formerly under the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), resumed the title Office of Naval Intelligence, a division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. At that time the Operational Intelligence Section was made a branch (OP-16-O) under the Assistant DNI, Intelligence Group.[27]

At the conclusion of World War II, in an OPNAV reorganization, ONI was placed under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Administration and was designated OP-23; the Director of Naval Intelligence was given the new title, Chief of Naval Intelligence. The sections and subsections of Domestic Intelligence dealing with naval, cable, and radio censorship, and with security controls relating to commerce and travel, were deactivated.[28]

The postwar abandonment of the wartime combination of CNO and COMINCH (Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet) under FAdm. Ernest J. King caused a merger of the COMINCH staff into the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In the postwar reorganization, the Domestic Intelligence Branch absorbed several functions of the COMINCH staff, including publicity security and the security of code designations, the classification of reports, and security control. Those functions were allocated to the Security of Naval Information Section of ONI.

Immediately after the end of World War II, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal directed the CNO to establish a rigorous, centralized control of the disclosure of classified information. The Security of Naval Information Section (OP-23D21) was designated as the agency to perform the function. With the reallocation of duties and functions precipitated by the end of the war, matters pertaining to security, which had been decentralized during the war, were centralized in OP-23D21.[29]

When its designator was changed from OP-16 to OP-23, ONI's organization consisted of seven branches and two staff elements and was approved by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, Commo. Thomas B. Inglis, on 29 October 1945. Branches included 23C, Administrative; 23D, Domestic; 23E, Naval Records and Library; 23F, Foreign; 23V, Air; 23W, Special; and 23Y, Operational. The staff elements included 23L, Liaison, and 23X, Plans. The Administrative Branch consisted of four major sections: C1, Special Publications; C2, Services (which included Personnel, Supplies and Accounts, Reproduction (duplication), and Mail and Files); C3, Training; and C4, Translations. The Domestic Branch consisted of five sections: D1, Investigations; D2, Security; D3, Contact Register; D4, Sabotage, Espionage, and Counterintelligence; and D5, Cable Censorship (inactive). The Naval Records and Library Branch had four sections: E1, Library; E2, Records; E3, Sound Recordings; and E4, Historical Publications. The Foreign Branch consisted of six sections: F1, Collection and Research; F2, Technical; F3, Graphic; F4, Washington Document Center; F5, Specialist Staff; and F6, Dissemination and Administration. The Air Branch had four sections: V1, Collection; V2, Photographic Intelligence; V3, Evaluation; and V4, Dissemination. The Air Branch was also the channel to the Joint Army-Navy Air Intelligence Activities. The Special Branch and the Operational Branch had no separate sections.[30]

The Navy Subsidiary Post-War Plan–Intelligence was promulgated in November 1945. Based on Basic Post-War Plan No. 7.5, it set down in detail the organization and personnel requirements of naval intelligence, incorporating the views of capable and experienced naval intelligence officers.

The greatest differences between the wartime Naval Intelligence organization and the postwar plan were in the reduction in numbers of service personnel and the resultant necessary increases in civilian personnel to carry out postwar naval intelligence functions. Many wartime intelligence operations had ceased, but new and vital functions had commenced, such as opening posts in locations inaccessible during the war, processing the remaining mass of captured documents, collecting intelligence in occupied countries, and keeping pace with the unstable international situation.

Naval Intelligence opined that it would carry out its mission to the maximum extent with whatever funds and personnel were available. However, it was becoming more evident each day that, as the international situation deteriorated, the requirements for intelligence were becoming greater and more urgent. The personnel statistics for naval intelligence billets during the immediate postwar period show the effects of the drastic reductions in personnel.

Table 28.1.
Intelligence Billets, Jul 1945–Aug 1946

Officers

	1 Jul 1945	1 Jul 1946	20 Aug 1946	Postwar Plan
ONI*	599	374	121	195
DIOs†	787	155	21	92
Foreign	253	205	133	120
Total‡	1,639	734	275	407

Enlisted

	1 Jul 1945	1 Jul 1946	20 Aug 1946	Postwar Plan
ONI*	702	265	75	5
DIOs†	1,158	112	98	18
Foreign	337	180	142	81
Total‡	2,197	557	315	104

Civilian

	1 Jul 1945		1 Jul 1946		20 Aug 1946		Postwar Plan	
	C.S.	Cont.	C.S.	Cont.	C.S.	Cont.	C.S.	Cont.
ONI	356	23	305	21	314	31	510	6
DIOs	148	35	94	51	121	72	137	92
Foreign	30	139	52	123	56	111	120	113
Totals	534	197	451	195	491	214	767	211

*Joint Army Navy Air Intelligence Division (JANAID) included.
†District Intelligence Officer, Photo Intelligence Center included.
‡Washington Document Center not included.
Source: Chief of Naval Intelligence, ser 1520P32, 23 Aug 1946, Accession 3770, box 1, ONI Day File, OA.

1946

To a slight extent, the effects of demobilization in ONI were counterbalanced by obtaining authorization for civilian billets to replace released military personnel in key positions. Even such partial replacement, however, was not possible in the naval districts, where the field activities of the Domestic Intelligence Branch were carried on. During demobilization and until the peacetime components of the Naval Reserve could be organized to advantage, the effectiveness of the naval intelligence service in the naval districts was seriously impaired.[31]

The demobilization of military personnel assigned to ONI proceeded rapidly with the close of hostilities as shown in the table below.

Table 28.2.
ONI Personnel, Aug 1945–Jan 1996

Date	Officers	Enlisted	Civilians
1 Aug 1945	563	652	336
1 Sep 1945	506	620	334
31 Jan 1946	421	364	321
30 Jun 1946	267	214	313
30 Sep 1946	165	59	327

Source: OP-32 Quarterly Summary Report, 1 Jul 1946-30 Sep 1946, OA.

On 19 July 1946, VAdm. Forrest Sherman, then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations (OP-03), in a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, recommended the transfer of ONI from OP-02 to OP-03.

> Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was not in the Navy Department adequate coordination between the War Plans Division and the ONI. The War Plans Division undertook to evaluate intelligence by means of a small Op-Intelligence group. During the war, there existed in the Navy Department an intelligence organization in the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and also the ONI in OPNAV. After the establishment of the present organization [in 1945], there remained in the Operations Division an OPINTEL [Operational Intelligence] Section (OP-32) in addition to the ONI in the Administration Division.
>
> In January 1946, Rear Admiral Inglis (DNI) and Captain Smedberg (OP-32) both advocated consolidating all intelligence activities under DCNO (Operations). For various reasons, I did not consider such action wise at that time but did agree that a consolidation should take place. Accordingly, OP-32 was disestablished as of 11 February.
>
> In order that in the future there may be the closest practicable coordination of intelligence, strategic planning, and operations, it is recom-

Passed Assistant Engineer J.P.S. Lawrance

*The *Navy Register* of 1 Aug 1883 shows then-Ens. Potts reporting to the Navy Department for Special Duty on 13 Feb 1883.
Source: *Navy Register*, Feb 1885

1889

Officers as of 1 January:

Lt. Raymond P. Rodgers,
Chief Intelligence Officer

Lt. Frederick Singer

Lt. William H. Beehler

Lt. Charles E. Vreeland

Lt. Sidney A. Staunton

Lt.(jg) John T. Newton

Lt.(jg) Benjamin Tappan

Ens. John M. Ellicott

Ens. John B. Bernadou

Ens. William L. Howard

Passed Assistant Engineer Charles W. Rae

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1898

1892

Officers as of 1 January:

Cdr. Charles H. Davis,
Chief Intelligence Officer

Lt. George W. Mentz

Lt. Charles E. Fox

Lt. George H. Peters

Lt. John C. Colwell

Lt. Ridgely Hunt

Lt. Charles C. Rogers

Lt.(jg) Augustus F. Fechteler

Lt.(jg) Charles W. Jungen

Ens. Edward Simpson

Ens. Marbury Johnston

Assistant Engineer W. H. Alderdice

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1892.

1895

Officers as of 1 January:

Lt. Frederick Singer,
Chief Intelligence Officer

1stLt. Lincoln Karmany, USMC

Lt. William W. Kimball

Lt. Edward B. Barry

Lt. Edward F. Qualtrough

Lt. John W. Stewart

Lt. Philip V. Lansdale

Lt.(jg) Randolph H. Miner

Lt.(jg) Wiley R.M. Field

Ens. Creighton Churchill

Ens. Clarence M. Stone

Ens. Sumner E. Kittelle

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1895.

1897

Officers as of 1 January:

LCdr. Richard Wainwright,
Chief Intelligence Officer

Lt. William W. Kimball

Lt. Herman F. Fickbohm

Lt. John C. Colwell

Lt. Edward B. Barry

Lt. William. S. Hogg

Ens. William. K. Harrison

Ens. Lay H. Everhart

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1897.

As of 1 July:

LCdr. Richard Wainwright,
Chief Intelligence Officer

LCdr. Edward B. Barry

Lt. Herman F. Fickbohm

Lt. William S. Hogg

Ens. William D. Brotherton

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jul 1897.

1898

Officers as of 1 January:

Cdr. Richardson Clover,
Chief Intelligence Officer

LCdr. William H. Driggs

Lt. Herman F. Fickbohm

Lt. Samuel W.B. Diehl

Lt. William S. Hogg

Lt.(jg) Webster A. Edgar

Ens. Sumner E. Kittelle

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1898.

1904

Officers as of 1 January:

Capt. Seaton Schroeder,
Chief Intelligence Officer

LCdr. Charles N. Atwater

LCdr. John B. Bernadou

Lt. Humes H. Whittlesey

Assistant Engineer Robert E. Carney (Ret.)

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jan 1904.

1908

Officers as of 1 July:

Capt. Raymond R. Rodgers,
Chief Intelligence Officer

LCdr. Henry H. Hough

LCdr. Robert K. Crank

LCdr. Humes H. Whittlesey (Ret.)

Lt. Charles H. Fischer

Lt. Horace P. McIntosh (Ret.)

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jul 1908.

1911

Officers as of 1 July:

Capt. Templin M. Potts,
Chief Intelligence Officer

LCdr. Humes H. Whittlesey (Ret.)

Maj. Dion Williams, USMC

LCdr. Powers Symington

LCdr. John V. Klemann

Lt. Horace P. McIntosh (Ret.)

Lt. William N. Jeffers

Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Jul 1911.

1917

Officers as of 1 August:

Capt. Roger Welles,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Cdr. Edward McCauley, Jr., USNRF*

LCdr. Humes H. Whittlesey (Ret.)
Officer in Charge of Section D

LCdr. Macgillivray Milne

LCdr. Orie W. Fowler (Ret.)

Maj. Dickinson P. Hall, USMC

LCdr. E. C. Gilpin, USNRF

LCdr. J. H. Roys, USNRF

Lt. R. K. Wright, USNRF

Lt. A. B. Legare, USNRF

Lt.(jg) E. Menocal, USNRF

*McCauley also spelled his name "Maccauley" on some documents.
Source: *Navy Register*, 1 Aug 1917

1919

An unsigned document, believed to date from 1919, shows the ONI organization as follows:

Director	Officer in Charge
Assistant Director	Executive; foreign naval attachés; U.S. naval missions; liaison with foreign officials in the U.S.
Situation Officer	Estimates of different situations
Section A (Administrative)	Personnel; supplies and accounts; maintenance; cleaning and floor space; translating; photostat; photography; draftsmen
Section B (Intelligence)	U.S. naval attachés; DIOs; selection control of agents; liaison with other departments of government; ship inspection; espionage; counterespionage; passport
Section C (Collating and Compiling)	Collating and compiling information
Section D (Censorship and Photographs)	Censorship of cables and radio propaganda at home and abroad
Section E (Information)	Archives; file room; mail room; official publications

Source: ONI organization document [1919] in author's files, OA.

1922

ONI had six sections and two staff elements under the Director and the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence:

Designation	Responsibilities
Section A, Administration	Archives; files; mail; official publications
Section B, Intelligence and Counterintelligence	Attachés; DIOs; plant protection; ship inspection; selection of agents; passport files
Section C, Collection and Compiling	Aviation; hydrographic and navigation equipment; merchant marine; engineering, construction, and ordnance; social conditions; finance
Section D, Censorship and Propaganda	
Section E, Information	
Section F, Naval Records, Library, and Historical	
Staff Elements	Foreign naval attachés' liaison section; U.S. naval missions section

Source: NA, RG 38, File E-9-a, Item 11334B rearranged into ascending order.

1922

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Luke McNamee,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Capt. Cyrus R. Miller

Cdr. John P. Jackson

Cdr. William F. Halsey
Cdr. Royal E. Ingersoll
Lt. Robert H. Grayson
Lt. James M. Creighton
Lt. D. M. Collins
Maj. Victor I. Morrison, USMC

Other officers assigned to specific ONI sections:

Cdr. Ralph A. Koch (Information Section)
Lt. R. E. Webb (Information Section)
Lt. John B. Heffernan (Information Section)
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.) (History Section, Records, and Library)
Col. Harry K. White, USMC (Ret.) (History Section, Records, and Library)

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1922.

1924

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Henry H. Hough, Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Frank B. Upham
Cdr. William W. Galbraith, ADNI
Cdr. Claude B. Mayo
LCdr. John W. McClaran
LCdr. Edward K. Lang
LCdr. Robert M. Hinckley
LCdr. Roscoe E. Schuirmann
LCdr. Richard H. Knight
Lt. Richard W. Gruelick
Maj. R. E. Messersmith, USMC
Maj. Harold B. Pratt, USMC
Cdr. Halsey Powell (Information Section)
Lt. John B. Heffernan, (Information Section)
Lt. R. E. Webb (Information Section)
Lt. William F. Dietrich, (Information Section)
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.) (Historical Section)
Cdr. Jay H. Sypher (Ret.) (Historical Section)
LCdr. Samuel S. Payne (Historical Section)

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1924.

1926

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Arthur J. Hepburn, Director of Naval Intelligence
Cdr. Lloyd W. Townsend
Cdr. David McD. Le Breton, ADNI
Cdr. Leigh Noyes
Cdr. James L. Kauffman
Cdr. Paul H. Bastedo
LCdr. Herbert R. Hein
LCdr. Ames Loder
LCdr. John W. McClaran
LCdr. Robert M. Hinckley
LCdr. Robert H. Grayson
LCdr. Paulus P. Powell
Lt. Charles B. Gary
Cdr. Jerome C. Hunsaker (CC)
LtCol. Robert B. Farquharson, USMC
Maj. Harold B. Pratt, USMC
Cdr. John T.G. Stapler (Information Section)
Lt. Richard W. Gruelick (Information Section)
Lt. Charles G. Moore, Jr. (Information Section)
Lt. H. Raymond Thurber (Information Section)
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.), (Historical Section)
LCdr. Richard Wainwright, Jr. (Ret.) (Historical Section)
Lt. Robert S. Robertson, Jr. (Historical Section)

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1926.

1928

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Alfred W. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Cdr. Raymond A. Spruance, ADNI
LtCol. Robert B. Farquharson, USMC
LCdr. John H. Magruder, Jr.
LCdr. Roscoe E. Schuirmann
LCdr. Aaron S. Merrill
LCdr. Paulus P. Powell
LCdr. Richard E. Webb
LCdr. John K. Richards, Jr.
Lt.(jg) David W. Roberts
Cdr. Allan S. Farquhar (Information Section)
LCdr. Francis C. Denebrink (Information Section, also White House Aide)
Lt. Beverley A. Hartt (Information Section)
Lt. Walter R. Jones (Information Section)
Lt. Alfred P. Moran, Jr. (Information Section)
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.) (Historical Section, Records and Library)

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1928.

1930

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Harry A. Baldridge, Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.)
Capt. Herbert C. Cocke, ADNI

Capt. William Baggaley
Cdr. Cortlandt C. Baughman
Cdr. Charles C. Gill
Cdr. Lucius C. Dunn
LCdr. Scott B. MacFarlane
LCdr. Webb Trammel
LCdr. Herbert R. Hein
LCdr. George D. Murray
LCdr. Ellis M. Zacharias
LCdr. Roscoe E. Schuirmann
Lt. Charles G. Moore, Jr.
Lt. H. Raymond Thurber
Lt. Lyman S. Perry
Lt.(jg) Edward S. Pearce
Maj. William W. Buckley, USMC
Maj. Clark H. Wells, USMC

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1930.

1932

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. Harry Ellis,
Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.)
Capt. William Baggaley, ADNI
Capt. Douglas L. Howard
Cdr. Francis D. Pryor
Cdr. Stephen B. McKinney
Cdr. Jonas H. Ingram
Cdr. Walter K. Kilpatrick
Cdr. William R. Munroe
Cdr. Archibald McGlasson
Cdr. Frank Loftin
Cdr. William C. Barnes
LCdr. Aaron S. Merrill
LCdr. Hamilton V. Bryan
LCdr. Hartwell C. Davis
Lt. George F. Mentz
Lt. Charles B. McVay III
Lt. Donald R. Tallman
Lt. Angus M. Cohan
LtCol. Harold B. Pratt, USMC
Maj. R. E. Davis, USMC
1stLt. James M. McHugh, USMC
1stLt. Frank P. Pyzick, USMC

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1932.

1934

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. William D. Puleston,
Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.)
Capt. John T.G. Stapler, ADNI
Capt. Augustin T. Beauregard
Cdr. Francis D. Pryor (Plans)
Cdr. William F. Amsden
Cdr. Jonas H. Ingram
Cdr. Samuel A. Clement
Cdr. Clifford E. Van Hook (Head of Security Section)
Cdr. Lucius C. Dunn
Cdr. Frank Loftin
Cdr. Ellis M. Zacharias
LCdr. Ward P. Davis
LCdr. Charles G. Moore, Jr.
LCdr. Ralph C. Alexander
LCdr. George F. Mentz
Lt. Arthur D. Blackledge
Lt. Andrew P. Lawton
Lt. Arthur H. McCollum
Lt. Lucien Ragonnet
Capt. Maurice G. Holmes, USMC
1stLt. Charles C. Brown, USMC

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1934.

1936

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

Capt. William D. Puleston,
Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.)
Capt. John T.G. Stapler, ADNI
Capt. Fred F. Rogers (under orders)
Cdr. Francis D. Pryor (Ret.)
Cdr. Frank T. Leighton
Cdr. Wallace L. Lind
Cdr. Charles H. Maddox
Cdr. Earle C. Metz
Cdr. Lawrence F. Reifsnider
Cdr. Frederick G. Reinicke
Cdr. Ernest G. Small
Cdr. John M. Creighton
LCdr. Charles G. Moore, Jr.
LCdr. Ralph C. Alexander
LCdr. C. E. Taylor
LCdr. Joseph U. Lademan, Jr.
LCdr. Allen D. Blackledge
Lt. David W. Roberts

Lt. Alfred J. Bolton (also White House Aide)
Lt. Edwin T. Layton
Lt. Robert N. Allen
Maj. Maurice G. Holmes, USMC
Capt. Edward G. Hagen, USMC
1stLt. Harold D. Hansen, USMC
1stLt. Russell Lloyd, USMC

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1936.

1938

Officers in ONI as of 1 July:

RAdm. Ralston S. Holmes,
Director of Naval Intelligence
Capt. Dudley W. Knox (Ret.),
(Head, Historical Branch)
Capt. Allan S. Farquhar, ADNI
Capt. William R. Munroe
(Head, Domestic Intelligence Section)
Capt. Frank T. Leighton (Head, Security Unit)
Cdr. Francis D. Pryor (Ret.) (Plans and Training)
Cdr. Elliott B. Nixon
Cdr. George A. Rood (Head, Administration Branch)
Cdr. Robert B. Simons (Head, Central Europe Unit)
Cdr. Hamilton V. Bryan (under orders)
Cdr. Terry B. Thompson
(Head, Dissemination Section)
Cdr. John M. Creighton (Head, Far East Unit)
Cdr. William S. Popham
(Head, Foreign Intelligence Section)
Cdr. Nathanial M. Pigman
(Head, Western Europe Unit)
Cdr. John S. Phillips
LCdr. Leland P. Lovette
(Head, Public Relations Branch)
LCdr. F. E. Vensel, Jr. (Head, War Records Section)
Lt. John A. Waters, Jr.
Lt. Daniel A. Frost
Lt. Bernard L. Austin
Lt. Redfield Mason
Lt. Alwin D. Kramer (under orders)
Lt. William G. Beecher, Jr. (Public Relations)
Lt. William S. Veeder
Lt. J. H. Armstrong (under orders)
Lt. S. Adams (under orders)
Lt.(jg) Allan B. Roby (under orders)
Lt.(jg) R. W. Germany (under orders)
LtCol. Robert Blake, USMC
(Head, Latin American Unit)
Maj. W. L. Bales, USMC
Capt. Clayton C. Jerome, USMC
Capt. Earl S. Piper, USMC
Capt. Harry C. Lang, USMC

Source: *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1938.

1937–1939

An organization chart approved by DNI RAdm. Ralston S. Holmes shows the breakdown of ONI branches by sections during 1937–1939:

OP-16-A, Administrative Branch:
- A-1 Foreign Liaison
- A-2 Personnel
- A-3 Mail, Filing, and Archives
- A-4 Supply and Accounting
- A-5 Legal*
- A-6 Translating
- A-7 Photo and Drafting*

OP-16-B, Intelligence Branch
- B-1 Dissemination
- B-2 Domestic Section
- B-3 Investigating Unit
- B-4 Security Unit
- B-5 Commerce and Travel Unit*
- B-6 Plant Protection Unit*
- B-7 Developments and Patents Unit*

(B-3 through B-7 were under the Domestic Section.)

- B-8 (Not identified)
- B-9 Foreign Intelligence Section
- B-10 British Empire Unit
- B-11 Far East Unit
- B-12 Western Europe Unit
- B-13 Central Europe Unit
- B-14 Eastern Europe Unit
- B-15 Balkans and Near East Unit
- B-16 Latin American Unit
- B-17 Enemy Trade Unit*

(B-10 through B-17 were under the B-9 section.)

OP-16-C, Public Relations Branch
- C-1 Public Information
- C-2 Press
- C-3 Propaganda*

OP-16-D, Censorship Branch*

OP-16-E, Historical Branch
- E-1 Library and Archives
- E-2 War Records

OP-16-X, Planning and raining Section

*Inactive
Source: ONI organization documents in author's files, OA.

1939–1940

ONI organization and personnel as of 1 December 1939:

OP	Title	Incumbent
16	Director of Naval Intellligence	RAdm. W. S. Anderson
16-1	Assistant Director	Capt. Jules James
16-A	Head, Administrative Branch	Capt. G. A. Rood
	Assistant, Administrative Branch	Cdr. H. R. Holcomb
	Assistant, Administrative Branch	Lt. D. J. Harkins (USNR)
16-A-3	Mail, Filing and Archives Section	Lt.(jg) D. S. Knox (USNR)
16-A-6	Head, Translation Section	Miss Boernsen
16-A-8	Head, Reserves Section	Cdr. C. C. Miller
	Assistant, Reserves Section	Lt. J. W. Boulware
	Assistant, Reserves Section	Lt. C. N. Walker (USNR)
	Assistant, Reserves Section	Lt.(jg) Nolan (USNR)
16-B-2	Head, Domestic and Special Intelligence Branch	Capt. E. B. Nixon
16-B-3	Head, Investigating Section	LCdr. R. B. Hunt
	Assistant, Investigating Section	LCdr. H. E. Keisker, (USNR)
	Assistant, Investigating Section	Lt. M. J. Perry (USNR)
16-B-4	Head, Security Section	Cdr. J. S. Phillips
	Assistant, Security Section	Lt. H. W. Taylor
16-B-5	Head, Commerce and Travel Section	LCdr. C. J. Gass (USNR)
16-B-6	Head, Plant Protection Section	Lt. A. D. Condon (USNR)
16-B-8	Head, Coastal Intelligence Section	LCdr. E. S. Earnhardt (Ret.)
16-B-9	Head, Foreign Intelligence Branch	Capt. H. D. Bode
	Assistant, Foreign Intelligence Branch	LCdr. H. W. Baltazzi (USNR)
16-B-10	Head, British Empire Section	Cdr. W. S. Popham
16-B-11	Head, Far East Section	LCdr. A. H. McCollum
	Assistant, Far East Section	Maj. Ronald A. Boone, USMC
	Assistant, Far East Section	Lt. A. D. Kramer
	Assistant, Far East Section	Lt. S. A. Carlson
16-B-12	Head, Western European Section	Cdr. N. M. Pigman
16-B-13	Head, Central European, Balkans, and Near East Section	Cdr. R. B. Simons
16-B-16	Head, Latin American Section	LtCol. Robert Blake, USMC
	Assistant, Latin American Section	Capt. Earl S. Piper, USMC
16-C	Head, Public Relations Branch	Cdr. L. P. Lovette
	Assistant, Public Relations Branch	Lt. W. G. Beecher
	Assistant, Public Relations Branch	Lt.(jg) V. F. Blakeslee (Ret.)
16-C-2	Head, Press Section	LCdr. B. L. Austin
	Assistant, Press Section	LCdr. N. W. Sharpe (USNR)
	Assistant, Press Section	Ens. F. B. George (USNR)
16-D	Head, Censorship Section	Cdr. H. K. Fenn
	Assistant, Censorship Section	LCdr. V. Huber
	Assistant, Censorship Section	LCdr. A. H. Oswald
16-E	Head, Historical Branch	Capt. D. W. Knox (Ret.)
16-E-2	Head, War Records Section	LCdr. R. S. Robertson, Jr. (Ret.)
16-S	Chief Clerk	Mr. H. C. Daniels
16-X	Head, Planning Branch	Cdr. F. D. Pryor (Ret.)
16-Z	Head, Dissemination Branch	LCdr. A. T. Emerson (Ret.)
	Aide to DNI	LCdr. C. O. O'Connell (USNR)

*Forty-four officers and forty-eight civilians, plus nineteen officers under instruction on the list were on duty in ONI at that time.
Source: ONI Personnel Roster, 1 Dec 1939, in author's files, OA.

5. Capt. Herbert E. Cocke, USN, "History of ONI," MS, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1931, 17.

6. Department of the Navy, "Administrative History of the Office of Naval Intelligence in World War II," 10 Jul 1946, unpublished MS, 11, hereafter *ONI WWII Admin History*.

7. *Navy Directory*, 1 Jul 1918.

8. ONI, *Naval Intelligence Office Organization*, 1 Sep 1918, 1–31.

9. RAdm. Albert P. Niblack, USN, *The History and Aims of the Office of Naval Intelligence* (Washington: GPO, 1920), 23.

10. Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, Oral History, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1965, 45–56, 102, copy in OA.

11. *ONI WWII Admin History*, 507.

12. Capt. Henri H. Smith-Hutton, Oral History, USNI, Annapolis, MD, 1979, 1:99–100, copy in OA.

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CHAPTER 29

Intelligence Reserves

The part played by naval reservists in intelligence in World War II and the Korean War was of major significance, particularly during World War II, when most intelligence billets, both ashore and with the operating forces, were filled by reservists. Even during World War I, before there was an intelligence component specifically designated within the U.S. Naval Reserve Force, more than three quarters of the officers assigned to ONI as of 1 July 1918 were members of the USNRF. The percentage was even higher in the naval districts and naval attaché offices. This chapter about the Naval Intelligence Reserves is general, mainly because very few histories of specific units have been located. Its relative brevity, therefore, should not be taken as a negative indicator in an evaluation of the significant and vital requirements that the Reserves have successfully fulfilled in wartime. Those parts of all the other chapters that relate to wartime periods could appropriately have been included in any history of the Naval Intelligence Reserves.

Establishment of the Naval Intelligence Volunteer Service

The Naval Intelligence Volunteer Service was created by the Naval Reserve Act of 28 February 1925 (Public Law No. 512, Sixty-eighth Congress, First Session). The object was to provide a nucleus of reserve officers who, by virtue of their education, experience, and training in civilian life, would be immediately available in time of national emergency to assume duties and perform the important functions of intelligence officers at home and abroad.[1]

The functional code designation for reserve intelligence officers was Class I-V(S), or Intelligence Volunteer (Specialized).[2]

Little effort was made initially during the 1920s to procure I-V(S) officers because of the predominantly pacifistic outlook of the general public in the United States at that time. In February 1926, the Office of Naval Intelligence asked the district intelligence officers to submit a list of qualified individuals, "preferably key people in the news and writing world, who in time of peace can keep in touch with this office and in time of national emergency can be actively coordinated with the duties of Naval Intelligence."[3]

A file card record was kept of all naval reservists enrolled, those awaiting appointment, and those proposed. The last included persons who had had previous experience or who had volunteered their assistance. The cards gave the name, rank, date of acceptance, and a brief of their qualifications, together with their mobilization assignments. The cards were filed under four categories of prospective assignment: ONI Intelligence, ONI Public Relations, ONI Censorship, and Naval Districts. In addition to the card record, a separate file on each reservist was maintained in the ONI file room.

Quotas for Intelligence Volunteer Reserve officers for ONI and the naval districts were revised upward during Fiscal Year 1933 by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) following a study on the subject by the General Board of the Navy. The training of the Intelligence Reserves for their specific war duties was accomplished by the district intelligence offices, and a correspondence course prepared in the ONI Administrative Branch was issued by the Bureau of Navigation (BUNAV) (Reserve Section) through the Navy education centers.

When funds were available, BUNAV authorized training with pay either in the naval districts or in ONI, depending on where the officer was to be assigned.[4]

One of the early reserve intelligence officers was Sidney W. Souers, who was appointed as a lieutenant commander on 29 April 1929. Souers served in an inactive status as Senior Intelligence Officer in St. Louis, Missouri, and had the responsibility to study

the development of the Naval Intelligence organization, its publications, and its officer procurement.[5]

Intelligence Reserves in the 13th Naval District in the Pacific Northwest area in the 1930s were influenced to a great extent by LCdr. (later Cdr.) Luke May, a private detective with an international reputation in scientific crime detection and an expert in the development of informant networks. Monthly or semimonthly meetings were held in Cdr. May's home or in the Washington Athletic Club in downtown Seattle. All training was in crime detection and surveillance. Practical drills in the late 1930s included surveillance of Japanese "suspects" under the indirect guidance of the local FBI and the boarding of Soviet and Japanese merchant ships.

Personnel in the 13th Naval District Naval Reserve group included lawyers, law enforcement officials, shipping and travel specialists, public relations personnel, and foreign language experts (especially in Japanese, Russian, and German). The naval reservists received neither pay nor retirement credits, but they did get promotion credits for drills attended. Active duty training in a nonpay status on board West Coast Navy ships and stations was common. Completion of correspondence courses was required for the reservists to remain in the program.[6]

In 1933, under the guidance of the ONI Planning Division, most of the naval reservists under the cognizance of ONI were given mobilization assignments compatible with their qualifications.[7]

In the mid-1930s, conditions and government policy changed as it became apparent that an international conflict was approaching. The "Estimate of the Situation," beginning in 1935, stressed the need for expanding intelligence duties and personnel.[8]

The allowed number of I-V(S) officers was gradually being increased to meet the needs of the Navy, as determined from its approved war plans. Reports from the naval districts during the late 1930s indicated that progress was being made in the enrollment of desirable persons and in their general instruction, indoctrination, and assignment to specific billet-related training.[9]

The allowance of I-V(S) officers was increased in Fiscal Year 1936 from 459 to 536, and other increases were contemplated as the naval districts prepared their estimated requirements according to their individual war plans.[10]

Difficulties were being encountered in 1937 in finding persons with the necessary qualifications to serve abroad as naval attachés or assistant naval attachés. On 16 March 1937, ONI sent a letter to all naval districts advising of vacancies in forty cities throughout the world and requesting "a careful and confidential survey . . . for the purpose of locating suitable personnel to fill these vacancies."[11]

Preparations for War, 1938–1941

A survey was made in July and August 1938 by the ONI Planning Officer, Cdr. Hamilton V. Bryan, to obtain information on the readiness of the Naval Intelligence Reserves for active duty. He concluded that it was not ready and that the organization was ineffective, possibly because there were no pertinent ONI directives. Bryan reported that the commandants of the naval districts did not appreciate the importance of district intelligence or of intelligence reservists; the morale in the district intelligence offices and of the I-V(S) reservists was low; war plans were in a backward state; I-V(S) personnel had been commissioned without regard for the tasks that they were expected to perform, and their fitness for the tasks had not been determined; no effective liaison had been developed with the government and private agencies that would play an important part in future naval intelligence activities; and the opportunities for enrollment and training through existing civilian activities had been neglected.[12]

In ONI, there had been no real attempt for many years to supervise and coordinate the training and education of the personnel of the Naval Reserve or of the Navy, active or retired, who were slated for intelligence duties in wartime. The training of Naval Reserve personnel had been assigned to the commandants of the naval districts where the records of the personnel were maintained. No attention had been paid to Naval Reserve officers residing abroad; their records were maintained at the Bureau of Navigation.[13]

As a result of Bryan's survey and report of August 1938, and a subsequent directive issued in April 1939, efforts were begun to improve the readiness of the Naval Intelligence Reserves. By June 1939, approximately two-thirds of the naval districts had completed defining their organizational and personnel needs. The approved war mobilization complement for the entire naval intelligence service was 150 retired regular naval officers to be recalled to active duty, 2,023 reserve officers, 505 warrant officers, and 3,934 enlisted personnel. Of the total, 80 percent was authorized to be procured during peacetime.

In January 1939, another step in improving the readiness of the Intelligence Reserves was taken by dividing the I-V(S) officers in the Washington area into boards to produce training manuals on plant protection, commerce and travel, investigation, censorship, general intelligence, espionage, administration, public relations, and coastal intelligence activities.[14]

Article H-2104 of the *BUNAV Manual* authorized the appointment of Naval Reserve officers in warrant grades in peacetime only in exceptional circumstances. CNO (OP-16-X) letter of 25 May 1939 to the Chief of BUNAV requested authorization for the procurement of warrant officers for the I-V(S) category up to 12 percent of the total officer requirement. It was explained that many mobilization billets required a type of person whose economic status precluded his acceptance of an enlisted rating but whose professional status, while not up to commissioned requirements, was still of great value to the Reserves. The Chief of BUNAV, on 29 November 1939, approved making warrant grade appointments in the categories of boatswain, machinist, and carpenter, I-V(S), USNR.[15]

Although the district intelligence officers might have been able to make a fair estimate of their wartime personnel requirements and might have even succeeded in filling their allowances of reserve intelligence officers, they rarely knew how many of those officers would be available to accomplish active duty training or how many would be drawn off for assignment to billets in ONI or outside the continental limits of the United States.

When funds were made available to pay I-V(S) officers under training, they were used as investigators. Quarterly meetings were held for all I-V(S) officers for training and work study assignments. Much of the investigation of officer applicants was performed by I-V(S) officers on inactive duty as spare time training, performed when their civilian occupations permitted.

By directive from ONI in December 1939, each district intelligence office was to designate one or more suitable inactive I-V(S) officers to establish and maintain liaison with local FBI and Army organizations in the naval districts that were far from the district intelligence offices.[16]

It was believed that the value of reserve intelligence officers could be degraded by publicity concerning their reserve status and activities. Furthermore, publicity could prove embarrassing to reservists residing abroad. To help reduce the chance of adverse publicity, naval district commandants were instructed by the Department of the Navy to inform all I-V(S) officers that

> (1) All communications to I-V(S) officers residing abroad will be mailed in plain envelopes, addressed to them as civilians.
>
> (2) All communications to I-V(S) officers residing in the U.S. or in its possessions will be mailed in franked envelopes but shall be addressed to them as civilians.
>
> (3) No publicity will be given to luncheons, meetings, etc. of I-V(S) officers.
>
> (4) To casual inquiries, I-V(S) officers should state that they belong to the Naval Reserve but not mention the branch.
>
> (5) I-V(S) officers must refrain from using their affiliation with the Naval Reserve for political, business, or social purposes.
>
> 6) I-V(S) officers should be indoctrinated in the policy that their status and mission are confidential.
>
> (7) I-V(S) officers will be omitted from District directives.[17]

The problem of obtaining qualified reserve intelligence personnel continued in 1940. In addition to the standard qualifications required to be met by all naval reservists and special-service volunteer reserves, reserve intelligence officer candidates had to meet special standards because of the highly confidential and sophisticated nature of the matters and material with which they would be required to deal. Those special standards included

> broadness of outlook, familiarity with public events and international affairs, social understanding, tact, imagination, reliability, force, loyalty, enterprise and perseverance. In addition, he is required to have intellectual background suitable to Service requirements, versatility, adaptability, clean-cut Americanism, professional ability, sobriety under strain, and lastly, an unimpeachable record.

From the beginning of the Intelligence Reserve Program, the task of procuring intelligence officers had been in the hands of the district commandants, with the processing of applications and commissions coming under the immediate jurisdiction of the district intelligence officers.[18]

On 18 July 1941, the Bureau of Navigation ordered all district commandants to nominate immediately for active duty all officers in Class I-V(S) other than those assigned to censorship billets or those residing abroad.[19]

In December 1941, BUNAV directed the commandants of naval districts to forward all reserve officer applications to Washington without regard for district mobilization billets or previously assigned district quotas.[20]

Naval Intelligence Reserves in World War II

Immediately after the United States entered World War II, the number of applications for intelligence commissions increased. In some naval districts, so many intelligence duty applications were awaiting action that many persons considered it futile to apply. A new, more efficient system was

needed for speeding up the mechanics of selecting and processing applicants.

On 17 February 1942, the Secretary of the Navy directed that one or more officers charged with the paramount duty of procuring naval officers be assigned as soon as possible in each continental naval district, under the direct supervision of the BUNAV and separate from the naval district headquarters. In May 1942, CNO Adm. Ernest J. King directed that an intelligence officer be detailed to each of the officer procurement offices to assist in interviewing and determining the qualifications of I-V(S) applicants.[21]

In June 1942, an intelligence officer who had already been assigned to pass on the qualifications of applicants for intelligence appointments in the Division of Naval Intelligence was assigned to the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) (previously part of the Bureau of Navigation) to process the applications. The officer was given additional duties as liaison officer to the Division of Naval Intelligence in connection with the ongoing planning for procurement of I-V(S) personnel.[22]

Because the Navy failed to provide intelligence training to its regular officers, most wartime intelligence functions had to be taken on by the reserves. Many of the reserve officers were well qualified for intelligence work through previous civilian experience in fields such as law, engineering, investigations, news reporting, linguistics, and professional writing. With a quick Navy indoctrination, they performed very well and helped fill most of the billets in the Naval Intelligence service during World War II.[23]

Post–World War II Reorganization

Secretary of the Navy letter (Pers-1D2 serial 48) of 27 March 1946 activated the postwar Naval Reserve Program. As part of the implementation of the program, Bureau of Personnel letter (Pers-1D2 serial 505) of 22 May 1946 established the Reserve Component of the Naval Intelligence Program.[24]

Effective 1 July 1946, the Reserve Component activated in the naval districts was divided into two parts: the Organized Reserve, which was required to perform specified work assignments, and the Volunteer Reserve.

The intelligence work of the Reserve Component in each district was under the control of the district intelligence officer. Both the Organized and Volunteer groups were subdivided on the basis of their mobilization assignments, i.e., to ONI, to the naval districts, to foreign posts, and to the operating forces afloat and ashore. Each subgroup was given instruction and training appropriate to their prospective active duty assignments.

Most of the officers in the Reserve Components at that time had had wartime intelligence experience, but provision was made for enrolling NROTC (Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps) graduates and civilians who had the specific qualifications and aptitudes required by Naval Intelligence to fill vacancies in mobilization billets.[25]

The organization and training of the Reserve Component of Naval Intelligence continued to be carried out by the district intelligence officers under the direction of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, according to the BUPERS letter of 22 May. The training included periodic meetings of reserve officers in the various districts at which lectures were to be delivered by the district intelligence officers and other officers with wartime experience.[26]

To alleviate the critical personnel situation in ONI and the district intelligence offices, a program for using officers of the Organized Reserve Component of Naval Intelligence on two-week training duty was inaugurated on 7 August 1946. Each branch in ONI and each district intelligence office was to prepare a schedule of work projects that could be performed by reserve officers during a two-week tour of active duty. Each district intelligence officer was also to canvas Organized Reserve officers for volunteers for two-week tours of active duty.[27]

With the reactivation of the Reserve Component of Naval Intelligence and the establishment of the Organized Reserve, a general information letter was addressed to all district intelligence officers on 23 August 1946 in order to assist in getting the program in operation as soon as practicable. It was recognized that the active duty program would place an additional administrative burden on the district intelligence offices, and the Bureau of Personnel had been requested on 12 August to authorize each district commandant to order to active duty one special duty intelligence officer, S(I), as the former I-V(S) category had been redesignated) and one enlisted reservist who were to establish and administer the Organized Naval Reserve Intelligence Program in each naval district.

Quotas by rank for the Organized Reserve were established on 29 July 1946. The quotas authorized for each district intelligence office did not mean that all S(I) officers assigned would be earmarked to fill mobilization billets in the district concerned nor that they would perform their two-week annual training duties in the district intelligence office. In selecting S(I) officers for the Organized Reserve, the district intelligence officers were to exercise care to nominate only those who would be of the most value and benefit to Naval Intelligence as a whole. For guidance, each district intelligence office was instructed to adhere to a specific breakdown of

Organized Reserve officers by mobilization billets as shown below.

Table 29.1.
Organized Reserve Officer Billets

	Totals	Percentages
Naval Districts	461	31.0%
Operational Intelligence	180	
Domestic Intelligence	257	
Pool	24	
ONI	415	28.0%
Foreign Posts	171	11.6%
Operational Forces	428	29.4%
Totals	1,475	100.0%

Source: OP-32C5 ltr, ser 15390P32, 23 Aug 1946, ONI Day File, OA.

In October 1946, Naval Intelligence became one of the first reserve programs in the 13th Naval District to be reconstituted after World War II. By mid-1947, there were sixty-five officers and chief petty officers drilling in units in Seattle, Spokane, and Portland. Participants were mainly officers who had been in intelligence and related billets ashore and afloat during World War II. Training emphasis was on operational intelligence, especially for amphibious operations.[28]

The facilities for continuing the training of air combat intelligence (ACI) officers for the postwar Naval Air Reserve Program were established by CNO Planning Directive 16-A-46 serial 225P510 of 21 August 1946. To provide information on the new program to all reserve air combat intelligence officers who had returned to inactive status following World War II, and to invite them to participate, the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training Command at Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, issued a letter describing the program. Officers enrolled in the Naval Air Reserve Program would be assigned to one of the following:

> 1. The Organized Reserve, which would be composed of officers who would regularly attend drills, receive retainer pay, and take two weeks' active duty for training annually. The quota for the ACI Organized Reserve was 225 officers.
>
> 2. The Volunteer Reserve (Associated), which would be composed of officers who would regularly attend drills with the Organized Reserve at their own volition and without pay, while awaiting the availability of a billet in the ACI Organized Reserve. The Volunteer Reserve Associates were to be eligible to request annual active duty for up to two weeks with pay and allowance.
>
> 3. The Volunteer Reserve (Inactive), which would include those ACI officers who were unable to take an active part in ACI Reserve training but who would receive routine information sent out to all Reserve officers. The inactive Reservists would be encouraged to organize and hold meetings from time to time in their own communities, and a limited number could request up to two weeks of active duty annually with pay and allowances, depending on the availability of funds. It was recognized that a majority of the former ACI officers would of necessity remain in the inactive category, but the Navy hoped they would retain an active interest in the Naval Intelligence Reserve Program.

At first, the Naval Intelligence Reserve drills and training periods were with the Organized Reserve squadrons and air groups at the 28 Naval Air Reserve stations and Naval Air Reserve Training units. Later it was found that the Air Reserve intelligence officers could provide better support to the stations and squadrons if they drilled together at a station rather than work individually with single squadrons. Annual active duty training, however, continued to be performed with the squadrons to which the reservists were assigned.[29]

The training syllabus for the Organized and the Volunteer (Associated) Reserves was developed cooperatively by the Air Branch of (OP-32V) ONI, the Postgraduate School of Naval Intelligence, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Air (OP-55T). The Reserve Air Intelligence Program remained the responsibility primarily of DCNO (Air) and the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training until 1 June 1950, when ONI took it over.[30]

Naval Intelligence Reserves at the Local Level, 1946–1951

On 15 May 1946, a meeting was convened at the Zone Intelligence Office, Los Angeles, for the purpose of planning the establishment of a Naval Reserve Intelligence Unit (NRIU) to be composed of local S(I) and former I-V(S) officers. As a result of the meeting, the first official drill of NRIU Los Angeles was held on 12 November 1946 at the zone intelligence office in the Van Nuys Building at 210 West Seventh Street. Cdr. Robert Sibert, USNR, was the first officer in charge; Cdr. Beryl E. Burchfiel, USNR, was first Assistant Officer in Charge; and Cdr. William D. Bretz, USNR, was responsible for training and administration.

The initial complement of the Los Angeles unit in 1946 was 26 officers. It expanded until 1951 when it had 33 officers in a pay status, 33 nonpay officers, 82 I–V(S) officers, and 12 enlisted men, for a total of 160 unit members. Unit strength declined thereafter for several reasons, including the establishment in 1951 of a separate Telecommunications Censorship Unit, the elimination in May 1951 of the enlisted allowance for the Organized Naval Reserve

Task Group	1
Intelligence Processing System	1
Field Operational Intelligence	2
Ocean Information Center	1
Fleet Ocean Information	2
Naval Investigative Service support	38
Fleet Intelligence Centers, Area Analysis	30
Data Handling/Special Communications	1
Intelligence Processing Training	1
Naval Intelligence Command support	15*
Naval Investigative Service (NIS)	6†
Fleet Intelligence Training	2

*Twelve assigned to the Naval Intelligence Command, one to intelligence audit, one to dissemination, and one to intelligence collection.
†Five to NIS investigative teams and one to NIS headquarters.
Source: OPNAVNotice 5400 of 15 May 1974.

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CHAPTER 30

Officer Training in Naval Intelligence

In the early years of U.S. Naval Intelligence, training in intelligence procedures was gained largely through experience. Lists of naval officers with intelligence experience, as well as officers who had acquired a proficiency in foreign languages or who had knowledge through travel of foreign countries, were kept at the Bureau of Navigation (the predecessor to the Bureau of Personnel and today's Naval Military Personnel Command). The lists were used when selecting officers for assignment to intelligence billets in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to naval attaché posts.

Not until World War II did training for intelligence work achieve recognition as an essential preliminary step toward providing effective intelligence support to naval planning and operations. One persistent and serious gap in intelligence training has been the inadequate indoctrination of prospective commanders in the use of intelligence.

This chapter on intelligence training begins with the first assignment of officers to language training in Japan and China. Chapters 13, 21, 22, 29, and 31 also contain information on training.

Foreign Language Students

In 1910, the first group of oriental language students was sent to Japan. Among them were Lt.(jg) Fred F. Rogers (who served as Naval Attaché, Tokyo from 1933 to 1936); Lt.(jg) George E. Lake; 1stLt. William T. Hoadley, USMC; and 1stLt. Ralph S. Keyser, USMC. The officers assigned to Peking, China, for language study were Marine Corps officers Capt. Thomas Holcomb and 1stLt. E. L. Bigler. All students had diplomatic status and were assigned for administrative purposes to the Naval Attaché, Tokyo and Peking, Capt. John H. Shipley and later LCdr. Lyman A. Cotton. The language training program was terminated in 1913 with the establishment by President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels of a policy of having as few naval officers as possible on shore duty.[1]

The post–World War I period saw the revival of the language training program; LCdr. Ellis M. Zacharias was sent to Japan during Fiscal Year 1921 and spent three years learning the language and customs. He was followed by others, among them Ens. Thomas Ryan, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for rescuing a woman from the burning Grand Hotel in Yokohama during the earthquake of 1923; Ens. Arthur H. McCollum, later the head of the Far East Section of ONI prior to the Pearl Harbor attack; Lt. Joseph J. Rochefort, who had charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at the 14th Naval District at the time of Pearl Harbor; Lt.(jg) Edwin T. Layton, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer at the time of Pearl Harbor and throughout World War II; and Lt.(jg) (later Capt.) Henri H. Smith-Hutton, Naval Attaché, Tokyo, from 1939 to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. There were other language programs: Chinese and Russian were taught in China, and in 1924 Lt. Boyd R. Alexander was a French language student in Paris.[2]

No intelligence collection assignments were given to the Japanese language students in Japan. Their primary job was to learn the language, and they were not trained in collection techniques. On the other hand, they were directed to report to the naval attaché anything of naval interest that they inadvertently learned. When nearing the end of their courses, they were sometimes employed in translation work at the embassy in Tokyo. For example, Lt.(jg) Smith-Hutton was given the task of translating part of the 1926 revision of the *Japanese Coast Pilot* in response to a request to the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, by the U.S. Hydrographic Office.[3] Lt.(jg) William J. Sebald, one of the Japanese language students in Japan, was also given the job of translating part of the *Japanese Coast Pilot* for the

naval attaché. Sebald spent several months doing nothing but working on the translation.

The language students were also assigned tasks of writing intellience reports. In March 1927, LCdr. Franz B. Melendy was working on "Comparative Gun Power of American and Japanese Fleets, Its Effect Upon Tactical Handling of the Different Classes of Ships"; Lt.(jg) Sebald was preparing "The Shipbuilding Industry in Japan, Number and Capacity of Shipyards, Government and Private; Possibilities for Expansion of Plants; Developments in Merchant Shipbuilding"; Lt.(jg) David W. Roberts was assigned to report on "The Steel Industry of Japan, Location and Capacity of Steel Mills, including Blast Furnaces, Sources of Raw Ores, Coke, Coal, etc., Data on Yearly Output, Same for Imports"; and Lt.(jg) Smith-Hutton was researching and writing "The Chemical Industry of Japan, Particularly Those Factories Directly Pertaining to War." The sources of information for the reports were the files of the naval attaché, military attaché, commercial attaché and the consul general, plus trade journals, official Japanese government reports, and American and foreign businessmen.[4]

In the early 1930s the U.S. Army and Navy were sending selected officers to countries sharing borders with the Soviet Union for Russian-language training. Among the most popular of these locations were Harbin, Manchuria, and Riga, Latvia. Until World War II, Navy interest in the Soviet Union was primarily confined to ensuring that there were always a certain number of officers on active duty who could understand the Russian language.

There were many international considerations in assigning officers to Russian language training duty. In April 1930, when the question arose of stationing a Marine Corps officer in Harbin for the purpose, the State Department was concerned over the effect that this would have on relations with Japan. After a discussion between LCdr. Zacharias, who was then assigned to ONI, and representatives of the State Department, it was determined that the Harbin assignment would not be taken as showing any special U.S. interest in the affairs of northern Manchuria, or the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Neither was it felt that any harm could result from the association of the language student-officers with the Russian Communist officials of the railroad.

The establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo (formerly Manchuria) by Japan in March 1932 further complicated the Russian language program. Previously, the students had been given diplomatic passports, were accredited to China (which up to then controlled Manchuria), and were then assigned to residencies in Harbin. The United States refused to recognize the creation of Manchukuo, and the Navy Department withdrew its two students on 7 December 1932, permitting one to remain another three months to complete his training.[5]

In 1933, there were six Navy lieutenants (junior grade) and one Marine first lieutenant language students assigned to the naval attaché office in Tokyo. There were also nine language students at Peking, China: three Navy lieutenants (junior grade), four Marine captains and two first lieutenants. Two of the Marine captains in Peking were studying Russian. There were also Marine officers studying Russian in Shanghai under the aegis of the Commanding Officer, 4th Marines.[6]

In August 1934, Capt. David R. Nimmer, USMC, the first assistant U.S. naval attaché to the Soviet Union, who had been a Russian language student in China, visited Tallin, Estonia, to investigate its suitability as a site for stationing Russian language students. He rejected Tallin because he found that the instruction opportunities and housing facilities there were inferior to those at Riga, Latvia. He also felt the presence in Tallin of British officers in a Russian language program would inhibit the use of Russian in off-duty hours. In reference to the British students, Nimmer observed, "There are now six British officers studying Russian in Tallin, and . . . it is not understood why the British Government goes to such extreme efforts and expense to teach Estonian girls to speak English."[7]

In 1935, the Navy began sending Russian language students to Riga. To meet the wishes of the State Department, the language student-officers were enjoined to refrain from any intelligence activities while stationed at Riga.[8]

Lt.(jg) Carroll H. Taecker was the first officer sent to Riga as a Russian-language student. He arrived in July 1935 and was assigned to the Naval Attaché, Berlin, for administrative purposes in an arrangement that was approved by the State Department as long as such students were not listed as being on the official staff of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin and did not appear in uniform. The students were also required to keep the American Mission in Latvia informed of their movements and activities while in Riga, and they did not have diplomatic status in Latvia.[9]

Lts.(jg) Samuel B. Frankel and George F. Schultz followed in 1936 and were the first officers to receive a complete two-year course. Frankel and Schultz were ordered to report to the Naval Attaché, Berlin, and were further instructed to go to Riga on detached duty for a two-year stay during which they were expected to become completely proficient in Russian. The two officers lived with a Russian family and engaged White Russian instructors. They also talked

with Russian military personnel in Latvia from time to time in order to learn military terms.[10]

In 1935, at a U.S. Government initiative, the dozen or so Navy officers assigned to language training in Japan were removed from the diplomatic list. The move was prompted by the presence of over fifty Japanese assigned as "language officers" in the United States who were enjoying diplomatic immunity while they were deeply involved in espionage.[11]

Other than those already mentioned, naval officers assigned to Riga, Latvia, for instruction in the Russian language were Lts.(jg) Harry E. Seidel, Jr. (1937–1938), Arthur L. Wilson (1938–1940), and Stanley W. Lipski (1939–1940). Lipski continued his Russian instruction in Stockholm in 1940, and in 1941 he was assigned as Assistant Naval Attaché, Stockholm, resident at Helsinki, Finland.[12]

In 1941, there were nine competent young officers assigned to the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, for language training. Before they left for the mountains or seashore for the summer, they were told to have their personal effects ready for departing Japan on a moment's notice. Naval Attaché Capt. Henri Smith-Hutton had exchanged letters with ONI, pointing out that the Japanese language students did not have diplomatic status, and that, in case of war, they would probably be seized by the Japanese. He suggested that they should leave Japan and continue their studies in Hawaii or another place where there were Japanese teachers. Smith-Hutton also recommended that he send to the United States the books needed for an expanded Japanese language program, such as dictionaries, phrase books, and grammars. ONI agreed completely with the plan, and, in late July 1941, Smith-Hutton and his assistant, LCdr. Martin R. Stone, telephoned each of the students and told them (in Japanese) to get back to Tokyo as soon as possible. Most of the students had anticipated the call and had put their household possessions in storage in Yokohama.

After a good deal of negotiating and difficulty with local officials, the students were evacuated, moving by train from Tokyo to Kobe, where they took a ship to Shanghai arriving on Labor Day 1941. The Army did not take similar action, and a number of their students were interned for about six months before being repatriated on *Gripsholm* in 1942.[13]

The Navy language students in Japan at the time of the evacuation were Lt. William R. Wilson; Lts.(jg) Forrest R. Biard, Rufus L. Taylor, John R. Bromley, Allyn Cole, Jr., Ted A. Hilger, Thomas R. Mackie, and Gilven M. Slonim; and Marines Capt. Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., and 1stLt. Ferdinand W. Bishop.[14]

In addition to ensuring that the student officers safely left Japan, Smith-Hutton also sent back all the Japanese dictionaries he could buy, and several hundred were shipped back in mail bags. They were of great value later when the Navy set up its Japanese language school.[15]

Table 30.1.
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Language Officers Who Studied in Japan, and Their Subsequent Intelligence Asssignments

Name	Dates	Training and Subsequent Duties
Rogers, Fred F.	1910–1912	Training in Japan, (Lt.[jg])
	1919–1920	ONI (Cdr.)
	1933–1936	Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Capt.)
Lake, George E.	1910–1912	Training in Japan (Ens./Lt.[jg])
Hoadley, William T.	1910–1913	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo Training (1stLt., USMC)
Keyser, Ralph S.	1912–1914	Training in Japan (1stLt., USMC)
Redles, William L.	1915–1918	Training, Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Capt./Maj., USMC)
	1920–1921	ONI (LtCol.)
Zacharias, Ellis M.	1920–1923	Training in Japan, (LCdr.)
	1923–1925	ONI (LCdr.)
	1925–1928	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (LCdr.)
	1928–1931	ONI, Head FE Section (LCdr.)
	1934–1935	ONI, Head FE Section (Cdr.)
	1938–1940	DIO-11ND
	1942–1943	Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence (Capt.)

Name	Dates	Training and Subsequent Duties
Davis, Hartwell C.	1920–1923	Training in Japan (LCdr.)
	1931–1932	ONI
	1940–1941	ONI (Cdr., Ret.)
McCollum, Arthur H.	1922–1925	Training in Japan (Ens.)
	1928–1930	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Lt.[jg])
	1933–1935	ONI, FE Section (Lt.)
	1935–1936	Assistant DIO-11ND, San Diego (Lt.)
	1939–1942	ONI, Head FE Section (LCdr.)
	1942–1945	Fleet Intelligence Officer, 7th Fleet (Cdr./Capt.)
	1944–1945	Additional duty CO SEFIC
	1946–1948	CIA Naval Administrative Command (Capt.)
Ryan, Thomas J., Jr.	1922–1924	Training in Japan (Ens.) Awarded Medal of Honor for action in Yokohama earthquake in 1923.
Sullivan, William A.	1923–1926	Training in Japan (Capt./Maj., USMC)
Hickey, B. F.	1923–1924	Training in Japan (Capt., USMC)
Roberts, David W.	1924–1927	Training in Japan (Ens.)
	1928	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1932	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Lt.)
	1933	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (Lt.)
	1935–1937	ONI (Lt./LCdr.)
Melendy, Franz B.	1924–1927	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (LCdr.)
	1930–1932	As above
Sebald, William J.	1925–1928	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1942	ONI, FE Section (LCdr.)
	1943–1945	COMINCH, Pacific Section (LCdr.)
	1945	OP-32P (Cdr.)
Monahan, James S.	1925–1928	Training in Japan, (2dLt./1stLt., USMC)
Smith-Hutton, Henri H.	1926–1929	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1929–1930	ONI, (Lt.[jg])
	1931–1932	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (Lt.)
	1932–1935	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Lt.)
	1937–1939	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (LCdr.)
	1939–1941	Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Cdr.)
	1942–1944	COMINCH Intelligence Officer (Capt.)
	1947–1952	Naval Attaché, Paris (Capt.)
Libenow, Louis D.	1926–1929	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1930	ONI (temp) (Lt.)
	1935–1936	ONI (Lt.)
Pearce, Edward S.	1927–1930	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1930	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1937	ONI (Lt.)
	1943	Commander South Pacific Forces Intelligence Staff (Cdr.)
	1944–1945	ONI, Head Japanese Empire Section (Capt.)
Birtley, Thomas B., Jr.	1927–1930	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1931	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1944	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
Ringle, Kenneth D.	1928–1931	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])

Name	Dates	Training and Subsequent Duties
Watts, Ethelbert	1928–1931	Training in Japan, (Lt.[jg])
	1935–1937	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Lt.)
	1941–1943	ONI (LCdr.)
	1950–1952	Assistant Naval Attaché, London (Capt.)
	1952–1954	Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Capt.)
Pyzick, Frank P.	1929–1932	Training in Japan (2dLt., USMC)
	1932	ONI (1stLt.)
	1941	Shanghai (POW thereafter)
Layton, Edwin T.	1929–1932	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1932–1933	Assistant Naval Attaché, Peiping (Lt.[jg])
	1936–1937	ONI (Lt.)
	1937–1939	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Lt.)
	1941–1946	CINCPACFLT Combat Intelligence (LCdr./Capt.)
	1948–1950	Director, Naval Intelligence School (Capt.)
	1950	DIO-14ND (TAD Fleet Intelligence Office, NAVFE, 7/50–9/50) (Capt.)
	1951–1953	Fleet Intelligence Officer, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPAC AC/S(I) (Capt.)
	1953–1956	Joint Staff, J-2 (RAdm.)
	1956–1958	CINCPAC AC/S(I) (RAdm.)
	1958–1959	Director, Naval Intelligence School (RAdm.)
Rochefort, Joseph J.	1929–1932	Training in Japan (Lt.)
	1941–1942	Officer in Charge, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Cdr.)
Mason, Redfield	1930–1933	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1937–1939	ONI (Lt.)
	1940–1941	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (Lt.)
	1942–1945	Navy COMINT (LCdr./Capt.)
McCallum, Daniel J.	1931–1934	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1934–1935	ONI (Lt.)
	1938	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet (LCdr.)
	1939–1941	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (LCdr.)
	1946–1948	Naval Liaison Officer, Batavia (Capt.)
Kramer, Alwin D.	1931–1934	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1934–1935	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1938–1943	ONI FE Section (Lt./LCdr.)
	1944–1945	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific
	1945	ONI FE Section (Capt.)
Claiborne, Henri deB.	1931–1934	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1934–1935	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1943	ONI FE Section (Cdr.)
	1945–1946	Fleet Intelligence Officer, 7th Fleet (Capt.)
Cornell, Kenneth H.	1931–1934	Training in Japan (1stLt., USMC)
	1935	ONI (1stLt., USMC)
	1938	4th Marines, Shanghai
Fullinwider, Ranson	1932–1935	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1935	ONI (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
	1946–1949	Naval Attaché, Buenos Aires (Capt.)
	1952–1953	Naval Attaché, Karachi (Capt.)

Name	Dates	Training and Subsequent Duties
Carlson, Spencer A.	1932–1935	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1939	ONI FE Section (Lt.)
	1940	4th Marines, Shanghai
	1941–1942	Cast Unit Corregidor
	1942–1944	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne
	1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Capt.)
Finnegan, Joseph	1934–1937	Training in Japan (Lt.)
	1937–1938	16ND Cast Unit
	1942–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
	1947–1950	CIA (Capt.)
Karrer, Harold E.	1934–1937	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1938	ONI
	1939–1940	16ND Cast Unit (Lt.), died 22 September 1942
Stone, Martin R.	1934–1937	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941	Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo (LCdr.)
	1950–1951	N2 COMNAVFE (Capt.)
Jordan, Francis D.	1934–1937	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg]), died as POW, Asiatic area 24 October 1944
Richardson, Gill M.	1935–1938	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1939	RIO, 14ND
	1940–1942	Assistant Fleet Intelligence Officer Asiatic Fleet and Cast Unit
	1942–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne
	1947–1949	Fleet Intelligence Unit, CINCNELM (Capt.)
Lasswell, Alva B.	1935–1938	Training in Japan (1stLt., USMC)
	1938–1939	Cast Unit, 16ND
	1939	4th Marines, Shanghai
	1941–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
Hudson, Robert E.	1936–1939	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1945	Assistant Intelligence Officer, CINCPACFLT (Lt./Cdr.)
	1945–1946	ONI, Operational Intelligence Section (Cdr.)
	1948–1949	N2 CINCPAC/FLT (Cdr.)
	1949–1960	Various DIOs (Capt.)
Ballard, Nixon L.	1937–1939	Training in Japan (1stLt., USMC)
Roenigk, John G.	1938–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1942	CINCPAC Intelligence Staff (Lt.)
	1942–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Lt./Cdr.)
	1957–1960	Naval Attaché, Stockholm (Capt.)
	1962–1964	Naval Attaché, Tokyo (Capt.)
Benedict, Arthur L.	1938–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1942	CINCPAC Intelligence Staff (Lt.)
	1942–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Lt./Cdr.)
Cole, Allyn, Jr.	1939–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Lt./Cdr.)
	1947–1950	ONI, Operational Intelligence (Cdr.)
Mackie, Thomas R.	1938–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1942	Cast Unit, 16ND (Lt.[jg]/Lt.)
	1942–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (Lt./Cdr.)
	1946–1947	ONI, Operational Intelligence (Cdr.)

Name	Dates	Training and Subsequent Duties
Taylor, Rufus L.	1938–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1942	Cast Unit, 16ND (Lt.)
	1942–1943	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (Lt./Cdr.)
	1943–1944	OPNAV (Cdr.)
	1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Cdr.)
	1945–1946	OPNAV (OP-20) (Cdr.)
	1948–1951	ONI, Operational Intelligence (Cdr.)
	1951–1953	OP-20 (Cdr.)
	1953–1955	OSD (Cdr./Capt.)
	1955–1956	N2 COMNAVFORJAP (Capt.)
	1956–1959	Fleet Intelligence Officer, CINCPACFLT (Capt.)
	1959–1963	ONI, OP-922/OP-92B (Capt.)
	1963–1966	DNI and ACNO(I) (RAdm.)
	1966	Deputy Director DIA (VAdm.)
	1966–1969	Deputy DCI (VAdm.)
Wilson, William R.	1938–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1942–1945	POW
	1950–1952	ONI, Plans and Policies (Cdr./Capt.)
Biard, Forrest R.	1939–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific and Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific (Lt./Cdr.)
	1945–1946	ONI, Technical Intelligence (Cdr.)
Bromley, John R.	1939–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1943	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Lt./LCdr.)
	1943–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (LCdr./Cdr.)
	1946	ONI, Head Japanese Desk (Cdr.)
	1947–1949	N2 COMNAVFE (Cdr.)
	1949–1950	ONI, Dissemination (Cdr.)
	1950–1951	ONI, Intelligence Staff (Cdr.)
	1951–1954	Naval Attaché Lima (Cdr./Capt.)
	1954–1956	DIO-1ND (Capt.)
	1956–1959	ONI, ADNI Security (Capt.)
	1959–1962	Naval Attaché Tokyo (Capt.)
Slonim, Gilven M.	1939–1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg])
	1941–1945	Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (Lt.[jg]/Cdr.)
Holcomb, Bankson T., Jr.	1935–1937	Training in Chinese in Peiping (1stLt., USMC)
	1939–1941	Training in Japan (1stLt.)
	1943–1945	NAVGROUPCHINA
Bishop, Ferdinand W.	1940–1941	Training in Japan (1stLt., USMC)
	1943	SOPAC POW Interrogator, killed in plane crash in North Pacific
Hilger, Ted A.	1941	Training in Japan (Lt.[jg]), killed March 1942

Source: *Navy Directory*, various editions; Capt. Joseph Finnegan, manuscript narrative, OA.

Navy School of Oriental Languages During World War II

The need for more Japanese language officers in the Navy became evident when a check was made in December 1940 of the status of those officers who had received language training in Japan. Of the sixty-five or so officers, only twelve were fully proficient in the use of spoken and written Japanese.

To correct the situation, Cdr. Albert E. Hindmarsh, USNR, a former language professor at Harvard, was instructed in February 1941 to make a nationwide survey of Japanese linguists in and out of the Navy, with a view to establishing a practical course that would produce junior Naval Reserve officers thoroughly trained in writing, reading, and speaking Japanese. The survey, conducted between March and June 1941, found fifty-six persons with sufficient knowledge of Japanese to justify inviting them to become the nucleus of a U.S. Navy Japanese language course.

On 1 August 1941, Cdr. Hindmarsh submitted a plan to establish two training centers, one at Harvard University, the other at the University of California at Berkeley. The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation approved Hindmarsh's plan.

Arrangements were made to have the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, procure fifty complete sets of the seven-volume Naganuma Japanese Language Course, which had for many years formed the basis of the course given to U.S. Navy language officers in Japan. The books reached the United States in September 1941 and were duplicated for the first language class, which was to be convened on 1 October 1941.

Between 25 August and 22 September, Hindmarsh and Glenn Shaw, the chief Japanese language expert in ONI, interviewed and examined student applicants at various U.S. cities. During the trip, forty-eight students were enrolled in the course.

In January 1942, it was decided to enroll additional students, and on 22 February forty-seven new students were selected on the basis of personal interviews conducted by Hindmarsh and Shaw. The students reported to Berkeley, where the course was being conducted far more smoothly and efficiently than at Harvard. It was decided to let the contract at Harvard expire on 30 September 1942 at the end of the one-year contract period.

Between 18 May and 15 June 1942, Hindmarsh and Shaw visited centers throughout the country and enrolled 153 additional students for the course at Berkeley that was scheduled to begin on 1 July. On 23 June, however, the school was transferred to the University of Colorado at Boulder because of a Western Defense Command order requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry to be evacuated from the West Coast. The school had eleven ethnic Japanese teachers and was expecting twenty more.

Between 5 November and 20 December 1942, 302 additional students were enrolled, and approximately 200 were prepared for enrollment, based on interviews and written examinations. Approximately 80 percent of the applicants were rejected because they failed to meet the high minimum standards, which included a college degree and either previous study in Japanese or Phi Beta Kappa standing.[16]

In December 1943, there were seventy WAVES enrolled in the Navy's Japanese Language School, but it was decided to curtail further enrollment until women officers could be assigned outside the continental United States.[17]

In January 1944, courses in Chinese and Malay were added, and the name of the school at Boulder was changed to the Navy School of Oriental Languages. On 6 March 1944, a course in Russian was approved. The new courses began with a small number of students on 3 April: Russian, 29; Chinese, 16; and Malay, 9. The courses lasted eighteen months for Chinese, six months for Russian, and three months for Malay.

The Navy School of Oriental Languages at Boulder and a second facility that had been established at Oklahoma A&M at Stillwater were closed upon activation of the Language Division of the Naval Intelligence School at Anacostia in the District of Columbia on 1 July 1946 under then-Capt. Hindmarsh.[18]

Naval Intelligence Training in the World War II Era

In the Director of Naval Intelligence's annual report for Fiscal Year 1935, it was reported that

> there is [a] definite need for officers with training in intelligence work including knowledge of the principles underlying investigating work. To this end, a school of instruction has been initiated in the Division of Intelligence, and the first class, consisting of four officers who have completed one year at the Postgraduate school and one Marine officer, reported during June. In this connection, arrangements have been made with the Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, for the participation of the officers in question in the special course for investigators of the Bureau.

For additional details, see Chapter 21.

Upon the establishment of the Planning and Training Section (OP-16-X) of ONI on 27 August 1938, it was tasked to organize naval intelligence training programs and courses and to prepare for the inspection of the training and readiness of naval reservists in the naval districts. Although OP-16-X had the responsibility for preparing, disseminating, and correcting ONI training and procedural manuals, much of the actual work was gradually assumed by the Administrative Branch because of the small number of people assigned to OP-16-X.[19]

As a result of his study in England in early 1941 of the British methods of extracting information from photographs taken over enemy territory, LCdr. Robert S. Quackenbush, Jr., recommended the establishment of a naval school to train officers in the science of photo interpretation. On 12 September 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the creation of a photo interpretation school under the Bureau of Aeronautics to be located at the Naval Air Station (NAS), Anacostia.

The first class of the School of Photographic Interpretation convened on 5 January 1942 with a faculty composed of Navy and Marine Corps officers. The school was intended to teach its students how to extract intelligence data from factual evidence contained in photographs of enemy holdings and to pre-

sent the information obtained in a useful and readily understandable form for operational commands.[20] For more information on the school, see Chapter 13.

On 2 May 1941, a Training Section (first OP-16-A-9, then A-8) was set up within ONI to conduct a three-week course for the indoctrination of officers destined for domestic and foreign intelligence duties. On 1 February 1942, the indoctrination classes were moved to Frederick, Maryland, where the Basic Naval Intelligence School was set up in the Francis Scott Key Hotel. The school was closed, however, on 4 September 1943.

On 1 February 1943, a school for advanced intelligence training was established at the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City. Its two principal courses were Operational Intelligence and Commerce and Travel. The length of each term was eight weeks, later lengthened to ten.[21]

The purpose of the Operational Intelligence course was to train officers for duty with advance bases, staffs, and forces afloat in foreign theaters. The curriculum was modified several times during its 2½ years of operation. The basic course included photo intelligence, ship and aircraft recognition, communications, navigation, amphibious warfare, and organization and strength of enemy forces. A mock-up of a shipboard combat information center (CIC) equipment and layout was used.[22]

In April 1942, it was determined that specially trained air combat intelligence (ACI) officers were needed to brief pilots on their missions and to ensure a flow of information from combat reports. The Naval Air Combat Intelligence Officers School was set up on 15 April 1942 at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, under the supervision of the Aviation Intelligence Branch of the Bureau of Aeronautics. The Aviation Intelligence Branch selected the students, worked out the curriculum, and made recommendations on the assignment of ACI officers upon completion of their training.[23]

Virtually all ACI students were selected from graduating classes of the A-V(S) (Aviation Volunteer Specialist) Indoctrination School at Quonset Point, until that school closed in January 1944. Thereafter, they came from active duty in the field. In addition, a number of officers from the Marine Corps and ONI attended the school. A major proportion had backgrounds in law, journalism, teaching, or advertising, or extensive administrative experience in the business world. The number of students per class during the first year averaged about 150. After 1 May 1943, classes were limited to 100 students per class.

At first, the curriculum took advantage of the valuable experiences of the British Royal Air Force, particularly with regard to the briefing and debriefing of pilots. Principal courses included intelligence briefing and debriefing procedures, maps and charts, elements of photo interpretation, air tactics, economic geography, aircraft and ship recognition, aerial navigation, elements of aerology, naval communications, performance characteristics and armament of the principal air forces of the world, antisubmarine warfare, radar, flak analysis, amphibious warfare, and air support doctrine. Originally, the course lasted eight weeks, but it was lengthened to ten weeks in 1943. The last class graduated in September 1945, after the Naval Air Combat Intelligence Officers School had trained over 1,800 officers during its three-year existence.[24]

Post–World War II Naval Intelligence Training

By 1945, the Advanced Naval Intelligence School (ANIS) was conducting two-week refresher courses in New York City for officers returning to the United States before they were reassigned. The curricula were tailored to meet the needs of each individual's next assignment, when known. The officers repeated courses whose content had not been used during their previous duty assignments, and they also took new courses that had not been available during their previous attendance at the school. Approximately seventeen officers attended each of the refresher sessions, and they were billeted at the Henry Hudson Hotel. Frequently, the refresher course students were asked to serve as temporary instructors in regular operational intelligence (OPINTEL) classes, where they could speak on subjects with which they had had personal experience.

The ANIS staff had consisted of six officers when it was established in January 1943. By 1945, the staff consisted of fifteen officers, thirteen of whom had served in operational intelligence billets outside of the United States during World War II. At this time the ten-week regular OPINTEL curriculum consisted of the following courses: Naval Staff Procedure, 52 hours; Amphibious Warfare, 27 hours; Operational Intelligence Procedure, 18 hours; Navigation, 24 hours; Means Available and Opposed (i.e., U.S. and Japanese order-of-battle, capabilities, and tactics), 34 hours; Communications, 18 hours; Identification of Ships and Aircraft, 36 hours; Theater Areas, 24 hours; Aerology, 6 hours; Antisubmarine Warfare, 9 hours; Mine Warfare, 5 hours; Photo Intelligence, 38 hours; CIC and Radar, 25 hours; and miscellaneous lectures, 34 hours.

Beginning in November 1944, ANIS conducted three special military government classes, graduating fifty-three officers who reported to the Naval Civil Affairs Staging Area at Monterey, California,

Naval War College or the Armed Forces Staff College) in the theory of warfare and the military planning process. Functional training for specific assignments was to continue for officers at the intermediate level.

At the senior career level, those officers who displayed a potential for the most senior and responsible assignments in intelligence were to be sent to a Group I service college, preferably the Naval War College. At this level, except for intensive area briefing and language refresher courses for specific assignments, there would normally be no need for further functional training.

The foregoing represented an ideal career training pattern. Unforeseen and changing requirements continually caused deviations in the careers of intelligence officers. Regular Navy ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade) were rarely commissioned as intelligence specialists. Changes of designators usually occurred when the officers became senior-level lieutenants or junior lieutenant commanders.

A secondary source of personnel for filling intelligence billets in the early 1960s was the line officer (11XX and 13XX) subspecialist. Those officers were primarily oriented toward a general-line career. During their fourth to sixth year of service, they were selected from a volunteer list to attend the Naval Intelligence School. Upon graduation, they were assigned to the same types of billets as intelligence career specialists. The subspecialist officers normally were reassigned to a second tour in an intelligence billet later in their careers on a when-available basis.[40]

In 1962, the Naval Intelligence School was transformed into the Defense Intelligence School under the newly formed Defense Intelligence Agency. It continued to occupy the same dilapidated, wartime temporary buildings in Anacostia.[41]

Graduate-Level Training

In 1972, steps were initiated to establish a graduate-level course in naval intelligence. An objective of establishing a master's degree program was to fulfill the educational needs of naval intelligence for persons capable of developing systems analysis and computer techniques for intelligence research; having a broad understanding of technology and its defense applications, based on a non-engineering approach; and familiar with the national security structure and policy of both the USSR and the United States, with special emphasis on the Soviet ocean strategy and the Soviet navy. Another objective of equal importance was to attract talented young line officers to the intelligence subspecialty. The Defense Intelligence School was unable at that time to upgrade its level of instruction to meet either the standards for a master's degree or the educational requirements of Naval Intelligence. These conclusions were enunciated in DNI RAdm. Earl F. Rectanus's memo of 14 September 1972 to the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the recommendation was made that the course be set up at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California.[42]

After much correspondence and numerous conferences with the Director of Naval Education and Training, the Bureau of Personnel, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Defense Intelligence School, approval for the course was obtained and ONI provided the funding. The first class convened in September 1973, the students having been selected administratively, since there hadn't been time to circulate a request for applicants.[43]

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CHAPTER 31

ONI and the Naval War College

There was much in common between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College (NWC) in their purpose, origin, interests, and problems. Consequently, the two worked closely together during their formative years, and there was even a period of several years during which considerable thought and some pressure was applied to combining the two organizations to form a Navy general staff.

Though there is no known documentary evidence that Commo. Stephen B. Luce helped Lt. Theodorus B. M. Mason sell the idea of setting up an Office of Naval Intelligence, it is apparent that they were friends, and that each had an active interest in the U.S. Naval Institute and contributed to the early editions of its periodical, the *Proceedings*. They both recognized the need for and value to the Navy of information on foreign progress in naval science. It seems reasonable to assume that Mason may have at least had Luce's verbal support for his project.

The General Staff Concept

On 3 May 1884, Commo. Luce was designated the president of a board that was directed to consider and report on the subject of a postgraduate school to be established by the Navy Department. Cdr. William T. Sampson and LCdr. Casper F. Goodrich were the other members of the board.

In its report to Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler dated 13 June 1884, the Luce Board expressed the hope "that every officer's useful attainments, such as foreign languages, sketching, photography, draughting, surveying, painting, naval architecture, etc., may form a part of his record at the Navy Department [so] that his fitness for any special work may be known and utilized." Similar guidance was given in the Secretary of the Navy's first directive to Lt. Mason on establishing ONI.

The Luce Board also recommended that optional courses in modern languages, watercolor painting, and photography be added at the prospective postgraduate school, as they would bring their own reward in foreign service as well as in military and naval reconnaissance.

The Naval War College was established by General Order No. 325, signed by Secretary Chandler on 6 October 1884, and its first class was convened during September 1885, with Commo. Luce as president and one of the principal lecturers. As in the case of ONI, many people opposed the establishment of the War College and contrived to impede its progress. With mutual assistance, however, ONI and the Naval War College were both successful in attaining their common objective of aiding naval officers to acquire a better understanding of naval science.

Beginning in 1887, ONI staff officers served as lecturers at the Naval War College courses. Although not on ONI's staff at the time, Lt. Charles C. Rogers gave four lectures in three successive years on the functioning of a general staff. The subjects covered in his lectures included Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Systems of Foreign Armies, General Consideration of Naval Intelligence Departments at Home and Abroad, The Meaning of Naval Intelligence in Detail, Reconnaissance, Reasons for a General Staff, and Essence of Intelligence Work in the Preparation for War. As a result of Rogers's presentations, the Naval War College understood the need for a general staff and, until 1916, advocated the establishment of one for the Navy.[1]

Other lecturers from ONI included Lts. Carlos G. Calkins, Washington I. Chambers, and John M. Ellicott, and LCdr. Richard Wainwright. ONI usually sent one or two staff officers as students to each year's course. They were able to add up-to-date information from ONI's studies that was pertinent to the courses being presented at the War College.

In 1889 LCdr. French E. Chadwick, Naval Attaché, London, sent back to ONI the first *Kriegspiel*, a German concept for wargaming as a method for

teaching military tactics, and strongly advocated its use at the War College.

Professor James R. Soley, who was in charge of the Navy Department Library and was closely associated with ONI, was a frequent lecturer at the Naval War College. When Soley was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1890, friends of the NWC were encouraged by the fact that the college was being placed under his supervision. ONI and NWC were organizationally together under the Assistant Secretary, as they had been previously under the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.[2]

In the Secretary of the Navy's *Annual Report for 1896*, Secretary Hilary A. Herbert stated:

> A close union should be maintained between ONI and the War College, both working to the end of meeting all possible naval problems that may arise from any international difficulty, keeping all the time abreast with the actual facts and existing conditions of naval warfare.

NWC President Capt. Henry C. Taylor also stated in the annual report:

> By order of the Department, Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, attended a portion of the college session. The desirability of close relations between these two institutions leads me to hope that each year we shall have one or two officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence in attendance upon the college sessions.[3]

In 1897, NWC President Cdr. Casper F. Goodrich reported in his annual report:

> It having been recommended to the Department by the President of the College and the Chief Intelligence Officer that officers of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College should interchange at stated periods, Ensign J.V. Chase, of the college staff, was ordered to report to the Chief Intelligence Officer for duty in his office for one month from January 4 [1897]. At the completion of this duty, Ensign Chase returned to the college. When the college staff is recruited to its normal strength, it would be well to order Lieutenant [Joseph B.] Murdock to Washington for a month to repeat what Ensign Chase did last January.[4]

Another area of close association between ONI and NWC in the 1890s was in the field of war planning. ONI prepared the Navy's war plans in collaboration with the War College, and the latter would test them in wargaming exercises.[5]

On October 2, 1898, former NWC President Capt. Henry Taylor wrote to RAdm. Luce recommending that the War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence be gradually drawn together to form a general staff, but only if ONI was not hostile to the idea.

In February 1900, Taylor sent to Luce an undated and unsigned copy of a ten-page memo that he had prepared as a reply to an inquiry from Secretary of the Navy John D. Long on what should be done to develop a general staff. Taylor's memo stated:

> That in the development of the Intelligence Office and the War College, the Navy has been unconsciously forming the elements of a General Staff. . . . That the Secretary issue an order to the War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence that their work shall be regarded as directly connected and interdependent, and that the chiefs of the two institutions and their first assistants and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation shall constitute a permanent board of five members, who shall meet frequently and consult as to war plans and information.
>
> That one half of the Intelligence Officer force shall pass four months of each year at the Naval War College, and one half of the Naval War College Force, four months at the Intelligence Office. That the combined work of the College and Intelligence Office [shall] be under the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation's general direction and orders.

Possibly as a result of the above guidance, and obviously in conformity with some of it, Secretary Long established the General Board in March 1900. Admiral of the Navy George Dewey was senior officer, and among the other eight members were the Chief Intelligence Officer (Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee), the NWC President (Capt. Charles H. Stockton), and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Capt. Arent S. Crowninshield), with the last serving as chairman of the Executive Committee.[6]

In the first direct participation of the General Board in the work of the Naval War College, board members were present at the summer conference that met from 1 June to 30 September 1909. From the time of its establishment in 1900, the General Board had referred questions on strategic and tactical matters in numerous areas to the NWC staff for consideration and opinion.[7]

In 1901, Capt. Sigsbee stated:

> It is believed that still greater efficiency (in ONI work) would result if the natural relations existing among the General Board, War College and ONI were recognized by legislative action, enabling the Department to organize and adjust work on the systematic basis of a General Staff.[8]

Even when ONI had only five officers assigned (in June 1903), one was detailed on temporary duty at the Naval War College.

The Modern Era

Following World War II, intensive instruction in naval intelligence in relation to staff and command requirements was given in the junior and senior courses at the Naval War College. The college also conducted a correspondence course in naval intelligence. Officers of the regular Navy and Naval Reserve officers on active duty were allowed to take the course.

On 18 August 1947, an ONI team gave a series of talks at the War College as an "Introduction to Naval Intelligence." The team included Director of Naval Intelligence RAdm. Thomas B. Inglis who spoke on "The Organization of the Naval Intelligence Service"; Capt. Carl Espe, head of OP-32Y, who spoke on "Strategic and Operational Intelligence"; LtCol. T. L. Ridge, USMC, who discussed "Operational Intelligence Support to the Amphibious Problems"; and Capt. P. Henry, head of OP-32V, who covered "Air Intelligence."

From 1947 on, ONI has almost uninterruptedly provided lecturers to the college on an annual basis, usually the Director of Naval Intelligence and senior ONI officers. The NWC has also been on the distribution list for most ONI products. In due course, after the Navy adopted the practice of designating officers for intelligence duty only, at least one designated intelligence officer has been assigned as a student at the War College each year. When the availability of intelligence specialists permitted, an officer completing a year as a student would be extended for a year as a member of the college staff.

Commencing in 1958, at least one, and sometimes two, ONI civilian analysts attended the college, except for the courses commencing in 1969 and 1970.

Capt. Arthur F. Newell, Jr., USN (Ret.), was brought back on active duty on 1 April 1969 and became the Staff Intelligence Officer of the college. At the same time, NWC President VAdm. Richard G. Colbert was actively advocating setting up a series of military "chairs" for the various areas of naval warfare. Some of the first to be established dealt with air strike warfare, submarine warfare, and naval strategy.

In early 1971, Capt. Newell was instructed to prepare the paperwork to establish a military chair of intelligence. On 19 March 1971, Adm. Colbert signed a letter to RAdm. Frederick J. Harlfinger II, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, converting the position of Staff Intelligence Officer to the Military Chair of Intelligence, requesting that ONI (OP-92) sponsor the chair, and proposing that the chair be named for RAdm. Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.). Others considered for the honor had included RAdm. Ellis M. Zacharias, VAdm. Rufus L. Taylor, RAdm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, and RAdm. Samuel B. Frankel. Layton was judged to be most deserving of the honor, based on his success as Adm. Nimitz's Fleet Intelligence Officer throughout World War II, his becoming the first intelligence specialist to achieve flag rank on active duty, and his service as intelligence officer (J-2) of the Joint Staff.

The duties of the person who held the intelligence chair involved the same close liaison with ONI as had been the case for many years. The establishment of military chairs merely formalized the relationship.

On 22 April 1971, RAdm. Harlfinger, as ACNO (Intelligence), accepted the sponsorship of the Intelligence Chair and concurred with the choice of RAdm. Layton as the officer for whom the chair should be named. Capt. Newell became the first occupant of the Intelligence Chair and served until he retired on 30 December 1971. He was succeeded by Capt. Lewis Connell, USN.[9]

Chapter Notes

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CHAPTER 34

Operating Forces

This chapter deals with the intelligence activities carried on by Navy operating forces until the start of World War II and with certain general directives that governed fleet intelligence activities in the post–World War II era. It is closely linked with Chapter 18, concerning operational intelligence, although the latter relates mainly to intelligence support from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the operating forces. Subsequent chapters deal with fleet intelligence during World War II in specific geographical areas. Together this chapter and these subsequent chapters cover activities by the operating forces to fulfill their own intelligence needs as well as their efforts to fulfill collection requirements placed on the operating forces by ONI and higher authorities to meet national-level requirements.

In addition to the chapter on operational intelligence, Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, and 32 contain information on intelligence activities of the operating forces.

Beginnings of Fleet Intelligence

Lt. William S. Sims arrived on the China Station in the cruiser *Charleston* in 1894. He had been appointed by the commanding officer to be the ship's intelligence officer even though Sims professed to knowing nothing of intelligence work. His commanding officer brushed the excuse aside with the reply, "Neither do any of us."

The Sino-Japanese War was in progress, and it had drawn an unusually large number of neutral warships to the area. Sims gathered information on each of the neutral naval vessels present and submitted his reports to ONI. The war itself was demonstrating numerous significant lessons on the use of modern weapons in naval warfare. Following the Civil War in the United States, advances in ship design, ordnance, and armor had been made in Europe. The Sino-Japanese War provided the first opportunity to observe the value of many of these innovations.

From a British report about the Yalu River battle that Sims had obtained, he reported to ONI on the ability of the Chinese ironclads, or battleships, to withstand the withering fire of the Japanese cruisers. He also noted that modern shells, especially from secondary batteries, could set woodwork afire very easily. Other reports of special interest related to methods used by the British protected cruiser HMS *Crescent* during 6-inch gun target practice. The ship had a new type of gunsight that permitted continuous aim. One gun fired twenty-four shots in three minutes, obtaining eighteen hits, a record far superior to the target practice results being obtained by the U.S. Navy at that time. The event seems to have provided the impetus for Sims's subsequent efforts to get the U.S. Navy to adopt more effective fire control methods.[1]

In October 1901, Lt. Sims joined the staff of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet Adm. George C. Remey in the armored cruiser *Brooklyn* as aide "with special intelligence duties." Sims had arrived in the Far East on board the new battleship *Kentucky* (BB 6) in 1900, having come directly from duty as Naval Attaché, Paris. While engaged in his attaché duties, Sims's observations further convinced him that American naval gunnery was far less effective than that of the great foreign powers, and he repeatedly reported as much in strong terms. Because of his derogatory reports about the U.S. Navy, Sims was not ordered back to Washington en route to his next assignment. This development was contrary to the usual practice of having naval attachés review and discuss their reports at the ONI offices immediately following their foreign duty. Adm. Remey was in sympathy with Sims's efforts to stimulate improvement in the Navy's gunnery and gave him a free hand in reporting his observations.[2]

In November 1901, *Brooklyn* visited Vladivostok, and Sims submitted reports to ONI on the Russian warship *Gromovoy* and on the defenses of

the Russian Far East city. He commented particularly on the ship's unusually heavy armament at the expense of protection to the guns and, especially, to the ammunition supply. Yet he judged *Gromovoy's* inadequate protection to be superior to that in contemporary American cruisers.

To obtain information on the defenses of Vladivostok, Sims selected and briefed two young ensigns, assigning each of them one side of the harbor from which to observe specific points of interest. One of the ensigns made his observations without any difficulty, getting information on coast defense guns and their location, caliber, arcs of train, etc. The other did equally well but was apprehended in a guarded area as he was returning to town at the end of the day. The young officer was questioned at the Russian military headquarters and made to trace his hiking route on a military map (which he was able to study and subsequently report about when he got back to the ship).[3]

RAdm. Frederick Rodgers, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station, reported to the Bureau of Navigation for the period 20 March–30 June 1902: "A considerable amount of intelligence duty in connection with naval ordnance and target practice has been performed by the intelligence officer and inspector of target practice [Sims], and some important reports have been made by officers attached to vessels of the fleet."[4]

Fleet Intelligence During World War I

In 1917 Sims, then a rear admiral and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters (COMUSNAVFOREUR), selected London as the location for his headquarters because the predominant naval effort in the war was British. Also, the highly efficient Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty received all important naval information, which, in turn, was made available to Adm. Sims and his staff. Consequently, Sims believed it was unnecessary for him to include in his staff of twelve officers an organization for collecting information. A small intelligence section headed by his aide, Cdr. John V. Babcock, however, was maintained for the purpose of collating, digesting, and disseminating intelligence information. The intelligence section kept in close touch with the British Naval Intelligence Division, with one officer detailed to spend most of his time there.

The U.S. naval attachés at Paris and Rome provided communication channels between the U.S. naval force commander and the ministries of marine in France and Italy. In addition, the U.S. naval attachés in Holland and the Scandinavian countries forwarded *all* information they obtained (see also Chapter 3).

The COMUSNAVFOREUR Intelligence Section was constantly engaged in making summaries of information and in compiling statistical and other data in convenient form for other sections of Sims's staff. It also transmitted all important information received and the results of its own analyses to the Navy Department, Army Headquarters, and the U.S. operating forces.[5]

Fleet Intelligence Between the World Wars

The senior U.S. Naval Officer, Turkey, was also Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Near East, and U.S. High Commissioner, Turkey, from the end of World War I until U.S. diplomatic relations with the newly reorganized Turkish government were reestablished. He flew his flag on the U.S. station ship at Constantinople (the yacht *Scorpion* until July 1919, then the small cruiser *Galveston*) but maintained his offices at the U.S. Embassy. His staff included an operations office, a communications office, and an intelligence office. The principal and most important work of the intelligence office was that of watching, reporting on, and following the political activities of the Allies, as well as those of various other nations represented in the Near East. Ships of the Near East force visited ports throughout the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in support of relief and Red Cross activities in the Near East and in support of RAdm. Newton A. McCully's mission in southern Russia. Information was gathered on the ports of the area, particularly on the availability of coal, water, and other supplies. The Russian situation also demanded the attention of the intelligence office, which watched trends in the effect of Bolshevism on political and economic conditions in the Near East.[6]

The work of the intelligence officer on the staff of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet in 1920 had proven so successful that consideration was being given to the assignment of officers for similar duty with all the fleets.[7]

Aircraft were used by the U.S. Fleet in the 1920s for scouting and spotting gunfire. The airplanes were equipped with radios so that they could send back contact and information reports to the ship or force that they supported.[8]

Also in the 1920s, the need to develop a fleet cryptanalysis capability began to be recognized as essential in the collection of intelligence for the U.S. Fleet.[9]

A study on collecting and disseminating intelligence was made by the four force commanders for Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet in 1932. The study, with its recommendations, was forwarded to ONI as a basis for establishing good working relationships

between ONI and Navy operational units. It was anticipated that ONI would produce a pamphlet on naval combat intelligence similar to one issued by the Army. ONI-19, the *Intelligence Manual*, was issued in 1933 and included a chapter on combat intelligence.[10]

Combat intelligence units were set up in flag commands and in capital ships during fleet problems (operational exercises) in 1932 and 1933. The units were primarily intended to supply information and analyses for use in tactical situations. Instructions about making intelligence information reports on enemy forces were issued in 1933 by Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet to all fleet units.[11]

During the interwar period, the Asiatic Fleet was unique among the Navy's operating forces in that it had a full-time intelligence officer on the staff of its commander in chief. In 1929–1930, the officer serving in the billet was LCdr. Hartwell C. Davis, who had had previous duty in the Far East as Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo.[12]

Soon after Adm. Montgomery Taylor assumed command of the Asiatic Fleet in August 1931, Lt. Henri H. Smith-Hutton was shifted from his billet as Taylor's flag lieutenant to that of fleet intelligence officer. Adm. Taylor was more interested in what would happen tomorrow than in what had happened yesterday, and this attitude, of course, influenced the fleet intelligence officer in the execution of his duties. Taylor read the newspapers and the many reports received from military and diplomatic representatives in his area. He liked to discuss the significance of events and situations with someone, and Smith-Hutton was the logical staff officer for this duty. Few of the local reports were passed to ONI by Smith-Hutton unless the admiral wished to comment on or add to a report, since they were already available in Washington.

The Asiatic Fleet intelligence officer's other duties at the beginning of the 1930s included acting as a confidential secretary to the commander in chief because all classified correspondence, except registered publications, was handled by the intelligence officer and his yeoman.

No agents were employed ashore by the Asiatic Fleet intelligence officer, and no other means of covert collection were employed. Overt collection efforts were adequately carried out by diplomatic and consular officials. From time to time, fleet units were directed to photograph and describe the harbor facilities of a particular port to be visited, but most ports had already been well covered. Close contact was maintained with the officers of foreign navies in the Far East area. France, for example, was responsible for Catholic missions in China. The heads of the missions, many of whom were Jesuits, were extremely well informed and had many sources of information not usually available to other foreigners. French intelligence officers, therefore, had good information on how the Chinese were thinking about local situations.

The Asiatic Fleet had no communications intelligence (COMINT) collection capability in the early 1930s, but it did have one officer from OP-20G detailed to the commander in chief's staff, Lt. Joseph Wenger, who was especially competent in the means of collecting communication intelligence and whose duty it was to prepare plans for an expanded intercept network.[13]

The intelligence components afloat in 1933 consisted of "intelligence officers on the staffs of fleet, force and task group commanders and all personnel, especially or primarily detailed for intelligence duties, either afloat or ashore, operating under such commander," and "the officers assigned intelligence duties on staffs of smaller units or in individual ships." The organization, training, and operation of intelligence personnel afloat, both in peace and war, was a responsibility of the fleet commander in chief.[14]

The intelligence work of the forces afloat was intended to provide information for the following:

1. The commander in chief in carrying out his peacetime mission.
2. The commander in chief (on foreign station), the State Department representative, and the government in formulating U.S. policy.
3. American business in foreign countries: commercial, financial, industrial, and agricultural.
4. Naval and military commanders in time of war.

Officers permanently assigned as unit or ships' intelligence officers were expected to use the services of all available officers in the collection of information.[15]

The sources available to the fleet for strategic information were considered in 1933 to be radio intercept and cryptanalysis; surface, subsurface, and air observation; reconnaissance; merchant vessels; advance forces; scouting (all types); radio direction finder, plotting and tracking; underwater sound bearings; and shore stations that could provide radio tracking, intercepted messages, and data on U.S. and neutral merchant ships.[16]

ONI's requirements for information from the forces afloat in peacetime included information on foreign ports; reports on foreign combat ships and merchant vessels, limited to data not shown in available publications; reports on foreign naval personnel relative to their efficiency, morale, training, etc.; and tactical information about foreign naval formations, tactics, and maneuvering ability and "smartness."[17]

Lt. Smith-Hutton reported for the second time as Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet on 8 February 1937 and was promoted to lieutenant commander during his tour. The fleet commander in chief was Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, who flew his flag in the heavy cruiser *Augusta* (CA 31). Periodic situation reports were received on board *Augusta* from U.S. consuls in all major Chinese ports, the various military commanders ashore, naval and military attachés in the Far East area, and the Embassies at Peking and Tokyo. Radio intercept transcriptions were also available from Assistant Communications Officer Lt. Jack S. Holtwick, Jr., who brought them to Smith-Hutton for translation of material of interest to the commander in chief and his chief of staff.[18]

In July 1937, the Asiatic Fleet visited Vladivostok. Before the visit, ONI advised that the most recent reports about that area had been made by the Siberian Expedition in 1920. In order not to antagonize the Russians unnecessarily, no collection of information was to be attempted other than to note any new construction. No new ships or installations were seen, but reports were made on some old and obsolete Soviet submarines and ancient gunboats. Assistant Fleet Intelligence Officer Lt. George R. Phelan, an expert photographer, did take many pictures of the harbor and harbor installations, but only from on board *Augusta*.

When conditions heated up between the Japanese and Chinese in early August 1937, *Augusta* moved from her summer port of Tsingtao to Shanghai, arriving on 12 August. Because the 4th Marines was part of the defense force for the International Settlement within that cosmopolitan city, Adm. Yarnell decided that the fleet intelligence officer could follow the action better by being at the 4th Marines' headquarters, and Smith-Hutton was ordered ashore on about 18 August. His daily routine was to spend the night ashore studying reports and situation maps and then, after lunch, to return to *Augusta* and report to the admiral and answer any questions.

Almost every morning, Adm. Yarnell went to the office of the U.S. Consul General, Mr. Gauss, to discuss the local situation. Col. Charles F. B. Price, commander of the 4th Marines, also attended the conferences unless he was otherwise involved with urgent duties. The admiral liked, respected, and had great confidence in both Mr. Gauss and Col. Price.[19]

The intelligence officer with the 4th Marines was Capt. Ronald A. Boone, USMC, a Chinese-language officer, and his assistant was 2dLt. Victor H. Krulak, USMC (who was to become well known and retire as a lieutenant general). Their staff also included a small group of Marine noncommissioned officers. The organization's reports were highly reliable because the Marines had good sources of information in Shanghai. Capt. Boone had been in China a long time and was on good terms with the Shanghai police force, local and international newsmen, and Chinese authorities, including the military. The radio intercept group with the 4th Marines was copying Japanese diplomatic traffic, much of which they were able to decode. The Japanese messages considered to be of importance were translated by Smith-Hutton for Adm. Yarnell and Col. Price. Smith-Hutton also made periodic visits to the Japanese military headquarters in the Hongkew section of the International Settlement, and the Japanese officials talked quite frankly about their operations and intentions. Thus, Capt. Boone, as the expert on the Chinese, and LCdr. Smith-Hutton, as the expert on the Japanese, were able to follow quite well the progress of the fighting and even to forecast some of the events with reasonable accuracy.[20]

In early 1938, when the Soviets sent four fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons to the Chungking-Hankow area to help the Chinese, U.S. gunboats were still operating that far up the Yangtze River, and the gunboat commanding officers were instructed to learn all they could about the Soviet personnel and their equipment. Capt. Claire Chennault, U.S. Army (later of the Flying Tigers), who was even then operating with the Chinese, also sent in reports from time to time.[21]

"Intelligence" in the various U.S. Navy fleets in 1938, except in the Asiatic Fleet, was still a largely theoretical concept. Press relations and, to a very limited extent, counterintelligence and security were actively engaged in, but other types of intelligence activity were generally ignored. In the Asiatic Fleet, approximately four officers and four enlisted personnel were working full time on intelligence as a primary assignment. And, one officer in each ship and on each staff of the Asiatic Fleet was assigned to additional duty as intelligence officer. In contrast, in the U.S. Fleet in the Atlantic, only one officer was assigned intelligence functions as additional duty on each staff, air base, submarine base, large ship, and in each division of small ships.[22]

In late October 1939, when the first detailed reports of early naval actions of World War II started coming to the Commander Battle Force, his flag secretary, acting as the intelligence officer, started the *Force Intelligence Bulletin*. The initial distribution was 100 copies, but requests for copies started rolling in, and the distribution was soon running over 1,000 copies per week.[23]

In the years immediately prior to U.S. involvement in World War II, commanders afloat were re-

sponsible for the organization and administration of the intelligence efforts within their commands. Such organizations were expected to conform to general directives prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations insofar as they touched upon, or required coordination with, other parts of the Naval Intelligence service.[24]

On 14 May 1942, Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), directed the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to train personnel for twelve aviation intelligence units that were to be assigned to the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor and to Advanced Joint Intelligence Centers in other locations in the Pacific. The advanced centers were not to be established until the main center at Pearl Harbor had been activated and became well organized. By the end of June 1942, personnel and material planning for the centers was in progress under the coordination of the Director of Naval Intelligence. As of 8 September 1942, the advanced centers were partly constructed or were in the final planning stages for the South Pacific area at Auckland, New Zealand, for the Northern Pacific area at Kodiak, Alaska, and for the Southwest Pacific at Bellconnen, Australia.

Adm. King intended to establish centers for the Atlantic Fleet, with the main center at Norfolk, as soon as the Pacific area intelligence centers were sufficiently advanced. One aviation intelligence officer was ordered by COMINCH to report to Naval Air Station, Norfolk, as early as 28 August 1942 for duty in connection with the establishment of the Atlantic Fleet Air Intelligence Center at the base. Next in priority were intelligence centers for the five sea frontier commanders (Eastern, Western, Panama, Caribbean, and Gulf). All ten components of the air combat intelligence organization were in operation by 16 November 1942.[25]

The wartime activities of the various wartime and postwar fleet intelligence organizations are discussed in Chapters 35 through 40.

Organization of Fleet Intelligence After World War II

Changes to Navy Regulations 1920, published on 21 June 1946, contained a new article, 687-A, in Chapter 18: "The Commander-in-Chief, or commander of any force or unit of the operating forces not operating under the Commander-in-Chief, shall maintain an efficient intelligence organization within his command." *Navy Regulations* also contained subparagraph (2)(c) of Article 786: "The organization of the staff shall include an intelligence section headed by a line officer designated as flag intelligence officer."

The Naval Intelligence Manual–1947, ONI-19(A), prescribed the mission of an intelligence officer assigned to duty with the operating forces to be as follows:

> a. To provide his commander or commanding officer with the strategic and operational intelligence required for the execution of his mission;
>
> b. To deny to the enemy or hostile forces all information of own forces;
>
> c. To combat sabotage and subversion in own forces; and
>
> d. To supply ONI with information and intelligence of value.[26]

Fleet Air Intelligence Augmenting Units (FAIAU) were established and used during the 1950s, primarily to provide the fleets with the capability, in an emergency, to immediately augment trained intelligence personnel for the forces afloat (usually aircraft carriers) in a forward area, and secondarily to assist the Fleet Intelligence Centers (FIC) in the production of intelligence. FAIAUs were attached either directly to the commander in chief or to the Fleet Intelligence Center of the fleet to which they were assigned.[27]

Fleet Intelligence Centers were established in the 1950s to provide the major fleets to which they were assigned with an intelligence production and intelligence personnel augmentation capability (see Chapter 40 about the specific FICs).

Mobile Intelligence Production Units were designed for rapid deployment so they could provide the fleet to which they were assigned with a mobile intelligence production capability.

Each intelligence organization in the operating forces was under the operational and administrative control of the command or commands to which it was assigned. In accordance with General Order No. 19, the Director of Naval Intelligence exercised technical control over intelligence matters through the Department of the Navy, including those relating to the operating forces.

Publications produced by ONI to provide guidance in intelligence activities in the operating forces during the 1950s included *Operational Intelligence*, ONI Y-1; *Operational Intelligence Manual (Air)*, ONI 52-2; *Operational Intelligence Manual (Amphibious)*, ONI-52-6; and *Intelligence Manual for Operating Units*, ONI-52-7.

To fulfill his mission in the Cold War era, the Director of Naval Intelligence required information concerning the current organizations; planned wartime organizations; operating plans; collection requirements; material status, training, techniques, and procedures; and command support for all intelligence activities and elements in the operating forces. The *U.S. Naval Intelligence Manual*, ONI-70-

1, of 20 June 1956, required that this information, together with appropriate comments and recommendations, be included in the intelligence activity reports to be submitted by the operating forces in accordance with the effective edition of OPNAV Instruction 05440.53. An officer in the operating forces who had been assigned to intelligence could be assigned collateral duties only to the extent that such duties did not interfere with his primary duty, according to the same directive.[28]

To increase the amount of intelligence collected by the operating forces, and focus better collection efforts on the highest priority gaps, a system of formalized, yet flexible, programs was established in 1958–1959. The general parameters of the programs were established by the CNO to provide technical guidance and support as well as to monitor the execution of the programs and the processing of the end results. Actual missions under the program were planned and conducted by the fleet commanders. The intelligence collected was initially processed by the fleets for fleet support requirements and was then forwarded to ONI for complete technical analysis and exchange with other intelligence services.

The basic objectives of the fleet intelligence collection programs were, in order of priority, the collection of intelligence to determine the operational characteristics and capabilities of new enemy material and equipment and to support research and development on countermeasures; the operational status and production level of new material and equipment as related to their effects on enemy strategic capabilities; and the current deployment and employment of new material and equipment as related to enemy order-of-battle and tactical capabilities.

Consistent with national intelligence collection requirements, top priority in all programs was assigned to the collection of intelligence on the potential enemy's state of the art in missilery, including information about naval forces that were considered capable of carrying missiles. A slightly lesser priority was the collection of intelligence on the USSR's capabilities in undersea warfare and air defense.

The fleet intelligence collection programs instituted during the late 1950s provided for the use of submarines, surface ships, and air forces, normally operating independently on specific assignments but occasionally participating in a joint effort. Special equipment and collection devices were made available to the designated forces, particularly for the interception and collection of electronic and acoustic emissions. In addition, the best possible photographic equipment was procured, and special detailed briefings and instructions were given to participating personnel to ensure the maximum coordination of visual, photo, and electronic observations.[29]

Chapter Notes

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3. Ibid., 111–13.

4. *SECNAV Annual Report, 1902*, 134.

5. ONI, *Monthly Information Bulletin*, 15 Apr 1919, 38–42.

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11. *CINCUS Annual Report, FY 1933*, 55; and *FY 1934*, 14.

12. VAdm. Felix L. Johnson, interview by author, 14 May 1975.

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14. ONI-19, *Naval Intelligence Manual*, 1933, para. 4001–4002.

15. Ibid., para. 4006, 4009.

16. Ibid., para. 5004.

17. Ibid., para. 4010.

18. Smith-Hutton oral history, USNI, 2:209–10.

19. Ibid., 224–27.

20. Ibid., 237–39.

21. Ibid., 258–59.

22. Department of the Navy, "Administrative History of the Office of Naval Intelligence in World War II," 10 Jul 1946, unpublished MS, Appendix H.

23. James O. Richardson, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral J. O. Richardson as told to Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, USN (Retired)* (Washington: GPO, 1973), 176.

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26. ONI-19(A), *Naval Intelligence Manual*, May 1947, para. 6004.

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CHAPTER 35

Operating Forces, Pacific

Pearl Harbor and the Aftermath

On 6 January 1940, Adm. James O. Richardson relieved Adm. Claude Bloch as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS). As part of Fleet Problem XXI, the fleet deployed to Hawaii on 1 April from its home bases on the U.S. West Coast, but it remained in Hawaii at the conclusion of the exercise, on the order of President Roosevelt.

In October 1940, Adm. Richardson wrote to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Harold R. Stark that Orange Plan 1, for a war with Japan, called for a major military operation to capture Base One in the Japanese Mandated Islands. Such an operation would require detailed knowledge of the area for proper planning, but the necessary information was not then available. The plan anticipated that sufficient information might be obtainable by reconnaissance after hostilities had commenced. The basic concept of delaying the gathering of necessary intelligence until after the opening of hostilities, Richardson said, presaged disaster.[1]

When Adm. Husband E. Kimmel relieved Adm. Richardson on 1 February 1941 as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and CINCUS, he was supported by a small staff designed for basing on board ship. On 21 March 1941, the staff moved to temporary facilities at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Between March and September 1942, the staff (less the War Plans Section) accompanied the admiral on board ship only briefly for short cruises. CINCPACFLT decided in early August that "in order successfully to prosecute a campaign in the Pacific, a shore headquarters at the principal base must be available." Commandant 14th Naval District was requested to erect a new headquarters building, and plans for the building were nearly complete at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.[2]

In addition to the small intelligence section of the Fleet staff, discussed below, intelligence support to the CINCUS staff included the Radio Unit, Pearl Harbor, headed by Cdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. Established in 1936 as an activity of the 14th Naval District, it was known in 1941 as the District Combat Intelligence Unit. Rochefort's organization served as the primary source of tactical intelligence for the fleet intelligence officer.[3]

When Gen. Tojo took over the Japanese government on 16 October 1941, CNO Adm. Stark alerted the Navy by message and directed that due precautions and preparatory deployments be made. Adm. Kimmel took various actions, including putting submarines on "war patrol" off Wake and Midway Islands and sending twelve patrol planes to Midway to conduct daily patrols within 100 miles of the island.[4]

Upon receipt of the CNO's 27 November "war warning" message, Adm. Kimmel ordered a squadron of patrol planes to Wake from Midway with instructions to search the ocean areas en route. Three days later, Kimmel deployed a replacement squadron from Pearl Harbor to Midway. The squadron proceeded to Midway via Johnston Island, making a reconnaissance sweep along its track. The replacement squadron conducted distant search sweeps of not less than a 500-mile radius and of varying sectors from Midway on 3–6 December. The squadron then proceeded to Wake and, on 2 December, searched to a distance of 525 miles from that island. On 7 December, five of the Midway-based patrol planes were searching out to 450 miles from the island in the 120° to 170° sector.[5]

No distant reconnaissance patrols were conducted from Pearl Harbor. Adm. Kimmel had considered doing so, but he had only 49 patrol planes in flyable condition, and he estimated that another 84 planes would have been needed to patrol a full circle to 800 miles. Only such a massive search sector would, he felt, ensure against a surprise attack by

fast, carrier-based planes, and if the searches were conducted on a daily basis for a protracted period, 250 patrol planes would have been required.[6]

Kimmel's command at Pearl Harbor has been much maligned because of the Pearl Harbor attack—unjustifiably so in certain respects. Of the various potential targets for Japanese attack, geographic location made Pearl Harbor one of the lesser possibilities after those, such as Malaya, the Philippines, and Borneo, that had been more positively indicated as being probable Japanese targets by various items of intelligence.

Another mitigating factor relates to direct intelligence support. Insofar as communications intelligence (COMINT) was concerned, Rochefort's Pearl Harbor Unit had to rely on what it received from Corregidor and Washington; the unit had no organic intercept capability.

The unscheduled change of call signs and cypher by the Japanese around 1 December 1941 was an additional signal that hostilities were about to be undertaken. The radio intercept unit at Corregidor was the first to detect that major change, and it was duly reported. Also, when the Japanese carrier force left home waters, some of the enlisted intercept operators and traffic analysts at Corregidor suspected that transmitters from the carriers had been put ashore and were continuing to transmit as if exercises were continuing in the home waters. The suspicion was reported but was sufficiently speculative, so it could only be considered an uncertain possibility that the carriers had left Japanese waters. The big question remaining unanswered was, if the Japanese had left, where had they gone?

That the command at Pearl Harbor did entertain the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was indicated by Kimmel's employment of his inadequate reconnaissance resources. But the search sectors selected as most likely didn't include the northwest, from where the attack actually came.[7]

On 6 December 1941, a sighting report from the PBY flying boat reconnaissance effort of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet Adm. Thomas C. Hart was received, stating that a concentration of Japanese transports and naval vessels, including submarines, was south of Camranh Bay, Indochina, and that other ships were headed toward the Gulf of Siam. Kimmel sent Intelligence Officer LCdr. Edwin T. Layton to show Hart's message to Adm. William S. Pye, Commander Battle Force, embarked in the battleship *California* (BB 44), and to get Pye's comments. Adm. Pye and his acting chief of staff both read the message and estimated that the Japanese were probably going to occupy a position in the Gulf of Siam as an advance base from which to operate against the Burma Road. Pye and his staff asked Layton for his thoughts; he told them that he didn't believe the Japanese would stop there, although part of their operations might be against the Burma Road. Layton believed that the Japanese had objectives further south, probably the East Indies oil resources, inasmuch as the United States had stopped its export of oil to Japan. Layton also added that, since the Japanese never left their flanks exposed, he didn't think they would leave the unsecured Philippines on their flank, and that the United States would thus be at war.

Adm. Pye and his chief of staff both said in effect, "Oh, no. The Japanese won't attack us. We're too strong and too powerful." Layton reported their comments back to Kimmel. At lunch that day, several officers of the CINCPACFLT staff asked Layton about the significance of the Japanese troop transports heading toward the Gulf of Siam. He repeated the comments he had made to Adm. Pye and expressed his belief that the United States would be at war the next day. That drew the usual remarks about "Layton and his Saturday crisis." The next morning, during the attack, Capt. William A. Kitts III, who had been in the wardroom the day before and had heard Layton's forecast, acknowledged that Layton's audience should have listened more seriously to him.[8]

During and following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, there was considerable uncertainty as to the direction from which the attack had come. Layton had arrived at his office in the submarine base at 0820, and shortly thereafter Lt. Wesley A. (Ham) Wright of Rochefort's unit informed Layton that they had had one bilateral radio direction-finding (D/F) bearing, 353°/183°, on the attack force but that they couldn't communicate with the second D/F station at Wahiawa, which would have given a crossbearing and resolved whether the Japanese force was north or south of Pearl Harbor. (Later it was learned that the Army had taken over the telephone circuit to the Wahiawa station, which explained why the facility was out of communications when it was most needed.)

Layton laid down the reciprocal bearings on a chart in Operations Plot. Adm. Kimmel was rather irked that Intelligence couldn't tell him whether the enemy was to the north or south. To make matters even worse, a garbled message was received at about that time from a Navy ship reporting two carriers south of Pearl Harbor. Actually, this sighting, as originated, was of two U.S. Navy cruisers.

It was not until later in the afternoon on 7 December that positive information was obtained that the attack had come from the north. A "plot board" from one of the Japanese aircraft that had crashed into the seaplane tender *Curtiss* (AV 4) was recov-

ered and delivered to Fleet Intelligence. Layton examined the plot board and the pilot's navigation sheet, which showed the aircraft's course to Pearl Harbor and the intended course back to the Japanese carrier. With the plot board was a temporary callsign card listing the radio calls for all commands and ships in the attack force. The card was passed on to Rochefort's unit.[9]

When the attack had begun, the Army called its troops to operate lookout stations, gun batteries, security guard posts, etc. It was at this time that the plug was pulled on the telephone circuit to the Navy's second D/F station. Beach patrols and other lookouts then started sending in a series of "the damnedest reports you ever heard," many of which were passed to Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) by the Intelligence (G-2) organization of the Army's Hawaiian Command. Some examples included: "Enemy ships bombarding . . . beach, landing in progress." "Two carriers south of Oahu." "Paratroopers landing, wearing blue uniforms with red sun insignia on back." "Shells landing on . . . beach; we are taking enemy ships under counter-battery fire." The Army was reminded that the U.S. Marines had been scheduled to conduct exercises that day and that they were probably shooting at the Marines. Furthermore, since the Marines had no ammunition for their exercise, any shells landing behind the Army observers were probably "shorts" from their own counter-battery fire (which turned out later to be the case). Thus a confused and frantic day was made more hectic for the Navy intelligence staff trying to evaluate the true situation. The climax came that night when Army batteries commenced firing at PBY reconnaissance aircraft landing at Pearl Harbor, prompting reports that enemy airborne troops were landing from flying boats.[10]

At the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, Adm. Kimmel's intelligence staff consisted of an intelligence officer (LCdr. Layton), one assistant (Lt. Robert E. Hudson), and one enlisted yeoman. According to a CINCPAC Staff Instruction from 1941, the intelligence staff was responsible for assembling, evaluating, and disseminating enemy information; providing information essential for developing current estimates to Fleet Operations Officer Capt. Walter S. Delany and War Plans Officer Capt. Charles H. "Sock" McMorris; directing counterespionage and counterinformation efforts; supervising reconnaissance and photographic activities; and collecting, evaluating, and distributing information on foreign naval vessels and merchantmen. In practice, however, before the war, the Fleet Intelligence Office was mainly occupied with counterespionage and with the analysis of existing information on the strength and location of Japanese fleets and advance bases.[11]

After 7 December 1941, the fleet intelligence officer handled all types of intelligence needed by the fleet and the Pacific area commanders (North, Central, and South). It was almost immediately apparent that all those duties could only be carried out by a much larger organization; instead of the fleet intelligence staff being enlarged, however, other organizations were formed under the administrative control of the Commander 14th Naval District (COM 14) and under the operational control of CINCPAC to serve the fleet and area commanders. By placing the new intelligence organizations under COM 14, the intelligence producers were relieved of having to perform many purely administrative functions.[12]

Development of the Wartime Intelligence System in the Pacific

After Adm. Chester W. Nimitz took command of CINCPACFLT, and when LCdr. Layton had had his first chance to talk with him, Layton asked to be detached. He wanted to go to sea in command of a destroyer, if possible, and kill Japanese. Nimitz told Layton that he wanted him to stay on and that Layton could kill more Japanese by sitting at his desk on the CINCPACFLT staff than he ever could by commanding a destroyer.

Nimitz thereupon expounded on his requirements for intelligence support. He said that good intelligence was vital to a good estimate of the situation and, in turn, to making sound decisions. As he saw it, intelligence support to operations would become of the greatest importance. Nimitz told Layton,

> I want you to be the Adm. Nagumo [the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff] on my staff, where your every thought, every instinct, will be that of Adm. Nagumo's; you are to see the war, their operations, their aims, from the Japanese viewpoint and keep me advised what you [as a Japanese] are thinking about, what you are doing, and what purpose, what strategy, motivates your operations. If you can do this, then I think you will be able to give me the kind of information I need for the prosecution of my mission.[13]

Nimitz wanted Layton to be at his office ready to brief him daily at 0755 (the time was later changed to 0800). Promptly at that time, the intelligence briefing was started in an easy, informal atmosphere. After the briefing, Nimitz would ask questions about various things having to do with intelligence, the war, and enemy reactions. In addition to the daily briefing, Layton would go to Nimitz's office

whenever he had additional intelligence reports or specific bits if information deserving priority consideration. Soon, Nimitz informed his aide, Lt. H. A. Lamar, that Layton was not to be required to wait to see him. If Layton said he had something very important, Nimitz was to be informed, even if Nimitz was in conference with important people. In such a case, he would excuse his visitor while he received Layton's report. Layton didn't find it necessary to use the privilege often.[14]

The prewar Orange plans prescribed that the Navy's mission in a war against Japan was, basically, to advance and capture a position in the Marshall Islands at which to establish a forward fleet base. The Japanese success in their attack on Pearl Harbor caused the Navy to postpone that initial step, not only because of insufficient air, surface, and amphibious strength, but also because of a lack of intelligence on Japanese defenses in the Marshalls. Adm. Nimitz conferred with Layton on how best to remedy the intelligence deficiency. Submarine reconnaissance of Japanese strongpoints in the Marshalls and other Mandated Islands was initiated as part of the war patrols that were deployed immediately following Pearl Harbor. The resulting periscope sightings confirmed the Japanese militarization of the islands, and the receipt of the submarine intelligence contributed to Nimitz's decision to order a carrier task force raid on the Marshalls that was carried out on 1 February 1942. Although the orders urged that photographs be taken for intelligence purposes, none of value were obtained. Thereafter, photography for intelligence purposes was made a specific requirement in any carrier attack on enemy positions.

The strategic and operational planners soon realized their need for intelligence, particularly photographic intelligence, before they could plan and execute an amphibious assault on the Marshalls with any hope of success. The use of carriers for such intelligence-gathering missions, however, was out of the question at that stage of the war. The United States had too few carriers to be able to provide aerial reconnaissance on a continuing basis until some future D-Day.

Thus, in order to meet the requirement for vertical and oblique aerial photographs, a base had to be built within range of the first island objectives. At the outbreak of war, the Japanese were confident that the United States would attempt to seize the Marshall Islands. Accordingly, to protect the Marshall Islands southern flank, they seized and strongly fortified Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. The Japanese action forced the United States to set up its initial intelligence-gathering base in the Ellice Islands to the southeast of the Gilberts.[15]

After Midway, the subject of the need for more people in intelligence came up again, and again Adm. Nimitz stated his determination not to let the size of his staff get out of hand. Layton told Nimitz that he could not give him effective intelligence support unless he had enough people to do the work; that as the war progressed and U.S. Navy operations expanded in scope, the intelligence requirements would increase in magnitude accordingly; and that more people would be needed to do the job. Some time after Layton's plea, Nimitz announced that Layton had been justified in asking for more intelligence personnel. When Layton said that he needed forty to sixty additional people, however, Nimitz said flatly that he wouldn't consider expanding his staff to that degree. Layton then pushed the idea of assigning the necessary personnel for intelligence to the 14th Naval District to work specifically for him. That led to the establishment in July 1942 of the Intelligence Center, which eventually became the Joint Intelligence Center when Adm. Nimitz became Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. (See Chapter 19 for more information on the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas [JICPOA].)

Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (ICPOA) was thus established by Commander 14th Naval District, on 13 July 1942. Initially, part of the Fleet Intelligence organization became the Combat Intelligence Section of ICPOA, and the District Combat Intelligence Unit was assigned in October 1942 to ICPOA as the Radio Intelligence Unit of the Combat Intelligence Section. The fleet intelligence officer and the part of his section remaining with the CINCPAC staff provided a personal advisory unit for CINCPAC himself and was concerned primarily with tactical intelligence and with collecting and collating information on the location and movement of enemy naval, ground, and air units.[16]

Shortly after the war began, the Fleet Intelligence Office had been augmented by Lts. Arthur L. Benedict, John G. Roenigk and H. B. Coleman (who became the fleet security officer). With Lt. Robert Hudson, they were placed on a one-in-four intelligence watch under the direction of Layton. Benedict and Roenigk, both Japanese linguists, assisted in the translation of captured documents, particularly those from the midget submarine that had been captured off Bellows Field after the Pearl Harbor attack. The Fleet Intelligence watch was maintained until about August 1942, shortly after ICPOA was set up. At that time, Benedict and Roenigk were detached and assigned to the Radio Intelligence Unit of ICPOA. The continuous intelligence watch was then terminated until June 1943 when three Naval Reserve officers, Lts. K. A. Brown, A. M. Ellerby,

and R. L. Jackson, were assigned, trained, and established as an intelligence watch.[17]

On 6 September 1943, the day before ICPOA became JICPOA, the Radio Intelligence Unit was removed from ICPOA, assigned to CINCPACFLT, and given the name Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPAC). The officer in charge of FRUPAC, Capt. William B. Goggins, was given additional duty on the staff of CINCPAC-CINCPOA as Communication Intelligence Liaison Officer. His primary duty was to supply to CINCPAC all information derived by communications intelligence methods, by all units of the U.S. naval communication intelligence organization, and by all similar Allied organizations.

Also on 6 September 1943, the CINCPAC Staff Intelligence Office, headed by then-Cdr. Layton, became the Combat Intelligence Section of the Staff Intelligence Division. It handled all urgent intelligence material and controlled the dissemination of intelligence at the highest classification. In daily conferences with CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Layton presented the special intelligence material, and it was largely through his briefings that Nimitz received the information necessary to make decisions on the employment of his forces.

Specifically, the Combat Intelligence Section assembled, collated, and made appropriate distribution of information on the enemy; made a daily review for CINCPAC of the current enemy situation and apparent intentions; kept a strategic plot of enemy naval and air forces; prepared daily and special intelligence bulletins for distribution to appropriate echelons of Nimitz's command; disseminated combat intelligence to appropriate fleet, area, and task force commanders; analyzed what was known of the current logistic and material condition of the enemy; directed counterespionage, counterintelligence, and counterpropaganda; and carried on other general intelligence duties.

A concise daily message to distribute current information about the enemy was sent out by the Combat Intelligence Section by radio. Although the addressees on the message varied from time to time, they usually included the most important naval commanders in the Pacific, including British, and all important Army commands in the forward areas. In addition, Capt. Layton helped to supervise the Estimate Section of JICPOA and was the key officer responsible for intelligence matters in support of other divisions of CINCPAC's staff, especially Plans and Operations. Of necessity, the work of the Combat Intelligence Section and the Operations Division overlapped where an intelligence function ended and an operational function began. The smooth transition of such functions was achieved by mutual understanding between the heads of the two organizations.[18]

When the Joint Staff was set up in September 1943 (at the insistence of the Army Chief of Staff and at the direction of COMINCH Adm. Ernest J. King, a distinction was drawn between the Fleet and Joint Staffs by the use of F (Fleet) and J (Joint) designators for particular billets. Some officers, including almost all those in the Plans and Operations Divisions, were double-hatted and given both F and J designations. Fleet Intelligence Officer Layton and his assistants were listed as F only.

The staff functioned as one unit, with the separation between Fleet and Joint on paper only and serving no real useful purpose. In December 1943, when the original controversy that had led to the establishment of the Joint Staff had abated, the Fleet-Joint distinction and the F and J designators were discontinued. The CINCPAC-CINCPOA staff remained what it had been all along, a single joint staff organization.[19]

Of the four main divisions of the staff, two were headed by naval officers (War Plans and Operations) and two by Army officers (Intelligence and Logistics). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Col. J. J. Twitty, was also officer-in-charge of JICPOA. The fleet intelligence officer headed the Combat Intelligence Section of the Intelligence Division.[20]

In planning for the attack on the Marshall Islands and its occupation, it was noted that reinforcements of the perimeter islands were continually being made by the Japanese at the expense of Kwajalein. Some troops had even been moved from the Japanese headquarters on Kwajalein to the perimeter islands.

Adm. Nimitz, in late 1943, called a conference with his Marshall Islands assault commanders, Marine MajGen. Holland M. Smith, Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, and others. The flag and general officers had all been making plans to occupy Mili, Wotje, and Tarawa (Maloelap). Nimitz reviewed the intelligence situation, order-of-battle, etc. with them and asked the senior officers if they still wanted to follow through with their assault planning for the same three islands. After receiving an affirmative reply, Nimitz announced that the assault would be on Kwajalein.

His assault commanders thought Nimitz had lost his mind. They believed that Japanese air strength in the outer islands would make penetration to the central island, Kwajalein, much too hazardous. Nimitz, however, pointed out that heavy strikes by carrier air and surface bombardment, plus close reconnaissance of outer island strong points, would not only reduce the hazards posed by the strong points, but would also falsely confirm to the Japanese what they expected would be the U.S. objectives, leaving the defenders to be surprised by

landings on weakly defended Kwajalein. Nimitz's estimate proved to be correct.[21]

Prior to the invasion of Kwajalein in January 1944, small U.S. Army raider units were to seize two small islands astride the southeastern entrance to the lagoon just before the main assault was to begin. Both units landed on the wrong islands; each unit was one island west of its prescribed target. The more western unit found some Japanese naval personnel whose ship had been sunk during the preliminary naval bombardment and aerial bombing. The senior Japanese officer was carrying a roll of red-edged charts. In Turner's flagship, the Japanese material was identified as being top secret charts of all the Japanese Mandated Islands showing areas that were mined and areas that had been cleared of coral heads and wire-dragged to a certain depth. Copies of the captured Kwajalein chart were immediately reproduced and distributed to all ships and commands, and they were used in clearing Kwajalein atoll of mines and guiding the amphibious invasion to safe and sheltered anchorages in the lagoon. The other charts were later used in the operations against Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian, Ulithi, etc.[22]

To the Japanese, long-range photographic reconnaissance missions by four-engined PB4Y "Liberators" meant that a U.S. carrier attack would soon follow. That had happened at islands in the Marshalls and at Eniwetok before the early raids on Tarawa. Thus, when a Marine photo plane flew out of the Solomons for a photo mission over Truk, Adm. Koga ordered his fleet out of the base. Most of the Japanese combatants (battleships, cruisers, and destroyers) moved out on Koga's order, but the auxiliaries (supply ships, fleet oilers, repair ships, submarine tenders, ammunition ships, etc.) were delayed in their departure and were sunk by a carrier task force raid on 17 February 1944. The raid and the loss of the vital auxiliaries effectively terminated the Japanese navy's capability to carry out overseas offensive operations from Truk or any other forward base.[23]

The lack of good maps and charts of Pacific islands was a problem throughout the war. Even Guam, which had been a U.S. possession since the Spanish-American War, had not been mapped adequately enough for military-amphibious operations. Similarly, when the United States decided to recapture Attu in the Aleutian Islands chain, no satisfactory terrain maps of the former U.S. island were to be found. That deficiency was corrected by frequent aerial photographic missions flown just after the Japanese occupation of Attu. Photo interpretation kept track of the Japanese buildup of defensive installations and order-of-battle on Attu and also enabled the production of accurate terrain maps.[24]

Guam and the other islands of interest in the Marianas were beyond the range of Allied reconnaissance aircraft. A carrier task force under Adm. Marc A. Mitscher was therefore sent to make an offensive sweep of the Marianas but primarily to fly aerial photographic missions. The intelligence information obtained on 23 February 1944 from Mitscher's reconnaissance operations was needed for planning the capture of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.

In support of the Hollandia landing by forces under Douglas MacArthur, carrier task forces struck Palau in early April 1944 with devastating effect. In anticipation of the raid, Adm. Koga (who had taken over from the late Adm. Yamamoto) and his staff had left Palau for the Philippines in two flying boats. Adm. Koga, in the first plane, was never heard from again. His chief of staff in the other plane ran into a terrific storm and was forced to land near Cebu, where he and his briefcase were captured by guerrillas.

MacArthur's headquarters was informed of the briefcase with its apparently important papers. The Seventh Fleet was directed to send one of its submarines to collect the documents. The gist of a non-Navy translation of the document was received by dispatch at Nimitz's Pearl Harbor headquarters and prompted a request to MacArthur for photostatic copies of the originals. The copies arrived promptly by air and were translated immediately. Copies of the Japanese defense plans were mimeographed and were sent with a cover letter to all unit commanders of the Marianas invasion forces assembling in Eniwetok. In the Japanese defense plans, the Marianas were included among the areas considered vital to the defense of the empire and were designated as areas where a major U.S. assault or invasion would be counterattacked by a concentration of all available Japanese forces.

Consequently, after the invasion of Saipan had started, when Spruance received intelligence that the Japanese navy was concentrating for a counterattack, he decided to remain close to the invasion area and neutralize the enemy airfields there to disrupt any use by the Japanese as staging points for shuttle bombing. (In shuttle bombing, aircraft take off from carriers, drop their bombs, land at a nearby land base for refueling, and then return to the Japanese carriers.)[25]

On 5 January 1945, a billet was established for a radio intelligence officer in the Communications Division of the CINCPAC-CINCPOA staff. In addition to assisting the communications officer, the radio intelligence officer acted as liaison between the fleet communication officer and the fleet combat intelligence officer and between CINCPOA and the top Army and Army Air Force commands in the

theater that were involved in communications and intelligence, and between CINCPAC and FRUPAC.

Early in 1945, CINCPAC adopted a policy of furnishing mobile Radio Intelligence Units to the fleets, task forces, and principal task groups afloat. The Radio Intelligence Units were assigned after an initial period of training at FRUPAC. The radio intelligence officer kept in close touch with the program and drafted the necessary directives, assigning units and moving them to the commands for which they were destined.[26]

The establishment of the Combat Intelligence Office at the CINCPAC Advance Headquarters on Guam in January 1945 required a group of officers to serve as watch standers and intelligence analysts in specific fields. Accordingly, Capt. Layton brought with him to the Advance Headquarters section Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer Lt. Donald M. Showers, USNR, a specialist on Japanese naval order-of-battle; Lt. L. H. Mann, USNR, geographic specialist; Lt. L. B. Fowler, USNR, Japanese air specialist; Lt. G. M. Page, USNR, Japanese merchant shipping specialist and photo interpreter; Lt.(jg) J. A. Rutter, USNR, Japanese economics specialist; and 1stLt. H. F. Leathers, U.S. Army, Japanese Army order-of-battle specialist. Lt. Mann was subsequently released for duty with the Advance Intelligence Center when that organization was set up at Guam as a forward echelon of JICPOA.

The need for direct and secure communications between the Advance Headquarters intelligence section and the Pearl Harbor intelligence agencies prompted the installation of a radio teletype circuit for that purpose. Another teletype circuit to the Radio Analysis Group, Forward Area was maintained in the Combat Intelligence Office for handling intelligence material disseminated to the fleet from Advance Headquarters. The location of the communication equipment within the Combat Intelligence Office necessitated the assignment of four communication watch officers to stand 24-hour watches concurrently with the intelligence officer analysts named above. By that arrangement, CINCPAC communications was relieved of handling special intelligence material, and all such material was received, processed, and disseminated by the Combat Intelligence Section at Advance Headquarters, providing the additional benefit of an increase in security.[27]

Advance Headquarters functioned throughout the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations and the final actions leading to Japan's surrender. It was closed on 19 September 1945.

Korean War Era

The Intelligence Section of the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during Fiscal Year 1950 continued to disseminate intelligence information within the Pacific Command by means of its *Weekly Intelligence Digest*. Within the CINCPACFLT staff, intelligence was disseminated through daily and weekly summaries and by oral briefings. It appears that the importance of intelligence to the daily routine of operations at CINCPACFLT had sunk to a low level after the Second World War; intelligence appeared as a sketchy report in the "Miscellaneous" section of the Fiscal Year 1950 CINCPACFLT Annual Report.[28]

Upon the outbreak of Korean hostilities, the primary problem for CINCPACFLT was to secure adequate intelligence personnel for the naval forces deployed to the Western Pacific. The immediate solution to the problem was complicated by the orientation of the U.S. armed forces toward the European theater, and the loss, since demobilization in 1945–1946, of many skilled intelligence specialists, such as photo interpreters and air combat intelligence officers. Through assignment of additional billets, establishment of Fleet Air Intelligence and Photo Interpretation Schools, and the recall to active duty of reserve officers, the intelligence personnel situation was well on the way toward solution as of 20 September 1950, but it was still not satisfactory.

Other problems facing CINCPACFLT were the need to provide timely and adequate dissemination of intelligence to Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), and receipt of intelligence from the Western Pacific by CINCPACFLT. The difficulties were caused by an overload of traffic at the message-handling facilities. A top secret 24-hour telecommunications circuit between CINCPACFLT and COMNAVFE was established as a solution.

The reproduction and dissemination of photographs presented yet another problem. The need for timely photographs, both in Pearl Harbor and in Washington by intelligence agencies and for publicity purposes, was also extremely pressing. Experience had shown that if the required number of copies was not printed and the film cataloged while events were fresh, exploitation was seldom carried out at a later date due to lack of personnel and the overriding priority of subsequent requirements. To correct the situation, it was suggested that the film be sent to Pearl Harbor for reproduction when theater facilities weren't able to provide the requisite copies, especially when large numbers of copies were needed. The establishment of a courier service provided expeditious transfer of film and prints.[29]

Shortly after the start of the Korean conflict, CINCPACFLT's Intelligence Section was raised to the status of a staff division. The Intelligence Division conducted daily oral briefings for CINCPACFLT and staff and gave special briefings to type,

force, group, and unit commanders, commanding officers of individual ships, and intelligence officers of subordinate staffs. Intelligence was also disseminated to the staff and subordinate commands through intelligence annexes to various plans, by means of the *Weekly Intelligence Digest*, and via formal intelligence estimates and staff studies.

A photo interpretation school was initiated at the Naval Air Station, Alameda, under Commander Naval Air Forces, Pacific, and the CINCPACFLT Intelligence Division coordinated the flow of fleet photography from the forward areas to the respective Navy bureaus in Washington, with collateral distribution of prints to other naval commands as required.[30]

The Submarine Evaluation Board was established in 1952 to provide for a systematic and rapid evaluation of submarine contact reports received by CINCPACFLT. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence served as senior member on the board.[31]

The Joint Operational Intelligence Agency, Pacific Command (JOINPAC) was established during Fiscal Year 1953 by integrating the CINCPACFLT Intelligence Division (N-2) with the CINCPAC Joint Intelligence Division (J-2). The consolidation was made to maximize efficiency and economy of personnel and funds by physically integrating intelligence operations, administration, personnel management, and facilities. The Special Intelligence Production Unit was established and functioned under the operational command of CINCPACFLT for the production of targeting materials. The Submarine Evaluation Board, established at CINCPACFLT during Fiscal Year 1952, was renamed the Submarine Classification and Damage Assessment Board, but it retained the same functions and membership.[32]

Expansion of the Peacetime Intelligence Capability in the Pacific, 1954–1969

In reaction to increasing Chinese Communist support to Viet Minh aggression against the French in Indochina, the United States ordered two aircraft carriers and a squadron of destroyers to the Philippines in February 1954, ostensibly for six weeks of "fair weather training." Commander First Fleet VAdm. William K. Phillips, with a small operational staff, was flown from San Diego to Sangley Point via Honolulu (during the long Washington's Birthday weekend) to assume command of the force. At CINCPACFLT Headquarters, VAdm. Phillips and his staff were briefed on the situation in Indochina and on his mission while deployed to the South China Sea. First Fleet Intelligence Officer Cdr. Wyman H. Packard was also briefed by the CINCPACFLT Intelligence Officer, Capt. Samuel B. Frankel, on the intelligence support that could be expected and the intelligence collection requirements and possibilities in the anticipated operating area.

Dien Bien Phu had been under Viet Minh attack since late 1953, and when the U.S. carrier force arrived in the Philippine area, the situation was becoming critical for the French. VAdm. Phillips's classified mission was to be ready for combat operations in case a decision was made to employ his force in support of the French. Initially, the aircraft carrier *Wasp* (CV 18) was the flagship, and the intelligence officers (air group and ship) on board provided staff support to Flag Intelligence Officer Cdr. Packard. Appropriate maps and charts were obtained from Commander Naval Forces, Philippines for plotting the situation in Indochina and for planning possible air strikes. Daily situation reports were received from CINCPACFLT, and other intelligence reports were received from the Naval Security Group Detachment on board *Wasp*.

While the force maintained a high state of readiness for contingencies, it conducted a wide variety of training exercises. Reconnaissance patrols were flown to identify and photograph shipping in the area of the force when it was at sea. Detailed surveys were made of the Subic Bay, Cubi Point, and Sangley Point facilities in the Philippines to determine their adequacy to serve as fleet bases.[33]

On 19 March 1954, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Robert B. Carney ordered VAdm. Phillips to maintain a 12-hour alert and to prepare to steam near the entrance to the Gulf of Tonkin, ready to begin operations in support of the French on about three hours' notice. The force was accordingly moved to an operating area about 100 miles south of Hainan Island. On 25 March, CINCPACFLT recommended that carrier aircraft from Phillips's force conduct reconnaissance of nearby Chinese airfields, assembly points for shipment of supplies, and critical roads and trails over which artillery and other military items had been flowing to the Viet Minh for their Dien Bien Phu siege. Lang Son and Caobang across from Kwangsi Province, and Lao Cai south of Yunnan Province were also to be covered in the reconnaissance flights. Adm. Carney concurred with the recommendation on 29 March.

Using photo plane detachments from Phillips's two carriers, and with the force positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin about 125 miles east-southeast of Haiphong, the photo reconnaissance missions were successfully carried out. Flying in pairs at high altitudes, the photo aircraft covered railroads from west of Nanning and south of Kunming to Hanoi. The aircraft also took pictures of port facilities and airfields in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas and on

Port data collection in the Pacific Fleet area during Fiscal Year 1964 was highlighted by the visit of the survey ship *Rehoboth* (AGS 50) to Nakhodka, the commercial port for Vladivostok, from 9 to 13 November 1963. The visit was in reciprocity for a previous visit by the Soviet research nonmagnetic sail research ship *Zarya* to Honolulu and San Francisco. The *Rehoboth* had also conducted an oceanographic and hydrographic survey in the Sea of Okhotsk from 7 to 26 October, prior to the Nakhodka visit.[47]

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CHAPTER 36

Operating Forces, South and Southwest Pacific Area

The South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas are considered together in this chapter, partly because many of the sources of intelligence information were common to each and also because, initially, most of the current intelligence support to Commander South Pacific Area and Forces (COMSOPAC), came from various Southwest Pacific (SWPAC) commands and activities.

The amount of detailed information located on naval intelligence activities in the two areas has been disappointingly small, possibly because, as commands in these areas completed their operations, they moved on without summarizing or preserving their records. Lt. James A. Michener, USNR, was Historical Officer in 1945 on the staff of COMSOPAC, and he reportedly had access to some of the intelligence files. COMSOPAC's official history manuscript has not been located, although certain elements may appear in Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific*.

Commander South Pacific

In preparation for the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal in 1942, all immediately available information on those islands was collected. In addition, Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, sent LtCol. Frank B. Goettge to Australia, where he obtained valuable information on the southern Solomons from Australian intelligence centers and from individuals familiar with the area.[1]

Following the landings on 7 August 1942, VAdm. Robert L. Ghormley, COMSOPAC, with headquarters in Auckland, New Zealand, was almost completely dependent upon Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPAC) for current intelligence on Japanese reactions to the landings. This was because the line of demarcation between SOPAC and SWPAC ran just west of Guadalcanal and separated it from the approaches that Japanese naval forces would use coming down the "Slot" from Rabaul.

Although reports from SWPAC aerial and submarine reconnaissance indicated that Japanese forces were on the move on 7 and 8 August, their inaccuracies and delayed receipt by the forces covering the Guadalcanal landings contributed to the disaster that befell the U.S. Navy at the Battle of Savo Island on the night of 8–9 August. Furthermore, no intelligence officers were assigned to the covering forces and, consequently, no professional analysis was made of the fragmentary and conflicting reports received before the Japanese attack.[2]

Subsequently, Australian coastwatchers in the northern Solomons, New Ireland, and New Britain provided invaluable information about the concentration and movement of Japanese air and naval forces threatening U.S. forces in the southern Solomons. The coastwatchers established jungle hideouts at vantage points where they could observe and report on Japanese-held ports and bases and on the movements of combatant forces and troop reinforcements en route to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area.[3]

When VAdm. William F. Halsey relieved VAdm. Ghormley as COMSOPAC on 18 October 1942, he established his headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. His Force Intelligence Officer was Col. Julian Brown, USMC. Collaboration between Brown and the rest of the staff, particularly with Halsey's operations officer, was very close. Intelligence information from COMSWPAC, CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), aerial and submarine reconnaissance, coastwatchers, and communications intelligence (COMINT) was brought as received into Flag Plot and the Operations Section, and was discussed as to its relevance to current and planned operations. In turn, operation reports were made available to Force Intelligence when they contained information on enemy forces.

Some of the intelligence staff officers assigned to COMSOPAC during the 1942–1943 period included Cdr. Marion C. Cheek, Cdr. Edward S. Pearce (a Japanese-language officer), LCdr. Logan Jenkins, and Lts. Harris Cox and John Goodbody, USNR. Col. Brown was relieved as Force Intelligence Officer early in 1943 by Col. F. P. Munson, U.S. Army.

Photographic interpretation, prisoner-of-war interrogation, and other specialized intelligence units performed support functions appropriate to their specialities. Commander Air Forces, South Pacific and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing rotated air combat intelligence officers to the various squadrons operating from Noumea, Espiritu Santo, Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Munda.

During the height of the campaign for Guadalcanal, LCdr. Daniel J. McCallum, a Japanese language officer, was on that island for eight months as part of COMSOPAC's intelligence group, listening to the voice communications of the Japanese army and navy in the area and reporting what he heard to the local U.S. commanders.[4]

In March 1943, the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington recommended that the Radio Intelligence Unit (RIU) at Auckland be merged with the Advanced Unit at Melbourne. It was believed that the interests of COMSOPAC could best be served by a major center at Melbourne. A small RIU coding board would continue operation at COMSOPAC headquarters in Noumea. CINCPAC and COMSOPAC both concurred in the move, and the latter made the necessary arrangements to carry it out.[5]

As of March 1944, Col. Ronald A. Boone, USMC, who had been the 4th Marines intelligence officer in Shanghai before the war, was COMSOPAC Intelligence Officer. The officer in charge of the Counterintelligence Unit was Capt. Emil Kruger, USMC. Other elements of the intelligence staff included the Operational and Combat Intelligence Sections, the Photo Intelligence Section, and the COMINT Section. The Operational Intelligence Section included a Lt. Byron R. White, USNR, who later became a U.S. Supreme Court justice.

In 1944, air strikes were still being conducted out of bases in SOPAC, particularly against targets such as Rabaul. The strikes required a considerable photo intelligence effort, and a rather large Photographic and Reproduction Unit was maintained on the COMSOPAC staff at Noumea, New Caledonia.

The Counterintelligence Unit of the COMSOPAC staff was concerned with any possible sabotage, espionage, or subversion involving naval facilities or personnel. It maintained close liaison with the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps office in Noumea and with the local French civil police agencies. It also maintained close liaison with the port director at Noumea for the purpose of checking on crew members of merchant ships arriving in port. Occasionally, leads would be received from district intelligence offices back in the United States concerning suspected crew members due to arrive in SOPAC ports. In those instances, the ship involved would be boarded and, if appropriate, surveillances would be conducted. The French population in Noumea, at that time, had a small but active Communist party and a couple of active Communist-front organizations.[6]

Commander Southwest Pacific

A few days after the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942, RAdm. J. G. Crace, RN, commented that Allied aircraft reporting on enemy ships was very bad and that the recognition of ships by aircraft was completely inadequate. In fact, it was so bad that his flagship had been attacked by U.S. Army Air Corps B-17 bombers. VAdm. Herbert F. Leary, Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC, replied that efforts would be made to improve Army Air Corps ship recognition. When the Air Corps was approached, however, it was found that the subject was so distasteful that the commanding general prohibited further discussion on the grounds that the problem had been exaggerated.

To study possible cooperation between submarines of the Seventh Fleet and aircraft of the Fifth Air Force, RAdm. James Fife, Jr., rode as a passenger on several Air Corps reconnaissance flights during the spring of 1943. In December 1942, he had been successful in persuading the Air Corps to extend its reconnaissance into areas where more targets for submarines might be found. But from his experience as a passenger on extended reconnaissance flights, Fife concluded that the Army pilots were not properly trained in ship identification or in sea reconnaissance. Sending naval observers on the flights was suggested but was not carried out due to a lack of personnel.[7]

The U.S. Navy established numbered operational fleets on 15 March 1943, and the U.S. naval forces in the Southwest Pacific Area were designated the Seventh Fleet. Its Intelligence Officer, Capt. Arthur H. McCollum, had a dual capacity; he acted as advisor to Commander Seventh Fleet (COM7THFLT) on intelligence matters and also served as commander of the semi-independent Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center (SEFIC). The Seventh Fleet Intelligence Division advised on intelligence policy and handled public relations and censorship; SEFIC gathered intelligence for dissemination to organizations needing intelligence sup-

port. Initially, Seventh Fleet headquarters and SEFIC were located at Brisbane, Australia.[8]

The Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center operated from early 1943 to the end of the war. Its staff grew from a few operational intelligence officers to over 200. Approximately sixty officers were ultimately located at Seventh Fleet headquarters to maintain plots, brief the admiral and his staff, process intelligence, and disseminate information to the operating forces. SEFIC also assigned officers and personnel to related intelligence activities in the area, such as the Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit; the Tactical Air Intelligence Unit; the Central Interpretation Unit, which handled photographic intelligence; the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, which processed all prisoners of war and captured documents; and the Army's MIS-X (Military Intelligence Service, Unit X), which was responsible for developing survival intelligence.[9]

SEFIC was organized functionally and was composed of sections to provide intelligence support material for the various types of naval operations, such as air, amphibious, and submarine. Briefings were prepared and given daily to COM7THFLT and COMSWPAC (Gen. MacArthur).

As U.S. forces fought their way up through New Guinea and the Southwest Pacific islands to the Philippines, SEFIC moved from Brisbane to Hollandia to Leyte. It sent an advance party forward to provide the necessary intelligence support to the naval commands and ships involved in the New Guinea operations. SEFIC Unit No. 1, composed of eight officers and two yeomen, was set up at Manus with LCdr. Cecil M. Deason, USNR, as the officer in charge.[10]

By January 1944, officers from SEFIC had been assigned to Cruiser Division Five, Destroyer Division Five, Commander Task Force 71 (submarines), Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, long-range reconnaissance aircraft squadrons, the Fifth Air Force, and Australian Forces. Also, six officers staffed the SEFIC advanced echelon at Port Moresby.

On 1 September 1944, SEFIC moved to Hollandia with the flag, leaving a small rear echelon at Brisbane with the Deputy Commander Seventh Fleet. An advance unit of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section also moved to Hollandia to handle captured material and prisoners.

SEFIC started publishing a *Weekly Bulletin* while it was located at Brisbane. The *Weekly Bulletin* staff later moved to Hollandia with the rest of the SEFIC staff. Distribution of the SEFIC bulletin was made to all Seventh Fleet cruisers, destroyers, motor torpedo boat squadrons, and other assigned units.

After the Battle of Leyte Gulf, SEFICU No. 4 was established at Tacloban on Leyte, and, in January 1945, SEFIC moved from Hollandia to Tolosa on Leyte. Unit No. 2 was with the Tactical Air Intelligence Unit, and Unit No. 3 was composed of Japanese language officers. Later, a Unit No. 5 was set up at Subic Bay, and Unit No. 4 was moved to Clark Field.[11]

Chapter Notes

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2. Capt. Wyman H. Packard, USN (Ret.), "Intelligence and the Navy," *Naval Review 1968* (Annapolis: USNI, 1969), 209–11.

3. Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific (NAVFORSWPAC), *Command History, 1946.*

4. Capt. Henri H. Smith-Hutton, Oral History, USNI, Annapolis, MD, 1979, 1:173, copy in OA.

5. Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) msg 102152Z Mar 1943; and COMSOPAC msg 121415Z Mar 1943.

6. Cdr. James L. Newson ltr to author, 10 Jan 1976. Newson, then a lieutenant (jg), was assigned to the Counterintelligence Unit of the COMSOPAC staff and also had collateral duty as liaison officer with the French colonial government of New Caledonia.

7. *NAVFORSWPAC Command History, 1946*, 48–50.

8. Ibid., 28; and RAdm. Arthur H. McCollum, Oral History, USNI, Annapolis, MD, 1971, 2:510–11, copy in OA.

9. *ONI Review*, Nov 1945, 40.

10. Cdr. Cecil M. Deason, USNR (Ret.), interview by author, 21 Jul 1976. Deason was Prosecuting Attorney, Jefferson County, Alabama, when called to active duty, 31 March 1941. He was assigned to DIO-8ND in New Orleans until June 1943, attended Advanced Naval Intelligence School, New York (Henry Hudson Hotel), and was then sent to Seventh Fleet Intelligence Command (SEFIC), Brisbane.

11. ONI, "OPINTEL Notes," Jul 1945.

CHAPTER 37

Operating Forces, Far East Area

This chapter includes information on the intelligence activities under Commander U.S. Naval Group (COMNAVGRP), China during World War II and Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), and Commander Seventh Fleet (COM7THFLT) after World War II.

Information on Naval Intelligence activities in the Far East is also found in Chapters 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 32, and 40.

Asian area commands not researched for this book include Commander Naval Forces, Philippines and Commander Naval Forces, Japan. A chapter on the Vietnam War should probably also be written, although, except for support to naval operating forces, most of the Navy's intelligence resources in Vietnam were expended in the joint service intelligence centers in Saigon. The Navy was required to provide personnel to those centers primarily so that they would be "joint," not to fulfill any need for persons specifically qualified in naval intelligence.

Naval Group, China

U.S. Naval Group, China was established in early 1942 by Cdr. Milton "Mary" E. Miles, who acted on oral orders from Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) Adm. Ernest J. King to set up a network of weather reporters and coast watchers and to harass the Japanese in China. Cdr. Miles set up his headquarters at Chungking.

Liaison and close collaboration were established with Gen. Tai Li, the Nationalist Chinese intelligence chief, expediting the establishment of a weather observation and coastwatcher net. Initially, the effort was called the Friendship Project, and it was officially designated the SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization) Agreement in April 1943. The U.S. Navy part of the organization was assigned the title U.S. Naval Group, China.

Approximately 2,500 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel were assigned to NAVGRP China. Intelligence officers assigned were of both the S(A) (Special Duty, Aviation) and S(I) (Special Duty, Intelligence) classification; the S(A) officers primarily handled intelligence liaison with the air forces, and the operational intelligence officers supervised the coast watcher nets. NAVGRP China also received intelligence information from the Chinese army intelligence organization and from the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force (14th AF). The Chinese supplied about fifty reports a week, and the Fourteenth Air Force provided photo intelligence reports and daily and weekly summaries on Japanese air, shipping, and related operations.

A daily dispatch was sent by COMNAVGRP China to local commands and to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, and the XX Bomber Command. Fleet Liaison Officers at what later became the Sino-American Cooperative Organization headquarters expedited the dissemination of urgent intelligence information to fleet units operating off the China coast. Such intelligence from a coastwatcher enabled *Barb* (SS 220) to attack a Japanese convoy at night in the Chinese harbor of Namkwan, for which the submarine's commanding officer, Eugene B. Fluckey, later received the Medal of Honor.

An Air Ground Aids Section was established at COMNAVGRP China for escape and evasion assistance to downed airmen. In September 1944, NAVGRP intelligence officers made a survey of coastal areas to obtain data needed for survival assistance. Village officials were given guidance in the recognition of U.S. airmen and in procedures to assist them. Approximately 900 Army Air Force and Navy fliers were rescued in China during the war, representing 90 percent of all airmen bailing out or ditching in Japanese-occupied Chinese territory.

In early 1945, in cooperation with the Commander of the Fourteenth Air Force, Miles established the Anti-Shipping Control Center, which was designed to "obtain, evaluate, and disseminate all

shipping information from all sources in China and direct the air effort against Japanese shipping." NAVGRP China directed Army Air Force mining efforts along the China coast to force Japanese shipping out into the deeper waters where U.S. submarines were operating.[1]

Following Cdr. Miles's arrival in early May 1942, the first contingent of personnel and equipment, consisting of Lt. Daniel W. "Webb" Heagy III, six enlisted radiomen, and six tons of radio equipment, for COMNAVGRP China reached Chungking in September 1942. They were the first members of Naval Group, China to occupy "Happy Valley," a 200-acre site eight miles outside Chungking that was to become the operational and training center for the group.[2]

The second and third contingents arrived in October and November 1942. They included LCdr. Edward Gilfillan, USNR, an explosives expert, chemical and mechanical engineer, and long-distance swimmer; Maj. John Masters, USMC; and Lt. Raymond Kotrla, an aerologist, multilinguist, and expert photographer.[3] Marines of SACO actively trained Chinese troops for guerrilla operations. One such officer, 2dLt. Robert H. Barrow, became the 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps.[4]

On 22 September 1942, Cdr. Miles had been unexpectedly appointed as coordinator of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) activities in the Far East. Because of the complications and uncertainties introduced by such an appointment, Chiang Kai-shek directed Miles and Gen. Tai Li to work up a written agreement to take the place of the oral gentlemen's agreement that had previously been observed. The new formal agreement, which became the SACO Agreement, was to be signed by the highest available authorities of the two countries.[5]

By terms of the agreement, which was initialed by Dr. T. V. Soong on 31 December 1942 (and eventually by President Roosevelt on 1 April 1943), the United States was to train guerrillas, intelligence groups, weather teams, saboteurs, and raiding squads. The United States was also to set up weather and radio stations using American equipment and, for the most part, Chinese personnel. In addition to personnel, the Chinese were to furnish transportation and material facilities in China, including bases of operations, and they would make available the intelligence facilities already established. The director was to be Chinese (Gen. Tai Li), and the deputy director was to be American (then-Capt. Miles), each with veto power over the operations of SACO.[6]

Ultimately, SACO put ten units at widely scattered locations to train Chinese guerrillas in small arms and demolition, intelligence collection, weather reporting, and the use of portable radios for reporting.[7]

On the recommendation of French Army Gen. Henri Giraud, NAVGRP China made contact in Indochina in 1943 with Cdr. Robert Meynier of the French navy. Meynier had recruited and organized a large number of agents in Indochina, and their communications were routed through COMNAVGRP China. Consequently, during the remainder of the war, reports were received from Indochina about shipping and port information, weather, Japanese aircraft, prisoners, and the status of wounded. The Indochinese reporting continued even after Cdr. Meynier was forced out in 1944 by de Gaullist elements.

In early 1944, Miles was promoted to the one-star rank of commodore. Up to that time, he had technically been attached to the U.S. Embassy at Chungking with the title of Naval Observer. The Navy part of SACO was now made a "Group of the U.S. Fleet," operating directly under COMINCH Adm. King in Washington.[8]

The administrative change in its status had no apparent effect on the logistic support problems SACO had to put up with throughout its existence. SACO's quota for supplies to be airlifted over the "Hump" from India was 150 tons per month, an inadequate amount, considering the number of people being supported and their extensive intelligence-gathering and operational support responsibilities.[9]

When Commo. Miles visited Washington in March 1944, Adm. King instructed him to be ready for fleet landings on the Chinese coast, possibly by December 1944. Upon his return to China, Miles spent two weeks personally surveying the coastal situation, selecting sites for coastwatchers, and recruiting pirates to provide assistance. When Miles returned to Kunming from the survey mission, he found Capt. W. L. Painter who Adm. Chester W. Nimitz (CINCPAC) had sent to survey the China coast also. Miles gave Painter all the data and pictures he had just gathered, provided supplies and guerrillas for his protection, and published Painter's report in book form, using SACO's printing plant in Calcutta. The title of the book was *The Painter Expedition*.[10]

Ultimately, SACO had under its control nearly 100,000 guerrillas, more than fifty weather stations, more than sixty coastal units, and numerous other small intelligence-gathering services. Its staff organization as of late 1944 was as follows: S-1 (Personnel), S-2 (Intelligence), S-3 (Operations), S-4 (Supply), S-5 (Communications), S-6 (Radio Intercept), and S-7 (Aerology). SACO's major assets included two radio stations that were capable of working directly with Washington, San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor. The operations officers in Chungking were Cdrs. Walter G. Ebert and I. Joseph Galantin, both submariners.

The commanding officers of Coastal Intelligence Units in China were supplied with four-letter codes for communication with Chungking. Submarines operating in certain areas off the Chinese coast were given the relevant code and ordered to monitor the appropriate frequencies. The submarines did not know the originator of the messages on the special frequency, and the Coastwatcher Unit did not know that fleet units could decode their transmissions. Operational immediate messages in the code usually related to Japanese ship movements and were, of course, of immediate interest to U.S. Navy submarines in the area.[11]

During World War II, naval personnel were trained for naval guerrilla warfare at Fort Pierce, Florida. The trainees were being prepared to train and organize indigenous Asian peoples into naval guerrilla forces. As an example, a SACO unit in the Amoy-Swatow area consisted of about 2,000 Chinese fishermen and coastal pirates, with their native small craft and about 300 U.S. Navy officers and enlisted personnel. The unit was intended to interdict the Japanese seaborne resupply effort by coastal and river mining operations; attack and destroy Japanese shipping by employing armed junks and sabotage operations; occupy and defend coastal islands; establish a network of cells and routes for the removal of Allied personnel from China; establish communications networks for the surveillance and reporting of Japanese shipping; interdict Japanese overland supply routes by raids and sabotaging bridges and transports; and establish meteorological reporting stations in conjunction with U.S. Navy forces in the area.[12]

Aerology was one of the important original reasons for the Navy being in China; weather reports were vital to the fleet in the Pacific, because the weather conditions coming down from the SACO area affected weather conditions in the Pacific and thus fleet operations. Cdr. Irwin T. Beyerly arrived in August 1943 to take charge of SACO's Weather Central. By early 1944, enough equipment had been assembled to form a SACO weather-reporting net. Chinese personnel attended a ten-week course similar to that given for Navy aerographers. Weather observation stations were set up at SACO camps and at General Claire L. Chennault's airfields. SACO's U.S. Navy Weather Central sent four daily broadcasts to the fleet.

SACO personnel assigned to Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force were soon called Navy Unit 14. In May 1944, when Cdr. Charles J. Odend'hal took over as the detachment's first commanding officer, its responsibilities included photo reconnaissance and interpretation, mining, radio intelligence, air combat intelligence, and some ground-to-air target guidance. Besides Kunming, elements of Navy Unit 14 were also located with air groups at Kweilin and at forward airfields.[13]

Odend'hal's group also worked with Technical Air Intelligence (TAI) and helped organize pilot rescue. TAI was a mixed group responsible to Washington and originally attached to the Naval Attaché, Chungking. The organization was later transferred to SACO and roamed the China-Burma theater looking for downed enemy aircraft, shells, mines, and other military equipment. In late 1944, the Navy's TAI was combined with its Army counterpart in China and placed under Army command. The intelligence office of the 14th AF tried to pick up everything brought in or photographed by 14th AF pilots that might be of help either to the fleet or to SACO. In turn, the detachment furnished the 14th AF intelligence with information from SACO's various sources that might prove useful to its operations.[14]

Air combat intelligence (ACI) officers went to all active fronts to collect information on Japanese aviation that would help fleet pilots. The first ACI officers sent to SACO, LCdr. Sam S. Savage and Lt. Henry F. Shoemaker, arrived in February 1944. LCdr. Marvin Plake arrived in May and was later commended for his writing of the "Tactics" section of the 14th AF weekly intelligence summary. Other ACI officers included Lts. Stanley E. McCaffrey, Frank Balsley, George H. Fiske, Alfred H. Driscoll, John A. MacLellan, and Edward Bolger; all became involved in combat operations.

Lt. Fiske was liaison officer with the 68th Composite Wing at Liuchow, where B-24s were flying ocean patrols in response to fleet requests. One of the patrols sighted and reported the Japanese Northern Carrier Force that diverted Adm. Halsey away from San Bernardino Strait at a crucial time during the Leyte landings.[15]

By the summer of 1945, fifteen American SACO officers were working for the Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS). Lt. Richard C. Scott was the first SACO officer to be assigned to the downed pilot rescue effort along the Chinese coast, and, before the end of the war, sixty-seven Army and Navy downed airmen had been rescued in his area around Nanking and Foochow. Lts. Frank Balsley and Stanley McCaffrey were two other SACO officers loaned to AGAS. Balsley helped twenty downed pilots escape from the Hangchow Bay area. During 1945, SACO coast camps picked up about twenty-five fliers who had been recovered by pirate fishermen loyal to Gen. Tai Li.[16]

In October 1945, Lt. Joseph A. Meyertholen, under Miles's direction in Shanghai, worked with a Japanese lieutenant commander to identify and plot Japanese minefields in the Formosa Strait, Shang-

hai approaches, Min River (at Foochow), Amoy Harbor, and Swatow.[17]

The SACO organization was formally disbanded on 30 September 1946 under Joint Chiefs of Staff decision 1290/8, although by that time most of the U.S. personnel had long since returned home. Throughout almost four years of war, SACO lost only three Americans as prisoners to the Japanese.[18]

Post–World War II China

Following World War II, U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific, maintained an intelligence liaison office in Shanghai, China, in order to stay informed on events transpiring within that unsettled country. In 1948, the liaison officer was Cdr. T. W. Joyce. One of Joyce's responsibilities was to develop capabilities to supply timely intelligence information under emergency conditions if the Chinese central government should lose control of the greater Shanghai area. Accordingly, he took steps to develop contacts that could provide essential basic information to his intelligence liaison office under such conditions. This office closed when the Chinese Communist powers gained control of China.[19]

Operational Intelligence Forces During the Korean War

On 1 June 1950, the staff allowance of the Intelligence Section of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, included one officer, Cdr. Arthur F. Johnson, plus one civilian interpreter and one enlisted yeoman. Following the start of the Korean War on 25 June, the allowance for the Intelligence Section was increased, and by 1 November 1950 the personnel allowance had grown to nineteen officers (one captain, one commander, four general-line lieutenant commanders, two aviation lieutenant commanders, four aviation lieutenants, and seven general-line lieutenants). The actual number of officers on board was twenty-three, headed by Capt. Martin R. Stone. Of these, five were on temporary duty in Korea to collect coastal information for fleet surface forces involved in blockading, shore bombardment, minesweeping, and evacuation.

Based on a COMNAVFE Staff Instruction of June 1948 that was still in effect at the start of the Korean War, the Intelligence Section was charged with procuring, evaluating, and disseminating to interested Navy and Army commands technical and current intelligence bearing on naval operations, counterintelligence data, and political and economic intelligence primarily of naval interest. The organization was also instructed to maintain liaison with the Army and Air Force intelligence organizations in the Far East and with the office of the chief counterintelligence officer in the Army's Far East Command. In addition, the COMNAVFE Intelligence Section had responsibility for writing the intelligence sections of COMNAVFE operation plans and operation orders.

During the early months of the Korean War, commands subordinate to Commander Naval Forces, Far East, that had established intelligence sections included Commander Seventh Fleet (two officers); Commander Amphibious Group One (three officers); Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (as of 15 November, eighty-nine officers and enlisted personnel, including a Combat Information Center team of seventeen and a prisoner-of-war interrogation team—both teams having been supplied by the Army); and Commander Blockade and Escort Force (section established in September, with two officers ordered in and due to report about 1 December).[20]

At the beginning of the Korean War, the flow of intelligence to naval forces was seriously hampered by the inadequate personnel in the COMNAVFE Intelligence Section, a breakdown in the normal incoming intelligence channels, and the overloading of communications channels.[21]

Capt. Edwin T. Layton was one of the officers drawn from the Pearl Harbor area at the start of the Korean War to augment COMNAVFE's intelligence staff. He had reported as District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District (DIO-14ND) in Honolulu in June 1950, having just come from duty as the commanding officer of the Naval Intelligence School at Anacostia, D.C. Layton reported to Yokosuka, Japan, on 8 July for temporary duty as COMNAVFE Intelligence Officer. He found four new graduates of the Intelligence School busily working on the Intelligence Annex to COMNAVFE's Operation Plan, an exercise similar to their last school "problem." They worked all day and all night for three or four days to finish the annex, doing a masterful job, for which they received many compliments.

COMNAVFE's original staff was small and not organized for a shooting war. After some delays, an Intelligence Section with thirty personnel billets was approved, but no additional intelligence officers reported for several months. After the Inchon landings (15–29 September), and more than two months of correspondence, Capt. Martin R. Stone relieved Capt. Layton, who was able to return to his regular duties as DIO-14ND, arriving back at Pearl Harbor in October 1950.[22]

On 7 October 1950, VAdm. C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, sent a Special Intelligence Team into Korea to gather data on ports, harbors, the coast, and landing beaches; to photograph anything of intelligence interest; to exploit captured documents and enemy equipment; and to interrogate

prisoners of war. The team was to make their reports to Commander Seventh Fleet, the commanders of Task Forces 90 and 95, Underwater Demolition Teams 1 and 3, Commander Mine Squadron 3, and to United Nations forces participating in the conflict.

The Special Intelligence Team included Officer in Charge Lt. Chester J. Oleniacz, USNR, with Lt. Horace G. Underwood, USNR, as Korean linguist; Capt. Ronald E. H. King, Royal Marines; and Lt.(jg) Raymond Moley, Jr., USNR, as Russian linguist. In performing their tasks, members of the team accompanied armed reconnaissance patrols into unsecured areas to collect mine and coastal defense information of importance to UN minesweeping forces in the Wonsan-Songjin area, contributing to their successful operations along the Korean east coast. While working through the Korean Military Advisory Group with the Eighth Regiment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) army's Capital Division, the Special Intelligence Team contributed to the Koreans' successful operations in the fighting prior to the capture of Myongchon and the crossing of the Orangchoon River. Their tactical interrogation of prisoners supplied on-the-spot information to ROK field commanders and to air-ground control and naval gunfire support teams. The team also checked the heavily booby-trapped buildings, caves, and snow-covered harbor installations in search of critically needed mine information at Chongjin; took photographs of important installations from Kilchu to Chongjin that proved to be of value in later attacks by UN forces against the enemy in that area; and rendered valuable services and provided advice to responsible UN commands and civil authorities during the orderly and successful withdrawal of personnel and material from the Chongjin-Songjin area during the December Communist counteroffensive. Following the withdrawal, the Special Intelligence Team was dissolved on 13 December 1950.[23]

Organized at the end of 1950 as an integral part of the COMNAVFE Intelligence Section, the Shipping Surveillance Center collated, evaluated, and disseminated reports of sightings received through air, surface, subsurface, and radar searches and reports from coast watchers.[24]

At the end of 1951, air, surface, and Marine forces had a relatively adequate number of qualified intelligence personnel. Shortages of photo interpreters, linguists, technical intelligence personnel, and trained enlisted men continued, however. The Air Intelligence Schools and the Photo Interpretation School at Anacostia were not graduating enough trained personnel to meet combat requirements. The shortage was expected to become more acute as reserve officers who had reported at the start of the Korean War were released to inactive duty.[25]

Intelligence in Support of the Taiwan Straits Patrol and Commander Seventh Fleet, 1950–1969

On 4 August 1950, the antiaircraft cruiser *Juneau* (CLAA 119) and two destroyers were ordered to patrol the waters around Taiwan. The group was designated Task Force (TF) 72 on 24 August 1950 and was the initial detachment of a force that eventually became known as the U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force. TF 72 surface units were supported by aviation patrol units, and, in due course, Commander Fleet Air Wing One was double-hatted as Commander Task Force 72.

On 7 March 1953, RAdm. Thomas B. Williamson hoisted his flag on the seaplane tender *Pine Island* (AV 12) as the first Commander Formosa Patrol Force, under the operational control of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (the title was changed to Taiwan Patrol Force on 1 November 1955, in deference to the Chinese Nationalists' use of the name "Taiwan" for the island). The purpose of the force was to conduct reconnaissance to detect enemy forces capable of invading Taiwan and to assist in training the Chinese Nationalist Navy.

On 11 December 1953, VAdm. Alfred M. Pride was designated Commander Formosa (later Taiwan) Defense Command, a unified command under CINCPAC. The Commander Formosa/Taiwan Patrol Force was the Navy component of the Commander Taiwan Defense Command.[26]

Total control of air and sea areas around Korea made it possible for UN naval forces to use relatively few ships on patrol and blockade duties, to operate major ships with a minimum of escorts because of the negligible submarine threat, and to use only token air cover. That freed the Seventh Fleet for maximum offensive operations in support of UN ground and air forces in Korea, but it also put a crucial demand on intelligence to detect immediately any change in the air, surface and subsurface threat to the fleet.[27]

As of early 1952, intelligence information received from the extensive collection agencies in the Far East and carefully evaluated through the coordinated efforts of the intelligence sections, ashore and afloat, provided adequate intelligence for conducting current operations. Commander Seventh Fleet believed that sufficient reliable information was being supplied to determine with reasonable accuracy the current disposition of North Korea's military forces and their condition of readiness. Due to the short distances involved and the known concentration of enemy air strength along the Antung border, however, it was recognized that early